Trident: Cost (Hansard, 17 December 1984)

§ Lord Bruce-Gardyne
My Lords I beg leave to ask the Question standing in my name on the Order Paper.

§ Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for the Armed Forces (Lord Trefgarne)
My Lords, the Trident estimate is currently being reviewed as part of the annual recosting of the defence programme. My right honourable friend the Secretary of State for Defence hopes to be able to announce a revised estimate early in the New Year.

§ Lord Bruce-Gardyne
My Lords, I am most grateful to my noble friend for that reply. Would he not agree that it is already apparent that that estimate is likely to be at least double the original cost? Is it not by now apparent that the original assurance that it would have no impact in squeezing the other programmes in the defence budget which we were given when this expensive purchase was embarked on, is no longer sustainable? Is it not therefore desirable that we should review this purchase at the earliest possible date?

§ Lord Trefgarne
My Lords, no. I am afraid that I disagree with my noble friend on all three counts.

§ Lord Grimond
My Lords, may I ask the Minister whether he would not agree that the constantly escalating costs of this weapon will distort the whole defence budget? Would he agree—I am sure he would—that there is no doubt that the cost estimates are going to be about double what they were originally, and that this is bound to mean cuts in conventional arms and other much more essential parts of our defence programme?

§ Lord Trefgarne
My Lords, no, I am afraid that the noble Lord is not correct. The total cost of this project is still estimated to be around 3 per cent. of the defence budget as a whole over the period of its acquisition. This amounts to about 6 per cent. of the procurement budget during the same time. Of course this is a comparatively small proportion of our total defence expenditure.

§ Lord Boyd-Carpenter
My Lords, does not the comparatively small proportion of the cost out of the total defence budget contribute, on the other hand, a major factor for maintaining the peace of the world?

§ Lord Trefgarne
Indeed it does, my Lords. If we were not to embark upon this programme we would, some time early in the 1990s, be out of the independent nuclear deterrent business altogether.

§ Lord Stoddart of Swindon
My Lords, is the noble Minister not being rather shy about this matter? We have heard and seen estimates of the costs at a figure of about £10,000 million. The running costs of the system have to be added to that figure. Surely that must detract from the conventional defence budget. Would it not be much more sensible for this country to concentrate its defence effort on the Navy and the Royal Air Force? Perhaps the noble Minister would comment on newspaper reports this morning that, due to lack of funds, the Air Force is going to cut down on pilot training.

§ Lord Trefgarne
My Lords, the equivalent in conventional terms of the cost of the Trident programme is four or five mechanised divisions. Having regard to the fact that the Soviets already have a preponderance of I think 60 or 70 mechanised divisions on the central front, that is not likely to make much difference.

§ Lord Kennet
My Lords, would the noble Lord not agree that all defence procurement programmes have cost overruns, and that those which are at the frontiers of technology at any given time always have very large cost overruns, often amounting to double and sometimes more? Would he not agree that it is about time this Government, like their predecessors, devised a system of costings which would eliminate those unexpected overruns? Above all, would he now begin to pay attention to the continuous warnings which have been uttered from these Benches over the past three years that the original costings given for Trident were totally unrealistic?

§ Lord Trefgarne
My Lords, may I invite noble Lords to await the publication of the new estimate of costs early next year? I do not think it will be anything like some of the absurd figures that I have seen in the press recently. In any event, as I was saying in answer to my noble friend, it does represent very good value for money for deterrent purposes.

§ Viscount Trenchard
My Lords, would my noble friend agree that previous Ministers at the Ministry of Defence made a major mistake in quoting as one figure an amount for a 15 or 18 year programme to keep our independent nuclear deterrent up to date? Even then it is substantially less than the cost of the Tornado. Would my noble friend further agree that our record in building submarines—half the cost of the project—has been good: they have come through at estimate on all recent occasions. Would he further agree that the U.S. cost of building missiles of this nature has also in the past come through at estimate? Would he further confirm—

Noble Lords
No!

§ Viscount Trenchard
Would he further confirm that the agreement has fixed, as a fixed sum in dollars, the R and D expenditure? Would he finally confirm—

Noble Lords
No!

§ Viscount Trenchard
Would he finally confirm that the French spend some four times what we do on maintaining an independent nuclear deterrent?

§ Lord Trefgarne
My Lords, I am afraid that I lost track of some of those supplementaries. But my noble friend does underline some of the important advantages of this programme, speaking as he does from an important position of experience in these matters.

§ Lord Beswick
My Lords, does not the noble Lord agree that a country that spends this amount of money on an independent nuclear deterrent that can never be used independently but that has nevertheless to cut down proper flying practice for its service pilots does not cut a very good figure in international affairs?

§ Lord Trefgarne
My Lords, the noble Lord starts from a mistaken premise. This is an independent nuclear deterrent and can indeed, if circumstances so demand, be used independently.

§ Lord Molloy
My Lords, while the noble Lord has always been generous about providing detailed information on the astronomical costs of the mighty weight of nuclear weapons that we are endeavouring to harbour unto ourselves, does he not agree that it is disturbing that, at the conclusion of his remarks, after giving all this information about what is being spent, he says the the reason for it is that the Russians have a 60 to 1 preponderance over us? Will he therefore inform the House what the Government think will encourage the Russians to start a war so that we shall not catch up with them before the position is 30 to 1 or 40 to 1 in the USSR's favour?

§ Lord Trefgarne
My Lords, the answer to the noble Lord is that the purpose of our independent deterrent and, indeed, of the deterrent posture of the alliance as a whole is to enable us to ensure that if, and only if, the Soviets or any other potential adversary should seek to attack us, we are in a position to respond in a way that they would find unacceptable.

§ Lord Carver
My Lords, would the noble Lord not agree that there is a general consensus within NATO now that the first priority for NATO is to improve its conventional capability? Would he not therefore agree that, rather than spend 3 per cent. on this superfluous weapons system, he should maintain the 3 per cent. increase in real terms which the Government, I understand, propose to cease to spend from 1986?

§ Lord Trefgarne
My Lords, I certainly agree that we should do what we can to improve our conventional forces' posture but not at the expense of our nuclear forces.

§ Lord Bruce-Gardyne
My Lords, having listened carefully to my noble friend's replies, would he not agree that in two respects at least the equations have changed since the sums were originally announced? First, as the noble Lord, Lord Carver, has pointed out, is it not a fact that we have abandoned, in my view 430 quite rightly, the open-ended commitment to a 3 per cent. real increase in defence expenditure since these commitments were entered into? Secondly, is it not apparent that the offset in terms of manufacturing to be done and orders to be won in this country has been substantially reduced as a proportion of the total Trident expenditure?

§ Lord Trefgarne
My Lords, in answer to the last part of my noble friend's question, no, I am afraid that the correct position is not as my noble friend describes it. The "offset", as my noble friend refers to it, will be, and was always intended to be, the result of a competitive process. It is up to British firms to compete effectively with their American competitors. But it is, of course, necessary that they should be given the chance to do that. And that is what we have arranged.