Cruise Missiles

HL Deb 15 November 1983 vol 444 cc1251-74

10.27 p.m.

Lord Jenkins of Putney

My Lords, I beg to leave to ask the Question standing in my name on the Order Paper. If I may, I shall refresh your Lordships; memories of the Question by reading it. It is:

"To ask Her Majesty's Government whether, as an opinion poll has shown that 94 per cent. of the British population want dual key control of cruise missiles, they will hold up deployment until such an agreement is reached".

I begin by saying how much I deplore the treatment which is reported to have been meted out to the right honourable gentleman the Secretary of State for Defence this evening. It is essential on these questions of peace and war, of armament and disarmament, that those of us who believe that the Government are not on the right path should endeavour to penetrate and to secure the minds and hearts of members of the Conservative Party. To offer the kind of treatment which it is reported has been given tonight to a member of the Government is no way to achieve that end. I hope that we shall have no more of it.

I suppose that the young people who have been referred to in the previous debate might take the view that we in this House have our priorities upside down. I calculate that there were 28 speakers in the previous debate, which referred to serious problems of violence against the individual. There are seven speakers on this later debate, which raises the question of violence against humanity as a whole, not least violence against the whole of the people of our country. I think the young people to whom my noble friend on the Front Bench referred as having this issue very much on their minds might say that perhaps it ought to have been the other way round.

In 1941 flying control people in the Royal Air Force told a rather macabre story among themselves which some of your Lordships may not have heard. It was said to have been based on fact. I am glad to see that the most reverend Primate has not left us, because the story has a termination which I think may commend itself to him. A bomber was returning home badly shot up. It had tried to jettison its bombs, but they were stuck in the bomb bay. The aircraft was circling its base, almost out of fuel. The pilot with increasing urgency asked for instructions, for the undercarriage would not come down and a pancake landing was inevitable. It was clear that on landing the aircraft would almost certainly explode, destroying not only itself and its crew but perhaps other aircraft and the ground staff on the station, including probably the flying control tower and its staff. The pilot desperately again asked for landing instructions.

After a long pause, the flying control officer spoke. I shall use ordinary English and not the radio telephone jargon of the time. "Hello, Zero One," he said, "This is flying control. Here are your instructions. Repeat after me. Repeat after me: 'Our Father which art in heaven, Hallowed be thy name". It seems that this is the position the Government have got the entire nation into. The people of this country, irrespective of party, have become powerfully aware of their peril. That is why I am asking the Government to act in accordance with the Question which I have put down tonight.

It is easy to see how, stage by stage, operational control was lost to the Government of this country. American aircraft flew from here under their own command during the last war and we were glad of it. From that, through the Berlin airlift, to nuclear weapons was an easy transition—and there is no Government distinction in this slippage—especially when United States Polaris submarines moved in and out of Scotland, again under American command.

In 1954 when I helped form the Anti-Hydrogen Bomb Campaign Committee—a precursor of the Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament—it was already clear that the situation was getting out of hand. In the days of conventional war, political control may have been enough. There was time. But land-based nuclear weapons are a different kettle of fish altogether. With cruise missiles, the operator who releases the weapon holds in his hand the fate of nations—perhaps of the world. It is absurd, and perhaps even deceptive, of the Government to rely on old agreements and to argue that because the Americans operated under their own command in the past we do not need to have absolute operational control over the cruise missile.

The final release of cruise is carried out by two men. Under present plans both will be—indeed are—American and under sole United States command. I believe that the British people, 94 per cent. of them, have perceived this, and I hope that the Government will listen to insistence that this must be changed. In detail, I say that the senior commander at each cruise station must be British and that one of the two men who actually fire the weapon must be an RAF man under his command. Cruise cannot be fired without both men acting simultaneously. Of course the RAF personnel on each station would be under the direct control of the Prime Minister

I would add that the emergency action message—the EAM, as it is called—which is in code, should be it two parts, one of which should be known only to the British Prime Minister and not to the President of the United States or to any other person. Only in this way is it possible for this country all down the line, at political, command and operational points, to be in control of its own fate. Under pressures of war there may be an honest disagreement. Since I have personal knowledge of working with other nations under pressures of war, in particular with the United States Army Air Force, I can say that under these pressures commanders act in accordance with their conception of what is their own national interest, and no other consideration whatsoever. Therefore, the notion that there can be effective political control in such an emergency is entirely erroneous. There must be total control right down the line if we are going to be in charge of our own fate.

I would add that the technical imperfections of cruise are really alarming. They are an additional hazard to which insufficient attention has been given. The manufacturing quality control of General Dynamics, the manufacturers, has been very heavily criticised in the United States, not least in Congress. The software has been insufficiently tested, in particular the software for the launch control mechanism. The in-service reliability of the sophisticated electronic and mechanical equipment is in doubt. The competence and training of the maintenance personnel and of the operators has also been criticised in the United States. In addition, there are known faults in the operational characteristics of the weapon itself. There are performance deficiencies in its guidance package and its terrain-following abilities.

I would commend to your Lordships who are concerned with these matters a little booklet entitled, The Ground Launched Cruise Missile—A Technical Assessment, which is published by Electronics for Peace. A copy of the booklet is obtainable in the Library.

This adds up to an alarming situation, and I think it right that the people of this country should demonstrate their alarm, irrespective of their political views, as they have done in the recent poll. Consider the enormous tests to which Concorde, a peaceful aircraft, was put before it was allowed to operate within the United States; the tremendous care which the Americans took to make sure that this aircraft was not going to be deleterious or disadvantageous to them in any way.

Compare that with the fact that the British Government have not carried out a single test of their own on this weapon—not one! They have accepted, lock, stock and barrel, the assurances given to them by the American Government. This is a rushed job. The decision to get cruise in here was a political decision as a result of which we have a weapon which is not only intrinsically dangerous, but which is even more dangerous because of the imperfections which have not been ironed out, which have not been properly tested, and which have not been tested at all by representatives of the Government; and the people who would be the sufferers in the event of anything going wrong.

As the pamphlet sums it up—and this is supported by American specialists on the subject to whom I have spoken—the Government would he offering, hospitality to an untested, unreliable, bug-ridden system that could turn out to he fatal to its hosts". That sums it up. No wonder that 94 per cent. of the people of this country want dual control over this bug-ridden system. No wonder that 96 per cent. of the Conservative voters want dual control.

I am not going to say that the establishment of dual control of this weapon right down the line is the ideal solution. I should prefer to he without cruise altogether, and without other nuclear weapons altogether. But if we arc to have cruise—and it seems that it is too late to stop them coming—then this is the minimum basis on which they should be allowed to stay.

The Government's refusal to insist on joint operational or dual key control leads them into much worse absurdities. I have a firm assurance from what I used to regard as the Government newspaper, the Sun—I do not know whether it still enjoys that favoured position—that the lunatic idea that the RAF regiment should shoot Americans who propose to deploy or to fire cruise against our will has actually been uttered by Government authority. If that is not the case and this has not been said by a Government spokesman, the noble Lord, the Minister, in replying to the Question, will no doubt refute it. But I have received that assurance. If that, as the Government spokesman is alleged to have said, is our dual key—that, in an emergency, instead of exercising control before the event, we shall try to shoot down our allies after the event—it illustrates the utter madness into which the Government appear to have descended. I heard Air Vice-Marshal Menaul utter something pretty close to it on television last week. So there may be substance behind this completely crazy idea.

What is needed is the means to prevent the missiles being fired in the event of a disagreement between ourselves and the Americans. It is no substitute to hand over operational control to the Americans and then to say that you will shoot them if they exercise it against your will. The Government seem to want to threaten to shoot everyone. What sort of statesmanship is this? I fear that the Greenham Common heroines are much more likely to be shot than American servicemen.

I beg the Government to think again even at this eleventh hour. If they will not, then, in spite of all their protestations, what they will really be saying to our entire people is simply, "Here are your instructions. Repeat after us, 'Our Father which art in Heaven'." But we shall not get to the end of the prayer, because the end of our world will have come.

10.42 p.m.

Lord Kennet

My Lords, may I first echo what the noble Lord, Lord Jenkins, said about what happened to the Secretary of State for Defence last evening. We share his regret and detestation for such action, which has no part in our way of discourse. So many times since 1979 the House has taken up the question of dual key on the cruise missiles. Among all the others, the Social Democrats and Liberals and most recently Labour people who have taken it up, I rise now for the 14th time since then.

Public opinion, which was 92 per cent. with us in May this year, is now 94 per cent. with us. It is clearly not a flash in the pan to rise beyond 92 per cent., even six months later. It is a rare phenomenon, indeed. We, in the Alliance, owe a special debt to Lord Jenkins. He has once again, from his unilateralist position, joined us in the Alliance in hammering home this one limited point about the physical dual key for cruise. I wish that his party in the Commons last week had done the same. In that debate, the Alliance put forward an amendment which was largely devoted to just this point about dual key. The Labour Party abstained in the vote on that amendment. Nor did the Labour Party feel able to risk its own fragile unity by committing to paper any amendment whatever. It limited itself to a totally negative attitude. It abstained on the Alliance amendment and voted against the Government Motion.

That is not our position. We do not, in the Alliance, necessarily resist the operational deployment of the cruise missiles. That remains to be decided at the last moment when it sensibly can be decided by an Opposition party.

We do demand dual key. I submit that the Government must now recognise that it is not just the CND, the Labour Party and the Alliance who demand dual key; it is not just the people who voted for the Opposition parties at the election—54 per cent. It is also a very large proportion of the 43 per cent. who voted for the Government.

The Government have adopted SDP language in talking about "one-sided disarmament" rather than "unilateral disarmament", to make the situation clearer to people. Presumably the Government understood what we meant when we warned the Labour Party that the British people would not accept one-sided disarmament. Will the Government now perhaps listen to the warnings we have been giving to them for four years about the dual key?

Let me rehearse the argument. Once upon a time there were American nuclear-armed bombers in Britain which were governed by a written agreement, which was secret, and there was no dual key. Then the question arose of American-made nuclear missiles being deployed on British soil. That wise Prime Minister, Mr. Macmillan, perceived in 1958 that this was something quite different and that there had to be a dual key. Why, my Lords? As we all know, a bomber can be recalled: a missile cannot be recalled. It is as simple as that.

Later came the nuclear-armed submarines—first American and then British. There was no dual key for the very simple reason that a submarine can be recalled, but a missile cannot be recalled. It is as simple as that. Moreover, a bomb is dropped from the air: a nuclear submarine launches its missiles from the sea, generally the high seas. What could be more different than that, on the one hand, and the soil of a nation—British soil—on the other hand?

However, for about 25 years there have been American-made nuclear missiles in the hands of the British Army in Germany. All the time for about 25 years those missiles, the Lance and Pershing I missiles, have been under physical dual key. Why, my Lords? It is because they are missiles launched from land. Of course, Macmillan was right; the British people saw it and did not protest. Of course, the Government are now wrong; the British people can see it and are protesting.

The Government are also putting up a number of specious arguments against the possibility or desirability of having a physical dual key. The first is that we should have to purchase the entire American-made cruise system if we are to get a physical dual key arrangement. That, of course, is not true. The physical dual key arrangement could be put on existing missiles, without our purchasing them, by agreement with the United States. An arrangement could be made. Whether it is quite as simple as the noble Lord, Lord Jenkins, said, I do not know—it is classified—but I expect that it is. However, if it is not it will not be much more complicated than the noble Lord described. It may well be that the United States would refuse this arrangement. But I have been told in answer to Questions in this House that a simple request for a physical dual key, without purchase, has not been put to the United States. I submit that it is the Government's duty to put that request. Indeed, it has been the Government's duty to put it for four years past.

Mr. Heseltine's newest argument is that if we were to request a simple dual key without purchase the United States would ask for the same as regards our Trident boats when they become operational. He has advanced this argument at great length with increasing certainty over recent weeks.

The discussion here goes rather near the heart of deterrence theory, and I only hope that I am able to express clearly what I have to say. I hope, too, that the following part of my speech will be heard carefully and perhaps even read carefully in Hansard later.

The Secretary of State for Defence will not accept that there is a distinction between a missile launched from a United States submarine based in British waters and an American cruise missile launched from British soil. This means that he denies the distinction between, on the one hand, British soil and, on the other hand, the high seas and international air space. If he really does deny that distinction, he is, of course, clearly unfit for his job. I do not believe that he is unfit for his job. and I do not believe that his denial of that distinction is sincere.

But Mr. Heseltine might answer—indeed, I think he has answered—that the Soviet Union has said that the launching of a United States-built missile, whoever it belongs to and wherever it is launched from, will bring Soviet retaliation on the United States as well, of course, as on the country which launched it. Either Mr. Heseltine does not believe this statement or he does. If he does not believe this Soviet statement, it is no doubt because he, like many others, cannot really believe that the Russians would be such idiots as to do it. It would be because he shares the opinion of most sensible people that that is a declaratory statement for deterrence purposes, but not an operational binding one. In that case, if he does not believe it, the distinction for this purpose between British soil on the one hand, and the high seas and international air space on the other hand, becomes even clearer.

If, though, the Secretary of State does not believe in the truth of this Soviet statement, there is no need for the cruise deployment at all, as a British-owned Polaris missile fired at a Soviet desert will ensure retaliation on the United States, and would have done so at any time in the last 15 years, if we were idiotic enough to want that.

It is supposed that the cruise deployment was desired by the Western leaders to avoid the "decoupling", so-called, of the United States and Western Europe. It is said that it was requested by Western European statesmen, and the commonly accepted locus classicus for that request is Helmut Schmidt's 1977 lecture at the Institute of Strategic Studies in London. That lecture is falsely quoted. It contains no such request and no suggestion of any such request. So we do not know who made the request, if anybody. To avoid decoupling one would have thought that the presence of tens of thousands of American troops on European soil would be enough.

I return now to the question of the United States dual key on our Trident—the question which Mr. Heseltine introduced two or three weeks ago. If the translation of Mrs. Thatcher's "categoric" veto (which she maintains we have on the launch of the cruise missiles) into a physical dual key means that the United States will demand a countervailing dual key on the launch of our Trident missiles when we have bought them, does not that imply that we have already agreed that the United States will have a categoric veto over their firing, equivalent to that which the Prime Minister claims we have over the U.S. cruise missiles? If not, where is the analogy? Where is the symmetry? Why does Mr. Heseltine introduce the argument? If the United States were to ask us for a dual key on our Trident missiles, would we say that they would have to buy the whole force?—not only to buy back their own missiles, but also to buy what we had made: the boats, the warheads, the command, control and communications systems? The argument becomes nonsense at this point.

One large area on which I have repeatedly put questions remains uncovered—the questions have remained unanswered. The Government rely on undertakings given by the United States that they will not fire these cruise missiles without our consent. All right, but who is the United States? The President of the United States has the right in United States law to devolve the function of firing nuclear missiles down the line of military command from himself as commander-in-chief. I have repeatedly asked the Government how far they have agreed he could devolve it in the case of cruise missiles on our territory. I have had no answer.

The United States constitution also foresees that if the President and the Vice-President of the United States are dead, or out of action, or cannot be found, the function of the Presidency shall fall upon the Speaker of the House of Representatives, Mr. Tip O'Neill, whom we know in the Irish context. Again I have repeatedly asked the Government whether they know, and if so whether they agree, that the responsibility for firing these missiles on which there is no dual key might fall upon such a person, whether I have understood it correctly, and if not on whom it would fall.

I come back to the beginning. The people say, according to the poll—and we have no reason to doubt it—that by 94 per cent. they want a physical dual key. Why do the Government insist on aligning themselves with the 6 per cent? Who are this 6 per cent. of the British people? Are they not precisely that strand of opinion which surfaced last week in the House of Commons when a few Conservative Members signed an advertisement in the New York Times actually apologising to President Reagan for our Government's criticism of his action in Grenada, and also for our "diplomatic errors"? Are they not the "United States right or wrong" brigade? Why should the Government wish to align themselves with that brigade, above all now that the Prime Minister and the Foreign Secretary have at last distanced themselves a little from the policy which many people thought until recently was veering too much towards "the United States right or wrong"?

Why are the Government unable to go with the huge majority of the people? Is it because that majority is saying what the Alliance has said since it came into existence in 1981? I cannot believe it. That would be laughable, if it were not so important. Or is it that there is some fact, some reason, some argument which the Government have not yet told us about? No fact, or reason, or argument which has been advanced has yet been sufficient. The British people are saying, "Macmillan was right and the present Government are wrong". Now let the Government, however belatedly, lead a united country in the right direction, which is the direction that that country desires.

10.58 p.m.

The Earl of Kimberley

My Lords, I am sure that the whole House is grateful to the noble Lord, Lord Jenkins, for his Question tonight, because possibly the air may get cleared a little before the end of the Question, and perhaps quite a number of erroneous impressions which have been circulating not just in this House but throughout the whole of the United Kingdom may get cleared. Much as I thought that the noble Lord's argument was extremely good, I am afraid that I do not agree with very much of what he said. However, I was extremely pleased that both noble Lords deplored what had happened to my right honourable friend the Secretary of State in Manchester today.

I maintain that the real purpose of Lord Jenkins's Question tonight is to provide a smokescreen so that the cruise missiles which have arrived and will arrive here, will never be deployed, because I think that that has always been at the back of the noble Lord's mind. He has always preached unilateralism, and he is fully entitled to his thoughts on that. But I find it strange when a newspaper such as the Daily Mirror—which, on the whole, has been a fairly good supporter of the Labour Party for many years—says in its editorial today that the United Kingdom will be no more of a target since cruise missiles are here than it was before they arrived. It also went on in the same leader to say that having a few cruise missiles here was nothing like as dangerous as disarming the West and relying on the Soviet Union's good faith.

I want to give one example of the Soviet Union's good faith. In the strategic arms limitations talks in the 1970s it was agreed that both super powers should have a rough parity of intercontinental ballistic missiles; an ICBM is one that has a range of 5,500 kilometres or more. But at the time the Soviet Union had considerably more than the United States. So what did they do? They dismantled a large number of what was their SS.16, which was a three-stage rocket, and they removed one stage, which meant it would travel only 5,000 kilometres and therefore was not an ICBM. That missile is today's SS.20. If that is not getting round a treaty, I do not know what is.

I do not really want to bring in personalities, but I think I would be wrong if I did not speak in your Lordships' House because I have said these sort of things before. I think that the peroration of the general secretary of CND, Monsignor Kent, to the Communist Party of Great Britain last Sunday left more than a lotto be desired. But I think it is more unfortunate for the CND because it at last shows where its loyalties lie, in spite of his many years of insistence that he has had no affiliation or connections with the Communist Party. One can read what one likes out of it and interpret it the way one wants.

I think we are lucky that the Monsignor's outburst and the first missiles arrived here more or less simultaneously, for it must be a bitter blow to the Soviets, who have striven by every means possible to prevent the arrival of these missiles. The Soviets may walk out of Geneva, but they will walk back again, because even they do not care to lose face. If they do not come back it shows that everything they have ever said before about disarmament is absolutely and utterly useless.

But, to revert to the Unstarred Question of the noble Lord, Lord Jenkins of Putney, dual key has been rammed down our throats by CND ever since CND realised it could not stop the missiles arriving. So it became CND's second line of defence. The leaders of CND have tried to mislead and misinform the general public. We have a perfectly good agreement between the President of the United States and the Prime Minister of this country. It has worked happily for many years and I am sure it will more than outlive my lifetime and the lifetimes of many younger noble Lords in this House.

But let us analyse what is trying to be done against us. The main objective of the unilateralists has been to dissociate the West—and the noble Lord, Lord Jenkins, mentioned this—by splitting the United States away from Europe. I repeat this objective. It would be absolutely and utterly disastrous for NATO and it does not need a crystal ball for us all to know that the other element that would like to destroy NATO is the Soviet Union.

However, I also maintain that CND may only be a small part of the British public, though it is indeed vociferous. However, it is also very canny because it is now trying yet a third ploy. It is advocating civil disobedience and it has even made efforts to try to subvert the British soldier. How can it be that in the dual track position of 1979 it was many Socialist Governments that asked NATO to update the intermediate nuclear force? Why is it that what was so good for the Socialists when in government is no good for them now that they are in opposition? I hope that my noble friend when he winds up will categorically state that deployment will not be held up unless and until such time as the Soviet Union gets down to serious arms reduction talks.

Lord Jenkins of Putney

My Lords, may I point out to the noble Earl that, in his tireless advocacy of the cause of peace, Monsignor Bruce Kent has talked to Conservatives, to the CBI, to the TUC, to the SDP, to the Liberal Party, as well as to the Communist Party? I do not know why that particular speech should have picked up so much prominence.

The Earl of Kimberley

My Lords, if I may say one word to the noble Lord, to whom I gladly give way, not very long ago I went to one of Monsignor Bruce Kent's talks. He spoke for 45 minutes and he spoke remarkably well. In those 45 minutes, he laid at the feet of everybody in that room—about 100 people—that everything that had gone wrong in the world since 1945 was the fault of Great Britain and America and was nothing to do with Russia.

11.7 p.m.

Lord Brockway

My Lords, I believe in the spirit of debate, one speech answering another. But I think that the noble Earl, Lord Kimberley, will find that what I say will be in comment on much of what he has said. I have said this before but it needs to be said again and again. The Government have no mandate for deploying cruise missiles in this country. In the defence debate I gave the figures of those who had voted for the Government and of those who had voted for parties which were against the introduction of the cruise missiles. Those figures showed that there was a majority of 111,365 for parties which were opposed to the introduction of the cruise missiles. I admit that many vote on other issues; but I say to the Government that that result indicates that opinion in this country is almost equally divided upon the installation of the cruise missiles.

I suggest to the Government that it is utterly irresponsible, when national unity is required on an issue of peace and war, to proceed with their policy when half the electorate have voted for parties opposed to the introduction of the cruise missile. If I may say so, the noble Lord, Lord Trefgarne, made no convincing answer to that argument. He said that he was unable to comment upon my arithmetic. I obtained my figures from the Library of this House. He has had the opportunity since that debate to check those figures. I asked him if he has found any inaccuracy in them. His only answer was that the composition of another place showed that the Government had a mandate. But, under our present electoral system, the Government represents only one-third of the votes of the electorate. I suggest that a far more reliable indication of opinion in this country is the actual votes cast by the electorate.

I am the co-chairman of the World Disarmament Campaign in this country. It is a multilateral organisation in its aims. Therefore, before we declared against the introduction of the cruise missile in this country we took the opinion of the Soviet Government as to what its response would be. It indicated that, if the cruise missile was adopted in this country and the Pershing II in Europe, inevitably it would have to increase its forces. But the Soviet Peace Committee, which is only permitted to advocate policies of the Soviet Government, replied that the Russian response to failing to introduce the cruise missile and the Pershing II would be as follows.

It would reduce its missiles to the level of the British and French missiles, including the SS.20. It was prepared to negotiate with the United Kingdom and France mutual reductions of the remaining missiles. It was prepared to accept a nuclear freeze which would mean no more nuclear weapons and no more deployment of them. It said that it would undertake no first strike with nuclear weapons. It also said that it was prepared to accept the absence of all nuclear weapons in Europe, from the Atlantic to the Urals, and was prepared to destroy the SS.20s and not merely to withdraw them from the other side of the Urals.

I suggest that the Russians should be put to the test when they say that they are prepared to do those things. It is often urged from the other side of the House that they are insincere in their proposals. If that is the case, if the Government feel that it is bluff, let the Government call the bluff If the Government are sincere in their proposals for multilateral disarmament, let them put the Russians to the test when they advocate those things.

The danger is that the introduction of the cruise missile here and the Pershing II in Europe will result in the escalation of Russian arms. We have urged the Russians to he restrained in their response and I think it probable that, while they may withdraw temporarily from the talks with the United States of America, they will resume those talks in the early future.

I acknowledge that I have little faith in dual control. The statement has been made that the Americans will not use the cruise missiles without the consent of the Prime Minister. But a Prime Minister in this country is only temporary. It may easily be the case that after the next election there will be a Labour Government with a Labour Prime Minister, and the response of that Prime Minister would be very different from that of the present Prime Minister.

In addition, I do not believe, in the circumstances of a nuclear war, that the American Government would pay much attention to the opinion of the people of this country. Once the bombs began to fall, the very security of both America and the Soviet Union would be at stake. In that situation the Americans would inevitably use whatever power they had stationed in this country. Therefore, I urge very strongly that the only solution to this problem is the withdrawal of the cruise missiles from this country. People all over the world are now beginning to realise that they cannot live with the nuclear weapon. If the nuclear weapon remains in the world, mankind itself might be destroyed. I believe that this conviction is spreading throughout the world so strongly, that within five years the peace movement of the world may sweep like a wave over Governments which have been installing the nuclear weapon and it will be decided not merely that nuclear weapons must be ended but that we must make a beginning in world disarmament.

11.17 p.m.

Lord Mayhew

My Lords, my noble friend Lord Kennet set out very clearly and persuasively the case for dual key. As he said, in the House of Commons a few weeks ago this was the central feature of a comprehensive amendment covering the problem of cruise missiles which was put forward by the Alliance and supported by all the Alliance Members of Parliament, though unfortunately not supported by the Labour Party. However, one of the dangers of discussing the dual key as intensively as we have in this debate is that we may lose sight of what is the bigger objective of us all: to create the conditions in which the deployment of these missiles, either the deployment of the first flight of missiles which have arrived or the deployment of the later flights which will arrive as the months go by, is no longer necessary.

I am haunted not only by the belief that the British Government could have created the conditions in which we did not have to deploy the cruise missiles but also by the belief that they still have the opportunity, if they have the courage and independence to take it, to solve this problem in the way that we all, on both sides of the House, want to see it solved; namely, by agreement between the United States and the Soviet Union which would make the deployment of the missiles unnecessary.

I was greatly struck by the final words of the noble Earl, Lord Kimberley. He said, "We will deploy until the Russians start to negotiate seriously". But I would put it to him that a careful, objective study of the way the negotiations have gone over the last two years does not justify the comment implied in his statement, that whereas the United States has negotiated seriously the Soviet Union has not negotiated seriously. I would beg him to consider this carefully and in detail. We all remember that when the negotiations began two years ago they began with the United States' proposal of the zero option. At the time I believe everyone felt that this was an optimistic first negotiating bid. It laid on the Russians the duty to scrap all their SS.20s, and it laid on the Americans the duty merely to do nothing.

As I say, I think everybody realised that this was an opening, hopeful negotiating bid. Even so, I would say that the Russians might have been wise to accept it. After all, it would have given them their priority objective—which is to prevent the deployment of cruise and Pershing. And although it would have lost them all their SS.20s, they can easily devastate Western Europe several times over with the missiles they could already have. They would have been wise, probably, to have accepted it.

However, as we know, they rejected it and negotiations began. I draw the attention of the noble Earl, Lord Kimberley, to this fact: the United States have made no concessions whatever in those two years. The one significant move they made was to rejig the zero option saying, in effect, to the Russians, "If you will not accept equality on the basis of zero—with no Pershings, no cruise and no SS.20s, we offer you equality at some other level"; 420 warheads is the latest offer.

But something which no one has ever tried to explain, and which cannot be explained, is why, if the Russians reject the zero option, this rejigged option is more favourable to them or less favourable to the United States than the zero option. In the last debate, the noble Lord the Minister threw out this rejigging idea as though it was a concession which the Americans were making to the Soviet Union. Let him explain, therefore, in what way the Russians gain or the Americans lose by accepting equality at, say, 420 warheads.

What that would mean to the Russians is not only a reduction in their missile deployment but a corresponding increase in American missile deployment and the loss of their priority objective—which is, to prevent the deployment of cruise and Pershing, which is what the zero option gave them.

Apart from this rejigging, what have the Americans offered in two years of negotiations? Nothing whatever. It can be said that the Russians have not offered very much, and I agree that their concessions are limited. But their concessions are real. They have agreed to come down from more than 200 missiles deployed against Europe to 140. They have narrowed the gap. If the United States had negotiated seriously, the gap might have been closed.

Now we are back to the frank statement of zero option. The noble Lord the Minister, in his Statement last week, explained that the reason for the deployment was that the Russians would not accept the zero option; thus confirming that for two years there has been no movement at all. I asked the noble Lord at Question Time to give me a precedent in the history of international diplomacy for a Government going into negotiations of an important nature, spending two years pretending to negotiate, and coming out at the end in exactly the same negotiating position that they had when they entered. I invited him to search the history of diplomacy to find a precedent there.

Now there is some evidence growing that the Government agree with me that the Americans are not being flexible enough. Some noble Lords may have seen a report in the Guardian this morning with a headline stating that the German and British Governments were "brushed aside" for making representations that the United States should take a more flexible policy during the negotiations. I invite the noble Lord the Minister to comment on this point. I do not believe that the noble Lord himself would feel this; he showed in the last debate, not least in some references to myself, that in the East-West relations he stands four square with President Reagan. But I invite him to comment on that report in the Guardian. Can he confirm it? Because there is nothing in Britain's membership of NATO. nothing in acceptance of the twin track policy which commits us to the negotiating position of the United States. There is absolutely nothing, legally or morally, which obliges us to string along with this rigid negotiating policy. We are loyal to NATO, but the deployment of cruise missiles in Britain is a matter first and foremost for the British Government and not the American Government.

What is more, the British Government is in a position to insist on conditions if they wish, conditions as to the cruise missile, conditions as to the negotiating position at Geneva. They can do so, because, if the British do not deploy, the Germans will not deploy, the Italians will not deploy and the NATO project will come to grief. What I say is that it is a tragic thing that this Government have not shown their independence, have not used the very great influence they could have in this in order to close the gap and get an agreement. Why not insist even now, before the deployment of the first flight of missiles, that the United States make some move to narrow this gap?

We know what it is; we know the Americans will settle for no cruise, no Pershings and no SS.20s; we know the Russians will settle for no cruise, no Pershings and 140 SS.20s. Viewed in the light of the gigantic nuclear overkill of the Russians and the Americans, 80 to 100 SS.20s are meaningless. Even in the light of the Europe-based nuclear weapons of NATO, 80 to 100 SS.20s are meaningless—in the light of the 192 Polaris warheads, the 400 Poseidon warheads, all Europe-based, the 900 warheads on our 18 air bases in Europe, the carrier-based aircraft with their nuclear warheads. Even in the light of the Europe-based nuclear weapons of NATO this gap is insignificant.

Why do not the Government even now make some effort to close that gap—because, of course, the political consequences of an agreement would be of incalculable value to the Government, apart from anyone else. They would restore their reputation. They would deal a death blow to CND, if that has not already been done by Monsignor Bruce Kent. Perhaps I may just correct the noble Lord. Lord Jenkins; Monsignor Bruce Kent has never addressed the Liberal Party—perhaps he may have spoken at a fringe meeting at our Assembly. He has never addressed the Annual General Meeting. That is reserved for the Communist Party. I doubt whether he has addressed the Annual Conference of the Conservative Party; I doubt whether he has addressed the Annual Conference of the Labour Party: certainly not the SDP; I know for a fact that he has never addressed the Annual Assembly of the Social Democratic Party. His presence at an annual party rally is reserved for the British Communist Party. That is one of the aspects of the mistake I think he made.

What I am saying, however, is that the way for the British Government to win their political fight with unilateralism and neutralism and anti-Americanism is to get a multilateral agreement. That is the solution we all want, and they have shown no sign of the necessary imagination or courage or independence—no sign whatever. Therefore, it is in this spirit that I ask the Minister to reply to the debate tonight. Perhaps it is asking rather a lot that he should accept what I am saving at this late hour on this occasion, but let him use what influence he has to get the British Government to take a positive attitude to these negotiations and not to feel it is too late, because these flights of missiles are not all going to arrive at once. Let the British Government say to the Americans, "Before the first flight are deployed we are looking to you to make a decisive move in your negotiating position in Geneva".

11.30 p.m.

Lord Bishopton

My Lords, the noble Lord, Lord Mayhew, asked the Government to reply to the debate tonight. The Minister will not think it amiss if I remind him of what seems to have been forgotten recently: that the house is debating the Question which asked her Majesty's Government: whether, as an opinion poll has shown that 94 per cent. of the British population want dual key control of cruise missiles, they will hold up deployment until such an agreement is reached". That is the matter which the House is supposed to be debating tonight, and I anticipate that the Minister will be replying to those terms.

The House is once again indebted to my noble friend Lord Jenkins for giving us the opportunity to debate this most important subject—the most important that Parliament could be considering because the lives of future generations will be at stake if we make the wrong decisions. If the Government do make the wrong decisions—decisions which lead not to security and peace but to war with nuclear weapons—there could well be no way of recovering after the devastation and the grievous loss of life which would result. This is a matter which concerns all the Opposition parties here, and I am only sorry that the noble Lord, Lord Mayhew, chose the occasion to deflect attention on this vital matter into a party issue.

The one worry which many have concerns the apparent feeling of infallibility which the Prime Minister and the Government have that decisions, once made, cannot even be reconsidered, much less reversed, and that strength is coming to a conclusion and standing by it, with a failure to listen or to respond. More than at any other time we are dealing with a situation where the Prime Minister should, like the rest of us, be questioning personal and political judgments, because therein lies real strength, and not weakness. I am sure the House will agree that good politicians will he having regard to the possibility that they could well be wrong and that others may be right.

The other aspect of concern is the Government's practice of doubting the motives of those who dare to question their policies; so much so that Ministers appear—at least, according to the media—sometimes to he appointed on their potential ability to deal with the critics. Rightly or wrongly, the Secretary of State was put into that category by the press. This debate is not concerned as to whether we are in favour of multilateral disarmament or unilateral disarmament, or both, as the Labour Party is: it concerns the present position that the Government have decided that cruise and intermediate nuclear weapons should be deployed on our soil.

I am sorry to see that only two Government Back-Benchers have been present tonight because those who support the Government's policy have a much greater responsibility for questioning the policy of Her Majesty's Government regarding safeguards. They have a greater responsibility than those who do not. It is for them to try to hold the Government in check, to ensure that we have the safety procedures which are vital to our survival. I am pleased to see the chairman of the All-Party Defence Studies Group as the representative of the entire Government Back-Benchers, whose lack of concern is in direct contrast to the 94 per cent. of the people who want dual control of cruise missiles.

It is for sincere reasons that people question Government policies; and, if so, they have the responsibility to say so from the rooftops. That surely is the strength of democracy in the free world. "What kind of people do they think we are?", asked Mr. Churchill of our adversaries during the war. What kind of people do the Government think we are if, with grave concern about defence policies, people fearing for their future and the future of their families sit at home and do nothing? Is it a surprise that millions of men and women in all walks of life join in peaceful demonstrations to show their concern?

Is it surprising that thousands of women who are concerned for their families and future generations suffer personal hardship trying to impress Her Majesty's Government in the more cosy bunkers of Whitehall that they should reconsider their nuclear policies, even at this late stage? The vast majority of those demonstrating share with many others the wish which there must he among the Soviet people—and, one hopes, among the Soviet leaders—that the great powers should think again. The pity is that Soviet and Warsaw Pact people do not share the benefits of real democracy and the rights of free speech that we have.

Having said that, I must make reference to today's events involving the Secretary of State for Defence. Many of us have heard with great concern of the demonstration in which he was involved. While the nature of the demonstration may indicate the strength of feeling of the demonstrators, it is not representative of the millions of others who are also concerned. Such demonstrations do not help the case that we seek to put. If the Warsaw Pact countries take comfort from such incidents, they may well reflect on the freedom of expression and the right of protest identified with real democracy here. It is to be hoped that the Secretary of State and the Government will try to avoid the temptation to over-react to the unrepresentative minority whose actions will be deplored by the vast majority who share the concern on the matter that we are debating.

Briefly, what is the background to the growing number of people demanding dual key? There are good grounds not only for concern but for fear for the future of this country since the recent events in Grenada and following the shooting down of the Korean airliner a few months ago. It seems clear from recent opinion polls, as the Motion tells us, that only 6 per cent. back the Government in their policies in relation to dual key control.

The world recoiled in horror when, despite all the sophisticated controls, and despite all the considered safeguards regarding flight paths and international boundaries, over 200 people recently lost their lives. But of greater concern is the fact that it could have happened after all the assurances that Parliament has been given by the Government. Following the questions and answers in this House only yesterday, no one can be assured that it could not happen again, possibly within British air space over this country, and furthermore with a nuclear dimension next time.

In the events in Grenada, the late night telephone call to our Prime Minister from the President led to the faltering replies from the Foreign Secretary. In a country where for years the Prime Minister has insisted that there are no alternatives to her policies, her Foreign Secretary on 26th October told the other place in respect of the United States action in Grenada: On a matter of this kind it is still possible for more than one point of view to be held…Of course we have to take care of what we say about one of our principal allies".—[Official Report, Commons, 26th October 1983; col. 303.]

Lord Mayhew

My Lords, the noble Lord seemed to complain that I was straying from the question of dual key control to more general questions on the cruise missile. In the light of the noble Lord's admirable comments on Grenada and the Korean airline disaster, I wonder whether he would like to offer some explanation?

Lord Bishopston

If the noble Lord will listen, he will see the relevance. With the experience of the—

Lord Pitt of Hampstead

My Lords, does the noble Lord. Lord Mayhew, appreciate that it is "Grenada" and not "Granada"?

Lord Bishopston

My Lords, it is possibly the effect of too much television on the noble Lord, Lord Mayhew. I was making the point—and I think that the observation is a fair one—that recent experiences have given us grounds to doubt whether there is proper control by the British Government. The noble Lord, Lord Mayhew, never gives up trying to score party points where national interest is still at stake.

I had just quoted what the Foreign Secretary said on 26th October. The Foreign Secretary—and indeed the wholeGovernment—is showing reluctance in speaking out to the United States about our nation's security. Taking care of what we say about our allies, as the Foreign Secretary put it, is of course less important than protecting the well-being of our people.

On the same date (26th October), also at col. 303, the Foreign Secretary said that, There is no credible analogy between the exchanges on Monday"— on the Grenada debate— and the consultations that would take place before any decision could be taken to fire American nuclear missiles from Britain". He went on to say that, no nuclear weapon would be fired or launched from British territory without the British Prime Minister's agreement". Of course that means little if the British Prime Minister is consulted in the same way as she was before the United States forces invaded Grenada. Perhaps the President used the word "consultation" in the same way as the Prime Minister does; namely, telling the other party what has already been decided, rather than consulting in the sense of being prepared to change one's own mind in the face of the other's point of view. In an emergency time would be even shorter—maybe of only four minutes duration. What a pity it is that as members of a nuclear club we do not have our feet under the negotiating table in Geneva.

But how does the agreement of the British Prime Minister and the President fit in with the interests of the United States? Secretary of State Shultz said on 25th October last: We are, of course, always impressed with the views of the British Government and Mrs. Thatcher, but that doesn't mean that we always have to agree with them and, of course, we also have to make decisions in the light of the security situation of our citizens as we see it The old agreement, on which the Government place so much reliance for safeguards, was based on the use of weapons then far less lethal than the present nuclear weapons.

As allies, our interests have much in common most of the time, but many people—even supporters of the British Government—have the gravest fears when they recall, as I say, the Korean airliner and Grenada situations, as the recent poll reveals.

As I told the House yesterday, I am pleased that Labour's former leader, Mr. Foot, and former Defence Secretary, Mr. Healey, have visited Moscow to urge more flexibility in defence negotiations, and that recently Labour's former Prime Minister, Mr. Callaghan, has added his considerable influence, for the Labour party wants real security.

Finally, the need for dual key control is both vital and urgent. The Government claim that dual key control will cost a billion pounds. But without adequate nuclear safeguards billions may be pounded. Dual key control safeguards may be costly, but lack of adequate nuclear safeguards may well cost the earth!

11.43 p.m.

The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for the Armed Forces (Lord Trefgarne)

My Lords, following the Statement which I repeated to your Lordships yesterday, I am conscious that the issue raised by the noble Lord, Lord Jenkins of Putney, is one of considerable concern to many or your Lordships, and I therefore welcome the opportunity to explain the Government's position on the matter. But while I recognise that there is a respectable body of opinion that agrees with the thesis of the Question, I believe none the less that such views are mistaken, and I hope that your Lordships will allow me to explain why.

I trust that the noble Lord, Lord Jenkins, would not disagree with me if I suggested that the lesson to be drawn from last week's opinion poll is that the British people are perfectly clear that no decision on the use of nuclear weapons based in this country should be taken without the consent of the British Government. I shall make no apology for explaining once again that the existing understandings on joint decision-making provide the assurance that the British people reasonably require, and that the provision of a physical "dual key" would add nothing to that assurance, or to our safety and security. I should like to start by reminding your Lordships of the background to the current arrangements.

United States forces, both nuclear and conventional, have been based in this country now for well over 30 years. During that time it has been felt proper to establish clearly the basis on which any use of these forces might be called into play. The matter was first taken up by the then Mr. Attlee and followed through by Mr. Churchill. The understanding which those Prime Ministers arrived at with President Truman was summarised in a joint communiqué issued in 1952 which explained that any question of the use of those forces based here would be a matter for joint decision—not just consultation, but a joint decision. Your Lordships may wish to be reminded of the relevant section from that communiqué, which reads: The use of these bases in an emergency would be a matter for joint decision by His Majesty's Government and the United States Government in the light of circumstances prevailing at the time. It was not a secret agreement, as one noble Lord said, but was referred to in the communiqué which I have quoted. This understanding has been reviewed and reaffirmed by each successive British and American Government since that time. Without exception, all have found it to be an entirely satisfactory arrangement. Indeed, it is the arrangement which governs the use of United States nuclear forces already stationed here, the United States Air Force F.111 bomber aircraft and the Poseidon submarines, which have, of course, been here for some time through successive Administrations.

When the present Government came to consider the question of arrangements for controlling the use of the cruise missile force, it was entirely logical that this same understanding should apply. There was, of course, an alternative. We could have chosen to buy the cruise missiles and their supporting equipment and operate them as a British Force with the United States retaining control of the nuclear warhead. This was the so-called dual key system of control, and we use it for some weapons systems operated by the British Army of the Rhine. It also applied to the Thor ballistic missile based in this country 20 years ago. The cost of owning and operating Thor was, of course, borne by the United Kingdom.

But we estimated that the cost of such an enterprise for cruise missiles would have been in the region of £1,000 million. So we had to ask ourselves whether there would be any advantage in spending this order of money, thereby diverting it from other areas of the defence budget. There is no precedent for any country having a physical dual key on a nuclear weapons system except in circumstances where it owns, mans and operates the means of delivery.

Lord Kennet

My Lords, will the Minister allow me to interject a question? Why did the Government rule out the possibility of setting a precedent?

Lord Trefgarne

My Lords, for the reasons that I have already explained. There was no need to establish a precedent because the alternative arrangements were equally as good.

Lord Kennet

A circular argument.

Lord Trefgarne

My Lords, there is no advantage whatever, as I say, in such a course of action. There is no military advantage, and, above all, it would do nothing to enhance the crucial role of these weapons as a deterrent against aggression, or the threat of aggression.

Is there any reason to believe that the existing understandings are in any way unsatisfactory? Is there any evidence to that effect? There is none whatever. On the contrary every Government since the war, including the one, if I may say so, of which the noble Lord, Lord Jenkins, was a distinguished member, have found the understanding perfectly satisfactory. Moreover, the Government have reviewed the understandings in close consultation with the United States Government specifically in the light of the forthcoming deployment of cruise missiles in this country and have found them again to be entirely satisfactory. Cruise missiles pose no issue of principle such as to justify introducing new or different arrangements: for the effect of the understanding between the two countries is in no doubt. In the words of my right honourable friend the Prime Minister: The effect of the understandings and of the arrangements for implementing them is that no nuclear weapon would be fired or launched from British territory without the agreement of the British Prime Minister".—[ Official Report, Commons, 12th May 1983; col. 435.] These arrangements will apply to United States cruise missiles based in the United Kingdom whether on or off bases.

Any alliance is built upon, and can thrive only on the basis of, trust. The trust between the United States and the United Kingdom in our joint commitment to mutual defence within the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation is total. The degree of that trust in us by the United States is evidenced not only by its commitment to the Alliance, by the 300,000 men it has in Europe, but also by its willingness to make available to us the Trident weapon system, which will, like Polaris, be under the absolute control of the British Government. We reciprocate that trust, and it is fundamental to the integrity of the Alliance that we do. For what sort of message would we now send to the Soviet Union if we sought to change these long-standing arrangements? What sort of message would we send to our NATO partners? What would be the impact on the cohesion and solidarity of the Alliance which has been its foundation since the start? And what would be the strength and credibility of its deterrence strategy if we were now to say, in effect, that we no longer trust the United States and its commitment to a collective effort in support of its treaty obligations?

The decision to deploy Pershing II and cruise missiles in Europe enhances deterrence by demonstrating to the Russians that the United States sees the defence of Europe as indivisible from its own defence; and the resolution of the Alliance in implementing that decision is crucial in attempting to persuade the Soviet Union to negotiate seriously in the arms control talks in Geneva.

I should like to turn to the main thrust of Lord Jenkins' Question that we should call a halt to our progress towards the operational deployment of the first flight of missiles by the end of the year. I trust that I should not be misrepresenting the noble Lord's views if I suggested that he is not a supporter of the deployment of cruise missiles in this country. As he said in your Lordships' House on 3rd May this year (and I think he confirmed again this evening): many of us … would at least go so far as to say that Pershing II and cruise missiles should not be deployed".—[0fficial Report, 3rd May 1983; col. 46.] That is a view with which I profoundly disagree. However, having heard the terms of the noble Lord's Question, I find myself asking whether he would be prepared to accept the deployment of the missiles if the Government had gone to the expense of buying them and thus provided a sort of physical "dual key". If the noble Lord is not so prepared—and I do not suppose that he is—then I regret that I must conclude that he is attempting to use the controversy over control not as a means of meeting the public concern to which I referred in my opening remarks, but simply as a means to a rather different end—to delay the operational deployment of cruise missiles. That again is a perfectly respectable aim, although not one with which this Government agree.

At this point it is perhaps worth considering the effects of a delay in NATO deployments. It would leave the Soviet Union with a monopoly of land based longer-range INF missiles and the capabilities which these represent. It would remove from the Soviet Union a powerful incentive to negotiate seriously with the United States at the negotiating table in Geneva.

Incidentally, contrary to the expectations voiced yesterday—and I think by at least one noble Lord tonight—I am pleased to tell your Lordships that the Russians appear to be willing to meet as usual in Geneva this week. And what conceivable justification would the Soviet Union have for walking out? For two years the West has been negotiating patiently and constructively, without deploying a single cruise or Pershing II missile. The Soviet Union has steadily added to its arsenal of SS.20s ready to strike at Western Europe. Did we meet these Russian deployments by breaking off talks? My Lords, we did not. We met them by realistic new proposals for arms control; the latest advance in the Western position has been tabled by the United States only this week.

As your Lordships will recall, all the variations of the Soviet proposals in the INF talks have centred around one common theme. That is the retention of a substantial missile monopoly by the Soviet Union while seeking to prevent NATO deploying any comparable missiles of its own. The means to this end is the creation of a false balance between Soviet and NATO missiles. To create this so-called balance the Soviets have had to introduce into the talks the deterrent forces in Britain and France, which they had previously acknowledged to be strategic. On the strength of this they deny the right of NATO to deploy any equivalent missiles in Europe in response to that Soviet threat. I would not for one moment suggest that the Soviet leadership and the noble Lord, Lord Jenkins, share common motives, but I am bound to observe that the results of his proposal and of the Soviet proposal would be the same: no cruise missiles, no Pershing II, at least 140 SS.20s with more than 400 warheads threatening Western Europe, and well over 100 SS.20s with more than 300 warheads threatening the Far East.

I now turn briefly to some of the other points that have been made during the course of this debate. During the course of his opening speech, the noble Lord, Lord Jenkins, referred to the article which appeared in the Sun on Friday, 11th November. I, too, saw that article and I can tell the noble Lord that it is an entirely nonsensical one. The existing understandings between the United Kingdom and the United States provide that a joint decision between the two Governments is required before the bases or the missiles could be used in an emergency. There has been no consideration of an Order in Council by the Queen and there are no contingency plans which envisage shooting United States servicemen.

The noble Lord, Lord Jenkins, also referred to the reliability of these weapons. The United states has completed satisfactorily a very thorough and comprehensive programme of development and testing. The results of United States tests have been made known to us and we are confident about the safety and performance of the weapon. I see no reason why the Government should place more reliance on material provided by organisations such as Electronics for Peace, to which the noble Lord referred.

Lord Jenkins of Putney

My Lords, if the noble Lord would be good enough to give way on this point, I am sorry to interrupt him, but would it not at least be wise for the Government to carry out one or two tests of their own?

Lord Trefgarne

My Lords, I am not sure that that is necessary because, as I say, we are entirely satisfied that the tests, of which we have been fully apprised, have been carried out satisfactorily.

The noble Lord, Lord Mayhew, and I think one or two other noble Lords, referred to the Western attitude to arms control. I must reject the suggestion that the West is not serious about arms control. Events such as the Korean airliner tragedy, which was referred to by the noble Lord, Lord Bishopston, underline the need for an unremitting search for measures which can lead to greater stability and security and lower levels of forces. We shall continue to strive for arms control and disarmament agreements which are balanced, realistic and verifiable. There is a whole range of Western proposals on the table and it is now up to the Soviet Union to respond seriously to these.

On the INF talks in particular, which were very much in the mind of the noble Lord, Lord Mayhew, we of course strongly support NATO's goal, which is the zero option. If the Russians dismantle their SS.20, SS.4 and SS.5 missiles, we shall forgo the plans for cruise and Pershing II missiles. This radical proposal would eliminate all the Soviet and United States intermediate range missiles which can reach Western Europe from the Soviet Union, and the reverse. But NATO is also prepared to negotiate an interim agreement providing for balance in the number of warheads on these INF missiles. Indeed. President Reagan announced at the end of September further flexibility in the United States negotiating position aimed at meeting some of the concerns expressed by the Soviet Union.

The additional flexibility called for by the noble Lord, Lord Mayhew, would of course leave us wholly exposed in the present situation, where the Soviet Union have a monopoly of these intermediate-range weapons. The noble Lord, Lord Bishopston, referred to the relationship as he saw it, between this matter which we are considering tonight and the recent events in the Caribbean. The fact is that in the case of the cruise missiles based in this country there is a clearly defined and well-understood commitment to prior consultation and joint agreement before use. This cannot be compared with the conduct of United States foreign policy outside the NATO area, where there is no obligation to consult and no provision for joint decision.

I do not wish again this evening to rehearse the reasons underlying NATO's December 1979 decision and why it is now more than ever essential that NATO should proceed with its preparations for operational deployment, in the absence of an arms control agreement obviating the need for it. I will say again that 1983 is not the end of the deployment process, but the beginning. NATO's deployments are planned to be spread over five years. These deployments can be halted, modified or put into reverse at any time should results in Geneva warrant it. I still hope that the Soviet Union will be prepared to reach a serious agreement on a balance of forces at the lowest possible level of weapons. Their deployments of SS.20s have increased from under 130 in December 1979 to 360 now. The United States, in consultation with its allies, has made radical proposals for reductions and we are still awaiting a serious response from the Soviet Union. Whatever view one takes of the question for the control of cruise missiles, if one supports the need for NATO to retain an effective deterrent one must also support the need for preparations for operational deployment to continue without delay. Moreover, the Government are in no doubt that the existing arrangements for joint decision making remain fully effective with respect to cruise missiles as to other U.S. nuclear weapons based in this country, and that these arrangements fully meet the very proper concerns of the British people.

Lord Bishopston

My Lords, before the Minister sits down, as he has made what he thinks is a valid point against my noble friend Lord Jenkins for a Motion which he seems to suggest is compatible with unilateralism, would the Minister say why on so many occasions when he claims that most people are multilateralist still 94 per cent. of the population are insisting on dual key control? That is surely what the whole Motion is about.

Lord Trefgarne

My Lords, first this is a Question and not a Motion. I said at the beginning of my remarks that I thought that one thing that came clearly from that poll was that the British people are perfectly clear that no decision on the use of nuclear weapons based in this country should be taken without the consent of the British Government, and that is our position.

Lord Brockway

My Lords, before the Minister sits down again, does he deny my statement that at the general election more people voted for the four parties opposed to the introduction of the cruise missiles than voted for the Government party supporting them?

Lord Trefgarne

My Lords, I have no doubt that if we had a system of proportional representation in this country the result in the other place at the present time might be different from what it is, but I fancy that the Conservative Party would nonetheless have won the last election.

Lord Kennet

My Lords, before the noble Lord——

Lord Denham

My Lords, if the noble Lord will give way, I think we are getting a bit out of order. Perhaps if the noble Lord, Lord Kennet, wishes to ask a question of my noble friend before he sits down finally he could do it, but this is an Unstarred Question, the Government Minister has the right to reply, and there is no right of debate thereafter. If there is a brief question for elucidation that the noble Lord, Lord Kennet, has to ask he may well do so, but beyond that we shall be way out of order.

Lord Kennet

My Lords, I am grateful to the Government Chief Whip. We have had two questions for elucidation from the Labour Opposition. Is it not the case that the House is now in an unusual and possibly unprecedented situation in that the Minister in replying to the Question has not even mentioned, let alone answered, any of the arguments put forward by the largest opposition bloc in this House during the debate?

Lord Denham

My Lords, I do not think that that is a proper "before the noble Lord sits down" intervention. This is not a debate. There is no right of reply. I think that I must therefore move the adjournment of the House. I beg to move that this House do now adjourn.

Moved, That the House do now adjourn.—(Lord Denham.)

House adjourned at three minutes past midnight.