Nuclear Weapons in the UK: Dual control (Hansard, 10 May 1983)

§ Lord Molloy
My Lords, I beg leave to ask the Question standing in my name on the Order Paper.

§ The Minister of State, Foreign and Commonwealth Office (Lord Belstead)
My Lords, the understanding between the British and United States Governments, summarised in the joint communiqué of 1952, about the use of United States nuclear weapons systems based in this country, has been reaffirmed by the Prime Minister and by the President of the United States. The Government have satisfied themselves as to the effectiveness of this understanding.

§ Lord Molloy
My Lords, I should like to thank the noble Lord the Minister for his reply. Nevertheless, is he aware that there is still some apprehension regarding this particular policy pursued by both Governments? Can he tell the House what actual arrangements take place to ensure that the installation of these nuclear weapons is safe and that as far as possible any possibility of accident is removed? What consultations take place with regard to the land that is taken over for these weapons to be installed? Thirdly, can the noble Lord please tell the House what progress has been made on achieving the dual key procedure in the event of real hostilities in which those weapons could be used?

§ Lord Belstead
My Lords, the security of the missiles will be the responsibility of a jointly manned United States-United Kingdom force under British and United States commanders. They will be responsible for the security of the missiles at all times, whether on base or dispersed. I think that that answers both the first two supplementary questions of the noble Lord. As regards his final supplementary question, I repeat a reply which I have given on previous occasions in your Lordships' House: a full dual key arrangement rests upon ownership of the missiles, and Her Majesty's Government were certain that in this case ownership was not necessary and would involve the expenditure of money which could be put to better use elsewhere.

§ Lord Shinwell
My Lords, can the noble Lord the Minister say whether the first agreement has been amended in any form because of the variation in the kind of weapons which are intended as a deterrent and which will probably come into use?

§ Lord Belstead
My Lords, I quoted the agreement in a short debate which took place on an Unstarred Question tabled by the noble Lord, Lord Jenkins of Putney, and that is the agreement that we have today.

§ Lord Mayhew
My Lords, from the noble Lord's Answer to the first Question, would we be right to assume that, in fact, the Prime Minister is expecting to discuss this subject with President Reagan at the forthcoming Summit?

§ Lord Belstead
No, my Lords. As I said in my original Answer, the matter was reaffirmed by the Prime Minister and by the President of the United States in 1981. Therefore, I do not expect it to be discussed at Williamsburg.

§ Lord Jenkins of Putney
My Lords, is the noble Lord the Minister aware that no exercises whatever have taken place in this matter, and that a single exercise would reveal that in an emergency operational control is the only thing that could make these missiles safe?

§ Lord Belstead
My Lords, if exercises have not taken place, as the noble Lord says, it is because the policy of deterrence works and has worked for nearly 40 years.

§ Lord Kennet
My Lords, can the Minister of State confirm to the House that the Government have never proposed to the United States that there might be a dual key without our buying the missiles?

§ Lord Belstead
My Lords, that is the case. I have already given the reason in the questions and answers this afternoon.

Lord Paget of Northampton
My Lords, is the noble Lord aware that it is not a question as to whether we are satisfied or whether the Americans are satisfied with the arrangements? The question is whether the Russians are satisfied with the arrangements, because if the Russians see American-controlled weapons here they may think it is safer to take them out, and that would be very unfortunate for us.

§ Lord Belstead
My Lords, that is why it is important that I should make it clear for about the umpteenth time that the use of these weapons is subject to joint decision, and therefore the Russians should not be tempted to make a move. It would be disastrous for them as well as for other human beings in Europe.

§ Lord Brockway
My Lords, may I ask the Minister whether the Government seriously believe that in the emergency of a war situation in which America was involved, America would delay for discussions before using its nuclear weapons in this country? Secondly, may I ask a question I have asked before and to which I have not received a reply: In view of the fact that America has its reserve headquarters for Europe and this country at High Wycombe, how could the Government possibly control the actions of that centre with its missiles in this country?

§ Lord Belstead
My Lords, the answer to both the noble Lord's questions is in this way: the 421 understanding of 1952 in effect means that the use of nuclear weapons in this country and from this country is due to joint decision. Both the Prime Minister and the President have reviewed this understanding in 1981, and both are satisfied that it works well. It is an understanding about which all Governments for over 30 years have come to the same conclusion.

§ Lord Molloy
My Lords, is the noble Lord not aware that there are situations developing in Southern America and other parts of the world that could, not inconceivably, cause a clash between the Soviet Union and the United States of America which would not necessarily involve Great Britain? There could be a loosing of nuclear weapons. Would there be then the possibility of a situation arising of United States' nuclear weapons on our soil being used against an enemy with whom we are not at war? Therefore, in these circumstances would the noble Lord agree that the tiny chink of light which has come from Mr. Andropov's proposals ought now to be pursued as that is the only possible way in which we might prevent the possibilities that I have outlined becoming a terrible reality?

§ Lord Belstead
My Lords, in the event of a situation which the noble Lord has described, the use of nuclear weapons from British soil would still be subject to joint political decision under the 1952 agreement. So far as the proposals put forward by Mr. Andropov are concerned, those will be, I have no doubt, discussed in the correct forums at Geneva.

§ Lord Bishopston
My Lords, is the Minister aware that, on the eve of an election where the Prime Minister is claiming that Britain stands on her own feet and is respected in the world, we have a situation where, although there is a joint decision on cruise and other missiles, there are no joint operational checks? Can the noble Lord imagine a situation in the United States where allied missiles were fired only by the British and not by operational control with the Americans? Will he recognise the deep concern there is in this country not only on one side but in all parties, where people are most anxious about the need for dual control? Is it not really quite monstrous, when we are allies with the Americans, that we cannot have dual control, because we shall have to pay them rather a high cost to get it?

§ Lord Belstead
My Lords, as I said to the noble Lord, Lord Molloy, in answer to the first supplementary question, the security of the missiles will be the responsibililty of a jointly manned United States-United Kingdom force under British and United States commanders. That means that we are talking of a joint force working to a common purpose. That is one of the many contributions which this country makes to the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation. As the noble Lord has mentioned the general election, I hope that the electorate will draw their own conclusions from the proposals of the Opposition that that contribution should be withdrawn from NATO.