HL Deb 09 May 1983 vol 442 cc355-7

4.23 p.m.

The Lord Chancellor (Lord Hailsham of Saint Marylebone)

My Lords, I rise to move that this Bill be now read a second time. Its purpose is to restore the position which everyone had assumed was the existing law before the 10th March this year, when your Lordships in your judicial capacity gave judgment in the case of Peart v. Stewart. In that case it was held that a county court was an "inferior court" for the purposes of Section 14 of the Contempt of Court Act 1981, and that accordingly its power to deal with civil contempts was limited to 30 days' imprisonment. rather than two years.

For well over a century, by virtue of what is now Section 74 of the County Courts Act 1959, the county courts have had the same power as the High Court to deal with civil contempts—that is to say, breaches of injunctions. In paragraph 204 of their report, the Phillimore Committee recommended no change. The purpose of Section 14 of the Contempt of Court Act 1981 was simply to substitute a fixed instead of an indefinite term in such cases and to impose a maximum of two years on the terms of imprisonment which could be imposed on any occasion. It was not the intention to create any difference between the High Court and the county courts in this regard.

During the preparation of the Bill the question was raised as to whether the drafting, and in particular the definition of "superior court" in Section 19, was really clear enough for the purposes of Section 14, and I was assured that it was. Since I am responsible for the drafting of Bills—of that Bill, at any rate—which I introduce, I apologise for the error. It is fair to say that no discussion took place on the Floor of the House and that the advice I received on the subject was entirely reassuring.

From the point of view of policy it is vital, I am afraid, that the status quo as between High Court and county court should be preserved for this purpose. The county court now has a wide matrimonial jurisdiction, apart from everything else, and a general jurisdiction wider than ever before. If I may give one example, which is slightly diverting, sent to me by a judge who was rightly disturbed by the decision in Pearl v. Stewart, I will quote his letter, as follows: I write to bring to your attention the distress, difficulties and expense which the decision in Peart v. Stewart is causing in practice. I have at least one unbalanced man resident within the district of this court. He has a mania for molesting and assaulting the woman with whom he formerly lived. I made a non-molestation injunction against him, which he ignored. I sent him inside for five days. The next time he did it, I sent him down for 14 days. On the third occasion, the judge who was taking my list for me while I was sitting in crime, very sensibly sent him down for six months, but having regard to Pearl v. Stewart he was released after three months. This, I think, encouraged him and on his current breach he is again inside for one month. The woman concerned must be having a frightful time, knowing that he is likely to be hack on her doorstep before long. He now writes what I regard as his usual letter, saying that he will not offend again, and he will come before me early next week asking for an early release. I would not give very much for his chances of success, but he will be out before long and I expect will re-offend. Have I still got to play this ineffective 30 day game with him, with all the expense that it involves? The woman will be represented, on legal aid. Two bailiffs will have to take him to Bedford Prison over 50 miles each way. (Where he is well known and was welcomed last time by the Officer on the gate with the words 'Hello, you back again'. I thought at first I might be able to resolve some of the difficulty by transferring the matter to the High Court so as to get the extended and necessary jurisdiction, but I do not think I have power so to do. Nor, indeed, if I did, would it serve any useful purpose, because the Courts Administrator tells me the only authority he has to appoint me a deputy High Court judge is in divorce and wardship cases, and if it went to London even more expense would be caused". My Lords, that letter speaks more eloquently than I of the necessity—indeed, the urgent need—of this Bill. So I beg to move that this Bill he now read a second time.

Moved, That the Bill be now read a second time.—(The Lord Chancellor.)

Lord Elwyn-Jones

My Lords, the House will be grateful to the noble and learned Lord for that cautionary tale. I venture to think that there will be little dispute between the two sides of the House, tempting as it will be from now on to find reason for difference at all possible opportunities until the battle of the hustings is resolved one way or the other.

Obviously it is essential that courts should have the power to enforce orders against recalcitrant parties, particularly in the case of those who have been subjected to orders arising from the Domestic Violence and Matrimonial Proceedings Act, and the need to protect what—alas!—is usually the lady who has been the subject of violence from the continuance of the violence against her. The noble and learned Lord has pointed out that the jurisdiction of the county courts has of course increased very greatly in recent years, and the particular jurisdiction under the 1976 Domestic Violence and Matrimonial Proceedings Act is an important and useful illustration.

It is also the case that county courts grant far more injunctions than any other court in England and Wales. Therefore, it is very important to get this matter clarified. I am bound to say that I share whatever responsibility there was for the failure to spot this point at the earlier stage with the noble and learned Lords dealing with Peart—I should continue to pronounce it "pert" in case there is confusion with a most respected noble Lord in the House whose name is pronounced in a slightly different way and who assures me is no relation to any of the parties in question.

This provision therefore to give to the county courts the same power as exists in the courts of superior jurisdiction seems to us to be right. It does not follow by any means that the message should go out that the county courts should necessarily impose penalties of imprisonment over the period of one month that they can presently exercise. The two years is a maximum term and they will no doubt exercise their discretion as they think fit in the use of that power against recalcitrant litigants who have refused to obey the orders of the court. In the circumstances, we agree with the passing of this Bill.

Lord Wigoder

My Lords, in view of the changed political situation, may I not only express my support for the Bill but also the hope that it will be found possible for it to reach the statute book before Parliament is dissolved.

The Lord Chancellor

My Lords, I am grateful to both the noble and learned Lord, Lord Elwyn-Jones, for his well informed and helpful speech and also to the noble Lord, Lord Wigoder, with whose sentiments I agree. However, I can only say that these things can only be done by agreement.

On Question, Bill read a second time, and committed to a Committee of the Whole House.