HL Deb 21 July 1983 vol 443 cc1323-55

8.10 p.m.

House again in Committee.

Clause 31 [Payrolls and accounts]:

Lord Mishcon moved Amendment No. 47: Page 22, line 39, leave out ("subsection (2)") and insert ("subsections (2) and (7)")

The noble Lord said: With the Committee's permission, may I take with this amendment Amendment No. 51, and I hope introduce a long line of brief speeches in order that we may make some rapid progress. Amendment No. 51: Page 23. line 30, at end insert—("(7) The Secretary of State may by order withdraw the exemption of data under this section, and an order under this section may make different provision in relation to data consisting of information of different descriptions, or held for different purposes.") The object of this exercise is really to give legislative power first of all to redress something which proves to be wrong, and also—if I may put it this way—to move with the times.

Lord Swinfen

May I be so rude and so bold as to interrupt the noble Lord? Is he proposing to make use of the new procedure, introduced earlier this afternoon, to have a note of the second amendment to which he is speaking put into the Official Report at the same time?

Lord Mishcon

I am extremely grateful to the noble Lord, because it gives me quite pompously the opportunity of saying that it is a procedure which I had the honour of suggesting in the Procedure Committee and which was subsequently adopted. Therefore, I should love to take advantage of the new rule, as it were, to ask that this be done and that the linkage takes place in the report of our proceedings that subsequently appears. I cannot sufficiently express my gratitude to the noble Lord.

In speaking to both these amendments I should say that the real purpose of the exercise is to do two things. First, it is to give a necessary legislative power if one finds one has given an exemption which is wrong; and, secondly, it is to be able to move with the times because one imagines that the Bill, if enacted, will be on the statute book for some time and one does not want to have amending Acts every five minutes.

Under the present provisions it literally would be the case that one would be exempting at one stroke under Clause 31 about 80 per cent, of all the automatic processing of personal data that takes place. Therefore, to give power, as Amendment No. 51 does, to the Secretary of State to withdraw an exemption of data if he thinks it expedient to do so and to make an order under this clause which can make different provision in relation to data consisting of information of different descriptions, or held for different purposes, seems to me to be very sensible. I beg to move.

Lord Mottistone

In principle I support the noble Lord, Lord Mishcon, on the thinking behind what he is advancing, which is also reflected in amendments I have yet to move. I shall speak to them when I move them; otherwise, they will not get recorded as the new procedure does not go that far. I merely say that the principle of the idea that we can move with the times and adjust the extra things that can be included is a good one.

Lord Elton

In Clause 31 we bring home our unicorns—those elusive beasts, the completely harmless categories of data that can be exempted from the Bill without danger to anyone. Clause 31 has been carefully constructed at the urging of noble Lords on both sides of the Chamber and of bodies outside it. It reflects suggestions put to us from a number of quarters, among them the Opposition Members of the Committee on last Session's Bill in another place who put their names to an amendment exempting payroll and accounting data. We have been particularly careful to limit both the purposes for which the data are held and the disclosures that are permissible in order to ensure that no harm is likely to befall data subjects as a result of the exemption of data. I see no prospect of that expectation being disappointed. If we were not confident of that we would not have amended last Session's Bill in the way that we have. Nor, I suggest, would the Opposition parties have joined together to urge us to amend it.

That being so, I think there is only a slender chance of the order-making power proposed by noble Lords opposite in fact being needed. It is so slender that I find the prospect of legislating to provide that power awakens all those instincts which flourished in my bosom when in opposition, and which the holding of office tends to smother. I am not over-keen on voting a Government powers which I do not expect them to use. That is a healthy instinct which noble Lords opposite will understand very well. In this case it is supported by the reflection that as long as it exists small users who hold data for no other purposes than those covered by Clause 31 would not be finally free from potential application of the Bill, and the legislation would hang over them like the sword over the head of Damocles.

At one point last session we were urged to provide for an order-making power under which the Secretary of State could exempt certain data to be defined in the order. At that time we took the view, and I think it was supported by the noble Lords opposite, that if there were to be any exemptions they should appear on the face of the Bill. I think that the reverse equally applies, inasmuch as if an exemption is made on the face of the Bill, as it is under Clause 31, it should not be capable of being rescinded or withdrawn by subordinate legislation. I hope I am not splitting hairs and that, on reflection, the noble Lord will agree with me.

Lord Mishcon

I love to follow the noble Lord the Minister when he reminisces in the humorous way that he does about previous metaphors that he has used, especially when they relate to the animal kingdom. I am tempted to tell him that possibly the answer to his speech is: when is a unicorn not a unicorn? With the passage of time I suppose it is possible for the species to develop so that it is not recognisable as a unicorn. That is exactly what I am endeavouring to provide for. When one is legislating, is it not sensible to try to provide for all contingencies? The noble Lord said that there was only a slender chance that the cancellation of the exemption might be required. That may well be his forecast now. If so, should he not give himself the power in this legislation to deal with it?

May I say with great respect that I feel this is a debating argument. In order to defeat something it cannot be regarded as a very reasonable argument against it merely to say that the sword of Damocles would be hanging over many thousands of users who would wonder whether an order might appear one day and that Parliament might agree it. I do not regard that as a very practical prophecy.

I believe this is a sensible amendment. However, it is not the sort of amendment for which I am prepared to put my head on the block. I merely throw it out as a sensible suggestion. If the Minister will agree to consider, between now and Report, whether there is rather more merit in it than he thought, I, for my part, will be perfectly happy to withdraw the amendment. I hope the Minister will give that assurance.

Lord Elton

The noble Lord is as courteously persuasive as ever. I thought I had a unicorn with one horn, and he has presented me with a dilemma which has two. Therefore, if he will bear with me, although I am not enormously attracted by what he said I think there is some force in his argument and I should like to look at it before the next stage.

Lord Mishcon

In those circumstances I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

Lord Mottistone moved Amendment No. 48:

Page 23, line 6, at end insert ("; or (c) for the purpose of administering a data subject in respect of service by the data subject in any employment or office with the data user,")

The noble Lord said: I should like to bracket Amendment No. 50 with this amendment and, in accordance with the new rules of procedure, have both amendments recorded, because the first amendment does not mean anything without the second. Amendment No. 50: Page 23. line 24, at end insert— (" () Personal data as referred to in subsection (1)(c) above shall only be exempt as specified in the said subsection (c) if such data have been supplied to the data user by or with the consent of the data subject (or a person acting on his behalf).")

This amendment is on the same theme. It seeks to widen the extent to which Clause 31 can include information about which there is no doubt. It seeks to add all the types of information which are supplied by an employee, such as address, telephone number, children, next-of-kin, qualifications and courses attended. This will be the kind of information he will probably have entered on his application form for the job.

Amendment No. 50 is drafted in a rather strange way because the friend who proposed it to me was advised by a lawyer, but the important part of Amendment No. 50 is that which says that Amendment No. 48 only takes effect if it is information which is, supplied to the data user by or with the consent of the data subject". Therefore it is information which he already knows and which might usefully be added to his payroll information. The justification is similar because he knows what is there as he gets the money. I suggest to my noble friend that this would be something which could usefully be added at this stage in order to reduce the amount of excessive causes for data users having to register with the registrar so as not to overwork those inadequate 20 people whom the registrar has to work for him. I beg to move.

Lord Swinfen

I approve of the principle of this amendment, but I should like to ask my noble friend one small point. If someone, having completed his original application form, goes on to get more qualifications, attends courses or gains various bits of experience that are worked up within the firm's own time, which the employer may also wish to record in a similar manner, what is the position? It strikes me that information on the original application would be covered by the amendment but the other information would not be. It would be in a totally different position. It seems to me illogical.

Lord Mottistone

I think I can answer that. I used the application form only as an example of the sort of information that would be there. Amendment No. 50 speaks of data which has been supplied to the data user: by or with the consent of the data subject (or a person acting on his behalf)". He could allow the personnel officer who organised his course to provide that sort of information on his behalf within the terms of my amendments.

Lord Elton

The Government were persuaded as a result of exchanges on the earlier Bill that there was a case for exempting two sorts of data used in specific and very carefully defined circumstances. They are described in Clause 31 as data held only for payroll and accounting purposes. The clause exempts them provided that the limitations on their disclosure are met. My noble friend Lord Mottistone is now asking us to add a third category—data provided by an employee to his employer and used for "administering" the employee. My noble friend has indicated the kind of information that he has in mind here. It is the basic information about staff that managers are increasingly holding on desk-top micro-computers: name, address, qualifications, employment history, and the like. But I have grave doubts as to whether this ought to become a third category of exemption.

First, I have to say that, from the viewpoint of the data user, an exemption as proposed would, I think, be of limited value. Almost any user with managers holding this kind of data on desk-top micros will also hold similar data, as part of their general and much more wide-ranging employment records, on some central system. Those central records will not be exempt. I do not think my noble friend would suggest that they should be. The registration of the central system will sweep up the desk-top files, since the description of the central data will embrace the data on the managers' files, the purposes for which the data are held will cover both sets of data, and so on. To the extent that the limited exemption proposed will not relieve the user from any significant responsibility—and nor will it keep unnecessary particulars off the register—I find it unappealing. I would also add that I wonder how many managers with desk-top micros will in fact restrict their records on employees to the data covered by the amendments. I suspect that very few would qualify for the exemption. But that is not my main anxiety. We must look at the proposal from the data subjects' point of view.

As your Lordships are aware, one of the main purposes of this Bill is to reassure data subjects about the use of personal data; and I have to say that I think there could be some concern among data subjects at being "administered" by exempt data. Incidentally, I am not at all clear what the term "administer" means in this context. But what does seem indisputable is that it goes very wide. It could cover discipline, promotion, pay and a host of such matters. Data may be provided by the data subject, but when combined with other data he has supplied, or indeed that he has not, the net result may be an administrative use that he had never considered.

In exempting payroll and accounting data we have accepted that here are certain kinds of personal information that virtually every company in the country—large and small—holds as part of everyday business activity. The data subject knows it is held, and, more important, knows of what it consists and precisely what it is used for. Indeed, generally it can only be used in a way that is of direct benefit to the subject: paying his wage, salary or pension, or recording and regularising the business transaction which subject and user have both voluntarily entered into. This is all so innocuous that it really does not warrant statutory protective machinery. Finally, through regular pay slips and the normal process of invoicing, there is a means by which the subject himself can keep a check on the end result of the use of the exempt data. The data covered by these amendments are of a rather different nature.

I am afraid that the amendment leaves us with a rather imprecise idea of what will constitute the data, and we are even less certain of the uses to which it may be put. These two uncertainties make it difficult to assess the benefits which their exemption would bestow on users. They also leave us less than confident that they cannot combine to the detriment of the data subject. As the protection of the data subject is in fact a central purpose of the Bill, regretfully I am afraid that I cannot commend my noble friend's proposal to your Lordships. I am sorry I cannot be more encouraging.

Lord Mottistone

I am most grateful to my noble friend for having given the reasons at such length why he is not entirely happy with my amendments. Some of the general information that he gave us contained a few nuggets—which we talked about earlier. I shall look carefully to see the nuggets in print and will hope that they will satisfy me and my friends. If not, perhaps I might come back with an even more carefully contrived solution to the problem the next time we take this point. At this stage, I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

8.26 p.m.

Lord Elystan-Morgan moved Amendment No. 49: Page 23, line 7, leave out from ("Act") to end of line 8.

The noble Lord said: This is an amendment which refers to Clause 31 of the Bill, as the Committee appreciates. That clause exempts from the registration provisions of the Bill certain payroll accounts. I have no doubt at all but that this is a very desirable and wholly understandable provision. It follows therefore that in so far as those accounts are concerned, there will not be supervision by the registrar under the requisite provisions of the Bill. What we on this side of the Committee however quarrel with is the next stage. Why should data subjects, whose names and data appear in respect of such payroll accounts, be deprived of the right of access under Clause 21; rectification and erasure where there are mistakes, under Clause 24; or compensation for inaccuracy under Clause 22; where it is shown that the data published is wrongfully disclosed? We say that such data is capable of causing as much harm as any other data. The exclusion of such data from the provisions of Clauses 21, 22 and 24 is a complete non sequitur, we say. The effect of this utterly reasonable amendment would be to remedy that defect. I beg to move.

Lord Elton

As I have already said, we thought very carefully about the way in which exemptions such as those to which the noble Lord has referred should be described so as to ensure that they applied only to those strictly limited circumstances in which exemption would cause no harm. We did this not simply by the manner in which the activity was described, but by specifying that the exemption could be claimed only where disclosure took place in strictly limited circumstances. We believe that by specifying both use and disclosure in this way we have ensured that such data cannot be misused to the detriment of the subjects. Had we not believed this, we should not have come forward with the proposals.

It follows from this that the application of Part III of the Bill to such data must be superfluous. If we believed that there remained a need for a statutory right of subject access to such data, it would be because we believed that there was a possibility that they might contain material likely to do harm to data subjects. But if we had believed that, we should not have proposed this as a category of exemption. The noble Lord may well come back and say that perhaps the clause should be struck out of the Bill, but I think that that would be a mistake.

Had we conceived the possibility of damage arising from the misuse of such data, or that there might be a necessity for rectification or erasure to be ordered by the courts, we should not have exempted these activities. If there are threats to data subjects arising from the use of data for these tightly defined purposes, then the answer is to apply the whole range of the Bill's provisions to them, and not to embark upon selective controls; but as I have made clear, I do not believe that such a threat exists.

I think that I might have said enough, at least to expose my central position. If the noble Lord wishes to press me further, there is more that I can say.

Lord Mcintosh of Haringey

That was a very high-minded reply, if I may say so, and it removed from the Government's argument for exempting payroll and accounting data the issue of practicality. I should have thought that the prime argument for exempting payroll and accounting data from Part II of the Bill was primarily one of practicality; that these are universal types of data, and that the inclusion of these data in the Bill would have made the task of the registrar very much more onerous, and would have made it much more difficult for the remainder of automatically processed data to be dealt with adequately by the registrar and his very limited staff, as the noble Lord, Lord Mottistone, said. I would go along with that practical argument for exempting payroll and accounting data.

However, I do not think that that necessarily proves that harm could not arise to the data subject from these forms of data and from the way in which these data are held by employers. To me, as someone involved with payroll and accounting data, it seems self-evident that there are inaccuracies, that there are things which in the short term affect the employee's next pay packet, and in the longer term could affect his whole employment history, and could affect his chance of continued employment either at his existing place of employment or somewhere else. Without being a lawyer, I should have thought that there must be some legal redress for such an employee, and that it could very well be obtained through the courts in the ordinary way without going to the trouble of having the data subject to the registrar and the whole paraphernalia of Part II of the Bill.

Therefore on strictly practical grounds I agree with the application of Part II to these data; but there is no logical reason why there should not be redress in the courts in the ordinary way, and there is no particular good reason why the Bill should be used to deny the data subject access in this way.

The second argument that I would adduce on the amendment is that I seriously doubt whether such an exemption is in accordance with the European Convention. The principles on this matter are quite clear. Not even any of the interpretations laid down in Schedule 2 to the Bill allow for the possibility of such a wide-ranging series of exemptions from the erasure and disclosure conditions, and I seriously wonder whether in this particular case the Government have been adequately advised about conformity with the convention.

Lord Elton

I am very grateful to the noble Lord for raising the issue of the convention and for pressing this matter further, because in fact it is Article 3.2.a of the convention which enables us to justify the exemption which we propose. A further obstacle to what the noble Lord, Lord Elystan-Morgan, and his noble friends propose is that it would not be possible to adopt the proposal contained in his amendment and remain consistent with the Council of Europe Convention in that respect. This may sound surprising, but the fact is that the article to which I have referred entitles a state to give notice that it will not apply the Convention to, certain categories of automated personal data files". The provision goes on to say that among these categories there shall not be included, categories of automated data files subject under its domestic law to data protection provisions". The result of that provision—a somewhat ironic one, some noble Lords may think—is that, with the exception of the derogation permitted under Article 9, data must either be wholly bound by the provisions set out in the convention, or wholly outside the scope of those provisions. The convention does not allow a state to pick and choose between the provisions that it will apply. Although some of the other requirements of the convention could without undue difficulty be applied to the data that we are discussing, there would, I fear, be considerable problems where unregistered data are concerned, in meeting the full obligations of Article 8, which, as I shall remind your Lordships, entitles any person …to establish the existence of an automated personal data file". The position is therefore that we are forced to choose: either data as described in Clause 31 are wholly harmless and appropriate for total exemption from the provisions of the Bill, or we remain concerned about them and allow no exemption at all. It was with this in mind that we were so rigorous in deciding which categories we could safely exempt, and that is why there are so few. The result is I think that we have chosen what is genuinely and entirely innocuous. I hope that noble Lords will be content to leave it wholly outside the Bill, because the only alternative under this Article is to have it entirely within it.

Lord Elystan-Morgan

I have listened with very great interest to what the noble Lord has said, and I must say that on a superficial reading of Article 3 it seems that it is neck or nothing; that it must be either wholly inside, or wholy excluded from the data provisions. However, I am not quite sure that I understand the interaction between Article 9 and Article 3, and it seems to me that Article 9 refers specifically to exemptions under Articles 5, 6, and 8.

Be that as it may, we shall take full advantage of the next three months to reflect much more deeply upon this matter and to cogitate in very great depth upon what the Minister has said. I am sure that likewise he too will reflect upon the argument that has been put forward by my noble friend Lord Mcintosh of Haringey. That is, that if it has to be total inclusion or total exclusion, whether on a balance of fairness and convenience it might not be better to include altogether. So over the next three months we shall consider this matter and we shall return reinvigorated and we hope inspired in relation to what course ultimately to take with regard to the Government's attitude, knowing that they too will have given the matter their fullest thought. On that basis I most certainly beg leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

[Amendments Nos. 50 and 51 not moved. ]

8.39 p.m.

Lord Mottistone moved Amendment No. 52: Leave out Clause 31 and insert the following new Clause—

("31.—(1) Notwithstanding the preceding provisions of this Act. where a data user holds personal data for one or more purposes specified in subsection (2) of this section, and for no other purpose, sections 5, 6, 7, 8 and 11 of this Act will not apply in respect of that data user.

(2) This section applies if the data user has with the data subject a contractual, trading, business or professional relationship to which the personal data relates and the purposes referred to in subsection (1) above are to administer (in a manner and to an extent that the data subject would reasonably expect) that relationship and/or the internal management of the data user's trading, business or professional activities.

(3) Any data user who is exempt under the provisions of subsection (1) of this section shall nevertheless take all necessary steps to ensure that any personal data which he holds are held in accordance with the principles contained in Part I of Schedule 1 of this Act and in interpreting the second, third, fourth and sixth principles the purpose or purposes for which data are held will be deemed to be the appropriate purpose or purposes described in subsection (2) above.").

The noble Lord said; On this amendment I have been advised by the CBI, and its great concern was that of the noble Lords opposite in the amendment that we have just debated; namely, that the Government were moving outside the terms of the convention. My noble friend has answered the points of which the CBI was fearful, and it asks in particular that this should be clarified. The CBI very much welcomes Clause 31 as it stands because it is moving in the direction in which it has always sought to move of having exemption for registration for data held for routine business purposes. The CBI presumes to recast in the amendments that we are now discussing the whole clause partly in order, as it sees it, to get over this problem of possibly going against the convention for the very reason with which my noble friend has dealt, but also in order to expand the scope somewhat to cover other routine business matters which it felt it could reasonably fit within its recast clause. I accept what my noble friend says so far as it goes. I cannot comment upon it but I will ask my advisers to study it carefully. I hope that he might see whether Clause 31 as re-proposed on the lines of Amendment No. 52 might not be a better way of tackling the problem in order to make sure about the convention and in order to give the scope that is possible.

I would have also thought that we are on a slightly dangerous point, both noble Lords opposite and myself, insofar as the Government have taken immense trouble to include this to satisfy what we were asking for when the Bill came before us last time. If we push too hard the Government may find some terrible weakness and take it away. We must try to preserve Clause 31, albeit in its present form, if the Government can live with it. I do not know whether my noble friend will be able to say that he will look at my amendment which genuinely tries to help him. It is only in any case a probing amendment.

Lord Elton

I hope your Lordships will forgive me as I pause. I was reflecting whether I could not curtail what I was going to say. I have so decided. If, therefore, there is a certain incoherence, I hope that my attention will be drawn to it and I shall try to put it right. It is perhaps proper if I start by explaining why I believe that a reduction in the scope of the register as drastic as that which I believe to be implied in the amendment would fundamentally change its character.

In our view, the register will fulfil two functions in relation to domestic considerations. The first is that it will provide the registrar with an insight into the range of circumstances in which personal data are used. It will tell him the scale of the activity and the range of purposes, disclosures and so on, that currently take place. Although Clause 31 as drafted may remove a number of entries from the register there would always be entries of a similar type. They would relate either to payroll or accounting systems.

The amendment we are now considering would. I believe, not only remove a substantially larger number from the register. It would also remove a wide range of activities of different types. It would lose its role as the registrar's essential point of reference and he would have no precise means of judging whether data were being used or disclosed in accordance with a clearly defined purpose. I appreciate the attempt made in subsection (3) of the amendment to interpret what the principles mean by specified purposes and disclosures, but I fear that the overall effect would still remain extremely vague. Indeed, I cannot believe that users would really welcome so uncertain a provision as that now before us, since it would leave the registrar with total discretion to decide, subject only to appeal, whether a particular disclosure by a data user was compatible or not with the trading relationship in question. The effect of the amendment could thus be to rob the registrar of an essential tool in general oversight while leaving him wide-ranging discretion in individual cases to interpret what I am bound to say are some highly subjective tests. I do not think that it would be right to do that.

Nor should we forget the implications for data subjects if we were to go down the road that is proposed here. The result, I suspect, in a wide variety of cases would be to deprive them of the ability to discover from the register what were the legitimate activities of a particular data user. Although they would still be entitled to seek subject access to data held about them, they would apparently have no means of knowing the purposes for which those data were held or to whom it was the user's practice to disclose. They, like the registrar, would be deprived of any general idea of the range of activities undertaken with personal data.

I suspect that we would find ourselves in considerable difficulty with the Council of Europe Convention. It is the unexpected difficulty that noble Lords opposite came up against in the last amendment, so I will not elaborate. I hope that I have said enough to satisfy my noble friend that I am afraid I cannot meet this proposal with the enthusiasm that he would like.

Lord Mottistone

I am deeply grateful to my noble friend for what he said in answer to Amendment No. 49 and in answer to this Amendment No. 52. It will give us great food for thought. I said that it was a probing amendment. We shall have a good look and if we can think of anything better we might come back on Report. At this stage, I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

Clause 31 agreed to.

Clause 32 [Domestic or other limited purposes]:

8.46 p.m.

Lord Mishcon moved Amendment No. 53: Page 23, line 43. at end insert ("but it shall be a condition of that exemption that the data are not disclosed to any other person").

The noble Lord said: The Committee, or what is left of the Committee, may well remember that on this clause dealing with some sensible exemptions from Part II and Clauses 21 to 24 of the Bill, we dealt in the last Session with certain difficulties. Some amendments were generously conceded by the Government. However, I do not think that they have gone far enough. I can put the point shortly. If your Lordships will look at Clause 32, and particularly subsection (2), you will see that, understandably, the exemption I have mentioned is given to personal data held by an unincorporated members' club relating only to members of the club and personal data held by a data user only for the purpose of distributing or recording the distribution of articles to the data subjects and consisting only of their names and addresses. The first example, obviously, is that of a club, which will be readily appreciated. The second, I suppose, is of a departmental store or mail order business.

If your Lordships turn over the page you will see in subsection (3) that the condition for the exemption is that there has been a request by the club or the other data user of the person concerned to see whether or not he objects. If he does not object, the exemption applies. All that is sensible.

But the amendment catches, I think, the omission from the clause. It is this. If the members' club, the departmental store or the mail order business decides to pass on to a third party the information that they have with the permission of the data subject, and does so without the data subject's permission—it is most likely, in some cases, and certainly for a mail order business or departmental store, that may be for money or money's worth—it is obviously completely unjust that the data subject is then robbed of his rights in respect of that matter by virtue of the exemption that is granted by Clause 32. It is a simple point that I can put in one sentence. Non-objection to holding should result in exemptions for holding but not in exemptions for unauthorised disclosure. I beg to move.

Baroness Trumpington

With this amendment to Clause 32(2) we return to an issue which was, as the noble Lord, Lord Mishcon has indicated, the subject of some debate last Session. Noble Lords and others well know the contents of the clause, so I shall not weary the Committee by going through them again.

As indicated last Session, the first part of the exemption is aimed at specialised clubs and societies who may well use micro-computers to hold membership lists and to circulate news-letters et. cetera. The second is aimed primarily at similar noncommercial bodies who may not be able to claim the examption for clubs—such as a local church which may use a micro-computer to circulate a parish magazine. The requirement that only names and addresses are held and that subjects be consulted means that this exemption is unlikely to be of great significance in the commercial direct marketing industry. Thus we are dealing with two categories of personal data held in very limited circumstances which can be exempted without leaving the data subject unprotected.

The amendment proposed by the noble Lord opposite would impose a further condition of exemption under Clause 32(2), that the data are not disclosed to any person. As a result of a Government amendment last Session—prompted by the comments of the noble and learned Lord, Lord Elwyn-Jones—we have already ensured that where these personal data are diclosed the recipient of the data, before being able to claim the exemption under Clause 32(2), will himself have to go to the subjects and make sure that they do not object to his holding the data. He can no longer rely on the subjects' consent to the original user holding the data. Moreover, the requirement under Clause 32(3) to consult the data subject gives him a very considerable power to safeguard his own interests. Thus, when asked by a data user whether he objected to personal data about him being held, the subject could indicate that he did not object provided the data were not disclosed to particular persons, or indeed to any third party.

I have to say that to go as far as is suggested in the current amendment and to ban all disclosures would in large part render the exemption worthless. Few would wish or be able to claim the exemption if all disclosures were prohibited. Thus a fishing club might wish to inform another club of members who might be interested in taking part in a competition; and, back at the church, even a vicar is likely to need to disclose personal data to his churchwardens and voluntary helpers who circulate the parish magazine.

In conclusion, I would suggest that Clause 32(2) already places sensible limits on these exemptions, and that Clause 32(3) allows the subject to place limits on disclosures. It therefore appears something of an over-reaction to impose additional restrictions on disclosure, and to go as far as this amendment would render the clause a nullity. Having said that, we recognise that in the new Clause 31 we have limitations (though not an absolute prohibition) on disclosure as a condition of exemption, and those limitations permit of disclosures where, for example, the subject himself agrees. In view of that, we will undertake to have another look at this point, though at the present time we are not convinced that the safeguards for the subject here are in need of further enhancement.

Lord Mcintosh of Haringey

I am sure that my noble friends will be grateful to the noble Baroness for what she has said. I only want to point her in one direction in her reconsiderations and to say that I believe that she has made out a reasonable case for paragraph (a) dealing with clubs, and that there should not be this further restriction. However, I would ask her to continue to look very carefully at the case as regards direct mail houses recording the distribution of articles to data subjects.

The fact that this is a serious matter was shown by the intervention of the noble Lord, Lord Redesdale, in the debate in Committee last Session, when he pointed out that the British Direct Mail Advertising Association had found it necessary to have a voluntary code to allow people who are on mailing lists under some circumstances to say that they do not want to have their names passed to a third party. It has been a matter of considerable public controversy. The direct mail industry is conscious that this is something which has caused a great deal of trouble and resentment. I personally have always avoided joining the Automobile Association or subscribing to Reader's Digest very much for that reason. I do not want my name sold to other people for totally different purposes. I certainly believe that this part of the clause requires further consideration.

Lord Swinfen

I should like to back up what the noble Lord, Lord Mcintosh, has just said. Direct mail houses and list-builders of one sort or another are always looking for additions to their lists. Lists of club members or people who shop in one place or another are very important to them. I should perhaps declare an interest in this particular point as a member of the Direct Mail Services Standards Board.

Lord Mishcon

I wonder whether I can abbreviate the proceedings by saying that the two noble Lords who have just spoken have said everything that I would have said in reply to the noble Baroness. All I want to do is to thank her for her promise to reconsider in the light of what has been said today. In those circumstances. I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

8.55 p.m.

Lord Avebury moved Amendment No. 54:

Page 24. line 5, at end inserted— ("()Data processed solely for the purpose of publication shall be exempt from the registration and subject access provisions."')

The noble Lord said: Amendment No. 54 is concerned with electronic newsrooms, and your Lordships will be aware that when material is processed for the purpose of publishing the damage which may arise to the data subject arising from inaccuracy would obviously be the result of publication. It is, from that point of view, irrelevant whether the processing was carried out manually or electronically.

Publishers who use electronic means, such as the BBC, make use of systems which process data and are closedly connected with the purpose of publication. Many of these operate on a timescale which is far too short to offer the data subject any practicable opportunity for intervention. We would suggest that there is very little point in giving the data subject an ostensible right of access which he would have no conceivable opportunity of exercising. Registration of most of the capacities of an electronic newsroom would, therefore, we suggest, be an empty and bureaucratic gesture.

Information is received by the BBC and other publishing organisations of that kind, and then immediately published. If there is anything wrong with it an effective remedy would follow the publication. The appropriate remedy for the data subject in respect of this material is already provided in the law of defamation. The provisions of the Bill could not, for the most part offer any practical remedy for inaccuracy, and registration of such systems would have no merit beyond the achievement of bureaucratic completeness. I beg to move.

Baroness Trumpington

When I first saw the amendment, placed as it is in Part IV of the Bill, I assumed that its purpose was to ensure that any data held only for the purpose of publication should not need to be registered, nor should subject access apply. This would allow the exemption to be enjoyed, I suppose, by newspapers, broadcasting companies and publishers. I had not been conscious that the newspaper and publishing industry feared that compliance with the Bill would make life impossible for them.

Further, as has been said before, we must be very careful about making special cases. Is it really desirable to provide that newspapers and publishers should not have to register under the Bill, and that the subjects of any data that they hold should not have the benefit of subject access? Indeed, many data subjects would argue that the prospect of the whole country being made privy to information about them increases rather than reduces the case for them to be able to check that the holder of the information has got it right. There is a certain irony in a situation in which a data subject could be refused access on the grounds that there is no need to worry, all the information will be emblazoned across the front pages of tomorrow's newspaper and he can see whether it is accurate then.

But the noble Lord has indicated that in fact his purpose was a much more limited one—and that was, in effect, simply to ensure that the use of computer type-setting techniques should not be caught by the Bill. In other words, he is seeking to restrict the definition of "processing", and to that extent Clause 1 might have been a more natural place for the amendment. But in fact there is no need for it, because Clause 1 as cast already deals with the point.

When computer type-setting techniques are used, personal data may of course be involved. Most newspaper stories, for example, include some personal data about somebody. But it is scarcely likely that those personal data will be processed by reference to the data subject in terms of Clause 1 (7). If that does not happen, the activity is not caught by the Bill. Moreover, even if it were to happen. Clause 1(8) provides that processing shall not be construed as applying to operations performed only for the purpose of preparing the text of documents—which of course computer type-setting is. Therefore, I hope that, on reflection, the noble Lord will accept that there is no need for further amendment to the Bill to exclude computer type-setting from its scope.

Lord Avebury

I am afraid that that takes care only of newspapers; it does not seem to take care of broadcasting. Obviously, we shall have to look at the technicalities of it and see whether what the noble Baroness has said about the interpretation of Clause 1 would apply to broadcasting and to tapes as it would apply to documents. As I understand it, the subsection to which she referred me in Clause 1 concerns only the preparation of texts and it would not apply, for example, to the use of tapes which are subsequently to be broadcast. This would seem to mean from what the noble Baroness was saying, that newspapers would be exempted from registration in respect of computer type-setting systems but that broadcasting authorities would be subject to them in respect of the electronic processing of news items which were held on tape arid which were never subsequently turned into texts. This would seem to be an anomaly which would require further examination and perhaps we could add this to the list of holiday tasks for the Government, although in this matter I am delighted to urge that it be considered by the noble Baroness and not be added to the duties which have already been laid on the noble Lord, Lord Elton. If the noble Baroness would like to consider that and has nothing further to add, I am perfectly happy to leave her the next three months to mull it over, and we shall return to it in October. With that, I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

9.4 p.m.

Lord Avebury moved Amendment No. 55:

Page 24, line 13. at end insert— ("(5) Personal data which have been published, including data written or otherwise published by the data user about the data subject, are exempt from the subject access provisions if they are held by organisations whose primary function is publishing whether in print, broadcasting or by other means, and the data are held to facilitate publication.").

The noble Lord said: This amendment also concerns publishers of ephemera, the newspapers and the broadcasting organisations. I would point out—because the noble Baroness will do so if I do not—that there is a mistake on the second line of the amendment as printed in the Marshalled List, where the word "subject" appears instead of the word "user". I disclaim any responsibility for that error because I did not actually draft this amendment.

The amendment seeks to exempt from the subject access provisions the personal data which have already been published by the data user in the course of his operations and which are held by organisations, the primary function of which is publishing, and I emphasise that that means broadcasting as well as print. Obviously, if the material in question has been published, then any inaccuracies in it will have been noticed by the data subject and he has the ordinary remedies to which I have already referred. He can seek a remedy in the courts for defamation if a newspaper publishes material which is false and damaging to him; he can do the same thing if an item is broadcast which has the same effect. Therefore, there would be no purpose for the protection of the data subject in extending the provisions of this Bill to material of that kind which is held for the limited functions referred to. I beg to move.

Baroness Trumpington

While congratulating the noble Lord, Lord Avebury, on the assiduousness of his efforts to look after the interests of those engaged in publishing, I must however disappoint him by not being able to accept the amendment that he proposes. I fail to see that there is a pressing need to make special exemption from the rights that the Bill bestows on data subjects. I also cannot perceive the justification for special treatment of the data that the noble Lord has identified.

The noble Lord proposes that where data have already been published (including in an autobiographical context) and they are then held by a person '"whose primary function is publishing", then provided that they are held to "facilitate publication" they should be exempt from subject access. It has not been altogether easy to see what the precise effect of the amendment is. However, the overall aim of the amendment seems clear—to eliminate data subject's entitlement to subject access to data with a view to further publication of information about the subject.

The fact that information has been published in the past is not a consideration that has led us elsewhere in the Bill to reduce the safeguards for data subject. And, frankly, I do not see why we should start now. Publication can take place in all kinds of guises—over long periods of years. That does not remove all possible threat to privacy. Indeed, the collection of published tit-bits about an individual can result in a meaty dish when collated together. And, of course, it may well be that published information is inaccurate: should not the data subject have an opportunity to check what is being compiled on a computer from sources that may be fallible?

The amendment would apply to a variety of users, such as the BBC and publishers of regularly revised reference works such as Who's Who, or the compilers of the various profiles of parliamentarians with which we will all be familiar. But here, too. I find it difficult to be persuaded that if the information about the subjects of such works is held on computer and processed, and if those subjects want to check on what is held about them, they should not be able to do so. I cannot think that this will be an area in which the traffic in subject access requests will be great. But where access is sought I suggest that there is no overwhelming reason why it should not be given. Certainly I cannot believe that the data users concerned would face intolerable problems from meeting such requests. If subjects feel in need of the assurance that access will give them, they should be able to have it. In considering exemptions we have always tried not to grant them except when there is very good reason. I have to say that this is a case where I do not see that good reason.

Lord Avebury

I am not sure that this is a point of fundamental importance, but perhaps I can illustrate what I mean so that the noble Baroness can understand it slightly better than I did on the first occasion. If you have an article which has appeared in The Times about you, you can of course obtain a printed copy and, as I understand it. The Times has a service whereby it will sell extracts from back numbers at a price to anybody who wishes to see them, including the person who may be the data subject in question. Therefore, one is not saying that a person is not entitled to have access to material which has appeared in published form. It is simply whether or not the data subject will have a special right of access to it under this Bill if the material is subsequently held in electronic form.

If The Times in future—and it may already have done this for all I know—transfers the whole of the text of every issue on to a computer, we are now conferring a special right on the data subject in respect of whom an article has appeared in that newspaper beyond the commercial right which he has now to see that information in print on payment of a certain fee. This could be vexatious to the publisher if a large number of persons wish to access computer records in respect of their own entries, and it would interfere with the smooth working of the Bill where subject access is more important. However, I shall consider carefully what the noble Baroness has said and take advice from those concerned with publishing interests. No doubt we shall return to this again in October. I have pleasure in asking leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

Clause 32 agreed to.

Clause 33 [Other exemptions]:

Lord Mishcon moved Amendment No. 56: Page 24. leave out lines 24 and 25.

The noble Lord said: As the Committee well knows, my noble friends and I have adopted a completely moderate tone in moving all our amendments. I hope that I am not going to depart from that worthy habit if I say that if this amendment, or something like it, is not passed then the whole of ths Bill becomes a mockery. It is doubtful indeed whether indeed by this exemption about which I am going to remind your Lordships the convention itself is not breached.

May I just go through the terms of the Bill which I am criticising. It is Clause 33(2). It contains there: The Secretary of State may by order exempt from the subject access provisions personal data consisting of information— (a) the disclosure of which is prohibited or restricted by or under any enactment; That is any enactment that has existed from the past and is at present an enactment, and obviously any enactment of the future. It goes on: (b) which appears to him to be of such a nature that its confidentiality ought to be preserved".

That means literally that in regard to any Government record which is restricted under the Official Secrets Act as a matter of course the Home Secretary has the right to exempt without any restriction any and every Government file from subject access simply because he thinks it ought to be kept confidential. That would include computerised Inland Revenue, DHSS. and Home Office parole index files. All of them could be kept secret from the people they concern under this Bill, not because they are covered by a specific exemption under the Bill, such as prosecution of offenders, but because the Home Secretary thinks that confidentiality is desirable.

If the hour were earlier and if the Committee were fuller, I would have ventured to test the opinion of it upon such a vital matter if the answer that is going to be given either graciously by the noble Baroness, or eloquently by the noble Lord. Lord Elton, is not a satisfactory reply. That will not be the course adopted tonight; but I hope that in essence the Government Front Bench can indicate that they can see the worthiness of this amendment and do something about it between now and Report stage.

Baroness Trumpington

I hope that I shall be charming and eloquent. I was rather surprised to hear the tone of Lord Mishcon's speech. I was also surprised to see an amendment which seems to widen the Secretary of State's powers rather than restrict them. If we accept it the Secretary of State would not be constrained to making orders only in respect of data to which statutory restrictions on disclosure already apply. This power of exemption would be almost limitless. If your Lordships will bear with me, I will explain how this clause works.

Above all else, I must emphasise that this is not a catch-all provision enabling the Secretary of State to exempt from subject access anything he feels like exempting. Its scope is in fact very narrow, and that is very much our intention. Data to be covered by an order under Clause 33(2) will have to satisfy two tests—both the test in paragraph (a) and the test in paragraph (b). So, in the first instance, there must already be in existence a statutory prohibition or restriction on disclosure of the data in question. Parliament must have decided that there was good reason for information not to be disclosed or only to be disclosed in a certain way. In the second instance, the Secretary of State will have to be convinced, for one reason or another, that the confidentiality afforded by those statutes ought to take precedence over the subject access provisions provided by this Bill. The amendment loses the first leg. so allowing data to be exempted by order only because the Secretary of State believed that confidentiality should be preserved. That is not our wish and it is clearly not the wish of the noble Lord either. So let me disregard the actual effect of this amendment and explain instead the effect of Clause 33(2).

In general the right of subject access under the Bill will override existing legal restrictions on the disclosure of information. That is the effect of Clause 26(4). We are sure that is, broadly speaking, the right approach, because such restrictions normally have been imposed in order to protect the privacy of the person to whom the information relates.

Since under subject access it is only that person who sees the data, the problem does not arise. It would be wrong to allow these restrictions to defeat the subject's own right of access to personal data about himself. However, there are a few instances where, for one reason or another. Parliament has decided that a person should not see information about himself. To take one example, there are restrictions on the right of an adopted person to obtain access to information which would allow him to obtain a copy of his original birth certificate. While the adopted person is below a certain age there is no right of access; thereafter access is conditional upon either the offer of counselling to the person concerned or in some circumstances his acceptance of counselling. It is to meet such cases that Clause 33(2) appears in the Bill empowering the Secretary of State to preserve statutory restrictions where necessary.

But, as I have said, not all statutory restrictions need to be preserved. Since most seek to prevent third parties seeing an individual's information—and a third party cannot benefit from subject access—the mass of restrictions can and should be overriden. That is why the order-making power in Clause 33(2) is qualified by paragraph (b). It has been suggested that Clause 33(2) could be used to exempt from subject access any data held by Government to which the Official Secrets Act could apply. That is an ingenious suggestion. But it had certainly not occurred to us in drafting the clause and it is certainly not intended to use the clause in that way. Indeed, it would be an astonishingly unusual use of the power, clearly at odds with the thrust of the provisions of the rest of the Bill. Of course, it will not be used for that purpose. Indeed Parliament would have something to say if we tried. As evidence of our good faith we accepted an amendment during the Committee stage of the previous Bill to make orders under Clause 33 subject to the affirmative procedure to enable Parliament to have full control over them.

I am sorry to have taken so long, but I hope that by spelling out the circumstances in which we envisage the order making power being used I have allayed the concern of the noble Lord.

Lord Mishcon

I appealed to the graciousness of the noble Baroness and it would be singularly ungracious of me if I did not at once acknowledge that she has a technical point which is absolutely correct, quite obviously I have seen that there is some error, but whether it is a typographical error that has occurred I do not know. The intention of the amendment was to remove subsection (2) from the Bill on the ground that the Secretary of State's power was unlimited except that the affirmative resolution procedure would have to go before both Houses of Parliament. Clearly that is not a sufficient safeguard in all circumstances, as we well know.

The main burden that I want the noble Baroness to take with her, as it will save so much time at Report stage, is that this is an overriding power given to the Secretary of State, even to recommend to Parliament that merely because there is some restricting enactment—such as the Official Secrets Act which covers all Government records—and the Secretary of State thinks that confidentiality ought to be preserved or that there are overriding interests more serious than that of the data subject, there ought to be these powers, even if it is to be sanctioned by the affirmative procedure of the House. I think the proper thing for me to do in the circumstances is to ask your Lordships' leave to withdraw the amendment. I have put on record the intention behind the amendment so that it can be considered. I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

9.20 p.m.

Lord Mottistone moved Amendment No. 57:

Page 25, line 20, at end insert— (" () A person shall be temporarily exempt from the provision of section 5(1) above in any case in which data processed by him is urgently required to be processed as if it were personal data for preventing injury or other damage to the health of any person or persons; and in an appeal under section 13(1) (b) above it shall be a defence to prove that he had reasonable grounds for believing that the processing was urgently required to be done for that purpose.").

The noble Lord said: This is a small point to deal with emergencies. If your Lordships would look at subsection (6) of Clause 33, you will see that there are exemptions for non-disclosure provisions in cases where injury and health are involved in an emergency situation. There are circumstances in which the emergency situation might not directly and only apply to health. There is also no provision for by-passing the registration provisions, and that is the burden of my amendment.

If I may give your Lordships an example, the situation might occur in which there was a dam which developed a crack on Christmas Eve. It might be necessary to finds out about the designer of the dam, and the computer file that you had on the dam would be a technical one—all about its construction and who built it and, of course, the designer would be within that. There would be particulars of the designer within in it but, as a technical file, it would not have been registered. So you would have a problem, because if you extracted the data on the designer so that he might come and give advice on how the dam might be put right, you would be in breach of the Bill as it stands.

There is a very useful provision, in particular in Clause 7(6), to allow you, once you have communicated with the registrar—and you get special rules under Clause 7(9) to say how you can do it by post—to assume that you have got permission to go ahead with your registration, even if it is only in the post. But in this case it would not work because one can imagine that the registrar's office has shut down on Christmas Eve, there is no post anyway, and you want to ring him up and say. "Look, old boy, is it all right?" But he would not be there and he might not be coming back until the 3rd or 4th of January, so you could not deal with that. And it would not necessarily be a health situation. It could be that, because you have got the crack in the dam on Christmas Eve and you were busy trying to find out about the designer, you have evacuated the population of the town down river from the dam so that there would no question of the people being harmed. On the other hand, if the dam broke it would destroy the town; and that sort of emergency would need to be taken care of.

Therefore, the purpose of this amendment is to deal with such an emergency and to build upon subsection (6) to deal with any sort of emergency. I have written in that it is only temporary because, of course, as soon as the registrar comes back from holiday you put the whole thing right. I beg to move.

Baroness Trumpington

As my noble friend Lord Mottistone has indicated, the Bill already recognises in Clause 33(6) that a data user may need to disclose personal data unexpectedly in an emergency. The emergency services might need access, for example, to a list of residents in a given area when dealing with a natural disaster such as a flood. In such circumstances, Clause 33(6) would allow the data to be disclosed without risk of an offence under Clause 5(2)(d), or of any action by the registrar in respect of any breach of the principles. In addition, Clause 33(6) would provide the data user with a defence in a prosecution under Clause 5(2)(d) where he had made an unregistered disclosure in the mistaken but reasonable belief that the Clause 33(6) exemption applied.

The amendment proposed by my noble friend Lord Mottistone is designed to provide for an analogous situation in the case of unregistered persons. Only personal data "held" in the terms of Clause 1 of the Bill must be registered. Thus a person might keep a collection of data which happens to include some personal data but he need not register the data so long as he neither processes nor intends to process the personal data by reference to the data subject; in other words, if he has no intention of using the data to find out information about any particular person. He does not, in those circumstances, "hold" the personal data. Under the scenario envisaged by the amendment, however, such a person might, in an emergency, want information about an individual which he happens to know is stored amid the non-personal data but is not registered since he never previously thought of extracting the information. If he did extract it, he would be a data user holding personal data, and, if he had not registered, he would commit an offence.

I have to say that the situation that is envisaged here sorely stretches my credulity. Is it really feasible that somebody, with no previous intention of processing the personal data hidden away among non-personal data that he has, will not only know that the precise personal data exist but will not have the necessary information about the person or people in question in a more readily available form, and will also be able immediately to instruct the computer to process the personal data? I cannot help feeling that such a combination of events is so unlikely as not to require specific amendment of the Bill to meet it.

But even if this most improbable scenario were to arise—and this is perhaps the crunch—the scheme under the Bill as drafted could cope. If the existence of personal data needed in an emergency did come to light, and it was necessary to process the personal data to find out information about a data subject, it would be quite possible to do so without committing an offence under Clause 5(1), as my noble friend fears. What the user would do would be immediately to apply for registration and, under Clause 7, the requirements of the Bill in that respect would be satisfied. But I think that the improbability of the whole situation should be enough to persuade my noble friend that he is concerning himself unnecessarily.

Lord Mottistone

I appreciate the argument that it is a rare occasion, but it really comes down to the point that my noble friend the Minister is saying that the situation is so rare that we do not need to enact for it. I should have thought that that was an invitation for fate to intervene; and when this Bill becomes an Act it will not be my situation—it will be something else, and we shall be caught out. I am not sure that I am wholly convinced by the answer, but I will certainly look at what my noble friend has said.

I do not believe that the situation is fully covered, and I also do not believe that my example is as farfetched as has been suggested. I hope that my noble friend will also have another look, because each time I have discussed this with my other noble friend, the Minister, or his advisers, we have thought of added reasons why this is necessary. It might be worth another look by both of us. In the meantime, I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

Clause 33 agreed to.

Clause 34 [General ditties of Registrar]:

Lord Elwyn-Jones moved Amendment No. 58: Page 25, line 30, leave out ("promote") and insert ("ensure").

The noble and learned Lord said: Now we come to an exciting part of the Bill, and with this amendment I should like to speak to Amendment No. 59. Amendment No. 59: Page 25, line 32, at end insert ("and to facilitate the exercise by data subjects of their rights under this Act").

This is a change in the Bill, because the poor registrar was previously a man with massive powers but no duties. It brings to mind many a famous quotation, which it would no doubt be indelicate to remind the Committee about at this late hour. I think the press was the subject of one great observation, but I cannot remember how it went. Your Lordships will remember that there was a certain prerogative which had existed through the ages. The registrar has now been clothed not only with powers but with duties. He is no longer Hamlet without the Prince of Denmark. But the difficulty is that the duties are so nebulous and so ineffective, as stated in new Clause 34: It shall be the duty of the Registrar so to perform his functions under this Act as to promote the observance of the data protection principles". What does the word "promote" conjure up in your Lordships' minds? Does it conjure up advertising or possibly winning a general election? Is it promotion of that kind? Or is it sponsorship? Surely the function of this great public official, the registrar, is more significant than that. Therefore we propose, as a modest amendment, to leave out "promote" and to insert "ensure the observance of the data protection principles".

It has been argued and urged more than once as to Amendment No. 59 that the registrar should have a specific duty to help data subjects who will almost always be in a weaker position than the data users who will hold the personal data about them. Therefore it is proposed in Amendment No. 59 that the following words should be inserted at the end of line 32: and to facilitate the exercise by data subjects of their rights under this Act". These are modest proposals to clothe the Hamlet in the case, the registrar, with specified duties which happily he will have powers to enforce. I beg to move.

Lord Elton

I am a little saddened and surprised that the noble Lords opposite were not entirely enchanted by the word "promote" because it was taken from a proposed amendment of their own at Third Reading last time round when they asked us to place upon the registrar the general duty to promote and facilitate compliance by data users with the data protection principles. We did not like the rest of the amendment but we rather liked "promote", and I am sorry that the noble and learned Lord now finds it nebulous.

If I may paraphrase my brief, the clause places an obligation on the data protection registrar to do whatever is described in line 30, which at present is called "to promote". If the registrar is asked to promote something, he can decide for himself how he sets about doing it. This is what we like about it. The amendment substitutes for the word "promote", which to some extent does have the virtues of nebulosity, the precise word "ensure", which means that at every opportunity he has got to make certain that the data protection principles are observed by the data users. That gives him absolutely no discretion. On each occasion, if there is any hint of a deviation he must deploy his full forces to see that it is corrected or prevented. Consequently, he cannot concentrate his forces on the major issues which are, apparently to him, those matters which most deserve his attention.

I see that the noble and learned Lord is now being advised as to the category of argument which I am putting forward. I am always disturbed when what I say is so familiar as to fall into a category, because I fear that the answers to it must have been thought out many generations ago. It seems to me to have force that the data protection registrar should have some discretion as to how he pursues his duties. To ask him to promote does preserve that discretion. To ask him to ensure does not.

Turning to Amendment No. 59, to which the noble and learned Lord also spoke, I have just spoken about the question of precision in definition, but in the case of the second amendment the duty is not so clearly defined. I imagine that the data protection registrar could often be in a quandry in deciding where his duty lay. Would it be enough for him to tell data subjects of their rights under the Bill and to advise them on, say, how to seek compensation? Or would this fall short of the subjects' expectations? Should the registrar actually assist them in bringing proceedings before the court?

If that were the case, everybody might seek to enlist his help, no matter what their case. He would then be placed in the invidious position of having to prejudge the merits of cases and I suppose to prejudge the courts' decisions on them when choosing whom to sponsor. All the time of course the registrar would be vulnerable to litigation brought by disappointed complainants, who might claim that he failed in his statutory duty by not taking up their cases. That is leading the registrar into difficult and expensive country.

That expresses the nub of our objection to both amendments. Clause 34 already has plenty of signposts to the registrar; that he is to promote observance of the principles. One of the principles with which he is directly concerned is subject access. Clause 34 (1) says that the registrar is to promote observance of the principles, and one of the principles is directly concerned with subject access. Clause 34 specifically empowers him to give advice to individuals; and it is also quite clear that he can intervene where there has been a breach of the principles. Thus, he can certainly take up the cudgels on behalf of any data subject who has been refused access or who is the subject of inaccurate data.

To go further would involve the registrar in inescapable and trivial duties, or in the expense and unnecessary frittering away of energies which I described earlier. I hope that I have said enough to persuade the noble and learned Lord at least to hesitate before he goes further with this amendment.

Lord Elwyn-Jones

I confess that the logic that has been applied to the meaning of these words by the noble Lord is attractive. I am sorry to be hoist upon the petard of my own promotion, but I had forgotten that it was a responsibility of mine. But with legislation of high technicality and much complexity, such an oversight may be forgotten and forgiven.

Speaking seriously, it is obviously an important point not to impose intolerable duties upon the registrar which could be the subject of litigation and breaches of duty. I will certainly look again at the noble Lord's comments. In the light of this observation and in the circumstances I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

[Amendment No. 59 not moved. ]

9.38 p.m.

Lord Avebury moved Amendment No. 60:

Page 25, line 43, at end insert— ("(4) The Registrar shall investigate complaints by data subjects of infringement of their rights under Part III of this Act.").

The noble Lord said: This amendment would oblige the registrar to investigate complaints by data subjects of infringements of their rights under Part III of the Act. I seem to remember that we have discussed this proposition also on a previous occasion. Now we do so in the light of the Government's introduction of Clause 34 which, as the noble and learned Lord has pointed out, does at least lay down some general duties which the registrar has to perform. This is an advance upon what was not in the Bill before.

We rather believe that a degree of precision in the matter of complaints would be advantageous. We would not agree with that which the noble Lord said in reply to the previous amendment—that this means the registrar would be bogged down in a large number of trivial complaints which he is obliged to investigate and that it is better to leave him with the unfettered discretion he has under Clause 34(1).

I do not believe this would be so, because there are other statutory officials who are obliged to investigate complaints and they have no difficulty in disposing of the ones that are manifestly unfounded in a very short space of time and with practically no expenditure of resources. So I think if we laid this duty on the registrar not only would it import a degree of precision into the duty set out in Clause 34(1), but it would say plainly on the face of the wording of the Bill, for the benefit of the data subject, that if he goes along to the registrar and claims that a particular violation of his rights under Part III has occurred then definite steps will be taken to investigate.

For instance, if he claims that he has written to the data user and asked whether the data user holds any personal data of which he is the subject, and a period of six weeks elapses and the data user has not answered, clearly he could claim violation of principle No. 7, that an individual should be entitled "without undue delay" to be informed by any data user whether he holds personal data of which that individual is the subject. The registrar will then take steps to find out why the data user has not replied to the letter, and I presumably compel him to do so with all the force at his command, in a way which the poor data subject would not be able to do. A large data user might well ignore a letter he receives from one humble individual, but he is not going to ignore a request from the registrar to explain why he has failed to answer the letter. Therefore, investigation of the complaint by the registrar will in nine cases out of 10 remedy the infringement of the individual's rights which is complained of. That perhaps is not a particularly weighty example.

The registrar of course has enormous powers set out in part II of the Bill: Section 10, "If the Registrar is satisfied…"; Section 11, "If the Registrar is satisfied…"; Section 12, "If it appears to the Registrar…". In each of these cases he obviously has to be presented with facts which indicate to him that certain things have happened, and in many of those cases the facts will be presented in the form of a complaint from the data subject, which we believe the registrar ought to be obliged to investigate so as to set in motion the powers that he can exercise under Part II. I am sure the noble Lord will say that the registrar can and will do these things. We simply ask, why not write it into the Bill? I beg to move.

Lord Elton

I have already tried to make clear the dangers of placing precise duties on the registrar, and I am afraid this amendment does attract those difficulties. Before I deal with them, I think I should point out another. While it would be in order for the registrar to investigate any complaints that subject access had been refused under Clause 21, the remainder of Part III conveys various rights exercisable through the courts. The amendment, as it is drafted at present, requires the registrar to investigate them also. Clearly it would be wrong for the registrar to oversee the work of the courts.

But I do not suppose that is what the noble Lord intends. I would rather address myself to his intention. That is that the registrar should investigate all complaints properly brought before him. Thereby he would, of course, lose his discretion in dealing with complaints made to him in distinguishing between those which were worth following up and those which were entirely trivial. But it is not just a question of eliminating the frivolous or vexatious, which could, I agree, be remedied by a further amendment. There will also be occasions when the registrar must be free not to investigate certain complaints, even though they may not be classified as ill-founded, frivolous or vexatious.

I hope the noble Lord will not take that out of context because I am thinking here that although he may have been alerted to a problem by a number of complaints, individual investigation of each one may not seem to him to be the most effective way of dealing with and resolving the issue. A single exemplary case might suffice at very much less cost and at rather greater speed. It is I am afraid the same old argument. Specific duties tie the registrar's hands in advance and we tie them, if we tie them now, when we cannot yet see how he would most successfully approach the matters that will concern him. A formal complaints procedure would require a good deal more provision than the amendment offers and we should not impose it on him regardless of his own views on the merits of such action when the time comes.

If a data subject believes that his right to compensation, correction or erasure under Clauses 22 to 24 have been infringed that is a matter for the courts and not for the registrar. If the subject feels that his right to access has been infringed he can already go to the registrar for action in respect of a breach of the seventh principle and the registrar is already under a duty to act to promote observance of the principles. By that means the Bill as cast makes clear where the registrar's duty lies without depriving him of all discretion where he believes that investigation would serve no useful purpose or where he could be better served another way. That, I must repeat, is far preferable to tying the registrar's hands as, regrettably, this amendment would.

I hope that I have explained to the noble Lord why we feel that the Bill is competent to do what he wants in the way that it is drafted and that it would not be advisable to be more precise.

Lord Avebury

I do not feel that it would be undesirable, as the noble Lord said, but I shall not prolong the argument at this hour. I intend to pursue the matter on Report; but now I ask leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

Clauses 34 and 35 agreed to.

Clause 36 [Application to government departments and police]:

Lord Elystan-Morgan moved Amendment No. 61:

Page 26, line 43. at end insert— (" (6) For the purposes of subsection (1) of this section a chief officer of police or chief constable shall not be treated as a servant of the Government department to which his responsibilities or duties relate").

The noble Lord said: The effect of this amendment is to add a sixth subsection which reads: For the purposes of subsection (1) of this section a chief officer of police or chief constable shall not be treated as a servant of the Government department to which his responsibilties or duties relate.

The purpose of the amendment therefore is to ensure that a chief constable must register police computers separately from the rest of the Home Office functions. We submit that the amendment is made necessary by the fact that the Bill in its re-drafted form allows disclosure to servants or agents by a data user or person carrying on a computer bureau. Therefore, persons in the public service of the Crown have to be identified as servants or agents of a particular department. It is clear from the interpretation in Clause 39 that organisations such as the Health and Safety Executive and the Commission for Racial Equality which were set up as, a body or authority exercising statutory functions are a "government department" for the purposes of the Bill and that they will have to register separately.

However, the position of a chief constable, in our submission, is anomalous. A chief constable is a person in the public service of the Crown, and particularly outside London his responsibilities or duties relate to the Home Office. Therefore chief constables are included, perhaps unintentionally, as people who relate to the Home Office as data users. So it is possible for police computers to be registered by the Home Office as data users.

The amendment is put forward purely for clarification; but I trust that the Minister will be able to say that if we are correct in our reasoning then there is no earthly reason why the amendment, or one very similar to it, should not be incorporated in the Bill. I beg to move.

Lord Elton

I am sure that the noble Lord will understand if I try to reply very briefly to an amendment which has required a great deal of research. This is a tortuous area to which we are addressing ourselves. The concern behind this amendment is that Clause 36(1) could have the unintended effect of making chief constables servants of a Government department—or more particularly of the Home Office—rather than separate data users. This is certainly not the Government's intention, nor, I am advised, is there any question that this could possibly be the effect of Clause 36(1) as drafted.

First, a chief constable would not be regarded as a person in the public service of the Crown. This would be contrary to the constitutional position of chief constables who have the sole operational responsibility for the policing of their area. Secondly, the responsibilities and duties of a chief constable would not, on any normal interpretion of the phrase, be said to relate to any Government department, including the Home Office. Again this would be contrary to the traditional independence of the office of chief constable. I should emphasise from experience that there is a great sensitivity about explaining that this link does not exist. Thirdly, an interpretation of Clause 36(1) which resulted in chief constables being treated as servants of a department rather than data users would make a nonsense of Clause 36 subsections (3) to (5), because these are drafted, and would only be necessary, on the assumption that chief constables will be data users.

The Government have looked carefully at the effect of Clause 36(1). I quite understand why on the face of it it would appear that the amendment is necessary, but I hope that, by explaining to the noble Lord the conventions, which are well established, about the relationships of these people, he will see that there is no danger for his amendment to avoid.

Lord Elystan-Morgan

We certainly welcome that assurance from the Minister. I am sure that his statement of the constitutional position is well understood on this side of the Committee and certainly by me as a former junior Minister in the Home Office dealing with police matters. Upon that very full assurance by the Minister, we are pleased to ask the leave of the Committee to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

Clause 36 agreed to.

Clause 37 [Data held, and services provided, outside the United Kingdom]:

Lord Mottistone moved Amendment No.62: Page 27, line 31. leave out subsection (5).

The noble Lord said: This is entirely a probing amendment to seek clarification of the meaning of Clause 37(5). This is another amendment on which I have had advice from the CBI. It seems to us that if data are processed wholly outside the United Kingdom but used in the United Kingdom, they fall outside the legislation by virtue of no longer being data within the meaning of Clause 1. It is also difficult to see to whom in the United Kingdom the subsection applies, since, if the data are processed wholly outside the United Kingdom, control is also outside the United Kingdom. I should be most grateful if my noble friend could clarify this for me. I beg to move.

Lord Elton

Clause 37(1) provides that the Bill does not apply to a data user in respect of data held outside the United Kingdom. But if one looks at Clause 37(2) it can be seen that we use these terms in a rather special sense, so that data are to be regarded as "held" where control over the contents and use of the data is exercised, irrespective of where the data are processed. Broadly speaking then, the Bill will apply where the person in charge within a data user bureau is within the United Kingdom.

This is, I would submit, the sensible approach, because it is these people who can ensure that the operations comply with the Bill. Given the international nature of the information technology industry and the capabilities of the equipment, a data user might utilise processing facilities belonging to bureaux or himself in a number of countries. Thus it would be arbitrary, and very difficult in practice, to make the whereabouts of the processing of personal data the sole criterion for the territorial effect of the Bill. This is why Clause 37 concentrates on the person in charge who may or may not be in the same country as the processing facilities used.

There are, however, two exceptions to this. First, Clause 37(3) provides that where aperson outside the United Kingdom controls the contents and use of data as mentioned in Clause 1(5), through a servant or agent within the United Kingdom, the servant or agent shall be treated as doing these things on his own behalf. This is to ensure that where a person such as a branch manager is effectively in charge of operations within the United Kingdom he cannot escape the obligations under the Bill simply by pointing to the ultimate foreign control, so claiming not himself to be the data user, and therefore depriving the registrar of anybody to whom to look in order to require compliance.

The second exception is set out in Clause 37(5). As is clear from what I have said, the whereabouts of the processing of personal data is in general irrelevant for the purposes of the territorial effect of the Bill. But where data are processed and used wholly outside the United Kingdom it would be wrong in principle to attempt to take jurisdiction simply because the person in charge happened to be in the United Kingdom directing operations that had effect in another country, where quite different data protection law and practices might apply.

This is a complex clause, but I am afraid that the international nature of the industry and the capabilities of the technology force this upon us. Given this complexity, my noble friend may wish to reflect on what I have said before committing himself; but I hope that when he has studied it he will agree that, on the whole. Clause 37 represents a sensible and practical approach.

Lord Mcintosh of Haringey

Before the noble Lord responds to that reply, I should like to add a single sentence in support of the Minister by saying that it is not just a matter of who controls and uses the data; and he is quite right in saying that the place where the data are processed is not the valid consideration. The fact is that with the networking of computers many data users do not even know where their data are being processed. The data could be going on to a network which operates in London, in Frankfurt and in San Jose, California, and one really has no idea where it is being processed. Where it is actually being processed is simply a matter of availability.

Lord Mottistone

I was ready to accept my noble friend's remarks without qualification until the noble Lord, Lord McIntosh, supported him. My suspicions are now aroused, and I shall have to look carefully at what my noble friend has said. It seemed to me that what he said made a lot of sense, but there might still be a loophole, and we shall have to have a look. I quite understand that the matter is complex, and strangely enough, I agree with what the noble Lord, Lord McIntosh, said. I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

Clause 37 agreed to.

Clauses 38 and 39 agreed to.

Clause 40 agreed to. [Commencement and transitional provisions]:

[Amendment No. 63 not moved.]

9.58 p.m.

Lord Elwyn-Jones moved Amendment No. 64: Page 29. line 28, leave out from ("above") to end of line 15 on page 30.

The noble and learned Lord said: Now we reach the omega of the Committee stage. The point that arises under this amendment is the old one about the fact that the registrar's powers to serve enforcement notices imposing requirements to be complied with are put in a state of suspense for a period of two years. The basis of this proposal was the fear that the registrar might be overwhelmed for that period of time by the duties and tasks being imposed upon him. It was considered that the two-year period of emasculation, or whatever is the appropriate word, was sensible in the circumstances.

In the meantime there have been removed from the registrar's purview both the payroll and the accounting systems, which were expected to account for much of the burden of work that he would have to face; so that now his initial burden, at any rate, will be rather lighter, and there is even less reason why he should not have the power to remedy even major scandals which become manifest from his own register. If the clause remains as it stands, he will be powerless to act.

As that is so, subject to anything that the noble Lord the Minister may say, it raises a serious problem under the convention. If the registrar—he is after all the executive and the supervising officer—has no powers to ensure compliance with the principles of the convention, it could indeed raise serious doubts as to whether we could properly ratify the convention in good faith. Even if that is not a binding, technical, legal problem that would face him, it could mean, were it to become widely known, that we could hardly expect the other convention parties to treat us as having conformed with the terms of the convention. It raises a serious matter. It is not merely the effect of his being left powerless to deal with what could well have become a major scandal manifest from his own register but our being exposed as having a dog that had a bark but no bite—a registrar with no powers effectively for a period of two years to intervene. I beg to move.

Lord Elton

We have come to the end of a second long, hot afternoon and evening. It is late and I shall detain the Committee but a moment. I hope however that your Lordships will allow me to cast my eye a little wider than this amendment. The exchanges that take place in this Chamber, the results reflected on the statute book, often have a profound effect on a great number of people for a very long time. That gives an importance to such exchanges of which we are never unaware. Compared with their results, the exchanges themselves are pretty brief; but they represent only a fraction of the effort that the Members of your Lordships' House put into legislation. It is only the tip of the iceberg that those outside the House are ever likely to see.

Legislation is an enormously complex process involving all the critical faculties and much consultation. For those in Government, it is just a part—if an onerous one—of the job. For those not in Government, it is a labour almost of love. It is enormously to the credit of this House that it is so thoroughly done. Those who bear the heaviest part of the burden tend to be the spokesmen of the Opposition parties who, without a Civil Service to support them, manage to give as good as they get, month after month and year after year, and do it with precious little thanks in prospect. This is a service that noble Lords who are not in office render to the country. It is voluntarily and tirelessly given.

Much that comes forward is of course hostile to the Government and Ministers reject it. But they do so after a searching consideration both of what is proposed and what they, the Government, intend. That is just as beneficial to the whole community as are those improvements that are actually incorporated in legislation. Beneficial as all these objections may be, the repeated process can become lengthy and try the patience of your Lordships, particularly if the responses are over solemn or over long. The reason that I say all this now is that in trying to avoid being ponderous, it is all too easy to appear merely dismissive of proposals that deserve careful consideration and which have, indeed, received it.

I fear that I seem to have fallen into that trap myself in dealing with a serious, carefully considered proposal put forward by the noble and learned Lord, Lord Elwyn-Jones, and his friends for statutory codes of practice when last we were in Committee. I may have done it unwittingly at other times and to other noble Lords. I therefore thought it right to explain that both I and the Government have a proper regard for their work and that of all your Lordships. I am only sorry if, at any time, this should not have been apparent. I could find no more suitable place to put that grace note except on the last amendment. I have caused my remarks on the last amendment to be somewhat eviscerated in order to leave room for that grace note. I hope that I do not fall instantly into the trap that I have just described.

Turning to what the noble and learned Lord has put before your Lordships, it is clear to all of us that time will be needed to bring the scheme in the Bill fully into effect. The White Paper indicated that registration would take a considerable time—perhaps two years. To require immediate compliance would quite unreasonably increase the cost burden on both public and private sector uses. Thus, broadly speaking the Bill provides for a transitional period of some two years during which data users and computer bureaux can come gradually into compliance with the principles.

One has only to consider the practical problems facing data users to realise that such arrangements are necessary. There will be the need to scrutinise the security precautions they take to protect their data. It will be necessary to consider the means by which data are collected. Steps will have to be taken to check that the personal data held are adequate, relevant and not excessive. I really think that the noble Lord, who has taken great care to try to resolve the difficulties of the first onslaught of work, has provided something which would not in fact be successful.

Obviously if the Bill left the registrar to determine when compliance will be required, we would expect him to adopt a sensible approach. But most users would, if they knew that they could be ordered by the registrar to comply with the principles at any moment, want so to comply from the start. That is how responsible users work. So the whole point of the transitional arrangements would be lost. And then, of course, there is the question of the civil remedies. The registrar can obviously have no role in dispensing with those in particular cases and therefore the Bill must make appropriate provision in that respect.

Lastly I should deal with the point raised about delay in ratifying the convention. The Government have been criticised for delaying ratification by allowing for a two-year transitional period. But some delay, as I have explained, is inevitable before the scheme is fully operational. The important thing is for the United Kingdom to establish a workable scheme as soon as possible while not imposing unreasonable burdens on data users by setting unrealistic deadlines. I would reiterate that the Government regard Clause 40 as making sensible provision for the implementation of the scheme on a reasonable timescale. I would urge noble Lords opposite to accept that this is preferable to the approach which they have, with great diligence and goodwill, put forward in the last amendment to this Bill.

Lord Elwyn-Jones

Let me say first of all that we note and are grateful for the generous tribute that the noble Lord has paid to the Opposition both below the Gangway (if that is the right phrase) and—if there was somebody there—on the mountain heights: to those who would have been behind me had they known what compliments were coming. I regard the duty of Opposition as being not merely to oppose but, indeed, largely to expose—to expose shortcomings and limitations in Government. I have always endeavoured to conduct my opposition politically on that basis and to provide such practical assistance as can be given, short of out and out rejection and opposition.

Here we deal with a difficult, very technical field where a matter of great importance, which I am bound to say has not been sought to be tackled before legislatively—namely, the protection of the privacy of the subject and consideration of the new menaces of computerisation—obviously raises, and has raised, serious and difficult problems. We have endeavoured, to the best of our ability, to play our part.

We still regard the Bill as inadequate. Nevertheless, we have done our best to contribute to its improvement. I am sorry that my noble friend Lord Mishcon had to leave before hearing the conclusion of our proceedings. But I should like in my turn to express our gratitude—and I think I speak for the whole Committee in doing so—to the noble Lord, Lord Elton, who has borne the heat and burden of the day, nobly assisted by colleagues from time to time, in a way which was patient and, at the end of the day, most generous.

So far as the immediate matter under consideration —the final amendment—is concerned, I will certainly consider what has been said. Whether the extent of the pressures on the registrar's time is still so severe, as is suggested, can perhaps be the subject of further thought. One of the gratifying features that has emerged today has been the willingness of the Government to present an open mind about the matter which has given rise to very grave concern in this House: the immigration question. I feel that we shall be parting with hope of better things to come and also the hope of a good Recess for the noble Lord and his colleagues.

Lord Avebury

Before we take leave of this amendment, may I say how very much we appreciated the kind and generous words of the Minister about the work of the Opposition. Encouraged by these completely unmerited encomiums, we shall quadruple our efforts at the Report stage.

However, sometimes it would be easier for the Opposition to do their job in the Chamber if they were provided with such facilities as one would expect in a normal office. Not to have a single square millimetre in the Palace of Westminster makes life just a little bit difficult. To have to buy one's own copy paper and carbon paper, and such things of that kind as one uses in a normal office, makes one believe that although the Government always say on the Floor of the House or in your Lordships' Committee that they want to see an efficient working Chamber, they are not really prepared to provide your Lordships with the means of carrying out their duties. But perhaps that would be an ungracious note on which to end.

I am hoping that attention will be given to this matter by the noble Viscount, Lord Whitelaw, who has always been such a champion of Back-Benchers. I am hoping that he may see his way to doing something to improve the conditions under which we labour and make the contribution that we make as an Opposition more efficient than it has been in the past.

This amendment in particular requires further examination. I should just like to make this suggestion to the noble Lord, Lord Elton. If we look at the procedures that have been adopted in other countries and we find that the timescale can be shortened, that is the route that we ought to take. The longer it takes to bring the full powers of the registrar into operation, the more data users will be encouraged to stray into undesirable practices knowing that the registrar will not catch up with them for a very long time.

Therefore, I believe that if we want the Bill to work then we want the data protection principles to be thoroughly in operation and to enter into the convention in spirit as well as in letter, we should try to shorten the time-scale. I suggest that it could be something like a year before the powers of enforcement are brought into practice. If we look overseas and we find that this has been done without causing any difficulty to the enforcement agencies in other European countries which have signed the convention, we ought to be able to do it with our great skill in these matters in administration generally in Great Britain.

We look forward to discussing this again in the autumn, with the noble Lord, Lord Elton. We hope that he has a restful time during the Recess but that he does his homework and comes back full of good answers, as he has been this afternoon. We too are most grateful to him in particular for the undertaking that he has given on Clause 28. If we can have the correct result as we see it from out deliberations on that matter, then all the time we have spent on this Chamber will be fully worthwhile.

Lord Elwyn-Jones

May I thank the noble Lord, Lord Avebury, for his support on this amendment. May I also thank him for his tremendous contribution to our discussions. He has shown very great conscientiousness, energy and thoroughness, and has obviously been willing to receive and to react to cries for help from all quarters—as most generously he always does. He plays a great part in the proceedings of the House. Although we would have liked some kind of indication, even of a 12-month substitution for the two-year period, in the light of what has been said, and with the opportunity of a long period of further consideration of the matter, I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

Clause 40 agreed to.

Remaining clause and schedules agreed to.

House resumed: Bill reported without amendment.

House adjourned at quarter past ten o'clock.