Security: The Case of Mr. G. A. Prime (Hansard, 11 November 1982)

§ The Lord Privy Seal (Baroness Young)
My Lords, with the leave of the House. I should like to repeat a Statement being made in another place by my right honourable friend the Prime Minister. The Statement is as follows:
"In my Statement on 20th July I informed the House that Mr. G. A. Prime had been charged with offences under Section 1 of the Official Secrets Act 1911.
"He was tried yesterday. He pleaded guilty to the charges under the Official Secrets Act and to charges relating to certain sexual offences.
"He was convicted, and was sentenced to a total of 35 years' imprisonment in respect of the Official Secrets Act offences and a further three years in respect of the sexual offences.
"Prime joined the Royal Air Force in 1956, when he was 18. After service in Africa he took a Russian language course and qualified in May 1964. In June 1964 he was posted to RAF Gatow in West Berlin where his work was of a classified nature.
"His engagement with the Royal Air Force terminated on 31st July 1968.
"Earlier that year he applied from Berlin to join Government Communications Headquarters.
"Although he had been positively vetted while in the Royal Air Force he was positively vetted again by GCHQ. He was certified for access to classified information and joined GCHQ in September 1968 as a Russian translator in the grade of linguist specialist (that is, broadly equivalent to executive officer).
"The highest grade he ever reached was the next grade up (broadly equivalent to higher executive officer).
"He was positively vetted again in 1973, and that was reviewed again in 1974 following the break up of his first marriage.
369 "Nothing arose on either occasion to put in doubt his fitness for access to classified information, and his certificate was renewed.
"In the course of his employment both in the Royal Air Force and in GCHQ Prime came to have access to information ranging from the sensitive to matters of the utmost secrecy.
"He resigned from the Government service for personal reasons in September 1977, and has not since then been employed in the public service or in any other position which would give him access to classified information.
"Prime first came under suspicion earlier this year following an investigation by West Mercia police into a case of indecent assault on a young girl. He was charged with this and two other similar sexual offences on 28th April 1982.
"While he was in custody, Mrs. Prime told the police that she thought that he might have been engaged in espionage.
"His home was searched and a quantity of espionage material was discovered.
"Though at first he denied having been a spy, he eventually made a confession, in which he gave an account of his espionage activities.
"In his confession he claimed to have embarked on these activities (to use his own words) 'partly as a result of a misplaced idealistic view of Soviet socialism which was compounded by basic psychological problems'.
"He said that he had initiated a contact with the Russian Intelligence service while he was in the Royal Air Force in West Berlin in January 1968. He told them the nature of his work and said that he wished to give them any information they wanted. During the remainder of his service with the Royal Air Force in Berlin he passed information to the Russians.
"In August 1968, after leaving the Royal Air Force and before taking up employment in GCHQ, he visited East Berlin to be given training and equipment for espionage activities.
"During his period of service in GCHQ he made a number of visits to Vienna for meetings with his Russian controller, at which he handed over material and received money, instructions and further equipment.
"After he resigned from GCHQ in September 1977 there were two further contacts.
"He went to Vienna two and a half years later in May 1980 taking with him photographic material and handwritten notes derived from the last period of his Government service.
"Then he was summoned to East Berlin in November and was closely questioned.
"He was urged to seek further employment in Government service, but did not do so. On one or other of these occasions he was given further espionage equipment, but he did not use it.
"What I have just said summarises Prime's own account of his activities.
"Over a period of 13 years to 1977, during which he was engaged on highly classified work. Prime had access to information of the utmost secrecy; and on his own admission from the beginning of 1968 at 370 least until 1980 he passed the Russians a lot of that information, which must have alerted them to the state of our knowledge of certain important aspects of Russian defence arrangements, and to the ways in which that knowledge was obtained.
"It is not only British interests which have been damaged; the damage extends to the interests of the United States Government.
"And of course the damage to our own and United States interests is damage to the interests of the Atlantic Alliance as a whole.
"There is, however, no evidence that Prime had access to any classified information about our own or allied military dispositions or intentions, or about nuclear weapons; or to any information which could have endangered the lives of agents.
"This case raises three major questions. The first is how Prime was able to be engaged and retained upon highly classified work and to escape notice as a spy for so long; and whether this was due to some defect in procedures which remains to be corrected.
"The second question is to ascertain precisely how much and what information Prime passed to the Russians and what damage was done.
"The third question is whether Prime knows of any others in the public service who were or who may have been involved in espionage.
"Investigations so far have yielded no evidence which contradicts Prime's own statement that no others were involved in his activities. But now that the trial proceedings are complete, all these questions must be further and exhaustively investigated.
"I told the House on 20th July that any security issues that arose would be referred to the Security Commission in accordance with the arrangements described to the House on 23rd January 1964 and on 10th May 1965.
"As the right honourable Gentleman the Leader of the Opposition is aware, it was not possible to proceed with a reference while the trial proceedings were pending.
"Now, after consulting the Chairman of the Security Commission and the right honourable Gentleman, I have decided to refer these matters to the Security Commission.
"The terms of reference will be:
'To investigate the circumstances in which breaches of security have, or may have, occurred arising out of the case of Geoffrey Arthur Prime, who was convicted on 10th November 1982 of offences under the Official Secrets Act 1911; and to advise in the light of that investigation whether any change in security arrangements is necessary or desirable'.
"These terms of reference will enable the commission to inquire into all the questions which this case raises.
"The commission's findings will be laid before the House to the fullest extent compatible with national security".
My Lords, that concludes the Statement.

§ Lord Cledwyn of Penrhos
My Lords, we are very grateful to the noble Baroness for repeating the 371 Statement. We had read most of the details in today's newspapers and it is without doubt a deeply disturbing case—the worst in this category for about 30 years. A mass of information has been passed to the Soviet Government and, as the Prime Minister said, major questions now call for answers: notably, how so totally unstable a character came to be recruited to so sensitive a post and then promoted in it with access to matters of the utmost secrecy.
The case shows beyond doubt that positive vetting is an inadequate procedure to rely on to such an extent. Prime was positively vetted three times, according to the Prime Minister's Statement. Therefore, may I ask the Government whether they will now consider creating some new system whereby the Intelligence Service is made more accountable to Parliament? We support the reference to the Security Commission and are glad to understand that as full a report as is reasonably possible will be published in due course. Later, of course, the House will expect to debate this matter; but, in the meantime, we thank the noble Baroness.

§ Lord Wigoder
My Lords, we also are grateful to the noble Baroness the Leader of the House for repeating this grave Statement. If one looks at the first six months of this story, so far as it is known, the first six months of 1968, and the first count to which Prime pleaded guilty, it appears that in January of 1968—I assume after he had already been vetted for the first time; the noble Baroness can perhaps confirm that—he was in contact with the Russians in Berlin. In July 1968 it appears that he sought employment at the Government communications headquarters and was positively vetted for a second time, apparently without any discovery being made of the previous approach in Berlin.
It then appears that at some time within the next month or two, before taking up his employment, he was in East Berlin being trained in espionage by the Russians. Perhaps the noble Baroness can help us as to whether that was before or after the second vetting which took place at the time that he was seeking employment with the Government. It then appears perfectly clear that before the third vetting in 1973 there were frequent contacts with the Russians in this country and it may be—and, again, the noble Baroness can perhaps confirm this—there were also trips to Vienna during that period.
On the facts as they were revealed in court yesterday it is perfectly clear that the positive vettings were a total failure. They failed not only to reveal his activities and his movements: they failed also, of course, to reveal his sexual proclivities, if they indeed existed at that time. They perhaps have very little relevance to this case in the sense that he was not a person, so far as one can make out, who was blackmailed into this activity. Nevertheless, they are the kind of proclivities that should be revealed by an efficient, positive vetting system.
I should like to ask the noble Baroness this. When reference is made to the Security Commission, are they going to consider not only whether—as is almost self-evident—the positive vetting procedures totally failed on the earlier occasions but also whether the existing positive vetting procedures are adequate and whether they can be improved? Thirdly, are they going 372 to consider whether it may be that positive vetting procedures in themselves never offer a complete guarantee in matters of this sort? Is there not an urgent necessity that there should be some form of continuous supervision? For example, this man's passport may have contained evidence of his trips abroad. Was that ever looked at and, if so, when and what did it reveal? Is there not clearly a case for the Security Commission to look into the whole of the arrangements for not merely vetting at periodic intervals of several years but covering continuous supervision and control of people who have access to sensitive information?

§ Baroness Young
My Lords, I should like to thank both the noble Lord, Lord Cledwyn, and the noble Lord, Lord Wigoder, for their response to this very serious Statement. In answer to both noble Lords, who are naturally—as are all noble Lords—very concerned about the positive vetting process, I would say that this is a matter on which we shall have to await the advice of the Security Commission in the light of its investigation. That answers the various detailed points that the noble Lord, Lord Wigoder, put to me about looking to see whether the procedures are adequate or whether they need improvement. The Commission has already considered the positive vetting process in the course of its review of security procedures last year, and it made a number of recommendations which have been put into effect.
I should like your Lordships to recognise the very important point that no vetting process can be proof against someone who is sufficiently determined and sufficiently skilful to keep his activities secret, unless the authorities are prepared to resort to methods of investigation and surveillance which I believe Members of this House would contemplate only with extreme repugnance.
The noble Lord, Lord Cledwyn, asked about the possibility of a debate. I have noted that and it will be a matter for the usual channels.
On the particular points asked by the noble Lord, Lord Wigoder, I can say that Prime was positively vetted in September 1968. He had of course been vetted during his RAF service, but they would not have been the same procedures as when he applied to join GCHQ. On the question about whether his passport was looked at, yes indeed it would have been looked into by the investigating officer when he was positively vetted before joining GCHQ. Regarding the exact dates when these matters took place, I can only say that this clearly will be a matter that the Security Commission will look at. I am sure that they will take note of the detailed questions which the noble Lord has asked.

§ Lord Shinwell
My Lords, is the Leader of the House aware that the implied criticism by my noble friend the Leader of the Opposition and the noble Lord. Lord Wigoder, about the inadequacy of positive vetting appears to me to be irrelevant? The question that has to be asked—and it has not appeared in the terms of reference—is: who is responsible for what is called positive vetting? Are they going to be brought into the picture? Are those who are associated with the terms of reference going to be informed about the people who were responsible for the vetting? Having undertaken 373 the ordinary, normal vetting, is a person about whom there may be suspicion followed up wherever he goes? Is any crime in which he has indulged investigated? Are his family's circumstances taken into account? Are all other relevant matters considered? In other words, it is not so much the vetting—there is nothing wrong with it; it is a question of how it is undertaken and who is responsible. Will that aspect be brought within the terms of reference?

§ Baroness Young
My Lords, I take the point of the question of the noble Lord, Lord Shinwell, when he says it is not just a question of the procedures for positive vetting but whether the procedures are adequately followed through. I think this is the sort of issue which the Security Commission will look at because it is clearly necessary to follow up what are quite naturally very real anxieties, not only in this House but outside, that there is something further which could or should have been done. It is very necessary that all the procedures should be thoroughly looked at, and this is what the terms of reference will enable the Security Commission to do.

§ Lord Beloff
May I ask another detailed question? Will the Security Commission be entitled to look also at the arrangements for the physical security of material held at GCHQ and similar places? It seems to be that it is almost impossible, even with the best system of vetting in the world to prevent people retaining things in their heads and communicating them to other people: but in the Prime case, as far as one can gather from the Attorney-General's speech at the trial, actual physical material was removed and handed over to other people. Is it possible to have checks against the removal of physical material, whether by people who have been vetted or those who have not?

§ Baroness Young
My Lords, the answer to the noble Lord, Lord Beloff, is, Yes. This is the kind of issue which can be, and I have no doubt will be, looked at by the Security Commission. It has been raised obviously not only by my learned friend in his Statement but also in other reports that we have had.

§ Lord Harris of Greenwich
My Lords, is the noble Baroness aware that many of us recognise the force of the argument that she has just put forward, that if procedures were tightened up beyond a reasonable extent it could create genuine civil liberties problems? I think most of us accept the force of that argument; but would she also not agree that the revelations at this trial have done the most grievous damage to our relations with the United States of America and with the Intelligence community within the United States, which will have a very serious impact upon our security services in this country? Secondly, would she recognise that this matter came to light only because of a particularly painstaking inquiry undertaken by police officers in the West Mercia Force into a number of sexual offences? Had it not been for that inquiry the offences of Mr. Prime would not have been detected?
Also, may I ask several other questions? Would the noble Baroness not agree that it is a matter of serious concern that a person who has access to information which is, as the Prime Minister described, "of the 374 utmost secrecy" has been making visits to Eastern Europe without apparently the fact of these journeys having being disclosed to anybody?
Secondly, when the Commission look into this matter—I should be very grateful if the noble Baroness is able to give me a specific answer to this—will they also be invited to look into the resource implications as far as the security services are concerned and the other agencies involved in tightening up existing procedures? Would she not agree there is no point in tightening up procedures unless there are adequate personnel to undertake this work? Lastly, would she not agree that the Statement made today has done grievous damage not only to our relationship with the United States and has also, unhappily, given pleasure to the Soviet Union as a result?

§ Baroness Young
My Lords, I have not in any way attempted to minimise the seriousness of this Statement or of what has happened. I think that view is shared by all my colleagues in Government. In answer to the question put by the noble Lord, Lord Harris, about our relationship with the United States, the Americans do not regard this speech as catastrophic. They, in common with most other democratic countries, have had their own security problems in the past and I have no doubt that the present close co-operation in intelligence and security matters will continue.
The noble Lord asked also about the resource implications for security matters. As I indicated in my answer to the original question on the whole process of positive vetting, the Government have put into effect all the procedures which were recommended last year. I am quite certain that if the commission felt that the resources for positive vetting procedures, or other procedures which may or may not come out during the course of the investigations required to be increased they would say so, and obviously this would be a serious matter which the Government will have to consider very seriously when we have the commission's report.

§ Lord Hankey
My Lords, the terms of reference have been very carefully drawn but rather narrowly drawn, if I may say so. May I ask the noble Baroness whether the Government will also look at this very unpleasant case in its wider implications? When I was in the Foreign Service it was strictly forbidden even to mention GCHQ, and I was amazed last winter when "Panorama" put on a programme giving very complete information about MI5, MI6 and also GCHQ, with pictures of the headquarters buildings and a great deal of other information.
I wonder whether we have not been getting a little "wet" about this subject, because information on our intelligence services is absolutely vital to the Russians. An American Communist called Philip Agee, whom we had to expel, has been publishing information designed to give complete details of the CIA and also of the CIA's agents over here and its relations with our own intelligence services—and even at one time with parts of the Labour Party. Do the Government not consider that this state of affairs is becoming embarrassing and damaging to the real interests of this country and will they take advantage of this case to go into the matter more carefully and see whether our 375 whole attitude to the security of these intelligence organisations should be tightened up?

§ Baroness Young
My Lords, I have of course noted very carefully what the noble Lord, Lord Hankey, has said on these matters. Clearly the terms of reference have been drawn in order that the circumstances arising out of the conviction of Prime will be fully investigated. If it is possible to improve the circumstances there, it will be found that it will make it more difficult for others to find out security material, but I think it is very important in the first instance that we should look at the security system and at how the particular circumstances in which Prime was able to reveal this information arose, so that we can deal with them. Then the other matters would follow. The answer to the noble Lord would be that we would not enlarge the terms of reference. I am sure that the commission will note the questions which have been asked following this Statement in your Lordships' House and I am sure they will bear in mind what he has said.

§ Baroness Gaitskell
My Lords, may I ask the noble Baroness this: is it not important to look into the people we employ rather than the system? It seems to me that where we have gone wrong in recent years is in allowing in people who have really disappointed by their obviously very evil character.

§ Baroness Young
My Lords, I do not think I can say anything further to the noble Baroness, Lady Gaitskell, than I said in my answer to the original question about the whole process of positive vetting.

§ Lord McNair
My Lords, may I ask the noble Baroness a question which may be peripheral, but which I hope she will not find irrelevant? According to my information, which, of course, comes only from the press and from the Statement, the unfortunate wife of this spy is showing a commendable resistance to the lures of what we might call cheque book journalism. Does the noble Baroness agree that this is commendable, and can she assure us that, whatever agency there is that looks after the dependants of convicted offenders, it will keep the case of this woman and of the step-children of the convicted man sympathetically and continually under review?

§ Baroness Young
My Lords, indeed, the behaviour of Mrs. Prime has been very commendable. I have no doubt that she has been through a very difficult and upsetting time. I will certainly note the points that he has made and will pass them on.

§ Lord Mayhew
My Lords, will the noble Baroness confirm that none of this man's visits to Vienna or to Eastern Europe was known to the authorities at the time?

§ Baroness Young
My Lords, on the point about Prime's visits abroad, his visits to his Russian controller while he was employed in GCHQ all seem to have been to Vienna, and the fact is that Vienna is not behind the Iron Curtain. However, I have no doubt that it is something which will be examined by the commission.

§ Lord Greenhill of Harrow
My Lords, may I ask the noble Baroness a rather different question? I have, in the past, been a member of the Security Commission but I do not think that the point which I am going to raise comes within the scope of the commission. The point is this. Will the Government please recall the cases of Blake and the Russian spies, the Krogers, who were wrested from this country by the actions of the Russians, and thereby enabled to escape the consequences of their actions? So long as the Russians can recover from this country the spies that they have employed, it will be an encouragement for further recruitment.

§ Baroness Young
Yes, my Lords. I am sure that we have all noted that important point raised by the noble Lord, Lord Greenhill, and it is something which not only we should note, but which I am sure the Security Commission will recognise.

§ Lord Elwyn-Jones
My Lords, has not the Lord Chief Justice put that beyond peradventure in this case?

§ Baroness Young
I hope so.