HL Deb 13 May 1982 vol 430 cc362-73

7 p.m.

Further considered on Report.

Lord Elwyn-Jones moved Amendment No. 26: After Clause 61, insert the following new clause:

("Documents disclosed in litigation

. The obligation to protect and maintain the confidentiality of the contents of a document disclosed to a party to litigation or his solicitor shall terminate if and to the extent that the contents of the document are read aloud in open court in proceedings which are not subject to any limitation on reporting.").

The noble and learned Lord said: My Lords, this amendment has been round the course before, the last time finishing in a dead heat. As your Lordships will know, it arises out of the Harman case, which was apparently brought by the Home Office in the hope that it would help to clarify the law on contempt of court. Unhappily, it has failed signally to do so. The three-to-two decision of the noble and learned Lords of the Appellate Committee in that case has prompted considerable demand, particularly in the press and the media, for the legal position to be made clear, and that is the aim and purpose of this amendment.

As your Lordships will know, when parties are involved in litigation they are under a duty to disclose and hand over to their opponents all the documents which are relevant to the issue in the case. It is a valuable part of the procedure in civil cases. Relevant documents are an important part of the evidence, and in some cases they are indeed of more value than the oral evidence itself. Because the documents are often private—indeed, usually so—the litigant and his lawyers who receive them from the other side are under a duty not to disclose them for purposes other than the pur- poses of litigation; and that is obviously right, because it protects the confidentiality of the documents until such time as they are needed in court. If and when the cases come to court, the documents, if they are relevant and admissible—and the judge, of course, has control of that—may be read out and questions may be asked about them, and the parties may examine witnesses about their contents. The public and the press representatives in court hear their contents read out. In the High Court, what is said and read out is mechanically recorded and transcripts are available on payment.

The court has, of course, substantial powers to prevent documents and evidence from being disclosed or made public if it thinks the public interest and other relevant considerations make that course necessary. This power of the court can be exercised by the judge at any stage in the course of proceedings; for example, on application for discovery of documents or for their production at the trial itself. That power was in fact invoked unsuccessfully by the Home Office in the Harman case, in the proceedings brought against the Home Office; the learned judge ordered production of the documents.

When the court thinks that confidentiality is of overriding importance, it can give effect to that view. The judge can order that a document should merely be read silently in court and not aloud, and can apply other safeguards with which the press and everyone else must comply. This amendment will not alter that position or remove that protection. But if documents are read out aloud in open court, I submit that they then become public property and public knowledge. To use the language of the noble and learned Lords, Lord Scarman and Lord Simon of Glaisdale, in the Harman case, "privacy is then stripped from them".

My Lords, the common law of this country has long recognised the principle of open justice. To ensure that the public administration of justice in open court will be subject to public scrutiny, the press should be free to report what has become public knowledge and to report and comment upon what is said in courts of law. As the noble and learned Lords whose names I have just mentioned indicated, trials often expose matters of public interest worthy of public discussion, and serve a purpose additional to the judicial task of doing justice between the parties in the particular case. The openness and ability to report what is said in court is a valuable means of informing the public and promoting informed discussions upon matters of public interest.

The outcome of the Harman case—and this debate is in no sense a rehearing of that case—turned, as the noble and learned Lord, Lord Diplock, said, on its own particular facts, which he described as "very special". However, in the event its outcome has produced a good deal of general uncertainty and concern as to where, in particular, the press now stands. That concern has been expressed by the Press Council, which has indicated its support of the amendment. The Guild of British Newspaper Editors has stated that it believes the amendment is necessary: to preserve free speech and, in particular, to protect the ability of journalists to report, discuss, criticise and comment on what has been said in open court". The National Union of Journalists has also expressed its concern, and supports the amendment.

I submit—and I take the matter briefly because we have covered the ground before—that the amendment accords with principle, is in the public interest and will be of value in maintaining the freedom of speech and of comment. I beg to move.

Lord Campbell of Alloway

My Lords, may I apologise for not having been able to attend at the Committee stage. This amendment raises the question whether the majority decision in the Harman case should continue to represent the state of judge-made law, and in this context your Lordships may think two matters may be of relevance. One is that it was by an accident of composition of your Lordships' Appellate Committee that the decision went as it did, because so easily could it have gone the other way. The other matter that your Lordships may consider to be of relevance is that as long ago as 1966 the doctrine of stare decisis was abolished, and that, in a matter of great public importance such as this, if it came back before a differently constituted Appellate Committee the decision again might go the other way.

Apart from reflecting the judicial distaste of the conduct of Miss Harman, who was using documents obtained in discovery for an ulterior purpose, not connected with the litigation—and do not let us pretend that it was otherwise—the reasoning of the majority, in submission, is open to serious objection for three reasons; that is, serious objection as affording a safe precedent, that it should remain as part of our judge-made law. The first is that it is an impracticable situation. I borrow, if I may, with your Lordships' permission, gratefully, what was said by the noble Lord, Lord Hutchinson, at the Committee stage. The fact that he was more concerned with the aspect of criminal law than civil law does not, as I am sure your Lordships will agree, detract from the force of his observations on this issue. Also, that affects those who practise in the courts and—perhaps how much more important—the press. Here the speech of the noble Lord, Lord Jacobson, again in this regard, I adopt and also, with the utmost respect, everything that was said by the noble and learned Lord, Lord Elwyn-Jones, just now. The second reason is that it is unduly restrictive of fair and accurate reporting within the public domain; and, thirdly, it conflicts with the principle that what has been said in open court and done in open court is within the public domain.

This being regarded as a constructive discussion, may one put aside criticism? May one put aside criticism of Miss Harman? It is accepted that she believed that she had the right to do what she did and that in that sense she acted in good faith. On the question of professional misconduct, a handsome withdrawal and apology has been made. There is no question of professional misconduct. It is important if one is to have a constructive discussion to clear away prejudice which can obstruct a fair approach. Let us in that spirit put aside all criticism of Her Majesty's judges who were faced with a conflict of principle, the conflict between the principle of confidentiality and the principle of freedom within the public domain. The majority decided—and perhaps we should be grateful to them in one sense—in favour of the principle of private confidentiality but at the expense of the public domain. The question is really this. In the long run, is this right or wrong? In my submission, it was wrong for the reasons that I have given.

I have so little more to detain your Lordships with, but those who support this amendment will vote for a more practicable, more workmanlike approach. They will also vote for a wider concept of freedom. They will also do something more as a bonus. They will do something to ease or remove the tensions which some of your Lordships may have seen evolve over recent years between the press and the judiciary. That is a bonus. But it is not one, in my submission, to be cast aside or just ignored.

Among the lawyers there are two views. There is nothing wholly unusual in that. But perhaps it is fortunate that this problem does not lie to be resolved by the somewhat jerky antics of opposing teams of mummers round some home-made, parchment maypole in the execution of a Morris dance. It falls to be resolved by your Lordships. In that regard, I acknowledge that my noble and learned friend the Lord Chancellor said at the Committee stage that this was a complex and difficult problem and I hope that he will forgive me for having spoken in the manner in which I have.

7.15 p.m.

Lord Wigoder

My Lords, I shall suggest to my noble friends when they return from the dining-room that we should support this amendment, although I do so with perhaps slightly more reservation than has been expressed by the noble and learned Lord, Lord Elwyn-Jones. My reservations are twofold. First, that there will be inevitably a temptation for publicity-conscious and politically-motivated members of the legal profession to reveal in court the contents of documents, not because that helps their legal case but because that helps their political cause. That is a temptation which I think one must rely upon the integrity of the legal profession to resist.

Secondly, I do not think it has been realised perhaps in the debates on this amendment that as a matter of practice certainly 99 per cent., if not 99½ per cent., of the documents that are read in open court are not read in full. There are almost invariably extracts and there are irrelevant passages that are missed out. There is a danger that a document will be read partly or mostly in court and handed over to the press so that there may be publication of parts of it that are confidential. I accept that if the wording of this amendment is strictly complied with, that danger will not arise; but I suspect that it may do so nevertheless.

Having made those observations, I remain of the view that the fundamental argument put forward by the noble and learned Lord, Lord Elwyn-Jones, is quite irrefutable in logic. My noble friends and I will go through the Contents Lobby. In doing so we are not to be taken as expressing our most enthusiastic approbation of the conduct which gave rise to this litigation.

Lord Renton

My Lords, I must confess that I have throughout found this a very difficult issue. It is the first time I have spoken on it, but I have read a great deal about it I find myself, for the first time since we had the advantage of his appointment to your Lordships' House, in disagreement with my noble friend. I come down on the side of confidentiality and I do so for a particular reason. Of course, there are other reasons which I need not express.

It is the fact that in civil actions, in order to save time, frequently the attention of the court is drawn to documents, sometimes quite lengthy documents or a number of documents, without one actually reading them out. On many occasions the judge or the members of the Court of Appeal will have read the correspondence in advance of the case, and all that one has to do in appearing before the court is to invite the court's attention to documents which have been disclosed, which are known by counsel and solicitors on both sides, and their contents are known; and it saves a great deal of time if you do not have to read the document aloud—and I use the words in the amendment. If this amendment were passed, there would, I fear, often be an ulterior motive in that documents would be read out which it might not have been normally the practice to read out. That is the principal reason why I come down on the side of confidentiality.

But there is another reason, if I may say so, why I feel that it would be unwise for your Lordships to pass this amendment. My noble and learned friend the Lord Chancellor has made it clear that at this stage of the Session he will be fortunate to get his Bill on to the statute book. To the extent that controversial issues are introduced into the Bill before it leaves this House, there is the risk—and I do not know how great it is, for I am not in charge of Government business—that because of increasing controversy the Bill might not be passed in this Session. That would be extremely regrettable. If it comes to a Division, I shall be voting against this amendment.

7.20 p.m.

The Lord Chancellor (Lord Hailsham of Saint Marylebone)

My Lords, the noble and learned Lord, Lord Elwyn-Jones, in his admirably concise speech in proposing this amendment, said that we have been round this course before. Indeed we have. I must begin by reminding the House—and I would say in particular my noble friend Lord Campbell of Alloway, who was not I think a Member of it at the time—that we went round the course first of all on the Contempt of Court Bill, when a similar amendment was moved by the noble Lord, Lord Gifford. On that occasion I gave an express undertaking, which I repeated at the Committee stage of this Bill, that once the litigation in the Harman case was out of the way I would see that the matter was properly discussed not only with my colleagues but with the profession and other interested parties, which of course includes the press.

The effect of trying to bulldoze this amendment through now—if the noble and learned Lord will forgive such an indelicate expression—is to prevent me from carrying out that undertaking which stands. I hope to persuade the House that there is more to this issue than the noble and learned Lord thought. It is a basic principle of law reform—especially lawyer's law reform, if I may be forgiven for using a common phrase—that one should have the fullest consultation before effecting controversial changes in the law. That this is controversial there can be no doubt at all, if only from this short debate that we have held. The noble Lord, Lord Wigoder, had his reservations—very wise ones, if I may so say. The noble Lord, Lord Renton, had his, which he expressed very well a moment or two ago.

I simply want to say some of the things which make this to my mind a very highly controversial proposition. It is important to remember that the only person before the court in the Harman case was Miss Harman. I see the noble Lord, Lord Gifford, in his place, and I do not want to say anything at all derogatory about Miss Harman. I think that the noble and learned Lord, Lord Elwyn-Jones, and my noble friend Lord Campbell of Alloway, in saying that the House of Lords Appellate Committee was divided three-two were altogether over-simplifying the state of affairs at the end of the Harman case. Seven judges out of nine, —from Mr. Justice Park, the Court of Appeal, to the House of Lords—decided that she was guilty of a contempt of court. That was one side. Two judges of the utmost eminence, universally respected and admired, my noble and learned friends Lord Simon of Glaisdale and Lord Scarman, took the opposite point of view.

To say in those circumstances that the matter is simple and should be dealt with as if it were not controversial is to underestimate the difficulty of the problem. To show how controversial it is, the noble and learned Lord who proposed this amendment this time should have borne in mind what the issue was as seen by the majority in the House of Lords and by the four judges who decided the matter below the House of Lords.

The opening words of Lord Diplock's judgment in the case were: My Lords, in a case which has attracted a good deal of publicity, it may assist in clearing up misconceptions if I start by saying what this case is not about. It is not about freedom of speech, freedom of the press, openness of justice or documents coming into the public domain'.". Nothing could be more flatly in contradiction with every word which the noble and learned Lord said about it than that.

The noble Lord, Lord Gifford, in rather a frolic of his own—if he will forgive me saying so—said at the Committee stage that the law was an ass. But the noble and learned Lord, Lord Diplock, is not an ass; he is one of the best judges of English law in this century. The noble and learned Lord, Lord Keith of Kinkel, who arrived at this same conclusion by another route, because he is a Scots lawyer and therefore may be presumed not to have started with any particular preconception in favour of our curious esoteric habits of English law, said this: The fact that a certain inevitable degree of publicity has been brought about does not, in my opinion, warrant the conclusion that the door should therefore be opened to widespread dissemination of the material by the other party or his legal advisers, for any ulterior purpose whatsoever, whether altruistic or aimed at for financial gain". The noble Lord, Lord Wigoder, spoke about ulterior motives for altruistic or political reasons. But of course information can be sold, if this amendment is passed, for financial gain. The noble and learned Lord, Lord Roskill, made similar observations of an equally serious kind about the consequences. He said this: …it was common ground that there was no previous decision of any court which might guide your Lordships' House to a correct answer. I do not find that this is in any way surprising, for although the obligations to which the undertaking gives rise are well known and of long standing, no one until the present case has suggested that that undertaking is susceptible of termination or qualification in the manner now urged on behalf of the appellant". These are very weighty considerations. When one considers what is really proposed, one must consider the issues of public policy which are involved on the side opposed to those who are supporting the amendment. First of all, there is the relationship between solicitor and own client. It is fundamental of course that a solicitor or barrister should not be able to show his client's documents to others, even if he believes such disclosure to be in the public interest, without the consent of his client. If this amendment is passed, once the document has been read out in open court, forever afterwards that will no longer be binding on the legal adviser of the client.

There is the interest of the opposing party. There is nothing improper about an agreement freely made between parties not to disclose their documents to others even after a hearing, and there seems no reason why promises given in such circumstances should not be kept. Yet if this amendment is passed forever and forever, ad infinitum, such an agreement will be unenforceable between parties.

Let us consider one or two cases in which this issue might have arisen. Let us consider for instance the case of Church of Scientology v. Department of Health and Social Security. In that case, as in the Harman case, disclosure was ordered against the DHSS which included hospital case notes and confidential medical reports I do not want to say things which are derogatory of the Church of Scientology, although I have heard other people say remarkably critical things of that body. If this amendment had been passed, they could have used that document against the people whose medical reports were shown at any time in the future without any recourse against anybody. This is on the assumption that the documents were read out in court, of course. This is an assumption that I must make for this purpose to make the case comparable.

Let us take the case of Campbell v. Tameside Metropolitan Borough Council. In the case, a middle-aged schoolteacher was violently attacked by a pupil, suffered severe injuries and had to retire early. Her solicitors wanted access to the pupil's school records to ascertain whether they supported the allegation that the child had a history of repeated violence, and so they sought discovery. That preliminary matter went to the Court of Appeal which, balancing the public interest in keeping such records confidential and the interests of justice in having them produced, required disclosure of the school records for use only in the conduct of the instant case and for no other purpose. But if this amendment had been passed, that would have been a power they would have been totally unable to enforce, because, if the amendment were passed, the obligation of confidentiality would have been terminated by the reading in court, if it took place.

There are serious questions of public policy to be discussed here. The noble and learned Lord who proposed the amendment spoke of the necessity for discovery. I do not myself disregard the difference, as he appeared to do, between civil and criminal proceedings as the noble Lord, Lord Hutchinson of Lullington, remembers that I said in Committee. One of the greatest difficulties in civil litigation is for solicitors and counsel to persuade their own clients about the absolute duty under which they lie of disclosing these particular documents. They may be secret memoranda—they are not confined to Government departments—and they could be secret memoranda in relation to private litigation, but one is able to say that, if they disclose the documents, they cannot be used for any ulterior purpose whatsoever. It would not be only the press who would be able to use them if this amendment is passed. It would be anybody—anybody in the world—without limit of time. Once they had been disclosed in discovery and read out in court they could be used to harass innocent individuals and persecute them. It so happens that Miss Harman, being, as she is, the solicitor to the National Council for Civil Liberties, is very much preoccupied with civil liberties. She is persuaded—I have no doubt sincerely—that in the particular case in which she was engaged as a party as well as a solictor civil liberties stood on her side and not on the other. But I wonder what she would have said if those medical reports or school reports had been used against an individual, and I wonder what her counsel would have said.

These are very serious questions of public policy: that is all I am saying. They are obviously controversial. They are controversial as between members of the profession. They must be—if ever this amendment came to be the law, which it could well do—controversial as between members of the public. It is not the press: they are not directly involved at all. The press were not accused of contempt of court: they were not before the court. Miss Harman was before the court and found guilty of contempt of court unanimously up to the House of Lords and by a majority in the House of Lords. There was a suggestion, which has not been repeated today, I am glad to say, that the House of Lords judgment depended on a real or imaginary distinction between reporters and feature writers. But it depended on nothing of the kind. The question was whether breach of an undertaking not to disclose which Miss Harman was found to have given, not merely implied, but as an express undertaking, was a contempt of court when she did disclose. That was the finding. It could have been a reporter 20 years afterwards or it could have been a feature writer at the time. But the fact is that this does involve serious questions of public policy. I am sorry that the House is rather a thin one, but I hope I have established that at least to those in the Chamber at the present time.

All I ask—I ask no more—is that I should be allowed to keep the undertaking which I gave on the Contempt of Court Bill. I shall be prevented from keeping it if this amendment is bulldozed through on this occasion. I shall be prevented from consulting the profession, the press, members of the public or interested bodies. I am asking only that what is admittedly controversial should be omitted from a non-controversial Bill and that the ordinary procedures regarding law reform which involve reference and consultation should be pursued, instead of an attempt to pre-empt all the ordinary procedures of this kind.

For these reasons, I hope that even at this late hour the noble and learned Lord who has heard my appeal will yield to it. I think he will make this concession to me at all events. I entered into a bargain both with my colleagues and with the Opposition that this Bill should not contain any controversial matter. I have kept that bargain and I think I could defy anyone who has heard the proceedings in this Bill to say that I have not kept this bargain through thick and thin. I have kept it against the Opposition but I have also kept it very severely, perhaps more severely, against my noble friends when they have sought to write into the Bill some provisions which I believed, rightly or wrongly, to be controversial and which I thought would be rightly considered to be controversial by those to whom I gave my undertaking. Having said that, I do ask the House, without prejudice to any future decision which Parliament may wish to make, to yield to my appeal on this occasion not to pursue the matter any further. That is the only answer I can give to the noble and learned Lord.

Lord Campbell of Alloway

My Lords, before the noble and learned Lord sits down, might I say I was wholly unaware of the undertaking he had given that the due process of consultation would be put at jeopardy and that, although my views remain my views, I wholly accept that this is not the appropriate vehicle in which they should be conveyed.

Lord Elwyn-Jones

My Lords, this is clearly a very important amendment and a very important occasion. Let me clear some of the ground first, if I can. We on the Opposition side, and noble Lords on the Liberal Benches and those behind me have co-operated fully in seeking to eliminate from this Bill matters not directly pertaining to the administration of justice. But contempt of court is a very important aspect of the administration of justice and it is very important that the public and the press should know where they stand in relation to it. The judgment of your Lordships' House on this issue was given on 11th February of this year. The issue has been canvassed widely in the press and in learned journals since that time. I readily concede that opinion is not unanimous in support of the point of view I have expressed, but I would venture to express the judgment that it has been pretty overwhelmingly in favour of the amendment.

So far as the amendment is concerned, the suggestion that I am bulldozing the Lord Chancellor comes very strangely, as if he would be capable of being bulldozed. It is a lesson I have learnt in long, long association with him that that is not "on", and I am not trying to put it "on". Whether we were opposed in court or wherever else it may have been, it does no good, and I am not trying it. But I think it is necessary to test the opinion of this House in a few moments of time.

It is, indeed, a pity that the House is so thin and that the attractions of a square meal take importance over the consideration of improvement in the administration of justice. I have always found it so in another place and here. I never introduced an important measure of law reform with a House of more than four or five people. We are doing pretty well tonight! So the judgments have to be exercised in absentia by those who have no doubt given the matter careful thought beforehand, with those who are present possessing the advantage of having heard the arguments.

There is a certain conflict of interest here. I maintain the principle of the common law of this country that justice should be open, that the public administration of justice should be in open court and that the public should have the right to know what is going on and to be informed by the press about what is going on. The reality of the position at the moment is this. What is said in the High Court is all recorded mechanically. Anybody can buy the record of what has been said in open court. I imagine that it will be open and available even in the 20-year interval which that great advocate, the noble and learned Lord the Lord Chancellor, called in aid. So it is no longer confidential. Once it has been read out aloud in open court, the confidentiality has gone out through the window. It has become public knowledge uttered in the public domain, and the right and duty of the press is to report exactly what goes on in the public domain.

As I ventured to say in my observations, the litigant is not defenceless. If this amendment is carried, hereafter the judges will still have the power, where they think that matters of delicacy are involved, certainly where they think that matters of public security are involved, either to require the document not to be read aloud at all—and one has had many instances of that, such as in medical cases and when considering probation reports; I do not want to go into the criminal field, but there are many circumstances where that is and has been done—or to adjourn to chambers and have the matter dealt with there, where the press are not present at all. That also is done.

So your Lordships must not think that we are leaving the litigant defenceless if this amendment goes through. On the contrary, the court still has considerable powers at all stages, as I said in my observations, to protect the position of the litigant. So it is not the case that we are leaving him at the mercy of ruthless lawyers—I do not know who they are—who are, apparently, willing to exploit the position for the benefit of this, that or the other purpose.

What is happy about the Harman case is the common ground that the conduct of the lawyers in that case is in no way impugned. Your Lordships were not here, but you may well have read of the full retraction and apology which the noble and learned Lord, Lord Rawlinson, made, because it was thought that some of his early observations might have given an indication that the lawyers, especially counsel, were the target on that occasion. That allegation was generously and fully withdrawn the moment when the noble and learned Lord, Lord Rawlinson, learned what the true facts were.

So coming back to the issue with which we are now faced, I submit that the primary consideration is to maintain the principle of open justice, and when we have the arrangements that already exist—first, the matter having been read aloud the confidentiality has ceased anyway; and, secondly, the powers remaining in the trial judge to control the proceedings, so that that which ought not to go to the public domain need not go to the public domain, where confidentiality should be a primary consideration—the judge can deal with the matter in that way and protect the litigant. I am sorry to be in disagreement with my noble and learned predecessor about this. In my respectful submission, we have trodden this ground both in the House and outside it, and I think it is proper that the view of the House should now be taken.

7.45 p.m.

On Question, Whether the said amendment (No. 26) shall be agreed to?

Their Lordships divided: Contents, 56; Not-Contents, 75.

Ardwick, L. Kennet, L.
Aylestone, L. Kilmarnock, L.
Bernstein, L. Kirkhill, L.
Beswick, L. Llewelyn-Davies of Hastoe, B.—[Teller.]
Birk, B.
Bishopston, L. Longford, E.
Blease, L. Mishcon, L.
Boston of Faversham, L. Monson, L.
Brockway, L. Peart, L.
Bruce of Donington, L. Pitt of Hampstead, L.
Cledwyn of Penrhos, L. Ponsonby of Shulbrede, L.
Collison, L. Rhodes, L.
David, B.—[Teller.] Ross of Marnock, L.
Donaldson of Kingsbridge, L. Seear, B.
Elwyn-Jones, L. Segal, L.
Elystan-Morgan, L. Stedman, B.
Evans of Claughton, L. Stewart of Alvechurch, B.
Fisher of Rednal, B. Stewart of Fulham, L.
Gardiner, L. Strabolgi, L.
Gilford, L. Strauss, L.
Gosford, E. Tordoff, L.
Hampton, L. Tweeddale, M.
Houghton of Sowerby, L. Underhill, L.
Hutchinson of Lullington, L. Wedderburn of Charlton, L.
Jacobson, L. Wells-Pestell, L.
Jacques, L. Whaddon, L.
Jeger, B. Wigoder, L.
Jenkins of Putney, L. Winstanley, L.
John-Mackie, L. Wootton of Abinger, B.
Kaldor, L.
Abercorn, D. Cork and Orrery, E.
Airey of Abingdon, B. Crathorne, L.
Ampthill, L. Cullen of Ashbourne, L.
Armstrong, L. Davidson, V.
Auckland, L. De La Warr, E.
Avon, E. Denham, L.—[Teller.]
Belhaven and Stenton, L. Digby, L.
Bellwin, L. Drumalbyn, L.
Beloff, L. Eccles, V.
Brougham and Vaux, L. Ellenborough, L.
Coleraine, L. Elliot of Harwood, B.
Colville of Culross, V. Elton, L.
Enniskillen, E. Morris, L.
Fortescue, E. Mottistone, L.
Fraser of Kilmorack, L. Murton of Lindisfarne, L.
Gainford, L. Northchurch, B.
Gainsborough, E. Orkney, E.
George-Brown, L. Orr-Ewing, L.
Gridley, L. Pender, L.
Hailsham of Saint Marylebone, L. Piatt of Writtle, B.
Rankeillour, L.
Henley, L. Renton, L.
Hunt of Fawley, L. Ridley, V.
Hylton-Foster, B. St. Aldwyn, E.
Kemsley, V. St. Just, L.
Kinnaird, L. Sandys, L.—[Teller.]
Kinnoull, E. Sharples, B.
Lane-Fox, B. Skelmersdale, L.
Lindsey and Abingdon, E. Spens, L.
Long, V. Stradbroke, E.
Loudoun, C. Swansea, L.
Lyell, L. Trefgarne, L.
McFadzean, L. Trenchard, V.
Macleod of Borve, B. Trumpington, B.
Margadale, L. Vaux of Harrowden, L.
Marley, L. Vivian, L.
Mersey, V. Ward of Witley, V.
Montgomery of Alamein, V. Young, B.

Resolved in the negative, and amendment disagreed to accordingly.

Lord Denham

My Lords, I beg to move that further consideration on Report be now adjourned.

Moved accordingly, and, on Question, Motion agreed to.

Lord Denham

My Lords, I beg to move that the House do now adjourn during pleasure until eight o'clock.

Moved accordingly, and, on Question, Motion agreed to.

[The Sitting was suspended from 7.54 to 8 p.m.]