HL Deb 15 March 1982 vol 428 cc402-13

3.30 p.m.

The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State, Department of the Environment (Lord Bellwin)

My Lords, I beg to move that the House do now resolve itself into Committee on this Bill.

Moved, That the House do now resolve itself into Committee.—(Lord Bellwin.)

On Question, Motion agreed to.

House in Committee accordingly.

[The LORD ABERDARE in the Chair.]

Clause 1 [Travel concessions in London]:

Lord Underhill moved Amendment No. 1:

Page 1, line 13, at end insert—

("( ) It shall be the duty of the Greater London Council in the exercise of their powers under subsection (1) to enter into arrangements with the London Transport Executive for the provision of travel concessions for elderly and disabled persons").

The noble Lord said: The Committee has before it this Bill to give the Greater London Council powers to pay for travel concessions for the elderly and the disabled—precisely the same powers as given to other authorities in the United Kingdom, under the Transport Act 1968. I suppose that I should declare an interest, as I should have done on Second Reading, not because I am a ratepayer receiving these concessions, but because I have the facility of a British Rail senior citizen's pass which gives me concessions in London. Incidentally, I noticed on reading the posters as I came in this morning, that the concessionary fares for those persons who hold these passes outside the Greater London area will be increased by three times.

This is a simple amendment, the purpose of which is to place on the Greater London Council a duty to exercise these powers and to enter into arrangements with the London Transport Executive to provide the services required to meet the needs of the elderly and the disabled. On Second Reading, I inquired whether there was any assurance that payment of a grant for concessionary fares could not be held to be unlawful. I said: We must ensure that everything possible is written into the Bill to make certain that the legality of concessionary fares in Greater London is not to be challenged in law. It must be made absolutely watertight". [Official Report, 8/3/82; col. 17.] The noble Lord, Lord Bellwin, did not greatly help me, because he said on Second Reading on 8th March at column 22 of the Official Report: My right honourable friend gave his view of what is a reasonable level of support in his transport supplementary grant settlement". I ask your Lordships to note the words "his view". It was not a legal ruling. The noble Lord, Lord Bellwin, continued: It is for the GLC to take their own view on whether a different level would comply with the law". Therefore, apprehensions about a possible challenge to the concessionary fares are real. I shall not take up the time of your Lordships by quoting from the Law Lords' judgment—this will arise on Amendment No. 2—but after repeatedly reading the whole text of that judgment, there is nothing that gives me, as a layman, an assurance that the concessionary fares could not be challenged, and that is the advice that I have received.

I am certain that all noble Lords will want the concessions for the elderly and the disabled to be made an actual fact and to be continued by the GLC, as is proposed in this Bill. The amendment seeks to help to clarify the position by placing a duty on the GLC to make arrangements with the London Transport Executive in exercising the powers to provide these travel concessions for the elderly and the disabled. We submit that this would lessen the possibility of the provision of these concessions being challenged in law. That is the purpose of the amendments. I beg to move.

Lord Bellwin

It seems to me that the noble Lord's proposed amendment to Clause 1 is closely linked to his proposed new clause, in that both taken together are intended to prevent the legitimacy of the GLC's expenditure on travel concessions from being challenged in the courts, particularly on the ground that the GLC has breached its fiduciary duty to its ratepayers. I can understand the fears. They were aired when this Bill was considered in another place, and the then Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for Transport dealt with the point. The noble Lord, Lord Underhill, might like to look at what he said in Hansard for 1st March at columns 45 and 46.

But to take the noble Lord's amendment to Clause 1 on its merits, the first point to be made is that this Bill is concerned with putting the GLC in exactly the same statutory position as all other local authorities in England and Wales, so far as its powers to pay for travel concessions are concerned. It is for the noble Lord to show why the GLC should be under a duty to arrange for concessions, while all other local authorities have a discretionary power to do so. I do not think that he has satisfactorily shown why this should be so.

The Government's position is clear. We have said all along that, in our view, the question of whether there should be travel concessions and how generous they should be is one for individual local authorities to settle for themselves in the light of the circumstances in their own areas. We stick to that view, in spite of the pressure from various quarters to impose a standard national scheme. It seems to me to follow from that that the GLC, like any other local authority, should be free to choose whether or not to pay for travel concessions, as well as what kind of schemes to run. I do not imagine that there is any risk that the GLC will need compelling to continue its present scheme. I therefore see no need or justification for treating the GLC differently from all other authorities by placing a duty upon them.

I recognise that the amendment provides a foundation for the new clause. The main question here is whether the GLC's expenditure on travel concessions should be exempt from the normal fiduciary duty of local authorities to look after their ratepayers' money with proper care. It seems highly undesirable for any local authority to be freed from the responsibility to use its ratepayers' money in a responsible way. I can see no justification for saying that concessionary travel is, in some way, so special that a local authority should he able to spend its ratepayers' money on it as wastefully and as irresponsibly as it liked; and why should the GLC alone be allowed to be free of this normal duty to its ratepayers? Its recent performance does not seem to suggest that it is such an exceptionally responsible authority that there is no need for it to be subject to the normal constraints within which every other local authority works and has worked for many years.

The only justification, of course, lies in the fear that the noble Lord, Lord Underhill, and others have expressed, that, somehow, the GLC's fiduciary duty will be interpreted in the courts in a way which will prevent it from making even perfectly proper expenditure on travel concessions. This fear is misplaced. Legislation, as it stands, has allowed all other local authorities to run their concessionary fare schemes without challenge, and I am not aware that any challenges have been contemplated, even in the light of the salutary reminder which the courts have recenty given to local authorities of their underlying duty to every ratepayer.

The present powers for local authorities to pay for travel concessions for the elderly and the disabled, under Section 138 of the Transport Act 1968, follow the Public Service Vehicles (Travel Concessions) Act 1955. The 1955 Act was specifically framed to reverse the effect of the judgment in the case of Prescott v. Birmingham Corporation. In that case, the court held that it was unlawful for Birmingham Corporation to grant travel concessions for pensioners, because it had to run its transport undertaking on a commercial basis.

The present Bill gives the GLC specific powers to arrange for travel concessions, as other authorities already have. In making payments to London Transport for this purpose, the GLC are not constrained by London Transport's duty to break even, as far as practicable, which was the main consideration in the Bromley case. I have seen no evidence that the present powers under the 1968 Act have become inadequate in this respect, nor that they would not serve the GLC as well as they have other local authorities. So there is no case for exempting the Greater London Council from the normal proprieties of local authorities by trying to exempt them from their fiduciary duty. If the noble Lord wishes to press the amendment, I would ask your Lordships to resist it.

Lord Hawke

Before the noble Lord sits down, could I ask him to give some guidance to those of us who are in receipt of these benefits: whether it would be proper for us to vote one way or the other on either of these two amendments?

Lord Bellwin

Just as when the noble Lord, Lord Underhill, in moving his amendment declared his interest I assumed he would not have any reservations or inhibitions about voting, any more than he did about speaking to the amendment, so I should have thought that that would apply to my noble friends and, indeed, to anybody else who wished to vote.

Lord Mishcon

In view of that intervention, which was obviously most proper, may I disclose that I am in the dual capacity of walking into one formula, happily not the disabled, and also, very proudly, of having been a ratepayer of London for very many years. Having disclosed that interest, may I speak in support of the amendment and deal with the arguments which, as always, have been lucidly expressed by the noble Lord the Minister. I say "lucidly". I did not say "logically". The noble Lord the Minister will forgive me if I differentiate between the two.

There is not the slightest doubt that if the noble Lord the Minister were in a judicial capacity and could pronounce his judgment as a member of the judicial side of your Lordships' House, we should have listened to him with rapt attention and there would have been no point in moving this amendment. But the noble Lord the Minister does not sit in a judicial capacity. The Law Lords have recently come to a decision—I am one of those who believe in respecting the decision of the Law Lords and in respecting the Law Lords themselves—which rather surprised many of the people who occupy the voluntary position of being local councillors. It was this: When they cast their benefits, in welfare or otherwise, they operate as trustees for the ratepayers and they must always remember that there is this fiduciary capacity.

It is quite right that there was a Birmingham case some years ago, but I believe most of your Lordships would have assumed when looking at local authority welfare expenditure that that was in the wide discretion of local government, who are merely asked to act reasonably in the way in which they dispense ratepayers' money. The difference now is that it is not a test of reasonableness, whatever that may be. The noble Lord the Minister was asked by my noble friend and myself on Second Reading to tell local authorities, by a pronouncement from the Front Bench, what they could and what they could not do with regard to their expenditure upon the disabled and the aged and he replied, again lucidly but not very helpfully, that their expenditure had to be reasonable. We therefore managed to go round the eternal circle before the Second Reading stage was passed. At the Committee stage we cannot go round in circles. We have got to be a little more precise.

The purpose of this amendment is the following: this Bill pronounces that the Greater London Council shall have the power to do what other local authorities do over conferring concessionary travel allowances upon the elderly and the disabled. Leaving those words as they are, we are back again at the beginning of the circle in regard to the fiduciary capacity concerning ratepayers. Can Bromley again come forward and say that too much is being spent upon the disabled and the elderly and that in those circumstances the fiduciary capacity of the local authority, the Greater London Council, is being breached?

The purpose of a legislative assembly, as your great Lordships' House is in this matter, is to be precise and clear. We were not clear before, otherwise we should not have had the House of Lords decision. What this amendment says is that this is not just a power: there shall be a duty to look after the elderly and the disabled by way of travel concessions. And if there is a duty to do so, nobody can come forward and say that you are exercising a power you need not have exercised and therefore you are in breach of the fiduciary capacity. If therefore the Government want clarity and do not wish to fog the matter or open the door to further litigation, which can cause so much time wasting and cost wasting, they will agree to this amendment instead of opposing it as, so far, the noble Lord the Minister has done.

Lord Bellwin

Had I attempted, as the noble Lord Lord Mishcon, asked me to do at Second Reading to spell out exactly what local authorities should do in this direction—or in any other, for that matter—I doubt very much whether they would have thanked me, even if I had decided so to try—which clearly was impossible to do. I repeat: what this Bill sets out to do is to oblige the Greater London Council to be in exactly the same position as all other local authorities—neither forward nor behind. I do not think we need to go further.

Lord Underhill

In view of the noble Lord's remarks, which to a great extent deal with the second amendment (which I have not spoken on). I should like to read very carefully what he has said. I know that there is anxiety that the Report stage should be completed fairly quickly because of the desire to get the Bill passed by the end of the month, and we wish to assist. As I have already said, I should like to read what the Minister has told us regarding the first amendment, and then we can decide what to do at the Report stage. Therefore I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

Clause 1 agreed to.

3.48 p.m.

Lord Underhill moved Amendment No. 2:

After Clause 1, insert the following new clause— ("( ) No expenditure incurred in the exercise of the duty imposed upon the Greater London Council by section 1 of this Act shall be held to breach the fiduciary duty of the council to the ratepayers").

The noble Lord said: This amendment is the one upon which the noble Lord the Minister has to a great extent concentrated in his reply to Amendment No. 1. Its purpose, quite simply, is to provide that expenditure incurred by the Greater London Council in carrying out the powers under Section 1 (to provide for concessionary travel for the disabled and the elderly) shall not be held to breach the fiduciary duty of the council to ratepayers.

Reference has been made to the judgment of the Law Lords who placed considerable emphasis upon the fiduciary duty to ratepayers. It is very difficult to quote extracts from nearly 100 pages of the judgment, but a very important statement was made by the noble and learned Lord, Lord Scarman, who referred to the case which my noble friend Lord Mishcon mentioned during his remarks on the previous amendment: the Birmingham case of 1955 which concerned their fiduciary duty relating to concessionary fares. Birmingham then had no general powers. On page 6 of his judgment the noble and learned Lord, Lord Scarman, said: The legislation, the facts and the era were very different from the 1969 Act and Greater London in 1981. Moreover, Parliament has subsequently intervened to permit fare concessions. But a principle was declared by the Court of Appeal. it is well put in the headnote as being that local authorities owe a fiduciary duty, analogous to that of a trustee,"— that is a remark to which my noble friend Lord Mishcon referred— to their ratepayers". The noble and learned Lord, Lord Scarman, also stated: So far as I am aware, the principle of a fiduciary duty owed to the ratepayers has never been doubted. Certainly, I do not doubt it". May I quote also from the judgment of the noble and learned Lord, Lord Keith of Kinkel. Dealing also with the Birmingham case of 1955 the noble and learned Lord said at page 2 of his judgment: The effect of the decision has been reversed by statute in relation to free travel for certain selected categories of persons, including the old (see section 138 of the Transport Act 1968, and, as regards London, section 40 of the 1969 Act), but the general principle laid down remains valid". Mr. Kenneth Clarke, until recently Under-Secretary of State for Transport, pointed out on 1st March (in column 45)—and I can assure the noble Lord, Lord Bellwin, I have read and re-read all the speeches on this matter in another place— It is true that all the statutory powers of local authorities are subject to the fiduciary duties of ratepayers, which for many years all local authorities have owed to ratepayers, as the courts have said". He added that it is not a novel doctrine; it goes back 20 years. I am certain that many noble Lords would think that 20 years was not a long time. In the light of that statement, concessionary fares could come within the fiduciary duties. It may be that the question of concessionary fares was never placed in doubt in the legal arrangement; but Mr. Kenneth Clarke, in the same speech, stressed that the Law Lords had applied a stricter test for transport than they might have done for other social services.

With respect, I would say that it is not sufficient for the former Under-Secretary of State to have stated, as he did in column 46: There is no prospect of anyone challenging a well thought-out concessionary fares scheme introduced by councils that exercise the statutory powers that they have had for many years". That was what everyone thought was the case applying to the Greater London Council's general cheap fares policy. Everybody thought until the Bromley case that that was within the law. Moreover, the Minister stressed that all local government policies could be held to come within the fiduciary duty. According to the judgment, there must be a balance between the duty to the ratepayers and that to particular groups of persons. The disabled and the elderly are particular groups of persons.

If the Minister says, as he did in reply to the first amendment, that this could not possibly arise—he hopes that it could not arise; he has no certainty—will he define those local government activities which would be liable to the 1955 judgment concerning fiduciary duty and those which would not? The noble Lord, Lord Bellwin, could not do that. He may say as he did in relation to Amendment No. 1, that it depends upon the policy being reasonable. I would suggest with respect that what is considered reasonable in 1982 might not be so considered in 1985. I am sure that what was considered reasonable when I entered politics in 1930 is far different from that which, now, 52 years later, is considered reasonable.

No one can say that these powers could not be challenged. Why not, therefore, provide safeguards in the Bill? Mr. Kenneth Clarke emphasised (in column 45) on 1st March that the fiduciary duty to ratepayers is not statutory. I do not think that anyone would challenge that and, therefore, as I am sure the whole Committee would wish there to be no interference with the provision of concessionary fares for the elderly and disabled, we should agree to the amendment and place it in the Bill.

May I conclude by saying that the spokesman in the other place, Mr. Albert Booth, said that it must be ensured that the Greater London Council powers to provide these concessionary fares were not circumscribed by the Lords. I am certain that he was referring to the Lords of Appeal. He wanted a freestanding power, irrespective of any duties in legislation, to provide these services. I would emphasise those last words. Later in the same debate, Mr. Kenneth Clarke said: There will be a free-standing power to use the rate-payers' money for the purposes of financing a concessionary fares scheme". Note that the then Minister and the spokesman for the Opposition both wanted the same thing and used almost the same words. I would suggest that the desire of both honourable gentlemen to have a free-standing power can be ensured only if this amendment is approved. I would ask the Minister, if he says that it could not be challenged because it is a reasonable thing—and one's idea of what is reasonable can change—and if he believes that there is a legal ruling why it can be challenged, to quote me a legal reference as to why it cannot be challenged. I do not believe he can. As the Committee will not wish to challenge these concessions, I beg to move.

Lord Bellwin

As the noble Lord, Lord Underhill, has said, I had covered in my original response what I wanted to say on this as well as on the first amendment. Again, I see no reason to go any further than we are going; no need for the concern that the noble Lord has expressed, because, if it applies to the Greater London Council, then it applies to all other local authorities. So far as I am aware, they are not lining up for some new powers, for some new clarifications or for some new statutory legislation to specify precisely what is needed.

I do not think it is quite fair to try to say that the stance taken by the Greater London Council, which was subject to the Bromley case, can be compared in any way with what we are talking about now. There, they were setting out to do something which was open (or became so) to challenge and which was highly controversial, or became more than that in the end. In this Bill it is something quite different. This is to give the Greater London Council the same powers as everyone else, and we would want to stand on that. Let us go on with it and get this on to the statute book. Then there is no difficulty so far as I am concerned. The noble Lord is right. It could be challenged if it is not spelled out as he wishes, but, in practice, the likelihood is remote. If so, the same challenge would apply to all local authorities; and then it would become another matter. I do not think that is what we are concerned with today.

Lord Mishcon

For the sake of the time of the Committee, I wish that things could be left in the way in which the Minister would like to leave them. I think your Lordships will remember that the travel arrangements made by the Greater London Council, be they right or wrong, were forecast openly in their manifesto, be it sensible or ridiculous, and were never greeted throughout the Kingdom by lawyers or others with the remark, "How foolish! You will not be able to do it. It is contrary to the law". Nobody thought of that. No Conservative lawyer, unless he was deceitfully hiding his reasoning and arguments until after the election was over—and I do not think that is applicable to any Conservative lawyer; and I am greeted with approval from the Front Bench opposite, so I must be right—came forward.

I wonder whether the Minister remembers that so doubtful is this area of the law that the judge of first instance found in favour of the Greater London Council. From hearing the noble Lord the Minister speak, it seemed so obvious that what the Greater London Council was doing was illegal that really they ought to have known it, everybody ought to have known it and of course the legal position was quite clear. But it was not. The judge of first instance found in a way contrary to the Court of Appeal and the House of Lords. It is the Law Lords and the Court of Appeal who have had all the vituperation from those who are upset by their judgment. The vituperation ought not to go to them at all; it ought to go to those who frame Acts of Parliament and who revise Acts of Parliament, as this House does, and who do not do their job properly. If it be the wish of this House to pass a Bill in which it is abundantly clear that the fiduciary duty does not apply, then it is the duty of this House to do so and not to leave it to the ambiguities, the arguments, and the lawyers of the future to debate the matter if ever it comes before the courts.

In conclusion, might I briefly explain to your Lordships precisely what I mean from a practical point of view. This afternoon the word "reasonable" has been pushed hither and thither. My noble friend Lord Underhill spoke in terms of the change in the meaning of reasonableness over the passage of years. I do not intend to go into that side of the argument, but perhaps your Lordships could imagine an argument before a court of law where an analysis has been taken of those who contribute rates to the Greater London Council. Imagine that, as a result of that systematic analysis, it has been found that business rates plus rates paid by those who are neither disabled nor aged hayed contributed 80 per cent. of the rates of the Greater London Council. In those circumstances, would your Lordships be quite sure that there is not a perfectly arguable case for saying that if those who are supposed to be the beneficiaries of the trust and who have contributed 80 per cent. of the rates of London are neither disabled nor aged, then it must be a breach of the fiduciary duty of the Greater London Council if it has granted concessions which amount to quite an expensive sum in favour of the aged and disabled? If the noble Lord the Minister says that other local authorities have not thought of this and have not asked for this amendment, I would merely suggest that they might very well want to do so in the future.

When the Bills were passed and dealt with, the House of Lords' judgment was not before the other local authorities. All we ask for on this side of the Committee is clarity. We ask for what the Minister himself claims, unless I misunderstood him. He claims that it is already written into the Act. We say that we do not think that it is written into the Act. We say that we want to carry out our duties and make things clear. It is in that spirit that the amendment is proposed, and I hope your Lordships will support it.

4.3 p.m.

Lord Donaldson of Kingsbridge

Having listened very carefully to the arguments, I shall advise my noble friends to support the amendment. I want to say only one thing, apart from acknowledging the same debt which the noble Lord, Lord Hawke, does; I too travel free, with the greatest of pleasure. The point of the Bromley case was not the concessions to the elderly or the disabled; it was the sweeping reduction in fares, which was probably uneconomic. This is an entirely different issue. Therefore, I believe that we are perfectly safe in insisting upon this and shall advise my noble friends to do so.

Baroness Wootton of Abinger

My noble friends are very persuasive but I wish they would give some grounds for providing the GLC with special protection which is not enforceable in respect of all other local authorities. The Bill as it stands puts the GLC on exactly the same footing as comparable local authorities throughout the country. I believe some defence is necessary for providing special protection, particularly from those of us who are very anxious to maintain freedom and independence in all aspects of local government.

Lord Bedeliffe-Maud

May I first declare my interest, as an old and senile person who benefits from the card in my breast pocket. It seems to me that there is one very strong argument against this amendment. I am sure all of us wish that there should be no further curtailment of the freedom of local authorities to make up their minds for themselves in the light of the electors in each local authority's area. I do not wish to develop the argument about fiduciary duty, but I personally believe that the fiduciary duty in this case is not only to people like myself, who are senile and incapacitated; not only to the ratepayers; but to all the citizens of, in this case, the Greater London area. That fiduciary trust is something that has to be weighed in the balance—in giving something outside what the law already provides to the Greater London Council—in giving freedom to Birmingham, Tyneside and the other transport authorities to interpret and balance the wishes of their citizens, whether incapacitated or wealthy, whether ratepayers or persons who do not have to pay rates (and as we all know, large numbers of people in each of our areas do not), and to take a decision in the light of what they think is an interpretation of the word "reasonable".

I entirely agree that the word "reasonable" has a shocking, although to my mind, splendid history, in that it changes and develops its meaning. How right we are, and what a matter for rejoicing it is, that if this debate had been taking place in the 1930s, we would not be operating in the same sort of context as we are today. In these circumstances I personally, as an independent Member of this House, will on this occasion give the Government the benefit of the doubt and vote for them and against the amendment.

Lord Tordoff

I also will advise my colleagues to vote for the amendment. In a sense, the speech we have just heard underlines the point. The problem is that "reasonable" may yet again be reinterpreted if these matters were to go before the Law Lords once again. As the noble Lord, Lord Mishcon, has said, what we need above all at this stage, for the GLC on transport matters, is clarity; otherwise we shall find ourselves going around the same bit of track in a few months' time, with the Government getting up again and saying, "Really, the GLC ought to suck it and see". I believe that that is not acceptable. Although I have problems with the instructions to the Greater London Council from your Lordships' House, I do not see any other way around this problem now that it has got to this stage.

To put the GLC in exactly the same position as other local authorities does not answer the problem because, in a sense, they do not know what position they are in in the event of a challenge. As the noble Lord the Minister has said, there has not been a challenge, but someone whose reasons might be unknown to us may wish to make that challenge at some stage in the future. It is time that Parliament made its intentions clear on this matter. Although I have some reservations about the wording of the amendment and believe that there might be some difficulty about inserting this new clause, which refers to an amendment which has been withdrawn—and doubtless someone will advise us on that point—nevertheless, I believe that this is the only way in which this House can make its view clear.

Lord Bellwin

Perhaps I might quickly add a final word. The noble Lord, Lord Underhill, said that he wants to ensure that these arrangements are not made subject to challenge in the courts. But the Bill cannot spell out the details of the concessions operated by the GLC, and it would be wrong to try to do so. What the amendment would do is to say that any arrangements would be immune from challenge. Clearly, that must be wrong. The GLC has the power to take ratepayers' money, and it has a duty to ensure that that money is dealt with responsibly. In my submission, the GLC should not be exempted from that duty, however worthy the nature of the cause.

Lord Underhill

I hope your Lordships will put on one side the general position of the fares policy of the GLC; that is not what we are discussing today in this amendment. It has been said that to do this would mean applying this condition to Greater London only. We had considered the possibility of amendments to the Bill, but we are constrained because the Bill is drawn up to provide only for Greater London and only to deal with concessions for the disabled and elderly. It should not be assumed that other local authorities are not perturbed. Your Lordships will be aware that there has already been a Merseyside case on their general fares scheme. That was only a decision in the first instance, as my noble friend Lord Mishcon said; the original decision in Greater London in the first instance was in favour of the Greater London Council. I am certain the noble Lord, Lord Bellwin, would agree that other local authorities are concerned about the operation of the whole question of fares grants as a result of the judgment.

The noble Lord said there is no need for concern and, in practice, it is so remote. It is because it is only so remote—in other words, it could be nearer—that this amendment is so important. I hope the Committee will support it. I am grateful to the noble Lords, Lord Tordoff and Lord Donaldson, for agreeing and being ready to support this amendment. The noble Lord, Lord Bellwin, said that this would give carte blanche for any powers. We are dealing only with concessionary fares for the disabled and the elderly. I hope noble Lords will concentrate on that position alone. No noble Lord, I am sure, would wish to see these concessionary fares for the elderly and disabled challenged, but without this amendment someone could challenge them; someone could say that this particular group is having a benefit that they should not have, having regard to the duty to the other ratepayers. Therefore, it is a matter of great principle, and in the interests of the disabled and the elderly we must press this amendment to a Division.

Lord Tordoff

Before the noble Lord sits down, could I revert to the point I made at the end of my remarks. The wording of the noble Lord's amendment refers to "the exercise of the duty imposed…by Section 1 of this Act", but by the withdrawal of his earlier amendment there is no reference to duty in Section 1 of the Act as it stands unamended.

Lord Underhill

This is a matter I am certain we can deal with at a subsequent stage. I think we should get the view of the Committee on what is the vital principle at stake in this amendment.

4.13 p.m.

On Question, Whether the said amendment (No. 2) shall be agreed to?

Their Lordships divided: Contents, 60; Not-Contents, 112.

DIVISION NO. 1
CONTENTS
Airedale, L. Jenkins of Putney, L.
Amherst, E. John-Mackie, L.
Ardwick, L. Kennet, L.
Aylestone, L. Kilmarnock, L.
Bacon, B. Leatherland, L.
Banks, L. Listowel, E.
Beaumont of Whitley, L. Llewelyn-Davies of
Birk, B. Hastoe, B.
Blyton, L. Longford, E.
Boston of Faversham, L. McGregor of Durris, L.
Brockway, L. Maybray-King, L.
Bruce of Donington, L. Mishcon, L.
Byers, L. Moyne, L.
Collison, L. Paget of Northampton, L.
Cooper of Stockton Heath, L. Peart, L.
David, B. [Teller] Phillips, B.
Davies of Leek, L. Plant, L.
Davies of Penrhys, L. Ponsonby of Shulbrede, L.
Denington, B. [Teller]
Donaldson of Kingsbridge, L. Stedman, B.
Elwyn-Jones, L. Stewart of Fulham, L.
Evans of Claughton, L. Stone, L.
Fisher of Rednal, B. Strabolgi, L.
Gaitskell, B. Taylor of Mansfield, L.
Greenwood of Rossendale, L. Tordoff, L.
Grey, E. Underhill, L.
Hampton, L. Wallace of Coslany, L.
Hanworth, V. White, B.
Houghton of Sowerby, L. Wigoder, L.
Jacques, L. Willis, L.
Jeger, B. Wynne-Jones, L.
NOT-CONTENTS
Adeane, L. Coleraine, L.
Airey of Abingdon, B. Constantine of Stanmore, L.
Alexander of Tunis, E. Cork and Orrery, E.
Allen of Abbeydale, L. Cottesloe, L.
Alport, L. Croft, L.
Ampthill, L. Cullen of Ashbourne, L.
Avon, E. Daventry, V.
Belhaven and Stenton, L. De Freyne, L.
Bellwin, L. Denham, L. [Teller]
Beloff, L. Dilhorne, V.
Belstead, L. Donegall, M.
Bessborough, E. Drumalbyn, L.
Cockfield, L. Dundee, E.
Ebbisham, L. Mersey, V.
Edmund-Davies, L. Milverton, L.
Effingham, E. Minto, E.
Eldon, E. Montgomery of Alamein, V.
Ellenborough, L. Morris, L.
Elles, B. Mottistone, L.
Elliot of Harwood, B. Mowbray and Stourton, L.
Elphinstone, L. Murton of Lindisfarne, L.
Elton, L. Newall, L.
Fraser of Kilmorack, L. Northchurch, B.
Gainford, L. Nugent of Guildford, L.
Gainsborough, E. Orkney, E.
Glanusk, L. Portland, D.
Glenkinglas, L. Rankeillour, L.
Gormanston, V. Rawlinson of Ewell, L.
Gridley, L. Redcliffe-Maud, L.
Hailsham of Reigate, L.
Saint Marylebone, L. Reilly, L.
Harmar-Nicholls, L. Renton, L.
Harvington, L. Richardson, L.
Hatherton, E. Ridley, V.
Hawke, L. Robbins, L.
Henley, L. Romney, E.
Holderness, L. St. Davids, V.
Home of the Hirsel, L. St. Just, L.
Hylton-Foster, B. Sandford, L.
Ilchester, E. Sandys, L. [Teller]
Inglewood, L. Selbourne, E.
Killearn, L. Sempill, Ly.
Kilmany, L. Shannon, E.
Kimberley, E. Soames, L.
Kinloss, Ly. Somers, L.
Kinnoull, E. Spens, L.
Lane-Fox, B. Stamp, L.
Lauderdale, E. Strathspey, L.
Linlithgow, M. Sudeley, L.
Long, V. Swinfen, L.
Loudoun, C. Thomas of Swynnerton, L.
Lucas of Chilworth, L. Tranmire, L.
Lyell, L. Trumpington, B.
Macleod of Borve, B. Vaux of Harrowden, L.
Mancroft, L. Wilberforce, L.
Mansfield, E. Wynford, L.
Marley, L.

Resolved in the negative, and amendment disagreed to accordingly.

Remaining clause agreed to.

House resumed: Bill reported without amendment.