HL Deb 21 July 1982 vol 433 cc853-64

3.10 p.m.

The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State, Home Office (Lord Elton)

My Lords, I beg to move that the Bill be now further considered on Report.

Moved, That the Bill be further considered on Report.—(Lord Elton.)

On Question, Motion agreed to.

Lord Hutchinson of Lullington moved Amendment No. 45: Insert the following new clause—


.—(1) Where a person has been convicted on indictment and has given notice of appeal, or as the case may be, notice of application for leave to appeal, the court of trial may, if they think fit, on his application admit him to bail pending the determination of his appeal.

(2) In section 19 of the Criminal Appeal Act 1968, after the words "of his appeal there shall be inserted the following subsection— (2) Where the appellant has applied to the Crown Court for bail and that court has withheld bail or imposed conditions the Court of Appeal may, if they think fit, grant bail or vary the conditions".").

The noble Lord said: My Lords, I rise to move Amendment No. 45 which seeks to speed up the criminal process in order to save time and—something I am sure is near the heart of the noble Lord the Minister—to save unnecessary expense. The proposal is a simple one, although it may take a few minutes to explain. It is simply to give Crown Court judges the power in appropriate cases to grant bail to persons who have given notice of appeal against their conviction or their sentence, a power which has been exercised by magistrates in cases appealed to Crown Courts every day of the week all over the country.

It may appear surprising to your Lordships that if a person chooses summary trial and is convicted and sentenced, say, to six months' or possibly 12 months' imprisonment by the magistrate, he can immediately enter a notice of appeal and apply for bail, which will be considered by the magistrates. If that same person chooses jury trial and goes to the Crown Court and is equivalently convicted and sentenced to up to 12 months' or more imprisonment, he may fill in all the necessary forms "or launching an appeal to the Court of Appeal Criminal Division, but the judge before whom he has appeared and been convicted would not be able to grant him bail pending the hearing of the appeal. That would seem strange—would it not?—because it is the judge at the trial who has heard all the facts, who knows the whole of the background of the accused person, who has heard the evidence and, indeed, who has probably ruled on a matter of law which is to be taken up to the Court of Appeal; yet he is not the person who makes the decision whether or not that person should be granted bail pending the hearing of his appeal.

There are times when Crown Court judges feel that a miscarriage of justice may have taken place. In the judge's opinion the jury may have been swayed by local prejudice or may have returned what he considers to be a perverse verdict; or he may have ruled in law on a difficult question of law which he, above all, would like to hear reviewed in the Court of Appeal. He may agonise about a sentence, feeling that although the mitigation is overwhelmingly strong, he is apparently governed by some observation made by the Court of Appeal which impels him to pass a custodial sentence really against his wishes, and he would wish that matter to be reviewed.

What can he do at the moment? He can say to the accused or the accused's lawyers, "I hope you will appeal against this decision". He can grant a certificate saying that the case is fit for appeal, but he cannot go on to say that it would be outrageous if this person should go through the whole trauma of surrendering himself at the local prison only to be released a week or a month later having served that period of time, when in all probability his appeal will be allowed.

In my submission two serious mischiefs arise by this situation. First, because, of course, there are substantial delays in the hearing of appeals, appellants may well have served a substantial part of their sentence by the time their appeal is called on in the Court of Appeal Criminal Division; for instance, with regard to this Bill the situation of a 21-day order of a detention centre for a young person. Secondly, at the moment—and I do not say this in any offensive way—many appeals are fudged in the Court of Appeal by allowing appeals against sentence in these terms: "We allow this appeal to the extent that the appellant is released today "; whereas what they ought to do, of course, is to say that no custodial sentence should, in fact, ever have been imposed at all. It gives rise to this fudging system because of the results of saying that no custodial sentence should have been imposed when the man or woman has already served a substantial amount of time in prison.

At the moment, if you wish to get bail pending your appeal you have to fill in a number of forms. They have to be sent to the registrar of the Court of Appeal in London and must be accompanied by the appropriate documents, or they may be sent to the governor of the prison. Of course, notice must be given to the police and the prosecution. When the hearing of the application for bail is made, the lawyers and the police have to come all the way to London, at a great deal of cost and, in my submission, causing a great waste of time, in order that this application shall be made.

The noble Lord the Minister made four observations when I moved this amendment at the Committee stage. First, he recognised the desirability of the proposal and wanted time to consider it, which gives one hope that he is now further convinced by its good sense. Secondly, he said, surprisingly, that as an appeal has to be submitted in writing to a judge of the Court of Appeal, he would be the only person who would have the material on which bail might be granted. I hope that I have dealt with that objection because that is manifestly not so. But what I suspect he may have had in mind is that whereas on a matter of law and a matter where a certificate is granted the appellant has an absolute right of appeal, where it is a question of fact in law or fact only, or a question of sentence, he must seek the leave of the Court of Appeal to be enabled to appeal. In my submission that is no basic objection to this proposal; it is merely a matter of mechanics, because if leave was refused on an application, he would simply have to surrender himself, either to the court of trial, which would be the simple thing to do, and be put back exactly into the position he was in when he was found guilty, or to the prison, in exactly the same way as a person who appeals from the magistrates has to surrender himself in due course to whichever court it is which will deal with his particular case.

The third matter which the noble Lord the Minister raised was that the amendment, as set down then, meant that any Crown Court judge should have this power. That has been corrected in the present wording of the amendment to read, as, of course, it should have read, the judge of "court of trial" —that is, the judge who tried the matter.

The fourth thing that the noble Lord the Minister said was to throw me a sop in the sense that he understood that the noble and learned Lord the Lord Chief Justice was minded to issue guidance to judges of Crown Courts to contact the registrar in London in cases of urgency to expedite the hearing of the appeal. I hope your Lordships would feel that, although of course that is excellent as an idea, so vital a matter as the deprivation of liberty of a defendant and the hearing of a possible miscarriage of justice should surely be governed by statute, should be dealt with openly, and should not simply be left to the goodwill of, if I may say so, a most humane registrar, the one who now fills that office, and the efficiency of solicitor, counsel, and the telephone system.

I assure the House that this reform is one which is much needed by practitioners and judges alike, but of course overwhelmingly by defendants who have to suffer the torture of an unjust and temporary incarceration. The amendment is backed by the All-Party Penal Affairs Group, and in its name I beg to move.

3.22 p.m.

Lord Wigoder

My Lords, I should like briefly to support this amendment. Of course the power to grant bail to an appellant pending appeal is sparingly used at the moment and there is no reason to suppose that it would be any the less sparingly used if this amendment were accepted. But it would be a useful, modest improvement on the present position in two respects. First, as the noble Lord, Lord Hutchinson, has indicated, there are each year a distressing number of cases—not a large number, but a sizeable number—where defendants have served the whole of their sentence before their appeal is heard, and their appeal is eventually allowed and they are acquitted without, as they say, a stain on their character. That is very little consolation to them, and of course they are not entitled to any sort of compensation for the period that they have spent in prison in those circumstances.

If this amendment were in existence, it would in that small number of cases give the opportunity to the Crown Court judge, if it was clear to him that there was an arguable case on appeal, to grant bail straight away instead of having to wait for the inevitable delay of three, six, nine months that it sometimes takes before the application for leave can be heard by the Court of Appeal. The other type of case in which it might be of assistance is the criminal case which turns as a matter of law on a particular point, and it is recognised by the prosecution and the defence from the beginning that on the Crown Court's adjudication of that point of law the verdict will depend. Indeed, if the judge rules one way the prosecution offer no evidence; if the judge rules the other way on the matter of law the defendant frequently then pleads guilty, having at that time of course to accept the judge's ruling on that matter of law.

In that situation, a judge sometimes feels that the point of law upon which he has to rule is a difficult one, and that it may well be that in due course it will take its way through the Court of Appeal and eventually to the Judicial Committee of your Lordships' House. He may therefore have very real doubts, although he has done his honest best to determine in his lights what the correct answer to the legal problem is. Again in those circumstances it would be only just that the Crown Court judge should be able to say that he has ruled to the best of his ability and that, having ruled, he is obliged to pass a prison sentence, but that he accepts that on the particular point he may well be wrong and therefore the matter will have to take its course through the courts, and it would be appropriate in some of those cases that he should therefore grant bail to the defendant on whom he has had to impose a prison sentence. I would regard this as a modest improvement but a real one that may help a certain number of defendants who would otherwise suffer a substantial injustice.

Baroness Trumpington

My Lords, my name is on this amendment mostly because of the frustration I have experienced on behalf of people who wait so long for their appeals to come before Crown Court judges when they are in custody. I must admit that if I had had any influence with the right reverend Prelate I would have asked him to include a prayer today during Prayers that the All-Party Penal Affairs Group would not divide the Government on any of their amendments. However, as I have no influence with the right reverend Prelate, I hope, despite the fact that my name is on this amendment, that we shall not divide, because it was my understanding at Committee stage that the Lord Chief Justice was going to give formal advice on this matter, and I shall wait with interest to hear what the Minister says.

Lord Avebury

My Lords, my name is also on the amendment, and I should like to say a word in support of it and to echo the view of my noble friend Lord Wigoder, that the fact that it concerns only a small number of cases does not detract in any way from the merits of the amendment. I believe that, even if it was only one individual who had suffered unjust imprisonment as a result of the lack of a power in the lower courts to give bail, your Lordships would be justified in making this amendment so as to save that person from wrongful imprisonment.

I cannot imagine anything worse happening to a person than to spend upwards of six months in prison and then to be acquitted in the appeal court, and to be left with a burning sense of injustice and resentment against the system which had caused this to happen. If any of your Lordships can imagine it happening to himself, spending such a period of imprisonment, which would certainly not leave a stain on one's character, as my noble friend said, would leave a grave sense of resentment against the system.

Therefore, I hope that the noble Lord the Minister will come forward and say that he accepts the amendment. I believe there are cases that take more than the six to nine months that my noble friend mentioned. I had a case myself—I am not saying that the man was found innocent—where it took almost two years for his case to come on in the Appeal Court. It would be utterly deplorable that anybody should spend time in prison for as long as that and then subsequently be found innocent on appeal.

I cannot think of any amendment which I would sooner were passed in the remainder of this Bill than this one, which has the support of the All-Party Penal Affairs Group. Since I can think of no argument against it, really the onus is on the Government to come forward and say why it should not be passed rather than for us to show why a few people wrongfully imprisoned should be released.

Lord Campbell of Alloway

My Lords, may I be allowed to support this amendment? I did so at Committee stage. I do so again. Everything that has been said by the noble Lord, Lord Hutchinson, with meticulous clarity, as one would expect with a background of vast practical knowledge, is wholly justified, wholly accurate and wholly true. Indeed, it has been supported by the noble Lord, Lord Wigoder, who also has considerable practical knowledge in this matter.

It is an unsatisfactory situation as it exists today. True this power will be used sparingly, there is no doubt about that. But there are these cases where, without this power, manifest injustice will be done. I support this amendment. It is not a matter on which, if driven to a Division, I would—and I say so now; I have not made up my mind—necessarily vote against my Front Bench, but I feel strongly about it and I hope it will be considered seriously.

Lord Elwyn-Jones

My Lords, I support the opinion expressed unanimously that the amendment would effect a modest and useful reform. It would also save money and time. My noble friend Lord Elystan-Morgan gives me an example of what can go on. Apparently he was appearing at the Cardiff Crown Court on a certain matter where, surprisingly, he did not succeed in his submission for the accused and was unable to apply to appeal to the learned High Court judge, who was then sitting in the Crown Court, under the present rules. However, he was able to enjoy a journey to London on behalf of his client a few days later to appear before the same judge, sitting in the High Court as a High Court judge, and on that occasion he succeeded in obtaining leave to appeal. It really is a nonsense, and an expensive one at that.

It seems extraordinary that magistrates can grant bail after a conviction and sentence where the defendant indicates that he wishes to appeal, but a Crown Court judge cannot grant bail pending the determination of the appeal. And, in the case of the imposition of short sentences, there is a real risk that the sentence will have been served before the appeal can ever reach the appellate stage. I therefore hope the Minister will be able to give way on this matter. I do not want to delay the House because we have a good deal of ground yet to cover, but perhaps I have said enough to indicate what I trust has been the receipt of a hopeful missive on this issue.

Baroness Masham of Ilton

My Lords, if people are imprisoned when they are innocent, are they not able to claim compensation? Might this amendment, if agreed to, save the Government paying unnecessary compensation?

Baroness Phillips

My Lords, I fear that I must ask a few questions. Throughout the passage of the Bill we have had many contributions from members of the All-Party Penal Affairs Group, who appear to bring some sort of weight to our deliberations as a result of having discussed these matters prior to the rest of us. We have also had contributions from noble Lords who often earn their livelihood in the practice of the law. When they state the case to a mere magistrate like myself I do not always understand exactly what they are talking about. Indeed, I have often suffered from that while sitting on the Bench, so I must ask a few simple questions on matters which confuse me, and the noble Baroness, Lady Macleod, may agree with me on that.

As has been said, when, in a magistrates' court, hail is denied, the facts are put to the Bench and it is denied because of the nature of the offence. We are here discussing people who appear in a Crown Court, a higher court, so we assume that the nature of the offence must be of a more serious character. However, nobody has said in the course of this debate what sort of offenders we are talking about. We assume that they have appeared before a higher court because of the very serious charges involved. If someone has appeared on a serious charge and bail is denied, and they must remain in custody while awaiting appeal, one wonders why that should be the case. Equally, one wonders why these individuals are then finally acquitted. Nor do we know how many such cases there are.

I have always been given to understand that we should never introduce legislation based on one or two cases. Unless we can have rather more explanation than the supporters of the amendment have given so far to show that there are a number of such cases, it is difficult to see what line to take. May we also be told the nature of the offence and why bail was denied? Do I gather that the noble Baroness, Lady Trumpington, is about to rise and give me the answer? We are entitled to answers to these questions.

Baroness Trumpington

My Lords, the noble Baroness knows only too well that there are certain cases of triviality who ask for trial by jury.

Lord Campbell of Alloway

My Lords, may I offer the noble Baroness, Lady Phillips, a possible explanation? It is not so much the gravity or nature of the offence but the fact that the sort of problem which could arise is this: you are sitting trying a case with a jury and you have a difficult question as to corroboration, whether you should allow it and which way you should rule. Sitting there, you know that if you have made the wrong ruling and let the evidence in, it is inevitable that he will be convicted; whereas if you rule it out, then there is no evidence and therefore he must go free. That is the very sort of ruling on which the noble Lord, Lord Hutchinson, said that the judge or recorder agonises. In a case such as that, it is not so much dependent—it may be, but not always—on the type of offence. There are cases where you feel that the fair thing to do—they will be rare but there are such cases—is to see whether that ruling is right before the man actually goes to prison.

Lord Derwent

My Lords, I hesitate to interrupt my noble friend, of all people, but I would remind him that this is Report stage.

Lord Elton

My Lords, I begin by saying that I think I understand the noble Lord, Lord Hutchinson, aright in that his intention is to give a judge who presides at a Crown Court trial the power to grant bail pending an appeal. The new clause as drafted does not, I think, achieve that end. As I read it, it still gives the power to all Crown Court judges, not just the one who presided at the trial. The expression "court of trial" means the Crown Court, which is one court, although it sits in many divisions and in many places. That is an important technicality which must be got right. The new clause also seems to preclude the possibility of the Court of Appeal's revoking bail if it thought that was appropriate. As there might be changes in circumstances which rendered such a course appropriate, I would have thought that would be a most understandable fetter on the Court of Appeal.

However, the noble Lord's main point, which he argued with exemplary clarity and brevity, is that a trial judge should have this power once the notice of appeal has been given. I ask your Lordships to consider what in practice this would mean. A notice of appeal is a form which is usually filled in by a solicitor. It has to be accompanied by reasoned grounds of appeal, which are usually drafted by counsel. They are sent to the Registrar of Criminal Appeals. The grounds must be real and carefully considered, otherwise it would be too easy for all appellants simply to file vague or frivolous grounds, but if they have substance, then the notice of appeal is complete. All this can be done quickly, but it cannot be done instantly. The fact that the grounds must be formulated and sent to the registrar, would, even on the noble Lord's proposal, as I understand it, inevitably mean that the Crown Court could not be asked for bail immediately; it would have to be re-convened at a later date. That is not mere mechanics but a serious consideration.

Although, as I have said, the forms and procedure for initiating an appeal are relatively straightforward, your Lordships may wonder why they need to be as complicated as they are. The reason is that some 50,000 people are convicted in the Crown Court each year. Of these, at least 23,000 receive immediate custodial sentences, and 6,000 or so apply for leave to appeal, of whom only about 1,000 are in any way successful. I hope those are the figures for which the noble Baroness, Lady Phillips, was asking. Thus, most applications have no hope of success. Much of the work of the court and of the Criminal Appeal Office is to weed out these hopeless cases as early as possible so that the court can concentrate on appellants who do have an arguable case. Experience has shown that the number of appeals rises sharply if convicted defendants feel that they have nothing to lose in appealing, or that there is some collateral advantage, such as bail, in doing so.

The effects of a flood of unmeritorious appeals from defendants whose real intention was not eventual acquittal but immediate bail would be administratively catastrophic. Again, this is not mere mechanics because the real losers would be the defendants whose appeals did have merit, because the Court of Appeal and Criminal Appeal Office would take far longer to deal with them than they now do.

Therefore the noble Lord's proposal seems fraught with difficulty and delay, but even if it were not, I should have to ask your Lordships to consider—and many of you can do it better than I can—whether the trial judge is necessarily the best person to decide whether bail should be granted. I am always very diffident in questioning the abilities of judges to do anything, because I stand in great awe of them, and I mean nothing in detriment to their learned and wise capacities. But on many occasions the trial judge will have had no experience of sitting in the Court of Appeal. He will not know how the judges of that court deal with these difficult matters. He will have no power to grant legal aid, or to order an expedited hearing, which a single judge of the Court of Appeal has. The trial judge will not have before him all the necessary material to make a decision. He will have no transcript of the proceedings. His recollection of the precise words that he used in his summing-up, if that is the basis of the appeal, may be imperfect, or may not agree with counsel's recollection. The grounds of appeal may relate to a point which arose days or weeks previously during the trial.

I would remind your Lordships, first, that the Crown Court judge is free to write to the Registrar of Criminal Appeals for an expeditious hearing and to recommend the grant of bail. Further, I can confirm what my noble friend suggested—that in the near future the Lord Chief Justice will issue formal guidance to judges and to the legal profession, so that all know how quickly bail can be considered, and how to set that machinery in motion more quickly. I fear that, even had the right reverend Prelate interceded in this matter, what I have said would not be regarded as an answer to his prayer, but it is the best that I can do.

Lord Donaldson of Kingsbridge

My Lords, as a layman with very little understanding of the courts, to me the position seems to be that the magistrate can deal with the matter, while the Crown Court judge cannot. That seemed to me absolutely inexplicable, and nothing that the noble Lord has said has explained it to me.

Lord Elystan-Morgan

My Lords, there are three points which the noble Lord the Minister has not touched upon, and in my submission each and every one of them goes to the very root of the issue. I do not say that in any spirit of criticism of the noble Lord. These are highly technical matters, and they involve the kind of consideration that comes only to someone who tends to come up against such questions very often in daily practice. First, there is what might be called the provinces point. If an application for bail is to be made on behalf of a person convicted in the provinces, it can be granted only by the Court of Appeal Criminal Division. With very few exceptions, the Court of Appeal Criminal Division sits only in London. As my noble and learned friend Lord Elwyn-Jones said, with great flattery so far as my own situation was concerned, quite often an application for bail means that the advocate has to travel up to London. The application is heard by a High Court judge, sitting as a single judge, as a member of the Court of Appeal. Sometimes, as has, by coincidence, happened in my own case, the judge will be a High Court judge from the very concourse of courts in the provinces from which the advocate himself has come. They both travel up to London. Counsel appears before the judge to make the application. The judge hears the application, and then they both travel back to the city in the provinces from whence they came. In my submission, that is a nonsense, but it happens from time to time.

Secondly, a further consideration is that the judge—for example, a circuit judge—who has tried the case is entitled after the conviction to hear an application by counsel that the matter should be allowed to go to the Court of Appeal without going through the sifting process of the single judge, if it is an appeal on a point of law. If the trial judge has that power, as he has under the Criminal Appeal Act 1968, to circumvent the single judge, is there any earthly reason why the circuit judge should not be allowed to decide, on a much lower level, the question of whether or not bail should be granted? Surely the issue of bail must be regarded as being utterly ancillary to the primary consideration of whether or not there should be an appeal.

The third point mentioned by the Minister was that if there was the prospect of bail, it might encourage persons to make frivolous applications. The answer to that is that when a frivolous application is made, the Court of Appeal, when it hears the application, is entitled to say that time already served by the defendant shall not be counted towards his sentence.

In my sincere submission those are three very fundamental matters which I feel the Minister has not had the opportunity of considering. Therefore we would ask him not to come to a final conclusion on the question until he has had that opportunity.

Lord Hutchinson of Lullington

My Lords, there seems to be considerable support in the House for the amendment. I should like to say two things. I wish to address one of the points to the noble Baroness who was so mystified by the type of people with whom we are dealing; and I seemed to notice in her observations a rather basic hostility to lawyers in general. I should like to assure her that the amendment contains no advantage to lawyers, because if it were passed, instead of the nice, long journeys to London which have been referred to, lawyers would be deprived of the privilege of a night in London, as well as a fee for applying in London for bail, all of which they could do on the fee that is marked on the one brief at the trial.

Lord Elton

My Lords, the noble Lord is most kind to give way. With the leave of the House, I would mention that I have a number of points, but I feel that I should make only one of them, since the noble Lord is now raising it. A High Court judge on circuit can grant bail. All that is needed is liaison by telephone with the Criminal Appeal Office in London. I am sorry to deprive people of many comfortable journeys.

Lord Hutchinson of Lullington

I should like to complete what I was saying to the noble Baroness. We are dealing with ordinary people who are being tried by a Crown Court judge. The Crown Court judge has been entitled to grant such people bail during the trial. He has made up his own mind about the seriousness of the offence, the type of offence, and the background of the defendant. From day to day, during the trial, at adjournments before the trial, or during the months which may elapse before the defendant is committed and heard, the Crown Court judge can grant bail. The judge knows all about the particular defendant. The amendment proposes that, whether or not the case is a serious one, when the trial is over, armed with all the information, the judge can continue the bail that has previously been granted. Having used his discretion in the one case, the judge would be enabled to use his discretion when the trial is over. There is no mystery about it; that is simply the situation.

The noble Lord the Minister referred to a question of technicality, and I accept that. It is simply a matter of drafting, and it can be set right quite easily. The Minister said that the whole of the amendment is fraught with dangers of delay. That is exactly what one is up against throughout the consideration of the very sensible amendments which have been put forward on a non-party basis. Over and over again the brief that the Minister reads out uses such phrases as, "fraught with dangers of delay". There is no fraughtness at all about the amendment; absolutely none. What was said by the Minister in that regard reflects the imagination of someone sitting in an office, hermetically sealed from what goes on in the real world, conjuring up objections to something that is positive, sensible, clear, and, I would submit, in every way admirable. The noble Lord the Minister is perfectly happy to accept ridiculous, cosmetic, negative amendments such as those to stop people making speeches from the dock if they feel like it because they are bored with their barrister, and so on, but is not prepared to accept sensible, positive contributions to the criminal process.

When I hear the noble Lord say that the poor judge who has sat for a week, a fortnight or a month on a case is not as suited as a High Court judge sitting in London, who knows nothing about the facts at all except for what he can glean from pieces of paper, and is not a man or woman who will understand the basis on which to grant bail because, for instance, he has not got a transcript of the proceedings which he himself has been listening to for the last few days or weeks, then, again, one despairs of this sort of reply. A man who has been conducting a trial does not have to have a transcript of the trial. He has been listening to the trial with his own ears, and making up his mind as the hours pass as to what is the basis of the matter.

As for the question of the grounds of appeal and time having to be spent by some lawyer to get them right, and the days that would have to be spent by the lawyer sitting in his chambers trying to think up some brilliant ground of appeal, the reality of the matter is that the barrister or the solicitor present during the summing-up of the case is perfectly able during the next half-hour or hour that elapses, or even while the jury is out, to formulate sensible, clear, common sense grounds of appeal which summarise the point; and once those have gone in, of course, there is time to perfect them afterwards and to add to them if necessary. In all those circumstances, I feel bound to test the feeling of the House on this important matter.

3.52 p.m.

On Question, Whether the said amendment (No. 45) shall be agreed to?

Their Lordships divided: Contents, 122; Not-Contents, 82.

Aberdeen and Temair, M. Howie of Troon, L.
Airedale, L. Hughes, L.
Amherst, E. Hunt, L.
Ampthill, L. Hutchinson of Lullington, L.—[Teller.]
Amulree, L.
Ardwick, L. Ingleby, V.
Auckland, L. Inglewood, L.
Avebury, L. Jacques, L.
Aylestone, L. Jeger, B.
Bacon, B. Jenkins of Putney, L.
Balogh, L. Kagan, L.
Beaumont of Whitley, L. Kaldor, L.
Beswick, L. Kilmarnock, L.
Birk, B. Leatherland, L.
Bishopston, L. Listowel, E.
Blease, L. Llewelyn-Davies of Hastoe, B.
Blyton, L.
Boston of Faversham, L. Lloyd of Hampstead, L.
Briginshaw, L. Lloyd of Kilgerran, L.
Brockway, L. Longford, E.
Bruce of Donington, L. Mackie of Benshie, L.
Buckinghamshire, E. McNair, L.
Burton of Coventry, B. Masham of Ilton, B.
Caradon, L. Massereene and Ferrard, V.
Carver, L. Melchett, L.
Chitnis, L. Merrivale, L.
Cledwyn of Penrhos, L. Milford, L.
Clifford of Chudleigh, L. Mishcon, L.
Collison, L. Molloy, L.
Cooper of Stockton Heath, L. Monk Bretton, L.
Mottistone, L.
David, B.—[Teller.] Moyne, L.
Davidson, V. Newall, L.
Derwent, L. Oram, L.
Diamond, L. Peart, L.
Donaldson of Kingsbridge, L. Ponsonby of Shulbrede, L.
Porritt, L.
Effingham, E. Reilly, L.
Elwyn-Jones, L. Rhodes, L.
Elystan-Morgan, L. Richardson, L.
Ewart-Biggs, B. Rochester, L.
Faithfull, B. Ross of Marnock, L.
Foot, L. Sainsbury, L.
Fortescue, E. St. John of Bletso, L.
Gainford, L. Saint Oswald, L.
Gaitskell, B. Sandford, L.
Glanusk, L. Seear, B.
Glenamara, L. Seebohm, L.
Gregson, L. Sefton of Garston, L.
Grey, E. Segal, L.
Gridley, L. Smith, L.
Hampton, L. Spens, L.
Harris of Greenwich, L. Stedman, B.
Harvington, L. Stewart of Alvechurch, B.
Hives, L. Stewart of Fulham, L.
Stone, L. Walston, L.
Strathcarron, L. Wells-Pestell, L.
Strauss, L. Westbury, L.
Taylor of Gryfe, L. Whaddon, L.
Taylor of Mansfield, L. White, B.
Trumpington, B. Wigoder, L.
Vernon, L. Winstanley, L.
Wallace of Coslany, L. Wootton of Abinger, B.
Alexander of Tunis, E. Lloyd-George of Dwyfor, E.
Allen of Abbeydale, L.
Avon, E. Lucas of Chilworth, L.
Bellwin, L. Lyell, L.
Beloff, L. McFadzean, L.
Bessborough, E. Mackay of Clashfern, L.
Blake, L. Macleod of Borve, B.
Boyd-Carpenter, L. Mancroft, L.
Bridge of Harwich, L. Mansfield, E.
Caccia, L. Margadale, L.
Campbell of Croy, L. Mariey, L.
Cayzer, L. Marshall of Leeds, L.
Clitheroe, L. Montgomery of Alamein, V.
Cockfield, L. Morris, L.
Craigton, L. Mowbray and Stourton, L.
Dacre of Glanton, L. Northchurch, B.
Daventry, V. Nugent of Guildford, L.
De Freyne, L. Pender, L.
Denham, L —[Teller.] Penrhyn, L.
Donegall, M. Portland, D.
Drumalbyn, L. Rochdale, V.
Dudley, B. Romney, E.
Duncan-Sandys, L. St. Aldwyn, E.
Eccles, V. St. Davids, V.
Ellenborough, L. Sandys, L.—[Teller.]
Elliot of Harwood, B. Sharples, B.
Elphinstone, L. Skelmersdale, L.
Elton, L. Stanley of Alderley, L.
Fraser of Kilmorack, L. Stodart of Leaston, L.
Gardner of Parkes, B. Stradbroke, E.
Geoffrey-Lloyd, L. Strathclyde, L.
Glenarthur, L. Strathcona and Mount Royal, L.
Hailsham of Saint Marylebone, L.
Suffield, L.
Henley, L. Thomas of Swynnerton, L.
Holderness, L. Thorneycroft, L.
Home of the Hirsel, L. Tranmire, L.
Hornsby-Smith, B. Trefgarne, L.
Hylton-Foster, B. Trenchard, V.
Kemsley, V. Vaizey, L.
Kilmany, L. Vickers, B.
Lane-Fox, B. Waldegrave, E.
Lincoln, Bp.

Resolved in the affirmative, and amendment agreed to accordingly.