HL Deb 22 December 1982 vol 437 cc1138-55

4.24 p.m.

Debate resumed.

Lord Gladwyn

My Lords, I must start by apologising for having missed the splendid oration of my noble friend Lord Mayhew, although, broadly speaking, I think I knew more or less what he was going to say! I was late because I thought the Statements were not going to be taken when they were. In the 10 minutes available, I shall simply make a series of generalisations, which I fear some of your Lordships may find contentious, but which I myself believe to be relevant.

First, I feel that the Russians are almost as frightened of us as we are of the Russians. Deep in the Russian consciousness lies the fear that Russia may once again be assaulted and almost overwhelmed by the West, as she was in 1912, in 1941 and, as some would say, even in 1918. It is chiefly, therefore, for this instinctive reason that the Russians have built up their nuclear and conventional strength, so as to deter the West and not necessarily, or only, for the accompanying ideological reason—dear to the hearts, no doubt, of some of the leaders of the despotic régime under which the Russian people have groaned since the formation of the Russian State—that Russia is in some way destined to triumph, this time under Soviet leadership, all over the world.

I also feel that even these Russian ideologues, so to speak, cannot actually want to have a war with the West if it can possibly be avoided, for, if the war was nuclear, Russia would be obliterated, and, if it was merely conventional, the Union would at least be cut off" from her external trade, above all grain, and thus would face, even if victorious, a potentially disastrous situation. She might also face an appallingly difficult war with China. What the leaders undoubtedly do want is to promote the collapse of the West if they can, and the best way of avoiding that is to see that our rival economic system works efficiently.

True, the aggression against Afghanistan would seem to support the view that the Soviet Union is now embarking on a regular policy of conquest, but this is by no means certain. We must, after all, remember that we ourselves, for imperial reasons, on more than one occasion invaded Afghanistan in the past, the last time with pretty disastrous results. We must certainly do our best now to see to it that the inexcusable Soviet aggression does not pay and that some sort of Afghan independence is eventually restored. And we must back up the Afghan people in their heroic resistance to the limit of our effective power. But I do not think we may expect any very similar exploits on the part of the Russians in existing world conditions. In other words, I hardly think that the Russians are now likely to risk another Afghanistan.

Poland, too, does not really support the suspicion that the Russians are all out for world conquest. Either we accept a kind of Russian hegemony over Eastern Europe or we do not. The brutal suppression of democracy in Hungary and Czechoslovakia was, it must be accepted, at least tolerated, even if unwillingly, by the West, at a time, incidentally, when the West had a great nuclear superiority. Poland, no doubt largely owing to Western pressure, has at least escaped Russian occupation, which is something. But beyond continuing to exercise such pressure I do not think the West can go, unless it has really decided to destroy all Russian authority and influence in Eastern Europe and to take the measures necessary to achieve this end—and that, of course, could mean war.

But maintaining economic and political pressure in order to induce the Government gradually to liberalise, or at least render less intolerable, the conditions in the countries in their zone of influence is one thing. Building up a nuclear superiority in order to compel them to do so is quite another. Certainly, we have to make it clear that we are in a position successfully to defend ourselves, and indeed our own vital interests, by one means or another, anywhere in the world. But that does not mean that we should regard the Soviet Union as enemies of the human race in the same way as we regarded Hitler and the appalling Nazi gangsters. They could be suppressed only by war. So might the Soviet Government be suppressed if one really believed that they were the equivalent of the Nazis. But, owing to the vast extent and indeed the power of the Soviet Empire, it is unfortunately likely that the West would also perish in any such attempt.

So it follows—and this is my main point—that some sort of understanding or truce, if you will, between the super powers, however difficult, is the only sane solution. It is, in fact, a total absurdity for either side to attempt to build up some sort of nuclear "superiority". Given broad nuclear parity, for example, which I believe now more or less exists, all that is really necessary for the purpose of deterring the adversary from using nuclear weapons against oneself is the possession of sufficient indestructible nuclear weapons to devastate one's opponent on a second strike. These might well be chiefly submarine. And clearly in such calculations all nuclear forces at the disposal of the West should be regarded as a whole. Of course they should.

True, broad parity in the so-called conventional field is also necessary. Here again, it is surely unnecessary to build up, as the Russians have certainly endeavoured to do, any vast superiority of power. All that the West wants, in fact, are enough conventional forces, or power, to make it clear that the other side would be unlikely actually to win a non-nuclear war. One does not have to match the Russians tank for tank or even, for that matter, man for man. What we need is a new kind of forward defence embracing, in quantity, all the anti-tank and anti-aircraft weapons and devices that are now, or could shortly be, at our disposal.

Such a general strategic concept certainly involves the possibility of a war confined to the Continent and to the oceans. That is why, as we all know, it may be suspect to the Germans. But if it can, broadly speaking, be accepted as valid, there is little reason to suppose that any such war will ever take place. In any case, and pace the Germans, we must all face the fact that, however destructive, such a war would be infinitely preferable to any nuclear exchange, which would almost certainly result in the virtual extinction of the Western European democracies.

I repeat, I believe the Russians are probably now as frightened as we are and I have no doubt that there would be "peace" demonstrations in the Soviet Union if the country were not in the iron grip of the KGB and largely intoxicated, I fear, with anti-Western propaganda. Some Russian generals may possibly be thinking in terms of the eventual conquest of the world, but I very much doubt if such silly dreams dominate the thinking of Mr. Andropov's Politburo.

What should we do? Here, I can only express myself in shorthand. As I see it, we should in the first place abandon Trident, which, from the general point of view of the West, is a waste of money, productive of totally useless overkill. Second, we should abandon "flexible response", which is essentially based on a willingness, in the last resort, to perform national suicide, and proceed with our European allies to strengthen our conventional forces on the Continent. Third, we should revise our latest Falkland-induced worldwide strategic plan on the chief assumption that we simply cannot afford, for long, to deploy at great expense a large task force in the South Atlantic. Fourth, if, but only if, it is clear that the present negotiations are failing owing to Soviet intransigence, we must accept some cruise missiles here, on condition that some sort of "dual key" control system is introduced, based, presumably, on the principle of "no obliteration without authorisation". But, fifth, we must try our best to induce the Americans to conclude some deal involving a compromise on the original "zero option", and at least take Mr. Andropov's latest proposals seriously for a start.

Sixth, we must declare that we ourselves, at any rate, will never authorise the first use in war of any nuclear weapons at our sole or, indeed, at our joint disposal. Seventh, and lastly, we must rally the nation against the CND—which, by imperilling NATO, really might result in our defeat—by popularising the kind of non-nuclear but defensively effective programme which I have outlined.

We must explain that a nation which, at a moment's notice, could repel aggression many thousands of miles away is entirely capable, with her allies, of successfully resisting any non-nuclear assault on these islands. More especially would this be so if our young people can be persuaded to take the defence of democracy seriously and, for instance, take part—as I think was half suggested in the speech of the Secretary of State for Defence in the other place only yesterday—in some scheme for a new kind of home guard or extended territorial army to protect our own centres against attack from the air in the event of war, which, if all the measures that I have proposed are taken, will in all probability never occur, the danger of a conflict between the super powers having been finally averted.

4.36 p.m.

Lord Beloff

My Lords, it would keep us here a long time on the day on which we are thankfully "breaking up"—if I may use that analogy—to deal with all the many and interesting points which the noble Lord, Lord Gladwyn, has put forward on the somewhat slender substructure of a Question about a particular set of negotiations on disarmament. But that does not mean that on some future occasion it will be irrelevant to enter into this broader field.

I personally am slightly interested, or puzzled perhaps, by the motives of the noble Lord, Lord Mayhew, in raising this Question at this particular juncture because it seems to me at least possible that his motives are connected—and it is perfectly legitimate that they should be—rather with the internal political situation in this country and the position of his own political party, than with the great issues of international affairs.

I recently received from a gentleman who describes himself as a card-carrying Liberal and also as Treasurer of the Lewes, Sussex, Group of CND, a long letter in which he explains the reasons why that movement is now resorting to various forms of direct as well as political action, and in the course of which he says: 'We have worked at party politics too. We have won over the Labour Party. We have gone a long way towards winning over the Liberal Party.". It seems to me that today's Question by the noble Lord, Lord Mayhew, represents an attempt to deal with this takeover bid by the CND by trying to find common ground which might exist between the unilateral and the multilateral. It is, therefore, not surprising that he finds himself to some extent allied, rather improbably if one looks at their different philosophies, with the noble Lord, Lord Jenkins of Putney.

Lord Mayhew

My Lords, as the noble Lord has referred to me, would he be good enough to give way? If it were my motivation, as he suggests, to appease the CND elements, surely I was greatly mistaken in attacking the unilateralists with the vigour that I did in my speech?

Lord Beloff

My Lords, I should not have thought that that consequence necessarily follows. There are various ways in which to deal with political movements, some of them more subtle than others. After a long acquaintance, I would associate the noble Lord, Lord Mayhew, with subtlety. But I do not think that, in pursuit of his laudable objective, he has done his cause, or rather the cause of multilateral disarmament—which is his, mine and I hope the cause of the majority of noble Lords—a great deal of good by going on to suggest that the rather lukewarm reply (not total dismissal, as he suggested and as I think the noble Lord, Lord Belstead, will indicate) to Mr. Andropov's latest set of proposals, arises from some failure of temperament or ideology in either the President of the United States of America or the Prime Minister of the United Kingdom.

I do not think it is my business or, indeed, the business of any noble Lord to speak up for or explain the position of the President of the United States of America. All one can say is that at the very moment when the noble Lord, Lord Mayhew, says that he attaches such importance to cementing the bonds of our alliance, a personal attack upon the head of state of its leading member is perhaps in this case not a very subtle way of going about achieving that admirable end.

Lord Gladwyn

; My Lords, is the noble Lord not aware that a great many Americans do not themselves approve of the policy of their President, and say so most emphatically?

Lord Beloff

My Lords, what is permitted to the citizens of one country to say about their Government takes on a different picture when the same thing is said by politicians in another country. There is quite a gap between an internal domestic debate, in which clearly Americans have every right to criticise their own President, and trying at one and the same time to say: "We wish to cement our alliance with the United States, but we think the President is temperamentally and ideologically unqualified to deal with a serious situation." As I said, I do not regard it as my business to pursue that argument.

What is my business—and here I would like to protest in the strongest terms on behalf of myself and my noble friends—are the remarks about our Prime Minister. There is not a shadow of reason to believe that the Prime Minister is less dedicated to the pursuit of peace through multilateral disarmament than any single one of her predecessors, whether those named by the noble Lord, Lord Mayhew, or whether those not named. It would, indeed, be incredible if anyone who held high office in this country was not primarily concerned to protect us and to protect our peace. To make these remarks rather than to pursue the problems which Mr. Andropov's statement represents, seems to me to be wide of the mark.

In view of references that have been made to recent history, it seems to me fairly obvious, and something which one could almost document, to say that if the three countries concerned—the United States, the United Kingdom and Germany—had still had at their heads President Carter, Mr. Callaghan and Herr Schmidt, the response to Mr. Andropov would not have been significantly different.

I entirely agree—and, again, this makes today a red-letter day—with the remarks made by the noble Lord, Lord Jenkins of Putney, that clearly we cannot examine any proposal for multilateral disarmament, or for any other aspect of our relations with the Soviet Union, unless we do our best to enter into their minds; to some extent the noble Lord, Lord Gladwyn, went down that path as well. But, of course, in order to do this successfully one has to be wholly au fait with the actual situation that exists, both as it exists and as they, in their turn, no doubt see it. I find it difficult to accept the view which the noble Lord, Lord Jenkins, put forward, that there has been no important change in the balance of forces in the world over the last decade, except the installation of the SS20 intermediate range nuclear missiles.

It seems to me, if you look at the figures, that there has been a greatly increased vulnerability in the case of the American strategic deterrent—certainly its land-based element; there have been many changes in the last decade, as my noble friend Lord Thomas pointed out, in the Soviet Union's capacities for conventional warfare, whether on land or on sea; and if one looks at the crudest of all measurements, the proportion of national expenditure devoted to defence, one sees that for a decade in almost every year, with one or two exceptions, that has been a great deal higher in the Soviet Union than it has been in the United States.

I do not jump from this to any conclusion about possible aggressive intentions by the Soviet Union. I believe that Mr. Andropov is almost as peace-loving as Mrs. Thatcher, and that is putting it high. I believe that he desires to preserve his régime and the comfortable position for himself and his friends in the KGB at which they have, after strenuous effort, at last arrived. Therefore, I assume that the Soviet Union, in building up this panoply of force, is well aware of the political gains that may be got from it, and equally well aware of the heavy economic pressures that it entails, as on the other side, the pressures which our own and our allies' rearmament entails for our own economies. Therefore, I am inclined to believe that the Soviet Union would genuinely like some kind of reduction in the overall burden.

Therefore—and I believe that the Foreign Secretary said that we must look at this—any proposal that they make must certainly be looked at to see whether it indicates even the remotest possibility of some route to an agreed reduction. It may well be that, when looked at, we shall find that the advantages that the Soviet Union maintains are not sufficiently reduced by these proposals, and that we should need to go something nearer to the original proposals put forward by the United States. But certainly that is a matter open for discussion, and for discussion on the assumption that both sides have a common interest in multilateral reduction.

Where I differ profoundly from the noble Lord, Lord Jenkins of Putney, and I can see how difficult he and his friends have made the position of the noble Lord, Lord Mayhew, is that we cannot disregard the other aspect of this; that is to say, the orchestration, of which this is a part, of protest against the West's own efforts to build up a countervailing force until that agreement is reached. There is something there which it is difficult for the protagonists of unilateral disarmament to argue away, and that is the simple fact that, until the two-track initiative of 1979, in the immediately preceding years, there were years of a serious and important build-up of Soviet nuclear weapons targeted on Western Europe. During that period those who now object so vociferously to our own preparations took no action, made no statement, and issued no denunciations. That is why, although no doubt there are many people who have seriously been brought to believe in the imminence of nuclear war, about which I have total scepticism, it is also the case that there is in the Andropov proposal, as the noble Lord, Lord Thomas, pointed out to us, an element of propaganda, and that it will be the business of our negotiators to find out what is serious and what is propaganda.

4.49 p.m.

Lord Kennet

My Lords, may I apologise first to the noble Lord, Lord Mayhew, for having missed his speech. That I did so was due to a misunderstanding about when this debate was likely to begin. The negotiations which are the subject of this Question are now being conducted in public. This means that Mr. Andropov believes that he now has a better case than President Reagan, and that I think is probably the reason why he has taken the step, which is not very common in Moscow, of switching (without, of course, any declaration that he is doing so) from private or secret negotiations to public negotiations.

If the press reports we have are correct—and these days they are not often correct—there are among President Reagan's advisers in Washington those who believe that the European Peace Movement—whatever that means; we all adopt our own definitions of it—was quieted by the announcement of the zero option and the beginning of the IMF negotiations about a year ago. I certainly count myself part of the Peace Movement, and I think that probably even the noble Lord, Lord Beloff, would if it were rightly defined. I was quieted for a little while at the beginning of those negotiations. One could not but applaud the fact that after a year in office the Americans had come to the table, and the Russians had come to the table, too, and that a Western offer had been put down. It was good news, and it was seen by a wide spread of opinion in Europe as being an acceptable opening bid in the negotiations. I do not think it has ever been accepted by anybody, including the American and British Governments, that it was to be both the opening bid and the final offer.

The problem at the moment, and the disquiet in Western European opinion, is due, I believe, to the fear that it may be going to be the American final offer. We are familiar with the strand of American thinking and policy which says, "If the Russians are going to make a useful offer, they will do so at the eleventh hour", meaning just before the cruise missiles become operational in this country and the Pershings and cruise in Germany, and so on. There are even those in Germany who say, "If the Russians are going to make a useful offer, they will do so at the thirteenth hour", that is, after the cruise and Pershing 2 systems in Germany have become operational.

I do not think we can any longer believe that is the case. Within a month of coming to power, Mr. Andropov has made two very public and noticeable proposals. He is not moving at the last moment: he is moving now, and it is up to our Governments to see what we had best do about that. We must listen with exceptional care to what is coming out of Moscow, because of the change of ruler. So much is obvious. Perhaps it is the conventional wisdom in Washington, but, at any rate, many people in Washington, including the Administration's advisers and spokesmen, believe that Mr. Andropov is clearing out Mr. Brezhnev's dead wood and that the new attitudes he takes up and the sound of heads about to fall, which is audible, are the fruit of his determination to get rid of all traces of the old régime.

It may be that that strand of opinion is missing the point. It seems obvious that Mr. Andropov's rival is not a dead man; his rival is probably, in my opinion, Marshall Ustinov, the Soviet Defence Minister. Marshall Ustinov has been telling the world that the Western deployment, especially of Pershing 2s, will force the Soviet Union to adopt "launch on warning"; and his utterances are becoming familiar. They are extremely alarming and bellicose. He ignores the fact that we have lived under precisely the same threat, of six-minute or ten-minute flight time of Soviet missiles, since about 1970, with the SS 4s and 5s. We, as the Government rightly state, never threatened to launch on warning when those missiles were first trained against us.

The adoption of such a bellicose line by the Soviet Minister of Defence can only tell us something about what is going on inside the Soviet Union. Marshal Ustinov in effect (if one reads carefully what he says, and it is essential to do that) threatens to breach the hot line agreement and to breach SALT II, which the Soviet Union maintains it is observing, though it is unratified. I will not detain the House by explaining in detail what I mean. It is all there in his speeches.

Mr. Andropov does not do any of that. If we face up to the fact, we are really being offered two Soviet Unions. We are being offered a choice of the Soviet Union with which we want to deal. It is important that the Western Governments should choose the right one, and it is rather easy to see which is the right one. If we talk back to Marshal Ustinov in his own language, we risk making Mr. Andropov his prisoner. Some of us are already talking back to the Soviet Union in "Ustinovite" language; and I do not mean only the right wing in our respective countries. I mean also, curiously enough, the headline writers in some of our most respected newspapers.

We had no copy of The Times today, so I was able to compare the treatment of Andropov's speech yesterday in only the Herald Tribune and the Guardian. In both cases the stories were careful and, so far as I am able to say, mainly accurate, though not entirely. The headlines in both cases were widely misleading, in that, for the second time in 10 days, the Guardian said that the Americans had flatly rejected Andropov's proposals, and the Herald Tribune said that Britain, Germany and France had flatly rejected Andropov's proposals. We may be glad that none of those Governments has done anything of the sort. I believe that if they did, it would be the recipe for tearing NATO apart within about three, or possibly six, months. One thing that we must avoid on this occasion is a flat rejection of anything; and to say that is not to state that we should put forward an immediate acceptance of anything, either.

What do we think the Russians make of NATO? Is it not likely that they think that it is probably rather like the Warsaw Pact, which is something that they know better? To them the only strategic targets are in the United States. To them the long-standing language of theatre and non-theatre nuclear weapons is still in use, though we in the West have, luckily, given it up. The Chinese seem to understand all this clearly, but we have to remember that the Russians do not, and try to get it across to them that the two Alliances do not resemble each other.

The main way in which they do not resemble each other is that there is no Polish independent nuclear deterrent and there is no Czech independent nuclear deterrent. In Britain and France there are such things. Other ways are perhaps too obvious to be worth mentioning. It is a fact that the Soviet Union single-handed conducts the affairs of the Warsaw Pact. It is not a fact that the United States single-handed conducts the affairs of NATO. The Russians must never be allowed to forget that difference.

At the risk of a bit of "I told you so", I want today to recall how in the early seventies, again and again, I bored this House by pointing to the arrival of the SS 4s and 5s, by clamouring against the imbalance in intermediate-range ballistic missiles, by saying that they were going to give trouble some day—and, by God!, they are doing now—and by asking why it was that the Governments of the West would not agree to ask the Russians to take them away.

I never suggested that we should meet this new problem by building our own forces to match the old SS4s and 5s. I did ask—and repeatedly—that somebody, somewhere, in some set of negotiations, should take those things into account. Conventional forces were being negotiated about. The SALT talks were going on. But at that time nobody was talking about the Soviet intermediate—range ballistic missiles. Now they have, of course, begun, and we have the dual-track decision and the deployments, about which all the present agitation takes place, in the face of the SS20 deployments on the other side.

There is a bit more "I told you so", and then I shall be finished with it. Again and again, since December 1979, I have bored this House, and perhaps worried the Government on occasion, by asking for a British safety catch on the cruise missiles when they are deployed. I ask for it again today. I go back to the Thor missiles of all those years ago; around 1959 to 1962, they were here. In preparing the British Parliament to receive those American missiles, the distinguished ex-Minister who is now the noble Lord, Lord Duncan-Sandys, promised that there would be "joint positive decision of both Governments", and indeed when they came here the system adopted was that of British ownership and manning with one American permanently present at each weapon with a key to permit the arming of the warhead and to permit the countdown to proceed beyond a certain point. If these American weapons are to be here in American ownership, a proposal which I have never disputed for its own sake, then I think that the least we can ask for is that that system should be applied in reverse; that there should be one British person present with each missile or with each launching console (or whatever modern technology has) who should be physically able to discontinue the countdown at a certain point unless he receives direct orders from his own Prime Minister to continue.

I am fortified in this proposal by believing that we in this country are not even too sure what happens if the President and Vice-President of the United States have disappeared. Perhaps the Government could even give us a bit of an answer today. If the President and Vice-President have disappeared in a nuclear exchange and our weapons, the American weapons on British soil, are still here and still intact—a not unthinkable scenario—who gives the order to launch? Unless there can be some clear answer to that, then it is perfectly obvious that there must be a British finger on the safety catch. Indeed, I think it is obvious that Parliament must have the right to decide this question at a moment which is not too late. The American-only trigger on the safety catch, no European finger on the safety catch, emphasises to the Russians the Americanness of the weapons; it gives them a great arguing point, possibly a bargaining point.

This is a perfectly genuine quandary because it is true that the American intermediate-range missiles in Western Europe will have a different effect on the super power balance from the effect exerted upon that balance by the Soviet intermediate-range missiles in the Soviet Union. The American missiles can reach the other super power; the Soviet missiles cannot reach the other super power. Nothing can change that; nothing that the Russians can say about it can make that fact a tainted fact. It is a true fact.

There is one further possibility I want to touch on before concluding—and it is back to this question of relations between Andropov and Ustinov, between, in effect, the KGB and the army in Russia. At certain times in the modern history of the Soviet Union, we in the West have had good reason to believe that the civil arm of government did not always know what the military was doing. During the SALT I negotiations, there was an episode which has become rather famous, when the Soviet military said to the American military in private in the evenings of the negotiation; "Here are some facts which we would like you to know but, please, will you not pass them to your civilian arm because our civilian arm does not know them?"

At moments during the process of Andropov's establishing his supremacy over the army in Moscow—which, I believe, might have been quite a tense process—it has seemed possible that something of the same sort may be happening again. If it were, there might even be a case for the Foreign Secretary in the privacy of his own room to tell his opposite number, the Soviet Foreign Minister, some of the things that he knows about the Soviet military, in case Mr. Gromyko does not.

What we need in my view, as it has always been, is an early and intense relationship between the three sets of negotiations, START, INF and MBFR and, possibly, an amalgamation of all three. I have never seen any objection to that. The Russians, we have to admit, did have an attractive, if specious, point about their offer to reduce their SS-20s to a number equivalent to the number of nuclear missiles now held by Britain and France. It would in no way prejudice our position about the reduction or final elimination of those two European forces if we were now to call for the joining up of START and INF and for the presence of Britain and France in those negotiations.

Of course there is a lot to be done before we can properly come to that. It appears at the moment that France would not agree and Britain would not agree. There is always hope for widening the field. Progress is subject to widening the field. The negotiations, whether public or private, are at the moment thwarted and set back again and again by the existence of capricious frontiers between one set of weapon systems and another. Every set of weapons systems, every different range of missile, the location of every different type of platform—on the sea, under the sea, in the air and on the land—are all matters which must be related to each other. It is impossible to pick out one and say: "Let us pretend these two things are equivalent without reference to their surroundings and let us negotiate about them".

To continue to insist on doing so at the present moment would be a recipe for continued deadlock in real disarmament negotiations, and such a continued deadlock would risk destroying the very political alliance on which we rest our hopes for the defence of our way of life. This is a way of life which, let us remember, may be destroyed not only by physical means but also by the mere threat of the use of such physical means.

5.7 p.m.

Lord Bishopston

My Lords, this debate is timely because the whole country is concerned about peace. In recent times those who have dared to mention the word "peace" or who have been known as peace lovers, have been, in the minds of some, the objects of ridicule. I think that now, only a few days from Christmas, we should be able to say that many members of the party opposite have been found sending messages concerned not only with expressions of peace but also of goodwill. So we may therefore assume that the word "peace" is acceptable for a few days, at least over Christmas. But very soon in the New Year reality will break through, blest, we hope, with the Christmas message.

If I summarise what I want to say, and what has been said by various noble Lords—including the noble Lord, Lord Mayhew, to whom we are indebted for this debate—it is a matter of saying, "Let us keep our options open and avoid getting into the rigid pockets or groups which tend to fossilise our thinking in a fast changing world situation". We all need to think for ourselves, to think again and to break away from those rigid barriers. The noble Lord, Lord Kennet, was pursuing much the same theme.

This subject is not a seasonal one although it is dealing with peace which is on the lips of many people at this particular time. But we need to keep our perspectives, because, although we are rightly concerned about the threats which face mankind and what we can do to maintain the peace and security of our way of life, other people have other things in mind at the same time. The problem is to make people more aware of the situation in a serious way while recognising their own point of view. At Christmas time the world is a better place. I think that it is better because it is less concerned with missiles and more concerned with mistletoe. Fewer are sensitive about stockpiling and more are toying with ideas for stocking fillers. After Christmas, after the Christmas meals, more people will be reaching for detergents than for deterrents. I suspect that even the Prime Minister will be less strident about Trident on Christmas Day—and long may that be the case! We want to make sure that peace is not only on the cards at Christmas but throughout the whole year. That really is the motive behind this debate, because we all have concern for policies which will pursue the path of peace and our way of life, keeping perspectives.

As I say, this debate is relevant this afternoon because of the vital importance of keeping a future with peace and goodwill and of ensuring its reality. I think we should keep our options open and, with the changes that have taken place in the leadership of the Soviet Union and with a President of the United States who seems to want the United States of America not only to be an independent power in matters of defence but, indeed, does not always have the number of consultations with others that some of us would wish, it is opportune that we should be seeking new initiatives from our Government. The fear is that, far from taking new initiatives, the Government are not responding to those which are coming forward in a rapidly changing international situation. They may not come again for some time; and in the meantime there will be nuclear proliferation and indeed new threats to world security and peace. I think the noble Lord, Lord Mayhew, and others were rightto express concern at the attitudes of the United Kingdom, of our own Prime Minister and of the United States President in these matters of closing the options so quickly. When one talks, as the noble Lord, Lord Beloff, did, of the view of the United States people, of course the President has not yet got both Houses of Congress to agree to his MX missile proposals, which deserve a great deal of consideration.

The question we are discussing is whether, to the Government's knowledge, the Soviet Union has proposed in the international nuclear forces reductions negotiations, to renounce half their SS-20s, and whether the Government will comment. That is something we certainly need to have more information about when the noble Lord replies. We know that the two main difficulties about the MBFR discussions are the data problem of getting agreement on the force levels, and verification. Of course it may be very difficult to agree as to whether the Eastern or Western European forces and weaponry are greater and, if so, by what amount. There is merit in ensuring that when reductions are made on either side the aim should be to reach parity on both sides. But in the absence of agreement the fear and the reality is that both sides will go on building up their forces and leading, as I say, to proliferation as an outcome; and provocation is a likelihood as well.

There can hardly be disagreement surely, even by the noble Lord, Lord Beloff, with many of the things I have said so far. That is essential because we should all be looking at proposals put forward by Members on all sides and from all points of view, to see how they affect the situation that we have. The problem of data assessment, as I say, is to decide the relative value in defence terms—the quality and quantity of resources on both sides on defence. As the noble Lord, Lord Mayhew, has said, NATO has a strong submarine-based missile capability, but at the same time the USSR have SS-20 missiles which can be sited, as they are, behind the Urals and can still be focused upon the European scene.

It is very difficult in that situation to work out who has what; and I certainly hope, as no doubt do many others, that this will not deter us from new initiatives and new alternatives in the meantime. It would be helpful if the noble Lord, Lord Belstead, when he replies, would be kind enough to give us more information about the Soviet proposals. It would be useful to know when they were made, what detailed discussions there have been about the assessment of the forces on either side and about the problems of verification, and also details of any other alternatives we might have put forward if we could not accept the Soviet proposals—I am not suggesting that we should have accepted the proposals out of hand—and how long those discussions have taken place. Mr. Andropov has been in office for only a fairly short time, but this Government and the United States Government seem to have made up their minds very quickly that they will not accept the offer and that that is the end of the story, when the negotiations on the alternatives should have continued for a little longer.

The House wants to know, and has a right to know, about the Government's thinking on matters of defence which are likely to be relevant in the next few months. We all know that defence matters do not stand still, and it is necessary to know the principles of the Government's defence policy, which may apply not only to the problems but, also, to the opportunities which arise from time to time. As has been said, we are indebted to the New York Times and to the press, in general, for leaks about some of the proposals, including the claim that the Soviet Union's proposals are not acceptable. But whether acceptable or not, there must be room for the Government to follow up other suggestions for détente. I would certainly emphasise the plea made by others for flexibility in our options. In such matters, it is not unreasonable that the United States should have a view, but that does not imply that we should invariably go along with them. We should use the occasion to put forward other ideas, which we should canvas and press with our other NATO allies.

One fear arises from the fact that the President often acts independently. Of course, if he and we claim to have independent nuclear deterrents or weapons, that independence means that we can use them without consulting others, which is a most dangerous state of affairs when we are members of an alliance. One hopes that this so-called independence accepts the need for consultation at all times, because one cannot use nuclear weapons in a situation, without affecting other people and creating the events which will flow from them. So it is vital that we should consult.

I do not think that it helps when, on occasions, the Prime Minister says that the United States President has a rightto do what he likes with MX missiles and other defence projects without consulting us, especially, as we said last night in debate, when the bases from which some of these weapons will operate are of concern to us. I mentioned last night that the Prime Minister was correct in saying that the Falklands issue was one where Britain said: "We are not going to be pushed around". But it is also true in the defence field nearer home, where nuclear weapons are going to affect far more people than were affected by the Falklands issue, important though that was.

The offer by the Soviet Union with regard to the SS-20 missiles is worth studying, even if it is not acceptable. But it does not follow that, if one proposal is not completely acceptable, nothing should be done and that proliferation and greater problems are the only alternatives. We all know that the SALT and MBFR talks are facing difficulties, but we must use the new situation, with Mr. Andropov coming to leadership of the Soviet Union, the sometimes unpredictable thinking of President Reagan and the fluid position elsewhere, as opportunities for British initiatives. If we lose the chance to break through, another one may not come for a long time and, in the meantime, the situation gets worse.

In future talks on defence, the United Kingdom should press for non-proliferation, which is only one of the alternatives, and we should press for legitimate proposals for reductions. If we refuse to agree to offers from the Soviet Union, then the stockpiles will grow on both sides. I believe that the time has come to recognise the new opportunities and new initiatives which can be made by Governments. As the noble Lord, Lord Beloff, and others have said, one needs to try to understand the point of view of other people and to take that into account. But one thing we want to avoid at all costs is going back to the cold war mentality, which was so ruinous for the world for several decades in the past. Given the calibre of leadership which we have a right to expect from our Government, and with the co-operation of the United States, I believe that in the New Year we ought to press the new leadership of the Soviet Union to recognise the alternatives which are being put forward, and in that way give a new sense of realism and of vision for a more peaceful and secure future.

5.20 p.m.

Lord Belstead

My Lords, the noble Lord, Lord Mayhew, has raised a subject of great importance: the present state of the negotiations in Geneva on intermediate-range nuclear weapons. The majority of these weapons are based in Europe or are targeted upon Western European countries. In his speech the noble Lord, Lord Jenkins of Putney, asked us to look at the problem through Soviet eyes. The noble Lord claimed United States superiority in strategic systems. Such a Soviet claim cannot be upheld. The two superpowers have about the same number of warheads on the strategic ballistic missiles. However, the Soviet Union has some 25 per cent. more strategic systems. Therefore I think my noble friend Lord Beloff was right to make the point that during the 1970s the Soviet Union caught up with the United States at the strategic nuclear level: the inter-continental and sea-based ballistic missiles and the strategic bombers.

Since then the NATO Governments have had to weigh very seriously the prospect that at some stage the Soviet Union might calculate that in a crisis it could afford to gamble on blackmailing Western Europe by the threat of missiles, especially the SS20, which can reach Western Europe but not North America from bases in the Soviet Union. This gamble would be based on the Soviet premise that in a situation where there was no longer an American strategic nuclear superiority, the United States might hesitate to defend Europe with strategic nuclear systems based in the United States or at sea.

I should like to make it crystal clear that we have every confidence in the United States strategic nuclear guarantee of our security. But whatever the Europeans' faith, the issue turns not on that but on Soviet perception of the matter. The NATO Governments believe—I think rightly so—that the surest route to prevent any such Soviet miscalculation would be to station in Western Europe intermediate-range missiles which could hold at risk targets in the Soviet Union.

This was half of the decision: the so-called twin-track or double decision which was taken in December 1979. These NATO missiles could, so the foreign and defence Ministers of NATO decided, be limited in number: 572 is the total chosen, spread around five European countries, including our own. The Pershing 2 missiles, to be based in West Germany, would not be capable of reaching Moscow, and the ground-launched cruise missiles could not reach the Urals. So a first strike capability forms no part of NATO strategy. Even if the alliance were to wish it, these missiles are not a first strike force. They would instead bind more thoroughly the defence of the alliance as a whole in the face of a threat from the SS20 missiles of Russia, for since the double decision was taken in 1979 the Soviet Union has almost trebled the number of SS20s that it holds.

At the same time, NATO made a serious offer of negotiations with the Soviet Union to limit this class of intermediate-range weapon. A year ago, on the eve of the opening of the INF negotiations in Geneva, the West offered, through the zero option, to eliminate such missiles entirely. It is worth reflecting that it is very possible to verify a zero option, whereas, as my noble friend Lord Thomas of Swynnerton pointed out in his speech, Mr. Andropov was totally silent on the question of verification of his proposals—and, of course, verification lies at the very heart of the whole question of arms control. The West has said that, if the Soviet Union will remove the source of possible blackmail of Western Europe—that is, the SS20s and the earlier generation of SS4s and SS5s about which the noble Lord, Lord Kennet, spoke—then NATO will have no need for its insurance policy against possible blackmail.

Since the INF negotiations opened in Geneva just over a year ago, we have seen three rounds of negotiations, but, it is true, limited progress. The noble Lord, Lord Mayhew, ascribed this lack of progress to reluctance on the part of the United States' negotiators, but I do assure the House that that is not the case. We have not been surprised that the Soviet Government would hold back to see if political doubts in Western Europe would do the job for them by, in effect, scotching the plans of the Governments concerned to deploy cruise and Pershing 2 missiles. But the NATO governments have not changed their minds, simply because the source of potential blackmail has not been removed.

That is the reason for NATO policy and not the reasons which the noble Lord, Lord Mayhew, unjustly ascribed to my right honourable friend the Prime Minister and the President of the United States. The West, NATO, the Alliance, still believe that the zero option proposal is far and away the best aim for the negotiations, but we will examine carefully other proposals, provided that they are equitable. When announcing on behalf of NATO the zero option proposal, President Reagan said that the negotiators would listen to and consider the serious proposals of their Soviet counterparts. That promise still holds good.

Lord Jenkins of Putney

My Lords, if I may intervene, if the Soviet Union were to accept the so-called zero option, in the opinion of the noble Lord, would the Government be prepared to suggest to President Reagan that in return for that, the West should be prepared to reduce our huge preponderance of submarine ballistic missile launching platforms, which the Soviet Union obviously see as the reason why they need to have the SS20s?

Lord Belstead

My Lords, this is ground which the House has gone over time and time again. The INF and START talks are talks between the two major nuclear powers. We hope, we pray, we believe in and we are working for agreement in those talks by making the realistic proposal from the West of the zero option at the INF talks, and by proposals for deep cuts in the strategic systems held so far as the START talks are concerned. It is necessary to get agreement between the two super powers in those talks. Then will be the right moment to start thinking of other things.

Recently we have seen signs that the Soviet Government maybe realising that demonstrations in Western European countries will not lead to the NATO Governments cancelling their plans for strengthening our ability to deter aggression. Recently there has been the Soviet offer, about which practically all noble Lords have been speaking and which was confirmed by Mr. Andropov yesterday, of some reduction in the number of Russian missiles in Europe. The noble Lord, Lord Bishopston, asked if I would comment on this. If, for the first time, the Russians now accept the principle that their SS20s must be reduced before there can be greater security, this would be a small step in the right direction. But to demand a substantial continuing Soviet monopoly of longer-ranged land based missiles in Europe while insisting that NATO alone should implement the zero option is not a serious position. Even if the Russians reduced SS20 numbers in Europe to the level of about 160, as has been mooted, that would still be twice the size of the force that we faced on the eve of the double decision two years ago. There is thus every reason for us to continue with preparations to deploy the first of NATO's new intermediate-range missiles at the end of next year. I would remind your Lordships that NATO's programme to deploy cruise and Pershing 2 missiles is to be spread over five years and could at any point be amended, stopped or reversed, if agreement in the arms control negotiations warranted it.

I should like to add two points, if I may. The noble Lord, Lord Bishopston, asked for information about: the negotiations concerning the Andropov proposals. I really cannot stress too strongly that members of the United States Administration have kept us fully informed of all that has taken place in Geneva, including the informal exchanges which prefaced the offer which has now been spelled out by Mr. Andropov. During just the last four weeks, for example, we have received a full briefing in Brussels from the chief American negotiator, Ambassador Nitze. My right honourable friend the Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs has had private discussions with the ambassador in London. The negotiations have been discussed by NATO Foreign Ministers at the North Atlantic Council. At the same time, NATO's Special Consultative Group, which is charged with monitoring the negotiations, was also meeting in Brussels; and, of course, we have had the advantage of discussing the subject bi-laterally again with Mr. Schultz here in London. So we really do believe that the present arrangements for full consultation within the alliance are working well, and we are confident that when the negotiations resume on 27th January the American delegation will be putting forward, as they have so far, the collective view of the alliance.

The second point I would make, if I may, is the one about British and French independent strategic nuclear forces being excluded from the negotiations—the point which the noble Lord, Lord Jenkins, raised just now. British submarine-launched ballistic missiles, like comparable United States and Soviet missiles, are strategic, and therefore have no place in the INF negotiations at Geneva. These negotiations are bilateral between the Americans and the Russians, and are concerned with the land-based missiles of those two super powers. The British Polaris/Trident force is a strategic nuclear deterrent of last resort, and is already of the minimum size viable for that purpose in the face of the huge number of Soviet strategic as well as sub-strategic nuclear weapons. I hope that makes the situation perfectly clear to the noble Lord, Lord Jenkins.

There is just one point I would pick up, if I may, before I conclude. The noble Lord, Lord Mayhew, mentioned the United States Poseidon submarine which is assigned to the Supreme Allied Commander in Europe. Here, again, these strategic nuclear systems are not the subject of the INF negotiations in Geneva, since they are fully covered in the strategic arms control negotiations in the START talks. Having said that, I must nonetheless reflect that the Question which the noble Lord asks this evening, although it is confined to the area of intermediate-range nuclear forces, cannot really allow us to concentrate only upon that field, if greater security is to be achieved for the whole world.

For that reason it is important that at the START talks in Geneva the United States proposals would cut deep into the number of deployed strategic ballistic missiles and their warheads, and that at the MBFR talks in July the West put forward proposals to reduce conventional forces on the central front by making a commitment to this by all participants in the Vienna negotiations—a factor which the Eastern bloc had always held to be an obstacle to agreement on conventional forces.

We believe we must continue to persevere, for only if both East and West agree that it is in their own interests to control the arms they hold will the security of the world be increased. It is a snare and a delusion to believe that through a unilateral rejection of responsibility there is some short cut to peace. We must remain firm in our resolve, but ready always to negotiate for agreement on balanced and verifiable reductions in arms. Only in that way can greater security be achieved.

Lord Denham

My Lords, as it all too often falls to my lot to inflict on your Lordships late hours and a heavy burden of work, I should like from this side of the House to express to all other parts of the House a wish for a Happy Christmas and a restful and peaceful recess. I believe I speak for the whole House when I express the same wish to all those in this part of the Palace of Westminster who work to look after us all so well.

Lord Ponsonby of Shulbrede

My Lords, in supporting the noble Lord the Chief Whip, I take this opportunity, I hope not prematurely, of congratulating him on achieving a more even flow of business at the start of this Session. As I said, I hope those are not premature remarks and that we will, in fact, be spared having an intolerable programme of business next summer.

I wholeheartedly join with him in his remarks to the staff, and all those who work at this end of the Palace, for the long hours and devoted service that they have given to the House. I join with the noble Lord in wishing a happy Christmas and a prosperous New Year to all.

Lord Gladwyn

My Lords, I associate these Benches with everything that has been said.

Lord Kennet

My Lords, and I from these Benches.

Lord Denham

My Lords, I am most grateful to the noble Lords. I beg to move that the House do now adjourn.

The House adjourned for the Christmas Recess at twenty-four minutes before six o'clock until Monday, 17th January next.

INFANT MORTALITY: NUMBERS AND RATES FOR LEGITIMATE BRTHS BY SOCIAL CLASS FOR AGGREGIATED METROPOLITAN CONTIES*
Social Class All legitimate* I II III IV V
Year Number Rate Number Rate Number Rate Number Rate Number Rate Number Rate
1975–76 3,826 15.1 145 10.0 414 11.0 1,911 14.1 776 17.6 425 24.7
1977–78 3,294 13.5 156 10.1 388 10.6 1,608 12.7 715 16.3 299 18.6
1979 1,704 13.0 70 9.2 205 10.3 865 12.8 344 13.7 185 20.0
Decrease in rate — 2.1 — 0.8 — 0.7 — 1.3 — 3.9 — 4.7
1979 rate as per cent. 1975–76 rate — 86 — 92 — 94 — 91 — 78 — 81
*Includes "others" not in I-V.
Rate: per 1,000 live births.
†Greater Manchester
Merseyside
South Yorkshire
Tyne and Wear
West Midlands
West Yorkshire.
1980 figures are not included in the tables because of changes in social class classification.