HL Deb 14 December 1982 vol 437 cc490-501

3.52 p.m.

The Minister of State for Defence Procurement (Viscount Trenchard)

My Lords, with the leave of the House, I will now repeat a Statement which is being made by my right honourable friend the Secretary of State for Defence in the other place at the present time. The Statement is as follows:

"The Government are publishing today a White Paper on the Falklands Campaign. It is now available in the Vote Office."—

My Lords, it is also available in our Printed Paper Office—

"Part I of the White Paper consists of a brief description of the operation to repossess the Falkland Islands; Part II analyses the principal lessons to be learned from the campaign itself; and Part III describes the steps which we are taking to make good losses of equipment, to provide for the future defence of the Falkland Islands, and finally the additional measures now proposed to increase the mobility and flexibility of our armed forces for future operations in the NATO area and elsewhere.

"First, we intend further to improve the airborne and other capabilities of 5 Infantry Brigade for out-of-area operations. It already has two parachute battalions, an infantry battalion and engineer support. To these we have just added an armoured recce regiment and in the course of next year we will add an artillery regiment, an Army Air Corps squadron and certain logistic units.

"RAF Hercules aircraft are already earmarked for deployment of the brigade, and the fitting of station keeping equipment to a number of Hercules will give the brigade a parachute assault capability by 1985. These enhancements should represent a significant improvement to our capability for airborne operations 'out-of-area'. Taken together with the amphibious capability of the 3rd Commando Brigade Royal Marines, they will give us an improved capability to respond to the unforeseen in a flexible and rapid way.

"For 'out-of-area' operations we also need an improved air-to-air refuelling capacity which was of such vital importance in the Falklands campaign. Subject to final scrutiny of tenders and to satisfactory contractual negotiations, our intention is to add to our tanker fleet by buying from British Airways six TriStar aircraft for conversion into tankers. We plan to convert four of these aircraft so that they can also carry freight.

"This purchase of a strategic tanker capability will enormously increase our existing tanker capacity. For example, a single TriStar tanker will be able to do the work of eight Victor refuelling aircraft in the South Atlantic. It could also carry up to 120 troops even while refuelling. It will therefore increase the RAF's troop lift; enable easier support and much more rapid reinforcement of the Falkland Islands; and, most significant of all, it will multiply the effectiveness of all the RAF's combat aircraft, including the Nimrod and the air defence Tornados and Phantoms.

"As well as greater strategic mobility to be provided by the TriStars, we also need greater tactical mobility and battlefield logistic support. After the loss of three Chinooks on the 'Atlantic Conveyor'—and the MoD are participating with Cunard in the design of her replacement—the one medium-lift Chinook was invaluable in the Falklands campaign. To add to the two Chinook squadrons, we now intend to purchase a further eight Chinooks—of which three will be replacements. Each Chinook can carry up to 80 men and substantial quantities of stores and ammunition. The extra medium-lift helicopters will greatly enhance battlefield mobility and logistic support in the NATO area and elsewhere.

"As I have already announced, all the Sea King and Lynx helicopters lost are being replaced and an additonal six anti-submarine warfare Sea Kings are being purchased for the Royal Navy, as well as seven more Sea Harriers, in addition to the replacement of all naval and RAF Harriers lost in the conflict. All these aircraft orders will be subject to satisfactory terms of contract, including price.

"In the light of the campaign and the future needs of the Falklands Garrison, we must take further steps to improve our air defence capability. Subject to the satisfactory completion of negotiations, we will purchase at least 12 additional Phantom aircraft from the United States; and 24 additional Rapier Fire Units for the RAF and Army are to be bought.

"The air defence of the Royal Navy must be strengthened by the provision of an organic airborne early warning capability, based on the Searchwater radar, for each of the operational aircraft carriers. We also intend to provide a modern point defence weapon system for all the carriers, the assault ships 'Fearless' and 'Intrepid', HMS 'Bristol', and all the Type 42 destroyers—the choice of system is still being studied.

"The White Paper describes a number of other new purchases of equipments, weapons and stocks—including a list of the new weapon systems such as Harpoon and laser-guided munitions purchased during the conflict, which remain as a general addition to our force levels. On the subject of war stocks, we saw again during the campaign the key importance of staying power and of the need to allow for delays in re-supply. We plan to increase substantially, by at least £10 million, the number and range of items in the stockpile specifically earmarked for the support of operations outside the NATO area.

"I now come to ship numbers and new ship orders. Under the plans set out in Cmnd. 8288, we would have had about 55 frigates and destroyers either running or in refit next year, with no ships in the Standby Squadron. The total number of ships would have remained at around this level over the following two years, but two ships would have gone into the Standby Squadron by 1st April 1984, and two more by 1st April 1985. The plan was that by 1989 up to eight ships would have been in the Standby Squadron out of a total of 50.

"With the additional funds now available and to meet the needs of the garrison, the two standby ships in 1984 and the two further standby ships in 1985 will now remain in the front line fleet for three years.

"We are at present covering for the four ships lost in the campaign by running on older hulls, but to sustain our proposals in Cmnd. 8288 for a total force of about 50 ships in the longer term—that is, beyond the mid-1980s—new-build replacements are needed urgently. We have decided that these replacements should be Type 22 anti-submarine frigates and that an improved Batch III design, taking account of the Falklands campaign, should be introduced as soon as possible.

"Competitive tenders were sought for the first of the replacement ships and for another Type 22 frigate already in the programme and not related to the Falklands losses. In the light of the tenders submitted, an order for two new Type 22 frigates of an amended Batch II design has been placed today with Swan Hunter, together with an order for a further two replacement ships of the new Batch III design from Yarrow Shipbuilders Limited. Initial design work is in hand for a replacement for the logistic landing ship "Sir Galahad". "Sir Tristram" will be brought back to the United Kingdom and we hope it can be repaired.

"I am also able to announce today, although it is not connected with the Falklands replacement programme, that an order for two further Hunt class mine countermeasures vessels has been placed with Vosper Thornycroft. Last year, in pursuance of our policy of modernising the fleet, we spent more in real terms on ships and their weapon systems than for the past 19 years and almost 50 per cent. more again than in 1978/79. The total value of the ship orders placed today is £585 million and, when added to other naval orders amounting to £161 million already placed this year, new naval shipbuilding will be maintained at very high levels.

"We plan that the fourth and final Falklands replacement ship will be a further Batch III Type 22 frigate. It will be ordered as early as possible next year by competitive tender when Yarrow Shipbuilders Limited and Vosper Thornycroft (UK) Limited will be strong contenders for this order.

"Mr. Speaker, the success of last year's review of the defence programme in matching resources to our revised forward plans had already won us a degree of flexibility to make adjustments to the defence programme—and the Government have now provided extra funds to meet the additional costs of the garrison—and the replacement of all equipment lost. All the measures that I have announced can be met within the announced defence budget for 1983/84 and the planning totals for later years.

"In many respects, the Falklands conflict was unique. We must be cautious, therefore, in deciding which lessons of the campaign are relevant to the United Kingdom's four main roles within NATO. These roles remain our priority, and the modernisation of our forces devoted to them must still have the first call on our resources. The measures we are taking will significantly strengthen our ability to perform our main defence tasks, but they will also increase the flexibility, mobility and readiness of all three services for operation 'out-of-area', as well as within the boundaries of NATO itself."

My Lords, that concludes the Statement.

4.5 p.m.

Lord Bishopston

My Lords, we are grateful to the Minister for repeating the Statement which has been made in the other place. This is, of course, a very important Statement and, rightly, a full one, and we look forward to studying the implications of it in the White Paper in due course. We welcome the replacements announced for losses and the re-equipping from British sources. This is most important, not only for the job situation but also as an acknowledgment of the superb skill of our designers and workpeople in this country.

I have a few questions which I should like to put to the noble Viscount the Minister. As he said, the White Paper includes a description of operations to repossess the Falkland Islands, and I am sure we all hope that the Government have learned the necessary lessons about the apparent inadequacy of their pre-Falklands defence policy. I am pleased to note that there is a plan to improve further the airborne and other capabilities. This is particularly important, in view of the rather limited airport and other landing facilities, and it may be helpful if the Minister were to comment on the airport aspect.

In view of the fact that there is still great uncertainty about Argentine intentions, can the Minister say whether he is really satisfied with the adequacy of our radar and other early-warning facilities and, indeed, other defensive measures, against surprise attack, by Super Etendard and other Argentine weapons, on our vessels in the area? What assessment has been made of the effectiveness of the laser-guided weapons and our facilities for reply?

Have the Government learned the lessons regarding the rundown of the Royal Navy, in vessels and manpower, which was evident at the time when we were having to face the unexpected and very heavy demands of the Falklands campaign? Apart from the proposals which the Minister has announced, will the Government be going ahead with the refitting of Royal Navy vessels to update them for the tasks which they face, or will there be some ships, even now, made obsolete?

Do the Government recognise that the sacrifices that are being made in favour of the Trident may be at the expense of conventional weapons, which are essential in this and, maybe, in other areas, and that if such a policy is continued it could well prove disastrous to the needs of the future? Are the measures announced within the cost limits of the proposed budgets and the contingency fund? I think the Minister has made a comment on that.

Last, but by no means least, is the Minister satisfied with the facilities for our forces in the area? One hears of some of the rather primitive conditions under which people have to live, and I am sure the House will agree it is essential that we make longer term plans, as well as taking immediate action, to improve them. The Minister will obviously be aware that there are bound to be social implications in having a large garrison on an island where there is a small civil population. This will call for very good liaison and co-operation between the civil and military commissioners.

Tribute has rightly been paid on many occasions to the skill, daring and devotion of our forces in the Falklands campaign, and I suggest it is essential that we ensure that those who prepare to defend us in any area in the future have adequate means for doing so by more conventional capability which is not lessened by some of the nuclear demands. Finally, recognising that the present position in the Falklands is one which will have to be sorted out in the longer term, will the Minister bear in mind the need to have closer liaison with the United Nations, in order that longer term solutions may be forthcoming and may be made known in the not too distant future?

Lord Mayhew

My Lords, on these Benches there will be a welcome for a number of the points in this detailed and important Statement: for the second thoughts of the Government, which no amount of careful drafting can conceal, about the future size of the frigate fleet; also, for the emphasis on greater mobility; and, in particular, for the remarkable suggestion of increasing tanker capability. The noble Viscount has already mentioned the very necessary improvement in aircraft early warning. We on these Benches also congratulate the Government for rejecting all proposals for thinning out BAOR or RAF Germany, which we should have regarded as a very serious error of judgment.

May I ask the noble Viscount to tell us how the manpower equation now stands in the Navy? Have the Government had second thoughts about the reduction in naval manpower? Have they had second thoughts about Portsmouth and Chatham? Can the noble Viscount tell us what the new features of the Batch III Type 22 frigate will be? What is the total cost of the changes which the noble Viscount has just announced? And what is the total cost of the garrisoning of the Falklands next year and for the two subsequent years? It seems extraordinary if, after the Statement and the calculations about the cost of the Falklands garrison, everthing can be happily included in the original budget for next year and in subsequent years.

May I make the further point that one lesson of the Falklands is that, despite the rightly praised performance of the Harriers, we needed greater size, range and endurance in the fighter cover. I see in the Statement no reference to this as a problem or as a lesson of the Falklands, nor any suggestion as to how this problem can be overcome in the future. It is not only a matter of aircraft early warning. There is the inherent difficulty of operating at sea without the support of land based aircraft or a big carrier. May I ask the Minister what defence is planned of the Navy in the East Atlantic against missile attack by Soviet aircraft operating at a range of 200 or 300 miles? Are they to be escorted by a United States carrier, or are they to rely upon interception of the missiles as they arrive? This seems to me to be a serious lesson of the Falklands and I hope that the Government will reassure us on that point.

Viscount Trenchard

My Lords, I thank both noble Lords for their constructive comments. They were long enough to keep me busy for what could be a full-scale debate. Perhaps both noble Lords will excuse me if I answer them very briefly on this occasion and take the opportunity to say that through the usual channels it will probably be desired that time should be set aside for a debate and that I am informed that this will be possible when we resume after Christmas.

So far as the pre-Falklands defence policy is concerned, my right honourable friend has never wished to hide the fact that our defence policy was for a very long time centred on mainly NATO European operations. I believe that the equipment which we had did cope, but the operation has taught us lessons which will enable us to prepare that much better for out of area operations. I believe that my right honourable friend's Statement and the White Paper make that clear.

Turning to the airfield, as your Lordships know we have extended the existing airfield so that the modern combat aircraft which are now on the Falklands can land and take off. No final decision has been taken on the best and most economic way of making a new airfield for permanent military and civil purposes.

The noble Lord, Lord Bishopston, and the noble Lord, Lord Mayhew, asked me about airborne early warning and about equipment generally designed to protect a fleet far from land-based aircraft. We have already equipped two Sea King helicopters with airborne early warning. Those helicopters are operational in the Falklands at present. In addition, now that we are ashore, we have taken other steps. We have taken steps to improve still further our not unsuccessful chaff decoy measures for missile attack and also to improve our surface-borne radars.

So far as naval manpower is concerned, we believe that our policy should not change to any great degree in relation to the allocation of resources and that most of the naval manpower savings will be made in approximately the time-scale outlined in Cmnd. 8288. Clearly the retention of a third carrier, the retention of four ships in the meantime until the lost ships are replaced, and the other points which I made in relation to the Standby Squadron, will erode the savings to a degree. But the majority of the savings were of shore establishments and shore personnel. These are being successfully carried out, and according to any plans we can see will not be altered very radically. The four ships which are being retained will be of the Rothesay and Leander class, which are the best we have in the meanwhile to cover the losses sustained.

Turning to the point made by the noble Lord, Lord Bishopston, on the cost of Trident, he will forgive me if I repeat once again that I find it hard to accept that this point is being made in this House from the Front Bench of the Labour Party. I say that because we have increased our defence expenditure by 3 per cent. per annum in real terms and will go on doing so until 1986, while several of the resolutions passed at the annual conference of the noble Lord's party would reduce defence expenditure to the average—as a percentage of gross domestic product—of our European NATO partners. That would reduce the current expenditure on defence by 10 Tridents-worth.

The facilities on the islands are improving and accommodation is being built. Further short-term steps for ship accommodation have been taken and will continue. The size of the garrison in the longer term is far from certain and depends upon the noble Lord's last point; namely, a longer-term settlement. I can assure the noble Lord that the Government are fully aware of the need for a longer-term settlement and that at what we believe is the right time according to our judgment we shall take the necessary initiatives.

In relation to the plans for Portsmouth and Chatham to which the noble Lord, Lord Mayhew, drew attention, the plans for Chatham stand. The plans for Portsmouth are being slightly changed—in fact, one can say appreciably changed. Subject to successful negotiations with the trade unions concerned in respect of flexible working conditions, Portsmouth, which was to have retained 1,300 people against an original total of 7,000 people in the base and the dockyard, will have its base retention figure increased to approximately 2,800 in order to carry out light repairs to ships and modernisation of ships while they are in dock. The Batch III Type 22 frigates will have a number of improvements. They will have in addition to the Sea Wolf, with its improved ability to take out very low skimming missiles, a further point defence system—although the exact type has not yet been decided. It will have a new hull sonar to help its anti-submarine role. It will have improved anti-ship missiles and eight tubes instead of four. I probably have not covered all the improvements, but they also include the new Rolls Spey engine. This engine has actually been fitted to one Batch II Type 22 as the first production fit, but all the Batch IIIs will have it.

So far as costs are concerned, I must ask the noble Lord to read all our Statements on those. I cannot do the addition quickly enough at this time, but we have said that the cost of the Falklands operation and replacements—weapon purchases and the like—have been around £700 million this year and will be around £900 million over the next years. We have said that the cost of the garrison of the Falklands will be £424 million next year. The cost of the garrison in the longer term will depend on many imponderables and we have not forecast it any further. Those figures will be added to the defence budget, which itself has been increased by 3 per cent. The separate cost of the airfield will also have to be met.

The noble Lord, Lord Mayhew, asked me about the Harrier enhancements. I believe he will find mention of some of the many enhancements to the Harrier in the White Paper. Enhancements to its equipment are taking place and the Harrier's range and its payload, or its range or its payload (whichever way it suits a particular operation) are being increased to a considerable extent. The reinstitution of big, long take-off carriers would require a very large shift in resources, which Her Majesty's Government do not feel is a proper call on our funds.

So far as the East Atlantic and the protection against air attack of our force in the East Atlantic are concerned, we will be operating in the East Atlantic behind the air defences of the United Kingdom with the United States' task forces—and perhaps those are the two main reasons for saying that I believe we should have a far greater degree of air superiority in the areas where our fleet will operate (and if we did not, the situation would be pretty desperate) than we were able to obtain in one of the hardest and most difficult of operations 8,000 miles away from our home base.

Lord Kennet

My Lords, we welcome the Statement also among the Social Democrat Peers. We think that on the whole it is a sensible Statement. Two questions arise immediately. The first concerns the stockpile. If we have learned from the Falklands campaign something which we did not know before about the importance of stockpiles, is that something applicable only to campaigns such as the Falklands? Is it not also applicable to operations in the NATO area; and, in the latter case, is the £10 million increase in the stockpile to apply only to the Falklands circumstances and why-is there no corresponding NATO increase?

The second question is closely related and concerns the very substantial and expensive purchase of TriStars for conversion into tankers. Their use in the Falklands surroundings is obvious. Their continued use there is perfectly clear. On the other hand, their use within NATO is not so clear. If there is a good use for them in the NATO area, how is it that we did not buy them before? If there is not a good use for them within the NATO area, does their purchase mean that the Government envisage maintaining a large garrison down there in the Falklands without any change in the political relations with the countries—I repeat "countries", in the plural—of Latin America as far as the eye san see?

Viscount Trenchard

My Lords, I hope that the noble Lord, Lord Kennet, will forgive me if I say that this is a White Paper on the Falklands and the lessons from it, and is not a further discussion—for which we shall have plenty of opportunity—on defence as a whole with particular reference to NATO. I should unduly impinge on the time of your Lordships' House if I were to do full justice to the questions which the noble Lord has raised.

All I will confirm is that the stockpile I have mentioned is for out-of-area operations, as the Statement makes clear. As far as the TriStars are concerned, again the Statement makes the situation clear; it is a major, total augmentation of this aspect of our force multiplier capability by the provision of yet more tankers. We have been gradually developing the force multiplier concept, and it is one of the ways of making sure that we get greater value out of the enormously costly fighting platforms, such as the Tornado, which we are buying today in order to ensure that we can keep them in the air virtually all the time that we have pilots for them. It is a major augmentation. The bigger tanker has a particular saving capability as compared with the smaller tanker in relation to very long distances. They will be valuable, and they are an addition.

4.27 p.m.

Lord Hill-Norton

My Lords, I should like to ask the noble Viscount, Lord Trenchard, two or three questions on the Statement. Not having seen the White Paper, I will not attempt to ask any questions about that. Three of my questions concern words which the noble Viscount or his right honourable friend have used and one concerns an omission.

As for the first question, the noble Lord, Lord Mayhew, referred to manpower—and I took it that he meant uniformed manpower in the Royal Navy. In his reply, the noble Viscount said that he thought there would be only minor changes to the proposed reductions of no less than 16,000. I ask the noble Viscount the Minister whether that is indeed realistic, observing that, before the Falklands campaign, one major ship (an aircraft carrier), two large ships (assault ships), and four medium ships (destroyers) were added to the fleet upon which the 16,000 reduction has been based. It seems to me that the reply which the noble Viscount gave the noble Lord, Lord Mayhew, simply does not make arithmetical sense.

My second question concerns ship orders. The Statement contained words about battle casualty replacements being four in number—Type 42 destroyers—to replace the two Type 21s and the two Type 42s which were sunk. The Statement also contained—although it was difficult to take in the words as they were spoken—the information that the much delayed order for the ninth Type 22 destroyer was about to be placed. My question to the noble Viscount the Minister is, is he aware that, with a frigate force of 54, if my arithmetic is right, the Government will have to order three a year from now on to keep that force in being; and that, so far, in the past three and a half years of this Government, they have ordered only two?

My third question on what was said—and then I come to what was not said—concerns the merchant fleet, without which the Falklands operation would have been impossible, and this is what I understand the White Paper is about. Is the Minister aware that, unless something is done to rescue the merchant fleet, in about 18 months' time it will be quite impossible to take up from trade 53 ships, as were taken up for the Falklands campaign, because they simply will not exist under the red or blue ensign?

My question regarding an omission from the Statement is simply this. Accommodation for the garrison in the Falklands is a scandal. It is now six months since victory was won. There is no mention in the Statement that any arrangements have been made. Those of us who read the newspapers are aware of ad hoc arrangements which have been made. It seems to me quite disgraceful that no mention is made of how it is intended to house these men, who are living in conditions which at the moment are squalid.

Viscount Trenchard

My Lords, I will say to the noble and gallant Lord, Lord Hill-Norton, also that I will be fully prepared and willing to debate all those points in much more detail as and when time is allocated for a debate. So perhaps he will forgive me for giving very short answers at this stage.

Cmnd. 8288 I think suggested a reduction, from a uniformed naval strength, if my memory is right, of somewhere around 72,000 to 75,000, by 8,000 to 10,000. It is those figures to which, mentally, I was referring in saying that we believed that the various measures we have taken will in fact result in figures short of that number, but not all that short of it, being saved by, again from memory, the years 1986–87, as the sort of time for that target reduction.

The noble and gallant Lord is quite correct in saying that we are ordering five Type 22 frigates in total, one of which is 22–09 which was already in the programme, but as far as the force numbers are concerned the Statement is correct. I would add that I will be prepared at the time of the debate to indicate the methods by which we believe that, even at the end of the decade, the force level of 50 destroyers and frigates will be maintained. The announcement today says that no ships will go into the Standby Squadron in the first two years, when they were originally planned to go in.

The study of the merchant fleet strength is continuing, both on an industry basis and by the advisory committee, the initials of which slip my mind. We will report the result of that fully too.

I note what the noble and gallant Lord says about the conditions in the Falklands. While I believe he is a little harsh, I fully agree with him. He did not speak for himself, but I am certainly glad that I am not in the Falklands at the present time. However, I believe that very considerable progress has been made, is being made and will be made in relation to facilities.

Lord Orr-Ewing

My Lords, can my noble friend tell us whether, as a result of this welcome upturn in new shipbuilding and other re-equipment and replacement, there is any slowing down of the air defence of the United Kingdom; or can we rest assured that the air defence Tornado will, if anything, be brought forward rather than set back, and that the improved ground radar and other protective measures will continue at the highest possible speed? Can he say whether the manning of these extra ships will be undertaken satisfactorily if we continue with the present planned rundown of our uniformed armed forces, or is there to be a slowing down, or even a build-up, from the low point planned in the past? Lastly, can he give a rough estimate of how many extra civilian jobs will be created as a result of this very welcome shipbuilding programme?

Viscount Trenchard

My Lords, I would say to my noble friend that nothing in my right honourable friend's announcement this afternoon will have any adverse effect on the air defence of the United Kingdom. In the White Paper he will find that it is our intention to purchase at least 12 extra Phantoms from the USA, if we are able to do so, not all of which will be necessarily committed to the Falklands; so there will be an augmentation of air defence.

So far as manpower is concerned, I can assure my noble friend that that will not in any way inhibit or delay the measures we have found it necessary to take. So far as civilian employment is concerned, I cannot give my noble friend a precise figure at this stage. In some cases, of course, as he knows, the result will be the retention of manpower that otherwise might have had no order book to keep it busy and employed, but there will be a very considerable plus to the level of employment on top of that.

Lord Denham

My Lords, the usual length of a Statement and the subsequent questioning is about 30 minutes. I know this is a very important Statement, and the Statement itself took rather a long time, but I am wondering whether we are not in danger of developing into a debate about this, and whether your Lordships may not feel that the time has come to pass on to the normal business of the day.

Lord Shinwell

My Lords, as there is to be a debate, I agree that we need not pursue these questions at great length now, but there are one or two questions that I think are very important. Based on our experience in the Falklands affair, it is obvious that the strategy involved in our Defence White Paper was defective; that is to say, there were defects which are now exposed. I think that would be generally agreed. I understand that the right honourable gentleman the Secretary of State for Defence is going to resign. Is he the only person responsible for the last White Paper, which we were asked to accept unanimously? Is he the only person who is going to resign? What about the other people involved? Is the noble Viscount going to resign, because he stood by the White Paper, to such an extent that when I suggested a review of the White Paper he said there would be no more reviews.

Lord Denham

My Lords, I think that the noble Lord, Lord Shinwell, with respect, is going too far.

Viscount Trenchard

My Lords, I would merely say to the noble Lord, Lord Shinwell: yes, there will be a debate, and so we can come back to these questions. He began by saying that everybody would agree that defects had been exposed. I think it would be astonishing if a nation went to war and was unable to find any lessons for improvement. What the Statement and the White Paper make clear, when the noble Lord has time to read them, is—and to me it is remarkable—that we did have the forces and the equipment capable of accomplishing a uniquely difficult operation. Therefore, I would just want to say that my Secretary of State announced his forthcoming resignation, that he was not standing again for Parliament, some time ago; this, in my opinion, and, I believe, in his and in the country's, has nothing to do with the changes of emphasis which he now makes to a defence policy which has put us in a very good position to resist the main threats to the security of this country. I stood by him then, and I still stand by him on the policy which is largely reiterated today.