Lords Sitting of 6 December 1982

Preamble
The House met at half-past two of the clock: The CHAIRMAN OF COMMITTEES on the Woolsack.
Prayers—Read by the Lord Bishop of Portsmouth.

Gatwick Airport: Development Delays and Costs
Lord Boyd-Carpenter: My Lords, I beg leave to ask the Question which stands in my name on the Order Paper.
The Question was as follows:
To ask Her Majesty's Government why it was necessary for 2¼ years to elapse between the conclusion of the public hearings of the inquiry into the development of Gatwick Airport and the announcement of their decisions by the Secretaries of State, and why work on this development is not yet authorised to begin; and what has been the cost to public funds and to the British Airports Authority of these proceedings.
The Earl of Avon: My Lords, the Inspector's report, which took eight months, contained many recommendations for consideration by the Government. In September 1981 new air traffic forecasts were made available which my right honourable friends considered to be material. In a letter to all the parties in November they expressed a preliminary view that it would be right to grant outline permission for the second terminal. However, they invited the interested parties to make written representations on the new forecasts before a final decision was taken. This procedure lasted until August 1982. My right honourable friends announced this final decision on 9th November last. It will now be necessary for detailed plans to be approved by the local planning authority, and other conditions of the permission to be met. The directly assessable cost to the Exchequer of the inquiry
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was £96,000; this does not include some establishment costs not separately available. Expenditure incurred by the British Airports Authority on the inquiry is a matter for the board.
Lord Boyd-Carpenter: My Lords, I thank my noble friend for that comprehensive reply. May I ask him whether he is really satisfied that it was necessary to follow a procedure which, in the words of a learned judge,
"went beyond time and encroached upon eternity",
in order to decide what is not a very difficult issue?
The Earl of Avon: My Lords, that may well have been a learned judge's opinion; but, on the other hand, there is another opinion which says that two and a quarter years is not considered to be unduly long for this process, bearing in mind the requirement for further representations which arose.
Lord Elwyn-Jones: My Lords, I do not wish to disagree excessively. The remark about encroaching upon eternity was made by Chief Justice Cockburn in the last century.
The Earl of Avon: My Lords, I am sure he would have great expertise on airport inquiries.
Baroness Burton of Coventry: My Lords, while not rising on a legal point, may I ask the noble Earl whether the Government still adhere quite firmly to their Statement that 25 million passengers per annum will be the maximum permitted at Gatwick? Additionally, can he give the House any indication as to when the work at Gatwick will be completed and/or actually when the new extension of the terminal will be in use?—because the two might not be the same date.
The Earl of Avon: My Lords, I cannot confirm the answer to the noble Baroness' first question because I do not have the information at my fingertips. As regards work on the second terminal, provided the necessary planning and investment approvals are forthcoming, the British Airports Authority hope to start preparatory work on the site during the spring of

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next year. It is estimated that the earliest that the first phase of the terminal can come into use is 1987.
Baroness Burton of Coventry: My Lords, will the Minister be kind enough to write and confirm the figure of 25 million passengers being the maximum per annum to be permitted?
The Earl of Avon: My Lords, I shall be happy to do so. I was not aware that the noble Baroness needed that confirmation.
Lord John-Mackie: My Lords, has the Minister any idea whether this decision will affect the decision at Stansted?
The Earl of Avon: My Lords, my understanding is that the inquiry at Stansted is going ahead on the assumption that the second terminal will be built at Gatwick.

Nuclear Attack: London Survival Rate
2.38p.m.
Lord Jenkins of Putney: My Lords, I beg leave to ask the Question which stands in my name on the Order Paper.
The Question was as follows:
To ask Her Majesty's Government whether they agree that even on their own 1980 "Square Leg" assumption of a nuclear attack in which there would be no direct hits on the capital and only 13 megatons exploding in five outlying areas, the survival rate in many London boroughs would be nil and, if they disagree, what is their own calculation.
The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State, Department of Health and Social Security (Lord Elton): My Lords, "Square Leg" was a military exercise, in which attack assumptions were made to test military plans. In the immediate vicinity of the assumed bomb bursts, few people, if any, would have survived. Elsewhere in London there would have been millions of survivors, as would be the case in any part of the United Kingdom on any realistically foreseeable scale of attack.
Lord Jenkins of Putney: My Lords, is it not the case that out of 33 London boroughs, survivors could be expected in only approximately half of those boroughs? Is it not irresponsible to insist upon London boroughs carrying out full nuclear preparations and civil defence exercises when it is known in fact that the possibility of any reasonable survival rate does not exist?
Lord Elton: My Lords, I have to say that I find it odd that the noble Lord should say in one breath that survivors might be expected, on his admission, in half the London boroughs, and say at the same time that no provision should be made to increase their ability to survive. I would add in the national context that the intention of our policy is to present a credible policy of deterrence, and this is part of it.
Lord George-Brown: My Lords, may I ask the Minister who it should be —possibly the noble Lord, Lord Jenkins of Putney? Also, could we be allowed to ask, through the Minister, the noble Lord, Lord Jenkins of Putney—
A noble Lord: No!
Lord George-Brown:—to ask the Soviet Parliament which, as I understand it, meets only twice a year, to ask whichever authority it is which runs Moscow, the very same Question which is put here and to ask whoever it is who runs Moscow then to ask the Supreme Presidium of the Soviets what their answer is to the very same Question?
Lord Elton: My Lords, the noble Lord's interrogatory process outruns the bounds of possibility. If it could be in action, my Lords, I would require more than two Sessions a year to answer the questions the noble Lord would ask of that body.
Lord Shinwell: My Lords, is the noble Lord aware that the time seems to have arrived when my noble friend Lord Jenkins of Putney puts down these Questions in order to frighten us and to frighten everybody—
Several noble Lords: Hear, hear!
Lord Shinwell: when in fact all that happens is that he is frightened himself?
Lord Elton: My Lords, anybody who tries to frighten the noble Lord, Lord Shinwell, is pursuing a lost cause.
Lord Brockway: My Lords, is it not now unrealistic to expect that there could be many survivors from a nuclear attack, in view of, first, the United Nations expert statement that a nuclear weapon has now been created which is 4,000 times as deadly as the one which fell on Hiroshima—
Lord George-Brown: Tell Moscow!
Lord Brockway:—and, secondly, that the preparatory committee of the Medical Association's investigation says that, even in the deepest shelters, people will be choked to death?
Lord Elton: My Lords, there is a good deal of misapprehension and some inaccuracy in the assumptions that underly the noble Lord's question. Be that as it may, the concern of Her Majesty's Government is to see, first, that a nuclear war does not arise; and, secondly, that if it does the maximum number of people shall survive under the best possible conditions. Both those aims require a credible and effective system of civil defence.
Lord Campbell of Alloway: My Lords, does my noble friend the Minister consider it profitable to talk in terms of expected survival, when the defence potential remains a wholly unknown factor?
Lord Elton: Indeed, my Lords. I am often at pains to avoid pursuing hypothetical questions in the House, but the weight, direction, location and number of nuclear strikes in a war on this country, if it took place, cannot be predicted by us, because we would not be pressing the button. We are concerned to see that the button is not pressed. The way to do that is to make people on the other side realise that there is a credible response. To make that reponse credible, we have to arm ourselves against the possibility of war and the need to see that members of this country, who are your Lordships' fellow citizens, survive in as a great a number, and under as great a chance of recovery, as is humanly possible. That is the aim of this policy.
Lord Mishcon: My Lords, would the Government consider cheering us up a little bit by making the next assumption not the "Square Leg" assumption, but the "Silly mid-off" assumption?
Lord Elton: My Lords, as I am a rowing man, rather than a cricketer, I shall not answer that question for fear of catching a crab.
Lord Molloy: My Lords, would the noble Lord agree that it would be an appalling shame, if the very existence of the Soviet Union should in any way prohibit any Member of this House or another place, or any other British person, from making full use of our democratic facilities? Would he further agree that all the horrendous figures which have been quoted in this Question Time apply equally to citizens in the Soviet Union and America, and that what is really wanted—and perhaps our Government could give a lead-is that there should be parliamentary concern expressed in the Soviet Union and, equally, the United States of America? We should challenge them to do that, so that, perhaps, we could band together to give humanity a lead away from the most probable of all holocausts and back to sanity.
Lord Elton: My Lords, it is beyond the competence of any British Government to alter the constitutional arrangements in the Soviet Union. But that said, I trust that those who live on the other side of the Iron Curtain realise that they are as exposed as we are to the consequences of any nuclear exchange and that we have a mutual interest in seeing that it does not occur.
Lord Jenkins of Putney: My Lords, is the nobleLord aware that it so happens that I have asked the question suggested by the noble Lord, Lord George-Brown, not in Moscow but in Leningrad, of the city soviet which is in charge of that city? The answer I received was that, although there are military preparations for the possibility of nuclear war, there are no civilian preparations, as they take the view that any nuclear war would result in wholesale destruction, and that there is so little possibility of human survival that it is undesirable, unnecessary and, indeed, absurd to make preparations for it. In these cicumstances, would the Government, even if they wish to make a pretence of the possibility of survival, at least refrain from enforcing upon local authorities an action to a pretence of survival in which they do not believe?
Lord Elton: My Lords, it would be useful if the noble Lord, in his next opportunity to question the supposedly democratic institutions of the Soviet
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Union, would take the opportunity of preaching the lesson, which I have tried to preach to him this afternoon, that it is in the interests of all of us to avoid nuclear war, and of saying that this country is prepared to contemplate the possibility, in order to avoid the likelihood.
Lord Jenkins of Putney: Answer the question!
Lord Alport: My Lords, may I ask the Leader of the House whether she does not consider that the process of this Question and Answer has been an abuse of the normal Orders of this House? Does she not also consider that if a matter is to be discussed in this House at this length, with information given to the House by the questioner, it should be in the form of a debate and not a starred Question?
The Lord Privy Seal (Baroness Young): My Lords, on all matters relating to the length of time that a particular Question runs on, I try always to act as the voice of the House and suggest that we move on after a given period of time. This has, in fact, happened on quite a number of occasions recently. But I am quite sure that the whole House will have taken note of the point which the noble Lord, Lord Alport, makes about the length of time which is spent on particular Questions.
Lord George-Brown: But, my Lords, may I just ask—?
Several Noble Lords: No!
Lord George-Brown: My Lords, the House may say that if it wishes. But may I just ask, if propagandists are going to make their propaganda for—
Several Noble Lords: What is the question?
Lord George-Brown: My Lords, your Lordships may say what you like. But if propagandists are going to make their propaganda for things which will do our country down, it has to be for some of us to resist, and if we are to resist it will take rather more time than the noble Lord, Lord Alport, thinks is right. May I ask, therefore, that we do not fall into the trap of allowing the propagandists to make their point and rule out those who wish to resist it?
Baroness Young: My Lords, there was nothing wrong with the Question which the noble Lord, Lord Jenkins asked. He was completely entitled to ask it. Other noble Lords may ask Questions of a contrary view. It is all part of Question Time in your Lordships' House. I think it would now be the wish of the House that we take the next Question.

European Community Development Policy
2.49 p.m.
Lord Oram: My Lords, I beg leave to ask the Question which stands in my name on the Order Paper.
The Question was as follows:
To ask Her Majesty's Government what attitude the United Kingdom Minister took to Mr. Edgar

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Pisani's Memorandum on the Community's Development Policy when it was discussed at the EEC Council of Ministers (Development) on 8th November 1982.
Lord Skelmersdale: My Lords, the Government welcomed the memorandum as a useful basis for discussion of Community development policy. We supported those ideas aimed at improving the quality and effectiveness of Community aid, but expressed reservations about certain ideas, principally those which implied a substantial shift in the balance of aid expenditure from bilateral aid to the Community aid programme.
Lord Oram: My Lords, while thanking the Minister for his Answer, may I ask whether it is not the case that the Minister representing Her Majesty's Government put forward a rather negative point of view when he suggested that we should not raise the expectations of the developing countries? Is it not the case that Mr. Pisani's paper not only presents very clearly the deteriorating position of the poorest countries in the world but puts forward constructive proposals for extending the Lomé Convention both in time—indeed, without a time limit—and geographically? That being so, was not an opportunity missed to back up the Commission's progressive views? Would it not have been much better if our Minister, and other Government Ministers, had taken a much more positive line?
Lord Skelmersdale: My Lords, I believe that the noble Lord, Lord Oram, is referring to a small article which appeared a few days ago in The Times. The media always like instant action upon anything which is discussed in the EEC, but in this case that is simply not practicable. My honourable friend was rightly cautious after the Council meeting, because this is a very substantial document which runs to more than 50 pages and covers a wide range of aid, trade and economic issues. Only a selection of the more important ideas were discussed at the Development Council on 8th November and, more recently, at the Foreign Affairs Council on 22nd and 23rd November. Further consideration of the issues will continue well into the New Year. I quite agree with the noble Lord that one of Mr. Pisani's points is that there should be more emphasis on the poorest countries. I am happy to say the Government consider that Mr. Pisani produced a very good analysis of why aid has not always gone to the poorest—either inside the countries or to the poorest countries themselves. So far as the reconstitution of the Lomé Convention is concerned, that convention is running in parallel with Mr. Pisani's memorandum. Until the memorandum is fully discussed it will be difficult to see what bearing, if any, it will have on the renegotiations.
Lord Cledwyn of Penrhos: My Lords, will the noble Lord ensure that one of the anomalies considered during the next few weeks in the discussions to which the noble Lord referred is the enormous surpluses produced by the Community? For example, millions of tonnes of fish are dumped in the sea and food fit for human consumption is converted into animal feed.
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Does not the Minister consider this to be scandalous when millions of our fellow men are living below subsistence level?
Lord Skelmersdale: My Lords, it is unfortunately not the case that the various surpluses to which the noble Lord referred are the most cost effective way of giving food aid. Around two-fifths of Community aid is already in the form of food, most of which comes from Community surplus stocks. We would not wish this form of aid to be increased. It is not a good idea to base food aid on the back of surplus disposals, which is the idea that the noble Lord has in mind. Often the Community cannot supply appropriate types of food, and often there is a double effect by spending money upon buying food from one neighbouring country in order to supply another which is actually in need.
Lord Hatch of Lusby: My Lords, in answering my noble friend Lord Oram the noble Lord spoke of an article in The Times and suggested that the media want instant action. Would not the noble Lord agree that it is action which we are asking for, without the adjective? The Pisani document has been discussed, as the noble Lord said, twice in November: first by the Council of Ministers and then by the Foreign Ministers. The noble Lord says that it will be discussed in the New Year. Is the noble Lord able to say by whom the document will be discussed, and when?
Lord Skelmersdale: My Lords, I said that it would be discussed well into the New Year, which means that it will probably take up to June. It will be discussed in the Foreign Affairs Council and also in the Development Council, both of which I understand meet every month. Furthermore, this is a long and complicated document. Action, I am quite sure, will follow—but neither instant nor immediate.
Lord John-Mackie: My Lords, if I may refer to the reply which the noble Lord gave to my noble friend Lord Cledwyn of Penhros, we all know that there are difficulties and that they create distortion in the trade in some of the countries to which food aid is given. We hope, however, that these difficulties will not be used as an excuse for stopping that aid or not doing our best to get it to the right places at the right time.
Lord Skelmersdale: My Lords, indeed it will not. The object of the exercise, in the Government's mind, is to make existing aid more effective.
Lord Oram: My Lords, is not the important point the attitude which Her Majesty's Government are to take in the forthcoming discussions to which the Minister has referred? Is it not the case that both under the leadership of Monsieur Cheysson, who is now France's Foreign Affairs Minister, and under the present leadership of Mr. Pisani, the Commission takes a much more forthright and progressive attitude towards aid and development matters than either this Government or some other member Governments? Ought not the Government to take this opportunity to change their attitude and be more forward looking?
Lord Skelmersdale: My Lords, the Government's attitude on all EEC affairs is always to be as positive as they can be without damaging the intrinsic interests of this country. This we shall continue to do.

Gibraltar: Dockyard and Economic Support
2.57 p.m.
Lord Merrivale: My Lords, I beg leave to ask the Question which stands in my name on the Order Paper.
The Question was as follows:
To ask Her Majesty's Government whether they will outline the various alternative ways, also carefully studied by the Gibraltar Government, by which they propose to fulfil their obligation to support Gibraltar's economy; and whether they will quantify over a reasonable period of time the Royal Navy and Royal Fleet Auxiliary work which will be undertaken by the naval dockyard with a view to bringing about a measure of confidence to the people of Gibraltar, bearing in mind that no final decisions about commercialisation are to be taken until discussions, between officials of both Governments and A. & P. Appledore International Ltd., and consultations with other parties directly concerned, have been completed.
The Minister of State for Defence Procurement (Viscount Trenchard): My Lords, if it is decided to establish a commercial dockyard in Gibraltar, Her Majesty's Government would be prepared to transfer the necessary land and assets to the Gibraltar Government free of charge, to provide funds to cover essential refurbishment and re-equipment and certain other initial costs. We are also in touch with the Gibralter Government about their revised request for development aid submitted in September and we hope to make an announcement soon.
As the noble Lord clearly recognises, the amount of naval work to be undertaken by the commercialised dockyard is a matter for discussion. Our officials will again be meeting those of the Gibraltar Government and with A. & P. Appledore International later this month. I would expect this matter to be considered further on that occasion; but final decisions may take longer to reach.
Lord Merrivale: My Lords, I thank the noble Viscount for his Answer. May I ask him whether or not he agrees that many see the short-term outlook for Gibraltar as very pessimistic, while the long-term outlook is viewed by some with only qualified optimism? Could the Minister therefore indicate, to a greater extent than he has so far, the amount of refit work which will be undertaken over a period of years—if he could indicate the years it would be useful—on Royal Fleet auxiliaries and on mine hunter refits? Could the Minister also say whether, from now on, any work will be undertaken on Leander class frigates?
Viscount Trenchard: My Lords, first let me say to my noble friend that the changes will be phased according to the negotiations which are taking place. Thus it is very much in the mind of Her Majesty's
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Government to ensure that the workload covers the interim period, which may be prolonged, while the plans for commercialisation of the dockyard take shape. In the end, we believe that those plans may well be able to make a very substancial contribution to the future economy of Gibraltar and to the viability of the dockyard. It is, in the main, the Royal Fleet auxiliaries, and the work appertaining to them that we shall keep in Gibraltar, which will provide a relatively large load in the interim.
Lord Blyton: My Lords, is the noble Viscount the Minister aware that in considering Gibraltar and the refitting of ships in Gibraltar, he ought to remember the River Tyne, where 26 per cent. are unemployed, where five shipyards have been closed down, and which cannot get any naval contracts?
Viscount Trenchard: My Lords, I note the noble Lord's points and his sentiments. In a changing situation there was, in the opinion of Her Majesty's Government, no possibility, if we were to keep the maximum expenditure on front line units for the Royal Navy, of maintaining the huge dockyard structure that we had for Royal Navy work. We do believe, however, that the commercial alternatives, of which A. & P. Appledore International's has been chosen as the most likely, may well provide a viable future in present circumstances for the important Gibraltar dockyard.
Lord Vernon: My Lords, now that the dust of the Falklands war has begun to settle, is it not time that Her Majesty's Government took a rather more positive view towards the long term future of Gibraltar, in conjunction with the Spanish Government, than they have hitherto done?
Viscount Trenchard: My Lords, the noble Lord must await the White Paper on the Falklands for any changes of emphasis that may seem desirable from that. But the Gibraltar base will be retained, just as Portsmouth base is retained. Bases are quite different from dockyard support, and unnecessary expenditure on the tail and administration of our fleet is not a help to maintaining the most effective fleet that we can.
Baroness Vickers: My Lords, may I ask my noble friend the Minister about the workers and the Moroccans in the dockyard? How many of those people may lose their jobs? Will they receive redundancy pay, and will my noble friend assure them that they will not be replaced by Spaniards, because they came in and did a very good job when the Spaniards' trouble began?
Viscount Trenchard: My Lords, let me assure my noble friend Lady Vickers that Gibraltar dockyard workers, for all the purposes of redundancy, are United Kingdom citizens, and they are fully entitled to their redundancy pay. Let me then say that at this stage, with discussions currently going on with officials which will be continued this month and next, it is far too early to know the quantity of redundancies, either in the middle term or longer term; I have already covered in my Answer to my noble friend Lord Merrivale the question of the shorter term.
Lord Cledwyn of Penrhos: My Lords, after all the postponements which have occurred, can the noble Viscount tell the House what prospects there are now, under the new Spanish Government, of implementing the Lisbon Agreement of 1980? As the noble Viscount will be aware, there were great expectations that something could be done because this would greatly improve the climate of opinion as between our two countries. Perhaps the noble Viscount can say whether any progress is now likely?
Viscount Trenchard: My Lords, the noble Lord the Leader of the Opposition will recognise that although this is an overlapping subject to a high degree, it is a separate subject. We very much hope that the Lisbon Agreement, which was unfortunately held up during the Falklands operation, will be implemented by the new Spanish Government. It is too early for me to say anything definite as to when they will do so.
Baroness Vickers: My Lords, I wonder whether my noble friend will say something about the Moroccans, about whom I particularly asked, because they are not United Kingdom citizens? Will they receive redundancy pay?
Viscount Trenchard: My Lords, my noble friend Lady Vickers invariably asks me something which I have to promise her a letter to answer; on this occasion, that it is!

National Heritage Bill
The Earl of Avon: My Lords, I beg to move the Motion standing in my name on the Order Paper.
Moved, That it be an Instruction to the Committee of the Whole House to whom the National Heritage Bill has been committed that they consider the Bill in the following order—

Clause 1,

Schedule 1, Part I,

Clauses 2 to 8,

Schedule 1, Part II,

Clauses 9 to 15,

Schedule 1, Part III,

Clauses 16 to 21,

Schedule 1, Part IV,

Clauses 22 to 28,

Schedule 2,

Clause 29,

Schedule 3,

Clause 30,

Schedule 4,

Clauses 31 to 33,

Schedules 5 and 6,

Clauses 34 to 36.

—(The Earl of Avon.)
On Question, Motion agreed to.

Mobile Homes Bill [H.L.]
3.5 p.m.
The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State, Department of the Environment (Lord Bellwin): My
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Lords, I beg to move that the House do now again resolve itself into Committee on this Bill.
Moved, That the House do now again resolve itself into Committee.—(Lord Bellwin.)
On Question, Motion agreed to.
House in Committee accordingly.
[The LORD ABERDARE in the Chair.]
Clauses 2 and 3 agreed to.
Lord Bishopston Lord Bishopston moved a Amendment No. 11:
After Clause 3, insert the following new clause:
Prohibition of premiums
(".—(1) Any person who, as a condition of the making of an agreement under this Act or the approval of the assignment of such an agreement, requires in addition to the sums payable in pursuance of the agreement the payment of any premium shall be guilty of an offence.
(2) Any person who, in connection with the making of an agreement under this Act or the approval of the assignment of such an agreement, receives any premium in addition to the sums payable in pursuance of the agreement shall be guilty of an offence.
(3) A person guilty of an offence under this section shall be liable on summary conviction to a fine not exceeding £100.
(4) The court by which a person is convicted of an offence under this section may order the amount of the premium to be repaid to the person by whom it was paid.
(5) Proceedings for an offence under this section may be instituted by any local authority.
(6) Where an offence under this section committed by a body corporate is proved to have been committed with the consent or connivance of, or to be attributable to any neglect on the part of, any director, manager, secretary, or similar officer of the body corporate, or any person who was purporting to act in any such capacity, he as well as the body corporate shall be guilty of that offence and shall be liable to be proceeded against and punished accordingly.
(7) Where any premium is paid and the whole or any part of that premium could not lawfully be required or received under this section, the amount of the premium or, as the case may be, so much of it as could not lawfully be required or received, shall be recoverable by the person by whom it was paid.
(8) For the purposes of this section, "premium" includes—

(a) any fine or other like sum;

(b) (subject to paragraph (c) below) any other pecuniary consideration in addition to the sums payable pursuant to the agreement; and

(c) the excess over the fair market price of any price paid for the mobile home,

but does not include any discount of commission provided for by this Act.")
The noble Lord said: I beg to move Amendment No. 11 standing in my name and that of the noble Lord, Lord Avebury. It might be helpful in moving this amendment if I were to refer to last Thursday's Committee stage very briefly. I rather feel that many noble Lords, interested people and organisations outside who read last week's Committee proceedings on the Bill must have been very disappointed with the Government's reactions to the amendments which have been tabled. The noble Lord the Minister will know better than I that he has received a great many representations over a period of time from organisations representing people such as mobile home owners and residents, Shelter, the National Consumer Council and others—and there has been a great deal of publicity in the press. I believe that many people, like myself, welcome the Bill not for what it contains but for the opportunity it gives us to deal with

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some of the anomalies, injustices and evasions not covered by the Mobile Homes Act 1975.
We all know that there is unequal bargaining power between the site owners and mobile homes residents. We have already received reminders of how many such residents are elderly people—I believe the figure is 25 per cent. Some are young people and some are probably not able to express their views about their rights as they should. So this Bill was welcomed as an opportunity to look at some of these outstanding injustices.
If the Bill becomes an Act, as one anticipates it will, then site owners and others will say that Parliament has just passed this legislation, that it is bang up to date, and that therefore it is a fair Bill. But surely the noble Lord the Minister himself must know that there are many loopholes in this Bill which need closing up during the period when this legislation is going through its various stages. I only say this because I hope that the Minister is prepared this afternoon and at later stages to concede either some amendments or the spirit of some amendments in order that we may progress in making the Bill even more effective. We do not want a Bill that is balanced one way or the other either in favour of site owners or residents, because of the possible consequences to which the noble Lord the Minister has referred.
I believe we ought to close some of the loopholes—and the amendment to which I am about to speak is certainly directed towards one of those. I hope that the noble Lord the Minister will be able to put into practice the impression which he gave in all sincerity at Second Reading, that he was prepared to look at some of these matters sympathetically, to see what could be done. In this new clause we want to stop site owners from requiring or receiving a premium in connection with mobile homes. This will be roughly in accordance with Part 9 of the Rent Act 1977. Perhaps I ought not to mention that Act or the Housing Act 1980, because the noble Lord the Minister does not seem to think that either should apply to mobile home owners. Certainly we do not want those two Acts to cover all the varying but in some ways similar circumstances which apply to mobile home residents and site owners, but we do think they have some merits so far as security and the prevention of abuse are concerned. The noble Lord the Minister may recall his own department's report of 1977, which, on page 11, said of the 1975 Act:
"The Act does not appear to deal with premium payments of any kind if they are charged outside the terms of the agreement and it is not yet certain which, if any, of these additional charges are open to challenge in the courts. Connection charges and premiums charged to new residents entering the site seem usually to be paid outside the terms of the agreement".
I think that quotation from the Ministry's report of a few years ago outlines the need for action.
The extra charges may take many forms, including £100 or much more for the agreement itself, for merely making the agreement. One can see that there are reasons for many other charges, such as service amenity charges and so on; but it seems to us that premium charges have no justification whatever. Unless the measure actually says so, the practice, which now causes so much trouble, expense and worry to so many residents, will continue. So we want to stop
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the taking of premiums on the making of an agreement under the Act or on the giving of approval to an assignment. It is a form of key money which is quite unjustified.
I would like to know whether it is the intention of the Government that the owner shall be entitled or otherwise to make a charge for offering an agreement under the Act or for giving approval to an assignment in accordance with paragraph 8 of Schedule 1. If so, they should say so. But if the Government say, "No, that is not the intention", then clearly there is justification for the amendment. The new clause makes it clear that such a charge should not be either demanded or received. This applies to all charges, whether imposed as part of the statutory agreement or outside it.
The amendment prohibits premiums. It is modelled on Part IX of the Rent Act 1977; the wording is very much the same as in this amendment. That has worked well, as I understand it, and it allows for recovery of premiums actually paid. I believe that the Committee will be well advised to support this amendment, and the Minister will be well advised to support the idea of making it quite clear that the Government are against premiums by putting that in the legislation. In that way they will help those who are not blessed with a solicitor—as are people who purchase other forms of homes—to deal with titles and similar matters. This will make it clear beyond all doubt that the charging of premiums on top of all the other charges which may be quite necessarily incurred is quite unjustified. I beg to move.
3.13 p.m.
Lord Avebury: I am sure the Minister will appreciate from the correspondence in the DoE that this is a matter which concerns mobile home occupiers almost as much as the level of the actual charges imposed. I think one should say also that it is not quite as simple a matter to deny the payment of key money to the owner of a mobile home site as it is in the case of furnished rented properties. The noble Lord, Lord Bishopston, mentioned the 1977 Act. The provisions go back earlier than that, in fact to the Rent Act of 1968. Parliament considered that it was wrong that premiums should be charged in that manner for the granting of an agreement to occupy a furnished letting. On similar reasoning, we would say that it is fundamentally inequitable for premiums or key money to be charged as a condition of the granting of an agreement under this Bill or under the Mobile Homes Act which preceded it.
In many cases the site owner is also selling the mobile home, and he can simply charge a little more than he would otherwise have done so as to obtain a concealed premium. The amendment we are now proposing to your Lordships tries to cope with this by extending the meaning of the word "premium" to include any sum over and above the fair market price. There can be many ways in which such sums are charged, as appears from paragraph 342 of the department's 1977 document:
"Residents may have to make a number of lump sum payments, often amounting to several hundred pounds and in some instances much more than that. These may be in the form of connection charges, a premium or contribution to development costs to enter the site, or within a 'package deal' price for the sited home. The

15
commission is payable to the site owner where the home is sold on site to a third party, or a discount on the price paid if the site owner buys it himself, at rates of normally between 10 per cent. and 15 per cent. of the sale price".
The DoE document goes on to say that there should be an implied covenant that all charges of whatever nature should be reasonable, with the ability to refer disputes to arbitration.
In this Bill the court is required by Clause 2(5) to see that charges are just and equitable, and that should certainly apply to any sums demanded in respect of improvements or new facilities. It would be helpful if the Minister were to say something about the ability of site owners to charge sums to the existing residents for the recovery of any capital expenditure which may be incurred—for example, on new drainage, in which there is frequently some attempt to make a levy on existing occupiers—not as key money or premiums for coming on to the site but as a condition for allowing them to remain in possession of the pitches which they already occupy.
This is a very widespread problem, as can be seen from some of the documents; for example, that from the National Association of Citizens Advice Bureaux talking about the 15 per cent. charge payable to the site owner. The memorandum of the National Consumer Council speaks of representations which they have had from a number of sites, including one in Nottinghamshire, which refers to at least one mobile home site which has been sold three times and each time the site owner has received a 15 per cent. commission and increased the pitch fee. We have received representations from the leader of the East Hampshire Liberals, which conducted an intensive local survey on problems faced by mobile home occupiers in that area. He says that they are indignant about the 15 per cent. commission which owners take on any sale, especially when some homes can now cost up to £20,000. So we are not talking about sums of a few hundred pounds, as the DoE document mentions; we are actually talking in this case about a sum of £3,000. If the mobile home changes hands, as in the Nottinghamshire case, three times in a year the site operator has made £9,000 out of a single pitch without lifting a finger.
If we allow such an enormous loophole to prevail in the Bill. I really do not think we are doing our job. If the noble Lord says that our amendment does not meet the evil to which I am addressing myself, then I hope he will say that he is seized of the problem and that the department will look at it very closely. Then perhaps the noble Lord will come back before Report stage with comprehensive amendments to the Bill which will take care not just of the premiums or key money charged for entry on to the site but all the other charges which may be levied on the unsuspecting mobile home owner, who goes on to the site imagining that once he has entered into an agreement for a pitch fee that will be the end of the matter and he cannot be caught for any other amounts. In fact, as we have seen from the examples which have been drawn to our attention, this is far from the case and owners may be faced with enormous imposts which it would be very difficult to pay. This is really one of the most serious loopholes in the Bill. I very much hope that the noble
16
Lord will accept this amendment, but if he cannot I hope that he will come forward with proposals of his own before we come to Report stage. I beg to move.
Lord Bellwin: In response to the opening observations of the noble Lord, Lord Bishopston, that there may be those who are disappointed having read some of our proceedings last Thursday, may I say first that I am sure they will be offset by those who will be very relieved having read those proceedings. As comes out again and again in our discussions, there are two sides and two groups of people whom we are seeking to protect. I only wish, if the noble Lord felt so badly about what he calls the evasions not covered by the 1975 Act, that someone at that time would have tried to anticipate the things to which our attention is being drawn today. Of course, we do not want loopholes, but one needs to know the definition of a loophole. One person's loophole is apparently something that is very desirable to others. That is what we are trying to protect in seeking to get the best Bill that we can.
The effect of the new clause is to make it a criminal offence for a site owner to charge a premium either as a condition of granting an agreement or as a condition of approving the assignment of an agreement, although it allows the charging of commissions and discounts on sale. I am not sure that it would achieve what the noble Lords have in mind. It may be helpful if I explain what the Bill already does in this area. The Bill imposes an absolute duty on site owners to offer agreements to all residential occupiers—those on site at commencement and those whom they allow to come on to site subsequently. There are no conditions on that offer and it is open to occupiers to accept the agreement freely. The Bill does not, therefore, allow a site owner to charge a premium as a condition of offering an agreement. Nor does it allow him to charge a premium as a condition of approving the assignment of an agreement. All he can charge on assignment is his commission—or discount—on the price of the mobile home. It is the case that the Bill does not make it a criminal offence to charge premiums in this way but I do not believe that criminal action is either necessary or desirable here. I would take some convincing that it was.
The Bill will, therefore, already achieve at least part of what this new clause, as drafted, sets out to do. But I suspect that its promoters, as they have said, have a rather different target in mind—that is, the premium that site owners charge new occupiers who bring new homes on to their sites. Let us be very clear here. These premiums are charged not as a condition of granting an agreement, but, in effect, as a condition of granting the right to station the new mobile home in the first place.
It is not our intention to prohibit this sort of premium. What often happens is that a prospective occupier identifies a new mobile home that he wants to buy and agrees with the site owner that he should bring it on to site. The site owner then arranges the transportation of the mobile home to the site and charges the occupier both the costs of transportation and connection and a proportion of the overall price as a "premium". We do not believe that this sort of premium should be prohibited, for two reasons: First, an occupier can very easily find out how much a site

17
owner plans to charge on this basis. If the premium is excessive, he can simply go to another site. He certainly does not have to accept it. It is not a surprise or something about which he does not know.
Lord Avebury: Is the Minister aware that there is a shortage of sites in this country? We are not faced with a completely free market. It is like the market for rented homes, where Parliament prohibited the charging of key money. Therefore, does not the noble Lord consider that these charges ought to be fair and reasonable, as is provided for on the weekly pitch fees under Clause 2(5)?
Lord Bellwin: Perhaps I may be allowed to finish what I want to say and we can then debate this in the normal way. The noble Lord says that there is a shortage of pitch sites. That is not my information. In any case, this is a matter of supply and demand. The noble Lord, Lord Bishopston, so often refers to the Rent Acts. I in turn so often refer to the shortcomings of the Rent Acts and what they have done to reduce the availability of accommodation. The same must surely apply in principle here. That is why on Second Reading I said that what we do not want is a Rent Act type Bill.
I come back to my point about the opportunity for the occupier either to accept or not to accept a site that is offered. That seems clear enough to me. Surely a site owner who attempts to charge excessive premiums is likely to find himself without any occupiers beause no one will pay more than he can afford or pay more if he can do better elsewhere. Secondly, these premiums represent an important part of a site owner's income. The result of prohibiting them would be increases in pitch fees for all occupiers, unless we were prepared to control the level of pitch fees, which we are not. I do not think that such a result is in the interest of occupiers as a whole.
The noble Lord, Lord Avebury, referred to levies on existing residents to pay for capital works. A site owner can only recover charges that are provided for in the agreement. If the agreement offered to an occupier allows the site owner to make such charges in a way that the occupier considers unreasonable, surely he should challenge the agreement when it is first offered to him. The site owner cannot go beyond what the original agreement says.
Your Lordships will have gathered that the Government do not want to accept the amendment, but in saying that the one point I do accept is that it is a difficult area. Whenever one seeks to do what we are doing in the Bill, and to find a balance, there are those who feel that the weight of advantage is going to one side rather than the other. It is not easy to get the balance exactly right, but I believe that on the whole we are doing that.
Lord Bishopston: I am sure that the Committee is very disappointed with the Minister's reply. He talks about being fair between the two sides. I felt that his reply was well balanced on the side of both in that in one respect one point applies and in another something else applies. I gather the Bill does not allow a premium, but does not prevent it. It does not make it an offence to charge a premium. The Minister went
18
on to give an impression that a premium was not possible under the Bill but later said that the premium represents an important part of the site owner's income. Therefore, he accepts that a premium is payable and I think I am right in saying that he justified it as a proper part of the site owner's income. I can imagine that site owners will be keeping a copy of today's Committee stage debate relating to the Minister's comments to that effect. I am sorry the Minister said that because he is saying that the site owners have been quite properly charging premiums and that he does not intend to make any changes.
We all know that people going on to these sites have to accept, and rightly so, many charges—connection charges, service charges, amenity charges, and so on—but the premium is quite unacceptable. The noble Lord, Lord Avebury, said that there is a shortage of sites and I believe that is the position. One might say that if the mobile home owner does not want to accept any part of an agreement he can go elsewhere, but that may not be easy. One can have premiums imposed after one is on the site, and one cannot suddenly take away the mobile home and plonk it somewhere else. It is not as easy as all that. That is quite unacceptaable.
However, the point is that we are not asking for something new. If the Minister turns to Section 119 of the 1977 Act, he will see that the wording in our amendment regarding prohibition of premiums and loans on grants of protected tenancies is not dissimilar. Therefore, it is a criminal offence under the 1977 Act. I am not suggesting—and I have said this many times—that we should make a blanket change in this Bill from all that the 1977 Act and the 1980 Act provide, because this Bill has a much more limited range of provisions. But we feel that, if the Minister believes that premiums are unjustified, then he ought to put it into the Bill so that there is no doubt whatever about it in the minds of site owners or residents living in mobile homes. I rather feel that his final comment, that the premium represents an important part of the site owner's income, is not only accepting the position but also justifying it. I hope that the Committee will support the amendment and help to keep the balance between the interests of site owners and of residents.
Baroness Ewart-Biggs: I should like to support what my noble friend has said about the rather confusing statement of the Minister which I, too, could not quite follow. Surely, if we allow a loophole, then someone will take advantage of it. As I understand it, we are trying to prevent the loophole whereby a site owner makes some money on top of what he deserves anyhow. Surely the Minister must agree that the new clause makes it explicit that such charges should not be demanded or received—indeed, this applies to all charges whether imposed as part of the agreement or outside it. As the Minister said, the point of the Bill is to keep a balance between those two aspects, and in this case I do not think that he has followed that up in what he has said.
Lord Bellwin: I should like to make a last observation. I am not sure what the noble Baroness means when she says that the site owner may charge "on top of what he deserves". I do not know what the noble Baroness meant by "what he deserves". I should

19
have thought that he would say to someone who comes along wishing to place a mobile home on his site, "This is what I want from you". It is then up to that person to say that the amount is too much, it is not acceptable or, "What you want is not acceptable". It is up to that person to decide and if he does not want it then he does not take it. If the site owner is asking more than the amount that anyone will pay, then he will not get anything from anyone. It seems clear enough to me. It is quite straightforward.
Lord Avebury: I do not want to prolong this discussion. However, one point that has not been mentioned is the reluctance of the local authorities to grant planning permission and site licences for new mobile home parks. I am sure that the Minister is well aware of that and that the department is familiar with the arguments that local authorities put forward against the development of these sites and the imposition of obligations on a local authority as a result of having mobile homes within its area. It cannot be disputed that the use of mobile homes as a form of residential accommodation is highly unpopular among planning authorities, who resist to the teeth the development of any new ones. That is why I said in my earlier remarks that there is a shortage, particularly in certain areas.
The noble Minister may be correct in thinking that there are some parts of the country where there is a sufficient number of mobile home parks for the would-be occupier to make the kind of decision about which he was talking. If he finds on entering into negotiations with a particular site owner that the premiums charged, the connection fees, the siting charges and the commission all add up to something which he is not prepared to pay, he can say, "All right, I will go to the other mobile home park just down the road". However, there are certain counties, one of which, to my knowledge, is Hampshire, where there is not a superabundance of these sites and the person who wishes to live in a mobile home does not have a choice. He may have already committed himself to this form of living. He may have retired shortly before and want small accommodation because he cannot sustain the burden of looking after a house. He may move into a mobile home because he thinks that it will be easier to look after, and he may not have the ability to pick and choose in the manner that the Minister portrays. That is why I believe that he needs the type of protection that the amendment would afford him and, therefore, it is really necessary to have it written into the Bill.
Lord Jaques: It appears to me that the Minister is contemplating two agreements. First, there is a verbal agreement which does not come under the Bill—for example, when the caravan owner wants a site he seeks out the site owner and they come to a verbal agreement that he will pay "X" in order to put his caravan on that site. Secondly, the Minister seemed to be contemplating that there would at a later date be a written agreement as provided for by this Bill. Is the Minister contemplating a verbal agreement and a written agreement?
Lord Bellwin: Not at all. The noble Lord has not read the Bill at all, because if he had done so he would have seen that what is proposed is that for the very first time those coming onto a site will have the right to receive a written offer of an agreement—something which they have not had previously. The mobile home owner has the right to have the notice in a form that the Secretary of State will prescribe. It will not be just any type of odd notice. If he does not get it, he has redress. So what we are proposing in the Bill is a whole advance on what was in the 1975 Act. I am sure that the noble Lord, Lord Avebury, who was deeply involved in that Act, and even, I think, in earlier legislation of this kind, will be the first to confirm that what I am saying is correct. We are here trying to protect the interests of occupiers of mobile homes who in the past have not had this type of protection. We are going a long way down that road, and because we are going so far down that road, quite naturally there are representations made to us by those on the other side of the fence who feel that we are going too far.
We are trying here to get a balance in doing justice and in making a tolerable situation for both sides. There is no question at all of two agreements. There will be the right to have a written agreement so that there will then be the kind of take-up to which the noble Lord, Lord Avebury, referred last week as not having occurred because people did not know that they had that right. Now we are bringing in a form that will not only ensure its existence but will make it obligatory to tell people that it is there in a written form. That is what we are doing and that is all that we are doing. But, when I say "all", it is a very big "all", because it is trying to keep a balance between the interests of all parties.
Baroness Ewart-Biggs: Will the Minister tell me how the inclusion of this clause would jeopardise the interests of the site owner?
Lord Bellwin: As I said previously, if we try to impose restrictions on the right to charge what is called a premium for the kind of services that I mentioned previously—namely, cost of transportation, cost of connection, and so on—then we shall be imposing restrictions upon them regarding something which we think it perfectly proper for them to do, because they are able to tell the prospective occupier of the home what it will mean to him if he wants to come to their site.
I thought that the point which the noble Lord, Lord Avebury, made as to availability was a very fair point, in that I am sure that there are parts of the country where it is much harder to get a site than in others. I accept that point and I would not try to say otherwise. However, when you try to strike a balance and to do something for everyone you do not get the ultimate that you would like to see everywhere and you compromise in the end to get the best you can, and that is really all that we are doing.
Lord Jacques: In the absence of this amendment, would an owner who charges a premium, allows the caravan to come on to the site and then later offers an

21
agreement which makes no reference to the premium which the owner has already received, be committing an offence under the Bill?
Lord Bellwin: The Bill says that it will be obligatory to offer an agreement. The terms of that agreement will be those which we will prescribe. We said earlier when discussing this matter that we were having consultation now upon the level of what the discount should be. We have had long consultations with all sides on this Bill and we have listened carefully to representations. We have brought the Bill to its present stage by taking notice of what all the interested parties have wanted to do. As the noble Lord will appreciate, we continue to receive representations. We continue to get them until the end of the proceedings. However, the Secretary of State prescribes what the notice should say and what has to be involved in an agreement, and whether anything else goes on outside certainly has nothing to do with the Bill.
Lord Bishopston: I do not wish to detain the Committee for more than a moment, but in relation to what my noble friends have said, I would remind the noble Lord the Minister of the DoE report of 1977, which, at paragraph 356, says:
"It is also unclear how far the Act"—
and that refers to the Mobile Homes Act—
"has succeeded for those who have agreements in outlawing certain restrictive practices. The Act does not appear to deal with premium payments of any kind if they are charged outside the terms of the agreement and it is not yet certain which, if any, of these additional charges are open to challenge in the courts. Connection charges and premiums charged to new residents entering the site seem usually to be paid outside the terms of the agreement."
That, of course, is another loophole, because not only can you charge a premium, but you can do it one way or the other. This point has not really been answered by the Minister. I hope the Committee will make it quite clear in the interests of all concerned by putting the amendment—or terms like it which the Minister might introduce later—into the Bill.
3.42 p.m.
On Question, Whether the said amendment (No. 11) shall be agreed to?
Their Lordships divided: Contents, 66; Not-Contents, 86.

DIVISION NO. 1

CONTENTS

Airedale, L.

Cledwyn of Penrhos, L.

Amherst, E.

Collison, L.

Amulree, L.

Cooper of Stockton Heath, L.

Ardwick, L.

Darwen, L.

Avebury, L. [Teller.]

David, B.

Aylestone, L.

Denington, B.

Bacon, B.

Diamond, L.

Banks, L.

Donaldson of Kingsbridge, L.

Barrington, V.

Elwyn-Jones, L.

Beswick, L.

Ewart-Biggs, B.

Birk, B.

Fisher of Rednal, B.

Bishopston, L.

Gaitskell, B.

Blyton, L.

Gormley, L.

Briginshaw, L.

Hale, L.

Brockway, L.

Hampton, L.

Brooks of Tremorfa, L.

Hanworth, V.

Burton of Coventry, B.

Hatch of Lusby, L.

Byers, L.

Houghton of Sowerby, L.

Caradon, L.

Jacques, L.

22

Jenkins of Putney, L.

Shinwell, L.

John-Mackie, L.

Stewart of Alvechurch, B.

Leatherland, L.

Stewart of Fulham, L.

Listowel, E.

Stone, L.

Llewelyn-Davies of Hastoe, B.

Strabolgi, L.

Milverton, I.

Taylor of Mansfield, L.

Molloy, L.

Vernon, L.

Oram, L.

Wallace of Coslany, L. [Teller.]

Paget of Northampton, L.

Peart, L.

Walston, L.

Ponsonby of Shulbrede, 1.

Wells-Pestell, L.

Rea, L.

Whaddon, L.

Sainsbury, L.

Wilson of Langside, L.

Seear, B.

Wootton of Abinger, B.

Sefton of Garston.L.

NOT-CONTENTS

Adeane, L.

McFadzean, L.

Alexander of Tunis, E.

Mancroft, L.

Alport, L.

Margadale, L.

Ampthill, L.

Marley, L.

Atholl, D.

Melville, V.

Auckland, L.

Merrivale, L.

Avon, E.

Mersey, V.

Bellwin, L.

Mottistone, L.

Brookes, L.

Mountevans, L.

Campbell of Alloway, L.

Newall, L.

Campbell of Croy, L.

Northchurch, B.

Clancarty, E.

Nugent of Guildford, L.

Clifford of Chudleigh, L.

O'Hagan, L.

Clitheroe, L.

Onslow, L.

Cottesloe, L.

Orkney, L.

Cullen of Ashbourne, L.

Penrhyn, L.

Dacre of Glanton, L.

Porritt, L.

De Freyne, L.

Reigate, L.

De La Warr, E.

Ridley, V.

Denham, L. [Teller.]

Rugby, L.

Derwent, L.

St. Aldwyn, E.

Dudley, B.

St. Davids, V.

Ebbisham, L.

St. Just, L.

Ellenborough, L.

Sandford, L.

Elliot of Harwood, B.

Skelmersdale, L.

Fortescue, E.

Soames, L.

Fraser of Kilmorack, L.

Spens, L.

Gainford, L.

Stamp, L.

Greenway, L.

Strathcona and Mount Royal, L.

Gridley, L.

Harvey of Prestbury, L.

Sudeley, L.

Hayter, L.

Swansea, L.

Hill-Norton, L.

Swinton, E, [Teller.]

Home of the Hirsel, L.

Thomas of Swynnerton, L.

Hylton-Foster, B.

Thorneycroft, L.

Killearn, L.

Trefgarne, L

Kinloss, Ly.

Trumpington, B.

Kinnaird, L.

Vaux of Harrowden, L.

Lane-Fox, B.

Vickers, B.

Lauderdale, E.

Vivian, L.

Lloyd, L.

Wilberforce, L.

Long, V.

Wise, L.

Loudoun, C.

Young, B.

Lyell, L.

Resolved in the negative, and amendment disagreed to accordingly.
Clause 4 agreed to.
3.50 p.m.
Clause 5 [Interpretation]:
Lord Bishopston Lord Bishopston moved Amendment No. 12:
Page 3, line 23, leave out ("the arbitrator") and insert ("an arbitrator appointed for this purpose by the President for the time being of the Royal Institution of Chartered Surveyors").
The noble Lord said: There is still hope yet of getting some satisfaction, but the last amendment was very important and it rather revealed the Government's attitude to the measure. Despite their fine words about

23
providing a balanced Bill, in fact the Government do not seem to be prepared to put in those amendments, or the substance of them, which we feel are essential to clarity and justice. This amendment, which I am moving with Amendment No. 13, is very important indeed. There have been many representations made about it.
One should look at one or two parts of the Bill to see exactly what it has to say. The purpose of these amendments is to be sure that the arbitrators who are appointed—or the arbiters in Scotland, I suppose—are really independent, because without fair arbitration there is no justice. The Bill refers in various places to the powers of the courts. I am a magistrate, and those who are aware of the work of the magistrates' courts, the county courts and other aspects of justice, get the impression that there are people sitting on the Bench who are fair-minded and are prepared to consider all aspects of cases put before them and come to a fair conclusion.
However, in this Bill Clause 5 says:
"… unless the context otherwise requires—
'the court' means—

(a) in relation to England and Wales, the county court or, where the parties have agreed in writing to submit any question arising under this Act or, as the case may be, any agreement made under it to arbitration, the arbitrator;

(b) in relation to Scotland, the sheriffor, where the parties have so agreed, the arbiter;"

Therefore, the court can be an arbiter or arbitrator.
If one is going to expect the justice, the fair-mindedness and the impartiality of the courts, one has to ask whether the arbiter, or arbitrator, is so fairly-minded to look at the cases put before him and to come to a fair conclusion; but the Bill gives no assurance that that is the case. There is no identity mentioned in the Bill as to who the arbitrator should be. One has to have regard to the kind of people living on mobile home sites. Many are quite capable of looking after themselves, of reading the small print, of looking to see what their rights are or indeed their responsibilities. However, there are many people, not only on mobile home sites but in any other kind of accommodation, who do not find it easy to work out these matters. Therefore, a site owner who is not as fair-minded as one would expect could suggest an arbitrator who was tilted in the direction of his own particular interests.
The fact that the arbitrator may have to be agreed between the parties is no case at all for anticipating justice because there are problems of pressures and harassment, and so forth, which can be applied to the site tenants, to the mobile home owners and occupiers, and they may not be able to understand parts of the agreement. It will be of course the site owner, under the Bill, who will have to produce the text of the agreement, and it can easily be that the significance of any part of the agreement is not appreciated by those who will be affected by it. Therefore, we have a situation where there is potential unfairness at a time when we are seeking to keep the balance of fairness between the two, and the bargaining power is not equal. After all, the mobile home resident is on the site by the kind permission of the site owner and he, or she, is the one who can set the pace.
The seriousness of the position arises when we turn from the interpretation of Clause 5, which says that "the court" can mean an arbitrator, to page 5, Schedule 1, paragraph 6, where you get such aspects as:
"[Termination by court]
(1) The court shall be entitled to terminate the agreement if, on the application of the owner, the court is satisfied that the occupier is not occupying the mobile home as his only or main residence."
It also goes on to say in sub-paragraph (2):
"The court shall be entitled to terminate the agreement",
for various reasons if,
"the mobile home—
(a) is having a detrimental effect on the amenity of the site;".
We are not dealing with a court, with a judge, or magistrates, who are concerned with impartiality and justice. We can have one part of the interpretation of Clause 5 which says that the court can be an arbitrator, and there is no limitation on who the arbitrator should be. It could be a friend of the site owner; it could be his brother-in-law, or his agent. If poor Mrs. Smith, who is being asked to come to an agreement, is asked whether she will agree to Mr. Brown or Mrs. Green to arbitrate and the site owner says, "Well, I think we can trust their impartiality. I am sure you will agree to that", she may say, "Well, that is all right". There is no limitation in the Bill as to who the arbitrator shall be.
The seriousness is underlined in paragraph 6(2) of Schedule 1 which says that the agreement can be terminated if,
"the mobile home—
(a) is having a detrimental effect on the amenity of the site;".
Who is to say what that really means? What is meant by having a detrimental effect on the amenity of the site? This is a matter of opinion. I submit it will even defy the good sense and impartiality of what we know to be a properly constituted court, much less an arbitrator, who may not be all that impartial. We believe that there should be an amendment. I am sure that the Minister, in his fair-mindedness, will accept the principle anyway.
The amendment says:
"an arbitrator appointed for this purpose by the President for the time being of the Royal Institution of Chartered Surveyors."
That is not an unusual clause, or requirement. It is in many areas where impartiality is expected, and it is left to the Institution. Indeed, if the Minister would like to suggest another body—a professional body whose recommendations, I am sure, will be really accepted as being impartial—I think we will accept it. This question of restricting the area of the appointment of arbitrators is very important, especially when security of tenure on the site is at risk, and mobile home residents can suffer a real sense of injustice.
Many organisations are concerned about this—the National Consumer Council and Shelter, for instance—and let us remember that we are not talking about an arbitration service. The Bill refers to "an arbitrator", not "an arbitration service"; if it did, one would have greater confidence in its impartiality. As I say, it would be easy for a site owner to pass off a relative, friend or employee as an independent arbitrator, so making the mobile home resident vulnerable.
Those are some aspects that the Committee should consider when viewing the amendment, and I feel that, unless the Minister either accepts the amendment or is prepared to name an alternative impartial or professional body to help in this situation, the amendment should be supported. We are here trying to close yet another loophole in the Bill, one which seems to be wide open.
Lord Bellwin: To listen to the noble Lord, Lord Bishopston, one would think we were introducing some wicked legislation seeking to impose a great new regime on all mobile home occupiers in order to grind them into the dust.
Lord Bishopston: Many think so.
Lord Bellwin: Need I remind the noble Lord yet again that the Government are introducing the Bill and that he is trying to find what he calls loopholes to ensure, I presume, that the interests of one side are not disadvantaged? That is fine and is what a Committee stage is supposed to be about; but that is not the only thing we are doing. Need I say yet again that we are trying to get a balanced situation so that all the parties concerned have all their interests properly protected? If we cannot get to that optimum situation, we are concerned to get as near to it as possible.
So that the noble Lord shall have no doubt, I say straight away that I do not accept the amendment. I, too, am a magistrate and therefore appreciate the impartiality and expertise of magistrates. The Bill provides for disputes to be settled by the court; it defines the court in England and Wales either as the county court or, if the parties agree to submit to arbitration any questions or agreements under the Bill, an arbitrator. In Scotland the court is either the sheriff or, again, if the parties have agreed to arbitration, an arbiter. The Bill does not attempt to define who the arbiter should be.
The effect of the amendment would be to restrict the choice of an arbitrator to a person appointed by the incumbent president of the Royal Institution of Chartered Surveyors. I believe that to be an unnecessary and, indeed, unwelcome restriction. I do not see why a site owner and occupier should not be able to choose the arbitrator they want. I do not for one moment question the ability of the president of the RICS to make a wise choice, but there may be a person known locally to both site owner and occupier who would be perfectly competent to arbitrate between them and who would not cost very much. Is it really necessary to remove from the parties to the dispute the ability to choose who the arbitrator should be? For all his virtues, the president of the RICS cannot know everyone who would make a good arbitrator, and dare I say that his choice would not be likely to be cheap?
It may be said that the site owner would try to impose his own choice of arbitrator on the occupier. But the person appointed must be agreed either at the time of the dispute or else be one provided for in the agreement under the Bill. If both parties do not agree, the dispute goes to court. It would be foolish of a site owner to persist with his own choice of arbitrator to the point at which the occupier demanded what would normally be a more expensive and drawn out process in court.
26
I shall not speak at greater length on the subject, otherwise I should have to bring a mobile home here, considering the time it would take to get through these proceedings. I would only say that I believe the amendment is unnecessarily restrictive and, for that reason, I cannot accept it.
Lord Avebury: The Minister did not deal with the second point raised by the noble Lord, Lord Bishopston, about the relationship of the definition in Clause 5 and the powers of the court in Schedule 1(6). As the noble Lord pointed out, the parties may have agreed in writing to submit any question arising under the Bill to arbitration, and when they do that the arbitrator may take the place of the court. According to the definition, the court is then given power in Schedule 1(6),
"to terminate the agreement if, on the application of the owner, the court is satisfied—
which means the arbitrator—
"that the occupier is not occupying the mobile home as his only or main residence".
Is that what the Minister really wants? Does he want to give such sweeping powers to the arbitrator—not the court—to deprive the resident of his occupation on the grounds that he is not occupying his mobile home as his only or principal residence or that it is having a detrimental effect on the amenities of the site? The noble Lord, Lord Bishopston, explained clearly that he did not think this was a suitable matter for an arbitrator to decide, that it should go before the county court and that the reference in the definition clause to the arbitrator should be limited to the clauses of the Bill and not extended to the schedules. I should be grateful if the Minister would deal with that point before we part with the amendment.
Returning to the substance of the matter, we are in some difficulty because, as I understand it (the Minister appeared to confirm this in his reply) while the parties to an agreement may decide to submit any question arising under the measure to arbitration, unless they specify who the arbitrator shall be or how he shall be chosen at that point—when, as the Minister said, he will be a person agreed at the time of the dispute—there is no provision to say what should happen when a site operator and occupier cannot agree. They then reach an impasse and that is not a satisfactory state in which to leave the legislation.
In other words, there may be a dispute which causes enormous difficulty for either the occupier or the site operator—the Minister will see that I am being even-handed here—and while the dispute can be resolved only by reference to an arbitrator as provided for in the agreement, the parties have not been able to decide who the arbitrator shall be. In that situation there is no means of resolving the dispute under the Bill. I do not think that is what the Minister would like to see; he cannot want the provisions more or less left in mid-air.
We must provide, if we are to leave the provision saying that the arbitrator may be a person appointed "under the agreement", for what happens when a dispute arises and there is no person acceptable to both parties. That is the nub of the question to which the noble Lord, Lord Bishopston, was addressing himself, and while I am tempted to agree with the Minister that perhaps a person appointed by the president of the

27
RICS might not be cheap, at least he would introduce an element of certainty into the Bill, one which is at present lacking.
Lord Bellwin: Perhaps I might answer now that one point as to what happens if the parties cannot agree on who the arbitrator should be. As I understand it, at that point the court will have to adjudicate, and that is where the matter ends. The amendment says the person should be appointed by the president of the RICS, whereas the Bill aims at leaving it to the parties themselves. Only if they cannot decide who the arbitrator should be will the court decide. I suspect that in almost all cases they will be able to decide. In the odd cases it might not be possible to decide, but that is the way with most legislation in any case. But to seek to say who should make the appointment is not, I think, at all related to what we are trying to do.
4.10 p.m.
Lord Wilson of Langside: I did not think that in introducing the amendment the noble Lord, Lord Bishopston, was suggesting that the Government were proposing to grind the faces of the poor, and certainly I make no such suggestion. If I may say so, I can think of no one less likely to be concerned to grind the faces of the poor than the Minister, who has opposed the amendment. I should have thought that there was everything to be said for an amendment to this effect, not in order to prevent Government, or anyone else, from grinding the faces of the poor, but in order to avoid people feeling that perhaps advantage has been taken of them in the original agreement.
I should have thought that there were many precedents for statutory and other provisions regulating the appointment of arbiters, if not by the president of the Royal Institution of Chartered Surveyors, then at least by someone else. For instance, in Scotland it is not at all unusual for a provision to be made in statute, or otherwise, for the arbiter to be appointed by the sheriff, which would ensure an appearance of impartiality. I am as surprised as is the noble Lord, Lord Bishopston, that the Minister should resist the amendment, which I should have thought cannot conceivably do any harm, and might do some good.
Lord Jacques: The Minister has made it clear to the Committee that what the Government are seeking is—in his words—a balanced situation. I submit that in order to secure a balanced situation steps must be taken in the Bill to ensure that any arbitrator who is appointed is independent—that is to say, does not belong to one side or the other. If that is accepted, I must ask the Minister whether, if he does not agree to the present amendment, he is prepared to consider another amendment which would ensure that the arbitrator is independent. I ask that question because by such a provision we seek to achieve the objective which he himself has in mind—a balanced situation.
Lord Bellwin: If, as the Bill states, it is for both the parties themselves to agree who the arbitrator should be, then no one is appointing anyone at all. It is the two parties who themselves have to agree who is to be the
28
arbitrator. It is only if they cannot agree that we have a situation in which (as was pointed out), in Scotland, the sheriff and, in England, the court will have to be the means of arbitration, if one may put it that way. But I cannot think of a position that is less of an imposition than one where the parties themselves have the right to decide who their arbitrator shall be. No party should impose an arbitrator upon another party; it does not arise. If the noble Lord and I were the two parties, he might say, "I want X to be the arbitrator", and I might reply, "I am sorry, old boy, but I prefer Y". He might ask, "Why?" If the noble Lord were to say "No, I don't agree with your suggestion", then I would say, "Let's see if we can find someone who we can both agree should be the arbitrator". I am fairly certain that we should find someone; in fact with the noble Lord involved I am certain that we should. But, if we could not decide on an arbitrator, then we should go to the court and it would decide. I do not see where the difficulty is there.
Lord Jacques: The Minister must know that in many circumstances the position is not so easy as he has made out. What happens is that there is a young man who is anxious to find a site for his caravan. He has found work, and he wants to find a site for his caravan. He finds a site, it is a suitable place, the rent is not unreasonable, and when he looks at the agreement he sees that Mr. X has been appointed as arbitrator. He regards that as unimportant. So far as he is concerned the main things have been agreed: he wants to get on to the site and get to work. He regards the name of the arbitrator as being of no account. But, if the Bill remains as it is at the moment, the person appointed could in fact be the agent of the site owner; he could even be the brother-in-law of the site owner. Surely if the Government want a balanced situation, they should ensure by means of the Bill that any arbitrator is in fact an independent arbitrator.
Baroness Ewart-Biggs; I should like to add a few words. The Minister spoke about the relative virtues of an arbitrator, but surely there is only one important virtue. It is not a question of whether he is tall, thin, rich or poor, but simply whether he is impartial. The major objective must be to find an arbitrator who is impartial. There might be a danger in leaving the situation as it is at present under the Bill, and, as my noble friend has said, there might be an occupier who has not understood the position. I am quite sure that it is not the same with the Minister, but the minds of some of us become a complete blank when we look at the small print in agreements. So why leave the danger in the agreement when it could be avoided in some other way?
Lord Bellwin: I really do not want to go on about this question, because otherwise we shall be here for several days, but, if what we are talking about is an arbitrator mutually agreed by both parties, I just cannot see how there can be any problem regarding someone reading the small print. If that is not independent, what is independent? I should have thought that an arbitrator appointed in that way would be far more likely to be regarded as an independent and acceptable

29
choice than would anyone who is imposed by someone else, no matter how well-meaning and able he or she may be.
Lord Jacques: But I must point out to the Minister, as my noble friend behind me has pointed out, that over the years Parliament has often taken the view that it is absolutely essential that the arbitrator agreed by the parties should have the approval of an authority concerned with arbitration. The kind of provision that is contained in our amendment is already in many Acts of Parliament. If Parliament has decided that the provision has been necessary in previous Acts, why is it so absurd now, as the Minister is trying to imply?
Lord Campbell of Croy: I should like to add a few words to the debate, because it seems to me that a sledge-hammer is being taken to try to crack a local nut. Many people in my area in Scotland would certainly object to what it is proposed to add to the Bill—which is, that an arbitrator, or an arbiter, as he would be in Scotland, must be appointed by someone in London, instead of someone who could be agreed upon locally.
Lord Jacques: All we are trying to get from the Minister is an assurance that there shall be an independent arbitrator. If some other method of securing that objective is appropriate to Scotland, well and good. We are not trying to force on the people of Scotland something that they do not want—that is a red herring.
Lord Campbell of Croy: I think that other rural areas, or areas remote from London, would probably feel the same. Why should someone based in London appoint an arbitrator for all kinds of local areas when the parties themselves can agree on someone?
Lord Wilson of Langside: I do not want to take a sledge-hammer to crack what might be a very small nut. However, will the Minister correct me if I am wrong in thinking that, in the kind of situations to which the provisions will relate, it is reasonably foreseeable that one party to a written agreement may sign it, apparently agreeing to the appointment of an arbiter, and will not at all understand the implications of the agreement because he does not know who is the arbiter?
Lord Bellwin: I do not see how one can agree to an arbitrator if one does not know who he is. One would not agree unless one knew who he was. I really do not follow the point.
Lord Gore-Booth: I should like to return to the already over-travelled suggestion that if there could be a formulation which included a clearly understood interpretation of the term "agreeable to both parties", if a wording could be found for that, surely it would be the solution.
Lord Bellwin: What can be more agreeable than the right of both parties to agree among themselves to appoint an arbitrator? I can think of nothing that would be more satisfactory. I am really astonished to find that we are now into another half hour on the amendment.
Lord Bishopston: I think we are in need of some kind of arbitration, and I hope we do not have this by means of a Division if it can be avoided, as it can be by the Minister saying that this is clearly something which needs looking at again. From all the debates which have been held in your Lordships' House and in another place the Minister must know the position on mobile homes; and he will have read the debate in another place on 9th July, when Mr. Nicholas Lyell and his honourable friend Nicholas Baker took part in an adjournment debate on this matter. If one reads the terms used by those two honourable Members on the Minister's side of the House (I am not sure whether I would be in order in quoting them) I think one finds that they say, in effect, that in practice the Mobile Homes Bill is riddled with flaws, anomalies and loopholes.
Only about a third of the mobile home residents have agreements at all, and there is a great deal of confusion and misunderstanding, as well as a lack of knowledge about rights and, indeed, responsibilities, on both sides—and lots of harassment, too. It is in this situation that the site owner can say, "I think that, as we cannot agree, we ought to have Mr. X or Mr. Y to look at this, and I think I can recommend someone who will do it fairly"; and many people will be pressured into accepting this because of fear of possible consequences, to put it no higher than that.
I think that if we could only get some assurance that the arbitrator would be appointed for his impartiality—we are not insisting on the RICS; it could be the Law Society (and it is not unusual that the chairman of the local law society should help on this matter) or some other body—it would be acceptable. What we are trying to do is protect the people who, albeit they will have to give agreement to whoever is appointed, will be assured that the person appointed is going to be fair and impartial. Indeed, I must not mention the rent officer again because the Minister loses control, almost, when I do, but if it was somebody who has experience in this kind of thing and who knows something about the problems, then this would be additionally helpful. But all we want is for the Minister to say, "This is a matter which has taken a little time, it has concerned your Lordships' Committee; I will have a look at it and come back at Report stage".
On Question, Whether the said amendment (No. 12) shall be agreed to?
4.23 p.m.
Their Lordships divided: Contents, 67; Not-Contents, 94.

DIVISION NO. 2

CONTENTS

Airedale, L.

Boston of Faversham, L.

Amherst, E.

Briginshaw, L.

Avebury, L. [Teller]

Brockway, L.

Aylestone, L.

Brooks of Tremorfa, L.

Bacon, B.

Byers, L.

Balogh, L.

Caradon, L.

Banks, L.

Cledwyn of Penrhos, L.

Beswick, L.

Collison, L.

Birk, B.

Cooper of Stockton Heath, L.

Bishopston, L.

Darwen, L.

BIyton, L.

David, B. [Teller]

31

Denington, B.

Listowel, E.

Diamond L.

Llewelyn-Davies of Hastoe, B.

Donaldson of Kingsbridge, L.

Oram, L.

Ponsonby of Shulbrede, L.

Elwyn-Jones, L.

Rea, L.

Ewart-Biggs, B.

Ross of Marnock, L.

Fisher of Rednal, B.

Sainsbury, L.

Fulton, L

Sefton of Garston, L.

Gaitskell, B.

Shackleton, L.

Gormley, L.

Shinwell, L.

Hale, L.

Stedman, B.

Hampton, L.

Stewart of Alvechurch, B.

Hanworth, V.

Stewart of Fulham, L.

Hatch of Lusby, L.

Stone, L.

Howie of Troon, L.

Strabolgi, L.

Irving of Dartford, L.

Strauss, L.

Jaćques, L.

Taylor of Mansfield, L.

Jeger, B.

Vernon, L.

Jenkins of Putney, L.

Wallace of Coslany, L.

John-Mackie, L.

Walston, L.

Kennet, L.

Whaddon, L.

Kilmarnock, L.

Wilson of Langside, L.

Leatherland, L.

Wootton of Abinger, B.

NOT-CONTENTS

Ailesbury, M.

Lyell, L.

Alexander of Tunis, E.

McFadzean, L.

Atholl, D.

Mancroft, L.

Auckland, L.

Margadale, L.

Avon, E.

Marley, L.

Belhaven and Stenton, L.

Melville, V.

Bellwin, L.

Merrivale, L.

Brookes, L.

Mersey, V.

Campbell of Alloway, L.

Milverton, L.

Campbell of Croy, L.

Mottistone, L.

Clifford of Chudleigh, L.

Mountevans, L.

Clitheroe, L.

Newall, L.

Colwyn, L.

Nugent of Guildford, L.

Cottesloe, L.

O'Hagan, L.

Cullen of Ashbourne, L.

Onslow, E.

De Freyne, L.

Orkney, E.

De La Warr, E.

Pender, L.

Denham, L. [Teller]

Penrhyn, L.

Drumalbyn, L.

Porritt, L.

Ebbisham, L.

Reigate, L.

Eccles, V.

Rugby, L.

Effingham, E.

St. Davids, V.

Ellenborough, L.

Sandford, L.

Elliot of Harwood, B.

Skelmersdale, L.

Ferrers, E.

Soames, L.

Fortescue, E.

Somers, L.

Fraser of Kilmorack, L.

Stamp, L.

Gainford, L.

Stradbroke, E.

Gardner of Parkes, B.

Strathcona and Mount Royal, L.

Gibson-Watt, L.

Gore-Booth, L.

Strathspey, L.

Greenway, L.

Sudeley, L.

Gridley, L.

Swansea, L.

Hailsham of Saint Marylebone, L.

Swinfen, L.

Swinton, E. [Teller]

Hankey, L.

Terrington, L.

Harmar-Nicholls, L.

Teviot, L.

Henley, L.

Teynham, L.

Home of the Hirsel, L.

Thomas of Swynnerton, L.

Hylton-Foster, B.

Thorneycroft, L.

Kearton, L.

Trefgarne, L.

Kinloss, Ly.

Trumpington, B.

Kinnaird, L.

Vaux of Harrowden, L.

Lane-Fox, B.

Vickers, B.

Lauderdale, E.

Vivian, L.

Long, V.

Wakefield of Kendal, L.

Loudoun, C.

Wise, L.

Lucas of Chilworth, L.

Young, B.

Resolved in the negative, and amendment disagreed to accordingly.
[Amendment No. 13 not moved.]
Clause 5 agreed to.
Clause 6 agreed to.
Schedule 1 [Agreements under Act]:
4.30 p.m.
Lord Avebury Lord Avebury moved Amendment No. 14:
Page 5, line 16, at end insert ("; and
(d) be in such form and include such terms as may be prescribed by regulations made by the Secretary of State.
(3) Regulation under this paragraph—

(a) shall be made by statutory instrument; and

(b) may make different provision with respect to different cases or description of case, including different provision for different areas.")

The noble Lord said: I beg to move Amendment No. 14 which stands in my name and in that of the noble Lord, Lord Bishopston. This deals with the point that cropped up indirectly on Amendment No. 11; that is to say, the right of the Secretary of State to prescribe the form of any agreement which may be reached between the occupier and the site operator. It seemed to me, from the remarks made by the noble Lord the Minister, that he was under the impression that the Secretary of State already had these powers because he said (and I took down the words) that the terms "will be that which we will prescribe". Later he said, "the Secretary of State prescribes what the notices shall say has to be involved in the agreement". So that if the noble Lord thinks that this is already within the powers of the Secretary of State, then I am sure that I need not spend much time in moving this amendment for he will already be on my side.
What the Bill actually says is that there are certain matters which have to be included in the agreement and these are specified in Part II of the schedule. Also there is a reference at the beginning of Part I of the schedule to some other matters which have to be specified. But this is not an exhaustive list. It does not include, for example, anything about the choice of arbitrator, which we have just been discussing. If the noble Lord thinks that the right way of approaching that question—and I know that we have disposed of it—would be that the site operator and the occupier, right at the start of their relationship, should agree on whom the arbitrator should be, or, if they do not specify a name, how he is to be appointed, then obviously that ought to be one of the matters laid down in the agreement. Then there does not arise the sort of dispute that we were talking about just now. It is because we were anxious that the agreement did not have to be as comprehensive as we thought it ought to be that we were discussing the possibility, at any rate, of these disputes arising.
Another very important matter which is not mentioned anywhere in Schedule 1 is the right of the site operator to lay down the rules which have to be observed by the occupiers. These rules can sometimes be very onerous. I do not suppose one would find it today but I have mentioned a case that came to my attention when I was first a councillor, some 21 years ago, a case of a site that was in my ward where the rules included a provision that no one should have a baby on the site. The person who came to me was desperate because she had become pregnant and was afraid that this was a contravention of the rules which would result in her being evicted from the site. That was a long time ago and I do not suppose that there are very many site operators who would seek to impose a provision of that sort today.
We want to ensure that the regulations made by the Secretary of State should include provisions regarding the site rules so that they do not impose the kind of onerous conditions that may be the result of an unequal bargain: because we are not talking here about an arm's length transaction in which the parties have equal powers—as the noble Lord the Minister would like to see. We on this side of the Committee agree with him that if one is talking about a free bargain in an open market between partners of equal powers, that would be absolutely wonderful; but in the conditions of shortage of supply and excess demand and the shortage of housing accommodation generally which impels people to look to mobile homes as an alternative to residential accommodation, then the bargain is very often an unequal one with the powers of the parties being extremely disparate.
Although we very much welcome the fact that in Part II there are certain matters which are enshrined in an agreement as of right—such as the right of the occupier to quiet enjoyment or, in Scotland, the right to undisturbed possession of the mobile home, which is fundamental—we think that many other equally important things are left out. In order to avoid having to specify them all in great detail in the Bill and in order to avoid the kind of inflexibility which would arise from trying to foresee every possible eventuality, in this amendment we should like to give the Secretary of State the powers that the noble Lord the Minister thought that he possessed already. I beg to move.
Lord Bellwin: Perhaps I can clarify this. This amendment is designed to amend the way in which the Bill deals with the contents of statutory agreements by adding a system of "model terms". The Bill currently provides, in Part I of Schedule 1, a list of requirements with which agreements must comply, in precise terms. Part II of Schedule 1 lists those subjects which an agreement must cover. It does not say how they are to be covered because that is a matter which site owner and occupiers will work out between them in the light of local circumstances. If an occupier does not like the way in which these subjects are dealt with in the agreement that is offered to him, he can ask a court or an arbitrator to change them.
The amendment would enable the Secretary of State to prescribe model terms for agreements, presumably in addition to the provisions in the schedule. We do not believe that the Secretary of State would wish to use that power. I think we must be absolutely clear what is meant by model terms. They simply provide a model agreement. Unless they are accompanied by controls on the content of the agreement, they do not go significantly further than the Bill already does. Let me give an example from Part II of Schedule 1. Paragraph 2 provides that an agreement must cover the,
"review at yearly intervals of the sums payable by the occupier in pursuance of the agreement".
A model term on this point would presumably say something like, "The sums payable are to be reviewed annually, taking into account" et cetera. Unless we are prepared to specify the et cetera, this sort of model term would go no further than the Bill already does; and we do not want to fill in the rest.
34
There are other subjects on which it is not for us to say whether there should be rules or not. Let us take Paragraph 4:
"the preservation of the amenity of the protected site".
It is not for us to say whether there should be rules about cats and dogs or not. I do not believe that model terms would significantly improve upon the approach the Bill uses and I ask noble Lords to reject this amendment. I do not see this in quite the same way as previous amendments. I am anxious, as is the noble Lord, Lord Avebury, to get this right. We are talking now of definitions. I do not think it is a question of "desirable". I do not think the amendment is necessary. I shall be interested to hear what the noble Lord may wish to say further on the matter.
Lord Bishopston: I should have thought the Minister might be more forthcoming on this matter, because although we do not want to restrict or put too much in the Bill there is a need to give more guidance than is in it already and to have more safeguards. We think there would be room for substantial unfairness and injustice in agreements if we do not pass this kind of amendment. It would be very difficult for people who are not legally qualified to challenge the terms of such agreements. Of course, we are also concerned with agreements which can be terminated, and then the security of tenants is also affected. I am sure—we are unbiased as well—it will be in the interests of the site owner also to have this clarification and I hope that, whatever the Minister's response may be to this, the matter can be looked at before the later stages.
Lord Avebury: Just one further word in response to the Minister's invitation to clarify the purpose of the amendment. If I may take up where he left off about cats and dogs, the point is that under Part II of the schedule the site rules do not have to be included among the matters concerning which provision has to be made, and so the agreement between the occupier and the site owner could be completely silent regarding site rules. What I should like to see as a very minimum is for the Secretary of State to have power to prescribe additional matters for which provision has to be made in the agreement, so that in his wisdom he might see his way to treating the rules as something to be included in the agreement and not to be treated as something separate from it.
As I said earlier, we ought also to include provisions for arbitration. That is not going quite so far as the model agreement, because the model agreement might include very detailed provisions regarding the keeping of pets, and so on, as the Minister has mentioned. But the actual existence of the site rules and their incorporation in the agreement is something which I should have thought the Secretary of State would want to consider. Therefore if the department is not prepared to go down to the roots, as we have recommended, and to the kind of detail that would be required in a model agreement, then at the very least the Secretary of State should have power to add to the matters which are dealt with in Part II and which have to be covered by any agreement.
Lord Bellwin: I think that is slightly on a different tack. Clearly, I cannot accept this amendment but I want to read what the noble Lord has said: that I

35
certainly will do. I must say that I do not feel any differently at all as I stand here, but I will certainly read what the noble Lord has said.
Lord Avebury: In that case, I shall be happy to seek your Lordships' permission to withdraw the amendment.
Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.
[Amendment No. 15 not moved.)
4.46 p.m.
Lord Campbell of Croy Lord Campbell of Croy moved Amendment No. 16:
Page 6, line 3, leave out ("at the end of a relevant period")
The noble Lord said: I think it will be convenient if we considered Amendment No. 19 with this one. I beg to move Amendment No. 16. As I see it, the Bill seeks to improve the system of agreements which was brought in under the 1975 Act. As I have been listening to my noble friend the Minister, it appears that he is building on the 1975 Act, which I remember going through this House when the party opposite were in government. From what I remember of those days I think the then Government thought they were providing a system of agreements which was the best balance possible at the time. Since then, in the light of the experience of the past seven years, problems have been thrown up and we are now trying to reconstruct the system of agreements and to improve them. I do not think it could be said that in 1975, when the Act was going through, the Government of the day thought it was going to be riddled with loopholes.
I think that the whole system of agreements needs to be improved now. Paragraph 2 of this schedule reads:
"The court shall be entitled to terminate the agreement at the end of the relevant period if, on the application of the owner, the court is satisfied that, having regard to its age and condition, the mobile home—

(a) is having a detrimental effect on the amenity of the site; or

(b) is likely to have such an effect before the end of the next relevant period."

The aim is clearly to attain high standards of accommodation. As I am sure your Lordships know, there are mobile homes which do have a detrimental effect on the amenity of the site, to use the words of the schedule, or are likely to do so. These homes are usually occupied by elderly people and they are usually mobile homes which are themselves ageing or sub-standard. The general run of site owners will normally allow those elderly people to live out their lives, if they wish to do so, in those mobile homes without requiring them to be replaced even though they may be sub-standard. That, I think, is a principle with which all sides of your Lordships' Committee would agree.
It would be wrong if those homes could be sold by the existing occupiers to further occupiers who were not ageing or living out the rest of their lives in a home they had previously occupied. As the Bill stands, the owner cannot exercise the right until after the first relevant period. The amendments will allow the owner to apply to the court at any time from the commencement of the agreement. I think that will deal with the circumstances which I have described.
Lord Bellwin: This amendment and Amendment No. 19, which is consequential upon it, would have a considerable effect on the operation of agreements entered into under the Bill. The Bill at present provides for agreements to last indefinitely but for site owners to be able to apply to the court every five years to terminate an agreement on the grounds that, having regard to the age and condition of the mobile home, it is having a detrimental effect on the amenity of the site or is likely to have such an effect within the next five years. This amendment would remove the restriction on the timing of applications to the court. It would mean that a site owner could apply to a court every year, or more often if he so chose, for termination on these grounds. It would mean that occupiers would never be secure in their homes.
In considering this amendment, I think it is important to bear in mind the other provision in the Bill for a site owner to terminate an agreement. A site owner can terminate on the grounds of breach of a term of the agreement. Part II of Schedule 1 requires that one of the matters that must be covered in an agreement is the maintenance of the mobile home by the occupier. So, if an occupier does not maintain his mobile home properly, the site owner can terminate the agreement on that ground. More specifically, if an occupier allows his home to fall into a state of disrepair through mistreatment or total neglect, the site owner should be able to terminate the agreement on these grounds.
The site owner does not need to be concerned about an irresponsible occupier who does not maintain his home. He does not need, in those circumstances, to use paragraph 6 of Part I of Schedule 1, to which this amendment relates. Paragraph 6 is concerned with the circumstances in which a mobile home deteriorates, through no fault of its occupier, to the point where it has become an eyesore. We believe that five years is a reasonable period within which to give an occupier security against termination on this ground. This amendment would leave an occupier unable to feel secure against termination on this ground at all. So really it is a question of time yet again; and here I am arguing the case from the other side, so even-handedness I most certainly do claim, despite what might have been thought or said earlier. We are just trying to get it as right as we can. The 1975 Act took the matter a certain stage forward. Loopholes have appeared and it has not worked as well as it might have done. The present proposals are welcomed by just about everyone. What is not welcomed is some of the detail, and that is why we are here in Committee trying to get it right. On this occasion, I cannot accept the amendment of my noble friend and I have tried to explain why. Even if that does not satisfy him, I am sure he will understand.
Lord Campbell of Croy: I fully understand my noble friend. I hope that he will look at the situation that I have described. Certainly, the intention of the amendments was not to cause the uncertainty which he mentioned, but to see whether there was a way of preventing an elderly person, for example, who was specially being enabled to stay on, passing on the mobile home to somebody else who was not in that position. But I hope that my noble friend will look at

37
this, to see whether there is any way of putting this in the Bill, even if my amendments do not do it satisfactorily. Therefore, I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.
Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.
Lord Bishopston Lord Bishopston moved Amendment No. 17:
Page 6, line 7, leave out ("having a detrimental effect on the amenity of the site") and insert ("unfit for human habitation").
The noble Lord said: I do not want to involve myself in family disagreements on the other side, but I must say that I was very much on the side of the Minister. If I had commented on the amendment of the noble Lord, Lord Campbell of Croy, I should have said that it would give insecurity to have a termination at any time. But, apart from that, there is the problem of defining what is meant by the words,
"detrimental effect on the amenity of the site".
The Minister was helpful and gave other areas where a site owner can, quite properly, have the safeguards which we should all want for the maintenance of very high standards. This is absolutely essential on sites of this kind, and I am sure that many residents are as anxious as anyone that amenities on sites are maintained at the highest possible level.
Amendment No. 17, with which I should like to take No. 18, sets out to strengthen the criteria for allowing the termination of an agreement due to the condition of a mobile home. I think the Minister will be well aware of the practice whereby some site owners expect the residents to buy new homes at certain periods—probably much too often—for the benefit of all concerned,
It is very difficult to argue in what kind of situation a mobile home has a detrimental effect on the amenity of a site. Certainly, it would be very difficult for the courts to apply this kind of definition, and we believe that it would be helpful to everybody concerned, not least the courts, if we had the definition which is in the amendment, so that we leave out the words,
"having a detrimental effect on the amenity of the site",
and insert the words, "unfit for human habitation". I recognise, as I am sure the Minister will, that amenity values are not easily defined. He may not be happy about the words, "unfit for human habitation". He may wish to have another look at this before the later stages, and I hope that he will do so in order that we can make progress. I beg to move.
Lord Bellwin: We go from one side to the other, and the noble Lord will probably not be too surprised to know that I cannot agree with his amendment either. The Bill provides that every five years a site owner may apply to the court to terminate an agreement on the grounds that, having regard to its age and condition, the mobile home is having a detrimental effect on the amenity of the site, or is likely to do so within the next five years. The effect of these amendments would be to make termination on these grounds much more strict, by entitling courts to terminate only if the mobile home is actually "unfit for human habitation". I think that that goes too far.
The term "unfit for human habitation" is a phrase used in—dare I say it, in view of what the noble Lord said a few moments ago?—the Housing Act 1957 and
38
applies in that Act to houses. It does not apply to mobile homes. But, even if it did, it would impose a far stricter condition on this ground for termination than would be appropriate in this Bill. The 1957 Act lays down that, for a house to be unfit for human habitation, it must be so far defective in one or more of a number of ways that it is not reasonably suitable for occupation in that condition. That test is, quite simply, too strict for a mobile home.
The life of a mobile home is a finite one. There must come a point when the external condition of the home has so far deteriorated that it has become an eyesore on the site and that it is having a,
"detrimental effect on the amenity of the site",
even if it is, in the strictest terms, still fit for human habitation. At that point, it will begin to reduce the value of the site as a whole. Not only will the site owner suffer if the mobile home is allowed to remain on site in that condition; so, too, will the other occupiers, particularly if they wish to sell their homes. I believe that most people involved with mobile homes—occupiers as well as site owners—would accept that a mobile home which fails the test which this Bill imposes should not be protected by an agreement under the Bill.
May I quickly make one further point? The test which the Bill imposes is not a trivial one. It is that, having regard to its age or condition, the mobile home has, or is likely to have, a detrimental effect on the amenity of the site. I do not believe that the courts, or an arbitrator, would lightly terminate an agreement on this ground. I think that it is an appropriate test and, with respect, I suggest that the test proposed in the amendment is not appropriate, which is why we cannot accept it.
Lord Bishopston: I do not wish to go on for too long, but this also concerns security. It is easy for any landlord who wants to exploit, or to get rid of, a mobile home resident, to say that a mobile home is having this kind of effect on the amenity. The test is used, as we know, on many occasions when a site owner wishes a tenant to buy a new van or a new mobile home, and to buy it from him as part of the conditions. It is subject to exploitation. While I recognise some of the points made by the Minister, it is very difficult to define the words in the Bill at this stage. It might be useful if the Minister, and my noble friends and I, were to look at this point between now and the later stages. With those comments, I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.
Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.
[Amendments Nos. 18 and 19 not moved.]
4.58 p.m.
Lord Campbell of Croy Lord Campbell of Croy moved Amendment No. 20:
Page 6, line 12, leave out ("five") and insert ("three").
The noble Lord said: I suggest that the following Amendment, No. 21, should be considered with No. 20, which I now move. This is a small point, but I hope that the Government have given it some thought. The court is here required to try to decide the future condition of a mobile home based on expert evidence, and it has been suggested that it is more likely to arrive at an equitable decision if it is required to predict over

39
a shorter period than five years. Therefore, this amendment and the subsequent one shorten the period from five years to three years. The purpose of the paragraph in the schedule does not seem to be impaired, in any way, by making the period shorter and I shall be glad to hear the Government's reaction. I beg to move.
Lord Bellwin: My understanding is that the reasoning behind my noble friend's amendments is that it would be difficult for a court or an arbitrator to judge the life of a mobile home over a five-year period. The hypothesis is that a mobile home might, in fact, be capable of lasting only a further two or three years. In such a situation, the court would either have to make a decision that was harsh on the occupier by terminating his agreement immediately, or one that was harsh to the site owner by forcing him to keep a home on the site beyond the end of its life. But the court or the arbitrator will have the benefit of expert advice in considering the life of the mobile home. It does not seem unreasonable to me to expect them to be able to look five years ahead. In a case where the view of the court was that the mobile home would last only two more years and therefore that the agreement should be terminated, there would be nothing to prevent a site owner from allowing an occupier to remain on site on the same basis as that of a statutory agreement.
Perhaps I should make the point that termination of an agreement is not the same thing as eviction. Under the Caravan Sites Act 1968, a site owner must separately apply to the court to remove a mobile home from his site. But the main reason why I cannot accept this amendment is that I believe occupiers should be able to know they are safe from the possibility of losing their agreement for five years at a time, provided that they do not breach the terms of the agreement.
I should have thought that five years was a reasonable period of security. I respectfully suggest to my noble friend that three years is not. The Mobile Homes Act 1975 gave an initial period of security of five years to all those who took agreements under the Act, whatever the state of their mobile home at the time. This Bill should not give any less. I hope that my noble friend, who I am sure will want to consider what has been said, will see the equity of that suggestion and will not press his amendment.
Lord Campbell of Croy: I am grateful to my noble friend. The last point which he made—security for five years, which is continued from the 1975 Act—is the most important. Therefore, I shall not press the amendment, and I beg leave to withdraw it.
Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.
[Amendment No. 21 not moved.]
The Deputy Chairman of Committees (The Earl of Listowel): Before I call Amendment No. 22, I should point out to the Committee that, if this amendment is agreed to, I cannot call Amendments Nos. 23 to 27.
Lord Avebury Lord Avebury moved Amendment No. 22:
Page 6, leave out lines 24 to 41 and insert—
40
("(2) This paragraph applies only if the occupier has given to the owner at least 14 days prior notice before agreeing to sell the mobile home and to assign the agreement.").
The noble Lord said: The Bill provides for the first time that nearly every mobile home occupier will have an indefinite right to remain in occupation of a pitch, so long as he conforms with the terms of the agreement. The corollary, one would have thought, is that he should have freedom to transfer that agreement to anybody he chooses. However, when we look at paragraph 8 of the schedule we find that the occupier has first to offer to the site operator the sale of his mobile home at a fair market price, less a discount at such rate as may be provided by the Secretary of State. There are certain other provisions which similarly restrict the occupier's right to transfer his mobile home at a price which is lower than that which would be paid by the site operator.
We are saying that these rights of the site operator to have pre-emption rights over the sale should be eliminated altogether and that the occupier should have the right to sell to whomsoever he chooses, within reason. The amendment provides that, instead of all these restrictions on transfer and the offering of the mobile home to the site operator before he can go outside and look around the market, the occupier simply has to give notice of his intention to sell to the owner. This would give to the site owner the opportunity, if he wishes to do so, to make an offer higher than he thinks would be received from outside. It means that the Minister's principle of maximum possible freedom of sale within the market and arm's length transactions would be complied with, because the site operator would have to compete with everybody else if he wished to acquire possession of this particular mobile home.
I cannot understand why these rights should be contained in the Bill, except that the custom has always been for a site operator to have the privilege of first refusal at a special price, which is normally something like 15 per cent. below what the market will stand. We have to remember that the site operator continues to receive rent or periodic payments for occupation of the pitch during the transitional period between one occupier and the next. He is not forfeiting anything as a result of the transfer of occupation from the existing owner to somebody new, so why should he suddenly receive a completely uncovenanted benefit of a sum, which may be as large as £3,000, for doing nothing else but give his assent to the transfer of an agreement from one person to another?
I do not need to waste the time of the Committee by outlining many of the detailed cases of abuse which have been drawn to our attention. I am sure that the Minister knows them as well as any of us on this side of the Committee. They have been a very severe thorn in the flesh of people living in mobile homes. Even where they are not immediately contemplating the sale of their dwelling, there is always in the back of their minds the knowledge that if they did have to move they would be at the mercy of perhaps an unscrupulous site operator in charging an enormous fee by way of consent to the transfer. This is a very outdated provision which finds no place in a modern Bill which attempts, as the Minister said a minute ago,

41
to bring up to date the mobile homes legislation and to eliminate the abuses which still remain from the 1975 Act. I beg to move.
Lord Bellwin: The first point I should like to make about the amendment is that I do not believe it would achieve what the noble Lord has in mind. It would remove the right of first refusal for the site owner but it would not stop him from charging commission. With this amendment the Bill would be silent about commission. The site owner would be able to make the payment of commission a condition of approving the assignment of an agreement, so long as he did not fix the commission at so high a level as to amount to an unreasonable withholding of consent. What the noble Lord, Lord Avebury, wishes to achieve by the amendment is clear, but it will be no surprise if I say that, unless the noble Lord can say something else to convince me, I fear that I shall be unable to accept his amendment.
I said in my speech on Second Reading of the Bill that we were issuing a consultation paper on commission and discount on sale. That consultation paper invites views on the maximum level of commission and discount that the Secretary of State should prescribe. It does not offer the option of prohibiting commission and discount altogether. Very few of those who replied to the consultation paper we issued in February this year advocated outright prohibition. It was clear that most occupiers believed that a certain level of commission and discount was justified—to reflect the site owner's level of investment in the site—though they felt that 15 per cent. was too high.
The new consultation paper will enable those who respond to give their views on what the maximum level should be, and our intention is to bring forward an order to prescribe a maximum level in the light of the views expressed. It is not beyond the bounds of possibility that the level we prescribe will be significantly lower than the 15 per cent. prescribed under the 1975 Act, but that will depend on our consideration of the responses to the consultation paper. I do not believe that there is a demand for outright prohibition of commission and discount, given the effect that would have on the level of pitch fees charged to all occupiers.
The other effect that the amendment would have would be to remove a site owner's right of first refusal on a mobile home. Site owners believe that this is a valuable right because it enables them to buy an aging home, or one that is out of place, and remove it from their site. Provided that the occupier is protected by the right to a fair market price on his home, less a discount, he should not suffer as a result of this provision. The Bill enables an occupier to claim a fair market price.
There is another point on which there was relatively little comment in the earlier responses to the consultation paper; that the worst abuses in this area, to which the media have drawn attention, have arisen where the occupiers concerned did not have agreements under the 1975 Act. Your Lordships may remember my saying before that one of the intentions of our proposals for the Act is to bring to the notice of everyone the rights they have, because we believe that
42
perhaps the reason why only one-third of people had such agreements was that they did not appreciate what their rights were. It is essential that those rights are brought to their attention in such a way that they can never claim, "We did not know". We said that it had to be done clearly and in simple terms, in a form which the Secretary of State will prescribe, because we thought that was much of the reason for the shortcomings of the 1975 Act.
Again, I have not yet seen a convincing case for removing the right of first refusal. The amendment—and I wonder whether the noble Lord, Lord Avebury, would agree—is a very sweeping amendment. We believe it goes too far. There is some merit in what the noble Lord has said so far as I am concerned, but the amendment goes much too far. For the reasons I have given, which I do not wish to repeat, we cannot accept the amendment—certainly, not as it is.
Lord Bishopston: As the noble Lord the Minister believes in the market economy, will he at least take a look at the right of the site owner to have first refusal? If the site owner has to consider buying the caravan or mobile home in competition with others, this is preferable to the kind of monopoly start which the Bill gives him at the moment. Will the Minister look at that?
Lord Avebury: The most important point that the noble Lord the Minister was making was that the discounts or premiums reflect to some extent at any rate the investment which the site operator has put into the land to make it suitable for a caravan site. On that I would say that originally, when the site came to be developed, the site operator sold new caravans to the residents for occupation on the pitches and he was entitled to a commission as a person running a business selling mobile homes. The example I gave earlier was taken as an indication of what the earnings level might be from these sales; a twin unit home might cost £20,000 and, if his level of commission was 15 per cent., the site owner would get £3,000.
What we are saying in this amendment is that the site owner should not receive another £3,000 every time that particular mobile home changes hand, because the original payment he received partly reflected the investment he made in the site—although £3,000 a pitch would be a very modest level of investment these days. For the remainder of his capital, he would hope to recover this in the form of the pitch charges he makes at weekly or monthly intervals for occupation. Therefore, he should not expect another sum on top of that every time that particular mobile home changes hands, when he has done nothing whatsoever in respect of that for which the payment is made.
I suppose the most I can hope for on this amendment is to impress this view on the noble Lord the Minister and ask him to take it into account when the level of commission or discount prescribed by the Secretary of State under the Bill is being decided. It would be helpful if we could have some indication of the direction in which the department's mind is moving before we lose the opportunity to discuss it on the floor of the House or in Committee. The Minister

43
has hinted strongly that he believes that 15 per cent., which has been usual in the past, is certainly on the high side; and I was delighted to hear him say so because I warmly agree with him. But even if one was to receive only 10 per cent., with the site operator receiving perhaps £2,000 every time a mobile home changes hands, this is still an enormous sum for doing nothing. I will not press this amendment to a Division, but I shall be grateful if the noble Lord the Minister, before we take our leave of him, will say whether or not we are likely to have any further indication of what is in the Government's mind before we leave the Bill.
Lord Bellwin: The noble Lord, Lord Avebury, has referred to a figure of £20,000, but, as he will be the first to agree, not all mobile homes cost £20,000. If he seeks my view on a figure of 15 per cent., I cannot give this until the results of the consultation paper are in. I hinted that many might think that 15 per cent. was too much—and certainly the situation which the noble Lord has described is of a kind which, I am sure, was never anticipated. If the noble Lord wants a further comment from me it will only be that, as I hope I have intimated, I believe there is some merit in the points he was making, and that we shall have to wait for the results of the consultation paper. I do not think that I can go any further than that today. I have said enough to intimate how we feel in general about this point—unlike some of the earlier points on which I was taking a more vigorous line, if that is the right term.
Lord Avebury: That is certainly a more encouraging reply than we have had on some earlier amendments. I believe it will be best if we delay further consideration of this point until we know the results of the consultation paper, which I understand will not be known during the proceedings of this Bill. Nevertheless, I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.
Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.
5.17 p.m.
Lord Campbell of Croy Lord Campbell of Croy moved Amendment No. 23:
Page 6, line 24, at end insert ("in writing").
The noble Lord said: I beg to move Amendment No. 23 and I propose that the following four amendments be considered with it. This amendment concerns a very simple point and one which I made at Second Reading. We are dealing with the sale of mobile homes and I believe that the procedure for these transactions should be formal. Unless my noble friend Lord Bellwin has reason to indicate that it is not necessary to put in these words, I consider that the formality should be prescribed in the Bill. This will avoid misunderstandings and disputes later, when transactions are being made. I beg to move.
Lord Bellwin: Again, I am in some difficulty. These amendments would affect the procedure by which a mobile home is sold. The Bill uses the same procedure as the 1975 Act. When an occupier wishes to sell his mobile home, he must first offer it to the site owner at a fair market price less discount. If the site owner decides not to buy it at that price and the price is subsequently reduced the occupier must give the
44
owner another chance to buy the mobile home at the new price, again less discount.
The effect of these amendments would be to require, each time the home was offered to the site owner, that the offer was made in writing. The 1975 Act does not require the offer to be made in writing, and I am not aware that the absence of that requirement has given rise to any serious problems that way—it just occurs to me that I do not know how one describes "that way" in Hansard—as opposed to the occupier having his rights brought to his attention. This would be an extra burden on occupiers in what is already a difficult area; the question of whether a site owner should have this right of first refusal at all is quite controversial. There is no doubt that it places him in a relatively strong position in relation to an occupier who wishes to sell his mobile home. I would not have thought that we should consider imposing an extra burden on an occupier to make his offer in writing unless there is very clear evidence that it is necessary to do so. If my noble friend feels that there is great evidence to show such a necessity then I will gladly listen, but I cannot accept this amendment as it is. I suspect that it will not be possible for him to do so, but it is only on that basis that I will say other than that we cannot accept the amendment.
Lord Campbell of Croy: I am grateful to my noble friend for his reply. I am glad to hear that there have not been difficulties on this point resulting from the similar provisions in the 1975 Act. If my noble friend is satisfied that this does not need to be put in writing, in the form of a formal transaction, then I am glad to propose that this amendment be withdrawn.
Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.
[Amendments Nos. 24 to 27 not moved.]
Lord Campbell of Croy Lord Campbell of Croy moved Amendment No. 28:
Page 6, line 45, at end insert—
("(2) In this paragraph the expression "member of his family" means a wife or husband, father, mother, grandfather, grandmother, stepfather, stepmother, son, daughter, grandson, granddaughter, stepson, stepdaughter, brother, sister, half-brother, half sister.")
The noble Lord said: I beg to move Amendment No. 28, which is on another of the points to which I referred in our Second Reading debate. This is the degree of family relationship in this part of the schedule. When my noble friend replied to the Second Reading debate he said—and I can absolutely understand this point—that the Government preferred not to put in any degree of relationship but to leave it entirely open, so that the matter could then be dealt with by the courts. That is a point of view which I understand. But I think the courts might need some guidance as to whether it should be a close relationship or a second-cousin-twice-removed relationship. I cannot resist giving some examples that have come up. Someone has done a little research for me on cases which have come up in litigation concerning statutes where no relationship has been defined. For example, there was an application for a housekeeper; that was not accepted. There was an application for a man masquerading as the tenant's husband; that was not accepted. There was the case of a mother-in-law who had only visited from time to time, and that was not

45
accepted. We can all perhaps agree that those are not the kinds of relationships which are intended, but it does show that applicants do come forward, and the courts may well be besieged with a large number of cases where the relationship is a distant or even a remote one.
I am aware that in this part of the schedule it is necessary to have the site owner's agreement, but it also states that this must not be unreasonably withheld. So the site owner has to agree, but on the other hand he cannot unreasonably withhold his agreement. The degree of family relationship is, therefore, something on which I think those who have to deal with these situations would need guidance.
The paragraph which this amendment inserts is taken from legislation; it comes from the Workmen's Compensation Act. That is an example of legislation where it has been included in the past. I would hope that perhaps my noble friend and the Government would find a way of using this as an example of the kind of relationship that should be followed in this part of the Bill. I beg to move.
BaronessWootton of Abinger: I wonder if the noble Lord can make it clear whether in this context "son" and "daughter" would include adopted son and daughter?
Lord Campbell of Croy: As far as I am concerned, I think they would.
Lord Avebury: I wonder whether it would be convenient to take at the same time Amendment No. 29, the amendment standing in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Bishopston, and myself, which takes into account the points made by the noble Lord, Lord Campbell.
Lord Campbell of Croy: I rather hoped that that one could be dealt with separately.
Lord Avebury: I thought the Committee had agreed that we would take them together, but I am perfectly happy to deal with them separately. It seems to me illogical because they are both addressed to the same point.
Lord Bellwin: I was not aware that they were to be taken together. I am quite content to deal with the first one. This is not a long matter, and I think there is a greater measure of agreement on this than might be apparent at first sight.
Lord Avebury: I am quite happy to leave it to the noble Lord, Lord Campbell, to deal with his amendment and then come to mine later.
Lord Bellwin: We are talking here about the intention to restrict the scope of the term "family" in paragraph 9 of Part I of Schedule 1. This paragraph enables an occupier to give his mobile home and assign his agreement to a member of his family approved by the site owner. It is a new provision, not taken from the 1975 Act. We have put it in because we think that an occupier should not, in selling his home to a member of his family, have to pay a commission
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to the site owner. If we consider, for example, a husband and wife whose marriage breaks down, the husband has the statutory agreement and he leaves the family home. Without this provision the only way that he could be sure of being able to transfer the home and his agreement to his wife would be to sell it to her.
Site owners are worried that without some limitation on the scope of "family" this provision might be abused. A gift might be made to an imaginary second cousin in North America simply to avoid paying commission. I think the danger of this sort of abuse can be exaggerated. The site owner does have the right to refuse his approval to a recipient if he considers the gift to be a sham.
There is also a risk that by defining "family" we might unfairly exclude someone who should not be excluded. My noble friend's amendment, for example, excludes from the definition people living together as husband and wife who are not actually married. I do not underestimate the concern of site owners on this point. I am also aware that there are recent precedents in legislation for the definition of "family".
As it stands, I do not think I can accept this amendment, because I think it is too restrictive. If my noble friend is prepared to withdraw it, I will undertake to consider the possibility of inserting an alternative definition at a later stage during the passage of the Bill. I think that this is a valid point of concern. If we can deal with it in that way, I think we may get a solution that will satisfy more or less everyone.
Lord Campbell of Croy: I am extremely grateful to my noble friend for his reply, having obviously taken this into careful consideration since Second Reading. He has raised the point about the common-law wife. I think in Scotland arrangements usually do cover a common-law wife in this sort of case. I do not know whether a similar position exists south of the Border. That is the kind of point that one would need to take into account in considering this. In view of what my noble friend has said, I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.
Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.
5.28 p.m.
Lord Avebury Lord Avebury moved Amendment No. 29:
Page 6, line 45, at end insert—
("(2) In this paragraph, "member of his family" shall have the same meaning in relation to the occupier as the expression "member of the original tenant's family" has in relation to the original tenant in Schedule 1 to the Rent Act 1977.").
The noble Lord said: If I may continue where the noble Lord, Lord Campbell, left off, it was apparent in the discussion we have just had that if you try to specify exactly in the Bill the degrees of consanguinity to which the privilege of transferring the occupation of a pitch without fee is extended, you are going to be in difficulties because there are always going to be exceptions of the kind mentioned, the common-law wife, the adopted child. On the other hand, one agrees with the noble Lord, Lord Campbell of Croy, that perhaps some indication should be given to the courts of what Parliament intended.
Therefore, one looks for parallels among recent precedents in legislation. We believe that a fairly close parallel is to be found in Schedule 1 to the Rent Act

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1977, where we were concerned with the transfer of tenancies in similar circumstances. We think this provides a model which would give some guidance to the courts when they come to decide to what kinds of relative it would be appropriate for an agreement to be transferred. I beg to move.
Lord Bellwin: I would say, similarly, to the noble Lord, Lord Avebury, that it is clear that there is concern on both sides of the Committee that some sort of definition is needed. I gladly undertake to consider the possibility of inserting a definition at a later stage. I hope that will satisfy the noble Lord, Lord Avebury, and that he will feel able to do as my noble friend Lord Campbell did. We will see what we can come up with.
Lord Avebury: I am happy to withdraw the amendment.
Amendment, by leave withdrawn.
5.30 p.m.
Lord Bishopston Lord Bishopston moved Amendment No. 30:
Page 6, line 45, at end insert—
(" .—(1) If any question arises whether the withholding of an approval required by paragraph 8 or 9 above was unreasonable it is for the owner to show that it was not.
(2) Such an approval—

(a) may be validly given notwithstanding that it follows, instead of preceding, the sale or gift in question;

(b) cannot be given subject to a condition, and if purporting to be given subject to a condition shall be treated as given unconditionally; and

(c) shall be treated as given if unreasonably withheld.")

The noble Lord said: This amendment stands also in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Avebury. Briefly, the purpose of the amendment is to bring the arrangements for giving the approval—that is, of the assignment or gift—nearer to those detailed in the Housing Act 1980. In other words, the burden of proof should be on the owner to show that lack of approval was not unreasonable, that approval may follow the sole assignment or gift, that the approval cannot be made conditionally and that approval should be treated as given if unreasonably withheld. The drafting of the amendment is on the basis of the 1980 Act but, like most amendments, is capable of some improvement. With those brief words of introduction, I beg to move.
Lord Bellwin: The Bill allows an occupier to sell his mobile home and to assign his agreement to a person approved by the site owner. It also allows him to give his home to a member of his family approved by the site owner. In both cases the Bill provides that the site owner's approval must not be unreasonably withheld. This amendment would impose very tight restrictions on a site owner's ability to withhold approval. It prevents him from imposing a condition on his approval, provides that his approval shall be treated as given if it is unreasonably withheld, and requires him to show that the withholding was not unreasonable. This is yet another point at which the Bill follows the precedent of the 1975 Act. And it is another issue on which I am not aware that the 1975 Act has given rise to any problems. Here, again, I must ask whether we should be changing the provisions of the 1975 Act without a very good reason for doing so.
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The amendment uses wording drawn from Section 82 of the Housing Act 1980. Since that Act was passed by this Government—I took it through your Lordships House—I would not dream of criticising its wording, but I wonder how relevant is the precedent. Section 82 is concerned with a tenant's right to improve his house or flat. These provisions are concerned with a mobile home occupier's right to transfer the ownership of his home. The crucial element in this amendment is the occupier's right to proceed if approval is unreasonably withheld. It is clearly important that a renting tenant should be able to get on with improving his home if the landlord is being difficult about the improvements. It is a matter between the tenant and the landlord and it is unlikely that anyone else would be harmed by the improvements the tenant is making.
However, the transfer of the ownership of a mobile home is a very different matter. This amendment would put the occupier in an extremely strong position and the site owner in a fairly weak one. I am not sure that it is right that the site owner's ability to exercise his right of approval is so weakened, either in his own interests or, frankly those of other occupiers on the site. An example may point out the difficulty I see here. There are a number of mobile home sites which cater only for retired people, where the occupiers have chosen to come on to the site for precisely that reason. Suppose that one of those occupiers wishes to sell, or give, his home to a young couple with small children. The site owner will withhold approval, but this amendment might very well encourage the occupier to go ahead with his gift or sale. The site owner would have to go to court to enforce his view and retrospectively cancel the transfer of ownership. In the meantime, the other occupants of the site would have their lives disturbed in precisely the way they wanted to avoid. I could give more extreme examples but I do not think that that is at all unlikely.
Here again we are trying to balance the relative strengths of the occupier and the site owner. For the reasons I have given, I think this amendment tips the balance too far towards the occupier. The Bill uses exactly the same approach as the 1975 Act and I am far from convinced that it is wrong to do so. It has not led to problems, so I do not see why we should proceed with such an amendment when it appears to be unnecessary and could lead to the sort of problems that I have mentioned.
Lord Bishopston: The amendment seeks to give the same kind of facilities to the tenants of mobile homes as to other tenants which have been referred to on a number of occasions today. I have another amendment which deals with the same section and it may well be that the matter will come before the House at a later stage. I am grateful for the Minister's comments and I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.
Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.
Baroness Fisher of Rednal Baroness Fisher of Rednal moved Amendment No. 31:
Page 6, line 45, at end insert—
(" . The occupier shall be entitled to give the mobile home and to assign the agreement to any person by virtue of a testamentary disposition.").
The noble Baroness said: I shall speak briefly on this amendment. We seek to allow the occupier to leave his mobile home and the benefit of his statutory agreements in his will. Therefore, it goes beyond Clause 3 which only allows a member of the family already in residence to take over on the owner's death. I draw attention to the fact that many who have spoken this afternoon referred to the fact that there are many middle-aged and elderly people who are moving to mobile homes. They might have spent the whole of their redundancy pay to become, for the first time, an owner-occupier. They might have already sold a larger house to raise capital and enable them to maintain their standard of living when they moved into the mobile home.
For that reason I ask the Minister to think seriously about the amendment. The majority of these elderly residents want to maintain their independence. That is why they have gone for something smaller and compact. By doing so they can continue to look after themselves. Therefore, they do not normally want anyone else living with them. They have moved to a mobile home in order to maintain their independence. They welcome visits from their children and their grandchildren. Their families are happy that they are living independent lives. Therefore, it seems strange that, when we have people who have entered the owner-occupier field and are trying to be independent, we penalise their families when they die.
This amendment has no party political bias. I am appealing to the Minister on the grounds of common justice. I say that because this House, above all organisations, believes in the hereditary principle. Many noble Lords pass on their homes to sons and daughters and to others in their family. If they believe that it is important to pass on what they have worked hard for, and their parents have worked hard for in the past, is it not right that the mobile home owners, who have very humble homes compared with some homes owned by noble Lords in this House, should not also be able to pass on those benefits when they die?
A strange situation exists when one considers the difference between leaving benefits when one dies and passing on benefits when one is living. I am referring to Clause 3 and what we have been discussing on Schedule 9. I am asking the Minister to maintain a balance between the gifts of the living and the gifts of the dead—to put it as simply as that. We are asking that the same privileges of giving shall apply. If a will is left, and it accords with the proper procedure, that should apply.
In conclusion, if the noble Lord says that he will not consider this proposal, can he tell us what other class of owner occupier is prevented from leaving, in a will, the home that he lives in to the person of his choice? Are we to discriminate against a very small group of people? If the noble Lord says that this is a matter that can go through the courts to be adjudicated, I point out that it is a matter which has been through the courts and has been adjudicated upon. Because we are operating under the previous Act of Parliament, quite obviously the people who have been left out are the families of the owners of mobile homes. I hope that the Minister will keep the balance and will perhaps give me a very favourable reply. I beg to move.
Lord Avebury: I should like to add a few words to what the noble Baroness has put to the Minister with such eloquence. If the old people living in this mobile home do not have any close relatives to whom they wish to leave their property but they have a close friend who has been very good to them in their retirement to whom they may wish to transfer the benefit of this asset, under the Bill, as presently drafted, they would not be able to do that because, as the noble Lord has pointed out, gifts and assignments are only to a member of the family approved by the owner.
Even if we assume that that is extended to a testamentary disposition, it still would not mean that the occupier could leave the mobile home in his will to a person who is not a member of his family. As a result, when the executors come to realise the assets and discuss the matter with the site operator, he can point out to them that the mobile home is worth absolutely nothing at all unless it is on the site. Of course, he then has them over a barrel because he car, charge a very large commission for agreeing to accept the person named in the will as the new occupier when he does not have to do so under the provisions of the Bill. It will be a source of immense profit to the site operator to be able to impose that type of condition on testamentary dispositions unless we have something like this amendment written into the Bill.
Lord Bellwin: Let me say at once that I applaud unreservedly the vigour with which the noble Baroness pressed the virtues of home ownership. I sincerely hope, as one who spoke not without some passion on this whole subject at the time we dealt with the Housing Bill which gave the right to buy, that the noble Baroness will use equal eloquence to persuade her colleages in another place to withdraw their intentions, so expressed, of taking away from tenants of council houses the right to buy and that they, too, should have the right to have all the inheritance—virtues which the noble Baroness so properly proclaims and to which I too, adhere.
I am aware that the relatively narrow provisions in the 1975 Act have caused some concern, unlike the earlier point that I was making when I said that one reason for not moving away from certain parts of that Act was that they had not been shown to have been working disadvantageously. In this case the noble Baroness is quite right when she says that there has been some concern about the application of that Act. But if we are to consider the possibility of extending the 1975 Act provisions which the Bill adopts, it must be on a narrower basis than the amendment.
Let us consider the effect of the amendment. It will enable an occupier to leave his mobile home, his agreement and all the benefits that went with them to anyone he chooses. His heir would be entitled not only to sell the mobile home on site and recoup its value in that way, but also to live in it and enjoy the full security which an agreement under the Bill will provide. There would be no way in which the site owner could influence the use which the heir made of the home.
I hope that your Lordships will forgive me if I quote again the example I used in an earlier amendment. On that occasion we were considering the right of a site

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owner to withhold approval from the sale or gift of a mobile home. I quoted the case of a site occupied entirely by retired people on which one occupier sold his home to a young couple with children. I made the point that the other occupiers of the site would be forced to put up with the resulting disturbance until the site owner could enforce his right to withhold approval in court.
This amendment will have an even more serious effect than the last one. A retired person on the site quoted in my example could leave his home to a young couple and there would be nothing that the site owner could do about it. There is no question here of whether the site owner's approval was considered reasonable or not: it would not be needed. I think that both the site owner and the other occupiers of the site, who perhaps chose it precisely because it was only for retired people, would be very well justified in complaining that their lives had been unfairly disturbed. This amendment will provide the only point in the Bill which will enable a new occupier to come on to a site without the site owner having any say at all in whether he will fit in.
Having said that, I think I am bound to say that the issue of inheritance is one on which we would not want to rule out the possibility of considering some change in the Bill's provisions. I have explained why I think the amendment goes too far and could lead to problems. However, if the noble Baroness feels able to withdraw her amendment, I think that I have said enough to indicate to her that I am sympathetic certainly to the philosophy of what she says. Indeed, that goes without saying and I hope that she would not expect otherwise from me. I give her that assurance and perhaps, in the light of that, she may feel able not to press the amendment.
Baroness Fisher of Rednal: I thank the noble Minister—it must have been the way in which I smiled at him! I readily withdraw the amendment on the undertaking that he has just given. Perhaps it will be possible for us to talk about another amendment or I could leave it to the Minister to bring forth an amendment at the Report stage. I am heartened by what he said so long as we achieve the principle in which our amendment is enunciated. I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.
Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.
The Deputy Chairman of Committees, (Lord Nugent of Guildford): The next amendment is Amendment No. 32 followed by Amendment No. 33. The noble Lord, Lord Campbell of Croy, is not in his place and so we pass to Amendment No. 34.
[Amendments Nos. 32 and 33 not moved.]
Lord Bishopston Lord Bishopston moved Amendment No. 34:
Page 7, line 9, at end insert—
("Service charges
11.—(1) If the occupier requests the owner in writing to supply him with a written summary of the costs incurred by the owner in respect of services available on the protected site in the relevant period defined in sub-paragraph (4) below, the owner shall do so within six months of the end of the period or within one month of the request, whichever is the later.
(2) The summary shall set out these costs in a way showing how they are or will be reflected in the sums payable by the occupier and must be certified by a qualified accountant as in his opinion a fair summary complying with this requirement and as being sufficiently supported by accounts, receipts, and other documents which have been produced to him.
(3) The occupier may require the owner in writing to afford him facilities for inspecting the accounts, receipts, and other documents supporting the summary and for taking copies or extracts from them and the owner should then make reasonable facilities available to the occupier.
(4) The relevant period mentioned in sub-paragraph (1) above is—

(a) if the relevant accounts are made up for periods of 12 months, the last such period ending not later than the date of the request; and

(b) if none are made up for such a period, the period of 12 months ending with the request.

(5) In this paragraph "qualified accountant" has the same meaning as in Schedule 19 to the Housing Act 1980.")
The noble Lord said: I beg to move Amendment No. 34. This amendment concerns service charges and it aims to help the occupier to get more information or, indeed, accurate information about service costs. There has been some mention today of the charges which can be levied on mobile home residents. We believe that it would be in the interests of the residents and of the site owners if there were written information as required in the amendment. After all, the amendment says;
"If the occupier requests the owner in writing to supply him with a written summary of the costs incurred by the owner in respect of services available on the protected site in the relevant period",
and so forth, it shall be provided. It goes on:
"The summary shall set out these costs in a way showing how they are or will be reflected in the sums payable by the occupier and must be certified by a qualified accountant",
and so on, Surely that information is something which all people concerned in the transaction should have. It is rather interesting that there is no requirement on the site owner to publish any accounts in the light of the charges which he seeks to impose upon the occupiers.
The amendment gives the occupier the right to information on service charges and the information may be needed by the court or, indeed, by an arbitrator—a matter which we have debated this afternoon. In many places if the site owner is a good owner he will be giving this information; if he is otherwise, then surely the mobile home residents have a right to the information?
I draw the attention of the Minister to paragraph 8.1.7 of the Department of the Environment report, which concluded:
"In addition, residents should have a right to certain information about the costs of services analogous to those already enjoyed by private tenants and leaseholders".
Therefore, I believe that the amendment provides for a written summary of costs, certified by an accountant, supported by receipts and so forth. This should be willingly given by any good site owner.
I should like to turn to another point which is not directly associated with that but which is involved. This matter may come within the preview or the consultation that the Minister has in mind. He mentioned earlier the new consultation which he is having with all those concerned; I believe he mentioned it in relation to commission. How many bodies have already been consulted and what action has already been taken? I understand that Shelter have

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not automatically been consulted and they had asked to be able to make submissions. I believe that other bodies, such as the National Consumer Council, have not yet been requested for their views. This is purely a question of information which may help all those concerned with this legislation. With those comments, I beg to move.
Lord Avebury: In the course of his reply, I wonder whether the Minister could remind the Committee of the point we had reached as regards the matter of electricity charges, which used to be a very difficult area to resolve when there was a supply of electricity to a site that was metered at a single point and not separately to the individual mobile homes? I know that the area electricity boards were very keen that every mobile home should be separately metered and then, of course, no difficulty would arise. But the problem of apportioning supplies that were received from a common source was a very difficult one to sort out and in many cases led people to think that they had been unfairly overcharged, and in some cases it was possible to prove it. Although the electricity boards were always quite ready to entertain representations from people living in mobile homes that their charges were excessive and to look into the matter, site operators were never happy about electricity officials coming on to the site, measuring the amount that was being consumed by particular residents and seeing whether or not the charges were fair. Therefore, I think that notification to the residents of that particular charge, to the extent that sites are still commonly metered, would be a very helpful way of ensuring that the charges are properly apportioned as between individual residents.
Baroness Ewart-Biggs: I should like to make one very general point to the Minister. Would he not agree in principle that, on the assumption that mobile homes are being used and will continue to be used more and more as permanent homes, the rights of these home-dwellers should in every possible way—and this amendment is a typical example—be brought into line with those of people who have lived and continue to live in ordinary houses? This is an important point which underlies so many of the amendments.
Lord Bellwin: On the latter point, I do not know whether or not more people will tend to use mobile homes. They may indeed. The likelihood is that they will. As to whether it will be other than at the margin in relation to the totality of housing, I should think probably not. If the noble Baroness is right in her assumption, all the more reason we should make sure that we have a Bill like this, that it is the best Bill we can get, and that we do the best we can. I do not think that there is any difference between us on that.
On the point made by the noble Lord, Lord Bishopston, about consultation, so far we have sent copies to the representatives of site operators, to the Mobile Homes Residents' Association and to any other bodies that have asked for it. We will willingly send copies to anyone. Of course, we will willingly pick up the cases to which the noble Lord referred, now that he has mentioned them. It would perhaps be useful for me to
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repeat on the record that if anyone has not had a copy—and I shall check to make sure that we have covered all who we think ought to be included—we shall gladly send him one.
Lord Avebury: I did ask the department and they said that the consultation letter was not available. If it is now available, may we have copies?
Lord Bellwin: There is absolutely no reason why anyone should not have a consultation paper. There can be nothing secret about a consultation paper. Why not? I shall gladly undertake to see that this is so.
Lord Bishopston: I thank the Minister for his comments on that and I anticipate that he will automatically be in touch with many organisations and individuals who may have made earlier submissions on his previous documents.
Lord Bellwin: If anyone has made submissions and has not had a copy, of course, we shall send him one. We would not want to start trying to discover anyone who we thought might be given one or ought to have one. But those who want one clearly should know. I certainly undertake to do that.
Turning to the amendment, I think that we must be very careful here—this is the last amendment of this Committee stage and I have said it on several of the earlier amendments—not to draw false comparisons between the position of mobile home occupiers and tenants of flats. They are two very different sets of circumstances. Schedule 19 to the 1980 Act gives flat tenants the right to information about the costs incurred when they pay variable service charges which will often be separate from the rent, and that is right. But mobile home occupiers are in a very different position. They do not normally pay one sum for rent and another sum for service charges. They normally pay pitch fees, which include both rent for their mobile home site and service charges and which are not directly related to increases in costs. No matter how much information they were given, it would not be of any use in challenging the level of pitch fees unless the agreement itself tied the level of increases to increasing costs.
The Bill does not prevent an occupier from seeking more information about the charges he is asked to pay. If he considers that the agreement offered to him contains too little information about the yearly review of sums payable by him or the provision of services available on the site, there is nothing to prevent the occupier from challenging that agreement. The Bill already provides in Part II of the Schedule that agreements must make provision on these matters. We do not think that it is justified or, frankly, practical, or even necessary to go further.
I shall conclude on the point of electricity charges which the noble Lord, Lord Avebury, raised. It depends on what the agreement provides for. If what is contained in the agreement as regards charges of any kind does not seem reasonable, then the occupier should challenge it at that stage. It seems to me that that is the answer to that particular problem. If the noble Lord would like us to go further on the point, of course I shall do so.
Lord Davies of Leek: This is a tangential point. I apologise for being late, but as a result of battling with fog and human beings in cars I have found it rather difficult to get here. However, I am delighted that I am here at this point. Fairness to the owner of the land and fairness to the people living in mobile homes comes into account when we are dealing with water services. The Severn-Trent Water Authority Bill is before this House and deals with water services. They want their committee meetings to be held in secret, with no press allowed. The inhabitants of mobile homes in country areas and the inhabitants of cottages in country areas often find that they pay as much for water services as people pay in the metropolitan areas and in the towns. Something should be done to get a relative payment of charges which is in ratio with the supplies to those areas. The noble Lord is a wise Minister. Does he take my point? I think he does. I could make out a long argument on this, which could go on for minutes, but I think that I have spiked down the point. Will he bear this in mind, because it is important to the rural areas of Britain and to the seaside towns where mobile homes are situated?
Lord Bellwin: I can only say that the noble Lord got here just in time. The last sentence of the last amendment of this Committee stage, and he just made it. It is always a pleasure to hear him anyway. I think I have the point he makes about the water. I do not think that it is relevant to this Bill at all, but I promise him—and he knows that if I say it, I will do it—that I shall talk to colleagues and, if it is felt in any way that there is some merit in bringing it forward, then of course I will. I truly do not think that there is, but he knows that I will do that.
Lord Bishopston: If my noble friend had been here a little earlier I am not sure that he would have been so keen on giving the compliments to the Minister that he has. However, this is the last amendment. The reason for moving this amendment, among others, was, as the Minister knows, that there is controversy where you have, say, metered services as to how much should be paid for gas, electricity, and so on. He knows that charges for electricity often spark off controversy, and this kind of amendment would help to eliminate that. The Minister has been forthcoming on this, and I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.
Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.
Schedule 1 agreed to.
House resumed: Bill reported with the amendments.

Abortion (Amendment) Bill [H.L.]
6.2 p.m.
Lord Robertson of Oakridge: My Lords, I beg to move that the Bill be now read a second time. What a happy coincidence it is that this is the day of St. Nicholas, or Santa Claus, the patron saint of children, for this is a Bill about children. In this connection. I should like straight away to clear up a misconception. It is claimed by some that the only issue at stake is the right of freedom of choice of women to control their own fertility. This claim is based on a serious error.
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Nothing in the 1967 Act or anywhere else in the law gives a woman such a right, and therefore the Bill cannot diminish the right which does not exist. I cannot emphasise too strongly that the issue at stake is this: under what circumstances should it be lawful to deprive an unborn baby of life?
Now I should like to go into the background. First, let me cover the legal background. There are three Acts which are relevant to the present situation: the Offences Against the Person Act 1861; the Infant Life (Preservation) Act 1929; the Abortion Act 1967. The present Act which makes abortion prima facie illegal is that of 1861. The 1929 Act made it an offence—the offence of child destruction—to kill a child capable of being born alive, and gave as prima facie proof of the capacity for live birth 28 weeks. The Abortion Act 1967 does not alter these two statutes. What it does do is to exempt a doctor from culpability under the 1861 Act if two doctors hold the opinion in good faith that the balance of risk favours an abortion.
To quote the 1976 Act, they must agree:
"that the continuance of the pregnancy would involve risk to the life of the pregnant woman, or of injury to the physical or mental health of the pregnant woman or any existing children of her family, greater than if the pregnancy were terminated".
There is also the provision in respect of a risk of a handicapped child, with which my Bill is not concerned. It is fair to say that when Parliament passed the 1967 Act it intended to legalise abortions on medical grounds, physical or psychological, but not to provide, in the words of the sponsor of the law in this House, Lord Silkin, "a general licence to a medical practitioner to carry out an abortion on anybody who desires it". That comes from the Official Report of 19th July 1967 at column 163. If Parliament had intended to legalise abortion on request, the Act would have said so.
Unfortunately, from the outset the abortion law proved to be open to widely and grossly different interpretations. It cannot be disputed that considerable numbers of doctors used the Act as a basis for granting abortion on demand, and no action is being taken to stop them. Doctors promoting such a policy justify their actions by the so-called statistical argument which claims that the statistics show that the risk to the life of the pregnant woman is smaller if the pregnancy is terminated in the early months than if it is allowed to continue. Incidentally, this argument is probably fallacious, as it fails to compare like with like. My Bill in any case would make the argument irrelevant.
In terms of numbers, the result has been a holocaust. For example, in 1981 in England and Wales the total number of abortions, including non-residents, was 162,454. Indeed, on present trends, the number of abortions in the United Kingdom since the Act came into force in 1968 will pass the two million mark by next March. Put another way, the number of abortions in England and Wales is at the rate of one baby aborted every three minutes, day and night, seven days a week. This state of affairs has caused persistent concern—not least in Parliament. Following two attempts in the other place to tighten the law, the Lane Committee was set up and reported in 1974. From evidence that it received, it admitted that abortion on demand was being practised, but stated that this could be curbed by

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departmental action. It has not been curbed. Three further major attempts in the other place to tighten the law on abortion were agreed in principle at Second Reading by substantial majorities but failed because of the lack of time and the difficulties of getting a Private Member's Bill through Parliament.
Now to the Bill itself. It proposes that the risk of continuing the pregnancy to the mother or existing children must be a "serious" one, and that it must be "substantially" greater than the risk of having an abortion. This would of course not disallow abortion on genuine medical grounds of substance, but it would rule out abortion for trivial reasons or abortion on request.
It has been claimed that the words "serious" and "substantial" are difficult to define. Legal advice that I have been given is that, although it may be difficult to frame a definition for general application, it would be a simple matter for courts to apply the words in particular cases. It is relevant to note what the Solicitor-General said in the other place on 4th December 1979, in Standing Committee C at columns 350 to 352 of the Official Report, when Mr. John Corrie's Bill was being considered. This Bill contained the words "serious" and "substantially".
The Solicitor-General drew attention to a certain flexibility in the words, but said that this was not necessarily a disadvantage. A court would assume that Parliament intended a test more stringent than 1967, but less so than 1929. He further said that without the word "substantial" the test of "greater risk of continuing the pregnancy than terminating it" amounted to a very slight test. The introduction of the word "substantially" would make the test more stringent and more than a merely statistical evaluation. In passing, I would say, my Lords, that you will surely have noted that the words "serious" and "substantial" already appear in the 1967 Act in Section 1(1)(b), which deals with the risk of a handicapped child being born. If they perform a useful function there, why should they not be inserted here?
I turn to the effect of the Bill on those concerned; first, doctors and nurses. It will no doubt be pointed out to me that the BMA and other representative bodies of the medical profession do not at present appear to share the concerns that have been expressed about the workings of the 1967 Act. However, in their current handbook on medical ethics, published in 1980, the BMA describes as a "problem" the fact that the Abortion Act can be interpreted as allowing abortion on request. Well might it have been considered a problem when interpretations of the law by doctors are so widely different as to amount to virtual anarchy. Is it not the case that because of the vague wording of the 1967 Act, doctors find themselves under great pressure to make decisions which are primarily, and sometimes exclusively, decisions based on social factors? Doctors now find themselves having, in their words, to "play God" in many cases. More than one doctor has told me that it would be a great relief to him if the law were amended as proposed in the Bill.
I would also mention those doctors and nurses who, on religious or ethical grounds, are reluctant to become involved in abortions without serious medical justification. Despite the let-out in Section 4 of the
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1967 Act, such people have either to condition themselves to do that which their conscience opposes or to get out of gynaecology altogether.
Next, I deal with the pressures on women. Those who oppose the Bill will, no doubt, lay much stress on the danger that women refused abortions will resort to back-street or criminal abortions. That is, of course, a factor to be taken seriously, but it must not be exaggerated or even accepted without question. Records show that deaths to women resulting from abortions have indeed gone down since 1967, but this is only part of a trend which started long before then and largely results from advances in medical science and antibiotics. There is no direct evidence that a reduction in legal abortions would be accompanied by an increase in maternal deaths because of abortion. Indeed, in certain Iron Curtain countries—Bulgaria, Poland and Hungary—where abortion laws were tightened in 1973–74 after a period of abortion on demand, such deaths are now the lowest in their history.
But there are other kinds of pressures on women, as letters I have received have shown to me. It must surely be obvious that women today are treated by men in a more cavalier way than ever before. It is more difficult for a woman to say "No" to the sexual act than it used to be, not least because abortion is held up as an extension of contraceptive measures. When the so-called worst happens, and a pregnancy occurs, it is only too easy for the man concerned to wash his hands of the whole business and put the woman under pressure to have an abortion, regardless of the dangers to her health or of her own convictions. Such pressures come also from employers and, sadly, also sometimes from the woman's parents, who may be embarrassed if the child will be illegitimate.
One story illustrates those pressures. I have received a letter from a girl aged 15½ who a year ago was in a children's home when she discovered she was expecting a baby. She was examined by a lady doctor who said she was 16 weeks pregnant and that she would not give her an abortion. However, the head of the home was determined that the girl should have an abortion. She took her back to the hospital to see another doctor, who said he would do the abortion and gave her a week to make up her mind. Then, to quote from the letter:
"That week was hell for me. The staff were all trying to talk me into aborting my baby. They even tried bribing me. They told me that if I had an abortion, they would take me out and buy me a lot of nice clothes. One of the staff told me that my baby would probably be dead anyway. The head of the home told me that if I went through with the pregnancy and had the baby, I would never love it and it would never love me. When finally I had to go back to the hospital, the children's home packed all my stuff in a bag and handed it to me … my social worker, my sister, even my mother, were all telling me to have the abortion".
I am glad to say that the girl resisted those pressures and her baby is now a beautiful girl of eight months.
The right to life of that baby is what the controversy is all about. For that baby, life started in some form at the moment of conception. The early weeks of her existence in the womb saw the physical development of her body happen almost incredibly quickly. By 30 days her main organs were already in recognisable form and she had a heart pumping blood she had made herself. In other babies, electric brainwaves have

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been recorded as early as 40 days, and this must indicate that the mind has started to develop. In this connection, Professor Sir William Liley, generally regarded as the father of foetological medicine, has stated:
"We know the baby is responsive in utero to touch, to light, to sound and to stimuli which at least you and I would consider painful".
The evidence of the Bible is that Jesus was fully man from the moment he was conceived by the Holy Ghost, later to be born of the Virgin Mary. We also read that John the Baptist, who was,
"filled with the Holy Spirit even from his mother's womb",
reacted to the presence of the baby Jesus when they were still both in the womb. As a Christian, therefore, I must consider the unborn child as part of God's creation, made in His image, and I must therefore try to offer him or her the same love, care and protection in law as any other child. My Bill is a step in that direction.
In the Old Testament Scriptures, which Christians, Jews and Moslems all regard as authoritative, the killing of children is linked with the worship of idols. Even if not all of us would equate abortion with the killing of children, it is plain to see that society has set up idols of selfishness, convenience, expediency and irresponsibility. It is so much easier and less costly to abort a woman's pregnancy than genuinely to help her and her child, or even to help men face up to their responsibilities towards them.
That is by no means to say that I do not have strong feeling and sympathy for the doctor or social worker who has to decide the proper course of action for a woman in hard and depressing circumstances who finds herself pregnant. I wish to make it perfectly clear in this connection that the Bill would not prevent a doctor from authorising an abortion in cases of genuine trauma or depression.
But ought we not to ask ourselves what is wrong with our society that so many women find themselves in this position today? As long ago as 1972, Sir John Peel told a national conference of nurses that available evidence indicated that the Abortion Act had engendered a social atmosphere which encouraged irresponsible sexual behaviour. Current statistics show the truth of what he said. Today, the rate of illegitimacy, despite the number of abortions, is the highest since records were kept.
Of course, it is not only the 1967 Act which has fostered an irresponsible attitude to sex. Apart from some sections of the media, especially some teenage magazines, there are also highly irresponsible books recommended for schools study by the Health Education Council itself, some of which apear to me to say that in sexual matters anything goes provided you enjoy it, and abortion is always there as a long-stop.
My other reason for sympathy with doctors and social workers in these cases is the lack of facilities on offer to support those women who decide to go ahead with pregnancy. Apart from the social services and adoption agencies, such organisations as Well-Care, LIFE, Let-Live and Lifeline, of which I am a patron, make a valuable contribution in this field, but their resources are limited. Therefore, I can well understand
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that the doctor may feel that there is no course open to him other than either to authorise a termination or to condemn the woman to battle on unsupported in distressing circumstances.
But there is another course. Let me illustrate it by quoting a case that is right up to date. There is a girl aged 17, who recently found herself pregnant. Her family were hostile, and the boy friend was uninterested. A social worker put her onto Well-Care, whose representative got in touch with LIFE. Her immediate needs were somewhere to live and general support. She was offered temporary accommodation in the home of a family. Before the birth she will go to a mother and baby home until six weeks after the birth. She should then be able to find her own accommodation through the council, but she will continue to be given the kind of support that she would normally expect from her family.
That story seems to me to illustrate society at its most callous and society at its most caring. How we deal with this kind of case and therefore with the unborn child who is at the heart of it will sooner or later be reflected in other fields; in other words, in our treatment of the chronically ill, the handicapped, and the aged. God forbid that it should ever be acceptable in this country for any person to be killed off solely because he or she is inconvenient, or is a burden on someone else. Unfortunately that is exctly what has happened as an unintended effect of the 1967 Act, and, what is more, the same tendency is discernible in the other fields that I have mentioned. Therefore, I would call upon the Government at the very least, first to do what they can to encourage responsible attitudes to sexual and family matters, and in particular responsibility in sex education; and, secondly, to encourage and enhance the provision of services to support and care for those for whom abortion is not the answer.
Your Lordships have been very patient, and in conclusion I would say this: an eminent teacher of obstetrics has pointed out to me that before the 1967 Act the doctor considering an abortion had to weigh up the life and health of the woman against the life of the unborn baby. Since 1967 it has been a different equation. Because of the framing of the law, he has had to forecast what will happen to the woman if she continues with the pregnancy and what will happen to the woman if she terminates it. Therefore, even with the best will in the world, the fate of the baby is not a question in the forefront of the doctor's mind. The baby has therefore effectively been written out of the law. My Bill is an attempt to write it back in again. If therefore your Lordships agree that the unborn child is a member of the human community worthy of our love, care, and protection, I hope that you will support the Bill, if necessary in the Lobbies. I beg to move.
Moved, That the Bill be now read a second time.—(Lord Robertson of Oakridge.)
6.24 p.m.
Lord Houghton of Sowerby Lord Houghton of Sowerby rose to move, as an amendment to the Motion that the Bill be now read a second time, to leave out ("now") and at the end insert ("this day six months").
The noble Lord said: My Lords, I am going to submit to your Lordships that this is not a Bill that should be given further and extended consideration in this House at this time. The amendment decides no questions of principle either way. It simply defers further consideration to some future and more appropriate time and, if I may say so, to an occasion more appropriate than this one. The antecedents of the Bill have been referred to by the noble Lord in moving the Second Reading. They comprise seven attempts made in another place to amend the Abortion Act in the same, or a similar, way.
I regret to say that opponents of the 1967 Act have kept up their persistent attacks upon it right from the beginning. Scarcely four years of operation of the 1967 Act had passed before Sir Keith Joseph, then the Minister concerned, appointed a committee of investigation, to which the noble Lord referred, and it made a number of recommendations, in particular recommendations regarding administration and guidance, which were adopted. It also confirmed in some respects the provisions of the 1967 Act and in particular the criteria which were adopted in Section 1.
I am bound to say that I think that opponents of abortion in principle, whether on doctrinal, religious, or any other grounds, want to change the Act for the worse from the point of view of the women of this country, and they wish to do that by restricting the opportunities for getting abortions. When I look at the guerrilla war that has gone on in another place against the Act, I see that the first attempt was made within 18 months of the Act being put into operation. Another attempt was made in 1970, another in 1975, another in 1977, another in 1978, another in 1979, and the most recent one was in 1980.
I think that after the gruelling experiences they went through on all those Bills Members of another place have concluded that no Bill to change the 1967 Act will pass through this Parliament. I believe that in another place a truce has now been declared, since two Members there who are strong opponents of abortion and whose names came out high in the ballot for Private Member's Bills have this time left the subject alone.
I suggest that by putting the Bill at arm's length we can over time to come consider the working of the Act by giving it closer attention. On the face of it, this is a single clause Bill, deceptively short, alluring in its simplicity, proposing only two additional words to be inserted before two existing words. But, apart from what in my opinion are the demerits of the Bill itself, to go on with it would open up a veritable hornets' nest. The noble Lord did not draw the attention of your Lordships to the fact that, under the Long Title of his Bill, the whole of Section 1 of the Act is open to amendment. That opens up a prospect of formidable proportions. In connection with one Bill in another place, 80 amendments to Section 1 were proposed.
I think that I ought to mention that the Labour Party has on abortion a policy diametrically opposed to the doctrine of the noble Lord who is proposing the Bill, and if the Bill goes into Committee, one must expect concerted action by my noble friends on this side of the House, as ever, to implement party policy—
The Earl of Longford: My Lords, may I interrupt the noble Lord? I was given to understand that this would be a free vote. This idea of concerted policy is new to me and rather unattractive.
Lord Houghton of Sowerby: My Lords, I am not in a position to say whether my noble friend can have a free vote, or what he should have. All I am doing is reporting to the House the policy that was adopted by the conference of the Labour Party as recently as last October. Whether that becomes a matter of discipline upon members of the party is another matter. I am merely saying that there will be opportunities to open up the whole of Section 1 if this Bill goes into Committee, and I think that prospect is not one—
Lord Somers: My Lords, may I interrupt the noble Lord for a moment? I hardly think that such a Bill as this is a party matter, or even that party politics should be referred to.
Lord Houghton of Sowerby: My Lords, I will try to get on because I have a few remarks to make.
Lord Mishcon: My Lords, I must interrupt the noble Lord, if he will allow me to do so. May I say from these Benches that whichever way we vote it will not be on the basis of any matter of party policy. It will be a question of our individual consciences.
Lord Houghton of Sowerby: My Lords, I am not in a position to confirm or deny that at all. I am merely reporting what is a matter of public knowledge and what is in the hands of all noble Lords on both sides of the House, and that is the declaration of policy made at the Labour Party Conference last October—and there can be no doubt at all that it runs firmly counter to the proposal which has been made by the noble Lord who has moved the Second Reading of this Bill. I will not read it out, but it is there on the record as to what the policy document said and what the Labour Party Conference approved.
I merely submit to your Lordships that there are parliamentary considerations about this Bill which I think cannot be ignored. I know that there is no constitutional question involved, but I think that if we are to go through a gruelling period on this Bill we want to be satisfied that it will do some good. I would submit to your Lordships that although it might be an academic parliamentary exercise, this Bill really has not got the value that it should have from a legislative point of view to justify the work and strain that would be involved.
Now I come to the Bill itself. The noble Lord referred to the British Medical Association, which he consulted, quite rightly—and so did I. But the British Medical Association have drawn my attention, at any rate, to the resolution passed by their representative body in 1978, which said:
"This meeting deplores the persistent attacks on the 1967 Abortion Act and reaffirms its belief that it is a practical and humane piece of legislation".
They also say, in a letter to me dated 1st December:
"If this Bill is passed it will put the clock back and do untold physical and emotional harm to many poor women who will again seek help from back-street abortionists".
That is the opinion of this most responsible and notable representative body of the medical profession,

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and I think that that prospect must deter us from proceeding along the lines which are proposed.
The noble Lord made some play with the suggestion that abortion is obtainable on demand, and a great deal of loose talk is very often heard about abortion on demand. My Lords, there is no such thing as abortion on demand. Those who have to carry out this unhappy task are not under any command by their patients. They may have a request, but they are not bound to accede to it. The doctors have their own responsibility, and they have to exercise their own judgment. They have to be accountable to themselves, to their profession, to the department and to their patients.
In this connection I would say that very little evidence is available, from investigations that have been made, that abortions are obtainable on demand. Sometimes the variations in the numbers of abortions in particular areas are used as prima facie evidence of variations in standard; and it is sometimes suggested that where abortions appear to be more freely available than in other areas, that is due to the greater liberality of the professional consultants in that particular area. There is, of course, evidence on the other side. There is evidence of great difficulty in obtaining abortions in particular areas due to the outlook and policy of the gynaecologist consultants and other members of the profession who have the responsibility. So before we accept general statements about the availability of abortion on demand we should seek much closer investigation of what actually happens in the field.
There are variations—considerable variations in some areas—but when one looks at what they are, where they are and who is where they are, one sees that there is frequently a pretty good explanation of why some people find it a great deal more difficult to get abortions in some areas than in others; and the number of abortions on the National Health Service varies considerably from area to area. What I am saying is that it would be a mistake to proceed with this Bill and to go through the mill of further stages without the additional evidence which I think should be available before any major review of the 1967 Act is undertaken.
I want to say in conclusion that this is not a purely marginal measure. What the noble Lord is proposing would make a very big difference indeed, or could make a very big difference, to the number of abortions and to the availability of abortion in different areas. The Minister, Dr. Gerard Vaughan, told the Members of another place on 13th July 1979 that about 85 per cent. of all abortions certified for women resident in the United Kingdom were on the basis of the criteria that this Bill proposes to amend. He therefore advised the House that it would affect potentially a large proportion of the women who now obtain abortions; and he warned that we must not delude ourselves in thinking that it would be altering the situation for a small number of women. It could alter the situation for a large number of women; and he warned that we have to go very carefully before we change the criteria. So this is not a small measure, or even a moderate one, and we have to consider what the full impact of it would be.
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The British Medical Association tell me quite definitely that they believe the underlying motive of this Bill is to frighten the doctors and to make them more reluctant to certify abortion; possibly to remove one doubt and substitute another; and generally to feel less certain of their ground, less certain that they have the legal power to exercise their discretion and their clinical judgment in particular cases. They would have to have at their side definitions of what "greater risk" meant, of what "serious risk" meant or of what "substantially greater" meant.
Incidentally, and in this connection, in the other place the Minister recommended that the word "serious" should not appear in this subsection, although the word "substantially" should. In the end, no compromise was possible and, as the noble Lord has said, the Bill ran out of time. But this Bill proposes to reopen the compromise which was reached in October 1967 in this House. I would say this very seriously: no change in the abortion law in future will be possible without some large measure of compromise. We cannot go on fighting the abortion issue indefinitely; we must get some basis on which there is a consensus and a general acceptance of what should be done. The compromise reached in October 1967 in this Chamber succeeded in enabling that Bill in 1967 to go back to another place for approval—and it did so approve. The compromise passed in this House without a Division and it passed in the other place without a Division. Now the noble Lord is proposing that we should reopen all that and start all over again.
My Lords, we do not proceed in this House by controversy so much as by compromise and there will be no compromise on the Bill that is before the House today. That is a clear statement of my attitude towards it. We should have to work in the further stages of the Bill to change it or to defeat it or to replace it by something else. There was an attempt made in another place on one occasion to redraft the whole of Section 1. That might be the only way, indeed, by which we could reach any accommodation in this House in future. This is hornets' nest. What is a moderate proposal, superficially, goes deep down into the whole issue of abortion with its principles, its doctrines, its convictions and its emotions—all of which are involved; and we have heard a great deal about that already.
What I am submitting to your Lordships is that, without committing ourselves one way or the other on what the noble Lord has said or upon the principles involved in what he has said, we feel that this is not the time to embark upon a major review of the 1967 Act because that is what will confront us if this Bill goes forward. This section, Section 1, which is open to amendment under the Bill, is 90 per cent. of the controversial part of the Act of 1967.I submit to your Lordships with great respect that no good purpose would be served by embarking upon this course and that, moreover, we should be unwise to do so without a great deal more evidence based on more recent investigations, hearing what is actually happening and listening to recommendations as to what should be done in the future. I beg to move the amendment standing in my name.
Moved, as an amendment to the Motion that the Bill be now read a second time, to leave out ("now")

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and at the end insert ("this day six months").—(Lord Houghton of Sowerby.)
6.44 p.m.
The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State, Department of Health and Social Security (Lord Trefgarne): My Lords, the noble Lord, Lord Houghton of Sowerby, has described the various parliamentary exercises that have been conducted on this matter in recent years. It is, nonetheless, nigh on 15 years since your Lordships yourselves considered this matter in any detail. We should be grateful therefore to the noble Lord, Lord Robertson of Oakridge, for bringing forward this Bill today. This subject is one on which widely differing views are profoundly and respectably held. There will, I am certain, be no unanimity among your Lordships tonight. The proposal on which your Lordships have to make up your minds is not the very principle upon which the 1967 Act is founded but, rather, the more limited suggestion that the criteria laid down in the Act be amended by the addition of certain words, thus making it more difficult to obtain an abortion.
Let me say at the outset that the Government have no views as to whether or not this is desirable. Successive Administrations have regarded it as something on which noble Lords and Members of another place must be free to vote according to the dictates of their consciences. There will be no departure from this practice today. What I say is not, therefore, intended to influence the consciences of your Lordships; what I shall try to do is assist your Lordships by drawing attention to salient facts and figures.
In 1969, the first full year in which the Abortion Act was in operation, around 50,000 women resident in England and Wales and nearly 4,000 in Scotland had their pregnancies terminated. After a rapid increase in the early 1970s the number levelled out at around 110,000 per year, plus a further 7,000 a year in Scotland. However, the trend over the past two or three years has again been upwards, with provisional figures for 1981 indicating nearly 139,000 abortions to women resident in England, Wales and Scotland. By contrast, the number of terminations carried out on non-residents—most, no doubt, coming here for the purpose—has declined over the same period and now stands at around 30,000 per annum. The great majority of abortions (about 99 per cent.), are carried out under Section 1(1)(a) of the Act; and it is this provision which the Bill before us today seeks to amend.
The Secretaries of State for Social Services, for Scotland and for Wales all have a responsibility for the operation of the Abortion Act. All terminations carried out under the Act have to be notified to the chief medical officers for England, Scotland and Wales respectively, and these notifications are the basis of the statistics to which I have referred. Through their involvement in the operation of the Act, the health departments take all possible steps to ensure that the law is being upheld. I think it is widely recognised that the actions successive Ministers have taken to regulate the operation of the Act in the private sector have played a major part in controlling the abuses which undoubtedly occurred in the early days of the Act. The operation of the Act continues to be closely
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monitored, and we have no evidence of a recurrence of these abuses, that women are being exploited or that their health is being put at risk.
The criteria in the Act set out the circumstances in which abortions may be allowed and represent a careful balance arrived at after prolonged and detailed debate during the passage of the legislation.
What then is the case for amendment now? In April 1974, after six years' operation of the Act, the report of the Committee on the Abortion Act under Mrs. Justice Lane recommended that the criteria be left unamended. In the 1974–75 parliamentary Session, the Select Committee on Abortion again made no recommendation for change, although there were those among its witnesses and, no doubt, among its members, too, who pressed the case for some amendment. Several attempts have been made in another place to introduce amendments to the criteria, but none has succeeded. Indeed, I have to tell your Lordships that members of the medical profession most closely involved have set their faces against any amendment of the Act. The British Medical Association have affirmed this and I should like to quote to your Lordships that affirmation—and this is a different observation from the one quoted by the noble Lord, Lord Houghton of Sowerby:
"It is the British Medical Association's view that the 1967 Act is a good and sensible piece of legislation that is capable of being operated satisfactorily. It should not be modified or amended. Termination of pregnancy is always less desirable than effective family planning".
Should your Lordships seek additional assurance from a professional quarter there could perhaps be no more distinguished body of opinion than the Royal College of Obstetricians and Gynaecologists. With your Lordships' permission, I shall again quote direct from the statement of views that today they have made available to me:
"The College considers that the grounds for abortion in the 1967 Act have provided a reasonable working basis allowing doctors and their patients a framework for differing views. We consider that the duty to distinguish degrees of risk more strictly as required by this Bill, would greatly increase the difficulties faced by doctors in recommending and carrying out abortion".
I am, however, aware of the criticisms often made of the Abortion Act from other quarters. For example, it has been claimed that it has resulted in abortion for the flimsiest of reasons unrelated to health and thus, in practice, goes far beyond Parliament's original intentions.
That claim is based on two misunderstandings. The first is that, as Section 1(2) of the Act allows the pregnant woman's actual or foreseeable environment to be taken into account in assessing her need for an abortion, social factors alone can provide the necessary grounds. The second misunderstanding is that, since statistics show that, in this country, there is less risk to the woman's life from an abortion than from childbirth, any pregnant woman may automatically obtain an abortion under the main criteria in the Act. But the fact of the matter is that although the Act does allow for social factors to be taken into account it does not allow for abortion on these grounds alone. So far as the statistics are concerned, the law requires medical practitioners to weigh the risks in respect of each individual woman and not for women generally.

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As I understand it, Lord Robertson of Oakridge's aims are to reassert what, in his view, were the original intentions of Parliament and to ensure that abortion cannot be obtained for trivial reasons unrelated to the woman's present or future physical or mental health. It is not clear that the Bill, as drafted, will have the effect the noble Lord intends. However, if, after listening to this debate, noble Lords are in favour of the principle on which the Bill is based, close attention can no doubt be given to the precise wording at any later stage.
I hope your Lordships will have found these observations helpful in your consideration of this very important issue. For the reasons I have stated, the Government regard it as a matter on which individual noble Lords must vote in accordance with their personal views. Having said that, I have to tell your Lordships that the Government will not be able to find time for consideration of this Bill in another place. Although my own views can in no sense be held to reflect those of my ministerial colleagues, I can say that, for my part, I shall vote in favour of the amendment proposed by the noble Lord, Lord Houghton, and hence against the Bill.
6.53 p.m.
Baroness Jeger: My Lords, I should like to start by saying that of course it is perfectly within the right of the noble Lord, Lord Robertson, to bring his anxieties about the abortion legislation before your Lordships. I think we should all accept and welcome the fact that he has found it possible to bring his anxieties before the House tonight.
I welcome this debate and I should like to make it absolutely clear that on this side of the House we have a free vote; but in case there is any difficulty—and this was referred to earlier—I must remind your Lordships, and especially my noble friends, that the Labour Party is on record as seeking to defend the 1967 Abortion Act from restrictive amendment. That was passed by a Labour Conference and I think that must stay with us as Labour Party policy; but in every case we accept the right of our friends to have their own conscientious objections thereto.
Going back to the 1967 Act, which many of us thought was going to be the end of this long road, I must say that when the Act was passed I hoped that was going to be a finality. I am very sorry that we are having to go back again over this Act, which has brought so much relaxation of tension and anxiety to so many women and to so many doctors. It is, in my view, a great pity that we are having to look at the subject again today.
I want to keep myself very narrowly to the Bill before us and I do not think it would be right for us to raise the religious, ethical and philosophical grounds about termination of pregnancy tonight. The noble Lord, Lord Robertson of Oakridge, has very rightly put down very narrow amendments. He wants in the first place to insert before the word "risk" in the 1967 Act the word "serious". I think this is too important an issue to be reduced to semantics; but because today's Bill is about words, we must examine the words. The 1967 Act allows termination, and I quote:
"where the continuance of the pregnancy would involve risk".
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I looked up the Shorter Oxford Dictionary, and it defines "risk" as follows:
"Hazard; danger; exposure to mischance or peril."
I suggest to your Lordships that this definition is clear. It does not lend itself to quantifying. If the hazard, danger or exposure to mischance or peril is there, surely that is enough, and the word "serious" does nothing to help the situation. All risks, I submit, are serious to the patient concerned and her family.
I have to ask the noble Lord: is he maintaining that it would be right for doctors to inflict a slight risk on an anxious woman? What is a slight risk? Doctors might decide that the chances of some disaster are a hundred to one. Is that slight or is it serious? If the doctors decide that a risk of one in a hundred is not serious, then I must say to your Lordships that that one woman in a hundred is to herself and to her family one hundred per cent. in trouble. You cannot work this legislation by numbers. I recall a surgeon telling me how he had been trying to persuade a patient to sign a consent form to an operation. He told the patient that of course there was an element of danger in all operations but no more than crossing Tottenham Court Road. The patient said: "But do you mean crossing Tottenham Court Road on a wet, dark, foggy night in the rush hour or on a sunny Sunday morning?" The surgeon never tried that analogy again.
That exchange illustrates the difficulty of quantifying risk. What might be a slight risk for one woman might be a serious risk for another, and who is to say among your Lordships that slight damage does not matter? This is especially so as nobody can look into the future and know what aftermath there might be in the case of a woman whose situation might not seem to be a serious risk but who later might develop consequential problems arising from a wrong decision which had been made earlier.
The problem was very clearly stated in 1967 in your Lordships' House by the then Chief Justice, Lord Justice Parker. He advised the House—and Lord Justice Parker was not parti pris on this issue—that words like "serious" or "substantial" would cause difficulties of definition in the courts. I am sure it was right that on that occasion your Lordships felt that the advice of the Lord Chief Justice should be taken. I refer your Lordships in this connection to the Official Report of 23rd October, 1967.
So far as I can gather, since the 1967 Act there have been no prosecutions under that legislation. There may have been a few prosecutions under the regulations, but I understand that no doctor has been prosecuted under the 1967 Act. That is, indeed, a change from earlier legislation, when I saw doctor after doctor being sent to prison for doing what they thought was in the interests of their patients. Therefore, the fact that there have been no prosecutions under the 1967 Act must indicate to your Lordships that this Act is working well, that doctors are assuming their responsibilities within the restrictions of the Act and that there has been no defiance of the law.
I know that there are noble Lords who would wish to widen the possibilities of legal termination under the 1967 Act. I know that other noble Lords would wish for restriction. Surely, in the traditional

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understanding of your Lordships' House, the answer must be a temperate consensus which would leave the 1967 Act as it is. I ask your Lordships tonight to let the statutes rest in peace. Meanwhile, through legislation, through the regulations and through the notifications procedure, there is ample scope to deal with difficulties. But the 1967 law should itself remain as it is on the statute book, because it is a law which combines common sense with compassion, and these are qualities which are not always to be found in combination in legislation in your Lordships' House.
I would only remind your Lordships that since 1967 10 attempts to amend the Act have been brought in, though not in your Lordships' House. This is the eleventh attempt and the first time in your Lordships' House since 1967. I would also remind your Lordships that the Lane Committee, under that very distinguished woman lawyer Lord Justice Lane in 1974, wanted the Act to remain as it was; that the Commons Select Committee, which was set up in 1975, urged that the Act of 1967 should be left alone; that the doctors are against any change, and that it is usual, when we are discussing legislation, to look to the people who have to enact it and ask them what they think about it. We now have incontrovertible evidence from the British Medical Association, from the Royal College of Obstetricians and Gynaecologists and from countless doctors up and down the country that they want the 1967 Act left alone, and it is incumbent upon your Lordships to pay attention to the views of the people who are having to deal with this Bill.
I will end by saying that we are indebted to the noble Lord for bringing this difficult subject to our attention, but we have to look at the underlying problems. I appreciate that he is concerned about the differences in the regional effects of the law—differences between one area and another. But I would say to him that the biggest difference in this area is not always between one region and another, but between whether a woman is rich or whether she is poor.
In all my years in another place and here, we have never had a debate on the subject of abortion which has questioned the right of rich women to get abortions when and where they want them. It was only under the National Health Service that working-class women, poor women, came to us and said, "We, too, must have our right to decide these things." I submit to your Lordships that if we pass this Bill tonight we shall be putting the clock back as regards the right of poor women to get a termination of pregnancy when two doctors think they should have it, and encouraging rich women with no medical qualifications or needs to go somewhere and give enough money to get what they want. So the Labour Party must oppose any restriction of the 1967 Act, because the Bill will mean a restriction against poorer working class women.
I want to finish by saying to your Lordships that abortion is nothing which anybody wants. I resent being called, as I sometimes am, pro-abortionist, because I am not in favour of abortions. They are something of which no woman can be in favour. What I am in favour of is an extended programme of family planning facilities, and I hope that none of those facilities will be reduced by any Government rearrangement of National Health Service priorities. I
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want to see more counselling and more child care facilities, so that a young woman faced with having a baby is not forced to have an abortion because there is nobody to look after the baby, which, perhaps, she wants. These are the social factors which are absolutely fundamental.
I also want to see a great deal more sex education. When I say that, I do not mean just the sort of mechanical instruction that can come from biology lessons in schools, but education both at home and at school, which would help young people to understand the richness and, may I say, the sweetness of responsible, loving, human relationships, as distinct from the cruelty and the disasters of casual unloving encounters. These are the thoughts which I must commend to your Lordships and, for all the reasons which I have tried to put before you, I very much hope that your Lordships will support the amendment of my noble friend Lord Houghton and reject the Second Reading of the Bill, because, with all respect to the noble Lord, Lord Robertson, I hope that it will be defeated.
7.9 p.m.
The Lord Bishop of London: My Lords, I, too, wish to thank the noble Lord, Lord Robertson of Oakridge, for introducing this Bill. I am also particularly grateful to him for setting the context in which this debate is taking place. He did so in simple, clear and direct terms when he reminded us that in this country, by next March, we can anticipate that abortions will take place at the rate of one baby every three minutes. That is the context in which we debate the issue today. Casualties through other reasons attract great attention. People are deeply concerned about them. They protest and ask, can they not be reduced? The noble Lord, Lord Houghton of Sowerby, referred to it as being an academic party exercise to debate this issue in your Lordships' House. I find that very difficult to understand. How can it be an academic party exercise to debate—
Lord Houghton of Sowerby: My Lords, if the right reverend Prelate will permit me to intervene, I did not use in this connection the word "party". I said "academic exercise" but not "party''.
The Lord Bishop of London: My Lords, I accept the noble Lord's explanation. When I made a note at that point, I must have written down a word he did not say. However, I could not regard it even as an academic exercise for this House to debate whether the Bill could reduce that appalling figure. The noble Lord, Lord Houghton of Sowerby, has called for an end to what he described as "this guerrilla warfare" against the 1967 Act. I could well understand his attitude if the Act had operated as was intended, but if an Act does not operate as intended there is every reason why those who are concerned about the issues with which it deals should seek to produce amendments designed to secure that the original intention of the Act is observed as far as possible. On 22nd July 1967 Mr. David Steel in another place said that it was not the intention of the promoters of the Bill to leave a wide open door to abortion on request. That statement was repeated many times in the debate. At paragraph 603, the Lane Committee admitted that abortion on request has

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been one of the results of the Act. Other points have already been made this evening. It was stated very confidently at that time that the rate of illegitimacy would decline. That has not happened.
I maintain that sufficient problems have arisen from the implementation of the Act for there to be ample justification for those who have sought to amend it in some way or another and for our debate this evening. A point was made about the variations in the operation of the Act. I am not a lawyer. Therefore I hope that noble and learned Lords will later be able to help us. However, I should have thought that to sharpen the criterion might have the effect of securing a greater uniformity of practice. If one leaves something wide open and largely to the decision of one or two people, I maintain that one is asking for the kind of variation of policy to which the noble Lord, Lord Houghton of Sowerby, drew attention.
Before I turn to the main points which I wish to make, may I say a word by way of reply to the noble Baroness, Lady Jeger? I agree that it is difficult to quantify risk, but it has to be done in many other aspects of the law. Again, perhaps we may have guidance on that point later in the debate. It is a question of what issues are at stake. We may disagree on this point, but I would suggest to your Lordships (I do not isolate the woman; I wish to emphasise that this issue is of as much concern to men as it is to women and that it is not good enough simply to say that the answer is for the woman to say no; it is equally necessary for the man not to seek to put her in the position where she has to say no) that it may be more serious to give the impression that we take a lighthearted view of procreation by simply allowing it to be thought that the results of sexual intercourse can be pushed to one side easily and without problems.
I have touched upon some of the reasons why I believe there is a case for looking again at the working of the Act. There are one or two other reasons which I should like to suggest to your Lordships. They spring from my own pastoral experience. I believe it is right for those who seek to speak on this issue to ask themselves what counsel they would devise for these kinds of situations. Over the years since the implementation of the Act women have come to me seeking pastoral counsel. Having had an abortion, they can no longer have children. What do I say to them? Women come to me for pastoral counsel who are now suffering mentally and spiritually from the effects of abortion. I have had to counsel a fair number of medical practitioners and nurses who are facing great strains of conscience as a result of being expected to operate the Act as it stands at the moment, and I have also had to counsel those who are under pressure to adopt the minimal view of what justifies abortion. I have had couples come to see me who are under great pressure—social pressure, pressure from social workers, pressure from parents, as the noble Lord, Lord Robertson of Oakridge, indicated in the letter which he read—to have their child aborted. Some of these couples are in great agony of mind. That such pressure is exerted I do not believe can be denied. I do not for a moment believe that my experiences have been unique and are not to be found elsewhere throughout the country.
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I am pleading tonight that we should look at the Bill clearly and directly, as people who are deeply concerned not only with individuals but also with the principles which underlie our society. I believe it is a great mistake to suppose that principle and pastoral care or compassion are contrary to one another and can never be brought together. On the contrary, I believe that it is from our principles that we are enabled most effectively to exercise pastoral care and that only if we have no principles are we in no position to offer pastoral care, since we have no guidelines to direct us.
With regard to the sanctity of life, I believe that we have to deal with an attitude of society. I do not believe that the way to solve social problems is by the extinction of life. I use that phrase deliberately because, whatever else people say about the state of the foetus, they cannot deny that it is alive. Secondly, I believe we have to concern ourselves with human responsibility. Something which worries me deeply about our society today is that it reflects the words of T. S. Eliot in one of the choruses of The Rock when he speaks of how we are seeking to escape from the darkness outside and within by dreaming of a system so perfect that no one will need to be good. If we are dreaming of a system so perfect that no one will need to be good then we are, I believe, gravely undermining human dignity and human freedom.
Society is, of course, illogical about life. On the one hand we abort babies at the rate of which we have heard and, on the other, when a baby is born we do all we can, at great expense, to try to keep it alive. As a Christian, I am committed to the sanctity of human life. By the incarnation and by the fact that God took our human nature upon him, human life was given an eternal blessing. I believe that when a child is conceived—and this is a fact, of course—a new individual with a unique genetical make-up comes into being. It is unable to protect itself, and it is the duty of society to protect it. It must not be regarded as being disposable.
I will not develop the theological points I would like to make, partly because the noble Lord, Lord Robertson of Oakridge, mentioned them and partly because I wish to speak specifically about the purposes of this Bill. I want to make clear that I speak from a deeply-felt Christian conviction, which is not merely concern for an abstract piece of doctrine but because I happen to believe that the Christian truth represents the truth about human beings and society and what they are for and how they should live.
One aspect of human life is that a human being is a responsible person. I would say that the greatest gift which God gives to us is our freedom. That is why I regard it as so inimical to society if we start behaving as if people can be manipulated and be made to do what we think is right for them—as if they were wholly determined by their environment, upbringing or genetic make-up. I believe that every human person, in whatever conditions they find themselves, has that point of freedom and it is for us to foster and develop it.
I believe that this freedom is uniquely reflected in the Christian gospels. It is a fact that God chose to redeem us on the Cross in a way which leaves every

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one of us still free to choose; the Cross does not compel but only recognises our freedom—but if we respond, it then liberates us even further. I believe that when we come to an issue such as this, we have to consider society as a whole—because society can help or hinder the freedom which individuals possess. We have to think of the responsibility we have for exercising our own judgments; anything which undermines that and which appears to minimise the consequences of our actions, although at one moment it may appear somewhat harsh, is in fact the most compassionate position to adopt.
I would now like to speak particularly about the issue before us. I believe that the foetus has a right to live and to develop as a member of the human family. Therefore I see abortion and the termination of that life by the act of man as a great moral evil. It has sometimes been said that there is a great diversity of opinion within the Church of England; but I would like to say that, in using those words, I was in fact quoting from a Church of England document published in 1980. I do not believe that the right to life, as a right pertaining to persons, admits of no exceptions whatever. I never have been an absolutist in this matter, but I do believe that the right of the innocent to life admits of very few exceptions indeed. I will not seek to elaborate those exceptions, but I will say that in abortion we are faced with a choice between two evils, and we have to decide which is the lesser evil.
The Bill before us helps us to make that responsible but very difficult judgment. In a society such as ours, with advanced facilities for prenatal diagnosis and care, such stituations ought to be much more exceptional than they are. The fact is that people today turn to abortion or are encouraged to seek abortion for quite other reasons. I say "people" again because I believe that we are making a great mistake if we isolate women as if it were simply their problem. I know that they are most immediately concerned, but we men cannot escape our responsibilities for this great problem. People turn to abortion for reasons which frequently point to seriously unsatisfactory personal or family circumstances, but which cannot on that account morally justify the extreme step of abortion.
With regard to the role of the law, I fully accept that before 1967, when the present Abortion Act became law, there was much uncertainty about what the law allowed. There were great inequalities in the opportunities open to women facing a dangerous or unwelcome pregnancy. There was a desire to remedy a situation where the wealthy could purchase a safe abortion. I will endorse all that the noble Baroness, Lady Jeger, said just now; but if I may say so with respect, I do not honestly believe that it affects the issue before us today.
Baroness Jeger: Of course it does, my Lords.
The Lord Bishop of London: The criteria we are seeking to adopt are the right criteria for deciding. I agree that the criterion of rich or poor should not be one of those criteria, but it is perfectly possible to have a different criterion from that which is operating now in the National Health Service. I do not believe that we should be led astray in the way that the noble Baroness indicated just now. What we are concerned about is
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the criterion we can operate within the National Health Service, although I would entirely endorse the words of the noble Baroness about the rich and the poor.
A desire to remedy a situation where the wealthy could purchase a safe abortion while the less well-off endangered their lives seeking back-street abortions was undoubtedly a motive—a very proper and right motive—in the campaign for a statutory basis for abortion. As I have said, matters have turned out rather differently, and I believe that the working of the Act has gone far beyond a clarification of the law. In its wake have come new injustices as well as the widespread belief that in the last resort, if a woman or those around her want an abortion, she will get one. Fifteen years' experience of working the Act have not ended the controversy surrounding it. As the noble Lord, Lord Houghton of Sowerby, has indicated, they have if anything sharpened it; but that is no reason for simply trying to shut our eyes to the situation.
My following remark may surprise your Lordships, but the fact that I regard abortion as an evil—and in my judgment it is an evil—is not in itself a ground for prohibiting it in law. Only if it were to be regarded as invariably wrong to terminate a pregnancy for any reason would prohibition be justifiable, and I do not believe that abortion in all circumstances must be rejected. Because of the evil which abortion entails, however, and because of the serious threat to the high valuation of human life which unrestricted recourse to abortion represents in the long term, it is of great importance that it be made clear that, in law, induced abortion is allowable only when the life or health of the pregnant woman can without disingenuousness be diagnosed as being seriously threatened by the continuation of the pregnancy, and no less drastic remedy than its termination is available. The responsibility for carrying out the intention of the law lies, in the main, with the medical profession. The presumption that clinical judgments are made in good faith and therefore not called in question subsequently is of great value; it is something which is of great value within our society. Nevertheless, I would suggest that the enormous increase in legal abortions as a result of the 1967 Act suggests a certain slackening of the tradition of concern for the life of the unborn child, and a loss of confidence within the profession in its responsibility to distinguish between the client's wishes and her needs.
What I am now going to say may be a little strong but I believe it is justified. If respect for the medical profession in its task of caring for persons is to continue in the community, there must be evidence that the profession will keep in good repair the distinction between an authentic expression of what that task requires and a purely formal and external observance of the law. This means that the terms of the law—the present law or any modified law—must be accompanied by action within the profession to ensure that evasion of its intentions is not enabled to prosper by appeal to the principle of not questioning a practitioner's clinical judgment.
A proper concern for the law should not blind us to the fact that it has at best only a limited and indirect role in protecting the true interests of persons and of the community. The request for abortion is frequently

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a pointer to underlying personal or social problems, which cannot be dealt with by a law on abortion, however framed. It cannot solve the problems of the girl who needs to prove herself by becoming pregnant, nor those of the tired mother facing an addition to an already over-large family in poor housing. Nor can it help a society which is in turmoil in its attitude to human sexuality, free of earlier fears, but unable or unwilling to accept the commitment and creativity which sexualty essentially points to, enables and requires. We as Christians are well aware that it is quite inadequate to limit ourselves to expressions of moral disapproval, in this case of the individual woman who seeks and obtains abortion on what often we may feel are quite inadequate grounds. Our moral concern must be for the protection of human life, and it will only have and be seen to have integrity if it also finds expression in an equal concern for whatever enhances human life and equally for whatever undermines it. In other words, while we must be deeply concerned for this particular problem, we must see it within a concern for society as a whole, within which the individual must be free to develop as a person. We believe that the Church has a major task in helping our contemporaries to reach a fuller understanding of our nature as sexual beings. The Church must also stand in opposition to the restricted life-chances, poverty, inadequate housing, and so on, which continue to limit and to stunt many people's lives.
Abortion on the scale and in the context we see today calls in question the transcendent value of human life to which the Christian is committed and to which our society still in principle subscribes. We need to be concerned with it, not as an isolated example of individuals' responsibilities deserving of moral censure, but as an encroachment upon the conditions for a proper human life in our society. I believe that the situation over abortion in this country today reflects very ill on its conditions. I believe that this House has a responsibility for considering what can and should be done to remedy it. That is why I ask your Lordships to vote against the amendment, in order that you have the opportunity for considering this issue which is put before us by the Bill which is before this House.
7.35 p.m.
Lord Denning: My Lords, I have been much concerned in abortion from the legal point of view. As a trial judge, I have tried cases of illegal abortion. I have sentenced men to some years, and one woman backstairs abortionist to nine months when the mother concerned had either died or been rendered very ill. I took part in the discussions in 1965, when the late Lord Silkin introduced the first Abortion Bill. I followed the Bill through this House then, and since that Act I have been engaged in, I think, the only case which has come before the courts on the interpretation of the statute.
Before I say more, I should like to say that I will support the Second Reading of the Bill and be against the amendment which seeks to postpone it, for these reasons. Really it is not only the Christian doctrine but
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it is the doctrine of our law and our common law that the unborn child has a life of its own and a right of its own which is recognised by the law at least from the time of quickening, and the common law has always recognised that. Our great jurist, Sir William Blackstone, put it in this way:
"Life is the immediate gift of God, a right inherent by nature in every individual, and it begins in contemplation at law as soon as the infant is able to stir in its mother's womb."
Such a child was protected by the law almost to the same extent as a new-born baby. If anyone terminated the pregnancy and thus destroyed the life of the child he or she was guilty of a felony punishable by life imprisonment.
In 1939 in Bourne's case that was modified to this extent by the common law. It was a defence if the termination was necessary to save the life of the mother. If the probable consequence of not terminating was to make the mother a physical or mental wreck then it was justifiable, but that was the only circumstance in which in the common law it was justifiable to terminate the pregnancy. So the common law laid great stress on the existence in the unborn child of a life of its own and a right of its own.
Now for the 1967 Act. As I read it, it does not alter that fundamental principle, but what it does do is to define the circumstances in which pregnancy can be terminated. I would like to follow what my noble friend Lord Robertson of Oakridge said. It is not for the doctors alone to consider the balance of danger to the mother's health; it is for the law itself, following the old doctrine, to consider that there is yet another person concerned and that is the unborn child.
In the first four or five years after that Act was passed—and we have had cases about it—there had to be surgery after three months to terminate the pregnancy. Termination by the knife. Naturally, grave consideration was given to the risks involved. Since about 1972 the medical profession has had a new system: the method of induction. As we understood it from a case, what happens is that the doctor inserts a catheter or whatever it may be, and then goes off and leaves the nurse to then insert the new chemical fluid which makes the space so that the mother's muscles act differently—at all events to induce labour prematurely without the knife at all. That was the case which came before the Court of Appeal and the House of Lords in which, in the Court of Appeal, we said that that really was not termination by a registered medical practitioner. He had just given the first word. It was termination by the nurse. Many nurses, including the Royal College of Nursing, objected to it. We took that point of view, but the House of Lords said otherwise. But there it is, I am just telling your Lordships how abortion has become much more facile and easy at the hands of the medical profession.
I am sure that the whole design of the act was to put a great social responsibility on the medical profession in regard to the termination of pregnancy. It is a great social responsibility. I do not believe that it can be effectively enforced by the law. If the doctor gives his opinion honestly and in good faith, no jury will challenge it, no law will challenge it. That is why there have been no prosecutions under the Act. The responsibility is firmly placed by the law on the

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medical profession. It is the profession's responsibility. But here comes the crux: weighing the balance and telling of the risk. That word "risk" covers a multitude of chances, from the slightest to the greatest. We all know that there is a risk in continuing with pregnancy. There is a risk in terminating it. What is advocated in the Bill is intended to help the doctors, by saying that there must be a "serious" risk when weighing the balance. What is the balance between the health of the mother in terminating the pregnancy on the one hand and letting her continue the pregnancy on the other? Everyone knows that in practice there is a risk to the mental health of the mother when she has the baby. Equally, everyone knows, as the right reverend Prelate said, that an abortion often leads to much mental disturbance. The doctors have to weigh that nice balance. Surely they ought to be given some guidance to show that the "greater" balance has to be to save injury to the mother. In other words, the Act as it stands with just the word "risk" and only the word "greater" does not give enough guidance to the profession. More guidance is necessary. That is why, in practice, abortions have slipped through. I said "judicially" in the one case that we had—the Royal College of Nursing case. This has been interpreted by some medical practitioners so loosely that abortion has become virtually obtainable on demand. Whenever a woman has an unwanted pregnancy there are doctors who will say that a risk is involved to her mental health. That is what I said in my judicial capacity and which I readily reassert now. It is because there is not enough guidance given to the medical profession.
How much more valuable would be the guidance to the poor girl in the greatest decision of her life on whether to have an abortion? Surely it is much better for the doctor to be able to tell her whether there is a "serious risk" or that the balance is the "greater" one way or the other. In other words, it gives an answering argument, or a good argument of reason, for the doctor when he is speaking to the poor bewildered girl who does not know which way to turn in her predicament. She may be influenced if she is told, "If you continue the pregnancy it will involve serious risk to your life". If she is told that, she will go by it. But supposing she is told that it will involve some risk or a slight risk to her life, will that influence her? In other words, for the sake of the girl herself, or the woman, is it not right that doctors should be able to say, "I have to go by the statute. The statute tells me to consider whether it is a serious risk and whether the injury would be substantially greater"? If he can tell that woman that, he would be better guiding himself and he would be better guiding the girl in the most difficult decision that she has to make.
I agree that there have been no prosecutions. There are not likely to be. This is a matter always for the doctors to determine. If the Act is amended as suggested there will be no prosecutions because the jury and the judge will always go by the good faith of the doctor concerned.
The only thing that troubles me is the opinions of the great medical bodies such as the British Medical Association. I confess that I hesitate, but I am not sure that the answer was not given by my noble friend Lord Robertson of Oakridge when he cited the specialist
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who said, "It looks as if I am just considering the balance as far as the woman is concerned and the unborn child is left out of the equation." Surely the Bill will bring the unborn child into the scales so that its interests are given a proper place in the vital decision that has to be made on its life. Therefore, I support the Second Reading and am against the amendment.
Lord Davies of Leek: My Lords, may I ask the noble and learned Lord a question? I have listened to the important speech he has just made but, with all seriousness, how would he make a judgment where a nubile girl of 13 or 14 is concerned who knows nothing about these problems but who is nevertheless pregnant?
Lord Denning: My Lords, I would say on that difficult problem of a child of 13 or 14, that she should go by her father and mother, but if she is old enough to become pregnant she is old enough to have her own views on the matter and they ought to be given the fullest weight. As I say, let her be advised by the medical men in accordance with the proposed amendment to the Act.
7.49 p.m.
Lord McGregor of Durris: My Lords, abortion touches people's notions about life and its origins, their religious faith, their beliefs about marital and sexual relationships, their emotional experiences and their views on morality and law. In short, few subjects define so sharply the nature of a person's outlook. Accordingly, present attitudes to abortion are passionately held as matters always of conscience and often of faith. As is so often the case in the sexual area, when it comes to deriving rules or guidelines for practical behaviour different consciences reach different and frequently contradictory conclusions.
In the case of views reflecting Christian beliefs, for example, the Church of Rome and the Methodist Church each issue different practical advice to their congregations. This is true of other communions and sometimes even within the same communion. Some denounce abortion and others permit it under certain conditions. The views of each communion may convince those who adhere to that particular set of beliefs, but they are not likely to be compelling for other Christians or to those who are not. It is one thing to respect the sanctity of life, but quite another to tell people how to respect it in daily life.
On what basis, then, can the legislator act? In a plural society which attaches high importance to religious toleration and to the toleration of different social views, he cannot accept on theological or philosophical grounds alone the practical consequences of one set of beliefs. The trouble is that people equally learned, equally pious and equally well-equipped to interpret the will of God, and equally careful of the public weal, reach contradictory conclusions—that abortion on present grounds cannot be permitted, ought not to be permitted and that it can be permitted.
Thus, having weighed the views of the Churches, the legislator must look for criteria in what is most likely to promote the social good. This was examined in the

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debates surrounding the Act of 1967 and it has been tested by the 15 years' experience of the operation of that Act. The result has been that the major representative and professional medical bodies are strongly opposed to the Bill of the noble Lord, Lord Robertson. Secondly, the most recent of many public opinion polls has shown that between three-quarters and four-fifths of the population support present arrangements, and that the support is at the same level across members of all political parties. It seems, too, that more than two-thirds of lay Roman Catholics also approve the present arrangements.
I do not suggest for a moment that a majority view is to be respected merely because it is the view of the majority, but it is evidence of the attitude of those whose lives are directly affected by the legislation, of those to whom the noble Baroness, Lady Jeger, so movingly referred. But this, taken together with the overwhelming opinion of the doctors who actually care for patients, including two-thirds of the professors of obstetrics and gynaecology in Britain, adds up to an impressive support for the present legislation.
I suggest that it would require much stronger evidence than the noble Lord, Lord Robertson, has produced, to support a change in the criteria. This evidence would have to include an analysis of all the relevant statistical data, which noble Lords have not discussed—for example, the incidence of illegal abortion before 1967, without which what followed cannot be accurately assessed. It would have to include the decline in annual deaths during the last 14 years from criminal abortion. They, in fact, declined from 22 to none, and the deaths from all abortions in the same period declined from 50 to four. We would have to analyse why this experience suggests changing the criteria.
However, my main point is that there is a big majority in Britain in favour of the present consensus; a minority dislikes and wishes to change it. But in a democracy which contains groups of conflicting and conscientiously held views, there is no escape from the practice of tolerating views with which one disagrees and which may even be strongly repugnant.
The noble Baroness, Lady Jeger, asked for what she called the retention of the temperate compromise. In similar vein I should like the noble Lord, Lord Robertson, to withdraw his attempt to use legislation to compel a majority of his fellow citizens and a majority of the medical profession to accept a practice of abortion which they do not want. The majority do not wish, and will not attempt, to coerce the noble Lord, Lord Robertson, and those who share his views, to conform with what the majority approve.
A domocratic society cannot function safely without the exercise of tolerance. It is easy to be tolerant of beliefs and practices of which one is indifferent. The virtue of tolerance arises only when consciences are engaged. The consciences of the majority concerning the settlement of 1967 are as much engaged as are the consciences of the minority. I respect the views of the noble Lord, Lord Robertson. I hope that he will respect mine and will not seek to compel me by legislation to accept his. I ask the House to support the amendment.
7.56 p.m.
Lady Saltoun: My Lords, I wholeheartedly support the noble Lord, Lord Robertson of Oakridge, whose Bill this is, and I cannot agree with the noble Lord, Lord Houghton of Sowerby. This Bill does not seek to alter the existing law; it merely seeks to reword it so that its spirit is obeyed, instead of being disregarded because it is too loosely phrased.
The group of women who have the greatest number of abortions are those who have never been pregnant before and are unmarried, and mostly they have abortions for purely social reasons. Medical evidence shows that abortions, even done under the best conditions, often cause damage which can make the mother sterile or cause her to miscarry or to suffer a variety of complications in future pregnancies. I do not consider that this House is the place to go into the details of what a friend of mine calls "Women's plumbing". But the evidence is available for those who are interested. The medical conclusions are that unless there are serious contra-indications for the mother, it is safer, particularly for healthy, young women, to bear a child than to have an abortion.
There is also the matter of the psychological ill-effects, as the right reverend Prelate the Bishop of London mentioned. A study carried out in 1975–76 of young people who, in a part of London, had attempted suicide by taking an overdose of drugs, showed that 29 per cent. of the attempted suicides had had an abortion, as against 13 per cent. of the control group—over twice as many. The number of attempted suicides among teenage girls who have had abortions is nine times as high as in the population at large.
An article in an American medical journal in 1978 on the psychological consequences of abortion, reports significant psychiatric illness often as a direct result of the emotional effects, and that psychological ill effects on other members of the women's family are not rare. The authors concluded that it was the emotional effects of the abortion which were to blame and not environmental factors. In a paper called Abortion Hazards to Bear in Mind a consultant obstetrician at a large hospital in the London area said in 1979 that risks included:
"emotional trauma, regret and severe remorse, guilt and grief".
That is something which is apt to happen to people who have done something which deep down inside they felt to be wrong.
So what of the children who will be born, should this Bill succeed and the present situation (which was not, I think, the intention of the 1967 Act) be rectified? As things are, many childless couples are unable to find children to adopt and are turning, faute de mieux, to AID, surrogate motherhood, et cetera, with the often distasteful social, legal and other problems as yet unresolved, which these alternatives involve. There are plenty of homes available for unwanted babies, but few babies for the homes.
I would not, myself, be prepared to advise or encourage a girl to have an abortion for social reasons. Rather, I should encourage her to have the baby and have it adopted, both for its sake and for her own. For these reasons alone, I hope that your Lordships will give this Bill a Second Reading tonight.
8.1 p.m.
The Earl of Longford: My Lords, the case for the Bill of the noble Lord, Lord Robertson, has been put so well by the noble Lord himself, by the right reverend Prelate, by the noble and learned Lord, Lord Denning, and by the noble Lady that it may be wondered whether it is very necessary for me to add anything. But I am one of the relatively few in the House tonight who played a prominent part in the debates of 1967 which are now spoken of as though they are ancient history; in fact, I was Leader of the House of Lords at that time and I left my seat to speak against that Bill. My dear friend Lady Jeger and my esteemed friend Lord Houghton, were otherwise occupied, so they did not know what was going on here.
Baroness Jeger: My Lords, we read about it.
The Earl of Longford: My Lords, yes, but they were not here. Therefore, I must be allowed to speak on that one point with a little more authority than they can command. I must just explain that to them. There is no doubt at all in my mind, because everything that was said at that time in various discussions was not necessarily said on the Floor of the House. So, if I may say so respectfully, it is no good my noble friend Lady Jeger saying that she knows everything that was said.
At any event, we have the Bill. There is no doubt whatever that the Bill has been interpreted much more widely and in a sense much more favourably towards abortion than was officially expected at that time. There were some prophets of doom, like myself, who forecast that that would probably happen, but it was said again and again that there would be a much more restrictive interpretation than, in fact, has been the case.
About a year after that Bill was passed, after I had resigned from the Government, I, together with others, started a centre in Soho for young people with problems and at the beginning I ran it day by day with the help of a secretary. Therefore, I know the sort of problems that people were raising at that time. Certainly quite a few asked us how they could obtain an abortion, and we took the line that if they were interested in that, they must go to their doctor. Therefore, we did not give any other advice. However, I am well aware that it was assumed by young women at that time that abortion was there on demand—that was the widespread assumption—and they had a good deal of justification, as the years have proved.
I wonder what some of our pro-abortion friends—I must not call them abortionists' friends—would say about this case. A woman rang me up and said that she wanted an abortion and asked me to help her because I was running this little centre. I asked her why she wanted it and she said that she wanted to go to Austria for winter sports. She was rather desperate about it because there was only about a fortnight before the season got started. We gave her the stock answer that she must talk to her doctor. We know of a famous case outside this country; the great Billie-Jean King had an abortion in order to play at Wimbledon. Those are actual cases. Those who favour a more liberal policy on abortion must ask themselves—and they never answer questions of this sort—whether abortions in cases of this sort are justified.
Baroness Jeger: My Lords, if the noble Earl will allow me, he said that we must ask whether, in the cases that he has mentioned, abortion is justified. Because he has asked the question I must be allowed to say "no", and I hope that when he cites cases of this sort he will also bear in mind the situation of desperate, middle-aged, poor women living in slum conditions with five children in one room. Those are the sort of women about whom we care. It is very frivolous of him to put these examples before your Lordships tonight. I am sorry to interrupt in this way, but I feel very strongly that my noble friend, for whom I have great respect, is being very frivolous tonight.
The Earl of Longford: My Lords, I am sorry if my noble friend feels that way. She became very emotional when she was speaking and I realise that her emotions are deeply involved here. But she must allow me to say that I have done as much social work as she has among people as distressed as any she knows about. So, I will not be lectured by her as though she were someone who just knew about sufferers and outcasts and as though I were not aware of cases of that kind. I refuse to be lectured by her or, indeed, by anybody on that particular topic.
To return to the subject in a more harmonious spirit, not long after that, in trying to investigate the working of the Act, I went to a clinic. I asked what sort of criteria were being employed and in what circumstances they allowed abortions in this clinic. The gentleman in charge who happened to be a Persian—I have nothing against Persians; I just mention the fact that he was a Persian—said, "But you do not understand. This is an operating hotel". That is how the abortions were being dished out in the early days. The rules may or may not have been tightened up, but that was the immediate effect of the Act. You could set up a large clinic—one of the best known in London—and women were simply treated in what was an operating hotel.
I am afraid that I must refer noble Lords to the point raised by my noble friend Lord Houghton at the beginning of the debate when he attached a very profound value to that Act of 1967.I am talking now of the 1967 Act and, like the noble Viscount, Lord Barrington, I played a part in those debates and other noble Lords did not play a part because they were not here to play a part. The Act as it has been interpreted is not the Act as it was passed into law. When we ask for something, we are asking for something that in theory, on paper, the noble Lord himself is demanding—the proper administration and interpretation of that Act.
I shall not go on for more than another minute. I should like to reply to a point made by the noble Lord, Lord McGregor, who is not in his place. He made a powerful speech.
Baroness Jeger: My Lords, he does not want to listen to this rubbish.
The Earl of Longford: My Lords, I wonder whether that will go into Hansard. If so, I can only say that it is not worthy of the Leader of our Party, or even the temporary Leader. At the moment the noble Baroness seems to be in charge of the handling of this debate. At

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any rate, it is not usual for those on the Front Bench to say:
"I shall not listen to this rubbish".
It is not usual at all. The noble Baroness dishes it out but she must be ready to take a little sauce in return. I am sorry, but she must. She ought to be experienced enough to understand. I return to the point that I was about to make to the noble Lord, Lord McGregor.
Baroness Jeger: My Lords, he is the one who is not listening.
The Earl of Longford: My Lords, the noble Lord made a great point of the fact that there seem to be a majority of people in favour of the Bill as it stands. He made a great point of the fact that only the minority are against it. I pay my tribute to my noble friend Lord Houghton and to those with him who worked for many years to turn a minority into a majority in favour of this Bill. For a long time the Abortion Law Society was a tiny body which worked away and gradually converted opinion. Therefore, it would not come at all well—it was not the argument used by my noble friend Lord Houghton—from anybody who had seen opinion diverted once in favour of abortion to argue that the minority, as they are called at the moment, have no right to try to get it altered.
I am sorry if I said anything at all offensive to the noble Baroness. She cares a great deal, but other people care deeply too. I believe in the sanctity of life, which the noble Baroness did not dwell on. I agree with the right reverend Prelate the Bishop of London that the unborn child is a person, and that taking the life of the unborn child is killing.
There may, as the right reverend Prelate said, be a few cases—I said it years ago, and I say it again—where it is justified; where, just as in war, I am afraid, killing is justified by probably the majority of people in this country or in this House. But initially there must be a presumption that taking human life, killing the so-called foetus, is a denial of the sanctity of human existence. I am glad that the noble Lord, Lord Robertson, has brought this Bill forward and I shall of course support it.
Lord Monson: My Lords, before the noble Earl sits down I wonder whether he can answer one question? If the unborn child is equal in status to a child who is born, why are miscarriages not followed by funerals?
The Earl of Longford: Is that said seriously?
Lord Monson: Yes.
The Earl of Longford: My Lords, I will leave it. Well, if the noble Lord is anxious to get an answer, I think it is because it would be too painful altogether. I do not see any reason for not having a funeral, but it would be too painful an affair.
8.12 p.m.
Lord Vernon: My Lords, this is an emotive subject. It always has been and I suppose it always will be. We were subjected particularly to some cases quoted by
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the noble Lord, Lord Robertson, when he introduced this debate this afternoon of people who had perhaps received abortions in wrong circumstances and in unfortunate circumstances. I would not for a moment dispute this. All I would say to him is that it is possible to quote cases on the other side. It is very possible to quote cases where people have been refused abortions, perhaps on grounds of conscience by a doctor, perhaps on other grounds, where very unfortunate consequences ensued, and perhaps tragic consequences. However, I do not want to pursue that because it is not profitable to go into the emotive side.
The way I look at the problem is that doctors already have a huge and, in my view, unenviable task in deciding when and whether to carry out abortions. It really is ridiculous to talk about abortion on demand when not only a doctor but a consultant also has to agree to it. The objective of this Bill is to restrict the operation of the 1967 Act by introducing an element of increased uncertainty as to whether or not a doctor is justified in carrying out an abortion. We have heard from the noble Baroness, Lady Jeger, and others how difficult it would be to decide whether there is a "serious" or a "substantial" risk. We have the authority of Lord Parker in 1967 saying that in his view it would be very difficult to decide this, and it was on his advice that the Act was framed in the way that it is now framed.
I appreciate that the view of Lord Parker does not appear to be shared by the view of the noble and learned Lord, Lord Denning, who also suggested to us that he did not think that there would be any increase in the number of prosecutions of doctors or consultants if Lord Robertson's Bill became law. If there are no increased prosecutions then it will only be because the doctors and consultants are too frightened to do what they deem to be their duty. While the noble and learned Lord, Lord Denning, was speaking I could not help reflecting on the prosecution brought in 1981 against the unfortunate doctor Leonard Arthur for murder. Dr. Arthur was not prosecuted for illegal abortion, he was prosecuted for murder under different circumstances, but all I would say is that the moral considerations in the case of Dr. Arthur were very similar to the moral considerations we are discussing this evening. I am happy to say that in the end Dr. Arthur was properly acquitted of murder, but not before he himself and his family had endured many months of anguish and distress. We do not want to place the medical profession in the position where all the time they are looking over their shoulder to see whether they are going to end up in the criminal dock.
We have heard this evening that distinguished medical authorities, and in particular the British Medical Association, are against any change in the law. It is not only the British Medical Association. Perhaps I may read out some of the other bodies who are also against it: the Royal College of Physicians are against the change; the Royal College of Surgeons are against the change; the Royal College of General Practitioners are against the change; the Royal College of Gynaecologists and Obstetricians are against the change; the Joint Consultants Committee are against the change, and the British Paediatric Association. That is a formidable body of medical opinion; and who are we as laymen, who do not have to carry out

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the effects of such changes in the law, who do not have the practical experience that they do, to say that they are wrong?
I regard this as a retrograde Bill. What it seeks to do flies in the face of the overwhelming majority of medical opinion. From the administration of justice point of view, there is at least a division of opinion as to whether or not the introduction of these words would be practical to interpret in the courts. Judging by the opinion polls quoted by my noble friend Lord McGregor this Bill is unlikely to be supported by the vast majority of public opinion in this country. I therefore hope that the noble Lord, Lord Robertson, will withdraw his Bill; but if he does not do so then I shall certainly vote for the amendment of the noble Lord, Lord Houghton of Sowerby.
Lord Robertson of Oakridge: My Lords, before the noble Lord sits down, may I ask him whether he is aware that Professor Peter Huntingford—who refused to fill in the new notification forms certifying that there were medical grounds, when no action was taken against him by the DPP—stated on mid-morning Radio Medway that he was pleased by the statement of the Attorney General that he was not to be proceeded against because:
"I think that the Attorney General's statement does mean what I have been saying publicly since 1970, that the Abortion Act does allow abortion on demand, on request, up to 14 weeks without any medical indication."
They are his actual words.
Lord Vernon: My Lords, the noble Lord has quoted one individual doctor. I was not quoting one individual doctor; I was quoting the different bodies responsible for medical opinion.
8.20 p.m.
Lord Coleraine: My Lords, I am grateful to the noble Lord, Lord Robertson, for introducing this important yet simple Bill. The virtue and importance of the measure seem to lie in the effort it makes to restore Parliament's intention to Section 1(1)(a) of the Abortion Act 1967.The noble Lord, Lord Houghton, in introducing his amendment, said we must not re-open the compromise reached on the Floor of this House, without a Division, on 23rd October 1967. He also said that we could not go on fighting the abortion issue indefinitely. I was not there, but I have read Hansard of the debate on the amendments to Section 1(1)(a), and I find it surprising that the Act has survived intact all these years in view of the quality of the debate that seems to have gone on on the Floor of the House, irrespective of what may have gone on elsewhere. As to fighting today, the question is, who is doing the fighting? The fight seems to go on in the mind of the noble Lord with the 80 amendments which he envisages in Committee if the Bill has a Second Reading.
This measure should be viewed not with praise as an exercise to reverse by a few feet the advancing tide—or possibly the high tide—of permissiveness. Nor do I think it right for those who oppose the Bill to take the
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contrary view. My reason for speaking very briefly this evening is that I should like to explain to the House, and particularly to those speakers who have followed the noble Lord, Lord Houghton, in narrow and specific terms why I think his amendment is inappropriate and should not be agreed to.
I think it fair to summarise the intention of Parliament in 1967 as being an intention that the laws, which at that time prohibited unlawful abortion, should be relaxed sufficiently to make lawful the termination of pregnancies in cases where continued pregnancy would involve risk to the life of the mother or injury to the mother or to the other children of her family. That is Section 1(1)(a) of the Act, at least, and I am using the word "risk" in this exposé in the sense of "real risk", which is how I think most Members of the House, and of the other place, would have wished to regard the word "risk" at that time—before the amendment of the noble and learned Lord, Lord Parker of Waddington, was accepted on Report, in the hope that it would give that desired meaning to the subsection. The amendment, however, in my view, does not seem to have worked.
It has become apparent since the passing of the 1967 Act that abortion on demand has been readily available from the right medical practitioners prepared to form only too easily the opinion referred to in Section 1 of the Act and to go through the notification procedures of Section 2 and the regulations thereunder. What is more—and, really, what is worse—is that there now seems to be widespread acceptance of the view that the 1967 Act permits that.
I understand there are medical practitioners who would see no difficulty over the termination of the first or an early pregnancy of a healthy young woman at her request, however her request was given or procured, under Section 1(1)(a) of the Act. I understand that if those practitioners touch their caps to the rule of law, they do so by the misuse of statistics. I believe that to be wrong on the point of law, and I note that Governments of both complexions have made regulations designed to make life difficult for such doctors, if such doctors there be. Whether those doctors are right or wrong about the meaning of the words of the Act, I understand there has been no challenge to them in the courts. There may be good reason for that, and the noble and learned Lord, Lord Denning, has referred to one of them; namely, that the courts will always be very reluctant to impugn the good taste of doctors, and that is certainly some answer to the points made by the noble Lord, Lord Vernon, when he painted a picture of the terrible decisions doctors would have to take whether or not to give their certificates and the fear they would have of going to prison.
I think the time is now ripe for the consideration of fresh legislation in your Lordships' House to restore the law to what it was thought to be after the 1967 Act. It seems to me that the Bill provides the clarification of the law which is now needed, or, if it does not, it certainly merits serious consideration in Committee. I would only say about the amendment, that it unreasonably seeks to end discussion on a matter of genuine concern and importance. I hope the noble Lord will withdraw it and that the Bill will have a safe Second Reading this evening.
8.26 p.m.
Baroness Denington: My Lords, as has been said by more than one speaker, we are discussing a deep moral issue. We are, therefore, as individuals, bound to react to it differently according to our natures, maybe according to our upbringing, our background and experience of life and our religion. My noble friend Lord Robertson wants to narrow the Bill, for the reasons he and others have given. Frankly, I lean in the other direction. There are many reasons for that, but I have no intention of wearying your Lordships by speaking for long. The BMA has pointed out in a letter to my noble friend Lord Houghton, of which a number of us have had copies, the almost inevitable consequences—if we accept the Bill—resulting from backstreet abortions.
Let us pause and think what backstreet abortions really mean; the misery and torment, the physical agony and ill-health, that result almost invariably for the woman, followed often by her early death caused by troubles arising from the nature of the backstreet abortionist. I consider it abominable and intolerable that in a civilised society we should think of going back—because that is what we should be doing—to the bad ways of the old days. It would be regrettable and very sad indeed if we were now to make it more difficult for a woman to get an abortion.
I was a teacher, as your Lordship may know. As a teacher in school, you see some children in class who are miserable, grey, depressed and spiritless. You wonder what on earth is wrong with them; you never see the mother of that kind of child in school. So you make it an occasion to go to the home to see the mother, to make contact, to see if you can find out what is wrong with the child, to see if there is something physically wrong. Almost invariably you find that it was an unwanted child; the mother passionately did not want the child and still does not want it, and the child knows it is not wanted. If the child does not react in that way—if it is not one of those grey, spiritless children—it takes the opposite attitude; and how often one hears the question, "Why do so many people nowadays bash and smash things?" If it is not the depressed type of child, it reacts the other way, against society and everybody, and just wants to smash things to demonstrate its misery. What I am talking about is the misery of children. I am not talking of those cases which hit the headlines, cases of children who are physically abused, injured and who even die.
My philosophy is to see every child born a wanted child, born in love, looked forward to and cherished by its parents. That is what we need; not to have women forced—to their own damage and to the damage of their children—to give birth to children they do not want. Every child should be a wanted child.
One Member of the House is leading us in one direction. I would want to lead your Lordships in another direction. But as somebody has said, it is one of the strengths that we have left in this country that we know how to compromise, we know how to be reasonable, to bend to meet one another; and so I hope that we shall this evening leave things as they are.
8.30 p.m.
Viscount Barrington: My Lords, time is getting on, and I agree with the noble Earl, Lord Longford, whose
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speech I heard with great interest, that it is a pity to go on on a subject so emotive as this in too emotional a way and at too great length. So I shall try to confine what I say to only three things. One is that, like the noble Earl, I was here at the time that the 1967 Bill was passed. I sympathise with, and admire, the noble Lord, Lord Houghton of Sowerby, for introducing exactly the same measure as I introduced, but with much less vigour and of course no success, which I had not expected, to have the Bill altered before it came through. That did not happen, but I was familiar with the way in which a great many of the controversial words, such as "substantial" and "serious" were eliminated at the last minute, indeed constitutionally perhaps improperly after we came back. It was a very near thing, and afterwards a great many noble Lords said that had they known that the Bill would go as far as it did go—and I think I can say that it has now gone 20 times farther—in the way of abortion on demand—and I would produce evidence for that for all to hear if the present Bill goes to the Committee stage—many of them would have thought differently.
I want to get back to the principle which has been admirably put at some length by the right reverend Prelate, and absolutely clearly, as one would expect, by the noble and learned Lord, Lord Denning, whom I do not think can be described as a man who knows nothing about the legal expressions involved in these matters. Speaking as a layman, I would say that although I could not possibly give a legal definition of "substantial" and "serious", there are occasions when I would know the difference. For instance, I should say that perhaps two years ago there was a risk of one being blown up by an Argentine Exocet while cruising in the Mediterranean, but it would not have been a very serious risk. But I think that the risk of being blown up by an Exocet this summer in the South Atlantic was very serious indeed. If anyone suggests that there is no difference between those two examples, I suggest he should tell that to the Marines—such Marines as survived; or, failing that, tell it to Welsh Guards. Of course where the distinction comes is well worth asking in Committee if, as I very much hope, the Bill gets a chance to go to Committee.
There are only two other points I should like to touch on. We hear a great deal about a woman's right to do what she likes with her own body, and we had a demonstration—quite a nice, pleasant one—when several ladies with their own bodies threw down many pieces of paper. They did not throw down anything more offensive. The only maxim of that kind that is, I think, a more pernicious one would be that a man has a right to do what he likes with his own body. Of course he has not. In my opinion he has not the right to rape a young girl; he has not the right to "mug" an old lady; he has not the right to assault a referee on a football field. Of course people do those things, but they have no right to do them, the reason being that other people's bodies are concerned as well.
Many people believe that in abortion another body is not concerned, and at this stage we cannot go into the question that has been admirably put by the noble and learned Lord, Lord Denning, of whether the unborn child is a body, because if it was not a body, it could not be aborted. There is a question of whether it is a living body. If it were not it would not need

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aborting. It is a living human body, in the sense that it is not the body of an animal; if it were, the noble Lord, Lord Houghton, would go to an extreme in its defence, and I would admire him enormously for that, even if he were in a minority of one. He would show the same concern for it as he would show against clubbing seals, or hunting foxes, or other living creatures.
My own view is that, as noble Lords have said, we want a revision of the attitude to the unborn child. Some of your Lordships may remember the late Alan Herbert when he was promoting a divorce Bill. What particularly he was attacking was the idea that a woman was not legally married if she had been married after three o'clock. He produced a song, the only two lines of which I can remember:
"Nor widow, maid, nor wife am I;
Nor ever hope to be;
For I was wed, as the bishop said, considerably after three".
If a foetus could sing—and I have no doubt that it can, because it can kick long before its kicking can be felt—I think that it would adapt that song—on the lines "Am I animal, vegetable, or mineral?"—as follows:
"Nor human, beast nor plant am I.
I have no rights on earth;
For I was dead,
The surgeon said,
Considerably prior to birth".
It is up to the surgeon to say when he kills the thing.
With the greatest respect to the medical profession as a whole, I do not accept all the statistics—which could crop up in Committee—of the apparently universal opinion of the medical profession that unborn children should be killed on demand. All I can say is what the Bill is about, and here I would differ from what the noble Lord, Lord McGregor of Durris, said about the Bill forcing anyone to do anything. What the Bill actually says is not that it is wrong in all circumstances to take innocent human life, but that it is wrong to take it indiscriminately—because an abortion must be indiscriminate; one does not know whether it is a male or a female. As I understand the Bill, what is opposed is the idea of "unnecessarily" and indiscriminately taking the life of an innocent human being of either sex. (We must remember that more than half of the children who are aborted are female.)
Then, if we are talking about minorities—and I know that the noble Lord, Lord Houghton, defends minorities as much as I do—I would say that this is the only minority which is in fact historically a majority, and not only a majority, but a majority of 100 per cent. I say that because whereas not every foetus will become a Member of your Lordships' House, every Member of your Lordships' House was at one time a foetus. On those grounds, quite apart from religious views, I would strongly defend the noble Lord, Lord Robertson's Bill, and with the greatest respect for the gusto of the noble Lord, Lord Houghton, I would ferociously oppose his amendment.
8.39 p.m.
Viscount Ingleby: My Lords, I would only remind the House, if I may, of the total number of abortions undergone by women residents of the United Kingdom since 1967; it now stands at 1,372,023. That is nearly double the total number of United Kingdom
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deaths in World War I, and nearly four times the total number of United Kingdom casualties in World War II. I ask myself: Can this be what was intended by Parliament in 1967? Would not this House agree that in many cases adoption is preferable to abortion, and should not the Government be giving some help—I understand that they are not giving any help at the moment—to those societies whose aim is to preserve life, such as Lifeline, and the various other societies mentioned by the noble Lord, Lord Robertson of Oakridge, in his opening speech? I commend the Bill to your Lordships.
8.40 p.m.
Lord Rea: My Lords, it has not surprised me, at least, that this has been one of the more exciting debates that we have had in this House for some time. I think it must be the first time in living memory that there has been a snow shower inside the Chamber. The amount of emotion, indeed, is not surprising because we are talking about decisions concerning potential human beings. I am not a member of any organised body of opinion about abortion, but I think I can speak rationally from a basis of personal professional experience in which I frequently use the provisions of the Act.
It may seem remarkable that two words have attracted so much attention, yet these two words, if introduced into the Act, will, as I think many speakers have said or implied, make it more difficult for doctors to carry out terminations of pregnancy which both they and their patients feel are necessary. I am very pleased to have the assurance from the noble and learned Lord, Lord Denning, that even if this Bill becomes an Act and doctors carry out terminations under it, they will not be prosecuted if they act in good faith.
However, I think it is clear that the aim of the Bill is to restrict the number of abortions, and in my view the Act (as it will be then) will become a less useful piece of legislation and the result will be hardship and danger for many women. When I speak of danger I am not using the word in a merely rhetorical sense. In the three years before the Act came into force—other speakers have given this type of statistic, Lord McGregor particularly—there were 133 maternal deaths due to abortion in England and Wales. From 1966 to 1979, which was a longer period, there were only 17. The rate is even lower now.
I have been a general practitioner in the National Health Service for more than 20 years, so I have experience of the situation both before and after the Act became law. Both before and after the Act I have been approached regularly, on average about twice a month, by women in great distress who, through bad luck, miscalculation or plain ignorance have become pregnant against their better judgment. The bad luck may be a failure of contraception which they have conscientiously practised. We all know that girls get themselves into scrapes, and, as a man, I will admit that in more than half the cases it is in fact the man's fault, but women, literally, bear the consequences.
At this point I think I should like to diverge a little from my own experiences and generalise slightly. It is perhaps hardly necessary for me to point out that the

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human race is very fertile and very sexually active, the British as much as any nation despite the title of a long-running West End play. This was vitally necessary to ensure our survival in an earlier era of high mortality, and this may be the basis of deeply-held beliefs that termination of pregnancy is wrong. Now, however, the converse is the case. Our survival and future progress and prosperity depend on limiting this reproductive potential. This can be done in three ways: by reducing sexual activity, by better contraception or by termination of pregnancy. I submit that, in this present age, to try to reduce sexual activity is unrealistic, and would be like King Canute trying to turn back the waters. To make contraception more effective and widely understood is the ideal for all of us working in this field, but for many years, and perhaps always since contraception is never perfect, there will be a demand and a need for termination of pregnancy.
Having said that, I should like to return to my original theme, which is based on my own experiences of the working of the Act. First of all, I should like to describe what happened before 1968. Requests for termination were always problematic then to doctors; perhaps not quite so much if the patient or her partner could raise the equivalent of approximately £500 at today's prices. They could then obtain a relatively safe termination by a qualified doctor who was prepared, for this high fee, to risk prosecution. But for those without means—the great majority—the outlook was fairly grim.
It was sometimes possible to obtain a National Health Service termination by getting doctors to state that the patient would become more seriously ill than was really likely; and there were a few gynaecologists of high repute who were prepared to do this. They felt that social and economic grounds were often a very real indication, and were prepared to risk their professional careers for this. The case of Alec Bourne, before the war, has already been cited. They had a disproportionate number of referrals. This was very depressing for them, because most doctors—and this has been said once, but let me stress it again—find it extremely depressing, very unpleasant and even abhorrent to undertake a termination of pregnancy, even when they feel that the grounds for the termination are extremely strong.
Because of the limited facilities before the Act came into force, many women had to have late abortions. They had to scout round all over the country before they could find one, and then have one after 13 weeks, which is when abortions are more risky. It is only after 13 weeks, I might say in answer to some speakers, that future pregnancies are imperilled. Before that, there is no evidence of this at all.
At this point I should like to mention—and I think it is a good argument for putting off the consideration of any changes in the Act at the moment—there is now a very large study being carried out by the Royal College of General Practitioners in which 6,000 women who have had terminations are being compared to 9,000 women who have gone on to have full-term pregnancies. We are looking very carefully at the results from the point of view of the physical and
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the psychological consequences of both abortions and full-term pregnancies.
Those who, before the Act, could not find a qualified doctor to carry out a termination felt impelled, as many speakers have said, to resort to illegal, so-called backstreet abortionists, who used such methods as the instillation of soapy water into the uterus, and other rather less pleasant procedures. Many women tried to procure their own abortions, using such things as knitting needles or other pointed implements—quill pens or meat skewers. In fact, a very important point which nobody has yet raised fully, I think, is that the total number of abortions before the Act was probably no less than it is today. As there were no figures we cannot be certain about this, but an estimate of the Birkett Committee before the war was that there were 60,000. In 1949 Dr. Eustace Chesters made an estimate of 250,000.
As a result of this, before the Act all general practitioners were faced with frequent cases of very ill women with septic abortions and/or severe uterine haemorrhage. I was one of those doctors. And every gynaecological ward and fever hospital had substantial numbers of beds occupied by these women. But for skilled care the death rate from the complications of abortion would have been very much greater. I think this is perhaps the main reason why all the royal colleges—the colleges of obstetricians and gynaecologists, general practitioners, psychiatrists and midwives—and the British Medical Association, all oppose changes in the Act.
After the 1968 Act came into force everything changed very quickly, though there were some areas where National Health Service terminations of pregnancy were difficult to obtain, and have remained difficult to obtain, owing to the beliefs of the gynaecologists in the area and the consequent lack of facilities. Illegal abortion and attempts at self-induced abortion have very largely disappeared, however, and I very seldom see a case of complicated "miscarriage", which was so often in reality the result of interference. This is reflected in the vastly improved national mortality statistics which have already been given to your Lordships.
I very much fear that to introduce the two words "serious" and "substantial" into Section 1 of the Act will make some doctors unable to recommend termination of pregnancy, even when a woman is determined to have one (and unless you have actually been confronted by a woman who is determined to have a termination, you will not really know what I mean; she will stop at nothing) and there are strong social and psychological grounds present. There will then be a high chance that some of the old evils will return.
Apart from the real danger of increasing deaths and serious illnesses, there are perhaps other, wider reasons for leaving the Act alone. Many women feel that the present Act is too restrictive and does not allow them sufficient freedom of choice in a crucial decision affecting their lives. We had a demonstration of that this evening. A few feel that, when used with sympathy, however, the present Act will allow an opportunity for reflection and counselling so that the pregnant woman and her doctors can make a wise

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choice together. It so happens that the first patient I saw this morning was a single girl of 23 with an unplanned pregnancy. Her boyfriend was unemployed and he was against her having a baby. She was uncertain what to do. I did not make up her mind for her. I referred her to a National Health Service clinic where she can have termination if the other doctor there agrees, but where she will see a social worker and have full counselling so that her decision will be a wise one.
To end, my Lords, I should like to quote no less an authority than the Prime Minister. Here, admittedly, she was talking about choice in another area; but her words are equally fitting for our subject today:
"Free choice is ultimately what life is about, what ethics are about. The whole of the case for freedom is a moral case because it involves choice. Do away with choice and you do away with human dignity".
8.52 p.m.
The Lord Bishop of Norwich: My Lords, while thanking the noble Lord who has just finished speaking for that quotation—"Do away with choice and do away with human dignity"—we are dealing with choices which are so complex and which so affect the life of an unborn child and so affect the whole area of the sanctity of human life that we risk endangering human dignity by letting this admittedly desperately difficult social problem go further than it has gone already. Even the noble Lord, Lord Houghton, himself, said in his opening speech for the amendment that had we reached a compromise all those years ago in 1967, but the noble and learned Lord, Lord Denning, did say that the Act as it stands does now give enough guidance. It is because of the need to redress the clearly observable facts stemming from the Act that those who have a real social conscience, a real concern for wives, for mothers, for the unborn baby, are not willing to be pilloried as unconcerned about women who are having babies for supporting this particular very modest Bill.
Let me quote. The noble Lord, lord Trefgarne, told us that in 1969, or soon after the Bill came in in 1967, there were only 50,000 terminated pregnancies. Within ten years, he reminded us, the average figure was at 110,000. Use that as you will as argument for or against. But it seems to me that the argument is a strong one for saying that the original purpose, with (to use Lord Houghton's words) "compromise", to provide a careful provision for the termination of pregnancies under very careful safeguards, has moved forward to the phrase which keeps cropping up throughout your Lordships' debate this evening, "abortion on demand". In those early debates, it was constantly and hotly said that this Bill, when it was only a Bill, had nothing to do with abortion on demand. It was a very carefully balanced Bill to provide alleviation under very clearly described circumstances in special cases.
As I see it, all that the present Bill seeks to so by putting in the words "serious" and "substantially"—and these are two words, important words but not enormous; they are certainly nothing like a wrecking amendment to the original Act—is to return to the original purpose of what was a compromise, though a number of us did not like areas of that parti-
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cular Act. At least it will mean if the noble Lord, Lord Robertson's modest Bill is passed that abortion on demand in its simplicity will be undeniably illegal. I believe that it will be for the strength of our nation and even for the comfort of those in distress to know that this was the main, first purpose of our original Bill.
Secondly, if Lord Robertson's Bill is given a Second Reading tonight (as I hope it will be), it will mean that conscientious doctors—and as the noble and learned Lord, Lord Denning, reminded us, with the new developments concerning abortion in medical practice today, nurses and midwives are brought in now in a way they were not brought in 15 years ago—will at least have their consciences cared for and their hands strengthened when they are in the position of being moved along by what is supposedly public opinion; because I recognise that the statements made by the learned societies and by the professional societies are very strong. If I were a doctor, a nurse or a midwife myself, I think I should feel myself very theratened by the statements made by the noble Lord, Lord Rea, about the learned societies who have spoken in this way. At least, Lord Robertson's Bill will have a modest care for minorities—in this case conscientious doctors, nurses and midwives.
Thirdly, his Bill will give support for pregnant women. We have had stories already tonight about the fact that it is quite difficult. There was the story that Lord Robertson gave of the young girl who was being almost pressurised into having an abortion. That will be taken care of by the firming up of the original Act by this Bill. I noted the phrase of Lord Houghton: a "guerrilla war" against the Act. Well, the emotive words there may be! But he also told us that this was the eleventh time in 15 years that responsible people—admittedly a minority—had shown unhappiness about the way the Act had worked out since it was passed and concern that we should do something. I honour the noble Lord, Lord Robertson, for bringing in this Bill. We know he speaks against those who are opposed in different ways to his Bill.
I finish with only one story, on balance, because I believe we are dealing with a matter of balance by seeking to bring the word "serious" and the word "substantial" into an area of deep human need and problems. Yesterday, I confirmed a little girl who, I discovered afterwards, was 13 years old, in an extreme state of muscular wastage. I thought to myself, coming down today, of the problems for that tiny child when she was first born and of the little girl who is now seriously ill with muscular wastage. I will not harrow the House with the details, yet, as I confirmed her yesterday morning, I felt that here was encapsulated the business of care for human life and respect for God-given life. The family surrounding her with loving care and the photograph of the whole family, all three generations, afterwards made me thank God that there were those who stood against this easy tide of sweeping away unwanted pregnancies into areas of limbo and who stood against the easy way out, which is what I believe this Act is now becoming. I believe, therefore, that, though it calls for a great deal of moral courage, it is right for us to set aside the dilatory amendment of the noble Lord, Lord Houghton, and strongly support the Second Reading Motion of the noble Lord, Lord Robertson.
9 p.m.
Baroness Vickers: My Lords, I dislike having to disagree with the right reverend Prelate but I should like, if I may, to read from a letter received from Doctors for a Woman's Choice on Abortion. I think it is rather helpful. It says:
"The introduction of such vague terms as 'serious' and 'substantially' will make the interpretation of the law more difficult and will undoubtedly result in doctors being less able to recommend an abortion in many cases. This would be most regrettable and would cause much suffering to women."
I have had a great deal of experience, though not medical experience, in the past of working in the East End of London and of seeing a great number of young women having abortions, many of them self-induced. In the Far East I have seen women also inducing their own abortions. It really is a horrifying sight and therefore I was so pleased to support the 1967 Act; and it has done a tremendous amount of good.
What has not been mentioned so far is the number of unwanted children—there are 35,000 children unwanted. You cannot get them adopted because people want either a white child or a perfect child, and so you have these children who are homeless. They have no parents and no love given to them in the way that normal children have. I think it is most unfortunate that a woman should have a child if she really does not want one or if she perhaps feels that she cannot cope with another child, having already had several. It will be on our consciences, I think, that there are all these children whom nobody wants. I was slightly astonished when the right reverened Prelate the Bishop of London said that women should have freedom. I know that he has left his place but I feel I must draw attention to this point because he was saying that people want freedom, but we are not giving the women freedom. It is their own lives and I think we should remember that.
I worked in the East End of London, in Poplar, Hackney and also in Lambeth, where I was the LCC member for many years, and I did what I could for the women and children. I used to have "surgeries", when women came along to see me and asked for my help. I did not really feel capable of giving them personal help so I always made sure they could be given both sides of the question before making their decision.
It seems to me that if we go along with this tonight we are putting the rights of the foetus above the rights of the mother, and I think we have to consider that very carefully. The mother has her rights and the foetus has its rights. To which should we give preference? There are so many ways in which people can help. I was not going to mention it, but the Bible has been mentioned now twice or three times tonight. There is no immaculate conception in this world, and so it takes two to make a foetus. I feel very strongly that it is up to the male sex, if they or their wives do not wish to have another child, to take action. There is nothing to stop them. Really, we seem to be thinking entirely in terms of the woman. It is the woman who has been mentioned all the time. I want both sexes to be involved in this, and I think there should be far better education in schools and far better special education given to young boys and young women, especially in this day and age when things are rather more promiscuous than they were when I was young.
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I should like also to say that I do hope we shall not accept this amendment tonight. I have mentioned the unwanted children—but what about the battered babies? Every day they are mentioned in the press. We have to think of these things. If we do keep all these children alive, are there enough social workers, to look after them?—because their parents are not going to do it. The "semi-orphan" child, in other words a child who does not have parents, is a very sad child indeed.
Finally, I should like to say I am grateful indeed to Dame Josephine Barnes, who is one of the most remarkable women of her age, and of course a gynaecologist. She has sent a letter from Doctors in Defence of the 1967 Abortion Act. She says, and I support her in this:
"We are dismayed at the prospect of a change"
That comes from a woman who is now head of her profession and who had been doing work of this kind all her life. I should like to suggest that we should think of her words tonight and think also of the freedom of the woman as well as the freedom of the man.
9.6 p.m.
Lord Melchett: My Lords, I very strongly agree with everything that the noble Baroness opposite has just said. At this late stage in the debate there is very little left to add. It seems to me that the debate has developed into an argument between those who are fundamentally opposed to abortion—those who support this Bill—and a rather broader church; indeed, a rather broader church than has been apparent from the Bishops' Bench—those who support the 1967 Act and the way it has been interpreted by the medical profession along with those, among whom I certainly number myself, who would like to go a great deal further than the existing legislation.
It seems to me that those who are in favour of the Bill tonight represent an extremely narrow view, a view which is clearly acknowledged by them, I am glad to say, even at this late stage in the debate, as being a view of a minority which they wish to impose on an overwhelming majority of the population of this country. It is, as has been frequently pointed out during the debate, a view which they want to impose on the overwhelming majority of the medical profession who have to implement the law. No one, it seems to me, who has spoken in favour of the Bill and against the amendment has even attempted to explain why there should be such an extraordinarily overwhelming majority of medical opinion in favour of leaving the legislation as it is. Nobody who has spoken in favour of the Bill has even attempted to explain that fact—or to go beyond that—to explain why we should ignore it.
There is one point that I should like to make about public opinion. I know that it has been referred to earlier, but I do not think that the actual question has been referred to. In fact, the 80 per cent. of people this year who agreed with the question about abortion, agreed with the question that said that the choice as to whether or not to continue a pregnancy should not be left to the woman in consultation with her doctor. As I say, 80 per cent. agreed with that, which was a 4 per cent. increase since 1979. That is a question which

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goes a great deal further than the existing law and, indeed, would support my view that there would be a considerable majority not in favour of this retrograde step in the Bill before us, but in favour of amending the law in the other direction.
The other point on which I want to comment, so far as the debate itself is concerned, is that there seem to have been a number of quite appalling and insulting remarks made against women who have had abortions, and those who have carried out abortions. The right reverend Prelate the Bishop of London said that the results of procreation are "pushed aside easily". The noble and learned Lord, Lord Denning, suggested that abortions had become "facile". That seems to me to be extremely insulting. I regret that neither the right reverend Prelate nor the noble and learned Lord to whom I have referred are actually in the Chamber, but that is not my fault. Those remarks illustrate an extraordinary attitude, both to the women who have had to undergo what all of us agree is an unpleasant and distressing experience, and to those who, in all conscience and with professional integrity, carry out those operations. To suggest that this is facile or easily pushed aside seems to me to be extraordinary.
That had got me annoyed enough, but then the noble Viscount, Lord Barrington, who, I also regret to say, appears not to be in the Chamber at the moment—I am not having very much luck tonight—issued a quite incredible insult against women when he suggested that a woman who decides, in consultation with her medical advisers, to have an abortion is doing exactly the same thing as a man who rapes women. That seems to me to be a quite extraordinary remark to make and I very much regret that those who are supporting this Bill have sunk to such depths, as I see it, of insults against people who have had the unfortunate and distressing experience of an abortion, and those of the medical profession who conscientiously do their jobs.
It seems to me that the real evil in these attempts—and the number of them was referred to by my noble friend Lord Houghton and others—to restrict the availability of abortions, and to go back on the Act that we have, is that they deflect the debates about what happens to women during pregnancy, during childbirth and afterwards from the real evils of poverty, unemployment, bad housing and continual cutbacks in social and health services, which themselves cause a large number of deaths to men, women and children; from the scandalous way in which women are often still treated in hospitals when the go to have their children; and from the scandal, to which a number of noble Lords have referred, of unwanted children and the problems which they face. Those are the issues which your Lordships' House should have been debating tonight, not this mean Bill, which I hope will not get a Second Reading.
9.12 p.m.
Lord Harris of Greenwich: My Lords, I think it is common ground that the issues raised in the Bill which we are debating this evening are not new. They lay at the heart of the argument that took place during the passage of the 1967 Abortion Act, and they were subsequently raised in the seven unsuccessful attempts
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in another place to amend that Act. All these attempts have failed, and I believe that they failed for one obvious reason—because it was on every occasion recognised that the sort of language proposed by those who sponsor these Bills, and today by the noble Lord, Lord Robertson of Oakridge, would create a wholly unacceptable degree of uncertainty in the law.
The noble Lord's proposal is that there would have to be serious risk to the life of a pregnant woman, or substantial injury to the physical or mental health of the pregnant woman, before a pregnancy could be terminated. It is, I believe given that type of language, hardly surprising that the noble Lord's proposal has met with such fierce opposition from a very nearly wholly united medical profession. That was, if I may say so, tellingly confirmed by the noble Lord, Lord Trefgarne, who spoke for the Government, when he referred in detail to the view of the Royal College of Obstetricians.
For what, precisely, is meant by the language used in the noble Lord's Bill? What, in fact, is a serious risk? What is the definition of a substantial injury? I waited for some help from the noble Lord. I am afraid that I did not get it, nor did the House. I do not believe that the noble Lord—and I do not, in any way, doubt his goodwill or his sincerity—has made a serious attempt to meet the the grave anxieties expressed about the Bill by the medical profession. Today he, bluntly, just brushed them aside. He gave us the view of one anonymous doctor. That, with great respect, is no answer to the anxieties which have been expressed by the Royal Colleges.
As I have said, I have no doubt about the noble Lord's sincerity, but I did believe that he was a root and branch opponent of the 1967 Act. Therefore I was, if he will forgive my saying so, mildly surprised to hear that that was not so. There is no doubt about the view of some of his supporters. I have received, as did a number of my noble friends on both sides of the House, a letter from Miss Bradley enclosing a pamphlet. Miss Bradley asked me to vote for this Bill. There is no question, as the noble Lord suggested in his speech, that this amending Bill is a half-way house between the 1967 Act and the law as it existed before 1967. We have had no such suggestion from those who are canvassing support for the Bill. Let me read one sentence, not in any sense taken out of context, from the pamphlet, headed Abortionists' Favourites:
"We oppose abortion because we want every child".
As the House will recall, that is not the view of the right reverend Prelate the Bishop of London. He made no such suggestion. In my view, that is what in reality we are discussing today.
I do not believe that this in any sense is a half-way house Bill. It is basically root and branch opposition to the 1967 Act. That would be its effect. I believe that what the noble Lord is proposing in the Bill is wrong. He is urging the House to pass legislation which suggests that abortion is lawful under certain prescribed conditions, but he then defines those conditions so unsatisfactorily that no doctor would have any clear idea as to whether his judgment would be supported by the criminal courts. And it is the criminal courts which we are talking about.
As the noble Baroness, Lady Jeger, reminded us, during the passage of the 1967 Act the then Lord Chief

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Justice, Lord Parker of Waddington, specifically warned the House of the dangers of using imprecise language, yet today's Bill seems almost consciously designed to create the maximum degree of uncertainty. The House should recognise that what would be involved if this legislation went onto the statute book would be one of two consequences. Either doctors who now authorise abortions would be so concerned at the lack of clarity of the new law that, notwithstanding their clinical judgment that an abortion was urgently necessary to save the life of a pregnant woman, they would decline to perform the operation, or they would take the risk and carry it out, in the knowledge that they might render themselves liable to lengthy police investigation, proceedings in the criminal courts and the possible destruction of their professional career.
I have great admiration for the noble and learned Lord, Lord Denning, but I regret to say that I found his speech, if he will forgive me saying so, not so persuasive as I normally find his speeches to be. He suggested, first, that the Bill is designed to help the medical profession. If that indeed is the object of the operation, I am bound to say that it has been spectacularly unsuccessful. Secondly, the noble and learned Lord said—and of course we listen with the utmost respect to the views of the noble and learned Lord on this question—that he was extremely doubtful whether there would be a successful prosecution, even if the law were amended in the way that the noble Lord, Lord Robertson of Oakridge, has suggested.
I repeat that I do not wish to cross swords on this matter. Indeed, I should not have the nerve to do so. However, I would say this to the noble and learned Lord. I am surprised that he has so much certainty about the views of a jury in a case of this kind. As the House will know, the noble and learned Lord and I were involved not so long ago in a debate in which it was said that sometimes it is extremely difficult to understand why a jury has reached a decision in a certain case. There would, I believe, be a perceived risk in the minds of many doctors that they would find themselves in precisely such a situation. Whether or not a prosecution would be successful is a matter of speculation but, as my noble friend Lord Vernon pointed out, the consequences of an unsuccessful prosecution can be devastating to the professional man and to his family who are involved in the circumstances of such a case.
Apart from anything else, we cannot close our eyes to the fact that if the law were amended and a chief constable received a complaint from perhaps a nurse, who might have deep conscientious and honourable objections in principle to abortion, that a specific consultant had performed one, two or even three operations which were outside the terms of the Act, the chief constable concerned would, in my view, be obliged to ask his criminal investigation department to carry out an investigation into whether there had been a breach of the criminal law. Papers might go to the Director of Public Prosecutions.
Are we really going to place responsibilities of this kind, after the experience of the past 15 years, on our overstretched and overtaxed police force? I do not
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know whether the noble Lord, Lord Robertson of Oakridge, has made any attempt to talk to the Home Office—although he may have done so for all I know—or to the Association of Chief Police Officers. I have no doubt that there are many police officers who agree with the general principle of what has been said by the noble Lord, just as there will be many who will oppose it. But I am very doubtful whether, at a time like the present, the police are enthusiastic about getting sucked into issues of this kind where, I believe (and, I think, they themselves believe) they do not have any particular skills or expertise.
As I have already made clear, I find the consequences of the passage of a Bill of this kind unacceptable to the extent that a new Abortion Act deterred doctors from authorising abortions which now take place. If we did this, we would quite consciously and quite deliberately be encouraging the re-emergence of the back street abortionist who did so much damage to the lives and health of so many poor women in this country. We would also be creating a situation—again, quite deliberately—where members of the medical profession, believing that the abortions they were authorising were indeed permitted under the terms of the noble Lord's legislation, could be at constant risk of prosecution in the criminal courts. I do not believe that such a situation would be acceptable and, accordingly, I hope that this Bill will be rejected.
The Lord Bishop of Norwich: My Lords, I wonder whether I may ask the noble Lord, Lord Harris of Greenwich, one question for elucidation? The noble Lord posited the situation of a woman in grave danger of death who was pregnant. If I heard him right, he then posited the fact that the doctor, if this Bill were passed, would feel it was a dangerous matter for him to act. Surely the argument, if taken forward logically by the noble Lord, is that if the words "serious risks" were built into the Bill, the doctor would have no problems about dealing with the woman who, in pregnancy, was in danger of dying.
Lord Harris of Greenwich: My Lords, I am grateful to the right reverend Prelate, and let me just put the matter to him. With great respect, I wish it were as simple as that; but I believe that the passage of this Bill would give rise to a climate of uncertainty within the medical profession. It is not quite so easy as the right reverend Prelate imagines to give a reassuring answer of the kind for which he obviously hopes.
9.23 p.m.
The Earl of Lauderdale: My Lords, we are all grateful to those who have opposed this Bill and those who are in favour of it for the moderation of their language. We have had a quiet and, on the whole, inoffensive debate today—although there were one or two little exchanges about which I will not particularise. In the noble Lord, Lord Harris of Greenwich, we can still hear the authentic voice of the Home Office ringing through his dulcet tones. The most important point he made was that concerning the danger of imprecise language. The two adjectives we are talking about are already in the Bill.
Of all the speeches against the Bill, I have to confess that the one that moved me most was that made by my

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noble friend Lady Vickers, who spoke of 35,000 unwanted children, the battered babies and, by implication, the need for their proper care. Frankly, I was less moved when the noble Lord, Lord Melchett, with all his debating skill, told us that a minority was trying to impose its will on an overwhelming majority. This matter has not, of course, been put to an electoral test. What did strike me above all—and I think it must have rung in your Lordships' ears—was the simple statistic, which is terrifying, of one baby lost every 40 minutes. Then it was suggested that in spite of that statistic, which so far as I know is unchallenged, it was thought improper for this House to reopen a compromise formula agreed by the collective wisdom of this House 15 years ago.
Lord Melchett: My Lords, if the noble Earl would allow me to intervene briefly, if he wishes to maintain the moderate spirit of the debate which he has so praised, would it not be more moderate to refer to that statistic as being that particular number of foetuses lost, because a number of us do not accept that when an abortion is carried out a baby is aborted. It is the foetus which is aborted.
The Earl of Lauderdale: My Lords, I entirely agree with that point; there are those in this House who do not consider the living foetus is a living thing whereas others consider it is a personality. This is a chop down the middle of the House; it is not from side to side but it is through the thinking of the House. I am much obliged to the noble Lord for his intervention on that point. But it is suggested that this matter should not be reopened after 15 years, or indeed even nine years after the Lane Committee or even seven years after the Select Committee in another place. If I may say so with respect and moderation—of course, I must say the noble Baroness, Lady Jeger, did not consent to this—it was suggested here and there that the matter should not be reopened. Well, this House and the parliamentary system is indeed for reopening the unmentionable and undiscussable, since these matters cannot be discussed outside patiently and quietly.
The first question is surely this. Is there or is there not in effect abortion on demand? Something we are quite certain about is that it was not the intention of the promoters of the 1967 Act that that should be permitted or encouraged. But there is abundant evidence to the contrary. The BMA and the gynaecologists told the Lane Committee that it was so; the Lane Committee themselves said it was so; and, in a very interesting poll in 1978, 73 per cent. of gynaecologists said it was so. Also, we have the word today of the noble and learned Lord, Lord Denning, whose authority carries very great weight indeed.
In the matter of medical opinion, clearly there are varying versions. We have had almost every version of it here tonight. But the fact is that both the BMA and the RCOG did tell the Lane Committee in 1974 that change was desired. Sir John Peel, President of the BMA and the RCOG, and the Queen's gynaecologist, told the Select Committee on Abortion the same thing in 1976. So there is clearly a dichotomy as to what medical opinion will say. There was a very interesting Gallup Poll in 1978 which showed that 81 per cent. of gynaecologists were against abortion on demand and
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73 per cent. said it took place. It was suggested—and I was interested to hear this from the noble Lord, Lord Vernon—that somehow laymen should not challenge medical opinion. Even assuming medical opinion were unanimous, his suggestion, if I have it right—and I will give way if I have it wrong—is that we should not presume to challenge medical opinion. Well, what is Parliament for?
Lord Vernon: My Lords, if I may intervene, as the noble Earl suggested I might, I never said that medical opinion should not be challenged; all I said was that very great weight should be given to it when they were unanimous on the issue.
The Earl of Lauderdale: My Lords, I am so glad that we have had a chance of correcting that because I do not want to misrepresent anybody, and being old and gaga I sometimes tend to get the point a little wrong. But what is Parliament for but to challenge technical opinion and bring a broad—what we may call "political"—decision to bear on the matter? At any rate, the Select Committee in another place urged Parliament to discuss and vote on the criteria. I think that we must remember the point made so effectively by the noble and learned Lord, Lord Denning, in a powerful speech—so powerful that some people did not agree with it—but something that will be well remembered and framed; that the child is left out of the equation. That was his point. Those of us who are promoting the Bill are speaking for the utterly defenceless, for those who have no voice themselves. We are doing so in a world where compassion is often cited as a kind of slogan.
I believe that the most important points were made, very sympathetically, by the noble Lord, Lord Houghton of Sowerby. It is always in season for old men to learn—that is Agamemnon in Aeschylus—and since we are both elderly, it is time for both of us to learn. I was very impressed—and I say this sincerely—when he opened his case by saying that we need more evidence. He said that the whole matter deserves close attention in time to come, and that a basis for consensus is needed. I wonder whether we cannot build on that, in a co-operative, sympathetic and, may I say, friendly sense.
Taking compassion as the theme and, above all, those who are defenceless, I should like to ask the noble Lord, Lord Robertson of Oakridge, who is the promoter of the Bill, this. Will he consider, if the Bill gets a Second Reading—and it could not be done without that—discussing through the usual channels a Motion to have this issue referred to a Select Commitee instead of having the nightlong badinage on the Floor of this House about adjectives? That is the alternative that was forecast by the noble Lord, Lord Houghton of Sowerby.
I suggest to the noble Lord, Lord Robertson of Oakridge, that he should consider whether that would be a useful and worthy way forward for the House. Will he be prepared to discuss and explore through the usual channels the possibility of the Bill going to a Select Committee? Of course, that possibility, which I hope is welcome to everybody, will not arise if there is no Second Reading. Therefore, I suggest to the noble Lord, Lord Robertson, that if he considers that

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approach worthy of the occasion, worthy of the subject and of this place, then he suggests to the noble Lord, Lord Houghton of Sowerby, that he should withdraw his amendment and allow the Bill to have its Second Reading, which I support whether or not there is a Division.
9.34 p.m.
Lord Robertson of Oakridge: My Lords, I sincerely thank all those of your Lordships who have taken part in this debate for their excellent contributions throughout the evening. I hope that, as the hour is late, your Lordships will not think me discourteous if I do not answer all the points that were made.
First, I take up the suggestion of the noble Earl, Lord Lauderdale, about a Select Committee. That proposal certainly seems to have some attraction. I am not at all encouraged by the prospect that we were given by the noble Lord, Lord Hougton of Sowerby, of guerrilla warfare if the Bill goes to a Committee of the Whole House. I would be willing to put forward his suggestion through the usual channels if the Bill is given a Second Reading.
Much was made of the weight of representative medical opinion against the Bill. This is clearly a factor that your Lordships will want to take very seriously. I submit that it is not all persuasive. As we heard from the noble Earl, Lord Lauderdale, medical opinion is perhaps not quite so unanimous as might be assumed from its representatives. There is the Gallup Poll that showed that 81 per cent. of gynaecologists in 1978 were against abortion on demand. Indeed, abortion on demand does come into the issue. The noble Lord, Lord Rea, made a valuable contribution to our debate and gave us his experience and the example of a case—not the one he mentioned he had seen today—where he was under very great pressure from a woman for an abortion. That is really abortion on demand.
However, it is not only medical opinion that needs to be listened to. I am sure that the House will be very grateful to the right referend Prelate the Bishop of London, and to the noble and learned Lord, Lord Denning, for their clear statements on the Christian position and on the legal position.
The noble Baroness, Lady Denington, and the noble Baroness, Lady Vickers, mentioned the phrase "unwanted children". The noble Baroness, Lady Vickers, gave statistics about children in care. I mention that the Abortion Act 1967 has by no means reduced the number of children in care. The number of children in care is very much greater that it was back in 1967, although obviously the Act is by no means the only factor to be considered. Every child should be a wanted child, and in a way it would be very nice if that were the case. However, if we think about it, what are we saying? We are saying unwanted children should be disposed of. Surely that raises some pretty abhorrent sequels. How are we to treat the chronicaly ill, the handicapped and the aged? Are we to say that unwanted chronically ill persons and unwanted handicapped children are to be disposable also? I do not think so, and I do not think that that is the intention of those who say that every child should be
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a wanted child. They should reflect on the implications of what they are saying.
The noble and learned Lord, Lord Denning, summed the Bill up: it is to write the baby back into the equation; not to give it priority over the mother but to put it back into the balance. If we acknowledge that we have a duty to show love, care and protection in law to the unborn child, I hope that your Lordships will support me in the Lobbies on this Bill.
9.38 p.m.
Lord Houghton of Sowerby: My Lords, first let me deal with the Select Committee. I regret that I am not prepared to accept the suggestion that I should withdraw my amendment in return for the noble Lord's indication a moment ago that he would be willing to consider referring the Bill to a Select Committee. I will certainly accept the idea of a Select Committee unprejudiced by this Bill, but not as the basis of considering a Bill which I regard as fundamentally wrong and against which there will be widespread revulsion if it gets a Second Reading in your Lordships' House tonight. The fair offer is an unprejudiced, open Select Committee with suitable terms of reference. That is how to investigate this matter in the way that I think it will have to be done.
Secondly, I point out to the noble Earl, Lord Lauderdale, that he is in error in saying that the poll of the gynaecologist consultants in 1977 showed that 73 per cent. of them said that abortions on demand were given. They were not asked that question. The Gallup Poll was requisitioned from a firm of public opinion pollsters by the Society for the Protection of the Unborn Child. The consultants were asked:
"Do you believe that there is abortion on demand?"
No evidence was asked from them in support of a belief. Moreover, the consultants were asked to judge other people's conduct and not their own. They were asked to express a belief about the conduct of certifying medical officers: they were not asked to say anything about their own behaviour. I think that that particular Gallup Poll cannot be relied upon.
The only other point I wish to make is this. From listening to the whole debate, it seemed that the voice of practical, professional experience is against this Bill. The voice of those who have particular experience among the poor, and the social problems of the poor, were against this Bill. I would hate to say that the difference of opinion in the House is a class division, but it is getting very near to it.
Several noble Lords: No!
Lord Houghton of Sowerby: My Lords, I think we must beware that Members of this House do not forsake entirely some semblance of representative capacity. I should hate to join issue with the noble and learned Lord, Lord Denning, but in my type of layman's way I have held the view that if you use the law to give guidance, you make it the law, and in making it the law, you intend to make it enforceable. If you intend to give guidance, guidelines or a code of conduct, that is a different mechanism for trying to achieve the same purpose. But if you put it in the law

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and make it the law, and say that the law shall be enforced then, as the noble and learned Lord said, you will not get a successful prosecution against any doctor who says "In good faith I was using my best clinical judgment, and applied that to the guidance in the law". In those circumstances, he is asking us to put, and the Bill is asking us to put, in the 1967 Act words which, if they give guidance, will frighten doctors. If they do not give guidance, they will not be enforceable in the courts.
I think that the situation can be very confusing; but certainly an attempt to extend the definitions in the 1967 Act is, I think, bound to lead to uncertainty and a great deal of difficulty, and it will not do the country or the women of the country any good. To that extent, I am bound to say that one of the outcomes of this debate is that one pedestal—namely, the noble and learned Lord, Lord Denning—has fallen from grace. I have enjoyed his theme that you put justice before the letter of the law. But with the greatest and profoundest respect, I did expect his legal guidance to the House this evening to be clear and a little more logical than the advice that he gave. I am grateful to him for not joining issue with me and prolonging the proceedings.
I urge noble Lords to support my amendment. This does not ask for any judgment on principles or practice. It says that this is not the moment, that this is not the hour and that this is not the stage in this Parliament to carry this matter to a conclusion. Therefore, let us put it at arm's length until wiser and better informed counsels prevail. Let us then have the Select Committee, but not on this Bill.
9.45 p.m.
On Question, Whether the said amendment shall be agreed to?
Their Lordships divided: Contents, 57; Not Contents, 42.

DIVISION NO. 3

CONTENTS

Avebury, L.

Listowel, E.

Balogh, L.

Llewelyn-Davies of Hastoe, B.

Birk, B.

Lockwood, B.

Boothby, L.

McGregor of Durris, L.

Boston of Faversham, L.

Melchett, L.—[Teller.]

Brockway, L.

Milford, L.

Brooks of Tremorfa, L.

Monson, L.

Brougham and Vaux, L.

Morris of Kenwood, L.

Cledwyn of Penrhos, L.

Northfield, L.

Craigavon, V.

Oram, L.

Darwen, L.

Oxford, Bp.

David, B.

Pitt of Hampstead, L.

Davies of Leek, L.

Ponsonby of Shulbrede, L.

Denington, B.

Porritt, L.

Elliot of Harwood, B.

Rea, L.

Elwyn-Jones, L.

Roberthall, L.

Ewart-Biggs, B.

Seear, B.

Fisher of Rednal, B.

Stedman, B.

Flowers, L.

Stewart of Alvechurch, B.

Gardiner, L.

Stewart of Fulham, L.

Hanworth, V.

Stone, L.

Harris of Greenwich, L.

Trefgarne, L.

Hooson, L.

Tweeddale, M.

Houghton of Sowerby, L.—[Teller.]

Vaizey, L.

Howie of Troon, L.

Vernon, L.

Jeger, B.

Vickers, B.

Jenkins of Putney, L.

Wilson of Langside, L.

Kagan, L.

Young of Darlington, L.

Kilmarnock, L.

106

NOT-CONTENTS

Airey of Abingdon, B.

Lawrence, L.

Avon, E.

Lindsey and Abingdon, E.

Barrington, V.

London, Bp.

Beswick, L.

Long, V.

Braye, L.

Longford, E.

Buckmaster, V.

Loudoun, C.

Caldecote, V.

Lyell, L.

Campbell of Alloway, L.

Massereene and Ferrard, V.

Chichester, Bp.

Mishcon, L.

Clifford of Chudleigh, L.

Mowbray and Stourton, L.

Coleraine, L.

Norwich, Bp.

Craigmyle, L.

Oxford and Asquith, E.

Denning, L.

Portsmouth, Bp.

Gainford, L.

Reading, M.

Grantchester, L.

Robertson of Oakridge, L.—[Teller.]

Halsbury, E.—[Teller.]

Saltoun, Ly.

Hampton, L.

Sidmouth, V.

Hylton, L.

Stradbroke, E.

Ingleby, V.

Swinton, E.

Kinloss, Ly.

Vaux of Harrowden, L.

Lauderdale, E.

Wakefield, Bp.

Resolved in the affirmative, and amendment agreed to accordingly.
House adjourned at six minutes before ten o'clock.