The Defence Programme (Hansard, 25 June 1981)

HL Deb 25 June 1981 vol 421 cc1168-81 1168

§ 4.1 p.m.

§ The Minister of State for Defence Procurement (Viscount Trenchard)
My Lords, with the leave of the House, I shall now repeat a Statement which is being read by my right honourable friend the Secretary of State for Defence in the other place. The Statement is as follows:
"Mr. Speaker, the Government have reviewed the Defence Programme; and a full account of our conclusions is contained in a White Paper which will be available shortly in the Vote Office.
"The Government intend to honour the NATO aim of 3 per cent. real growth in defence expenditure and have, exceptionally, taken a firm decision now to plan to implement the increase until 1985–86, a full four years forward—and two years beyond the published plans for public spending generally. This may mean that defence absorbs an even greater share of our gross domestic product; and while it will be necessary to curb several of our forward plans and aspirations, the additional funding should enable us to enhance our front-line capability above its present level in very many areas.
"The House knows of our basic problems, which are not unique to Britain. We have a defence programme which is unbalanced and over-extended. Last year we suffered from severe cash problems; and similar difficulties are already emerging in the current year.
"We cannot go on like this. We have no choice, in the longer term, but to move towards a better balance between the various components of our effort—front-line numbers, quantity and quality in equipment, and military and civilian support. And we must determine this balance in terms of real defence capability, rather than as the outcome of a debilitating argument over each Service's budgetary share.
"We have looked first at the defence of the United 1169 Kingdom itself especially in its role as a crucial reinforcement base for NATO. For some time we have felt the need to give greater emphasis to our reserve forces. For the Territorial Army, whose readiness and efficiency were vividly shown in Exercise Crusader, I intend a progressive increase in numbers of some 16,000 men and women and there will also be an increase in training days from 38 to 42 a year. We will order new minesweepers for the Royal Naval Reserve as soon as resources permit; and we will expand the use of Royal Air Force Regiment reserves in airfield protection.
"In United Kingdom air defence a priority requirement—we will sustain all the programmes already in hand, including the Nimrod early warning system and the doubling of modern air-to-air missile stocks. As a new enhancement we will provide Sidewinder air-to-air missiles for a further 36 of our Hawk aircraft, making 72 Hawks in all available to supplement our fighter force; we will run on two Phantom squadrons instead of phasing them out as had earlier been planned when the air defence version of Tornado comes in; we will examine the possibility of switching 20 Tornados to the air defence rather than the strike version; and we will substantially increase the VC10 tanker fleet which multiplies our fighter force by prolonging patrol time and range. Around our coasts, we will increase our capability to counter enemy mining, and we have set aside funds for enhancing our defensive mining capacity, to help secure our ports and maritime routes.
"I turn next to our major land/air contribution on the Continent of Europe. BAOR's manpower, which is above our Brussels Treaty commitment of 55,000 men, will return to that level. But we will retain in Germany our full present combat fighting strength of eight brigades and our responsibility for the forward defence of a vital 65 kilometres of the Central Front.
"We intend however to withdraw from Germany one divisional headquarters and other supporting staff with a consequent reduction in the number of locally employed civilians; and this, together with other necessary economies, will enable us to move over the next five years towards a slightly smaller Regular Army of 135,000 trained men, 7,000 less than at present, but partly balanced by the increase in the Territorial Army.
"Suggestions have been made, I know, that we should go for a much greater reduction in our troops in Germany. But quite apart from the fact that there is no one else to perform our task of defending 65 km of the Central Front, it would be much more expensive to bring them home, because we simply could not house or train them here without a massive new infrastructure programme. Only disbandment would relieve our budgetary pressures and we cannot prudently cut our Army below a certain minimum level.
"But the small reduction in regular Army manpower which I propose will help us to afford, as is our intention, the very wide range of re-equipment projects now envisaged for BAOR. The scale or timing of some of the projects will be modified, 1170 partly to restrain costs but mainly to provide for a further increase in war stocks and ammunition, to improve the combat endurance, the staying power, of 1st British Corps, which will be substantially enhanced. We plan tor instance to increase further the buy of Milan anti-tank missiles.
"The Challenger tank will equip four armoured regiments. New night sights for missile systems and tanks will be introduced and improvements will be made both to the present Chieftains and in due course to Challenger. We will bring into service the 2nd Chinook helicopter squadron to enhance Army logistic support and mobility. We shall introduce the tracked version of the Rapier missile system and the TOW anti-tank missile launched from Lynx helicopters.
"I am glad to announce that subject to final negotiations we should shortly be signing, in Washington, an agreement with the United States Government for the joint manufacture with the United States of the AV8B, the advanced Harrier. This has turned out to be an agile and effective aircraft, with a susbtantial weapon-carrying ability; and we plan to order 60 aircraft for close air support. Within the total Anglo-American programme of some 400 aircraft we are looking for a 40 per cent. share for British Aerospace, and a 75 per cent. share for Rolls-Royce on the engine. There should be something like a billion pounds' worth of work for British industry, the bulk of it for export to the United States.
"I have decided that we cannot afford early replacement of the Jaguar, though possibilities remain open for new combat aircraft in the longer term, perhaps through international collaboration. On the other hand, we must exploit our investment in Tornado—some £10,000 million at current prices. We will continue with the JP233 system for neutralising enemy airfields and we shall seek also to acquire new weapons to equip Tornado in an anti-armour role and for suppressing enemy air defences.
"At sea, the Royal Navy will continue with the key task of providing a strategic nuclear force by the modernisation of the Polaris force with the Trident system. We have maintained one Polaris boat on station continuously for the past 12 years. One Trident submarine, invulnerable to any preemptive strike, will carry up to 128 independently-targeted warheads which can hold at risk targets over a vast area of the Soviet Union. No enhancement of our conventional forces could possibly prove of equal deterrent value. In a world where nuclear weapons cannot be disinvented, it is the United Kingdom's surest way of preserving peace.
"But we must also keep strong the three conventional elements of power at sea. In maritime air, in addition to present plans, we will fit a further three Nimrods, making 34 in all, to the full Mark II equipment standard, which is as great a leap in technology over the Mark I as the Mark I was over the Shackleton. Armed with our Sting Ray torpedo, the Mark II will have great striking power against submarines. We will proceed with a new stand-off anti-ship missile to be delivered by 1171 Buccaneers—which we will keep on for this task—or by Tornado. Subject to the satisfactory completion of contract negotiations, we intend to acquire British Aerospace's Sea Eagle anti-ship missile.
"We will increase our fleet of nuclear powered attack submarines, newly equipped with Sub-Harpoon, from the present 12 to 17; I have today confirmed the order with Vickers at Barrow at a cost of £177 million for the next boat. We will also proceed as fast as possible with a new and more effective class to replace our present ageing diesel-powered submarines; these should also have a market overseas. We will acquire a new heavyweight torpedo for all our boats, and are considering alternative British and American designs for this.
"Overall our maritime air and submarine capability will be much enhanced.
"As regards surface ships we will go ahead with all the very large orders—20 new warships, to a value, with their weapons, of well over £2,000 million—already in hand in British shipyards, and shall be placing an order for a further Type 22 anti-submarine frigate at a cost of £125 million, which will sustain work at Yarrows on the Clyde. We are placing an order for five patrol craft with Hall Russell of Aberdeen for service in Hong Kong.
"But I believe we must make changes here in a number of ways. Firstly, if we want to build a reasonable number of new ships in the future, we must devise much cheaper and simpler designs than the Type 22 frigate. We must accelerate urgently, and I have provided funds in the programme for this, a new type of anti-submarine frigate, the Type 23 built with an eye to export as well as Royal Navy needs, for we have not sold a major British warship of Royal Navy design for over a decade. I intend to pursue as well the possibility of still more cost-effective, smaller, ships than the Type 23.
"Secondly, we only maintain our surface fleet at its present full strength through a continuous programme of refits and major mid-life modernisations of older ships, requiring a huge and costly dockyard infrastructure. Typically it can now cost up to £70 million to modernise an old Leander frigate which is actually more than our target cost for the new Type 23.
"If we are to be able to build new ships in our shipyards and fulfil other priority defence tasks, we simply cannot afford to sustain such a policy of refit and modernisation, or for that matter maritime air defence, at the present level, where the planned forward investment in major equipment for the air defence of warships at sea has been about double that for the air defence of the United Kingdom itself.
"It is for reasons like these that whilst we shall complete the new carrier 'Ark Royal', we intend to keep in service in the longer term only two of the ships of this class, with their heavy demands on supporting anti-submarine air defence escorts. The older carrier 'Hermes' will be phased out as soon as the second of the new carriers is in operation.
"Overall we will try and hold the destroyer and 1172 frigate force declared to NATO at around 50 ships compared to 59 ships at present. This will be achieved by disposing early of older and more manpower-intensive ships, for example from the County, Rothesay and Leander classes, and timing their withdrawal so far as possible to avoid major refit or modernisation. We shall place some of these ships, without further modernisation, in the Standby squadron where they will still be available, though at longer notice, as part of our force declaration to NATO. There will be a consequential reduction of Royal Fleet Auxiliaries.
"On present estimates the reduction in target numbers of the Royal Navy will be between 8,000 and 10,000 men by the end of 1986, rather more than the reductions of 7,000 in the Army. We will maintain the three Royal Marine Commandos since we place great value on their unique capability; but we will dispose of the two specialist amphibious ships rather earlier than planned.
"In consultation with the United States Secretary for Defense about these changes, I have indicated our wish to play an enhanced role alongside our allies, outside the boundaries of the NATO area. We envisage resuming the deployment of naval task groups—centred sometimes around a carrier, sometimes around destroyers or frigates—for substantial periods on visits and exercises out of area. We have made specific provision in our programme for the extra costs of such deployment. We are continuing with our plans designating an Army field command to plan out-of-area contingency tasks; for providing an extra stockpile of equipment and giving our Hercules aircraft the equipment needed for a co-ordinated assault by parachute troops.
"As regards support, the change in policy on refits which I have described earlier will mean that we cannot justify keeping a dockyard organisation of its present size. I regret to inform the House that the base and dockyard in Chatham will have to close in 1984; work at Portsmouth Dockyard will contract very severely, though the naval base will be retained; and consideration will be given to alternative ways of fulfilling the Government's obligation to support the economy of Gibraltar if it is decided that the dockyard work there cannot be kept up indefinitely. We shall consult closely with the Gibraltar Government about how best to deal with the situation.
"Much more naval training will take place at sea, and there will be a reduction in shore-based naval establishments, stores and fuel depots. Overall civilian numbers in the Ministry of Defence will fall by between 15,000 and 20,000 as a result of all our measures. Our total workforce will in due course be significantly below 200,000. Redundancies will, I am afraid, be inescapable.
"Mr Speaker, I have described to the House the main thrust of what we propose—and the substantial enhancement of our frontline capability in very many areas, but with a major reduction in the supporting infrastructure of defence.
"I am asking my right honourable friend the Leader of the House to find time, as soon as possible, 1173 for a debate on all these issues. At that time I shall be able to explain more fully the background to these proposals. In conclusion, the Government have, in accordance with their undertakings to the country, decided to provide the increased resources our defence demands by increasing spending by 3 per cent. in real terms for the next four years; and we have decided also to apply the extra funding in a revised programme which will enhance the combat endurance and the hitting power of our frontline forces in the decade to come."
My Lords, that ends the Statement. May I just say that I think the White Paper will now be in the Printed Paper Office. May I also say that I believe it has been agreed through the usual channels that Monday, 20th July, be set aside as a date for debate of these subjects in this House. Finally, may I mention that in last moment alterations to the Statement a cross-reference to a Written Answer in the other place released today on the Royal Ordnance factory organisation has been lost, but there is a Written Answer dealing with the Royal Ordnance factories which has been issued in the other place today.

§ 4.22 p.m.

§ Lord Peart
My Lords, I thank the noble Viscount for his very grave Statement, if I may put it like that. It is a very serious one which we must consider. It is, I think, the longest Statement that I have ever heard in either House, but I am not complaining because noble Lords will now be able to get the White Paper and to digest it. I shall make just one or two comments but they will be brief, because we shall await the debate. It is there that we shall deploy our main arguments as to whether or not the Government are fulfilling their promises, or are trying to live in cuckoo-land by ignoring the fact that one of the decisions which is relevant to our country's economy is the decision of the Government to go along with Trident. I think that Trident will distort the defence budget and many of the proposals that have been mentioned today.
A second factor which influences the Government's expenditure plans is, inevitably, the dramatic increase in social security, unemployment and supplementary benefit payments, brought about as a direct result of the Government's economic and industrial strategy. In many parts of our economy, men and women are unable to find jobs. I am prepared to examine very carefully and constructively what has been said about the army and the navy. I am anxious that we should always have adequate defence, and have always taken that view. So I shall not probe today. I shall start probing when we have the debate.
It is important that all noble Lords should carefully look at the White Paper, because it is a very important document. It is one of the most comprehensive documents that I have seen on the subject. But then, again, we have had all these wonderful documents over the last six months. Are these all to be thrown away in the dustbin? Do we stick to the White Paper, which goes further than the Blue Papers which I have mentioned? I should now allow Members to cross-examine, if they so wish, but I believe that it would be right and proper to wait until the debate.

§ Lord Gladwyn
My Lords, this very important 1174 Statement, which I thank the Minister for repeating, will clearly have to be debated before long and I understand that the Minister has already arranged a date, which is a very good thing. Of course, it is impossible at short notice to appreciate all the consequences of what seems, on the face of it, to be a major, and in many ways, a totally new defensive concept. At first glance, I feel—and I only speak personally—that much of what is proposed is, with one exception, acceptable. I am, at least, relieved to hear that it is the firm intention of the Government to give effect to the increase of 3 per cent. in real expenditure on defence for another full four years. But are we to assume that this is exclusive of any expenditure on Trident during those four years, or is the expenditure on Trident to be included in the 3 per cent. increase? If I may, I should like to have a reply to that question.
Even the withdrawal from Germany of one divisional headquarters does not seem to me to be unreasonable, given the very considerable saving which would result. But I take it that the German Government has been consulted and has not expressed any concern at this move? In general, I should also like to be assured that the proposals, as a whole, have been put before our allies and that there have been no major objections on their part—notably, on the part of the Americans—to any of the suggestions for new defensive schemes that have been put forward.
The major exception, of course—and your Lordships will not be surprised to hear this from me and my colleagues here—is the decision to go ahead with Trident, for it must be clear that, but for the £6 billion or so that is to be spent on this over a period of 10 years, we should be able not only (for instance) to provide a replacement for the Jaguar aircraft, which is important, but also to construct considerably more hunter-killer submarines, which are so essential for the closing of the Iceland-United Kingdom gap in the Denmark Strait, on which, after all, it is quite likely that our whole future will depend.
As is known, it is our view on these Benches that it is just not true that the enhancement of our conventional forces would not prove of equal deterrent value to Trident, which, as we see it, can only deter a nuclear assault on these islands and can in no wise be used as a first strike to counter some Soviet offensive on the Continent. Whether nuclear weapons would be used for this last purpose must, after all, depend on the decision of SACEUR and not on the decision of the United Kingdom. It is, in any case, more than likely that the next war, if it should come, will be waged by conventional means only. But, as I have said, these are all arguments which can be properly developed at length only in a debate, and I am glad to hear that such a debate will shortly be possible.

§ Viscount Trenchard
My Lords, I thank the noble Lord, the Leader of the Opposition, and the noble Lord, Lord Gladwyn, for their remarks, and particularly for agreeing that, for the major part of our discussion, we should await the day of the debate. I apologise for the length of the Statement, but I think the noble Lord, the Leader of the Opposition, thought that no bad thing. This is a matter of great importance, so we felt that it was warranted.
Both noble Lords have again raised the question of 1175 the Trident expenditure. At this stage, let me merely say—we have debated this before and will do so again—that, at the moment, the expenditure on Trident is very small indeed and is not the reason for the budget problems which have arisen. Over the full years of its capital construction programme, it will represent 3 per cent. of the defence programme, which is very close to the requirement of Polaris before it. Any alternative deployment of that 3 per cent. on conventional forces would move only a very fractional way towards correcting the huge imbalance between the conventional weapons of the Soviet Union and those of the alliance.
I am grateful to the noble Lord, Lord Gladwyn, for saying that with that exception he finds the general thrust acceptable. I can assure him that my right honourable friend has consulted with the German Government, with the USA and with important figures in the NATO structure, and that the detailed implementation of these plans will be co-ordinated in the future through the annual discussions which take place with NATO.
I must refer to the castigation of us by the noble Lord the Leader of the Opposition concerning the effect on job numbers. I ask him: would his alternative Government have increased real expenditure by 3 per cent. for these four years? Though we very much regret the necessary reduction in job numbers which will take place in some areas as a result of these changes of emphasis, we believe that with a virtually 90 per cent. "buy British" policy in the Ministry of Defence under this Government's policy we shall be keeping and, indeed, promoting in new areas of technology job numbers far in excess of what the alternative would have been under the Government of the Opposition.

§ Lord Kennet
My Lords, I was very glad to hear in the answer by the noble Viscount to the noble Lord, Lord Gladwyn, that a date has already been fixed for a debate. We may suspect that although Trident is at the moment costing virtually nothing and that although it may cost only 3 per cent. a year over its entire life, there will be a period in a few years' time when, like some monstrous and lethal pet, it will be devouring everything in the larder, and that this is the real meaning of this White Paper. The defence debate will be better if we can get answers to certain preliminary questions out of the way now and, if the House will permit me, I shall ask four of them. I make no apology for the fact that they all concern the Navy, which is the most difficult part.
First, are the frigates and destroyers which are to be mothballed included in the figure of 50 which will in future be declared to NATO instead of the present 59? Secondly, has the Secretary of State for Defence consulted the Government of Norway about these large naval changes, particularly in view of the fact that the two amphibious ships which used to carry Royal Marines to Norway on exercises are to go? What, if anything, is to carry the Royal Marines to Norway, bearing in mind that the sea frontier up there is the only undefined frontier between NATO and the Warsaw Pact, that Spitzbergen is in effect a "West Berlin" in the north and that that is a place where, 1176 while it is obvious that we could not win a war, it would be extremely easy to lose one in advance by not being there?
Thirdly, what is the intention regarding the expeditions outside NATO? Is it to be as NATO? And, if so, is it proper to do this without widespread public debate? Or are these expeditions to be not as NATO? In which case, why did the Secretary of State inform the United States Government of his desire to do it? Fourthly, which I shall abbreviate as I see that the Government Front Bench are looking impatient, whom did the Government consult among the civilian beneficiaries of naval activity in this country and among the many industries, civilian more than military, whose turnover depends upon naval purchasing power as regards exports as well as domestic sales?

§ Viscount Trenchard
My Lords, the first point which the noble Lord, Lord Kennet, made was that the expenditure on Trident in the future—I think he felt at the peak years—would be at a crippling level. I must mention that the expenditure on Tornado over the whole period, at £10,000 million, which is twice the estimate for Trident, merely shows that all modern weaponry is highly expensive. In this comparison one has to realise that, within the Trident estimate, we are including the whole cost of the bases, including the bases ashore, but that we are not including the airfield costs in the Tornado cost.
The answer to the noble Lord's first question is that about eight frigates and destroyers will move into standby over the next few years. Standby is not mothballs. Standby vessels can be manned, and manned effectively, within approximately one month. The noble Lord then asked whether we had consulted Norway regarding our role on the northern flank of NATO. At this stage, I would merely say that we shall continue to discharge our role on the flanks of NATO, including the northern flank. I do not believe that detailed consultations with Norway have yet started, but they will.
So far as the noble Lord's last question is concerned, which I think I heard correctly and which related to the out-of-area capability that we intend slightly to augment, all NATO countries have expressed worry about the threat out of area. The United States, being the bulwark of the NATO alliance in terms of defence and with its huge maritime power on a worldwide basis, has taken the lead. We have certainly told the United States and our NATO allies that we shall give what help we can. Whether in the course of time other nations will help to counter the growing possible threat outside the central front area will be up to them.

§ Lord Beswick
My Lords, inevitably noble Lords and, indeed, honourable Members will criticise different parts of the Statement. Certainly I shall continue to criticise the reference to Trident. However, having listened to the noble Viscount one is bound to say that one has admiration for the skill, ingenuity and flexibility with which he and his colleagues have contrived to marshal conflicting defence claims within given cost limits.
Having said that, may I ask three questions. There will be many who will regret the decision to buy the 1177 American version of the Harrier, although I understand the arguments which led to the AV8B decision. But the noble Viscount said that we shall be "looking for"—I think this was the phrase he used—a 40 per cent. share for British Aerospace. Would it be reasonable to ask whether, for "looking for", one can substitute "insist upon" a 40 per cent. share? Secondly, can the noble Viscount give an assurance that this contract will not mean that British Aerospace or Britain will lose the design leadership which they have had hitherto on VTOL aircraft, and that we can expect on the VTOL aircraft, and also when we come to the supersonic version, that it will be a question of Britain taking the lead there? My third question relates to the Jaguar replacement aircraft. The noble Viscount said that the possibilities there were being considered "longer term". Now "longer term" is a somewhat elastic definition. If there is a suitable international collaborative arrangement there, may I ask the noble Viscount whether the longer term would be brought into a shorter term?

§ Viscount Trenchard
My Lords, I thank the noble Lord, Lord Beswick, for his initial remarks. So far as the AV8B is concerned, the reason for the wording in the Statement is that we are not quite at the end of the negotiations. The intention, I believe, of all parties is that it should be pretty nearly exactly a 40 per cent. share of the production of the whole order, bearing in mind that the total number of aircraft required is some 400 and that the United Kingdom order is only approximately 60 of that number. So there are still some negotiating points to be completed. However, after a recent visit of my own to Washington I am satisfied that the combined intention, in agreements which are not easy to put on paper, is that it should be 40 per cent.
So far as the design leadership in V-STOL aircraft—a British invention—is concerned, I believe that if this partnership goes ahead the know-how, including developmental know-how, on the whole aircraft, including aspects where the USA have made major contributions to technology in the prototype aircraft which has flown, particularly in the areas of carbon-fibre, which the noble Lord will know about—in those areas and in our own we shall be in possession of the latest know-how across the whole field of the construction of this aircraft, and this is our main security for being able to plan, when the day comes, a further advanced aircraft in this area.
So far as the longer-term combat aircraft is concerned we are currently exploring, with other nations, the future needs, but as my right honourable friend said, a balance has to be struck between armaments and modern weapons and missiles for our existing platforms and a constant expenditure of enormously larger sums of money on the platforms.

§ 4.41 p.m.

The Lord Bishop of Rochester
My Lords, I hope it will not be thought out of place, as the Medway subcommand is in my diocese, if I comment on the very sad news about the closing of Chatham dockyard. It is grievous news, not only for the Royal Navy as a whole but also for employment in the Medway towns, and I should like to ask Her Majesty's Government 1178 whether at this stage they see the prospect of alternative employment for those civilians who are at present in the dockyard at Chatham.

§ Viscount Trenchard
My Lords, I thank the right reverend Prelate for his remarks. We share his sadness about the closure of Chatham and we also share his concern in relation to job numbers when we are at, I believe, the bottom of a recession. I can tell him that my right honourable friend the Secretary of State fitted in to today's programme, before going to the House, a meeting with the industrial and non-industrial unions representing the employees at Chatham and agreed a special programme for full consultation over the next few years which we have to plan how this will be carried out. I hope that during those years we shall see the continued growth which is already visible, of a number of small businesses and of certain modern industries, and we shall see the bottom out of the recession and, hopefully, some relief to the problem of job numbers all over the country.

§ Lord Hill-Norton
My Lords, may I put it to the noble Viscount that the only reductions contained in that very long Statement in the teeth arms available to the Government were those to the Royal Navy. They were savage reductions, amounting in the first instance to about 15 per cent. of the surface fleet and, as the answer to the noble Lord, Lord Kennet, revealed, within another two or three years another 15 per cent., making a total of something like 30 per cent. of the surface fleet.
It is within my knowledge and within the knowledge, I do not doubt, of many of your Lordships that there is no strategic assessment of the threat available in the western world which would suggest that that was a prudent thing to do. Nor is it possible that any of our allies can fill that gap. Whatever may have been said to the Secretary of State in the United States, or in Bonn or in Brussels, it is within my knowledge that there is no other Navy which can fill the gap which, within three years, according to the Statement, will appear in the North Atlantic and especially in that part of it for which this country has been responsible since the North Atlantic Treaty was signed 32 years ago. I have no wish to go into detail. That is proper for our debate, but I put it to the noble Viscount that there can be no strategic assessment of the threat which could conceivably justify this savage reduction in the Royal Navy.

§ Viscount Trenchard
My Lords, I answer the noble and gallant Lord, with all his qualifications, with some humility, and I have no doubt that he will spell out his views in greater detail when the time comes for debate. I would say to him that he suggested that the cut falls only—and his phrase was "on the Royal Navy". This is a cut in numbers to offset the cost of the enhancement of fire power which modern weapons and the modern threat make necessary. The suggested cut is in the surface fleet area. Expansions will continue in submarines and in maritime aircraft which have a major bearing on the roles which he will no doubt wish to raise in the debate.
The cut in naval personnel we estimate comes to 8,000 to 10,000, compared with 7,000 in the Army. 1179 I would ask him to remember the expansion areas; I would ask him to accept, because I believe the figures are valid, that the cut in frigate and destroyer numbers will be from 59 to about 50 in terms of our contribution to NATO in a time of tension, to prevent it moving to a time of disaster.
I believe—and I have to say it—that the majority of my right honourable friend's advisers in the services and the civilian experts who also advise him, while they would like a bigger expenditure than the Government have decided to incur and would thus like more of a number of things, nevertheless, within the budget constraints of the 3 per cent. increase, have shown support for the kind of emphasis which the Secretary of State has decided upon.

§ Lord Orr-Ewing
My Lords, can my noble friend reflect that after all the anxieties and the gloom and doom which has been forecast, I think, from most of us in this House and in the other, this is a realistic and a constructive Statement—surprisingly so? Is my noble friend aware that perhaps one of the most anxious points is the further rundown in uniformed personnel in all three services but particularly in the Army, and that the decision to build up our reserves will be most welcome? But does this action not reflect the fact that three all-professional armed services are now becoming very expensive indeed? Does he realise that no other Western European nation has been able to form this structure for their armed forces but have had to make use of national service or some other form of reserve; and will he now examine whether we cannot look to the next decade for some reassessment of all professional services, so that we can save money and give young men an opportunity of serving in a disciplined force? They may be very valuable should an emergency arise.
Unfortunately, the noble Viscount's words will be listened to less than those of Libby Purves and Brian Redhead in this morning's "Today" programme, when they stated, to some million or so listeners, that he has already spent £5,000 million in the United States for Trident. Can he put this matter right by reminding the House that the total cost of the Trident programme in the USA is £1½ billion over the next 15 years, and that billion of this Trident programme will be spent in this country, mainly in Barrow and other places where the jobs will be most warmly welcomed, in forming an effective deterrent for the next few years? Could the point also be made perhaps to the Liberals opposite, that this is not a costly programme; in real terms it is a very cheap way of ensuring an independent deterrent.

§ Viscount Trenchard
My Lords, I thank my noble friend for his initial remarks. He has indeed himself put the figures right in relation to a press srticle on the expenditure in America on Trident; indeed the proportion of expenditure in this country is slightly higher than the figure he has given. He has also put his finger on the main problem, in terms of the growing expense of equipment over and above the rate of inflation, due to much more powerful and sophisticated equipment, which has been running for many years at somewhere 1180 between 6 and 10 per cent. above the rate of inflation. My noble friend's suggestions in relation to manpower are one of the areas and one of the ways in which my right honourable friend is trying to tackle this problem. There are many others which I would like to leave until the time of the debate.

§ Lord Boothby
My Lords, I would like to begin by apologising to the noble and gallant Lord, Lord Hill-Norton, for trying to get in in front of him. The reason is a perfectly simple one; I did not know who he was. I hope he will accept my apology.
I want to say only this to the noble Viscount who has made this Statement: I am sure he realises that there is great anxiety throughout the country at what has generally been regarded as a much bigger cut-down of the Royal Navy than he has now told us in the Statement. I think he has gone a long way to allay the fears of those who were afraid of a very serious cut in our surface Navy. I would only like to say that I remember Lord Beatty, in the 'twenties when he was First Sea Lord, saying to me, "We are running down the Navy now to a point which will bring us near defeat if another war comes". In fact he proved right because we came nearer to defeat in the battle of the Atlantic than we did in the Battle of Britain. Sea power is essential to our existence.
I only want to ask, in conclusion, can the noble Viscount give us an assurance that the Royal Navy, which has now been supplanted at sea by the Soviet Navy, will emerge from these proposals stronger, not weaker, than it is today?

§ Viscount Trenchard
My Lords, I am glad that the noble Lord raised the question of the much greater anxiety caused by press speculation on what might come. I very much hope that by bringing forward the date of this Statement my right honourable friend will have relieved people's minds from the worst forms of conjecture which seem inevitably to accompany this kind of examination.
On the second point, I would ask the noble Lord to wait until the debate. My right honourable friend is absolutely clear that the performance of the maritime role in the Eastern Atlantic depends upon us; we must do it and we will continue to do it.

§ Lord Chalfont
My Lords, may I intervene briefly, partly to congratulate the Government on an extremely throughtful Statement, even if one does not agree with all of it; it at least shows welcome signs of having been filtered through some fairly rigorous mental processes, and that is a very welcome thing in defence matters. May I ask one very quick question; the Minister may not be able to answer it now, but I ask it so that, if possible, it can be answered at the time of our debate. Can he say what, in terms of the Trident agreement with the United States, is the position with regard to what are called late spares? In other words, if the Trident production line goes out of action in the United States, how do we ensure a continuous supply of spares for Trident in the future. I should like the noble Viscount in answering that question to bear in mind the unfortunate experience we had over Chevaline on the Polaris missile.

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§ Viscount Trenchard
My Lords, I thank the noble Lord, Lord Chalfont, for his remarks on the general Statement. May I ask him to wait until the debate to go further into the detailed question he raised, but to be assured that one of the reasons for our moving from Polaris to Trident according to a certain timetable and the discussions currently going on, is to ensure that we do not run into expensive production hiatuses.

§ The Lord President of the Council (Lord Soames)
My Lords, this was a long Statement which my noble friend repeated on a very important subject. I felt that the House wanted to run on rather longer than usual in asking supplementary questions, but I have the feeling that it would be the wish of the House now that we should resume our main business.

§ Baroness Llewelyn-Davies of Hastoe
My Lords, while wishing to agree entirely with what the noble Lord the Leader of the House has said, may I ask the noble Lord the Chief Whip to consult with his colleagues in another place? Is it really reasonable that in the middle of a busy afternoon the noble Viscount should be required to repeat a Statement which lasted over 20 minutes? The noble Lord the Chief Whip keeps us under constant pressure to get the Government's programme through. May we have an assurance that this kind of performance, when there is a debate coming on on the White Paper published this afternoon, will not be repeated during the rest of this Session?

§ Lord Denham
My Lords, of course I will always listen to what the noble Baroness opposite says. I think it is true that your Lordships would have wanted to have this Statement which was made in another place repeated here. I shall be only too happy to discuss future occasions, should such occur, with the usual channels.