HL Deb 18 June 1981 vol 421 cc762-74

3.21 p.m.

Further considered on Report.

Lord Elwyn-Jones moved Amendment No. 70: After Clause 65, insert the following new clause:

("Interception of mail

.—(1) A person who—

  1. (a) intentionally intercepts the contents of the mail carried by the Post Office;
  2. (b) instigates any person engaged in the business of the Post Office to intercept the mail; or
  3. (c) discloses the contents of any mail intercepted under paragraph (a) or (b) above.
unless acting in obedience to a warrant issued pursuant to the following provisions of this section, shall be guilty of an offence and liable on conviction on indictment to a fine not exceeding £5,000 or to imprisonment for a term not exceeding three years or to both.

(2) Proceedings for an offence under subsection (1) above shall not be instituted in England or Wales except by or with the consent of the Attorney-General, or in Northern Ireland except by or with the consent of the Attorney-General for Northern Ireland.

(3) No person shall be guilty of an offence under subsection (I) above as respects any act done by him whilst engaged in the business of the Post Office.

(4) The Secretary of State may, on the application of a chief officer of police or the Commissioners of Customs and Excise, issue a warrant for the interception and disclosure of the mail if he is satisfied that—

  1. (a) it would assist in the detection of a serious offence;
  2. (b) normal methods of investigation have been tried and have failed or from the nature of things are unlikely to succeed if tried; and
  3. (c) there is good reason to think that the interception would result in a conviction for that offence.

In this subsection "serious offence" means—

  1. (i) an offence for which a person not previously convicted could reasonably be expected to be sentenced to imprisonment for a term of three years; or
  2. (ii) an offence in which either a large number of people is involved or there is good reason to apprehend the use of violence.

(5) The Secretary of State may, on the application of a chief officer of police or the Director-General of the Security Service issue a warrant for the interception and disclosure of the mail if he is satisfied that—

  1. (a) it would assist in the detection of a major terrorist or espionage activity giving rise to external or internal danger to the defence of the Realm; and
  2. (b) normal methods of investigation have been tried and have failed or from the nature of things are unlikely to succeed if tried.

(6) An application for a warrant under this section shall be made in writing and shall specify—

  1. (a) the person whose mail it is sought to intercept; and
  2. (b) the facts and circumstances in support of the application; but the Secretary of State may allow any information required under paragraph (b) above to be provided orally and not in writing in respect of an application for a warrant under subsection (5) above.

(7) Except in a case of emergency, any warrant under this section shall be issued only under the hand of the Secretary of State; and, in any such case, shall be confirmed under his hand as soon as reasonably practicable after issue.

(8) In this section "intercept" includes the doing of any act designed to enable an interception to take place, and "intercepts", "intercepted" and "interception" shall be construed accordingly.").

The noble and learned Lord said: My Lords, in this amendment we return to the issues that were raised in the Committee stage of the Bill on the important question of interceptions of communications taking place between private citizens, either by the exercise of the state, through the Secretary of State, of a power to do so, or by persons or bodies with no such power. The purpose of the amendment is to give statutory authority and form to the actions now being taken in this field by the Secretary of State, and to prevent, so far as the law is able to do so, and to punish appropriately unauthorised interceptions of the contents of mail carried by the Post Office.

In Committee we debated and divided upon an amendment relating to telephone tapping. Later, we discussed, only very briefly and inconclusively, this amendment which we are now discussing relating to the opening of letters. In view of its importance, we have thought it right that the House should reconsider it on Report, grateful as I am to the noble Earl, Lord Gowrie, for having written to me about some of the matters we just began to canvass at the Committee stage.

Mail interception is an age-old practice, and I understand it dates back to the 17th century, when the Monarch was given the monopoly right over transporting the mails, and when it was thought that mail interception, to use a contemporary phrase, was the best way to discover those with wicked designs against the Commonwealth. There are still those with wicked designs against the Commonwealth and the common weal. Serious crime, not only on the domestic but on the international front, with terrorists and others, is being carried across frontiers of states by criminal gangs. There is no sign alas! of the diminution of that. The sinister and profitable drug trade continues, as, of course, does espionage, and accordingly in this situation powers are needed by the state for the protection of the people.

Nevertheless, the opening of private letters between citizens is a serious invasion of their privacy, just as much indeed as is listening to their private telephone conversations. I am sure noble Lords will agree with what the noble and learned Lord, Lord Diplock, wrote earlier this year in his report on the interception of communications in this country: that the exercise by the state of any power to read or listen to communications taking place between private citizens involved an invasion of their privacy which has always been looked on by the public with suspicion and distaste.

There is another factor that must be considered and it is this. That is the obligations of the Government of this country under Article 8 of the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, which in terms says that everyone has the right to respect for his private and family life, his home and his correspondence. What the amendment proposes is to ensure that the invasions of privacy that we are discussing here are clearly authorised by the law. That is not the position now.

As to telephone tapping, Sir Robert Megarry, the Vice-Chancellor of the Chancery Division, in his judgment in the case of Malone v. Commissioners of Police of the Metropolis, said that "any adequate and effective safeguards against abuse are at present wanting", adding that telephone tapping was a subject which cried out for legislation. So, I submit, does the opening of letters. In regard to mail interception there does not appear to be any statutory authority or, certainly, any express legal authority for what is happening. Your Lordships may think it very significant that early this year when the Royal Commission on Criminal Procedure reported—and of that Commission Lord Justice Eveleigh was a member, as was Sir Arthur Peterson, a former Permanent Under-Secretary at the Home Office, and Sir Douglas Osmond, the Chief Constable of Hampshire—in dealing with surreptitious surveillance they said this in paragraph 3.56 of their report: although we have no evidence that the existing controls are inadequate to prevent abuse "— and it is fair that I should say that that is also the view held by the noble and learned Lord, Lord Diplock— we think that there are strong arguments for introducing a system of statutory control … As with all features of police investigative procedures, the value of prescribing them in statutory form is that it brings clarity and precision into the rules; they are open to public scrutiny and to the potential of parliamentary review. So far as surveillance devices in general are concerned this is not at present so". They go on to recommend that the use of surveillance devices by the police—and they specifically say, including the interception of letters—should be regulated by statute and that surveillance should require specific authorisation to be obtained from magistrates' courts and be limited in place and duration and contain reasons for the intrusion: in effect, the same procedures as they recommend for search warrants. They add: We do not consider that the application of such controls will cause any substantial hindrance to the police in their work".—(paragraph 3.59.) This is, of course, the point the noble Earl was emphasising when we last discussed this matter.

The report goes on to say that they consider that these matters should be placed upon a statutory footing and they recommend that: Application for a warrant, which would have to be ex parte and (obviously) heard in private, should contain reasons for the intrusion; and the evidence should be recorded in writing". Then interestingly they go on in paragraph 3.58 to say: At the hearing of the application the interests of the person subject to surveillance should be represented by the Official Solicitor or a similar body; we see this as a necessary means of securing consistency in practice". They then add, and I mention this because of the anxiety expressed by the noble Earl last time as regards the risks involved in judicial intervention: Unless judicial authority to the contrary is obtained, the person subjected to the surveillance should be told of the surveillance after the event, as is the requirement in a number of other countries. By these means, it should be possible for the justification of surveillance to be challenged, and, if not justified, for redress to be obtained. These proposals would enable the police to use evidence obtained by surveillance in court, which they are at present unable or unwilling to do in relation to telephone tapping". I make no apology for spending some time upon those authoritative recommendations of the Royal Commission with the distinguished representation both of the police and the Home Office, and of the judiciary.

It is right that I should say, before I leave those recommendations, that none of the safeguards there suggested exists at present although, as will be argued no doubt, other safeguards, particularly the monitoring and the responsibility of the Secretary of State to the public and to Parliament, will be called in aid. But, with respect, it would seem to me that such procedures as that would indeed be apt for the area where surveillance is used which is referred to in subsection (4)—namely, assistance in the detection of serious offences—although I admit that that procedure might be a little difficult in regard to espionage investigations which might call for special provision. However, there is an authoritative view supportive of what we were venturing to say last time round on this matter. What is proposed in the amendment is nothing like as radical as that.

All that we are proposing to do is to make an honest, law-abiding man of the Home Secretary and to make sure that that which he is doing now has a firm, legal and statutory basis instead of being lost in the mists of prerogative and mere ancient usage. What we propose does not involve the suggestions, valuable as they are—and it may well be that we shall come round to those at some other time. All that we propose to do is to give proper statutory effect to what is already taking place.

There is, in addition, a provision to increase and make severe the penalties for those who unlawfully intercept the mail although as far as that is concerned, of course, it is much more difficult in regard to letters than in regard to telephone tapping for obvious reasons, and improper intervention by the Post Office servants in opening mail et cetera is already severely punished.

What we propose in the amendment is no more than a statement of what the Secretary of State has said is his current practice. I ask your Lordships to look at subsection (4) where it says: The Secretary of State may, on the application of a chief officer of police or the Commissioners of Customs and Excise, issue a warrant for the interception and disclosure of the mail if he is satisfied that—

  1. (a) it would assist in the detection of a serious offence;
  2. (b) normal methods of investigation have been tried and have failed …
  3. (c) there is good reason to think that the interception would result in a conviction for that offence".
The offence is then defined. That is precisely what the Secretary of State says that he is doing now, but he has no statutory authority to do it. When we come to the action of the Secretary of State, it says: The Secretary of State may [issue a warrant] on the application of a chief officer of police or the Director-General of the Security Service in the field of terrorist or espionage matters. The precise language that is used in that paragraph is the language which the Secretary of State has used to describe his conduct in this field. It says that warrants are issued if the Secretary of State is satisfied that: it would assist in the detection of a major terrorist or espionage activity giving rise to external or internal danger to the defence of the Realm; and (b) normal methods of investigation have been tried". Therefore, it is a far more modest proposal than is recommended by the Royal Commission.

There is one factual aspect of this field as regards which I would invite the assistance of the noble Earl, Lord Gowrie. In the earlier debate I asked the noble Earl if he could help us about the extent of mail interception. I did so in the light of statements that were made in the debate in another place where it was said that the figure for mail interception is "enormous". The honourable gentleman in another place added that half a dozen agencies, apparently called "requesting agencies", have a right to demand interception of mail. I would be grateful if the noble Earl could comment on those assertions of fact because the only information that the noble Earl has communicated to the House is from the White Paper on the interception of Communication in Great Britain. The White Paper gives the number of letter interceptions as only 52 by the Home Secretary in 1979. Indeed, as he pointed out, if those are the accurate and full figures of all that goes on, it does show a steady decline in the number of letter interceptions since 1958. However, there is a good deal of public anxiety that that table does not represent accurately what is actually going on. I think that it would be reassuring if we could get from the noble Earl himself some assurance about that and if he would deal precisely with those allegations that were made in another place.

Whatever the number of mail interceptions may be, we on this side of the House—and I suspect that there may be support in all parts of the House for this view—feel that the interceptions do require a far more certain and establishable legal base than they have at present. I think that it would put the position right in law; secondly I think that it would operate in the way that the Royal Commission has suggested, and would reassure the public. Finally, I think that it would greatly strengthen our position in Strasbourg in proceedings before the European Convention if it could be established beyond doubt that these practices are authorised expressly by the law. In those circumstances, I beg to move the amendment.

3.40 p.m.

The Earl of Gowrie

My Lords, I must, first, apologise to the noble and learned Lord and, indeed, to the House for not being wholly clear on one point that the noble and learned Lord made when he moved a very similar amendment during the Committee stage of the Bill. At that time I made a guess, which I think, in fact, turned out to be the right one; but one should not guess and I have now been able to confirm, as the noble and learned Lord said at the time, that the same principles apply to the interception of mail as to the interception of telecommunications, and I had been dealing at the previous stage fundamentally with telecommunications.

I shall not take up the time of the House by repeating once more the speech which I made at a previous stage, although it is still, of course, directly relevant and related to the present amendment. I would simply remind the House of the main elements of the Government's case against putting the mail and telecommunications interception arrangements of this country on a statutory footing, as the amendment of the noble and learned Lord would seek to do.

I think that everyone who has spoken has appreciated the sad necessity for interception in certain circumstances. There is agreement on the value of interception as a weapon against crime and other wrongdoing. But, if interception is to be effective, it must necessarily be carried out in secret. Public interception is a contradiction in terms, if you like. If someone is planning an armed robbery and knows that his telephone is being tapped or is likely to be tapped, or that his letters are being opened or are likely to be opened, he simply will not divulge his plans on the telephone or in his letters. But it is equally important that any of his associates who were disposed to tip off the police and direct the attention of the police to the crime, should have their identity and the information which they were giving also kept secret.

If the criteria for interception are laid down in an Act of Parliament, then necessarily the courts would have to be empowered to look into individual cases. They could only decide such cases if they had laid before them all the information which had led to the decision to authorise the interception. That includes, of course, the information given—possibly at considerable personal risk—for whatever motives, by the armed robber's associate or other criminal associates. As the case would have to be heard in the presence of the complainant—for example, the armed robber—he would thus learn not only which of his associates might be giving information to the police but also what information was in fact being given. Such a situation is not one to be contemplated seriously in the combating of crime.

On the points made by the noble and learned Lord about the Royal Commission on Criminal Procedure, in so far as the Royal Commission's recommendations bear on the interception of postal and telephone communications, the Government have, of course, considered them most carefully. The Royal Commission themselves drew attention to the sketchy and preliminary nature of their views and they were, of course, referring only to criminal cases. For the reasons that I set out in my speech in Committee, I do not believe that it would be right to follow the Royal Commission in the matter of interception. First, they recommend putting our practice into law and, therefore, as I have just said, before the courts. They recommend that the product of interception should be used in evidence, and they recommend that, at any rate retrospectively, the fact of interception should be disclosed. Again, that would be a damaging departure from our practice and would necessarily expose the secret facts of interception. In our view, it would not enhance the protection now given to the individual, but at the same time it would weaken the protection given by the practice of interception to law-abiding citizens.

The Royal Commission recommend that authorisation should pass from the Home Secretary to the magistracy. The Government considered this suggestion in preparing the White Paper and my right honourable friend the Home Secretary has now considered it again. But the balance of advantage seems to us to lie in making no such change. The transfer of responsibility to the magistracy or the judges would again tend to weaken rather than strengthen the undivided control over interception which is exercised by my right honourable friend. It would also make for inconsistency in the application of the principles governing the control of interception.

On the issue of "requesting agencies", I must say that I am not quite clear what is meant by these expressions. The allegations about hundreds of addresses being intercepted are altogether without foundation. The White Paper sets out the position, as the noble and learned Lord acknowledged. Applications for interception have to be made to the Home Secretary. They may be made by the police, by customs and excise or by the security service. On the point about the numbers, the number of warrants for the interception of mail issued in 1979—the last year for which I have figures—was 52 in all.

Therefore, the nub of the Government's case is that interception can be effective only if kept secret, and that legislation would destroy this secrecy and thus the effectiveness of interception, because the whole point of legislation is that it would be for the courts to enforce it. However, that said, the Government of course recognise the great concern that the public feel that the power to authorise the interception of private communications should be very strictly controlled indeed. I urge all noble Lords who have expressed anxiety about this, or who are in any state of anxiety about it —and I sincerely believe that such anxiety is reasonable and responsible—to read carefully the White Paper published in April last year (Cmnd. 7873) on the Interception of Communications in Great Britain. This White Paper sets out in the very greatest detail the rigorous procedures adopted to safeguard individual rights and also to ensure that the power is not misused.

I also urge the House to read the report by the noble and learned Lord, Lord Diplock, (Cmnd. 8191) on his monitoring of these procedures. The noble and learned Lord's role as monitor enables him to look into individual cases, into all the information behind them and to test them against the criteria set out in the White Paper. That, in the Government's view, is a really effective and disinterested safeguard for the individual. Perhaps I could conclude by quoting two passages from the noble and learned Lord's report. He said: My discussions with the responsible officers of each of the authorities on whose behalf warrants are issued by the Secretary of State, supplemented by my personal inspection of the actual products of interception in individual cases which I selected at random to follow through in detail, have satisfied me that the interception of communications, particularly telephone conversations, remains an effective, indeed an essential, weapon in the armoury of those authorities responsible for the maintenance of law and order and the safety of the realm. I conclude, therefore, from the monitoring of the procedures for the interception of communications that I have been able to undertake up to the present date, that those procedures are working satisfactorily and with the minimum interference with the individuals' rights of privacy in the interests of the public weal". If this amendment were passed, it would bring joy to the darkest corners of national and international life. I am confident that the House will have the wisdom to reject this amendment if the noble and learned Lord decides to press it—which I hope very much he will not do.

3.50 p.m.

Lord Gardiner

With respect, I should have thought that my noble and learned friend Lord Elwyn-Jones made an unanswerable case for this amendment. We have heard what the noble Earl has said but I should like to raise two points in particular. The noble Earl has laid great stress on the Diplock Report and I am sure that there is no Member of your Lordships' House who has more complete confidence in that noble and learned Lord than I have. However, when we were discussing telephone communications I did ask the noble Earl if he would be good enough to tell me whether I was right in thinking, first, that not all our own security services came within the terms of reference of the Diplock Report; secondly, that so far as telephone tapping was concerned the Diplock Report did not cover—because it was outside its terms of reference—telephone tapping by Government Communications Headquarters; thirdly, that the Diplock Report's terms of reference did not include telephone tapping by American security forces in England. The noble Earl was good enough to say he would write to me with the answers. I have since had a letter from the noble Earl, but it did not answer any of my questions. It is some little time since I raised these questions; so could the noble Earl now tell me the answers to them, and could he also say which agencies are authorised to open and read letters—or read without opening, as I understand one can do now? Do they include, for example, agencies which are security services serving foreign Governments?

Also, the noble Earl has not dealt in any way with the point made by my noble and learned friend about the European Convention. The European Convention is quite clear in providing a right of privacy, which applies to both telephone tapping and mail opening. It then provides for exceptions in the usual form; it states that any party to the convention may make a law allowing, whether for security reasons or for the prevention of crime and so forth, telephone tapping or mail opening, but that there must be a law made to that effect. Does the noble Earl agree with what my noble and learned friend has suggested, which I believe is unanswerable, that unless and until we have a law we are, in both these fields, in breach of the European Convention? As the noble Earl must know, Western Germany and many other Western European countries which are party to the convention have made just the kind of law proposed in this amendment. If these laws can work perfectly well in other West European countries, why should they not work here?

Lord Hooson

I agree that the noble and learned Lord, Lord Elwyn-Jones, has made an unanswerable case for this amendment. I believe what worries your Lordships' House are not so much interceptions made with a warrant but interceptions made without one. The noble Earl, Lord Gowrie, stated that there were 52 cases of warrants issued by the Home Secretary in the last recorded year, which I understand was 1979. Could the noble Earl assure your Lordships' House that there were no other interceptions? I do not believe that he can. It is the instances of interceptions made without a warrant which greatly disturb your Lordships' House. The noble Earl said that there was a "sad necessity" for interceptions. His exact words were: There is agreement on the value of interception as a weapon against crime and other wrongdoing". But, in fact, how many cases are solved in this way? There must be a limit, and surely what the amendment proposes are essential safeguards in a civilised community. If other European countries do not find it necessary to do things merely as a matter of practice without any backing in law, which is the position in this country, why cannot we do the same as they do? The noble Earl has not answered that point at all.

The Earl of Gowrie

The noble and learned Lord, Lord Gardiner, said that I wrote to him, but that I did not answer a number of points that he required me to answer. That is true and I did not answer him inadvertently. I have subsequently sent the noble and learned Lord a letter apologising for the fact that the tail-end of my letter was omitted from the original draft, and the noble and learned Lord now has it. My answer may not, from his point of view, be very satisfactory, but I did not intend any discourtesy in my original answer—it was simply an error for which I have apologised.

Lord Gardiner

I do of course accept the noble Earl's explanation. I have not had his answer, but I daresay that it is waiting for me upstairs.

The Earl of Gowrie

I am grateful to the noble and learned Lord. Obviously this is not a closed issue between the noble and learned Lord and myself, and I will now take up the answers to his questions, which should have been given in my original letter. The noble and learned Lord is slightly incorrect in giving the air that there are some agencies which have the right to intercept our mail or telecommunications, for whatever worthy ends. Agencies are not automatically authorised to do so. As I said previously, they are simply able to make applications to the Home Secretary. The noble and learned Lord asked me which agencies are involved and I repeat that they are the police, customs and excise, and the security service. These are the agencies which can make applications and my right honourable friend can grant an application or withhold it, and he exercises that right in each individual case.

On the security issues, I do not feel that it would be right for me to go further. The noble and learned Lord will be well aware of the very long-standing convention that Ministers do not answer questions which would bear on intelligence matters affecting the external defence and essential foreign interests of the Realm. I do not think that there is anything unusual or sinister in my reluctance to depart from that convention, which has obtained with successive Governments over many years. I can tell the noble and learned Lord that facilities are not made available to foreign Governments or their agencies to intercept United Kingdom telephone, postal, and telex services. Nor do we have any evidence of unauthorised interception of United Kingdom communications within the United Kingdom. If such evidence came to light, we would, of course, take appropriate measures.

The noble and learned Lord asked me whether our arrangements were not in conflict with the European Convention. I do not believe it is for me or for the Government to give a definitive ruling on whether or not our arrangements are a breach of the convention. In the Government's view, our arrangements fully protect the liberty of the subject, which is the purpose of the convention, because the procedures, conditions and safeguards are published and practised. They ensure strict political control by Ministers who are ultimately responsible to Parliament and they are buttressed by the undertaking that they will not be changed without Parliament being informed. On top of those long-standing protections we have added the overdrive, as it were, of the monitoring arrangements by the noble and learned Lord, Lord Diplock. His first report has in fact endorsed them. The Government will present their case before the human rights institutions at Strasbourg on the basis that I have outlined, because the Government are quite confident that that basis is sound.

I do not think I can answer again in detail the question from the noble Lord who sits on the Liberal Benches about the observation by others of these conventions, or how others interpret the Human Rights Convention. But the noble Lord on the Liberal Benches, as we all know, is far from naïve, and it would be naïve to assume that security precautions and procedures by sovereign states who are signatories to the convention do not in fact exist or take place.

On the question of unauthorised interception, interception not granted by my right honourable friend the Home Secretary, we have no evidence of such unauthorised interception. It would in any event be very difficult to conduct this unauthorised interception without the co-operation of Post Office officials. It is quite a tricky business. It would be a serious offence for any Post Office official to do any such thing. It would of course be a criminal offence punishable by imprisonment.

I do not think that I can make the case any more clearly than I have done. I would remind the House that the procedures and conventions that I have outlined have been a matter of consent in this country for some years, and that far from simply resting on that consent we have augmented it in the way that I described through the work of the noble and learned Lord. I would finally remind the House that while we are justifiably anxious at this period of history about violations of privacy, we are also facing something of an international epidemic not only in ordinary crimes of gain but in terrorism. I would very much doubt whether the House would wish to weaken what is alas! liable to be a continuing fight against this sinister but widespread historical development.

Lord Elwyn-Jones

My Lords, I confess that I did not feel particularly alarmed at the startling picture that the noble Earl painted of the thieves and villains and criminals in the dark corners of the world tonight raising three cheers that my amendment had passed through this noble House. I think that that is a grotesque paranoia on his part, if he does not mind my saying so, when the effect of the passing of this amendment will be to make more certain and more effective the exercise of the powers which at present the Secretary of State is using. It will certainly be more sure of seeing us through Strasbourg, and it will bring us in line with contemporary societies whose Governments have done the sort of thing that I am recommending. I do not think it will give them any comfort if they think again about it, in so far as they think at all in those dark corners of the world where the criminals foregather. I am sure that they would find no comfort in this.

What has disturbed me a little is the lack of confidence that the noble Earl has shown in the ability of our judicial system to protect the security and secrecy of interventions, when it is necessary that those who invade the security of the country and the criminals come up for trial. I, like other noble Lords, have taken part in secrecy cases in the Old Bailey where matters of the most intimate importance are canvassed, dealt with and tried; and so far as I am aware the dangers of breaches of security have been contained by the judicial process. No, I am sorry that the noble Earl has not been impressed more by the views expressed in the Royal Commission which seemed to run quite contrary to the conclusion that the Government have come to. In all the circumstances, I am afraid that I must ask the House to express a view on this amendment.

4.5 p.m.

On Question, Whether the said amendment (No. 70) shall be agreed to?

Their Lordships divided: Contents, 81; Not-Contents, 106.

Airedale, L. David, B.
Amherst, E. Denington, B.
Amulree, L. Donaldson of Kingsbridge, L.
Ardwick, L. Elwyn-Jones, L.
Aylestone, L. Ewart-Biggs, B.
Banks, L. Fisher of Rednal, B.
Barrington, V. Foot, L.
Beaumont of Whitley, L. Gaitskell, B.
Beswick, L. Gardiner, L.
Birk, B. Gladwyn, L.
Bishopston, L. [Teller.] Glenamara, L.
Blease, L. Hale, L.
Blyton, L. Hampton, L.
Boston of Faversham, L. Hanworth, V.
Brockway, L. Henderson, L.
Byers, L. Hooson, L.
Cledwyn of Penrhos, L. Houghton of Sowerby, L.
Collison, L. Hunt, L.
Jacobson, L. Sefton of Garston, L.
Jacques, L. Segal, L.
Janner, L. Shinwell, L.
Jeger, B. Somers, L.
Jenkins of Putney, L. Stedman, B.
John-Mackie, L. Stewart of Alvechurch, B.
Kennet, L. Stewart of Fulham, L.
Kings Norton, L. Stone, L.
Leatherland, L. Strabolgi, L.
Listowel, E. Strauss, L.
Lloyd of Kilgerran, L. Taylor of Mansfield, L.
Longford, E. Underhill, L.
Lovell-Davis, L. Wallace of Coslany, L. [Teller.]
Mishcon, L.
Morris of Grasmere, L. Wells-Pestell, L.
Peart, L. Whaddon, L.
Phillips, B. White, B.
Ponsonby of Shulbrede, L. Wigoder, L.
Porritt, L. Wilson of Langside, L.
Rathcreedan, L. Wilson of Radcliffe, L.
Roberthall, L. Wootton of Abinger, B.
Rochester, L. Wynne-Jones, L.
Ross of Marnock, L. Young of Dartington, L.
Abercorn, D. Henley, L.
Allen of Abbeydale, L. Hylton-Foster, B.
Allerton, L. IIchester, E.
Alport, L. Kilmany, L.
Ampthill, L. Kinloss, Ly.
Avon, E. Lane-Fox, B.
Balfour of Inchrye, L. Lauderdale, E.
Bellwin, L. Lindsey and Abingdon, E.
Beloff, L. Long, V.
Belstead, L. Lyell, L. [Teller.]
Berkeley, B. McAlpine of Moffat, L.
Bessborough, E. Mackay of Clashfern, L.
Burton, L. Malmesbury, E.
Caccia, L. Mancroft, L.
Campbell of Croy, L. Marley, L.
Chelwood, L. Marshall of Leeds, L.
Clancarty, E. Mersey, V.
Clitheroe, L. Mottistone, L.
Clwyd, L. Mowbray and Stourton, L.
Cockfield, L. Moyne, L.
Cork and Orrery, E. Newall, L.
Cottesloe, L. Northchurch, B.
Cromartie, E. Nugent of Guildford, L.
Cullen of Ashbourne, L. Onslow, E.
Daventry, V. Orr-Ewing, L.
Davidson, V. Perth, E.
De Freyne, L. Portland, D.
De La Warr, E. Rankeillour, L.
Derwent, L. Robbins, L.
Drumalbyn, L. Rochdale, V.
Dundee, E. Rodney, L.
Eccles, V. Rugby, L.
Elliot of Harwood, B. Saint Oswald, L.
Elphinstone, L. Sandford, L.
Elton, L. Sandys, L. [Teller.]
Energlyn, L. Savile, L.
Exeter, M. Selkirk, E.
Faithfull, B. Sharples, B.
Ferrier, L. Skelmersdale, L.
Foley, L. Soames, L.
Fortescue, E. Spens, L.
Garner, L. Strathcarron, L.
Geoffrey-Lloyd, L. Strathclyde, L.
Gibson-Watt, L. Swinfen, L.
Glendevon, L. Teviot, L.
Gore-Booth, L. Tollemache, L.
Gormanston, V. Trefgarne, L.
Gowrie, E. Trumpington, B.
Hailsham of Saint Marylebone, L. Vaux of Harrowden, L.
Vickers, B.
Halsbury, E. Vivian, L.
Hankey, L. Ward of Witley, V.
Hawke, L. Westbury, L.
Hayter, L.

Resolved in the negative, and amendment disagreed to accordingly.