HL Deb 27 July 1981 vol 423 cc629-45

8.11 p.m.

Lord Hatch of Lusby rose to ask Her Majesty's Government what is their current policy on bringing independence to Namibia. The noble Lord said: My Lords, it may be wondered why at this stage in the Session the question of Namibia should be raised. I fear that unless we have a clear statement made by the Government tonight, we have no assurance that over the next ten weeks, which will be crucial weeks in this issue, events may not take place without our having the opportunity of investigating the Government's policy. May I draw the attention of the Government immediately to the special responsibility which Britain has in the issue of Namibia.

When Namibia was mandated in 1919 by the Treaty of Versailles it was mandated to His Britannic Majesty. In others words, it was passed over from the control of the Germans to the control of Britain, although the South Africans, not at that time independent, were to conduct the actual details of administration. Those mandates that were invented after the First World War laid down that the material and moral wellbeing and the social progress of the indigenous people should have priority in the administration of those territories. In fact, Britain was given the responsibility of ensuring the material and moral wellbeing and social progress of the people of Namibia.

As we know, the South African Government was given virtually free control for many years over the administration of what was then South West Africa. During that time there were a whole series of land removals—removal of people from land that they had traditionally farmed. Indeed, in as late as 1933 if it had not been for the opposition of the United Nations Mandates Commission South Africa would have incorporated Namibia into what was then the Union. After the second war, with the coming of the policy of apartheid—which really is nothing further than an extension of the pre-war policy—more people in the world woke up to the fact that this philosophy that had been supported by the South African white electorate in the election of 1948 was now being applied to the people of Namibia. The Europeans in Namibia, who are something just over 10 per cent. of the total population, were given six elected members to the South African Assembly and two senators, all of them to be Union nationals.

During the 1950s this policy of the South African Government of regarding what was then South West Africa as at least potentially a part of South Africa continually strengthened. In the 1960s there sat the well known commission known as the Odendaal Commission, which confirmed all that I have just been saying. It laid down that in South West Africa there were to be Bantustans as in South Africa itself. It was based upon tribal division; on ethnic communities. Despite the attempts of various countries—in particular Ethiopia and Liberia as original members of the League of Nations—on the international scene to stop the development of this policy by South Africa, it was not until 1966, when the General Assembly declared that the presence of South Africa in South West Africa was invalid, that the international community took the matter into its own hands. This was confirmed five years later in 1971 by the International Court of Justice, which declared that the South African presence was illegal.

That might be taken as our starting point of the modern history and the modern policy towards Namibia. Here was an independent country, South Africa, claiming that it had the right to incorporate into its territory as a fifth province people who were not to be consulted, people who had been declared to be protected by the international community and after 1971 by international law; and vet there was no sign that the South African Government had any intention of taking any notice.

I wonder why? Why is it that the South Africans wanted to include South West Africa within their territory? I would suggest that there are two reasons. I was told on my first visit to South Africa that the most important reason was that it was known that South West Africa was very rich in minerals. In fact, I was told that it had the largest iron ore field in the world, although that had not been exploited. But what has happened since does bear out the economic argument, because today 54 per cent. of the gross national product of Namibia goes in company profits. And who holds these companies?—the South Africans, the North Americans, and the British. They are Consolidated Diamond Mines; Tsumeb, the metal company; Rössing, the RTZ uranium company, with a nice little side line of fishing off Walvis Bay. That was the first reason.

The second reason was strategic. The South Africans wanted to push their borders as far away as possible from Capetown and Pretoria as they saw the advance of African nationalism from the North. By annexing South West Africa they would gain several hundred miles in moving their borders northwards. In any case, the South Africans had now to devise some form of strategy to meet the new international threat to their declared intentions of annexing South West Africa.

Since then, the policy of the South African Govern- ment has been two-fold, to procrastinate whenever possible and to subdue the opposition to their rule in that country. From 1971 to 1973 there was a desultory dialogue with the United Nations; they then turned to what they called the "internal solution", and the Turnhalle Conference dragged on for two years, from 1975 to 1977; and then in 1977 the South Africans appointed their administrator-general who had virtually dictatorial powers under the South African Government. Within all of that there was the continual oppression of those who objected to South African policy. One recalls—it was only three years ago—in May 1978 the Kassinga massacre in which between 800 and 900 people were killed. That happened only nine days after the South African Government had accepted the Western Group's proposals; and this is where I suggest we find the key to South African policy: internal suppression linked with the postponement of any international decision-making.

So we go on to the holding of the internal elections, which again were based on the tribal theory and were rejected by the United Nations; the setting up of government departments under the administrator-general; the creation of the national assembly; the declaration of self-government in July of last year; the setting up of an independent Civil Service which includes 10,000 South Africans; last year the introduction of conscription for black males between the ages of 16 and 25; and in April of this year, the creation of a South-West African independent police force.

It was only at the beginning of this year that the South Africans again showed how they linked together their internal strongman tactics with the delaying of any international decision-making when they broke up the Geneva Conference by refusing to agree to a cease-fire. But meanwhile, what about the countries surrounding Namibia—Angola, Botswana and Zambia? If noble Lords have been in any of those countries, they will know that for years they have been the subject of continual attacks by, in particular, the South African Air Force. They have lost men, women and children and much of their infrastructure and installations by what is nothing less than international aggression. What has happened to the men and women whom one can compare with people like Robert Mugabe and Joshua Nkomo in Zimbabwe; people like Herman ja Towo, who has been on Robben Island since 1968 and who was one of the founder members of SWAPO; and many others, running into hundreds, who have been not only listed but named both by Amnesty International and the Defence and Aid Fund?

Where do the British Government stand in this situation? We became part of what was known as the Western Contact Group from 1977 onwards and we took part in the drawing up of Resolution 435 which made provision for United Nations-supervised elections and for United Nations forces to be present during the electoral period. Ourselves, along with the West Germans, French, Americans and the Canadians, as the Western Contact Group, were tacitly a bargain with the Front Line African states. The tacit bargain was—I am sure there is no piece of paper to prove this—that if the Western Contact Group could deliver South African acceptance of the United Nations' plan, then it was the responsibility of the Front Line states to persuade SWAPO to agree to United Nations-supervised elections. The Front Line states have delivered; we have not. The Front Line states persuaded SWAPO to agree to United Nations-supervised elections; we have not persuaded or coerced the South African Government to accept that same plan which has been laid down by the United Nations.

One reason why, it seems to me, the Western Group has so far failed is that the South Africans were doing very much what Ian Smith was doing two years before them. While Ian Smith was waiting for a Conservative Government in this country and refusing to negotiate because he believed a Conservative Government would give him greater opportunities, the South African Government were waiting for the Democrats to be defeated in the United States and for Reagan to become President. At present, it looks as though they were probably right from their point of view because we now learn that the Reagan Administration are attempting to strengthen Resolution 435. What does "strengthen" mean in this context?

Those of us who have had experience of regularly meeting officials in the State Department and seeing the business world of America, know very well what it meant when the Reagan Administration came in and how the forces in the United States have changed in their attitude towards South Africa. We have seen that the so-called strengthening of Resolution 435 means nothing more than its dilution; it means nothing more than the proposal to hold a conference before elections, whereas the United Nations' plan has always laid down that the constitution shall be determined by the elected representatives of the people of Namibia.

I was very alarmed when I read that in the last couple of weeks in another place a spokesman for the Government declared that the British Government gave fullest support to the American plan to "strengthen" Resolution 435. We have a right to know tonight whether the Government confirm or deny that they are supporting an attempt to change Resolution 435 in the way that has been suggested from within the Reagan Administration. That same Administration publicly declared after the Geneva conference that it might abandon its negotiating position if there was no realistic prospect of success. That can mean many things—but I know what it means in South Africa. In South Africa, it is a signal to hold on until the Reagan Administration in the United States can settle its southern Africa policy, with the promise that this will be settled in a way much more favourable to the white régime than in the past.

It has been suggested that the Reagan Administration will place one condition on any action or persuasion in Pretoria—the withdrawal of the Cubans from Angola. That has nothing to do with the issue of Namibia. The Cubans are in Angola because they were asked there by the Angolan Government. They were asked there in order to defend Angola from the South Africa invasion. There were no Cubans in Angola before the South Africans had invaded that country. May I suggest that this is one of the most dangerous issues that we are facing in the world today. So far as southern Africa is concerned I can tell your Lordships that no country in southern Africa will accept this attempted change in Resolution No. 435. But for as long as it lies on the table and is being thrown around, for as long as the Namibia issue remains not settled, and for as long as the Namibian people are not enabled to elect their own Government and to decide their own constitution, every part of southern Africa is being kept in a state of suspense, and a great deal of the work that was begun hopefully in respect of co-operation between the countries of southern and central Africa is being held up.

Secondly, there is an even deeper threat behind this. It has been suggested that part of the Reagan Administration's plan for the future is to create a South Atlantic treaty organisation which would include countries such as Argentina, Brazil, Chile and South Africa. Where does the British Government stand on that prospect? It is an open question and one that is being openly discussed in the United States, because if that kind of organisation were created then the signal would have gone to the third world that the Reagan Administration, with the support of the British Government, is prepared to support any friends, however oppressive and however barbarous they may be, so long as they will fit in and agree with the policies of the United States and Great Britain.

The question of sanctions has been raised and I will say only this about it. Comprehensive sanctions against South Africa are impossible. I say this quite bluntly, and I say it just as openly in Africa as I do here in London. Sanctions are impossible—and I am supported in this argument by Robert Mugabe—because the countries around South Africa cannot at the moment exist without trade with South Africa. I have pointed out that the manufacturing and mining industries of Namibia are controlled by South Africans—but they are also controlled by the North Americans and the British. There is a growing feeling in Africa—which I share completely—that it is the responsibility of the Western industrial nations, who have their investments in South Africa and who control very largely the economic activities of South Africa, to say that unless the South Africans will obey international law, then we will apply the necessary sanctions to their economic system.

Finally, we are facing here an issue which concerns the status of international law, the authority of the United Nations and of the International Court of Justice. In short, we are facing an issue in which one country with its distorted philosophy is defying the rest of the world community and the clear declarations which have been made about the future of Namibia.

8.37 p.m.

Lord Caradon

My Lords, I have no intention this evening of going into the detail of this case, which has been presented so fully and so ably. When I saw that this proposal was to be brought before your Lordships' House this evening, I was anxious to support that action. For a matter of a decade or two, I have been closely involved in the matter which we have discussed. I do not particularly wish to remember it now, but at one time I was appointed Commissioner of Namibia. That appointment did not survive the complaint made by the Soviet Union at that time—but for a day or two I did expect that I might be spending a great deal of time in dealing with problems of Namibia.

I have undertaken a tour of southern Africa at the request of the leaders of Namibia, although I was refused permission to enter South Africa or Namibia on that expedition. So for a long time I have been concerned with this main issue and two or three thoughts crossed my mind as I listened to the full and able exposition which has been put to us this evening. First is the thought that the weapon of delay is one that we so often attempt to counter—whether it is in Cyprus, over the unanimous resolution of the United Nations not being carried out; in the Middle East, where another unanimous resolution has been left to rot; or in Namibia, where the decisions of the United Nations have been ignored and in effect condemned by refusal to act.

Yes, delay is the weapon of those who wish to maintain indefinitely the tyranny of South Africa over the territory of Namibia. Now that the other neighbouring territories, which at one time provided a sort of fence around South Africa have changed, all the more anxious is South Africa to maintain its control of the remaining territory of Namibia. Delay has been the purpose, continues to be the purpose, and is sometimes the most difficult of all the policies to counter. It is so simple to convince people that it is easier to do nothing than to take courageous action, and it will I believe be the endeavour of South Africans and those who are apt to support them to maintain the long delay, which in my own experience goes back for a couple of decades.

The other thought—it is scarcely necessary to emphasise it still further this evening—is that this is an issue of such overwhelming importance to the future of the world. We talk about the relations between the rich and the poor and the north and the south. I can think of no issue which is of greater consequence than the issue of Namibia. It is a comparatively small country, or if not a small country, a thinly populated country, but it is now top of the list of priorities if we are to secure an answer to the racial questions of Africa, which are among the most important issues of the whole world.

So we now have to consider what can be done and what should be the part of our country. I think it is so that the five western powers, who have been endeavouring perhaps to tackle this question for a matter of years, have failed to give it the urgency and the importance which would justify courageous action, and I believe that our country carries part of that responsibility. We have heard tonight a reference to the part which the United States has played, or will play. I would be a little more hopeful perhaps. My impression is that the new administration in the United States in many matters started out with ideas, purposes, based on ignorance and prejudice, and I like to think that week by week we see changes taking place as they have to face up, with due experience, to the action which is required. I would not put it beyond possibility that the administration in the United States can learn the dangers, the necessities, of the situation in Namibia and Southern Africa.

However, I believe that the primary responsibility must be the responsibility of this Government. If this Government which, as we have heard, carried the original responsibility for the administration of Namibia, refuses to take the lead—leaves it to the Five, leaves it to the Americans, leaves it to indefinite delay—then I believe that in the end it will be we, our Government, our country, who have failed in their primary responsibility. We are I believe primarily responsible in Africa to ensure that this survival of racial tyranny should not be permitted. The authority of the international community and the United Nations should not be flouted. We should move towards a situation in which South Africa must realise that it must abandon its delaying tactics in Namibia, and must turn its attention to its own grave problems which have to be tackled if it is not to face appalling consequences for itself and indeed for many neighbouring territories.

So I believe that it is right and necessary that at this time the matter should have been raised as it has been this evening. I believe that within a few weeks there is to be a major consultation in New York in anticipation of the forthcoming General Assembly, at which for 10 days or more countries of Africa and of the third world will be coming together to give their undivided attention to this, possibly the most important problem for the future of the world. It is essential that in this country there should be a feeling of our own obligation, and I think that we, in our influence on the United States and on the other members of the Five, can play a belated, but an honourable, part.

8.45 p.m.

The Earl of Bessborough

My Lords, unlike the noble Lord, Lord Caradon, I am very much of a new boy in Namibia, and I cannot match the wide range of his experience in these matters both at the United Nations and in our own colonial service in the past. Therefore I was rather hesitant to speak this evening, but a friend of mine urged me to do so. I have to admit that I have never been to Namibia. I should very much like to go. I know a little about it. I know about its resources in uranium and diamonds. I was interested to see the Question on the Order Paper, and in a sense I am speaking in order to instruct myself, as much as to instruct other noble Lords.

Very briefly, it seems to me essential that any procedure for bringing about independence in Namibia should be fair for the whole of the population. If Resolution 435 remains the general basis (I emphasise the term, general basis) for achieving independence, then the United Nations should give clear evidence of its impartiality—whether it can do this I do not know; it might be too much to ask—well in advance of the implementation of the scheme; otherwise it would not be fair and just.

As Mr. Dirk Mudge, the leader of the Democratic Turnhalle Alliance (the DTA) said recently, It would be unfair if the referee was to wear the shirt of one of the competing teams". In my view the DTA will have to have a meaningful role in the negotiations. It also seems essential that Resolution 435 should be amended to give guarantees to all minority ethnic groups to safeguard their constitutional future after independence.

Whatever might have been suggested on the other side of the House, it does not seem to me that the Democratic Turnhalle Alliance (the DTA) are in any way puppets of the South African Government. They appear to be a party of unity, and to be representative of all the 11 ethnic groups within the territory. They claim, I think justifiably, to be a party of the liberation—but they have chosen the way of democracy, rather than of terrorism. I believe that the alliance have made remarkable changes in the territory during their short period of authority, removing among other things—and this is of primordial importance—all laws based on race.

If I look at SWAPO, I have to accept that they are a military and political Marxist organisation. But we simply do not know how representative that organisation is. To make my remarks extremely brief, I should like to say that Nujoma is not in my view a Mugabe, and indeed Namibia is not Zimbabwe. I hope my noble friend can assure me that these points are being borne in mind by Her Majesty's Government.

Briefly to summarise, I believe that President Reagan should send out a presidential envoy, rather like he did Mr. Habib in the Middle East, and I believe that envoy should assert a presence in Windhoek to assess Namibian development needs. I believe there should be constitutional guarantees for say 10 years by the United States, the United Kingdom and South Africa, with a multi-national guard under a three power council. The envoy should mediate reconciliation between Luanda and Savimbi and then recognise and give aid to a United Angola. That envoy should help negotiate a coalition government in Namibia. The United Nations could then supervise and ratify independent elections which, in the nature of things, would be a celebratory refendum. My last essential point is that the American envoy should call a final conference and proceed with those who attend and can stay the distance. We must leave it in this case for the United States to take the lead, unlike the lead which we took in Zimbabwe.

8.51 p.m.

Lord Brockway

My Lords, our discussion tonight is extraordinarily appropriate. Next week officials of the Western Powers will be meeting in Paris to make preparations for the full meeting of Ministers in September before this House resumes. Therefore this is the last opportunity which we have to express our view on these matters before those decisions are reached. It is quite extraordinary in international affairs that over the years South Africa has been able to defy not only the decisions of the United Nations but the decision of the International Court of Justice that its occupation of Namibia is absolutely illegal.

The discussions have been going on for years, and quite clearly the Government of the Republic of South Africa has sought delay after delay after delay, because every delay was to her advantage. During that time she set up a national assembly following an election which not only the United Nations but the Western Powers refused to recognise and said was illegal, setting up in Namibia tribal authorities reflecting her own plan of Bantustan, using her power to imprison political opponents. At this moment there are 60 people imprisoned in Namibia under the Terrorist Act. This is all proceeding in a territory which not only the United Nations but the International Court of Justice have declared is quite illegally occupied by South Africa. The noble Lord, Lord Hatch of Lusby, has gone into great detail which I do not want to repeat.

I now come to quite immediate events. The long negotiations of the five Western nations—Canada, France, the United States, Western Germany and Great Britain—have recently been supplemented by direct negotiations between the United States of America and South Africa. What their decisions are we only vaguely know. The United States describes them as strengthening Resolution 435 of the United Nations. I am a little disturbed that 10 days ago at Ottawa the five Western nations declared that they are considering measures which would complement and strengthen the existing United Nations plan. My Lords, that suggests that proposals have now been made by the United States of America, now given support by the five Western nations, which will qualify Resolution 435 of the United Nations.

I want to be constructive. Of the three points which were adopted in the statement by the five nations at Ottawa, undoubtedly the most controversial was the first, throwing doubt on the impartiality of the United Nations. One accepts that there is some case here; the United Nations has declared in favour of SWAPO as the only representative political organisation in Namibia. If there are to be elections under United Nations auspices, quite clearly the supervising body of the United Nations ought not to be on the side of one party. That difficulty has been met by decisions of SWAPO and of the front line states; both have said that in election circumstances the United Nations' declaration in favour of SWAPO as a representative of the people of Namibia should no longer apply and that in an election the United Nations itself should declare that they should withdraw in the election period from that position and so give an opportunity for an impartial supervision of that procedure. When earlier on in this House I suggested that that was a solution, the noble Lord, Lord Carrington, welcomed the idea. I should like to know from the Government tonight whether anything has been done to carry out that suggestion to meet the difficulty which was endorsed by both SWAPO and the front line nations.

My Lords, unless a solution is reached there is going to be a terrible situation in Africa. The whole of the African continent will be lined up against South Africa. What is to be our attitude in that kind of situation? We shall lose any sympathy or support from the peoples of Africa if we come down on the wrong side. I beg the Government, through its officials in Paris next week and at the ministerial conference in New York preceding the new United Nations Assembly, to be urging there a course which will bring Namibia to independence—bring it through an election; bring it through an impartial supervision by a United Nations force whose composition would have the confidence of the people. Let them do that, and then we may be saved from the terrible situation which there will be in Africa unless this position is resolved.

9.1 p.m.

Lord Gifford

My Lords, I am very sorry that the noble Lord, Lord Carrington, is not here to answer the Question which my noble friend has posed, and I hope that his absence from this House is not an indication of any lack of concern with which the Government view the problem which has been raised this evening. Because, as other noble Lords have said, there can be no other conflict in the world today which bears more menace for the future than the conflict that is already in progress over the future of Namibia; and there can be no other conflict in which the rights and wrongs according to international law are so clear as they are in the conflict of Namibia.

My Lords, if international law has any meaning at all, South Africa, through its illegal occupation of Namibia, must be branded as an international criminal. It is not only the illegal occupation; it is the imposition of South Africa's own racist policies—bantustans, or homelands, as they are called—outside its borders, upon a country in which it has no right to be. It is there in breach of its mandate, in defiance of the International Court of Justice and in violation of the resolutions of the Security Council.

Because of the repression of which my noble friend has spoken the people of Namibia have had no other option but, through their liberation movement, SWAPO, to take up an arms struggle—an arms struggle as legitimate in international law as the arms struggle of those peoples and those countries which were occupied by the fascist forces of Hitler. I thought the noble Earl, Lord Bessborough, was less than helpful in his references to terrorism when he was speaking of the struggle which the people of Namibia have been carrying on through an organisation which clearly bears, and will be proved to bear, the support of the overwhelming majority of the population.

My Lords, because of that struggle, because of the repression of the South African Administration, their leaders and their members have been executed, have been tortured and have been imprisoned upon Robben Island. Because of their struggle the amazing figure of 100,000 South African troops are now in occupation of a country whose population is only a little over 1 million. Nobody wants a protracted war, but the occupation of Namibia is storing up to come the bitterness of a guerrilla war which, unless the nations of the world can act, is going to lead to a spreading and increasingly bloody war.

What is less well known is that South Africa is not just responsible for a repression of the people within Namibia. It is extending its brutality deep inside the independent neighbouring states of Zambia and Angola. My noble friend spoke of Kassinga—Kassinga, where hundreds of Namibian refugees were massacred. Kassinga is in Southern Angola. So is Lubango and Xangongo, where in September 1979 South African jets came and bombed, leaving 56 Angolan dead and 175 wounded. So is Kunene, where South African land and air forces invaded in June 1980, leaving 378 civilians killed. These are just examples of a war which is continuing to this day and which the world hardly talks about. Who are the terrorists in such a war? I say it is those who invade and those who wreak acts of violence upon civilians in neighbouring states.

My Lords, I do not think that any amount of dialogue or contact or discussion or honest broking is going to have very much effect upon the policies of the South African Government. The pre-implementation talks in Geneva proved that. The representatives of SWAPO at Geneva behaved with exemplary moderation and restraint. The South African delegation was determined to wreck that meeting. Why? It was because, of course, they do not believe in democracy; they do not believe in the multiracialism for which SWAPO has always stood. Those who talk about guarantees for the whites in Namibia fail to realise that the people of Namibia are not infected by the same obsession about racial separation as are those who woo South Africa today.

In this situation I do not see that there is likely to be a peaceful solution unless the international community makes it clear that it will use the weapons at its disposal—not the weapons of war but the weapons which can shorten and reduce the horror of this escalating war. My plea tonight is for the Government to change their policy and to take seriously and to support the call for comprehensive mandatory sanctions against South Africa to be imposed by the Security Council under chapter 7 of the United Nations Charter.

My Lords, in May of this year an international conference on sanctions against South Africa took place in Paris. One hundred and twenty-four Governments took place. The Secretary-General of the United Nations took part. The United Kingdom was not represented, except unofficially through invited individuals such as myself. I had the honour to be elected rapporteur of the Political Commission of that conference, and I feel it is my particular duty to seek to convey to your Lordships the significance of the conference's declaration.

The conclusion of the conference was: The conference affirms that the sanctions provided under chapter 7 of the United Nations Charter universally applied are the most appropriate and effective means to ensure South African compliance with the decisions of the United Nations. The choice is between an escalation of conflict and the imposition of international sanctions, if all other attempts to reach a peaceful settlement have failed". That quotation does not convey the weight of the statement by the overwhelming majority of the world community that was represented: a statement of their desire to work together to secure peace in southern Africa. That statement does not reflect the growing impatience and resentment at the Western powers who, at the Security Council, imposed the veto upon the imposition of sanctions.

Sometimes it is said that sanctions cannot be imposed because of their effect upon the front line states. As my noble friend said, the front line states are in no position to take the initiative in imposing sanctions, but if and when the United Nations by its proper organs imposes mandatory sanctions the front line states will know how to play their part, as Zambia and Mozambique showed when sanctions were imposed against Rhodesia.

There is a possibility of influencing both South Africa and the United States by a change in attitude both of the French Government under their new President and of the British Government, who are two of the three powers which imposed the veto. It became clear to me in Paris that, quite apart from the moral issues, it was in our interests to ally ourselves with independent Africa and not with South Africa. The more we cling to our support for South Africa, the more we shall be disgraced in international circles which matter to the future of our own people.

I hope that in the end we can learn something from the tragedy of the Namibian people. If their independence cannot be gained by concessions from South Africa, as I think it cannot, it will have to be won, on the one hand, by the actions of the liberation movement, which would be long and bitter, or, on the other hand, by the united resolve of the rest of the world in imposing economic sanctions which can hurt, which is a way of reducing the bitterness which otherwise is to come.

9.13 p.m.

Baroness Llewelyn-Davies of Hastoe

My Lords, my noble friend Lord Hatch has waited for nearly three months for this Unstarred Question to be answered. I am very glad indeed that his patience has at last been rewarded because this is a very important and, indeed, highly dangerous situation which is brewing in Namibia and throughout the whole of southern Africa. He should, of course, have been supported in this debate by a deeply-experienced and knowledgeable Front Bench spokesman, but owing to the tragic loss of my noble friend Lord Goronwy-Roberts I shall try to speak briefly, although, I am afraid, much less adequately than he could have done, and with much less detailed knowledge than the very powerful speeches we have heard tonight.

My noble friend Lord Hatch gave a very full account, an historical account, of the Namibian situation, and one can summarise it briefly for the Government in these terms: Namibia has of course never been legally a part of South Africa. In 1966 the United Nations terminated the South African mandate; in 1971 the International Court of Justice declared South African occupation was illegal and that South Africa should withdraw. In 1976 the Resolution was passed demanding that the South African illegal administration should be ended. It stated that it was imperative that the peoples of Namibia should be enabled to decide their own future by means of free elections under the supervision and control of the United Nations. That is the position, in my view, which every British Government should maintain.

Many noble Lords have referred to the terrible happenings in Namibia: the appalling massacre at Kassinga; the illegal imprisonment of Namibians, not only in their own country but in South Africa as well; the stepping up of military aggression including something which I do not think has been mentioned, the use of nearly 3,000 international white mercenaries. One of the most dangerous things that the DTA (Democratic Turnhalle Alliance) has done has been to make conscription compulsory for the blacks into the security forces, which are of course South African. Until January of this year only whites were subject to conscription in Namibia, but now all races living south of the Northern territories are being conscripted. This is turning a guerrilla war into what is a civil war, with all the terrible implications that we know is held by that. My noble friend Lord Gifford also referred to the very dangerous extension of the war by South Africa into surrounding countries like Zambia.

I do not want to repeat the very powerful speeches that have been made, but I should like to ask the Minister who is to reply some questions to which I think the House is entitled to full answers. We were told that Namibia was to be discussed at Ottawa. The noble Lords, Lord Brockway and Lord Caradon, referred to this. All we gathered from the summit's report was that the ministerial talks in Europe this week are paving the way for discussions in New York in September. We assume that this is within the framework of the Security Council's Resolution, No. 435, undiluted, and we should like confirmation of that this evening.

The Observer newspaper reported on 19th July that at the ILO the United Kingdom had voted to support the liberation movement in Namibia. We should like confirmation of that vote and we should like to know what proceeds from it. We should also like to know what is the approach of the Government to the United Nations decree about the protection of the natural resources of Namibia. That is one of the key questions.

Then we come to the subject which I think most noble Lords have mentoned: the attitude of the new American administration. I tend to agree with my noble friend Lord Caradon perhaps a little more than with the more pessimistic view of others of my noble friends. Since they became a more experienced administration they seem to have modified their views on Namibia a little. Nevertheless, The Times reported on 23rd July that the American talks with South Africa in conjunction with the five nations contact group would try to ensure that the United Nations maintained impartiality between SWAPO and the DTA. The noble Earl, Lord Bessborough, mentioned impartiality. However, as my noble friend Lord Brockway explained, this is an unfortunate word to use in this connection, since SWAPO and the front line states have endorsed the fact that they will treat with all nations, whereas the DTA have specifically excluded SWAPO from their so-called Bantu-stance style of Government. So impartiality does not seem to enter into it very much.

If the noble Earl will forgive me, I think it was a pity that he brought in the so-called "linkage" argument with Angola and Namibia, because this seems to me to be not only highly dangerous but quite irrelevant. We are encouraged that Mr. Richard Luce, the Minister of State for the Foreign Office, said on 19th June that Britain regarded Resolution 435 as the only basis for a solution to the Namibian issue, and we would like to have that confirmed.

On these Benches we have some hope that the new French Government may strengthen the five nation contact group in its negotiations, since the French declared aims are: first, to end trade with Namibia; secondly, to stop public sector investment in South Africa; thirdly, to end incentives for private sector investment; and, fourthly, to tighten existing arms embargoes. I should like to plead with the Government to listen to the very eloquent plea made by my noble friend Lord Brockway about the meetings which will take place next week and also at the United Nations in September.

Above all, it is essential that progress should be made quickly. I thought my noble friend Lord Caradon made a marvellous phrase when he used the words, "weapon of delay". This has always been a weapon used against people trying to get their independence and it is particularly dangerous at the moment in this situation, because the delay is being used in many ways as described by noble Lords, but in particular it is being used by the internal Government led by Mr. Dirk Mudge, as was referred to by the noble Earl. You will all have had propaganda sheets from the Namibian authorities. On 13th July there was one which said: More power for the Council of Ministers: Mr. Danie Hough flew to Pretoria earlier this month to have talks with the South African Prime Minister and the discussion will centre on the possibility of extending the executive powers of the Namibian Council of Ministers. Repeated demands have been made by Members of the Council of Ministers for more authority to run the country". This is what happens when delay follows delay. Namibia becomes more and more consolidated with South Africa—with all the dangers that implies.

I should like to say in this connection that the New York Herald Tribune, a very realistic paper, had a good quote last month in which it said: The first priority of the Reagan people in Africa, as of their predecessors, is to find an internationally acceptable path to independence for Namibia. A Western plan for elections, supervised by the United Nations and leading to independence, was one of the notable examples of leadership by Carter administration". I should like to add to that. My noble friend Lord Gifford spoke eloquently about sanctions. He also said that Prime Minister Mugabe of Zimbabwe took a very realistic approach to this, which indeed he does, and the front-line states. Nevertheless, they express concern at any suggestion to deviate from the resolution which calls for elections supervised by the United Nations leading to independence.

I do not want to delay the House any further. We on these Benches believe that the peoples of Namibia should be able to determine their own future by free and fair elections supervised and controlled by the United Nations. We believe that the United Kingdom should stick firmly to the undiluted Resolution 435, which has been accepted by the majority of the international community, and we should like the Government to give us that assurance tonight.

9.25 p.m.

Lord Skelmersdale

My Lords, I do not think that at this hour of the night it would be very helpful for me to go over the ancient history, as it were, which was so ably described by the noble Lord, Lord Hatch, in his introduction to this small debate on his Unstarred Question on the Government's attitude to the future of Namibia. However, it would be fair to say that, despite the setback over the disappointing failure of the Geneva talks in January this year, the five have not abandoned their efforts.

When the Foreign Ministers of the five met in Rome on 3rd May, they agreed that the Namibia issue had been on the international agenda for far too long and they committed their governments to vigorous action in the effort to bring Namibia to early independence. It was agreed that the United States Government should take the lead in seeking to establish with the South African Government what were the reasonable requirements for South African agreement to implementation of the United Nations plan.

To this end there have been a number of exchanges between the United States and South African Governments over several weeks, including a visit by the South African Foreign Minister, Mr. Botha, to Washington in May and a United States mission led by the American Deputy Secretary of State, Mr. William Clark, to South Africa, Namibia and Zimbabwe in June. Most recently, while in Ottawa for the economic summit last week, the Foreign Ministers of the five met again to review the results of these exchanges. The Ministers considered possible measures to complement and strengthen the existing United Nations plan and to provide the confidence necessary for all parties to succeed. This has been a feature of this evening's debate and, if I am allowed to do so, I shall get back to it a little later on.

It is, of course, too early to say anything publicly about the nature of the measures which are currently under consideration, except that, as your Lordships may have seen from the statement issued after the Ottawa discussions, the Five Ministers agreed that officials should meet this week in Paris to do urgent and detailed work on them. Following the talks in Ottawa, we have been in contact with the front-line African states to explain that our objective is to work out concrete proposals for discussion with them and with the other parties and governments concerned in the effort to secure general agreement on implementation of the United Nations plan.

Of course, the independence of Namibia is long overdue. Nobody would dispute that. Indeed, in 1978, it was generally believed that a Namibia settlement would pave the way for the eventual independence of Zimbabwe. In the event, Namibia has proved the more intractable problem. The failure of the Geneva talks led in April to the meeting of the Security Council at which the United Kingdom, France and the United States vetoed four draft resolutions calling for economic sanctions against South Africa. These vetoes by the western Permanent Members of the Council evoked some criticism. But there is, in fact, a fairly widespread recognition that economic sanctions against South Africa would not advance the cause of independence for Namibia and, indeed, would cause great harm to the economies of many African and western countries, including our own. There is no viable alternative, apart from years of violence and misery, to patient negotiation designed to overcome one by one the remaining obstacles to agreement.

The noble Lord, Lord Hatch, spoke about United States policy in this area, and the noble Lord, Lord Caradon, later spoke a little more charitably about it. As I have said, the United States has recently been taking the lead in discussions with South Africa with the agreement of its partners in the five, who include, as well as ourselves, Canada, France and the Federal Republic of Germany. The current initiative is one of the Five as a whole—I must emphasise this; even though it is one member of the Five who, on this occasion, is having the talks, it is representing the Five nations as a whole—and this is made clear by the communiqué, which has already been referred to tonight, issued after the recent Ottawa meeting of Heads of State. This spoke: … of the five's agreement upon the urgent need to continue the effort to bring about the independence of Namibia in accordance with Security Council Resolution 435. This is something which has not changed. My noble friend Lord Bessborough asked about the need for the United Nations to demonstrate its impartiality. We have supported the right of the democratic Turnhalle Alliance to be fully involved in the negotiations and to speak in the United Nations Security Council. However, it is naturally up to the people of Namibia themselves in free and fair elections to decide who they wish to represent them in government. This is the goal of our Government's policy.

My noble friend also put forward some interesting proposals at the end of his speech. Like all the points raised tonight, I shall most certainly want to reflect upon them and study them further. The noble Lord, Lord Brockway, as did other noble Lords, stresssed the delay in achieving the independence of Namibia. The Government, I can assure him, share this frustration, but we also believe that negotiation, however frustrating and long drawn out, is the only way—as, indeed, was the case in what was Rhodesia and is now the independent country of Zimbabwe. Nobody would deny that that was a long drawn out road to independence. We want to make absolutely certain that we achieve a just, lasting and internationally recognised settlement. Neither sanctions nor violence will bring about the early and democratic independance of Namibia.

The noble Lord, Lord Gifford, spoke of South African occupation of Namibia and of military raids into sovereign States, such as Zambia and Angola. The United Kingdom Government have frequently condemned such raids and called for South African withdrawal, but the imposition of sanctions, as the noble Lord suggested, is we feel absolutely no answer. Sanctions, as I have said before, would merely drive South Africa further into isolation and make it impossible for us to secure a peaceful solution.

The noble Baroness, Lady Llewelyn-Davies of Hastoe, asked about a vote in the International Labour Conference in Geneva recently on a revised declaration by the International Labour Organisation on apartheid. I can confirm that the United Kingdom representatives voted with our 10 partners in the European Community in favour of the draft declaration. This vote signalled our support for the thrust of the declaration which was a condemnation of apartheid, especially in the labour field. The ten made a joint explanation of their understanding of certain aspects of the declaration. This declaration included references to various measures of assistance for liberation movements recognised by the Organisation of African Unity in its technical field of competence within the International Labour Organisation.

The noble Baroness asked for an assurnace that proposals being discussed by officials in Paris this week are consistent with Security Council Resolution 435. I think the communiqués issued in Rome in May and in Ottawa last week make it clear that the settlement will be in accordance with Security Council Resolution 435 and under the aegis of the United Nations.

A major objective of the Government's foreign policy is and will remain the achievement of an agreement on a cease-fire and a settlement leading to the independence of Namibia on internationally acceptable terms. As I have explained, the British Government do not play the same leading role that we did in the negotiations leading to the independence of Zimbabwe. These aims are important not only because the Namibian people have the right to an end to bloodshed and suffering, a right to self-determination under a Government and system of their own choosing, but also because while the Namibian conflict continues it will aggravate instability in the whole of Southern Africa. Here I agree with the noble Lord, Lord Brockway. This in turn affords opportunities for the Soviet Union and its allies to extend their influence throughout that region.

It has not been lost on the Governments and peoples of Africa and on other countries of the Commonwealth and the United Nations that while the western five have worked and will continue to work patiently and doggedly for peace and agreement, the best that Moscow and its friends have to offer is guns and bombs. Agreement on Namibian peace and independence will be a great blow to those who seek to advance their interests by fanning the flames of war and a great triumph for all who seek a peaceful, just and stable future in Southern Africa.

Despite all the frustrations, the disappointments and the setbacks, all of us in the West and our negotiating partners in the African front line States are, I think, entirely agreed about the need to continue our efforts. We do not underrate the difficulties. There is no certainty that we shall succeed. We have listened with extreme care this evening—and will study it with even deeper care—to all that has been said in your Lordships' House, and I promise that the points will be carefully noted. We have no intention of abandoning this task, and we are confident that in the end an independent Namibia will take its place among the free nations of the world.

Lord Brockway

My Lords, before the noble Lord, Lord Skelmersdale, sits down, will he say whether the Government have considered, as the noble Lord, Lord Carrington, promised on the last occasion, the proposal that in order that there shall be impartiality during the election the United Nations should, before the election, withdraw their support from SWAPO, and that the United Nations force for supervision during the elections should be of such a character that there would be no doubt about its impartiality? Is not this the way out of our difficulty?

Lord Skelmersdale

My Lords, the point which the noble Lord, Lord Brockway, has raised is still very much under consideration, but as I have tried to explain over the whole gamut of my remarks this evening, there is still a long way to go before we get to that point, and to that extent at least, there is time still to make up our minds on that proposal.