Lords Sitting of 16 July 1981

Preamble
The House met at three of the clock (Prayers having been read earlier at the Judicial Sitting by the Lord Bishop of Peterborough): The LORD CHANCELLOR on the Woolsack.
The Lord Coleraine—Sat first in Parliament after the death of his father.

Marriage of His Royal Highness The Prince of Wales to the Lady Diana Spencer
The Lord President of the Council (Lord Soames)The Lord President of the Council (Lord Soames) rose to move that an humble Address be presented to Her Majesty the Queen, congratulating Her Majesty and His Royal Highness The Duke of Edinburgh on the approaching Marriage of His Royal Highness The Prince of Wales to the Lady Diana Spencer; expressing to Her Majesty the great pleasure felt by this House and the Nation at this joyful event; and praying that His Royal Highness The Prince of Wales and the Lady Diana Spencer will be blessed with every happiness in their married life.
The noble Lord said: My Lords, I beg to move that an humble Address be presented to Her Majesty in the terms set out on the Order Paper.
On the 24th February my noble and learned friend the Lord Chancellor was able to announce to the House the most excellent news of the engagement of His Royal Highness the Prince of Wales to the Lady Diana Spencer. He added that the House would have a later opportunity to convey a more formal message to Her Majesty. It is my great pleasure and honour today to move such a resolution, offering your Lordships' congratulations to Her Majesty the Queen and His Royal Highness the Duke of Edinburgh, and expressing our wish to share with them the happiness which they must feel at the forthcoming marriage.
We recall with admiration the major events of the Prince of Wales's remarkably full and varied life. His many qualities, his courage, his determination, his personal achievements, his pursuit of excellence, his dedication to the many facets of his life and work, his desire and his ability to understand the problems of others, the warmth of his heart and his personality—all these are features of the admiration and affection in which His Royal Highness is held by the people of our islands, of the Commonwealth, and in the wider world. What father or what mother would not be proud of such a son?
We much value the Prince of Wales's membership of this House and we hope that both he and Lady Diana know that they will always be assured of the warmest of welcomes here. Lady Diana, with her charm and beauty, her naturalness and spontaneity, has already won a special place in the hearts of our people. We wish her well on 29th July—a supremely happy day—and in the years to come. She will surely be a source of great strength and happiness to our future Sovereign.
We offer Her Majesty the Queen and His Royal Highness the Duke of Edinburgh our warm congratulations
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on this great and happy occasion, and we pray that the Prince of Wales and Lady Diana Spencer will be blessed with true and lasting happiness in their married life. My Lords, I beg to move the Motion for an humble Address to Her Majesty.
Moved, That an humble Address be presented to Her Majesty the Queen, congratulating Her Majesty and His Royal Highness The Duke of Edinburgh on the approaching Marriage of His Royal Highness The Prince of Wales to the Lady Diana Spencer; expressing to Her Majesty the great pleasure felt by this House and the nation at this joyful event; and praying that His Royal Highness The Prince of Wales and the Lady Diana Spencer will be blessed with every happiness in their married life.—(Lord Soames.)
Lord Peart: My Lords, on behalf of the Opposition I warmly endorse the sentiments expressed by the Lord President to Her Majesty the Queen and His Royal Highness the Duke of Edinburgh on the approaching marriage of His Royal Highness the Prince of Wales to the Lady Diana Spencer. I think all of us will wish the young couple every happiness in their married life, and I am sure that they, too, in turn will inspire the love, affection and respect of the British people.
Lord Byers: My Lords, on behalf of noble Lords on these Benches I wish wholeheartedly to support the Motion now before the House. The engagement of the heir to the Throne has already given great pleasure to millions of people in this country and elsewhere. That pleasure stems largely from the fact that the forthcoming marriage obviously commends itself to Her Majesty the Queen and to Prince Philip, and to the affection which Prince Charles and the Lady Diana Spencer have for one another.
The Monarchy is an institution which, in the view of most of us, is vital to the protection of our freedom and parliamentary democracy. In our present Monarchy we have the sure confidence that they will develop and flourish. In the Prince of Wales, who, too, has earned the nation's respect and affection, and his future bride, I am certain that the principles upon which the Monarchy has been built will be fully upheld.
If I may speak as one who yesterday celebrated 42 years of happy married life, I should like to join in offering our affectionate good wishes that the Royal couple may enjoy throughout their lives all the blessings that a happy home can give.
The Lord Archbishop of Canterbury: My Lords, from these Benches I want heartily to endorse all that has been said in support of the Motion. The marriage of a Prince of Wales is in itself a matter for great rejoicing by the citizens of this country, but there are many reason why this particular marriage gives such great pleasure not only here but throughout the Commonwealth, and indeed the world. Walter Bagehot said in his work on the English constitution:
"A princely marriage is a brilliant edition of a universal fact and as such it rivets mankind".
The happiness which is felt on this occasion is an expression, first, of the deep affection in which the Prince's family is held. The example which Her Majesty the Queen and her family provide is a constant

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reminder in this uncertain world of the values which really matter; and not least of these is the strength of their family life. We rejoice to share their happiness on this great family occasion.
As has been said, our delight is also due to the place which the Prince of Wales has won in all our hearts. The qualities of courage, humanity, concern and zest for life which he has shown are indeed a happy augury for the future of our nation. All that seemed to be needed was that he should find someone of character and sensitivity with whom to share his life. It is clear that the nation approves his choice, for Lady Diana has quickly won a secure place in all our hearts. I have no doubt at all that the high ideals of Christian marriage, in which they believe, will help to sustain them in the great responsibilities to which they are called. We rejoice with them and for them, and their happiness will uplift us all.
Baroness Hylton-Foster: My Lords, noble Lords sitting on the Cross-Benches wish to be associated very warmly with the terms of the Motion proposed by the noble Lord the Leader of the House. There is, perhaps, an added pleasure for them in doing so since it was from these Benches that His Royal Highness made his very eloquent maiden speech on sport and leisure. The marriage of the heir to the Throne is, of course, a happy family occasion, but inevitably has wider significance also. It will bring great joy to the nation as a whole, to the Commonwealth and to all those throughout the world to whom His Royal Highness has endeared himself during his many visits and travels. We wish His Royal Highness and Lady Diana Spencer every happiness.
Lord Aylestone: My Lords, it is a pleasure and a great privilege to represent my few colleagues on this one Bench and to associate ourselves with the good wishes that have been expressed by the Leader of the House. July 29th is a memorable day, not only in the lives of His Royal Highness the Prince of Wales and Lady Diana Spencer but in the lives of all, or at least the majority, of the people of this country. It is a day which we shall look forward to as much as I think they do. We express the hope that in the future they have very many years of happiness and joy, and years that are spent in a world of peace.
On Question, Motion agreed to, nemine dissentiente: the said Address to be presented to Her Majesty by the Lord Chancellor, the Archbishop of York, the Lord President, the Lord Byers, the Baroness Hylton-Foster and the Lord Peart.

Refuse Collection
3.12 p.m.
Lord Boyd-Carpenter: My Lords, I beg leave to ask the Question which stands in my name on the Order Paper. After the State occasions, the dust-carts!
The Question was as follows:
To ask Her Majesty's Government what action they propose to take in respect of local authorities which arrange to discharge their statutory duty of rubbish collection only at weekends.
The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State, Department of the Environment (Lord Bellwin): My Lords, Her Majesty's Government are not aware that anyone is proposing to do so. Some may have considered it and I imagine the public health, environmental and particularly the expenditure and management implications for the collection area have weighed strongly against it.
Lord Boyd-Carpenter: My Lords, while thanking my noble friend for that very satisfactory reply, can I infer from it that if he were to have his attention drawn to specific examples Her Majesty's Government would take the necessary action?
Lord Bellwin: My Lords, if my noble friend would draw my attention to specific details I would be very glad to have a look at them.
Baroness Birk: My Lords, would the Minister agree that, where the collection is done by the local authorities direct, anybody who objects has a chance to get some redress, but that where it is contracted out, as it is in some authorities, there is quite a different situation? Further, is it not better to have refuse collected over the weekend than not at all?
Lord Bellwin: My Lords, if there is no collection at all then the authority concerned is not carrying out its statutory duty. I know of no such case.
Lord Leatherland: My Lords, the noble Lord will realise that in this House there is an expert on every conceivable subject, and I was the chief cost accountant for the Birmingham refuse disposal department before I degenerated into journalism. Therefore, may I ask the noble Lord whether he will bear in mind when he comes to consider this question that there are some places from which refuse must be collected at weekends? I am thinking of fish markets and meat markets, and places of that kind, and I remember that we always used to collect from them at weekends.
Lord Bellwin: My Lords, the noble Lord, with his obviously vast experience, is referring, of course, to the collection of trade refuse, and indeed there are situations where that is done at weekends.

Planning Appeals: Improved Service
3.14 p.m.
Lord Gisborough: My Lords, I beg leave to ask the Question which stands in my name on the Order Paper.
The Question was as follows:
To ask Her Majesty's Government whether they are satisfied at the rate with which local planning appeals are dealt.
Lord Bellwin: My Lords, we have made substantial improvements since taking office, despite a 40 per cent. increase in the volume of appeals. Improved productivity in the department has enabled us to contain this increase and still reduce the times taken to determine cases. However, we believe there is scope for much

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further improvement, and my honourable friend the Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State announced on Tuesday of this week in another place a whole new range of fresh initiatives designed yet further to improve the service provided on planning appeals.
Lord Gisborough: My Lords, I thank my noble friend for that very satisfactory Answer; and it is good news that there are still further plans to improve the productivity of the department in dealing with appeals. Is my noble friend aware that planning authorities are often loath to grant planning permission for the conversion of rural barns for rural industries because of the danger of precedent being used at subsequent appeals to get other rural industries nearby; and is he satisfied that the precedent argument is not being overused to get incorrect planning decisions?
Lord Bellwin: Again, my Lords, as I said in answer to the last Question, one would need to have specific instances brought to one's attention to be able to give a thoroughly satisfactory reply on a specific case. But in general may I refer my noble friend to a recent circular, Development Control—Policy and Practice, which in fact asks local authorities to look favourably on proposals to find new uses for disused agricultural buildings; and, yes, planning permission should be refused only if there are specific and convincing planning objections to an individual proposal. The question of precedent really should not arise, and each case should be decided on its merits.
Baroness Birk: My Lords, would the Minister agree that the improved performance by local authorities is in fact far greater than that of central Government, for would he not also agree that, while central Government have taken on additional staff for the work, particularly part-time inspectors, local authorities have had to achieve their improvement with fewer staff and reduced financial resources?
Lord Bellwin: No, my Lords, I would not agree. I gladly pay tribute to the fact that local authorities have made a contribution to this improvement—I am very pleased to acknowledge that—but I think I should also say, in view of the point that the noble Baroness makes, that in fact the Government's actions certainly have focussed the attention of local authorities on this issue; and I think I would be entitled to refer to the increasing productivity in the DoE planning inspectorate. In fact, in terms of the number of appeals that they have had to deal with, they have gone up by some 20 per cent. and the time factor has been materially improved.
Baroness Birk: But, my Lords, is the Minister denying that local authorities have had to speed up this work—and they have a great deal of work to do with regard to planning appeals—with fewer staff and less financial resources?
Lord Bellwin: My Lords, as always, the noble Baroness fails to take into consideration the improved efficiency of local authorities, and it is that, I would suggest, which is a material contribution to the improved performance to which I have gladly paid tribute.
Lord John-Mackie: My Lords, is the noble Lord aware that the circular that he mentioned gives local authorities the right to refuse everything in the green belt and conservation areas irrespective of whether or not there are buildings there?
Lord Bellwin: No, my Lords. The Government have said—and I am glad to confirm this yet again—that the circular in question makes it quite clear that there is no departure that is envisaged from current policies restricting development in green belts.
Lord Molloy: My Lords, would the noble Lord be prepared to take on board the other side of the problem when people wish to make appeals against planning decisions—tenants' associations and such like—but discover that they cannot afford to do it, and therefore the local authority wins hands down? Would he not consider the possibility of aiding such local voluntary organisations which wish to make appeals against planning decisions but cannot afford to do so?
Lord Bellwin: My Lords, I can only assume that the noble Lord is referring to the difference in making appeals other than by written statement, and, if he would care to bring to my notice specific instances, I should be glad to have a look at them.
Lord Taylor of Gryfe: My Lords, is the noble Lord aware of the statement made by the Leader of the Greater London Council to the effect that no further permissions will be granted by the planning authorities of that council for office development in London? Does he anticipate, therefore, a very considerable increase in the volume of appeals to his department arising from that view, and can he also anticipate its effect on rental values in the City of London?
Lord Bellwin: My Lords, I feel that we are going rather wide of the original Question. I am aware of the statement to which the noble Lord refers, and it may indeed have both effects that he mentioned. In both circumstances, I think that would be a rather unfortunate situation.

The Wytch Farm Project
3.20 p.m.
Lord Beswick: My Lords, I beg leave to ask the Question which stands in my name on the Order Paper.
The Question was as follows:
To ask Her Majesty's Government what economic, social or other national purpose will be served by the enforced sale of the 50 per cent. public holding in Wytch Farm project.
The Minister of State, Department of Employment (The Earl of Gowrie); My Lords, the Government's decision to require the corporation to dispose of their interest in the Wytch Farm licence after very careful consideration of their representations, is entirely consistent with their general policy objectives. These are to reduce the size of the public sector wherever possible

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by transferring to the private sector activities which could equally well be performed there, and to reduce the size of the public sector borrowing requirement.
Lord Beswick: My Lords, may I thank the noble Earl for that Answer, which he will not expect me to find very convincing. May I ask the noble Earl two further questions? Would he not agree that the Wytch Farm development was an outstanding example of precisely those qualities of initiative and enterprise for which the Prime Minister has called? Does he not also understand that the decision to sell off that project, so far as British Gas is concerned, is an affront or an insult to the dedicated public servants in British Gas who are responsible for it?
The Earl of Gowrie: My Lords, I have very high regard for the British Gas Corporation. But my view is that its main responsibility should be to supply gas, which it does very effectively. I see no reason why such a public utility should be a major holder of capital in our economy.
The Earl of Lauderdale: My Lords, would my noble friend not agree that this has the enormous advantage of relieving State capital overburden and replacing it by private capital and also spreading the glories of private capitalism?
The Earl of Gowrie: My Lords, I agree with my noble friend that British private capital is no less British than a British public asset.
Lord Mackie of Benshie: My Lords, is this not a case where private money put into this established project will not be available for new enterprises which we so badly need?
The Earl of Gowrie: My Lords, I find that an extraordinary comment. Up to about £50 billion every year is invested out of the capital markets of the United Kingdom and there is plenty of United Kingdom capital for such assets of which this is one.
Viscount St. Davids: My Lords, would the noble Earl not agree that Lord Beswick's remarks about an insult to the people who have developed this very valuable capital asset would only be an insult if this property was not sold off for a proper commercial price? I am sure that the noble Earl will tell the House that it will be sold off for a proper commercial price. Will he do so?
The Earl of Gowrie: My Lords, it is obviously for the British Gas Corporation itself to conduct the sale; but, in every other respect, I agree with the noble Viscount.
Lord Jacques: My Lords, have we reached the stage when a public body, if not successful, is damned; but if it is successful, it has to sell out?
The Earl of Gowrie: My Lords, I do not accept the argument of the noble Lord at all. This is a very successful and very well managed public utility corporation to which I am delighted to pay tribute.
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But there is no reason in logic or in any theory that I can see that it should simultaneously be a major holder of a capital asset of this kind.
Baroness Burton of Coventry: My Lords, may I ask the Minister why, if he has such a high regard for the British Gas Corporation's activities, he has chosen to ignore their advice in the selling of the gas showrooms to private enterprise?
The Earl of Gowrie: That is another issue. It is a contiguous issue. There is no reason why the fact that a company or corporation is successful at something that it should enjoy a continuous monopoly in that field.
The Earl of Lauderdale: My Lords, would my noble friend not agree that the term "selling out" is quite inappropriate? We should be talking about public participation in national wealth.
The Earl of Gowrie: My Lords, I am very grateful to my noble friend who has put the point that I was seeking to make rather more graphically.
Lord Beswick: My Lords, may I ask the noble Earl to consider a further point? Do the Government not realise that instead of creating an atmosphere in which we can consider how to make the role of the public sector more effective, this kind of vendetta is going to make it absolutely inevitable that we shall get an equal and opposite reaction? We shall get an alternative Government sooner rather than later which will nationalise for the sake of nationalising.
The Earl of Gowrie: My Lords, I would think that that would have been considerably later, and by then it will be too late.
The Earl of Selkirk: My Lords, could the noble Earl ensure that the same high standard is maintained regarding the environment of Wytch Farm which is an extremely beautiful part of the country?
The Earl of Gowrie: My Lords, I enjoy the good fortune to have friends with whom I stay at the weekend from time to time overlooking Wytch Farm so I have a personal interest of that kind. It is one of the most beautiful parts of Dorset. It has been well guarded so far and I shall see that that continues.
Lord Briginshaw: My Lords, would the noble Earl the Minister, on further consideration and in the light of all the efficiencies of the corporation in developing the project, consider that it is against the short-term, long-term and national interests to carry through this sale?
The Earl of Gowrie: My Lords, for the reason I gave earlier, I do not think that is so. As the noble Lord, Lord Lever, reminded us in his maiden speech in this House from the Benches opposite, there is no shortage of national capital in this economy. There is something of a shortage of profitable ventures into which that should go, which is one of the reasons why we have very large-scale overseas investment. This is a profitable investment and British capital will flow into it.

The Mexico Summit Conference
3.27 p.m.
Lord Hatch of Lusby: My Lords, I beg leave to ask the Question which stands in my name on the Order Paper.
The Question was as follows:
To ask Her Majesty's Government what policy they intend to adopt at the Mexico Summit Conference on the Brandt Commission Report.
The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State, Department of Trade (Lord Trefgarne): My Lords, the Government have welcomed the Brandt Commission report. We shall take it into account in our preparations for the Mexico Summit where we hope there will be a full and informal discussion of the many issues involved.
Lord Hatch of Lusby: My Lords, is the noble Lord aware that outside this country—indeed in some parts of this country—there is a firm conviction that this Government are opposed to the recommendations of the Brandt Commission report as shown in the conferences in Venice and New York last year and in the very cold terms of the Foreign Office the official response to the report published just 12 months ago? Is he further aware that at the Ottawa conference the Canadians are taking the lead in trying to stimulate western positive response to the Brandt Commission report in preparation for the Mexico conference? Will he tell the House, on behalf of the Government, whether the Government accept the core of the Brandt Commission report—the core being the interdependence of nations throughout the world with the inevitable consequence that the recovery of the British economy depends upon the kind of measures that have been put forward by the Brandt Commission which, included a former Conservative Prime Minister?
Lord Trefgarne: My Lords, the views of the noble Lord on the Brandt Commission report, I would think, were now almost as well known as those of the Government. I have certainly repeated the Government's view on the Brandt Commission report on a number of occasions from this Box. As the noble Lord said, the Government's view has also been published in various documents presented to Committees in the other place and elsewhere. We have welcomed the Brandt Commission report. We share its concern about the problems of the developing world and we shall continue to contribute to a wide range of international action designed to help developing countries.
Lord Harmar Nicholls: My Lords, is my noble friend aware that it is not to be against the principles of the Brandt Report to remind any Government that it is full of generalities, and to accept it as though it is a blueprint may well alter the approach to the real priorities that face any Government which want to remedy the inequality of conditions throughout the world?
Lord Trefgarne: My Lords, the fact is, of course, that, as my noble friend has rightly pointed out, the Brandt Report is a very long and comprehensive
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document. It is not possible to give a response to that document in one sentence.
Lord Bruce of Donington: My Lords, is the noble Lord aware that the report is full of particularities as distinct from generalities and it is to some of these particular matters that have been raised that some particular response is required?
Lord Trefgarne: Yes, indeed, my Lords, and the Government have expressed a view about some of the particular points and have expressed reservations about others.
Lord Brockway: My Lords, while welcoming the changed attitude of the Government towards the Brandt Report, as indicated by the earlier appalling paper they issued on the subject, may I ask the Minister this: Will our representative at the Ottawa Conference seek to secure a new approach to this problem which has meant North-South dialogue for eight years, with an increasing gulf between them? Will the Government make an effort at the Ottawa Conference to get the heads of the Western nations really to approach this issue in a different way?
Lord Trefgarne: My Lords, the change to which the noble Lord referred in the Government's attitude towards the Brandt Report is, I am afraid, confined to the mind of the noble Lord. As for the Ottawa Conference, that is another matter.
Baroness Llewelyn-Davies of Hastoe: My Lords, is the noble Lord aware that he really cannot get away with that? The Government's response, as he perfectly well knows—does he not?—was originally extremely cold, as my noble friend has said. We do very much welcome the increase in wisdom of the Government at the moment. Is the noble Lord aware that the world outside, though at first shocked by the Government's initial response, is now beginning to see that they can sometimes learn by experience?
Lord Trefgarne: My Lords, I am happy to accept the congratulations of the noble Baroness upon our current policy, but the difference that she sees between that and the earlier one is largely confined to people's minds.
Lord Oram: My Lords, will the noble Lord recall that a few weeks ago there took place in these buildings one of the most massive lobbies on the Brandt Report that I can recall on any subject, having been either in this Chamber or in the other Chamber for the last quarter of a century? Will he and his colleagues, in approaching the Mexico Conference, realise that if they can take a more positive attitude than has been indicated so far they will have the support of an important section of public opinion led, I am glad to say, by Church representatives?
Lord Trefgarne: My Lords, we have always welcomed, and I repeat our welcome now, public expression of opinion on these matters and public discussion on these matters. The lobby to which the noble Lord referred was of course part of that public debate.
Lord Aylestone: My Lords, can the noble Lord say whether a firm date has been fixed for the Mexico Conference, and, if so, who will represent this country? Will the Foreign Secretary himself be there?
Lord Trefgarne: My Lords, the firm date, I believe, is 29th September but I shall have to check that and let the noble Lord know if I am wrong. Her Majesty's Government will be represented by my right honourable friend the Prime Minister.
Lord Hatch of Lusby: My Lords, is not the noble Lord the Minister aware—and perhaps he will be further aware if he reads Hansard tomorrow—that he has missed the point I was making, as has his noble friend Lord Harmar-Nicholls? I am not talking simply about aid to the underdeveloped countries; I am asking the noble Lord whether the Government have recognised the core of the Brandt Commission Report, which is interdependence? Also, do the Government recognise that the future of this country, as well as the prosperity of underdeveloped countries, depends upon putting into effect the specific proposals—not the generalities—brought out by the Brandt Commission Report?
Lord Trefgarne: My Lords, as the noble Lord knows, the Brandt Commission Report contains a very large number of specific proposals. We have welcomed many of them and we have expressed reservations about others.

Business: The Summer Recess
Lord Denham: My Lords, it may be for the convenience of the House if I announce that dinner will be available today at the usual time. The Committee stage of the British Nationality Bill will be adjourned at approximately seven o'clock for a short period, and during the adjournment the Report stage of the Armed Forces Bill and the County Courts Jurisdiction Order 1981 and consideration of Commons amendments to the Forgery and Counterfeiting Bill will be taken.
With the leave of the House, I should like also to say a word about future business. Your Lordships will no doubt be concerned to know when the House will rise for the Summer Recess, and indeed it is customary for an announcement to be made at around this time in July. All that I can say at present is that, although every endeavour will be made to ensure that the House rises for the Summer Recess on Friday, 31st July, this will be subject more than usual this year to the progress of business. I will, of course, make a further announcement as soon as possible.
Baroness Llewelyn-Davies of Hastoe: My Lords, the House will wish to thank the noble Lord for making that announcement. May I ask whether he realises I am sure he does—that in all parts of the House there is a very strong feeling that an almost impossible burden of work has been put upon the House at this very difficult part of the Session, and that the Government really should not cram so much complicated and controversial legislation into the back end of the Session? Of course, we know it is not entirely the
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fault of the noble Lord himself; it is the Government's responsibility for their programme. But I think the House is entitled to ask him whether, if, as he foreshadowed, we have to sit in August, at least we shall not have to sit more than one or two days.
Lord Denham: My Lords, I think I shall probably have no opposition from any part of the House for the first thing I want to say, which is to wish the noble Baroness a very happy birthday. The House has certainly had to consider a great deal of business in recent weeks and I cannot deny that it has been a very busy Session indeed. But I would question whether it is correct to say that the Government have asked the House to sit far longer or later in the past few weeks than has been the case in most recent years. I think the noble Baroness asked for a guarantee about August. All I can say is that, as always, I will use my best endeavours.

Friendly Societies Bill
Brought from the Commons, read 1a, and to be printed.

Trustee Savings Banks Bill [H.L.]
3.38 p.m.
The Lord Chancellor (Lord Hailsham of Saint Mary-lebone): My Lords, I beg to move that this Bill be now read a third time. Exceptionally, your Lordships will notice that if the Bill is given a Third Reading I shall in a moment be moving an amendment.
Moved, That the Bill be now read 3a.—(The Lord Chancellor.)
On Question, Bill read 3a.
The Lord Chancellor The Lord Chancellor moved the following amendment:
Clause 57, page 28, line 45, leave out from ("force") to end of line 46 and insert ("at the end of the period of three months beginning with the day on which it is passed.").
The noble and learned Lord said: My Lords, I beg to move the amendment standing in my name, which is an exceptional one because the Bill is a Consolidation Bill. It is now Law Commission policy that unless there are exceptional circumstances Consolidation Bills should provide that they will come into force three months after Royal Assent. This has two obvious advantages: it ensures that a reasonable length of time elapses between the passing of the Act and the entry into force so that those concerned with the area of the law in question may obtain prints of the Act and become familiar with it. Secondly, it avoids the necessity for lawyers and others to scan the lists of statutory instruments for the Commencement Order which will bring the Act into force, and incidentally also avoids the somewhat trivial expense of a Commencement Order. I therefore beg to move the amendment.
On Question, amendment agreed to.
Bill passed, and sent to the Commons.

New Towns Bill [H.L.]
Read 3a and passed, and sent to the commons.
Compulsory Purchase (Vesting Declarations) Bill [H.L.]
Read 3a, and passed, and sent to the Commons.

Acquisition of Land Bill [H.L.]
The Lord Chancellor: My Lords, I beg to move that this Bill be now read a third time.
Moved, That the Bill be now read 3a.—(The Lord Chancellor.)
Lord Elwyn-Jones: My Lords, I am sure that your Lordships would want me to congratulate the noble and learned Lord the Lord Chancellor on his well executed quadrille in moving these four Bills and to mark their valuable contribution to consolidation.
The Lord Chancellor: My Lords, I am deeply grateful to the noble and learned Lord; it is wonderful what eloquence will do.
On Question, Bill read 3a, and passed, and sent to the Commons.

British Nationality Bill
3.43 p.m.
The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State, Home Office (Lord Belstead): My Lords, I beg to move that the House do now again resolve itself into Committee on this Bill.
Moved, That the House do now again resolve itself into Committee.—(Lord Belstead.)
On Question, Motion agreed to.
House in Committee accordingly.
[The EARL OF LISTOWEL in the Chair.]
Clause 3 [Acquisition by registration: minors]:
Lord Geddes Lord Geddes moved Amendment No. 49:
Page 3, line 34, leave out ("full-time").
The noble Lord said: My Lords, after the somewhat pyrrhic victory of Amendment No. 46 late on Monday evening, I suppose it could be argued that I am "Not out" as batsman and that logically therefore I should take first strike this afternoon. Continuing that sporting analogy a stage further, what greatly concerns me is that a Bill as important, as far-reaching, and as complex as this Bill should be developing into a match between, dare I say, my noble friends on the Government's Front Bench and the rest.
Apart from Amendment No. 46, which was essentially a drafting amendment, my noble friends on the Front Bench have effectively remained what I can only describe as distinctly hard of hearing to all arguments to date. Of course I can speak only for myself but,
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having sat through the Second Reading and the first two days in Committee, I am getting a growing feeling that all is not sweetness and light in the referee's dressing room.
Opposition—with a little "o"—to particular facets of this Bill can, does and will take many guises. The right reverend Prelate and others have taken what one might describe as a spiritually humanitarian stance. The noble Lords opposite have taken a wide variety of stances, ranging from political and humanitarian to purely practical. From the Cross-Benches and more particularly from the Back-Benches on this side of your Lordships' House there has come, I suggest, strong practicality based on not inconsiderable experience. I believe it is probably fair to say that there is wide recognition of the necessity for an up-to-date British Nationality Bill, but—and it is a big "but"—I sense that there already exists a strong feeling on these Benches, let alone elsewhere in your Lordships' Committee, that the Bill as presently drafted contains many anomalies, injustices and illogicalities.
As I understand it, it is a prime function, if not the prime function, of your Lordships' House, be it in Committee or otherwise, to be able to stand back from any piece of proposed legislation and to review it with extreme care. There must be—or should be—a corollary to that; namely, that the Front Bench of the Government of the day, whatever their political view, should pay more than passing heed to views expressed, particularly if, as in this case, those views seem to have support from all Benches except those occupied by my noble friends at the Dispatch Box.
Both my noble friend the Minister and the noble and learned Lord, the Lord Advocate, have stated on more than one occasion that they want first to hear all views—particularly, in the light of the situation we find ourselves in at the moment, views on Clauses 2 and 3—before they comment. Frustrating though it may be, I believe I can follow the logic of that position. Having said that and with the exception of my noble friends' comments on the discretion of the Secretary of State on the position of the self-employed and the "mini" concession on Amendment No. 46, the Committee has so far had ne'er a word of encouragement. Entirely coincidentally, the last amendment presently tabled under Clause 3 happens to be under my name and I shall certainly listen with more than usual interest to the comments of my noble friends on the Front Bench at that stage or immediately thereafter.
With Amendment No. 49, my endeavour is to avoid greater arguments as to the definition of "full-time employment". The position in respect of the self-employed has already been raised. What of the part-time employee or director? A man or woman may be partly employed by a number of firms, and I use the word "firms" deliberately in anticipation of Amendment No. 54. From each firm's point of view the individual is only partly employed, but from the individual's point of view, he or she may be very much employed full-time. If we look at Clause 3(9), which deals with a partner, it is interesting to note that even regardless of the outcome of Amendments Nos. 79 or 81, the wording of the subsection as it stands refers to:
"A partner in a firm established in the United Kingdom is to be regarded as employed in employment with the firm".

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There is no reference to the word "full" or "full-time". I should be much happier, and I suggest that the Bill would be that much better if the preamble to Clause 3(3) read:
"(3) In this section 'relevant employment' means employment—".
I beg to move.
Lord Belstead: I was disappointed to hear that my noble friend felt that the noble and learned Lord Advocate and I had not given enough heed to amendments which have been moved on the two previous sittings in the Committee stage of this Bill in your Lordships' House. I consider that we listened closely, and we showed that we had done so by accepting an important amendment which was moved by my noble friend Lady Trumpington to Clause 1(4). Then there was almost the last amendment to be moved at our previous Sitting, which was also moved by my noble friend the Lord Geddes. I should have thought my noble friend would have noticed that the very next amendment, which is in my name, is in response to opinions expressed in another place by the honourable Member for Uxbridge, Mr. Michael Shersby. Furthermore, I feel sure that before long this afternoon my noble and learned friend the Lord Advocate will also be demonstrating that we have, indeed, taken seriously other amendments in the names of my noble friends Lord Drumalbyn and Lady Elles and, indeed, my noble friend Lord Geddes himself.
But so far as this amendment is concerned, if employment is to be an essential element in defining a connection with the United Kingdom, then the employment concerned must occupy a significant role in the individual's life. The other evening there was an amendment down in the name of my noble friend Lord Drumalbyn, which my noble friend did not move, to insert the word "genuinely" into the text when it was referring to employment. Although my noble friend did not move the amendment, I could well understand why he felt that it was necessary to know, if there was to be a relevant employment criterion, that it was, at least, a genuine one. For example, I do not think a part-time job, or an occasional consultancy with a British firm, will do, since this cannot be the basis for a link with the United Kingdom which is sufficiently close to justify the conferment of citizenship on the employee's child.
Before I finish these few remarks, may I go just a little wider, because my noble friend went a little wider. May I just remind the Committee that the foundation of the Bill is the need to tie British citizenship with those people who have close and continuing links with the United Kingdom, and thereby to confer automatically the right of abode on all British citizens. In doing this, we are providing in the Bill that all British citizens, whether they are men or women, should have equal rights to transmit citizenship, and all British citizens, whether they are born, naturalised or registered, should also have equal rights to transmit. This will mean enormously increased opportunities to transmit from generation to generation. When, in addition, we are studying the criterion for those who will transmit through their employment, we are, after all, seeking
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to define the elements of a significant tie with the United Kingdom, and the Government believe that for this purpose the employment concerned should be on a full-time basis.
Lord Avebury: I wonder whether I may revert to a question which I put to the noble Lord, Lord Belstead, at the previous sitting on 13th July, which appears in col. 1100 of Hansard. I asked him then whether it would be possible, for a person who was contemplating taking up employment, to find out whether it would be accepted as relevant employment by the Home Office, for the purposes of this clause. The noble Lord, Lord Belstead, said in reply that he hoped I would understand when he said,
"that obviously all the practicalities have not been worked out, but … it would be wholly unreasonable if I did not say on behalf of the Government that people will want to clear their lines before they go abroad".
I took that as being a semi-undertaking that, when somebody wished to know whether a job which had been offered would satisfy those criteria, he would be able to get some kind of clearance before he went. It is very important that we should get that on the record, and that something more definite is said by the Minister this afternoon in response to this amendment. When we talk about full-time employment, the phrase can be interpreted in relation to United Kingdom legislation, but we do not know whether exactly the same meaning will be attributed to the phrase if somebody goes to Tanzania or Australia. Perhaps that is obvious to the lawyers; it is not to me and, I suggest, it will not always be to the people who are thinking of taking these jobs abroad.
The other point that I want to make is that the noble Lord, Lord Belstead, has just pointed out that, by the amendment that he is about to move, we are considering not only employment overseas; we are also treating employment in the United Kingdom as being relevant employment for the purposes of this clause. We had several discussions—not just one—on the circumstances that we face in this country, with 3 million people out of work and a vast number of people having to accept whatever jobs are available.
It is probably well-known to your Lordships that there is a growing practice of work sharing, in that two people may do the same job, one going to the place of employment in the morning and the other going in the afternoon. There is a growing practice in some companies of adopting short-time working as an alternative to redundancies. One hopes that that will continue, because it is better to have part of a job than none at all. So I would fully support the noble Lord, Lord Geddes, when he seeks to make this alteration in the Bill, particularly with regard to that part of the relevant employment within the previous two years, which may have been within the boundaries of the United Kingdom.
This would make the Bill more flexible. It would increase the confidence of people when they go abroad to know that the part-time job that they have had—if they have been so lucky—in the period leading up to their departure for overseas, would count as relevant employment. Therefore, I very much hope that the Government will, at least, take this back and give it further consideration before Report stage.
Lord Boyd-Carpenter: I hope that my noble friend Lord Belstead will not think it offensive if I say that, in his speech, he did not really even attempt to justify the retention in the Bill of the expression "full-time", which my noble friend's amendment seeks to delete. He said that where employment was to be the link with the United Kingdom, it should be significant and I certainly would not want to argue with him about that. I would agree with him about that. But employment can be significant, particularly in the cases of certain individuals, without being full-time.
My noble friend will be aware, if he looks at the lists of public appointments which are published annually in a White Paper, that many chairmen and directors of nationalised industries are described as "main-time" as distinct from "full-time". It would seem to me quite wrong that the advantages of this part of Clause 3 should be denied to someone whose employment was main-time, because it could not be argued to be full-time.
There is also the question of the women. Many married women with young children—and these are precisely the people who may well be going to have another child—work part-time while the child is at school. It would seem a little oppressive to exclude them from the benefits of Clause 3 simply because, in the nature of things, a part-time occupation was all that they could follow. But it may well be—in my noble friend's own phrase—significant. It may well establish a real and significant link with the United Kingdom. Yet on any reading of the clause as it stands, with the words "full-time" in it, it would not qualify. So I ask my noble friend to have another look at this.
He will have heard, in the nicest possible terms, the warning of my noble friend Lord Geddes that during the first two days of this Committee stage, while he and his noble and learned friend have been the height of courtesy and charm, they have been pretty inflexible on anything of any real substance. Some of us, who have a little experience of these matters, may have developed the suspicion that they themselves are operating under fairly tight riding orders from their friends elsewhere. It is not going to help our debate. Could I say with very great respect to my noble friend that a Minister in charge of a controversial Bill at a late stage of the session sometimes finds that he makes rather speedier progress by means of a well-timed and occasional concession.
Baroness Birk: I should like to support the spirit behind the amendment. Also, I agree entirely with what was said by the noble Lord, Lord Boyd-Carpenter. If the position remains as it is in the Bill it will cut out a great many women who are doing part-time work. If we look at subsection (2) it is quite clear that a person will fulfil the stated requirements if the Secretary of State is satisfied that those requirements were fulfilled in the case of either his father or his mother. In a case where it is the mother, it is very likely that her work will be part-time.
In his reply the Minister said that if employment is essential it must occupy a significant role in the applicant's life, but he has not given any strong reasons, except that it could not be part-time or consultancy
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work, to justify that assertion. It is very important that it should not remain in this restricted fashion. In concentrating on women I am not adopting a sexist attitude, because this would also apply to a number of men. If the position is left as it is in the Bill, it will be far too restrictive. I believe that this is how many of us across the Committee feel about it.
Lord Hawke: I take some interest in this part of the Bill because I would have had to qualify, together with one of my children, under this clause. I think I would have qualified under (3)(b) and (3)(c) but I can think of many people employed in that part of the world where I was employed who would not have qualified but who nevertheless would have regarded themselves as 100 per cent. British citizens and who would have wished to pass their citizenship on to their children. Directly you start to define something in terms of employment, you get into the most awful bog. The safest thing to rely on is (2)(d):
"That the parent in question intends to maintain a close connection with the United Kingdom …".
That is a criterion which it is not too easy to prove but it is very much clearer than trying to define innumerable types of employment which might or might not qualify. In the paper today I happened to notice that some hospital, I think in West Africa, is advertising for a financial controller. If he goes out, stays a number of years and has a family out there, will his children qualify under this Bill? I think they will qualify only if he intends to maintain a close connection with the United Kingdom. I would suggest that my noble friend should rest his case more on that than upon anything else.
Lord Drumalbyn: Could I begin by saying that for my part I would not expect my noble friend on the Front Bench to be able to accept many amendments at this stage because of the great complication of the Bill and because he will have to go away and think about what we have said and see how it ties in with the rest of the Bill. I have every confidence that he will do that and I hope that we shall see the results at the next stage of the Bill.
Unlike the noble Baroness opposite, I support the principle of the Bill as it stands but I foresee difficulties over its being put into practice. It is desirable that this facility should be given to people who are working full time, but that they should be employed full time by one particular company is a quite different matter. I would suggest that my noble friend should look at that point. I am sure that my noble friend Lord Hawke is quite right in saying that very often a person who goes out from this country to do a particular job then finds himself, as my noble friend Lord Boyd-Carpenter said, being mainly employed in that job but doing other jobs as well. I remember a man whose main employment was with a shipping firm but who was also the joint correspondent of The Times. Incidentally, he was also chairman of the British School in that place, and often captained the cricket team. This shows his close connections with Great Britain.
I should be grateful if my noble friend could at least say that he will look at this aspect because I do not think that the way in which the Bill is drafted on this point is quite right. It would tie a man to

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being full-time by one particular company. A man might be refused recognition under this clause if he had two or three other jobs which took up a considerable part of his time.
Lord Harmar-Nicholls: If it is the intention of my noble friend Lord Geddes to push this amendment to a Division, I would expect my noble friend the Minister to be in the Lobby with us because the words in the Bill do not square with what he said at the Box. He said that he would be satisfied, as my noble friend Lord Boyd-Carpenter said, if the employment was significant. The words do not allow "significant" to come into it. It is full-time. That has a real meaning. There is no doubt that if "full-time" remains as the definition it will restrict the Bill to a point where I doubt whether it will be workable. All the arguments which have been used regarding women, part-time consultants and the rest are very strong. But now that we have more or less had to accept that employment is going to be the touchstone as to whether or not it passes the test, I believe that from that point on we ought to be as broad and as sensible as we can as to how "employment" will be interpreted. I was very impressed with the point made by the noble Lord, Lord Spens, regarding one of his amendments, that employment as we see it today may well not be the type of employment which will be generally accepted as meaning employment 10, 12 or 15 years from now when this Bill, if it becomes an Act, will be operative.
I have argued on the one or two occasions upon which I have intervened that power should be left in the hands of the Secretary of State to decide upon the definitions. I should have thought that here is a case, for all the considerations which have been put forward by my noble friend, where the Secretary of State ought, in the light of the conditions existing at the time, to be the one to decide what is relevant employment. One ought not to tie his hands in advance by saying that he can concede only if it is what we term full employment. I believe it will be a much better Act if, having given the power to the Secretary of State to take into account conditions at the time when the decision will have to be made on this particular point we let him decide whether part-time, or consultancy time, or main time, as my noble friend Lord Boyd-Carpenter said, is that which brings them within the orbit.
I should have thought that this was a time when the amendment of my noble friend Lord Geddes ought to be accepted. And if it is that my noble friend still believes, as he seemed to do when he made his speech a minute or two ago, that "significant" is the word, then he ought to be in the Lobby with us.
The Earl of Lauderdale: May I add one other word in support of this amendment. I have in mind the situation of a foreign correspondent of one of our great newspapers. I speak now from direct personal experience, having travelled the world for The Times and other newspapers in my day. The foreign correspondent of, let us say, The Times who might also serve an American newspaper at the same time and who therefore would not be fully employed by either, though he would be fully employed by both, is in a
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very exposed position. Very often he is treated in the countries to which he is accredited as the nearest thing to a spy. I can think of one of my assistant correspondents who ended up in Dachau, of another one who only very narrowly escaped and of a third who also very narrowly escaped after great difficulties. The people who work for our media overseas are very exposed indeed. One can think of cases where, if they have not died in concentration camps they have been exposed to years of prison and suffering. With a change of régime, because the country is overrun by the Germans, or the Russians, or whoever it may be, it is very important that they should know that in serving—to take the example of The Times—they stand in some measure of respect and honour in the country from which their employment stems.
Merely because such a correspondent is not full-time in the technical sense, he will be ruled out although he renders great service to the country, simply by being in a very exposed position. Not only is he not on a salary, he may not even be on a retainer. He may simply be on the equivalent of a lineage basis or recompensed according to the amount of time that he gives to the paper or to the network for which he is working, according to the situation. When there is no crisis there is no work, and for him no money, or very little. When there is a crisis he is working flat out, so he is then full-time.
Then what applies to newspaper correspondents should also surely be considered with regard to part time engineering and planning consultants, for example. In countries in the developing world the planning or the architectural consultant has a very important role to play in identifying opportunities for which British firms may tender. He is therefore a very important element in the export drive. He may not be full-time employed; he may be self-employed. Are the self-employed left in or left out by this clause?
I hope that my noble friend will have gathered the sense of what has been said from many different quarters of the Committee and from many different points of view, both professional and political, and that he will take it back and realise that there are people who are not in the technical sense full-time employees of one particular organisation but their contribution to our well-being and our survival is indeed significant.
The Earl of Erroll: I would also point out that if the provision says "full time" it also prevents someone from changing jobs because subsection (2)(b) says "throughout the period of two years". Therefore, if a person were to change jobs and have, say, a lapse of a week between jobs the employment would not be throughout the period of two years. A person would immediately forfeit all rights.
Another point is that I should have thought that the purpose of these four categories, paragraphs (a), (b), (c) and (d), was to ensure commitment. The commitment is quite well assured in (c) and (d) and all four must be fulfilled. They are linked by the word "and" and not "or". All four have to be fulfilled and (c) and (d) seem to provide the request for commitment to the United Kingdom.
Lord Spens: The Minister knows my views about employment as the only tag on which to hang this

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close affinity and the fact that in future years employment may just be disappearing, but also when we were discussing the possibility of including self-employment in this clause he said that the Government were unable to think of any way of doing it and he has thrown the ball back at us in order to give us an opportunity to find a solution. If this phrase of "full-time employment" is kept in the clause that will rule out any chance of getting self-employment put into the clause. What is full-time employment for the self-employed? There may be occasions when they are working 24 hours a day and there may be other occasions when they do not work at all, so how do you define "full-time employment" in relation to the self-employed? We must try to get this very great restriction which the words "full-time" mean, deleted, if possible.
Baroness Elles: I should like to put a question to my noble friend. The fact that this Committee feels so strongly about the term "full-time" is perhaps indicative that many of your Lordships, when they are working abroad, are not working full time. I wonder whether any consideration has been given to those Members of your Lordships' House who do work outside this country and eventually have children abroad. Will they also not be British citizens when they take up their titles and sit in this House?
4.15 p.m.
Lord Belstead: I will, if I may, confine my remarks to the effect of the amendment, which is to delete the words "full-time" from the text when talking about relevant employment.
Lord Geddes: If my noble friend would allow me to intervene, he has in fact anticipated my point in regard to deleting the words "full-time" from the text.
Lord Belstead: Although many of the remarks which have been made in this short debate have been informative, they have gone a little wide of the amendment. My noble friend Lord Boyd-Carpenter expressed the hope that I would not find him offensive. Of course not. However, I do find my noble friend, uncharacteristically, somewhat inconsistent on this occasion, if he will forgive me for saying so. I say that because my noble friend, with his characteristic ability has, in previous debates on the Bill, expressed some criticism of the need for the Secretary of State to have so much discretion in the Bill, which my noble friend has said is bound, in the circumstances of today, to be in fact the discretion of officials of the Home Office, who of course in certain cases will give advice to the Home Secretary. The inconsistency which I feel is there on this occasion is that if this amendment were to be accepted—and my noble friend Lord Boyd-Carpenter would support him—then I think there would be endless arguments about what constitutes "relevant employment". There would be an increase of discretion and, incidentally, an enormous increase in the amount of time which is taken to decide particular cases.
However, both my noble friend and the noble Baroness, Lady Birk, have made valuable remarks about the particular position of women, although
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of course they are made in the context of a Bill which is supposed to be putting men and women on exactly the same footing. I cannot resist just reminidng the Committee of that.
Baroness Birk: Just let me interrupt—I particularly went out of my way to say that I wanted to make it quite clear that my remarks applied to men as well as women.
Lord Belstead: Very well; the Government will certainly look at the remarks made by my noble friend and the noble Baroness in that light. Indeed, we shall look carefully at what has been said by many of your Lordships, first by my noble friend Lord Drumalbyn, about the position of people who are doing valuable jobs—often very valuable jobs—but the very nature of their job means that it is not defined as "full-time".
Incidentally, there is one small technical point which I think it is right for me to inject, which is that both my noble friend Lord Drumalbyn and the noble Earl, Lord Erroll, I think were not entirely right in their assumption that Clause 3 only refers, in the requirements for relevant employment, to somebody who sticks in the same job. I think if the noble Earl glances at subsection (4) he will see that specific arrangements are made there for somebody who wants to change his or her job en route.
Certainly the Government will respond to what was said by my noble friend Lord Lauderdale and my noble friend Lord Harmar-Nicholls. The Government will look carefully at what has been said. I hope I have pointed out some of the difficulties in respect of this particular amendment from the Government's point of view, and I hope that with that response my noble friend will consider withdrawing the amendment.
Lord Boyd-Carpenter: Before my noble friend indicates what he is going to do, I should like to take up one personal reference made by my noble friend Lord Belstead. I welcome his emphasis on consistency and I hope that he will apply it himself. His argument on this occasion was against leaving matters to the discretion of the Secretary of State. When we come to subsequent amendments he will no doubt find that quoted against him.
Lord Belstead: There was a reason why I used that particular argument, and it was not a reason I had to resort to because I could think of nowhere else to resort. It was because we are talking in Clause 3 about an entitlement, and I genuinely think that there is some difficulty here, when my noble friend Lord Harmar-Nicholls talks about going wholly towards the Secretary of State's discretion. In considering the value of an amendment of this kind, I would ask the Committee to consider that one has to decide, first of all, do we really want to abandon what is meant to be, and indeed is written into the text as, an entitlement, or do we want to foresake that and go wholly to a matter of discretion? It is that which the Government will go on considering in the light of what has been said; but I hope that I have been able to point out some of the problems inherent in this amendment.
Before I sit down may I say that I realise I have not replied to the noble Lord, Lord Avebury. It is not

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from any wish to be cavalier to the noble Lord, but I really do not think I can add very much to what I said at the last sitting of the Committee. The noble Lord asked me specifically whether a certificate would be issued to people before they go abroad. I cannot add to what I said to the noble Lord on that point. Undoubtedly, if people wished to approach the Home Office, if Clause 3 became law unamended, they would be able to thresh out with the Home Office where they stood. I am not in a position to say whether or not a certificate would be issued. But this point, important though it is, goes a little wide of the amendment we are discussing.
Lord Geddes: I am most encouraged by the support that this amendment has had in your Lordships' Committee, and I think the correct wording would be slightly encouraged by the second remarks by my noble friend on the Front Bench, rather than the remarks he made immediately following my moving of the amendment. I think the feeling in the Committee is that this is an extremely important point. The noble Lord the Minister has said that it would cause—I am paraphrasing his words, with apologies—confusion and anomalies. The reason I moved the amendment originally was that it would cause even more illogicalities and anomalies if the words "full-time" were left in. It is a question of evils, and I personally prefer the evil of deleting "full-time".
There is one point the noble Lord did not take up. I was going to make it and I was delighted that the noble Earl, Lord Erroll, made it from the Cross-Benches. Subsection (2) says very clearly the word "and" after (a) and after (b) and after (c). We have four provisos, of which "relevant employment"—and whether it should be full-time or not is what we are talking about—applies only to (b). So from the security point of view, if that is the right word, there are still paragraphs (a), (c) and (d) involved. I find difficulty here, but I think on balance I am not going to press the amendment. I should be most grateful if the Government would look very seriously at this position. It is, I think, an extremely important one, on which I hope we will see an improvement when the clause gets to Report stage. I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.
Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.
4.25 p.m.
Lord Belstead Lord Belstead moved Amendment No. 50:
Page 3, line 35, at end insert ("(whether or not in the United Kingdom)").
The noble Lord said: I beg to move Amendment No. 50. This amendment is designed to clarify what is meant by the term "relevant employment" as defined in Clause 3(3). Under the Bill British citizens by descent can secure citizenship for their children born overseas if they are able to fulfil certain requirements, including in Clause 3(2) a requirement that the British citizen parent of the child has been in relevant employment for two years up to the date of the child's birth and is in overseas employment at that date. Clause 3(3) defines what is meant by the term "relevant employment" in this context. This amendment seeks to make clear that this relevant employment may be undertaken either in the United Kingdom or overseas.
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This is in fact already achieved in the Bill as it stands, but it has been put to the Government that this is not as clear as it might be and that those seeking citizenship for their children under Clause 3(2) might think that they had to be in relevant employment overseas for the two years preceding the child's birth. We are anxious that it should be clear that this is not so and that the period of relevant employment may be undertaken in or outside the United Kingdom. This amendment, therefore, is designed to remove any risk of uncertainty about this point. I beg to move.
Lord Elwyn-Jones: This would seem to be an admirable improvement in the provisions of this clause, and we naturally support it.
Lord Drumalbyn: As one who was not as clear as I might have been about the meaning of the clause without these words, and at that time not having seen this amendment, I welcome this clarification very much indeed.
Lord Underhill: May I ask the noble Lord the Minister, as he said this refers to the qualification in subsection (2)(b), whether this has any effect on the references to overseas employment in two places in subsection (4)(a) and in two places in subsection (4)(b), or whether that is to be clarified as well?
Lord Belstead: The answer to the noble Lord is, no.
Lord Avebury: If I may refer back to the previous debate, on the 13th, when we were talking about the question of unemployment, the noble Lord, Lord Harmar-Nicholls, suggested that if a person was out of work in the United Kingdom and he was drawing unemployment benefit, for the purposes of this Bill he would be treated as if he was employed. I think this was a point which was not picked up by the noble and learned Lord the Lord Advocate in the reply he gave at column 1087. Whatever the truth of the matter may be, whether a person is looked upon as employed if he is drawing unemployment benefit, is it not the fact that a person in that position would have a close tie or connection with the United Kingdom? Has not the noble Lord, Lord Belstead, reiterated again this afternoon, for the nth time in proceedings on this Bill, that the essence of nationality is that a person should have a close and continuing link with the United Kingdom. Therefore, while relevant employment outside the United Kingdom should perhaps have the character which is ascribed to it in the Bill, is it not an inappropriate concept for persons who are within the United Kingdom for a proportion of the two years leading up to the date of birth of the child?
Would not the noble Lord go a little further than he has done? I welcome the clarification which the amendment has brought to the Bill, but would they noble Lord not say on behalf of the Government that as far as a person's time in the United Kingdom is concerned, which is counted towards the two years, it does not make any difference whether he is in full-time or part-time employment or unemployed, because during the time when he is physically here within the country he must by definition have a close tie or connection with the United Kingdom?
Lord Geddes: For the record, I should like to support this amendment very strongly, if only so that the noble Lord the Minister does not think that I am always against his point of view.
Lord Belstead: I am grateful to my noble friend. So far as the point made by the noble Lord, Lord Avebury, is concerned, I endeavoured on the last sitting of the Committee to point out the reasons why the Government felt that it was necessary to have what I called a "cross reference" between relevant employment and having a close connection with the United Kingdom. I think that it would be tedious if I were to go over that ground again.
Concerning the point which the noble Lord, Lord Avebury, makes about being unemployed, that is a matter, of course, which the Committee may wish to discuss further later on. But clearly, at any rate my reading of the Bill is that the matter of being unemployed would mean that somebody would not fall within the scope of Clause 3(3), although I repeat what I said to the noble Earl, Lord Erroll, that, of course, provision is made in subsection (4) for somebody to have a period of time out of employment when he is changing jobs.
On Question, amendment agreed to.
4.31 p.m.
Lord Drumalbyn Lord Drumalbyn moved Amendment No. 50A:
Page 3, line 36, after ("company") insert ("firm").
The noble Lord said: I beg to move Amendment No. 50A, and I think that I can at least help the progress of the Bill so far as the number of amendments are concerned by speaking at the same time to Amendments Nos. 51A, 51B, 51C, 54, 55, 73, 74 and 75, and I should like also to refer to Amendments Nos. 76 and 78. This is a series of identical amendments which simply add the word "firm" to the words: "any company or association" in line 36 so that it will read:
"In this section 'relevant employment' means full-time employment—
(a) with any company, firm or association established in the United Kingdom".
There will be the same effect wherever the words "company or association" occur as regards these other amendments.
I think that this is an improvement. Indeed, reference has already been made to the matter. Self-employed partnerships should surely be included and so should professionals employed in partnerships. I do not think it necessary to develop this argument to any extent but I am quite prepared to do so if anyone would wish it. I should like only to add that Amendment No. 76 proposes that the word "firm" should include the word "partnership". I hope that that is correct in law. Subject to that, I beg to move.
Lord Renton: I have no doubt that my noble friend Lord Drumalbyn has noticed that in Clause 3(9) we find that the word "firm" is used—and used there, so far as I can see, for the first time. The strange aspect is that subsection (9) refers back to subsection (3) in such a way that one would assume that the word "firm" had been used in subsection (3), whereas it
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has not been used. Of course it may be that the draftsman, magnificent though he is and using the English language only in its strict meanings, has rather jumped a bit and taken it upon himself to use the word "firm" in its broader and looser meaning as well as in its strict and legal meaning. As I understand it, the word "firm" as a term of art in law, refers only to a partnership; whereas in ordinary common parlance, especially no doubt in the City of London, the word "firm" is used in relation to any company or association, incorporated or otherwise, as well as any kind of professional body. Of course, it may be that one has missed the point.
Lord Drumalbyn: I hope that my noble friend will forgive me for intervening for a moment. He will observe that this is an amendment to an amendment. I am proposing to leave out the subsection altogether, which will simplify the matter. Will my noble friend also bear in mind that the word "firm" has a slightly different connotation in Scotland?
Lord Renton: I had, in fact, noticed and I am sure that noble Lords have noticed the many amendments which are consequential upon the one which my noble friend is now moving. All the same, I think that we are entitled to some explanation, if there is a rational one—which there may not be of course—as to why it is that in subsecton (9), which my noble friend wishes to leave out, the word "firm" is used, but in subsection (3) it is not used. I can hardly believe that the parliamentary counsel really intends that the word "firm" shall be used in its wider and non-technical sense.
The Lord Advocate (Lord Mackay of Clashfern): I have sought to learn here from the wiser and more experienced, and your Lordships will have heard my noble friend Lord Boyd-Carpenter advising those in the position of my noble friend and myself that it would help us to give well-timed and occasional concessions. I hope that this is a good time for a concession, though. I fear that the concessions in the Committee stage, at least as regards the first part of it, may be rather occasional.
The difficulty so far as subsection (9) is concerned was one which we had appreciated. Having considered the matter as put forward by my noble friend Lord Drumalbyn we are persuaded that it would be possible now to do something to meet his point. I am glad, therefore, to be able to tell your Lordships, and in particular my noble friend, that we are prepared to come forward with amendments on Report to achieve this aim. At that stage also we shall take acount of what my noble friend Lord Renton has said. I think it likely that the intention was that a firm would be covered as an association—that is to say an unincorporated body of persons. We have the feeling that this is a fairly technical area and that therefore it would be preferable for us to come forward with our own amendments to deal with it rather than to accept those of my noble friend, and I hope that my noble friend will feel satisfied with that.
That undertaking will cover also the amendments which are down later in the name of my noble friend Lord Geddes, which I think are Amendments Nos. 79 and

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81—and we are glad on that matter to be of the same mind as he is—and also the amendment which is down in the name of my noble friend Lady Elles, which I think is No. 80. I hope that, with that assurance, my noble friend will feel able to withdraw the amendment.
Lord Mishcon: Before the noble Lord, Lord Drumalbyn, replies, I should like to say that I am sure that the Benches opposite feel very happy with the noble and learned Lord's reply. I am hoping that later in the proceedings some joy will equally be brought to the Opposition Benches because, as the noble Lord the Minister will know, when he quoted a number of concessions that had been made, he repeatedly referred to amendments moved by his noble friends. I hope that at some stage in these proceedings, he will be equally gracious to other sections of the Committee.
I intervene only to ask a question, I think that this was a very logical amendment to deal with the question of a firm—"an association of persons" was, I believe, the phrase that was used. But is it not equally illogical to have a clause of this kind which does not provide for the single employer who has an employee and who makes an arrangement with that employee to serve an association, or be it a single individual abroad who comes within the purview of this provision? I am at the moment unaware—and it may very well be my foolishness, for which I apologise to the noble and learned Lord—why this has to be an employer consisting of a body of persons or indeed a limited company. If the noble and learned Lord finds that, surprisingly, I have made a sensible point, I wonder whether he will agree to consider this aspect for the Report stage, as well as the aspect that has been covered by the amendment that we are now discussing.
Lord Mackay of Clashfern: I certainly would not express surprise that the noble Lord should make a sensible point—not at all. I think that these provisions are drafted against the background of what is understood to be the likely circumstances, and the use of the words "company" and "association" arises for that reason. But I certainly undertake to consider, with my colleagues, the problem that the noble Lord has raised, in order to see whether, in fact, there is anything that we ought to do in that connection.
In view of what the noble Lord said about the distribution of the amendments in respect of which we have been able to undertake to make alterations in the Bill, one of the earliest that we said we would consider very carefully came from his noble friend Lord Gifford.
Lord Drumalbyn: I should like clarification of the situation in which we now find ourselves. I have spoken to a large number of amendments and have also referred to Amendments Nos. 76 and 78. I gather that my noble and learned friend has replied to me on Amendments Nos. 76 and 78 and said that he will look into this with a view to bringing in more appropriate amendments in lieu of them. He has accepted in principle the amendments to include the word "firm", but again he is also going to consider what is the most appropriate form of amendment. Is the situation that he wants me to withdraw my amendment? I see that my noble and learned friend
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is indicating agreement, so with that, I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.
Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.
4.42 p.m.
Lord Geddes Lord Geddes moved Amendment No. 51:
Page 3, line 37, at end insert ("or").
The noble Lord said: In speaking to Amendment No. 51, I should also like to speak to Amendments Nos. 53, 56 and 57 and, with the same endeavour of my noble friend Lord Drumalbyn, try to sweep four in together. As will be obvious to your Lordships' Committee, I am neither a lawyer nor a professional draftsman. Indeed, I am advised that the normal usage of the word "or" in legislation is to reserve it for the last alternative. Be that as it may, it appears to me to make a great deal more sense in this subsection if the word "or" was inserted at the end of paragraphs (a), (b), (c) and (d). It is, of course, inserted after paragraph (e). I beg to move.
Lord Mackay of Clashfern: In this case there is no difference between us about the sense of the matter. The subsection that we are considering lists a number of forms of employment which can be "relevant employment", and then the word "or" between the last two of these is an indication of the nature of the link which exists. I think that it is in accordance with normal drafting style to express it in that way. It would not be wrong to have "or" in at each of the preceding breaks, but it would add nothing except an extra word, and in the interests of economy and of elegance of style, I think that it would be right to leave this subsection as it is. In the light of that explanation, I hope that my noble friend will feel able to withdraw his amendment.
Lord Elwyn-Jones: I am not sure that the elegance of style is not claiming too much for the words of the Bill. However, I agree with the point of the noble and learned Lord.
The Earl of Erroll: As someone who programmes computers, may I say that the words "and" and "or" have very definite logical meanings, and many of the problems that arise in legal documents are as a result of using the word "and", when one really means "or". Perhaps one should be aware of these distinctions when drafting. If a little more rigorous logic in the use of these two words was applied in drafting Bills, the Bills might be clearer at the end of the day.
Lord Elwyn-Jones: It is the legal precedent that the word "and" can mean "or". Indeed, in the last case in which I had the honour of appearing as counsel in the Appellate Committee, I successfully established that proposition.
Lord Mackay of Clashfern: I suppose that computers will need to learn to cope with "the noble and learned Lord"!
Lord Geddes: I am not entirely sure whether I should feel either chastened and/or reprimanded, but in view

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of the comments made, I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.
Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.
[Amendments Nos. 51A, 51B, and 51C not moved.]
Lord Geddes Lord Geddes moved Amendment No. 21:
Page 3, line 41, after ("in") insert ("or associated with a company or association established in").
The noble Lord said: I raised this point during the Second Reading debate when I asked—and I am not certain that I quote precisely my own words—whether it was equitable that the right of citizenship may depend on whether a person's employer happens to recruit through a company or association established in the United Kingdom. If Clause 3(3)(c) allows an associated relationship, as defined in subsection (8)(b), then it would seem logical that the same should apply in subsection (3)(b). With apologies if that sounds somewhat complicated, what I am getting at is that as drafted subsection (3)(b) is more restrictive than subsection (3)(c). There seems to be little logic behind that. Although the words are very cumbersome, I think that the amendment that I have tabled would bring those two subsections into line with each other, in that subsection (3)(b) would now read, towards the end:
"… was arranged by a company or association established in or associated with a company or association established in the United Kingdom".
I beg to move.
Lord Mackay of Clashfern: As regards Clause 3(3)(c), to which my noble friend referred, that is a continuing link which remains throughout the time of the employment. Subsection (3)(b), on the other hand, is concerned with a link which is established only at the beginning of the employment. In other words, it is a link that depends upon the way in which the employment itself was begun.
Clause 3(3)(b) was widened, in answer to representations made, in order to include some cases which appeared to be deserving cases. For example one of these was where a company in the United Kingdom grants a licence to the overseas company to manufacture its products and, as part of the agreement, agrees to provide staff who will be employed by the overseas company and who will provide expert assistance to it. That is the kind of case which the definition, as it now appears in Clause 3(3)(b), is intended to cover.
My noble friend's amendment would go considerably further than that. It would bring within the definition of "relevant employment" employment with an overseas company which was linked with the United Kingdom only because it had been arranged by a company, say, an employment agency, established overseas but which was controlled by or which itself controlled an employment agency in this country. I think that it would be impossible to accept that such employment in itself reflected any sort of real or significant link with this country. The difference between Clause 3(3)(b) and Clause 3(3)(c) is quite an important one in this area, and, therefore, I would ask my noble friend to accept that the logic which he
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was seeking to apply from Clause 3(3)(c) back to Clause 3(3)(b) is not appropriate in this instance. In the light of what I have said, I hope that my noble friend will feel able to withdraw his amendment.
Lord Geddes: I think that I can follow the counter-logic—if I may so call it—of my noble and learned friend the Lord Advocate. Having tabled the amendment, obviously, I should still like to see the extension that my amendment would give, but it is a relatively minor point and I beg leave to withdraw it.
Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.
[Amendments Nos. 53 to 59 not moved.]
Lord Geddes Lord Geddes moved Amendment No. 60:
Page 4, line 44, leave out from ("fit") to end of line 45.
The noble Lord said: In future I must endeavour to spread such amendments as I may propose to your Lordships' Committee a little further apart. In speaking to Amendment No. 60 I should like to speak also to Amendments Nos. 61, 62, 63, 64 and 65. These six amendments are an attempt to tie into each other. A great debate has taken place in your Lordships' Committee regarding the discretion of the Secretary of State. I feel it right that the Secretary of State should not have quite the wide powers of discretion that he has as the Bill is presently drafted. These amendments are therefore tabled with that aim in mind. It may be the general consensus of opinion in your Lordships' Committee that this point is already covered by remarks made by my noble friends on the Front Bench in response to earlier questions. I beg to move.
Lord Mackay of Clashfern: This series of amendments are at the very least drafting amendments and they may, as my noble friend said, have some effect in substance. It may be helpful if I read the subsection as I think it would be if my noble friend's amendments were given effect to. I think subsection (5) would in that event read:
"If in the special circumstances of any particular case the Secretary of State thinks fit,

(a) subsection (2) may be treated as if the reference to twelve months were a reference to six years; and

(b) subsection (2) (b) may be treated as if the reference to two years were a reference to a shorter period".

I accept that at first sight the wording of subsection (5) as it now is may appear rather cumbersome. It does however, we think, achieve the intention, and we fear that this is not quite so true of the revised wording proposed by my noble friend Lord Geddes. May I just say briefly why we think that? First, in Amendment No. 60 my noble friend is seeking to remove the words,
"he may do either or both of the following things, namely—".
Now I suggest that these words do in fact serve a rather useful purpose in that they make quite clear that each of the two discretionary powers set out in the subsection may be exercised independently. This is an important point that would not be equally clear in the revised version.
Secondly, in Amendments Nos. 61 to 64, my noble friend is seeking to replace the words
"the Secretary of State may treat subsection 2 (or 2 (b))"

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by the words,
"subsection (2) (or 2 (b)) may be treated".
Once again, I think this is to lose a little in the rewording. The wording as it stands emphasises the responsibility for exercising these powers by the Secretary of State.
Finally, in Amendment No. 65, my noble friend is seeking to replace the words, "such shorter period as he thinks fit" in subparagraph (b) with the words "a shorter period". Now, it is true that the words "the Secretary of State thinks fit" already appear at the beginning of the subsection. It may therefore be thought that there is no need for them to be repeated here. They are not, however, just repetition. They draw attention to the fact that two separate discretionary powers are involved here: one to decide whether or not a period shorter than two years should be accepted and another to decide of what length this shorter period should appropriately be. These are both quite important powers, distinct powers, and as my noble friend Lord Belstead said earlier, this is a section where we are concerned to confer an entitlement. It is important, therefore, that any discretions which are involved should be fairly clearly defined, so that, if a court had to consider the entitlement, they would have a clear view of the areas in which discretion operated.
This is a passage of the Bill to which reference has been made in exchanges in which my noble friend Lord Boyd-Carpenter and the noble Lord, Lord Mishcon, took part earlier. I referred then to the fact that (b) could lead to a discretion that would enable one to overcome difficulties that might occur in a particular case over the 90 days. Although it does not expressly cover that, I quite agree, the period that the Secretary of State is bound to consider might be shortened in an appropriate case so as to avoid the necessity of covering a particularly troublesome period that extended over 90 days.
I hope that, in the light of these explanations, my noble friend may feel that the wording we have chosen in this important area is appropriate. I am grateful to him, however, for his help in seeking to simplify the Bill. I am sorry that on this occasion we do not feel that the result is quite as good as he hoped for.
Lord Boyd-Carpenter: The noble and learned Lord the Lord Advocate referred again to an issue which arose the other day on the 90-day provision. I should like to be a little clearer in my mind than I am as to what it is he has just said to us. Has he been telling the Committee that, even if this clause goes through as it stands, there will be a statutory 90-day period of limitation? And notwithstanding the fact that there does not appear to be any express power given to the Secretary of State to modify that 90-day rule, is there nonetheless somewhere to be found in the sub-section, or in the Bill, a power in the Secretary of State to override the 90-day statutory figure? I should be grateful if he would clarify that.
May I take one further point which I am sure he will deal with with his habitual kindness? He used the phrase which his noble friend Lord Belstead uses quite regularly to the effect that this clause gives an entitlement. It is of course riddled with provisions like, "If the Secretary of State thinks fit", and the rest
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of it. Am I to understand from what has been said now and earlier that, notwithstanding that phraseology, it would be possible for an aggrieved person to appeal to the courts? If such an aggrieved person sought to appeal to the courts, would he be put in the extreme position of having to establish that no reasonable Secretary of State could possibly have "seen fit", or would the merits of the matter be open on appeal to the courts? I should be grateful if the noble and learned Lord would deal with both those points with his habitual clarity.
Lord Mackay of Clashfern: So far as the first point is concerned, the power we are looking at in subsection (5)(b) is a power to shorten the period of two years. The 90 days is an interval which can occur within the period of employment which might be looked upon as trying to meet the two years. The point that my noble friend made on the last occasion—and I think the noble Lord, Lord Mishcon, also dealt with this—was that there might be a rather peculiar case in which the period happened to be just over 90 days for some special reason.
I agree that there is no power in this clause as presently drafted to cope with that directly. That is to say, there is no power to extend the 90 days. But of course one can see that this power might be made relevant to that by shortening the period under con-sideration so as to leave out of account the awkward period with the more than 90-day interval in it. For example, supposing that, right at the beginning of the two-year period under consideration, the person in question was out of employment for, say, 93 days, and thereafter everything was perfectly all right; he was working fully from then onwards. It would be perfectly open to the Secretary of State under the power in subsection (5)(b) to say not the full two years but the two years minus 93 days, and in that way get over the difficulty, at least in that case. That is what I had in mind.
Lord Boyd-Carpenter: What would happen if the 93 days came in the middle of a period and not conveniently at the beginning?
Lord Mackay of Clashfern: Again, subject to the circumstances as a whole—and it is a pure discretion—it would be open to the Secretary of State to consider making the two-year period so short that it would be the period after that awkward 90, 91 or 92 day interval had occurred. So if it was about the middle, the period to which he would actually shorten it might be just under a year.
Lord Mishcon: The noble and learned Lord always delights the Committee with his clarity and simplicity of mind. May I therefore ask him to tell me why, instead of going through the whole mechanics of the two years and the discretion, there is not a simple provision in the Bill wich gives a similar discretion to the Home Secretary to reduce the period of 90 days or, rather, add to the period of 90 days?
Lord Boyd-Carpenter: Yes, add to it.
Lord Mishcon: That would seem to me, with my simple mind but not as clear a one as the noble and

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learned Lord's, to be a rather more advantageous way of dealing with the problem.
Lord Mackay of Clashfern: As I said earlier, it is obvious that this clause has to deal with a great variety of circumstances and if you deal with all the possible circumstances you will certainly sacrifice the clarity which the present clause has, and the more special circumstances you deal with the more difficult the whole thing will become. It is important to remember that there is an overriding and complete discretion to grant citizenship to a minor in Clause 3(1), and in my submission there is a limit to the number of subsidiary discretions that it is right to have, and subsection 5(b) is an appropriate one. I do not for a moment suggest that overcoming 90 days is the only purpose of that subsection; it is, rather, looking at the period and seeing whether in the circumstances it is a period that must be satisfied.
Coming to the second matter raised by my noble friend, it goes back to the first occasion on which the noble Lord, Lord Gifford, raised the issue in connection with the phrase "the Secretary of State thinks fit" where it first occurs, and it was also raised by my noble friend Lord Colville. The intention in Clause 3(2) is to confer an entitlement, and that is what is to be found at the beginning of that provision:
"A person born outside the United Kingdom shall be entitled"
and so on. The phrase "if he thinks fit" does not thereafter occur in the main provisions of that clause; the phrase "if the Secretary of State is satisfied" occurs, but the phrase "if the Secretary of State thinks fit", which is the appropriate phrase for a discretion, does not thereafter occur in the main provisions of Clause 3(2). Therefore, in Clause 3(2) the intention is that the facts, if they are established, should confer on the person in question an entitlement which he could raise with the court, and it not being a matter of discretion, he would not have to satisfy the very heavy burden, to which my noble friend referred, of overcoming a discretion by showing that no reasonable Secretary of State could have exercised his discretion in the manner exhibited in the particular case.
Within that, in order to deal with special cases, there is a subsidiary discretion in subsection (5), and that is why I said it was necessary to make as clear as one could what that discretion was because if there was a question of entitlement under discussion, then a separate test would apply if it was being sought to overcome in some way the exercise of discretion. But the discretions in subsection (5) are discretions in favour of the applicant, and therefore it is most unlikely that the applicant himself would want to challenge them, except possibly to try to say that the only reasonable exercise would be to have a shorter period in the case of paragraph (b) or a longer period in the case of (a), but it is in subsection (5) that that sort of test might be relevant. Once the result of that was established, the entitlement test would apply to the rest of the clause; and as the Committee knows, I have undertaken that we will look at the formulation of this to try to make it as clear as we can in the various contexts in which it occurs. I undertook to do that in answer to the noble Lord, Lord Gifford, much earlier.
Lord Gifford: While taking up a point just made by the noble and learned Lord, I will not go back to the concession he has kindly made about the "satisfied" formula, but he indicated that the "thinks fit" formula, which confers a pure discretion, might be challenged on the unreasonableness ground. That cannot be right if Clause 43 stays intact, and perhaps the noble and learned Lord would confirm that Clause 3(5) is one of the discretions which would be caught by Clause 43(2); that is, the discretion about which, if it were exercised against the applicant, the Secretary of State would not have to give any reasons and would not be subject to any kind of appeal or review.
Lord Mackay of Clashfern: Yes, I agree with the noble Lord, Lord Gifford, about that, when one takes account of the effect of the later provision. I was really attempting to distinguish between the kind of burden that ordinarily exists to overcome a discretion and the kind of burden on an applicant to show that he was entitled. To distinguish between those two was what I had in mind and I hope I succeeded in doing so.
Lord Geddes: I am grateful to my noble and learned friend the Lord Advocate for the very full explanation he has given, particularly on the last point raised by the noble Lord, Lord Gifford. I shall read with great interest the exact words my noble and learned friend used in his explanation and meanwhile beg leave to withdraw the amendment.
Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.
[Amendments Nos. 61 to 67 not moved.]
5.8 p.m.
Lord Drumalbyn Lord Drumalbyn moved Amendment No. 68A:
Page 5, line 19, at end insert—
("( ) A person born outside the United Kingdom shall be entitled, on an application for his registration as a British citizen, to be registered as such a citizen if the Secretary of State is satisfied—

(a) that at the time of that person's birth his father or mother was a British citizen by descent; and

(b) that that person has qualified in the United Kingdom to practise in any profession designated by the Secretary of State in an order made by statutory instrument; or

The noble Lord said: This is an effort to give the child of a British citizen by descent who is born outside the United Kingdom more chance of becoming a British citizen than is afforded by Clause 3(6). Subsection (6) taken with subsection (7) entitles a person born outside the United Kingdom, whose parents at least one of whom was a British citizen by descent at the time of his or her birth, to have an application for registration as a British citizen made on his behalf while he is still a minor, provided that both parents and the child have been living in the United Kingdom for the three years immediately before the applicaton, or, under subsection (7), if one of the parents has died before then, the surviving parent and the child have been living here.
These two subsections appear to be intended to cover cases not covered by Clause 3(2) and (3) which relate to the child born outside the United Kingdom of British citizens by descent, one of whom is engaged in relevant employment with a close connection to the United Kingdom. The characteristics of subsection (6)

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appear to cover those cases where the parents are employed or self-employed more or less for their working lives overseas, and in any case not in jobs which fall within the provisions of subsection (2) and (3). For these it seems that the requirement that application for registration while the child is still a minor, and after the parents and child have been living in the United Kingdom for three years or more ending with the date of application, is excessively onerous—and for this reason. If application is to be made while the child is under 18—that is, still a minor—the person in employment would have to give up his or her job overseas before the child is 15—that would be when the parents are, say, between the ages of roughly 37 and 50 at the latest—unless they are able to interrupt their life-work when the child is younger for at least three years, or to change their jobs entirely. Not many could do that.
Therefore, the amendment adopts a different approach and entitles the child himself, or herself, to make application after he, or she, passes minority if he or she has qualified in the United Kingdom to practise in any profession designated by the Secretary of State by order. I have in mind, for example, qualifying as a banker, a doctor, an engineer, in insurance, a lawyer, a manager with a bachelor of commerce degree, a scientist, a teacher, or whatever. Then there is the second alternative: or if he or she has been educated in the United Kingdom for four years at least. That is to say, the person has been sent home to complete his secondary education—I am speaking of a normal, typical case—and is then taken on as a trainee or an apprentice in a British company or association established in the United Kingdom, or in some other relevant employment in the United Kingdom, and has been employed in it for three years.
Nobody could say that with British citizens by descent as parents and such experience in the United Kingdom the person is not fit for British citizenship, though of course the Secretary of State could properly refuse the application if the person was, so to say, a bad egg. If the application was accepted, he would be a British citizen, but it would not follow that he would join his parents overseas or take any other job abroad. He might well spend the rest of his life in the United Kingdom. How absurd it would be if, with British grand-parents, he himself was not to be a British citizen—still more absurd if he was a stateless person. I assume that any children of his born in Britain would be British citizens—I hope that I am right in assuming that—by virtue of their birth in the United Kingdom, even if he married, say, a Guatemalan or a Korean. But it would be all the more astonishing if he himself remained an alien, or stateless person, while his own children were British citizens. Of course the Secretary of State might take pity on him and confer British citizenship on him under subsection (1) of the clause. But again he might not; nobody can tell. There is an inherent doubt here.
I dare say that I have not got all the details and permutations right, but at least I hope that I have said enough to show the Committee that we cannot remain content with the avenues open to the children of British citizens by descent to regain British citizenship by vindicating their determination to maintain a close
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connection with this country in the ways that I have outlined, or something along those lines. I again make the point. Here is a case where someone is not going to be qualified for British citizenship because as a minor application has not been made for him. Instead of that we are substituting professional training for practise in some profession or another, or schooling at home, plus being engaged in a job in Great Britain, and serving in it for three years. Those are the alternatives that I am putting forward, and if I may say so, they seem to extend the Bill in the right direction. I beg to move.
Lord Belstead: I am grateful to my noble friend for his clear explanation of this detailed and interesting amendment. I think that it raises problems and I should like to respond by trying to point out some of the problems as the Government see them. The normal avenue to British citizenship for an adult under the Bill is through naturalisation, unless the person concerned holds citizenship of the British Dependent Territories, or British Overseas Citizenship, or is a British subject under the Bill, or a British protected person, and then there is the entitlement to citizenship under Clause 4, which we shall come to shortly. An adult should be considered in his own right and upon the strength of his own connections with the United Kingdom.
Naturally in considering an application for naturalisation from an adult born overseas to a British citizen by descent, we would take into account the fact that the applicant's parent was a British citizen, but, frankly, once one is an adult, the status of one's parents cannot be decisive. The person would be considered on his or her own merits, and not entirely upon their parents, and this we believe is a fundamental objection to the amendment. Although my noble friend has put in some very interesting lines which would take the person concerned into citizenship, it depends initially on the fact that the person concerned is a child of a citizen by descent.
My noble friend might say that a different approach is justified with a person born overseas to a British citizen by descent, particularly if he has the links with this country specified in paragraphs (b) and (c) of the amendment. My noble friend has said that such a person will have links with this country through his parentage, his education, his employment, which justify conferring upon him an entitlement to our citizenship.
But for a moment I should like to consider the strength of the links that such a person will have with this country under the amendment. It might be said that the parent of the child might have had links with the United Kingdom through employment, but the parent simply failed to apply for the child to be registered under Clause 3(2) within 12 months of the child's birth. But we have specifically provided in Clause 3(5)(a) that there should be a discretion to accept applications made in this way up to six years after the child's birth. Although my noble friend dealt in great detail with practically every part of his amendment, in listening to him I was never quite sure why the application would not have been under made Clause 3, when it could have been.
On the other hand, it might be said that the parent

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had close connections with the United Kingdom but these did not fall within the ambit of Clause 3(2), and since the family never resided in the United Kingdom together, the child had no claim to registration under Clause 3(6)—the one about coming back to the United Kingdom. But as has been amply demonstrated, the ambit of Clause 3(2) as it now stands is very considerable, and where a family has real connections with the United Kingdom, but for some reason cannot meet the requirements of Clause 3(2), and the child does not qualify under Clause 3(6) (which is the coming home part of the clause), then there is always the avenue of registration under the discretionary power in Clause 3(1)—the power which has always been in the law of the land since the 1948 Act.
May I now turn to consider the ties with this country set out in paragraphs (b) and (c), one of which the applicant has to hold in his own right. First, there is the requirement in paragraph (b) of my noble friend's amendment that the applicant shall have qualified in the United Kingdom to practise in a profession designated by the Secretary of State. Of course, it is quite true that the professions which my noble friend mentioned indicate a significant period of training, which I presume under this amendment would have to be undertaken in the United Kingdom.
But we are dealing here with someone who has been born overseas whose connections with the United Kingdom, or through his family, are, as I have demonstrated, almost certainly very slight; otherwise, there would be the applications under Clause 3. Once that person has completed his or her training, he or she may well leave the country and return to the country of birth, and there is nothing in the amendment to stop the person doing that. I do not deny the formative effect of our institutions of higher education and professional training; and, of course, I do not deny for one moment the absolute right—indeed, very likely the desirability—of somebody, having trained here, to go away again. But it is a very different thing from saying that that is a good thing to do to saying that that should as of right confer citizenship upon the person concerned.
Secondly, there is the alternative requirement in paragraph (c) of the amendment. This, I think, is rather closer, and it is the bit which has two limbs. First, the applicant has to be educated here for at least four years; but if then a child, that person will presumably have been here on his own. Otherwise, if the parents were here, of course, he would have qualified under Clause 3(6). But if we are talking about a student who is coming from overseas, although his parents are citizens by descent, he is presumably a person coming and attending university or polytechnic here and then getting a job, albeit with a United Kingdom-based firm, and then going away again, perhaps for the whole of the rest of his life.
Again, although I do not doubt for one moment that such a person may be an admirable person, I really do not see that that coming back, being educated and going away again is really a basis for the conferment of citizenship. My noble friend raised an extremely important point that such a person might be stateless. I would hope that in an instance where that might be the case Schedule 2(4) would cover such a person.
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I hope I have dealt with the aspects of my noble friend's amendment which are important. I will certainly look very carefully at my noble friend's amendment again, because there really is a great deal in this and my noble friend's explanation was detailed and close. I would ask my noble friend, for his part, perhaps, to have a look at the Government's reply before deciding what it is ultimately that he would wish to do about the amendment.
Lord Drumalbyn: I do not want to hold your Lordships up on this but may I point out where, in the case of one or two things, I think my noble friend has not quite seized what I was after. Really, the whole point of making this effort to extend the avenues to British citizenship is that there are wide areas that are not covered in the earlier part of the clause. My noble friend seems to have a fixation about being employed in British industry, for example; as if it were that you could not maintain your connections with this country unless you were employed by a British firm. Surely that cannot be correct. That is one of the main reasons why I have drafted my amendment in this way.
My noble friend said in terms that the connections with the United Kingdom were very slight. It seems to me that this is by no means so. Here you have parents who have themselves, in all probability, been educated in Britain, and they then go abroad. Mark you, I agree that this is not necessarily so, but this is the sort of case I am taking: the parents have been educated here, they go abroad, they are not employed by a British company but they do maintain their links, possibly by coming home from time to time and having holidays in this country; or, in the second leg of the alternative, they send their child over to have its education in this country. But the point is that, not being in relevant employment, they cannot use the avenue laid down in the first part of this clause.
Another thing I should like to draw to the attention of my noble friend is that he has assumed that the child who comes over and, on passing his minority, either qualifies himself professionally or joins a firm in Britain to get further training and experience, will be going away again immediately. Of course, it is possible he may wish to go abroad, but having got his close connections with Great Britain I see no reason why he should not go abroad as a British citizen. I really can see none whatsoever. But I would guess that at least as many people who have the sort of pattern of life as indicated in my amendment would not be going abroad again. I have noticed that in many families there is a curious alternation, so to speak—one generation goes abroad, the next stays at home and the next goes abroad again.
But what is of great importance is that from this country we should have people with professional or technical training going out in a fairly steady stream so as to maintain the connections of this country with the rest of the world, and the rest of the world with this country. This is the whole point of my amendment; but I would lay great emphasis, at the end, on the enormous importance that people who do this attach to their remaining British and their children remaining British. I do not suppose that by any stretch of the imagination I could have got the conditions exactly right in this amendment, but I do com-

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mend it to my noble friend for further study. He has said he will look at it, and I am sure he will. I see the noble Lord opposite rising in his place, so I give way to him.
Lord Mishcon: The noble Lord, Lord Drumalbyn, is courteous, and I assure him that I rose only in order to say that my noble friends and I have much sympathy with this amendment. I would not have jumped up in order to say anything hostile to what he had said. It is right that a lot of consideration should be given to widening the sphere that we are discussing. Perhaps I may add just two points to what the noble Lord said in the hope that the Government, in considering this matter again, will take them into account.
It is obviously perfectly true—and this has been said already—that we need to encourage people from this country to go abroad, spread their skills, and do it for the benefit of this country. That is right. But equally it must be true that if you have people of merit you want them to come to this country, and they are not likely to come here unless they know that they can be part of the British family and can be admitted to British citizenship. Therefore, that obviously is a very good reason for seeing that the clause is widened.
There was one point that I did not understand in the reply of the noble Lord the Minister, and it was this. I thought he was saying that it was open to such a person to apply for naturalisation. I believe I understood him correctly to say that. This is a vicious circle, because I am not sure, unless I am told that I am wrong, that there is an automatic right to enter this country by such an individual, who will have to reside here for a minimum period of time before he can apply for naturalisation, and who furthermore during that time will have to have unconditional permission to reside here. This is a vicious circle because I do not think that any of us can by any means take it for granted that there will be permission to do anything else but visit—and certainly not to stay—for the requisite period. One knows the conditions on entry to this country are usually made clear: that the person concerned is not permitted to take employment here or is limited in his stay here for a certain period of time.
These are two points which the Government, in their kindness, may bear in mind when considering what on the face of it appears to be a very worthwhile amendment. It may be that there are some problems that we have to get over. The spirit of the amendment is obviously one that my noble friends and I appreciate.
Lord Belstead: When my noble friend felt the Government have a fixation about tying an entitlement to British citizenship by descent to employment in British firms, this is not borne out if one reads Clause 3. The whole point of widening the scope of Clause 3 was that it would give an infinitely wider scope than that particular interpretation which is the impression which my noble friend had.
If somebody in the circumstances that he envisaged comes back to this country, he also asked, why is it that they cannot then go away again but take with them the conferment of British citizenship? My noble friend said that he did not think that such a
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person would necessarily go away immediately from these shores. So often families work on a basis of one generation away and another generation at home. Humanity happens to work out like that.
We are talking about a situation where we have increased enormously the scope of the people who can transmit their citizenship as of right by birth by bringing within the rights of transmission women who have never been there before and also those who are not only born but who are naturalised and registered as citizens. This is going to mean that the people who can transmit their citizenship to the next generation by birth are going to be increased enormously.
Without going over old ground again, it is basically for that reason that not only the present Government, but the previous Government in their Green Paper reached the conclusion that the right thing to do was to say that citizenship could be transmitted as of right to the first generation and, after that, rules should be made. Coming now to the present Government and the White Paper, the rules should be either through relevant employment or through the other avenues of families who return to the country or through the general discretionary registration power of the Secretary of State under Clause 3(1) which has always been in the law ever since 1948.
Taking into account what the noble Lord, Lord Mishcon, said, I shall look at the detailed amendment. It necessitated a lot of research so far as the Government were concerned and my noble friend's remarks were lengthy and detailed. If he is prepared to look at my reply, I shall be prepared to look at his remarks.
Lord Mishcon: So that the Committee are informed of the validity or otherwise of the point could the noble Lord deal with naturalisation? He said that one of the solutions to the problem regarding the amendment was naturalisation. I tried to point out that this was a vicious circle. Could he deal with the point about right of entry and residence of an unconditional nature which is required before there can be a naturalisation application?
Lord Belstead: I was more downright; I was saying the people that my noble friend wishes to deal with in the amendment who will be adult should become British citizens by naturalisation. That is the way which is favoured under the Bill. I am not trying to avoid replying to the question, but we are going to come to these matters on Clause 5 and Schedule 1. This will arise again and again. To suggest in some way that naturalisation cannot be an avenue to citizenship because of rules about entry is to suggest that nobody can ever become naturalised. That is not the case. The avenue for naturalisation is going to be there for people who are able to enter the country under the immigration rules and fulfil the requirements for character, language and residence. Therefore, it is perfectly reasonable for me to suggest that the people who my noble friend Lord Drumalbyn has in mind should have—because they will be adults and not minors—the avenue of naturalisation under the Bill.
Lord Drumalbyn: I am grateful to my noble friend and the noble Lord, Lord Mishcon, for what has been said. I hope that my noble friend will pay great

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attention to what the noble Lord, Lord Mishcon, said. Perhaps my noble friend in the course of studying this amendment will have regard to the ways in which the people, about whom I have been talking, can gain entry into this country. Will they be given sufficient time in getting the right to stay here to be naturalised because their parents were British by descent? This would greatly ease the situation.
My noble friend has not quite seized what the whole of my clause is about because he said that a method is provided in the second part of Clause 3. People who have either their own businesses abroad or are employed in foreign concerns will have to retire from those early in order to come out of those jobs if they are going to avail themselves of the three-year period of residence during the minority of the child. One way of easing this would be to return, for the purposes of this Bill, to a minority of 21. It would give us slightly greater scope. The fact is that this will not happen.
I can envisage that parents may be prepared to come over with the child when he first comes to this country and no doubt he will be allowed in then. But, unless there is some other provision made, he may well be subjected to a time limit for a stay in this country to prevent his being naturalised. I find it very difficult to stomach—I am sure that parents in this position would—the idea that they have to come back to their own country to get their son naturalised. It is an extraordinary position. I hope that we shall find some way round this and I look to my noble friend to do so. I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.
Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.
5.39 p.m.
Baroness Elles Baroness Elles moved Amendment No. 69:
Page 5, line 23, after ("terminated") insert ("or if his father and mother were living permanently apart,").
The noble Baroness said: The purpose of this amendment is to obtain an interpretation of the word "terminated". Could my noble friend tell the Committee whether it covers all cases where a marriage has irretrievably broken down and the spouses are living permanently apart or is it strictly limited to those who have been divorced or to those whose marriage has been annulled? I would ask my noble friend if the operation of this clause, for instance, could be invoked in a case where a parent has not been divorced but has been granted the legal guardianship of his or her child.
The definition of the word "terminated" is important because sadly, but not surprisingly, it is a point that has not been raised previously by the right reverend Prelates, but it is a matter of discrimination on the grounds of religion. There are many, both of the Roman Catholic faith and of the Anglican communion—and, in parenthesis, despite the published press reports of debates in the General Synod recently as to the value of the words "till death us do part", many of the Christian faith do believe that their marriage vows are for life and therefore they are not able, on grounds of conscience, to divorce their partner, or indeed their partner may be of the Christian faith and believe that they cannot divorce Therefore, I would ask my noble friend whether he does not think that
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the word, as it is in the Bill at the moment, does not act discriminately against an individual—and, after all, we are talking of individuals in this Bill—who may have a child and who may want to come back to this country where his or her grandparents are living and where there is a close connection with the United Kingdom but, because of not being able to divorce, they would be excluded from the operation of this clause.
Following on that, in order to save the Committee's time, I would be grateful to my noble friend if, at the same time. he could comment when he gives the definition of the word "terminated", if it is what I believe it to mean, whether this might be a category of persons who could come within the purview of Clause 3(1) and be considered under the discretion of the Secretary of State, particularly where there might be some certificate from a minister of religion in order to vouch for the reasons why that individual has not been able to divorce. I beg to move.
Lord Gifford: I support the amendment moved by the noble Baroness, which I think raises a lot of important considerations. Regarding Clause 3, this is the first time we have been able directly to consider Clause 3(6), and it is a very important clause. It is going to be the main avenue by which people who have been born abroad and married abroad and who want to come back and bring their family back to Britain will be able to register their children as full British citizens. It is not, I suggest, in perfect form, and the amendment raises the main defect in it.
There are going to be a lot of cases—are there not?—involving a woman (I speak particularly of a woman) who has been born abroad and who has married abroad a foreign national, whose marriage has failed and who then wants to come back to Britain with her family and take up residence here. She returns and does not get divorced either because divorce is against her religious principles or because divorce is impossible or because the husband will not consent. The years go by and the eldest child begins to approach the age of 18, which is the cut-off point. Beyond that age the application will be no good. In this sort of case the husband will often not wish to consent to the child becoming a citizen of this country. He may be proud of his own citizenship and in any case, because of the breakdown of the marriage, may not be keen to allow a change of citizenship for his children. So the suggestion that the conditions should be widened to allow not only for one party's consent to be dispensed with on a divorce but to allow it to be dispensed with on a permanent separation is absolutely right, and I hope that the Minister will give this favourable consideration.
The Lord Bishop of Peterborough: I hope that the Minister will either define "terminate", which might terminate the debate, or accept the amendment which the noble Baroness has moved. It seems to me utterly reasonable and the only consolation any of us has, sitting in any kind of assembly, whether it be in Synod, in your Lordships' Committee, or a parochial church council, is to take refuge in Dr. Johnson's dictum,
"that which is not formed by reason cannot be destroyed by reason".

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As this is utterly reasonable, I cannot see that the Minister can continue to resist it and continue to have sleepful nights. I very much hope that the Government accept this amendment, which covers far more than it says, and which would leave in no doubt many people who find themselves abandoned with no home, no citizenship and not much clear hope for their children.
Baroness Vickers: May I ask my noble friend about the position of the common law wife? After all, the common law wife is now recognised in this country. I do not know whether they would be qualified or considered illegitimate under this clause. I should like to know the position with regard to the common law wife who has been living with a man for many years in this country and has children and what would be the position of the children, because much of this Bill deals with married women.
Lord Boyd-Carpenter: I should like to ask my noble friend Lady Elles why she has inserted in the amendment the word "permanently". Is she not putting up a considerable obstacle in the way of the applicant? The fact that the parents are living apart is easily demonstrable but who is to know, after they have been living apart for some time, that they may not come together? Therefore, to include the word "permanently" must put a heavy onus on the applicant. I wonder whether the amendment would not be much better without it.
Lord Belstead: This amendment seeks to enable a child to be registered if he or she is born overseas to a British citizen by descent and later comes to this country with one of the parents to live. Subsection (6) as it stands at present requires the child, before he can acquire an entitlement to be registered, to come to the United Kingdom and live with both parents unless, for reasons which are set out in subsection (7), he is effectively part of a one-parent family.
The provisions of subsections (6) and (7) are designed to accord an entitlement to registration where the future of the children concerned can reasonably be considered to lie in the United Kingdom. This amendment could cover cases where this would not be so. For instance, it would be possible for the family to make arrangements for one parent to reside here for three years solely to enable the child to acquire British citizenship, and the family would then be able to re-unite on a more permanent basis abroad. That would be unsatisfactory and would certainly be counter to the purpose of the Bill, which is to confer British citizenship only on people with real connections with this country.
I do not mean to be flippant in any way, but, arising from the intervention by my noble friend Lord Boyd-Carpenter, I may say that there are sometimes difficulties in deciding on the particular position which my noble friend Lady Elles has in mind. When I looked at my noble friend's amendment, my mind went back to a rather different situation. It certainly used to be the law—I do not know whether it is still—that if a voluntary school were to be closed and the school sold, the site had to be offered back to the original
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donor, unless the donor could no longer be found.
I remember a case, which is probably apocryphal, of such a school, whose site had been donated by the family of my noble friend Lord Salisbury; and the time came when the number of pupils fell away and the decision to close the school was taken. Entirely by an oversight, the existing Marquess, when that happened, was not consulted about the matter. When the people concerned were asked why they had not consulted the then Marquess of Salisbury the answer they gave was that he could not be found!
I believe there is a genuine difficulty in these cases and the Government believe that the solution is that which was mentioned by my noble friend Lady Elles at the end of her remarks. These are precisely the sort of cases which ought to be covered by Clause 3(1), which contains the general powers to register. It is worth saying, in case your Lordships' Committee feel that this answer is one that has suddenly been dreamt up by the Government spokesman on this particular Bill, that this power of the Secretary of State is in fact a very old one; it has been the law since the 1948 Act. It is used in deserving cases and I join with the right reverend Prelate the Bishop of Peterborough in saying that these are exactly the sort of cases that ought to come under the general registration powers of Clause 3(1).
Baroness Birk: What has just been said by the noble Lord the Minister makes me feel very uneasy. This particular subsection is both very wide and very narrow in its scope, and we are back again to what the Secretary of State "thinks fit". I should not have thought that that was good enough and it certainly does not answer the point that was raised by the noble Baroness, Lady Elles. I do not believe the noble Baroness got an answer to the question she asked concerning the definition of the word "terminated". It appears to me that "terminated" must mean that the marriage has come to an end, and therefore it means that the couple have been divorced. It follows from that that the point she made about couples being separated because of religious reasons is very relevant to this matter. There are also cases where one of the partners may go off to live with somebody else, and although in some cases there may be quite an amicable separation, in other cases one spouse may not know where the other spouse is and cannot get in touch. Neither can one fail to take into account those cases where the child's entitlement is used as a weapon in a marital quarrel. This is also something which happens between husband and wife and it seems to me to be quite wrong that the child should suffer.
I believe that the noble Lord, Lord Boyd-Carpenter, had a point when he raised the question of whether the word "permanently" should appear in this subsection. While the noble Lord was speaking it occurred to me that there could be a case where the parents are still married and where there is no intention of breaking up the marriage. One of the parents might come to this country with a child in order to acquire a home or to arrange for the child's education. Therefore, both the parent and the child might stay here for some time. It is clear that the family's home is in the United Kingdom—establishing the rather mystical "close connection" that covers the case—

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but the family will still be "separated", even though the separation would not be of a permanent nature. There may also be cases where the wife will return home with the child for some time in order to look after an elderly relative, for example. That does not mean that the marriage has been terminated or that there has been a permanent separation.
We certainly support this amendment because it appears that if the clause is left as it stands, with only what I must call a dubious proviso in subsection (1), then the clause can only work to the disadvantage of a number of children. The number of children so affected might not be very great but that is immaterial; it is an injustice even if it is an injustice affecting only one child. I do believe that this amendment should be supported. The Government should not rely on Clause 3(1) but should write something clear into the Bill, or if the Government reject this amendment and the noble Baroness intends to press it, we will certainly support her.
5.55 p.m.
Lord Avebury: It does seem to me wrong continually to rely on the discretion of the Secretary of State in Clause 3(1). I appreciate that, as the noble Lord the Minister said, this power or something very similar to it has been in our legislation since as far back as 1948, but surely we should limit as much as possible the number of occasions when one wants to leave it to the Secretary of State to exercise a very wide power of this kind. Even though the amendment proposed by the noble Baroness may not be in the precise form that the Government would like, if the Minister is prepared to stand at the Dispatch Box as he did and say that this is the sort of case where the Secretary of State would exercise his discretion, then he could equally well give instructions to the parliamentary draftsman to produce a form of words which gives effect to the wishes of your Lordships' Committee. I am sure that the noble Lord has heard enough from all sides of the Committee to realise not only that the amendment is welcomed universally but that many people would prefer to see something even wider.
I personally agree with what was said by the noble Lord, Lord Boyd-Carpenter, when he pointed out that permanent separation would be very difficult to test and that if the parents were separated for the three-year period provided for in subsection (6), that would be enough of a test to be written into the Bill. But if one parent returned to this country leaving the other parent overseas, and remained here for the qualifying period without being accompanied by the other spouse, then I should have thought that that was a separation that justified conferring citizenship on the child without the presence of the other parent. Whether there was the possibility of reconstructing the marriage at the end of the three-year period seems to me to be quite irrelevant as to whether or not citizenship should be conferred on the child.
I was disappointed that the noble Lord the Minister did not reply to the point raised by the noble Baroness, Lady Vickers. It is quite usual these days for couples to live together without getting married and for them to have several children, although this may be more common in some communities than it is in others. In this day and age I do not believe that we can write
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into this Bill, which deals with the conferring of privileges which might be vital to the future of people's lives, provisos which make those privileges conditional upon their parents having solemnised their union in a church.
I hope the Minister will take this back. I agree with what was said by the noble Baroness, Lady Birk, and maybe this is a question that could be returned to at Report stage if we do not have precisely the right wording now. But unless some undertaking of that kind is given, I hope that the noble Baroness will press her amendment, and if she does we on these Benches will certainly support her.
Lord Belstead: Since I have been guilty of not replying to two questions, perhaps I may answer now. The definition of "terminated" is, of course, a legal termination and no other definition applies. A legal termination is what is meant by the word "terminated" in this subsection in the context of this Bill. With regard to the question asked by my noble friend Lady Vickers, in a situation involving a common law wife the child would benefit from the mother's citizenship but not from the father's citizenship. I believe the difficulty which the Government see is that each case would probably be different and would have to be the subject of value judgments. In making his remarks the noble Lord, Lord Avebury, made a series of value judgments. The noble Lord is absolutely at liberty to make those judgments, but even if one were to agree with all that was said by the noble Lord—and I do not know that I did—it would be very difficult to write those value judgments into the statute. That is why I personally believe that these are cases which should be dealt with under the general discretion of Clause 3(1). Whether that is also the view held by my noble friend Lady Elles I do not know, but I think the moment has come to find out.
Lord Harmar-Nicholls: Before my noble friend decides what to do, may I say this? I apologise for not being here earlier, but I was in another committee. When I saw that my noble friend's amendments were being called, with both of which I have a lot of sympathy, I wanted to come in. I would not have added my voice—my vote would have been sufficient, if it were called for—except for the defence which my noble friend Lord Belstead has put up, which I find particularly irritating. In his first reply, he explained why this amendment could not be accepted. In some intricate way, somebody may be able to turn and twist it and one half of the family may be on the Continent, while the other half is here. That kind of defence, putting up this mythical, convoluted and intricate argument to get around something, is disturbing, because it is no answer to the possibly hundreds or thousands who, for quite genuine reasons, need the kind of protection which this amendment would give.
I am reminded of the lady living in a house, who objected because she could see somebody doing something in a window that she found rather unpleasant. She wanted the authorities to have a look at it, so the police came round and said, "But you can't see in the window where you say these awful things are happening." She said "Can't you? You bring up a table, put a chair on top, stand on a box on top of that and

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then you will be able to see." I hope that that rather convoluted explanation of the kind of thing that may happen—and it needs a lot of imagination to get to the point where my noble friend did on this—is not going to be brought in again on such practical questions as this amendment brings to the fore.
Baroness Elles: I am extremely grateful for the support which I have had from all sides, including the noble Baroness, Lady Birk, on the Opposition Front Bench and the noble Lord, Lord Avebury. The point that I wished to make was that, as the Bill is now worded, it is giving grounds for disagreement on the basis of religion and I wish to stick to that point. That is precisely why I put in the word "permanent". I am thinking of cases where there can be a judicial separation, but in legal terms—and in accordance with the definition of my noble friend, which I accept—it is neither divorce nor annulment of the marriage.
I accept that in a Bill of this kind there will be a lot of difficulties. People either know of, or imagine, all kinds of cases where the provisions of this Bill can be got around and where it can be severely abused. I think that we all accept that. But my noble friend the Minister has been made aware of the kind of case that I am thinking of, and I want assurances from him—not now, but at the next stage of the Bill, or in writing that, particularly, those women who have children abroad, and of whom they are given legal guardianship, can bring them back to this country.
We have all, particularly in this party—and I would remind my noble friend of that—made enormous studies of the rights of one-parent families, and have made all kinds of recommendations for their protection, whether they live in this country or in another country. I think that we as a party—and I speak now from the Conservative Benches—should not be seen to be failing in looking after those who may be in distress in any other part of the world outside the United Kingdom. On those grounds, I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.
Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.
6.3 p.m.
Lord Drumalbyn Lord Drumalbyn moved Amendment No. 70:
Page 5, line 30, after ("them") insert—
("( ) If his father and his mother both died before that date, the reference to his father and mother shall be read as a reference to his guardian.").
The noble Lord said: This is the point where it appears that a gap has been left in the Government's proposals. They are talking here of one of the ways of acquiring citizenship, and paragraph (b) of subsection (6) states as one of the requirements,
"that that person and his father and mother were in the United Kingdom at the beginning of the period of three years ending with the date of the application and that, in the case of each of them, the number of days on which the person in question was absent from the United Kingdom in that period does not exceed 270".
Subsection (7) goes on to state what happens if the father or mother are dead. It does that from two points of view: first, from the point of view of the length of time, to see whether the three years' residence in this country has been fulfilled before the application
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is made; and, secondly, from the point of view of the consent of the father and mother to the registration, where one of them has died.
The obvious question to ask is: what happens if both of them have died? This can give rise to many different questions. I suppose that, in most cases, the natural thing, if the family was living abroad and both parents died simultaneously, would be that the child would be sent back and then would be in the grotesque postion of, probably, being looked after by a grandmother or grandfather, both of whom would be full British citizens, while the child would be stateless, I revert to that once again so as not to let the matter pass.
But that is not the main point of the amendment. The point of the amendment is to find out what happens in a case like that. How is the child to get an application through for registration and so become a British citizen, if both his father and mother are dead? That is why the amendment says
"If his father and his mother both died before that date, the reference to his father and mother shall be read as a reference to his guardian".
I do not know whether that is the correct form, or whether it will work in practice. I beg to move.
Baroness Birk: It certainly seems to me that this amendment, too, should be supported, because I think the noble Lord, Lord Drumalbyn, has shown us that if both the parents die the child is not only in great personal and tragic difficulties but also in great citizenship difficulties. The noble Lord explained the amendment so well, that I shall not rehearse these points again. But, in addition, it seems that if the mother of an illegitimate child dies the child will have no right to citizenship without this amendment, because the relationship that is necessary for citizenship of an illegitimate child is through the mother. Therefore, if the mother dies there will be no entitlement. But if there is a reference to his guardian and the mother dies, the illegitimate child will also have a right of citizenship by way of the guardian. I shall be glad to hear what the Minister says in reply to those points.
Lord Mackay of Clashfern: As has already been pointed out, the purpose of subsection (6) is to provide a basis for deciding that a person born outside the United Kingdom has a sufficient connection with the United Kingdom to be entitled to citizenship. The nature of the connection is three years' residence in the United Kingdom, subject to qualifications, with that person's family—father and mother, if they are both alive. As my noble friend Lord Drumalbyn has so clearly pointed out, the provision in subsection (7) is designed to deal with the situation where the father or mother have died. If both father and mother have died, then this method of demonstrating connection is not open, because, in the nature of things, the family, sadly, is not there to have such a connection.
Certainly, I strongly sympathise with the matter which my noble friend has raised. His solution is to refer to the child's guardian where the child has lost both parents. It is clear that, where the family have come back, there is certainly sufficient connection. I am not sure that it can safely be said that there is sufficient connection in the case of a child who has lost both parents, and who is being cared for by a

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guardian. The guardian need not himself or herself be a British citizen, nor need the family of which he or she forms a part have established itself in this country. In many cases these requirements will no doubt be fulfilled, but not in all. It does not follow, just from satisfying the test of my noble friend's amendment that they would be satisfied. So far as I know, it is not provided in our nationality law that a child should derive any entitlement to citizenship from a person other than a parent. The introduction of the guardian would certainly be a novelty in this area.
The noble Baroness, Lady Birk, has pointed out that there is also a problem of the same kind in a situation where an illegitimate child has lost his or her mother. As I said earlier, it is next to impossible to cope with every case. It would seem to us that cases of this kind are best dealt with under the general discretion. In some circumstances, it may well be quite unnecessary to think of imposing the necessity to have the guardian there; the guardian may arrange for the child to come back and to be as permanently in this country as if the guardian were there, although the guardian himself or herself is not in this country. So it does not seem to be a particularly relevant consideration regarding the question of the connection between the child and this country.
For these reasons, it would be best, in our view, to leave this sort of special, though sad case to the exercise of the general discretion. There is a point on the form of the amendment to which I should draw attention. The amendment comes after subsection (7)(b) on page 5 of the Bill. Therefore, the reference to which the amendment refers is the reference to subsection 6(c) above: that is, to the question of consent. One can see that in relation to questions of consent the guardian may be important to some extent, although what I have said would apply there. However, I am wondering whether my noble friend intends this reference to extend back to subsection (6)(b) as well. I rather think so from what he said. Although I strongly appreciate the particular case to which my noble friend has referred, in the light of what I have said I hope he may feel that the best answer is to put it under the general discretion.
Lord Mishcon: If there is one phrase which occurs in your Lordships' House more than any other when dealing with a Bill it is this: "What is said in this House is one thing; what is engraved on the statute book is another". Perhaps I may be forgiven for using those words again, which are so often repeated, when one hears the noble and learned Lord, quite understandably, and the noble Lord the Minister, again quite understandably, refer us on each occasion to the benefits of Clause 3(1), which is the discretionary power of the Secretary of State, embedded in our statute book since 1948, to cause to be registered as a citizen any minor.
What worries me and, I believe, may worry other members of the Committee is that we are referred to it when we deal with the various hardship cases. And we are referred to it, I am absolutely sure, with absolute sincerity. I do not doubt that for one moment. However, in order that we may do something affirmative, is it possible that there could be some document, some leaflet, some list of precedents set down in the
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Home Office which said that the sort of way in which the Secretary of State would be expected to exercise his discretion would be in the following types of cases? And they could be given by way of examples. Obviously they would not be limited to those examples. They could be culled from the discussion in this House, from the discusson in the other place which took place in Committee and, no doubt, from the experience, the precedents which occurred in the past regarding the exercise of this discretion under the 1948 Act and subsequently.
If we could have an assurance from the Government that at least such a pamphlet, such a document could be considered, I believe that many of us, whatever be the hour at which we go to bed tonight, would go to bed that much happier. It would not then be just a question again and again of a reference to Clause 3(1): this is the sort of case which the Secretary of State might well consider. There would be about it something of a more permanent nature. I think that then we should feel that we had done a job, and done it properly.
Lord Drumalbyn: Again I am grateful to the noble Lord, Lord Mishcon, for what he has said. The idea which he has put forward is excellent, and I hope that it will receive consideration. My noble and learned friend has dealt with the matter very sympathetically but I have the feeling that he has done it in a case where the Government had, so to speak, three trays: in, out and too difficult, and that this went into the too difficult tray. I still feel that the way in which this would work out in normal circumstances if the parents died when they were abroad and had remained in touch (as will happen in most cases) with their relatives in this country is that a relative would go out from this country, collect the child, bring it back and probably have it adopted by somebody. Probably this would be a very good solution, which would give rise to another circumstance.
As I understand the Bill, the child would take its nationality from the adopter and that would get over the difficulty very nicely. In other cases it seems that, somehow or another, provision should be made for the attention of the consul, the high commissioner or whoever it may be in the various countries to be drawn to these cases and for appropriate action taken. One would hope that in the end the child would be able to get British nationality, if it was appropriate in the circumstances. I agree that this is a very difficult problem. I put down this amendment simply because there was an obvious gap and because in many cases a guardian was the obvious person to be a sort of ad hoc rather than a legal guardian. I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.
Lord Mishcon: In view of the fact that it appears that my suggestion met with some support, I wonder whether I am in order to ask the noble and learned Lord to give it favourable consideration.
Lord Harmar-Nicholls: My noble friend said that he thought the suggestion made by the noble Lord, Lord Mishcon, was excellent. I think that it is the opposite of excellent. The idea that some pamphlet can override what is written into a statute, the idea

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that a discretion which you are giving to the Secretary of State has got to be confined to some pamphlet which perhaps has been drawn up years before he has to apply it, is deplorable. The strength, as I have argued of Clause 3(1) in giving the discretion to the Secretary of State is that he can take into account the conditions which apply when he gives his decision. A pamphlet which was drawn up at the time we approve this Bill and make it an Act would, very likely, be out-of-date. It is a departure which I would deplore.
Some advocates are called great pleaders. The noble Lord, Lord Mishcon, is a great persuader. I am terrified when he uses his great power of persuasion to suggest this innovation. It is full of danger. Now that he has called for an explanation, I hope that the explanation which my noble friend will give will not repeat the word of my noble friend Lord Drumalbyn, who said that his idea was "excellent".
Lord Home of the Hirsel: I am attracted by the proposition of the noble Lord, Lord Mishcon, but we are dealing with cases which will arise years ahead where I do not think one can foresee the circumstances. I should not like the Secretary of State to be hampered even by some pamphlet which he put out indicating the kind of guidance which he would give. On the whole, therefore, I agree with my noble friend rather than with the noble Lord opposite, though with some reluctance.
Lord Mackay of Clashfern: Not even the Secretary of State can foresee all possible cases and therefore there is some difficulty, as my noble friend Lord Home of the Hirsel said, in laying down in a pamphlet how he proposes to exercise his discretion. I agree that it might be useful sometimes to know how he had done it, but unless one could have a full record of all the facts one would be in the same kind of difficulty as in trying to compare sentences imposed by different magistrates on different cases from newspaper reports, where not all the facts are set out.
I would remind your Lordships—just in case your Lordships might have forgotten it—that in the White Paper the Secretary of State indicated in very broad terms the way in which his discretion to register minor children is exercised. In paragraph 78 of the White Paper he says:
"In exercising his discretion he takes account of the citizenship of the parents, the place in which the child is living and is likely to live and other relevant matters and in considering an application on behalf of a child who is approaching the age of 18 he also has some regard to whether the child would be likely, on reaching that age, to satisfy the conditions required of an adult applying for naturalisation or registration at discretion".
I respectfully suggest that that is a very succinct but fairly widely embracing statement and I should have thought that it might satisfy at least my noble friend Lord Drumalbyn.
Lord Mishcon: I should never have spoken for a second time, and if I did I should have been ruled out of order immediately, because up to that stage it looked as though I had the support of the Committee but my second intervention seems to have produced another reaction. All I was asking for was examples of cases in which the Secretary of State might exercise his discretion. I will say no more.
Lord Boyd-Carpenter: I hope the noble and learned Lord will give a little more thought to this. We are getting case after case in which the noble and learned Lord or the noble Lord beside him says, "Oh yes, this is a hard case, it is an obvious case, and therefore I think is probably one for discretion". That is said in good faith, but as has been pointed out it is an assurance which has no legal value whatsoever. It cannot be quoted in any court and it is not binding in any sense. As we are continually being reminded, we are dealing with a clause which gives an entitlement. If an amendment is put in, there is the entitlement and there is something to argue about if a future Secretary of State refuses a request. But in the light of what has happened the alternative, so agreeably offered from the Front Bench, really amounts to very little at all and if we are not to have in some quotable form an assurance that these cases will be covered it may well be a temptation to some noble Lords to press the matter to a Division to try to put the provision into the Bill so that there would be something which gives an entitlement.
Lord Drumalbyn: That is perhaps something for the next stage of the Bill. There are two separate ways of looking at this. My noble and learned friend spoke about the way in which the Secretary of State proposes to exercise his discretion, whereas others have spoken about the sort of cases in which he might be called upon to exercise his discretion, which I think is more what the noble Lord, Lord Mishcon, had in mind.
Lord Mishcon: That is right.
Lord Drumalbyn: I have no doubt that my noble and learned friend will consider this again and individual Peers also no doubt will consider it, but at the moment it looks as though it is too difficult, and therefore I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.
Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.
6.25 p.m.
The Earl of Bessborough The Earl of Bessborough moved Amendment No. 71:
Page 5, line 32, at end insert—
("( ) A person born outside the United Kingdom shall be entitled, on an application for his registration as a British citizen made while he is a minor, to be registered as such a citizen if the Secretary of State is satisfied

(a) that at the time of that person's birth his father or mother was a British citizen by descent; and

(b) that that person was born within the territory of a member state of the European Community.").

The noble Earl said: As a former Member of the European Parliament and a colleague of my noble friend Lady Elles, I welcome the opportunity to move this amendment on our joint behalf and indeed on behalf of certain noble Lords opposite. I may say that I move this in no sense of hostility to my noble friends on the Front Bench, or indeed the Government. I am told that not having spoken to this Bill I should declare an interest, as others have done, in that my mother was French, my daughter is married to a distinguished scholar of Greek nationality and my niece is the wife of a young Italian banker. Also, like other noble Lords I have many friends working in Brussels and elsewhere in many firms within the European Community.
I do not want to repeat arguments which have been quite effectively deployed under Clause 2 in respect of those working in the Community, but I must explain that this amendment, which is to be inserted on page 5, at line 32, draws attention to the unsatisfactory position of British citizens in mainland Europe. There are an estimated 250,000 of them. They are people who are living and working in other member states of the European Community and, as many noble Lords will know, they are deeply concerned. They are working in a region in which there is freedom of movement and right of entry into the territory of every other member state. One of our respected officials in Brussels with whom I have worked closely has recently married a French girl and I know how concerned he is. Incidentally, it is instructive to compare the situation in this Bill with French law, under which there is complete certainty for a French citizen and any of his descendants to retain French nationality, if they so desire. Moreover, they would also be able to vote in French elections at the French Consulate—I say that in passing.
Many organisations and individuals have written to noble friends and to myself to express their concern about the uncertainty in which they will be placed over the nationality of their children and over the anomalies which I think are created under the Bill. As other noble Lords have said on amendments to Clause 2, these people have been strongly encouraged to work in the Community, to work on the Continent of Europe, to contribute towards improving British exports and British influence, but many may now be discouraged from remaining in the Community or others from leaving the United Kingdom. I admit that there may have been some misunderstanding as to the effects of the Bill and some amendments which were made in another place have been welcomed, but there are still some areas which are worrying for these British citizens.
In the first place, any child born in the European Community outside the United Kingdom would become a British citizen by descent, without the right to pass on his British citizenship to his child, if born outside the United Kingdom. As I understand it, the only exception would be if he were employed in the narrow field of employment contained in Clause 3. Anyone working for a company other than those might be excluded from the provisions. If he is self-employed, for instance; a doctor or an academic attached to a university or even, as my noble friend Lord Lauderdale said, if he was, say, a part-time foreign correspondent. We spoke of them under Clause 2. As I see it, he or she might be excluded.
Many young people now work in the Community in order to learn another language or to gain experience and build up business contacts for a few years in what is our largest growing export market. Over 44 per cent. of our exports go to the other member states in the European Community, with of course, West Germany as our biggest market of all, larger even than the United States. Secondly, the national legislation of other member states, particularly the French, does as I have partially already indicated, allow complete certainty as to the nationality of a child born to a French subject; that child is French. But in one at least of the member states, Belgium, for example,
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a child born to two British citizens by descent would be stateless. By this Bill we might, it has been thought, be creating more stateless individuals than before.
It is the special legal, economic and political ties binding us in the Community which are the strongest grounds for looking at this clause and seeing whether there may be some means of meeting the real concern and doubts of those who are working there for Britain and who want to be reassured of British nationality for their grandchildren, as of right, and not in so restricted a way as in this Bill. There is indeed a great difference between British citizens working in the Community and those working in any other European country, or indeed other countries in the world. That difference is provided for by British law. Following the supremacy of Community law, the European Communities Act 1972 incorporates the Rules of the EEC Treaty; it incorporates the legal Acts made under it, and their interpretation by the European Court at Luxembourg, and thus turns them into British law.
Among the fundamental principles of this "British law" is the right to seek work, to take employment, to provide services and to establish yourself or your concern in all 10 member states. To discriminate against British citizens who avail themselves of these rights would be no less a discrimination than that accepted as such by Her Majesty's Government in the case of naturalised and registered British citizens, when they amended Clause 11 in another place. It is true that the Treaty of Rome does not provide directly for citizenship, but the treaty does contain obligations to which the United Kingdom has agreed, and these would include freedom of movement for nationals. There is considerable concern within the Community that this Bill as presently framed may deter or hinder the exercise of this right of movement.
Finally, I cannot see why other overseas residents should resent a provision that recognises the rights enforced by the treaty and makes special provision for their preservation. I hope my noble friends on the Front Bench, including my noble and learned friend the Lord Advocate, will give this matter deep thought, and give some tangible assurances which can be passed on to those of whom I speak. I hope he can give these assurances either this evening or at the latest at Report stage. It may be that he can think up some alternative wording to that contained in this amendment. If he has such proposals, I hope he will be so good as to give us a few days' notice before Report stage, so that my noble friends and noble Lords opposite may consider them. I feel that this is a matter on which many of us do need assurances. I beg to move.
Baroness Birk: We on these Benches shall be supporting this amendment. Ideally I should like to see the scope widened beyond the European Community, but nevertheless it is a particularly important matter within the EEC for British parents to feel secure in the knowledge that their children will be born British. As the noble Earl, Lord Bessborough, pointed out, the freedom of movement provisions in the Treaty of Rome and in Community legislation are intended to ensure that a person who is a national of any member country can move freely between all member countries, enjoying essentially the same

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security and the same rights as in his own. As we know, the citizenship laws of other Community countries are all, except for Ireland, based on jus sanguinis. Children born in those countries to British parents will not get the local nationality. The noble Earl referred to France, where a child born stateless is entitled to become a French citizen, but it is also true that in all the other countries there is a residence requirement to be met before stateless children can get the nationality of the state in question.
Some thousands of British people are already working in Europe, and probably many more will do so, especially as unemployment in this country gets worse. A child born in Belgium, where many British people work—and I, like many other noble Lords, have had letters from people I know who are working in the Community, and from others whom I do not know—could be born stateless, and, if the parents' work required them to move to another country—for example, Italy—before the required number of years' residence in Belgium has been fulfilled to give the child Belgian nationality, the child would then have no hope of being anything but stateless. Italy would have no obligation to confer Italian nationality on the child. Imagine, further, a couple with several children born abroad, but born in different countries because the parents' work required them to move to another country in the early years after the particular child's birth. They might have several stateless children, none of whom would be able to get the nationality of the state of birth because they would never be able to live a sufficient number of years in any one country.
There is a further point, that not all EEC countries have ratified the UN Convention on the Status of Stateless Persons, as we have done in this country. This is an added burden. The number of children who would benefit from this change would be comparatively small, but the problems these children would otherwise face as stateless persons are so serious, the amount of work involved in dealing with the bureaucracy, trying to sort out their nationalities, the parents trying to do it for them, would be so great that it would outweigh any reservations the Government might have on this amendment. I cannot think of any at the moment. We believe this amendment should be strongly supported, and, hopefully, accepted by the Government.
6.38 p.m.
Lord Avebury: May I refer once again to the provisions of Schedule 2 for the reduction of statelessness, which the noble Lord the Minister has prayed in aid on other occasions when it has been pointed out that children born overseas may not be entitled to the citizenship of the country where they are born, as in the case cited by the noble Earl, Lord Bessborough, of the British child born in France. The noble Lord the Minister has airily said that we have provisions in Schedule 2 which will take care of this because they reduce statelessness. But, when one looks at Schedule 2, one finds that it does not apply to children born, for instance, in the countries of the European Community, unless at some stage in the child's life he can be brought back to the United Kingdom or to a dependent territory. If I may refer your Lordships to paragraph 4 of Schedule 2, it is headed,
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"Persons born outside the United Kingdom and the dependent territories".
It says that such a person shall be entitled to be registered in the circumstances mentioned, and the most important of the circumstances to which I would refer your Lordships appears in subparagraph (c), where it is required that the person be:
"in the United Kingdom or a dependent territory … at the beginning of the period of three years ending with the date of the application".
So, in the circumstances which we are considering, where somebody's parents are working, for instance, in France and they continue to serve overseas—perhaps they move from France to Italy or to Belgium; it does not matter where they go within the European Community—if they do not come back to the United Kingdom, then the provisions for the reduction of statelessness on which the noble Lord the Minister has set such great store will never apply. The child can never qualify unless he comes to the United Kingdom or to one of the dependent territories. Therefore, I think that this amendment is highly desirable, bearing in mind that, on Second Reading and again on the first day of the Committee stage, were we told quite forcefully from the Government Front Bench that all these countries of the European Community have jus sanguinis which is so much better than the jus soli which we have had for 700 years. However, is it better in the case that we are talking about where statelessness is likely to be created by the application of that law in those countries and where there is no remedy provided in the Bill?
I think that the noble Lord the Minister when he comes to reply must either accept this amendment or, at the very least, must undertake, when the time comes, to amend the provisions of Schedule 2 paragraph (4) so that children born outside the United Kingdom in the countries of the European Community may qualify if they remain in those countries for three years as they already do qualify if they are in the British dependent territories or in the United Kingdom for that period.
Baroness Elles: I should very much like to support the eloquent moving by my noble friend Lord Bessborough of this amendment tabled in our names and in those of noble Lords opposite. I shall try not to overlap the points which he has already made. However, I should like to confirm that I and many of my colleagues from Britain who are Members of the European Parliament, including I would say Labour members, have received many representations both from organisations and from individuals throughout the Community—not only confined to Brussels and not only confined to those who work in the European institutions or for them.
First, of course, it must be said that the British Nationality Bill is a courageous piece of legislation and is very much needed and warmly welcomed. I think that most of us accept that to be so. I think that most of us would also accept the principles on which the Bill is structured—namely, that citizenship and the right of abode are tied together and that at a certain stage for the majority of individuals there is a cut-off point for transmission by descent. But in accepting those principles there must be special cate-

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gories of people clearly definable who may not fit into narrowly defined limitations, but whose claims to better treatment from Her Majesty's Government than they have so far received under this Bill must be recognised. In another place, for instance, naturalised and registered citizens with little or no previous connection with this country, have been granted certain rights, and I think that nobody in this Committee would object to that. Nevertheless, the rights that have been granted to these naturalised and registered citizens are being denied to the particular category of citizens that we are dealing with in this amendment and who have possibly had for centuries long connections with this country through family, tradition, education and culture.
I wish to make a few brief points. First, my noble friend has pointed to the success of our trading association in the Community. It might be worth recalling the most recent words of the Prime Minister on this subject where she states in a document called, Here to Stay, produced by the European Democratic Group, that membership of the Community is central to Government policy. I hope very much that my noble friend the Minister is listening to that comment.
But, so far as the trading success of our country is concerned, it is almost entirely dependent now on the Community: eight of the 11 largest export markets of the United Kingdom are member states of the Community. The only one that so far is not in that list is Greece and it has only joined the Community this year. However, the eight others are among the 11 largest export markets of this country on which a third of the jobs in this country depend. I repeat, a third of the jobs in the manufacturing industry depend on the exports to these particular countries. It would be foolish to imagine that the success of this trade that has developed in the last eight years since membership has been achieved by British salesmen and businessmen staying at home: it has been achieved because they have gone out into the Community, out into the member states and have been prepared to settle there for a time and to do a job on behalf of this country.
Let us take another aspect—research and development. How would we have built Concorde or the Air Bus if British engineers and citizens had not been prepared to go, albeit for a short period of time, perhaps four or five years, to contribute British expertise and knowledge to the advancement of technology? Of course I mention only those two examples, but there are many examples which particularly my noble friend Lord Bessborough would certainly be able to draw to the attention of your Lordships.
One of the declared objectives during the United Kingdom presidency of the European Economic Community has been to adopt the Draft Directive on Freedom to Provide Service in Insurance. That will only benefit the United Kingdom if insurance firms actually have representatives serving in other parts of the Community in order to get work as a result of the adoption of this directive, and of course not only in British firms but to be allied and associated with foreign firms in the Community.
The very principle of mobility of labour and adaptability to new industries will only help to relieve our unemployment if citizens can move freely in a large, free, single market of the European Community
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to benefit from the opportunities available. That surely is what the European Community is all about. When we had freedom of movement in the Commonwealth we built up a strong economy. Those trading links do not exist now in the same way and we have to look forward to the future that freedom of movement within the Community is the base upon which our export trade and our economic propserity must grow.
If we want to have individuals within the European Community moving from job to job, as, indeed, is the employment pattern today, then we shall no longer be in jobs from the age of 20 to 60 behind the same desk and pushing the same pen. The whole essence of employment and solving the unemployment problem is being able to move from job to job. Here again is what the Community is about. We cannot expect a citizen from this country to go to a British firm in Paris, for instance, and stay in that firm forever if he is given the opportunity to bring British expertise, British influence and British knowledge to a French firm in order to gain further British exports. He will want to take the French job and his wife will say to him, "No do not do so because our child will be born French or possibly not French. We want our children to be British. We are working for Britain and that is a right that we have and should demand". I believe that your Lordships should support this principle.
The setting up of this market already implies the right of entry to all European Community citizens to this country and the right to social security benefits and the right to jobs. It also implies corresponding rights in the transmission of citizenship to descendants. Why is it that, if French people come to this country they can go on having French citizenship for three or four generations without ever returning to France, but if we send British citizens who are working, or who go of there own accord to live, in France—as my noble friend has pointed out—this is not possible? It is certainly not possible in Belgium and certainly not, for instance, in Denmark. If the right of abode is now a condition of citizenship, it is also true of the large majority of the nationality laws of EEC citizens in other countries.
If a French or Italian can pass on his citizenship to a grandchild, why should not a British citizen have the right to pass on his citizenship to a British grandchild with equal right? If we want to encourage the young, particularly to travel and to get to know their European partners, to learn languages—which, after all, is one of the main conditions and assets which is valuable to a trading nation—to attend other universities, to have teachers exchanging between schools in our member states, then we cannot also deprive them of the right to have their children being granted British citizenship and to be protected.
I am sorry to go on about this, but perhaps we should remember that the Community is based on the friendship which has been nurtured and maintained between France and Germany in particular in order not to create again zones of antagonism. It is only because there have been masses of exchanges between those two countries of individuals, groups and even townships that the Community is based on an area of peace in this western world. I do not want to get too dramatic or exaggerate this point, but I think that it is a fair

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point to make.
I should like to raise two more points. I apologise for being rather long on this, but it is perhaps worth raising the point—because it was touched upon by the noble Baroness, Lady Birk—that the number of children being born in the Community is difficult to assess. I have tried to obtain figures in order to give the Committee some idea of the numbers of citizens who might be affected if this amendment was to be accepted by the Government and by your Lordships' Committee. It is perhaps interesting to know that in 1979, out of a total population of British citizens of 30,000, 413 British births were registered in Brussels, about 40 in Luxembourg and slightly over 4,000 in Germany. Of course, that number is larger because of the British forces serving in Germany, so many of those would have been British citizens automatically under Clause 2. Therefore, noble Lords will see that the numbers are comparatively few.
However, noble Lords might like to know that when asked how many British citizens had been born in Paris in the last two years the British Embassy in Paris replied, "Oh, but we do not count how many British citizens are born in Paris. After all, we are all European". I must confess that this has only been reported to me because I did not telephone myself; I was given to understand that the person who telephoned the British Embassy in Paris on my behalf was horrified at that reply.
So perhaps that is also a lesson for the Government. I hasten to add that I cannot vouch for the reply because I did not hear it myself, but I have it on good authority that that was the reply given. Finally, of the many hundreds of Britons whom I have met in the European Community since our membership in 1973, having the honour to serve as a member of the European Parliament and representing over half a million electorate in this country, I must say that there is no group of British citizens more loyally attached to this country, more concerned about its future and more willing to remain outside the United Kingdom for part, if not all, of their working lives in order to contribute to a more prosperous Britain. I very much hope therefore that the Government will see fit to accept this amendment. Of course, I agree that it may not be properly worded, but I very much hope that they will take the spirit of this amendment in the way that I believe the majority of this Committee would wish.
6.55 p.m.
Lord Mackay of Clashfern: The Government, of course, very fully appreciate the importance of our membership of the European Community and of the special ties which exist through our participation in European matters. There will be logic in going from that to some aspects of citizenship. But it remains the fact that the individual members of the Community retain separate citizenships and that there is nothing in the circumstances of our membership to indicate that birth within the Community should confer greater privileges as regards citizenship than birth outside it.
My noble friend Lady Elles made reference to the Commonwealth situation and, of course, the situation is that since 1948 British citizenship cannot be passed down in the Commonwealth beyond the first generation,
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whereas of course in foreign countries it could be done through the male line at consulates. So far as the Government know, this has not prevented people wanting to go out to the Commonwealth or in any way inhibited the development of British connections with the Commonwealth.
As my noble friend has said on a number of occasions, the present proposals are designed to ensure that our citizenship goes to those who maintain links with this country—close connections with this country. I should like to draw attention to the fact that Clause 3 provides very considerable opportunities for people working in the European Economic Community to have citizenship through the provisions there. The great majority of cases which would arise would, I should have thought, be covered under these provisions.
We must also be cautious about distinguishing between, for example, the countries of the Community on the one hand and countries like Norway or Sweden, which have common travel areas with Denmark, which is in the Community, on the other. Is it right, for example, that someone living in Switzerland or Austria should be put in a different position from this point of view from a person living in West Germany?
It is the removal of anomalies that this Bill seeks to achieve. In 1971 we brought into line, to some extent, the arrangements for acquisition of citizenship by Commonwealth citizens and foreign nationals. This Bill takes that process a stage further. It seeks to remove the anomaly whereby citizenship can be passed on in the male line by consular registration in foreign countries but not in Commonwealth countries. Of course, as I have said, I very much appreciate what has been said by the various noble Lords who have participated in this debate. I think that what has been said does not take sufficient notice of the fact that those who do a job on behalf of this country—to quote the phrase that my noble friend Lady Elles used—would be covered by the provisions that we already have in the Bill.
As regards the schedule dealing with statelessness, of course, the noble Lord, Lord Avebury, is right in what he says about that, and it would be necessary, in order to get the benefit of that particular provision, to satisfy the provisions of sub-paragraph (c) to which he referred. I think that it is also worth noticing that in practice all member states have provisions which enable a child born in their territory to acquire their citizenship, though not sometimes until fairly late on in that child's minority. There is a problem certainly with those who may move from one country to another. But there surely is also a problem with those who might deliberately decide, for example, to settle in France. Why should generation after generation of people who have left here simply because they descend from British people in France have the right of citizenship, where that would not apply elsewhere?
These are the difficulties that we see in giving effect to this amendment. Nevertheless, we appreciate the very real problems that this amendment seeks to cover, and I should like to assure my noble friend Lord Bessborough and all others who have spoken that the Government will give very serious consideration to all that has been said to see to what extent we can meet the difficulties. I also take note of what he kindly suggested we should do; that is, to give full notice of

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any proposals that we have for change or improvement in time to enable him and other noble Lords to see these proposals. In the light of those assurances I hope that my noble friend will feel able to withdraw his amendment.
The Earl of Bessborough: We are reaching the bewitching hour of seven o'clock, so I shall not indulge in all the remarks that I might make in answer to my noble and learned friend. But I must admit that I am not entirely happy with the partial assurances which he has given, and I do not really agree with him about the various difficulties which he has raised. I hope that he will read our remarks carefully and that we may have further consultations before Report stage. Therefore, I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.
Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.
Lord Aylestone Lord Aylestone had given notice of his intention to move Amendment No. 72:
Page 5, line 33, leave out subsections (8) and (9).
The noble Lord said: This was a consequential amendment to an earlier amendment which fell on stony ground. Not moved.
[Amendment No. 72 not moved.]
[Amendments Nos. 73 to 76 not moved.]
Lord Denham: I think that this is probably an appropriate moment to adjourn this Committee stage for the dinner break. It would probably be a good thing if, after the intervening business, we resumed the Committee stage at eight o'clock, if that would be agreeable to your Lordships. I beg to move that the House do now resume.
Moved accordingly, and, on Question, Motion agreed to.
House resumed.

Armed Forces Bill
Report received.

County Courts Jurisdiction Order 1981
7.1 p.m.
The Lord Chancellor The Lord Chancellor rose to move, That the draft order laid before the House on 26th June be approved.
The noble and learned Lord said: My Lords, I rise to move that this Motion be agreed to. It is necessary in accordance with the ritual prescribed by Section 192 of the County Courts Act 1959, as amended. The ritual requires affirmative resolutions in both Houses before the draft Order in Council which is before the House is submitted to Her Majesty in Council. The purpose of the draft Order in Council is to increase the jurisdiction of the county courts. Your Lordships need not be reminded of the importance of these courts. They are in fact the main courts of first resort for civil claims in this country.
Last year, for instance, some 1½ million money claims were started in the county courts—that is,
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claims for sums of money or for damages—compared with 200,000-odd started in the High Court. There are in England and Wales something like 300 county courts and the extent of their jurisdiction, which of course is purely statutory, is determined by financial limits, in the case of money claims, on the amount of the claims which may be brought there. The most important of these are the limits relating to actions in contract and in tort. The last time that this Motion was moved was in 1977 when my predecessor raised the limit to £2,000, which is where it stands now.
Under the draft before the House the figure of £2,000, which is the status quo, would be increased to £5,000, and there would then be some consequentials. The limit of the trial jurisdiction of registrars would be increased from £200 to £500—that is to say, a tenth of the relevant figures that I have mentioned—and the limit in equity proceedings from £15,000 to £30,000. There are changes to which I shall return relating to costs.
The purpose of the increase is twofold. In the first place we have to take account of inflation, which, I am sorry to say, under two successive Governments has been considerable since 1977. We have at the same time to have a little elbow room in case inflation continues, even under the present admirable Administration of Her Majesty's Ministers, because I hope that, if the House will be good enough to accept these proposals, it will not fall upon me or any successor I might have to suggest a further increase of these limits within the lifetime of the present Parliament.
The second purpose to which I referred is to achieve, if we can, a more rational and economical use of judicial time. Many actions at present begun in the High Court could be dealt with in the county court. The High Court is heavily burdened and ought to be relieved, so far as it can reasonbly be done, so that it can then concentrate on the more difficult and substantial matters. I ought to tell the House that within the last nine months there has been a considerable increase in the volume of civil business in the High Court, and the pressure on the High Court bench continues to increase both in the civil field and in the criminal field, because the judiciary which deals both with the county court and the High Court business is a seamless robe covering both the civil and the criminal jurisdictions.
This might well be illustrated by the figures for waiting time in the Queen's Bench Division of the High Court—waiting time, of course, in civil cases. The period for which the litigant may have to wait for his trial to come on varies from perhaps as little as two months in the shortest case to two years in lengthier matters from the time that the action is set down. That might be compared with a waiting period in the county court which varies only from eight to 10 weeks, so that the period of delay in the county court is very much less, and far more acceptable.
Therefore, in the interests of justice, it becomes desirable that some of the actions now commenced in the High Court should be taken out and sent to the county court. I am told that the best estimate I can give to the House is that the proposals would result in between 450 and 500 additional trials each year being tried in the county court. That amounts to the time of between two and three High Court judges. By making that amount of extra judicial time available,

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the waiting times in the Queen's Bench Division can therefore be significantly shortened.
It is estimated that the increase of jurisdiction will bring to the county court not trials but plaints of the order of 30,000 to 40,000, and that compares with an existing total of 1,700,000 plaints which are now started in the county court. I am told that no extra court staff or bailiffs should be required, but in due course some extra registrars will be needed, and that is because the proposed increase in the registrars' jurisdiction would enable them to take work now falling to the circuit bench, especially in London and the South-East. The net result should be a lightening of the load on the circuit bench, and this means that more circuit judges can be released to deal with the even more serious backlog, especially in London and the South-East, in criminal matters.
I now come to questions of costs, which, in the eyes of lawyers, is sometimes the most important issue of all. Ever since I have been at the Bar the litigant with a rather small claim which can be tried in the county court has been encouraged by rules as to costs to start in the county court rather than in the High Court. This has been done by two rules which could conveniently, I think, be called the costs sanctions.
The first is a rule by which, if you start in the High Court—which of course you are perfectly entitled to do because it is a court of unlimited jurisdiction in either direction—and get an award which could have been recovered in the county court but is less than the upper costs sanction (I shall come to specifics later) you get only county court costs, even though you succeed in the High Court. The other sanction is that, at the lower end of the scale, there has always been, ever since I have been at the Bar, a rather lower figure below which you do not get any costs at all if you start in the High Court and get a figure of damages or debt below that lower figure.
At present the status quo is that under the first rule you get only county court costs if you start in the High Court and do not get more than £1,200, which compares with the maximum county court jurisdiction of £2,000. If my calculations are right, that is three-fifths of the maximum jurisdiction; if you do not reach that, then you get only county court costs. The draft order increases the £1,200 to £3,000, which of course is exactly three-fifths of the maximum proposed county court figure. So what we are doing is to maintain the status quo as regards that sanction.
Under the second rule, at present if you start in the High Court and do not get more than—or if you recover less than, to be exactly correct—£350, you do not get your costs in the High Court. That represents, again, if my calculation is right, seven-fortieths of the maximum jurisdiction, and the draft order increases that figure to £600, which is more favourable to the plaintiff because it represents six-fiftieths of the maximum jurisdiction, so that it is more favourable. This of course is the sanction which will ensure the real transfer of work. I have of course consulted those most likely to be affected including the judiciary, the Senate of the Inns of Court and the Law Society, the TUC and CBI and the under sheriffs, because they have an interest in the enforcement of High Court
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judgments.
An integral part of the increase in jurisdiction will be the accompanying provisions as regards costs, which are of major interest but are not contained in the draft order. I have been dealing hitherto with those which are contained in the draft order, but I think it is appropriate that I should mention briefly what it is proposed to do. The opportunity has been taken to propose to the County Court Rule Committee a completely revised structure for the provisions relating to costs on the higher scales. The new structure will be simpler than the old; the number of individual items has been more than halved and the number of higher scales has been reduced from four to three. The new structure is very similar to that for the High Court and this will assist anyone who has to deal with both.
However wide one makes the range of costs figures in these scales, there is always a possibility that there will be some cases where costs ought to exceed the range allowed at the top end. Most of us who have practised at the Bar, having won our case, have said how very difficult the case has been and asked the county court judge to give us costs on a higher scale, and that is what I am talking about. For that reason, there is a rule in the existing provisions which allows the range to be exceeded for certain items in certain circumstances. The County Court Rule Committee has been considering a proposal that these circumstances should be limited more strictly than at present. I have considered carefully whether that proposal should be adopted for the costs provisions associated with the jurisdictional increase. The profession has, understandably, expressed concern about this and I have concluded that the question needs to be explored rather further before a decision is taken. For the time being, therefore, the Rule Committee will be invited to retain the existing rule on that, the status quo.
Completely revised costs figures will also be proposed. These are not intended to lead to lower allowances than those being made under the existing county court costs provisions. The full extent of the ranges proposed can appropriately be used in taxing work done in 1982. The proposals on costs which will be made to the Rule Committee have been the subject of difficult but constructive discussions between the Lord Chancellor's Department and both branches of the legal profession. I will not claim that either side feels that the result is ideally what it would have wanted, but there seems to be general agreement that the result is the best that could be achieved amicably in the circumstances.
Returning to the draft order before your Lordships, the detailed changes are in tabular form in Article 2 of the draft. Column 1 lists the statutory provisions in which a change is to be effected; column 2 gives the existing figure; and column 3 gives the proposed new figure. The most important provisions are those in the first item in the column, namely, Section 39 of the County Courts Act, which set the current limit of jurisdiction in contract and tort; and Section 47, where the separate provisions relating to the upper and lower costs sanctions are set out. I also draw attention to the fact that the equity jurisdiction of the county court, covered by Section 52 of the Act, which deals with such matters as the administration

1433
of estates and variation of trusts, is increased from £15,000 to £30,000. Provision is also made for the upper limit on claims which may be heard by registrars to be increased from £200 to £500. I think I may properly reassure your Lordships that all the remaining changes are either consequential or parallel to those I have outlined.
I ought to take this opportunity of telling the House that I intend to make parallel changes in Northern Ireland. These will increase the upper limit of the civil jurisdiction of the county courts in Northern Ireland from £2,000 to £5,000, which is of course the same; the jurisdiction in equity matters from £6,000 to £15,000, which reflects a lower limit in both cases; and to raise the small claims jurisdiction from £200 to £300 and make other related amendments to the financial limits. I beg to move.
Moved, That the draft order laid before the House on 26th June be approved.—(The Lord Chancellor.)
7.18 p.m.
Lord Boston of Faversham: My Lords, I wish at the outset to thank the noble and learned Lord for explaining the order. These orders tend to be introduced every three or four years, so the introduction of this one, as the Lord Chancellor indicated, is in line with the established trend and I hope your Lordships will approve it. I also wish to endorse what the noble and learned Lord said about the immense importance and value of the county courts in this country.
The noble and learned Lord, with his customary foresight and care, has anticipated the main points I proposed to raise and has dealt with, for example, the question whether the proposed increases are in line with inflation. I will not, if he will forgive me, get involved in a comparison between what the noble and learned Lord described as the admirable efforts of his Government and the lower level of inflation during the final period of the last Government; I will leave that perhaps for another occasion. He also dealt with the other principal customary aim of these orders, namely, to maintain a balance of work as between the county courts and the High Court.
The noble and learned Lord has indicated what approximately will happen regarding the volume of judicial work likely to be transferred from the High Court to the county court as a result of the order. He has similarly also referred to the raising of the registrars' jurisdiction and the likely effect that that will have upon their workload and he mentioned the possibility of the appointment of further registrars in the future. I take it that it will be a while before the further appointments are actually made, and I should like to ask him whether he is satisfied that in the meantime the county courts from October onwards will be able to cope with the increased load.
While referring to registrars, I am bound to say that I have often wondered whether in fact we should not be raising their jurisdiction still further as a matter of principle, anyway. There could of course be a further sizeable saving in costs. They are a very able body of people, and I have never been convinced by the argument that increasing their jurisdiction would lead to a significantly higher number of appeals from their decisions.
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I also wish to ask the noble and learned Lord the Lord Chancellor about the increases which he has proposed in regard to the equity jurisdiction under the order. As the noble and learned Lord indicated, it is to be raised from £15,000 to £30,000. Last time, in 1977, the increase was from £5,000 to £15,000, and I am wondering whether the noble and learned Lord is satisfied that the proposed increase from £15,000 to £30,000 is sufficient, bearing in mind that the principal jurisdiction in contract and tort in the county courts this time has gone up from £2,000 to £5,000. Last time, in 1977, it went up from £1,000 to £2,000.
There is just one other matter to which I feel I must refer. It is the concern expressed in some quarters about the proposed increase in the so-called costs sanction from £1,200 to £3,000, to which the noble and learned Lord the Lord Chancellor has referred. In his references he also acknowledged the concern which has been felt in some quarters, and indeed he explained the background to this as well. My noble and learned friend Lord Elwyn-Jones has received a letter from a Mr. Brian Thompson of Brian Thompson and Partners, solicitors, in which Mr. Thompson states he had hoped,
"that there might well be discussions between the TUC and the Lord Chancellor and that some agreement might be arrived at. I regret to say that on this occasion there were no discussions and there is no agreement. The proposed increase of the so-called costs sanction from £1,200 to £3,000 is very substantial and very drastic. It will affect a large number of claims and will impose a heavy financial burden on trade unions at a time when legal costs are already escalating".
I felt it only right to pass on that particular concern which has been expressed and to ask the noble and learned Lord the Lord Chancellor whether he might feel able to comment further upon the fears expressed, and indeed perhaps to take them into account in any further discussions that take place. The noble and learned Lord has already indicated that he has consulted the TUC, and I am not sure whether or not Mr. Thompson's reference to the possibility of discussions is different from that. At any rate I felt it only right to mention that concern. As I say, the Lord Chancellor has already spelt out some of the background to the particular proposals.
So far as the order itself is concerned, and the extensions of jurisdiction contained in it, I would certainly offer the noble and learned Lord full support, and I hope that your Lordships will approve the order.
7.25 p.m.
The Lord Chancellor: My Lords, I am very grateful for the gracious way in which the noble Lord, Lord Boston of Faversham, has received this Motion. Yes, I am satisfied that the county courts can cope. I have no doubt about that. That is the advice that I have received, and I believe it is right. The noble Lord asked whether the registrars' jurisdiction could be raised still further. Well, probably, Yes, if one viewed it in isolation, but of course one must balance the trial jurisdiction of registrars against that of the judge. We thought that what is proposed was about right. I am afraid that it is a long time since I practised in the county court, but it must be remembered that nowadays registrars are usually dual-purpose. Very often they are district registrars as well, and they have an

1435
enormous matrimonial jurisdiction outside the kind of trial that we are talking about. Without going into specifics I would absolutely agree with the noble Lord, Lord Boston, that their quality has risen continuously throughout my legal lifetime, and of course their judicial experience is growing all the time. A very high class of person is attracted to such a post. There is no question that, if it were thought right to alter the balance, registrars probably could take trials involving a slightly larger figure, but I am not anxious to increase it further at the moment, for the reasons that I have given.
I had the letter from Thompsons, for whom I have a very great deal of respect, partly because they sometimes briefed me, and partly because I had the pleasure of appearing against them on a number of occasions. But I did not altogether go along with their arguments on this occasion, for the very reason that I gave in my opening speech. Of course, lawyers naturally want to have a greater flexibility, but I have kept the exact proportions at the top level of the sanction rule and at the bottom level I have been slightly more favourable to plaintiffs, if one views it at as a fraction of the maximum jurisdiction, as it will be if the order is passed. So I think that their case proved either nothing at all, or a great deal too much. The sanctions have always existed, and basically I have preserved the status quo.
The other point raised by the noble Lord was about the consultation with the TUC. The TUC wrote me a long and very interesting letter, which very largely covered the same ground as the Thompson letter. The TUC wrote some time ago—I think in April, but certainly quite a long time ago. In consultation with my officials, I wrote to the TUC an equally long reply. At the end of my reply—this is probably the point to which Messrs. Thompson were referring—I said to the TUC that, if it wanted discussions either with my office or with me, I should be very happy to hold them. But the offer was not in fact taken up, I thought probably because the TUC, if not actually content, had other thoughts on its mind and did not want to pursue the argument any further.
The noble Lord also asked me about the equity jurisdiction. What I have proposed is actually a compromise. I hope that I am not disclosing things that I should not disclose. My original proposal was to raise the figure to £50,000, instead of £30,000, and that, I think, would have been quite a good thing. But the profession came down quite heavily against me, and so £30,000 is a compromise figure. On these occasions one likes to carry people along with one if possible, and I hope that they feel that I have taken account of their point of view.
There is of course an argument for the lower figure—I am not sure whether they actually put it forward—and that is that equity jurisdiction is a matter with which the Chancery Division in particular is very familiar, while most of the circuit judges are common lawyers. I see the noble Lord, Lord Foot, here and I am not sure whether this is true of the solicitors' profession. But at the Bar most county court practitioners, too, are common lawyers. So I think they have got something there. I think I would have preferred to have put it at £50,000, as the noble Lord, Lord Boston,
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seemed to suggest, but these things are questions of judgment and discussion, and the figure of £30,000 was arrived at by those means. I think I have dealt with the various points that the noble Lord, Lord Boston, very kindly made, and I am very grateful to him for the kindly way in which he has received the Motion and for his interest in the matter generally.
Lord Elystan-Morgan: My Lords, I rise very briefly to support the remarks of my noble friend Lord Boston in this matter. There is, of course, ample justification for the order, and, as my noble friend has said, there have been periodic reviews of these limits. I believe that the parent Act, as it were, of county courts in their present form was in 1846, and the jurisdiction then was £20. In 1900 it was £100 for tort and contract jurisdiction, and £500 for equity jurisdiction. Some very bright statistician has calculated that, taking into account changes in the value of money since the halcyon days of 1900, it would give us £2,750 as a common law jurisdiction and £14,000 for equity jurisdiction. So the decision of the noble and learned Lord the Lord Chancellor here is well within those limits.
My Lords, may I make two points very briefly, first so far as the remuneration of practitioners is concerned, and particularly barristers—and I can do this with a great measure of dispassion as it is only very seldom that I am involved in civil matters. There is a feeling among members of the Bar that it would be wrong if, in the future, a barrister handling a claim limited to, let us say, something of the order £3,500, which previously would have been in the High Court, but now conducting that trial in the county court, should find himself receiving remuneration at a very much lower level than previously. If that were so I am sure it would be accepted that it would be wrong and invidious. There is the same responsibility and complexity, and the practitioner has to exercise the same care and the same attention in dealing with it. An assurance on that matter would, I am sure, be very welcome by both sides of the legal profession.
The second matter is on a perhaps slightly more, or even more, political note, and it is this. For my sins I was a Member of the Opposition Front Bench even in 1971, when the Courts Bill went through another place, and I remember then voicing the view that it might have been opportune at that time to have included the county courts within the purview of the Beeching survey. I must say that I find that thought returning to me at the present time in considering whether the criterion of financial limit is in fact the proper one to draw as a line of demarcation between the county court's jurisdiction and that of the High Court.
After all, a claim for £4,000 in a personal injuries case or a claim in equity jurisdiction of £27,000 will involve exactly the same issues and will demand exactly the same application, exactly the same skill, exactly the same experience, from a circuit judge or his deputy sitting in the county court as would a claim slightly above the limits in each case on the part of a High Court judge. This undoubtedly is not the proper forum in which to raise that, but I would be grateful if indeed the noble and learned Lord the Lord Chan-

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cellor were able to give some indication whether there is any propsect in the future of further thought along those lines.
The Lord Chancellor: My Lords, at this stage I can speak a second time only by leave of the House. I had not realised that the noble Lord, Lord Elystan-Morgan, was going to rise, or I would have dealt with the two speakers from the Opposition Benches together. First, as regards counsel's remuneration in the county court, of course in the Provinces the taxing officer is often the same person as in the High Court, and I am assured that the proposed provisions for Scale 2, which is the highest scale, do give registrars full discretion on brief fees and refreshers. That is some reassurance to him, I hope.
The noble Lord made a very interesting point at the end of his speech. When Beeching was going through in 1971—that is to say, when the Courts Bill was going through in 1971—I wanted to do this very thing, as he did. I was assured that it was far more than my rather humble department could take on board. The Courts Act itself put an immense strain upon the department, and therefore it was not then possible. They told me it simply was not possible to try it then. Curiously enough, during my present term of office the noble and learned Lord, Lord Elwyn-Jones, put the same point to me, and I had put the same point to him when I was in opposition.
I do not think I can offer any immediate prospect of this. What I can say is that I think we are moving slowly towards what I believe to be the ultimate goal. We are approximating the practice of the High Court with that of the county court more and more. We are going to bring out in a relatively short time a completely revised set of county court rules. The existing set (to show how slowly things move in the world) was, I think, introduced in 1936, and was in fact introduced by my father. But we are gradually approximating the practice of the two courts towards one another.
To some extent the registrars, as I say, have jurisdiction as district registrars in the High Court; and, of course, if we look at the people who in fact try the cases in the High Court and the people who in fact try the cases in the county court, you will see that they overlap to a large extent, because sitting as deputy High Court judges you find leading members of the Bar who are also recorders and deputy judges in the county courts. So it is moving in that direction. I cannot promise legislation, and I think myself—and this is the advice I have received—that in order to get it right one would have to have another Commission to square up the nuts and bolts and discuss the implications of it. It is an extremely interesting point, and I am very glad the noble Lord raised it.
On Question, Motion agreed to.

Forgery and Counterfeiting Bill [H.L.]
7.38 p.m.
Viscount Colville of Culross: My Lords, I beg to move that the Commons amendments be now considered.
Moved, That the Commons amendments be now considered.—(Viscount Colville of Culross.)
The Lord Chancellor: My Lords, before I take the voices, perhaps I can say publicly what a great debt is owed by the House and the profession, and indeed the public, to my noble friend Lord Colville of Culross and to Mr. Norman Miscampbell in the other place. This is a useful Bill which would never have seen the light of day if they had not taken the labouring oar and, respectively, piloted it through each House. I think the thanks of the public are due to both of them.
Lord Boston of Faversham: My Lords, perhaps I could add my congratulations to those just expressed by the noble and learned Lord, and from these Benches join him in his tribute to the noble Viscount, Lord Colville of Culross, and to his honourable friend in another place, Mr. Miscampbell. They have indeed performed a very great service to Parliament, to the profession and to the public generally in steering this very valuable Bill through the two Houses.
Lord Foot: My Lords, may I associate my noble friends with what has been said in congratulation to the noble Viscount? He has performed a very valuable service. We endorse everything that has been said on that account.
On Question, Motion agreed to.

COMMONS AMENDMENT
[References are to Bill [138] as first printed for the Commons]
1 Clause 10, page 6, line 4, leave out from ("omission") to ("the") in line 11 and insert ("intended to be induced is to a person's prejudice if, and only if, it is one which, if it occurs—

(a) will result—

(i) in his temporary or permanent loss of property; or

(ii) in his being deprived of an opportunity to earn remuneration or greater remuneration; or

(iii) in his being deprived of an opportunity to gain a financial advantage otherwise than by way of remuneration; or

(b) will result in somebody being given an opportunity—

(i) to earn remuneration or greater remuneration from him; or

(ii) to gain a financial advantage from him otherwise than by way of remuneration; or

(c) will be").

Viscount Colville of Culross: My Lords, I beg to move that the House doth agree with the Commons in their Amendment No. 1.
First, may I say to my noble and learned friend, and the noble Lords, Lord Boston and Lord Foot, that I had not expected those words and I am immensely grateful to them. I am sure that my honourable and learned friend the Member for Blackpool, North, will be equally grateful because he took a lot of trouble about it. I am a cautious person and I have still to pilot seven amendments that have come from another place before this measure can finally be put upon the statute book. I hope that we shall have no great difficulty before I finally row the boat and moor her to the quay and complete the task and voyage that we set about.
The first amendment is a technical matter but one of some importance. The whole of the first part of the Bill, which deals with forgery, is geared to the proposition in Clause 1 which relates to doing something

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to the prejudice of some other person or to oneself. Clause 10 set about to define, among other things, the meaning of "prejudice". This Bill was not only very carefully considered in this House but in another place, and the right honourable and learned gentleman, the Member for Dulwich, had a particularly acute look at Clause 10 and the meaning of "prejudice". On the discussion in another place, it became apparent that the definition was not sufficiently wide to cover circumstances in which a person could be prejudiced by being deprived of an opportunity to gain financial advantage or earn remuneration, and also it did not cover circumstances in which a person obtains an opportunity to gain a financial advantage from another thus prejudicing another person; gaining a financial advantage from person A to the prejudice of person B.
It was thought—I am sure rightly—that circumstances of this sort needed to be catered for. The classic example was quoted of a person who resorts to forgery in order to obtain a contract for which he and others had been bidding by forging testimonials or something of that sort, and thereby depriving the genuine tenderer of what would have been his contract if it had not been for the forgery. Although the first amendment looks very complicated, it makes the definition of "prejudice" more comprehensive so that it will deal with the type of case that was being discussed in another place. I hope that in view of the fact that it was accepted there your Lordships will also think it is right that we should agree with that House.
Moved, That this House doth agree with the Commons in the said amendment.—(Viscount Colville of Culross.)
On Question, Motion agreed to.

COMMONS AMENDMENTS
2Clause 12, page 7, line 29, after ("1960") insert (",section 169(3) of the Road Traffic Act 1972 and section 65(3) of the Public Passenger Vehicles Act 1981".)
3Clause 12, page 7, line 34, leave out subsection (2).
Viscount Colville of Culross: My Lords, I beg to move that this House doth agree with the Commons in their Amendments Nos. 2 and 3.
These are purely technical. What has happened is that in Clause 12 there are at the moment two subsections dealing purely with verbal amendments to the Road Traffic Act 1960 and the Road Traffic Act 1972. Since then Parliament has passed a measure called the Public Passenger Vehicles Act 1981 which contains the same definition relating back to the Forgery Act. It is much easier to have a comprehensive reference to the three Acts in one subsection. Therefore what this amendment does is to incorporate the measure that we have just passed and cut out subsection (2) which is not necessary any more and amalgamate the three into one.
Moved. That this House doth agree with the Commons in the said amendments—(Viscount Colville of Culross.)
On Question, Motion agreed to.

COMMONS AMENDMENT
4 Clause 14, page 8, line 8, after first ("or") insert ("of").
Viscount Colville of Culross: My Lords, I beg to move that this House doth agree with the Commons in their Amendment No. 4.
This amendment looks very small indeed; but, as a matter of fact, it is a point of substance. It occurs in Part 2 of the Bill where we go on to the matter of counterfeiting. In Clause 14(2) it is said that it is an offence for a person to make a counterfeit of a currency note or a protected coin without lawful authority or excuse. What is intended is to make it an offence to make a counterfeit of a currency note or a counterfeit of a protected coin. If you do not put in the word "of" it will read that it is an offence to make the protected coin. That is not a matter for counterfeiting at all and it should not be thus phrased. If you put in the word "of" it is the making of the counterfeit of a protected coin, that becomes an offence. This little word is very necessary and I beg to move.
Moved, That the House doth agree with the Commons in the said amendment.—(Viscount Colville of Culross.)
On Question, Motion agreed to.

COMMONS AMENDMENTS
5Clause 17, page 9, line 8, leave out ("It") and insert ("Subject to subsection (4) below, it")
6Clause 17, page 9, line 9, leave out (",without lawful authority or excuse,")
7Clause 17, page 9, line 15, at end insert—
("(4) It shall be a defence for a person charged with an offence under subsection (3) above to show—

(a) that he made the implement or, as the case may be, had it in his custody or under his control, with the written consent of the Treasury; or

(b) that he had lawful authority otherwise than by virtue of paragraph (a) above, or a lawful excuse, for making it or having it in his custody or under his control.").

Viscount Colville of Culross: My Lords, I beg to move that the House doth agree with the Commons in their Amendments Nos. 5, 6 and 7.
Your Lordships have always prided themselves on having experts in everything as Members of this House. But I had not appreciated that in the other House there was quite such an expert numismatist as one of my honourable friends there. He raised some recondite points, such as I would not have thought existed at all. These three amendments really relate to something that he raised, and I am sure that we are all very grateful to him for doing so. There are those people who make goods—tankards, coasters and that type of product—upon which they like to print an impression which looks like a coin of the realm—perhaps in the middle of the bottom of the coaster or on the side of the tankard or other such notable relics of one's holiday or possibly more valuable pieces, as the case may be.
It is all very well for those things to be produced because they in themselves could not possibly do any harm to the public since the picture on the side or the impression on the bottom of the article cannot possibly be taken to be a coin. But if you have the tools whereby you can make this impression or picture, they can be of the nature that you would be able to use them also to make a counterfeit coin. Therefore, it was thought that it ought to be clarified that people who wished to do this should be able to do so only with the consent of the Treasury. That is what the effect of

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these three amendments is: that people shall be allowed to produce goods of this sort. However, if they want to have the necessary equipment to make them and the impression or picture is such that it could be something which could be to the prejudice of the coinage by being used improperly to make something that looks like a counterfeit coin, then the making and use of the tools themselves should be subjected to Treasury consent. In those circumstances, the other place thought that it ought to re-write some of the provisions in Clause 17.
The three amendments concerned have the effect therefore of allowing these goods to be manufactured but retaining a certain control over the necessary equipment to do so. I hope that your Lordships will feel that that is a reasonable balance, one that will allow freedom for our manufacturers and at the same time allow sufficient control over the equipment to prevent any prejudice whatever to the coinage. Those three amendments go together.
Moved, That this House doth agree with the Commons in the said amendments.—(Viscount Colville of Culross.)
On Question, Motion agreed to.
Viscount Long: My Lords, I beg to move that this House do now adjourn until eight o'clock.
Moved accordingly, and, on Question, Motion agreed to.
[The Sitting was suspended from 7.50 to 8 p.m.]

British Nationality Bill
House again in Committee, on Clause 3.
Lord Geddes Lord Geddes moved Amendment No. 77:
Page 5, line 41, at end insert—
(";and
(c) "Close connection" means a connection of material significance with the United Kingdom which may include, inter alia, any of:

Ownership of United Kingdom house.

Child's full-time education in United Kingdom.

Intended retirement in the United Kingdom.

Beneficiary in United Kingdom pension fund.

Minimum five years annual contribution to United Kingdom social security levy").

The noble Lord said: I beg to move Amendment No. 77. The entitlement under Clause 3(2) of the Bill, ignoring the rather vexed question of the discretion of the Secretary of State, is subject to four criteria. The first, in subsection (2)(a), is quite specific with regard to the parent in question being a British citizen. The second has regard to "relevant employment", which is defined in some detail in subsection (3). The third and fourth criteria, in (2)(c) and (2)(d) have regard to close connection", which is not defined.
When drafting this amendment, I was conscious of something of a dilemma. First, it could be argued that the texts of these two subsections are already too vague and an attempt to define "close connection" could make them more vague and confusing. Secondly, the words "close connection" are used in different
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contexts in the two subsections, the text being commercial in subsection (2)(c) and the text being personal in (2)(d).
I asked the noble Lord the Minister on the Second Reading of this Bill how close was a "close connection". I do not recall receiving an answer. Therefore, despite the traps that I have outlined, I felt it was important to table this probing amendment to try to give some definition to the words "close connection". I may well not have got this amendment in the right place and it may not be sufficiently comprehensive. Indeed, my second definition of "child's full-time education" I now realise is somewhat premature, since that child at the relevant time within this clause would at the time of the application be at the most 12 months old. I apologise to your Lordships. I would think that even in such a probing amendment my reference to full-time education should refer to the parent and not to the child.
I repeat that I do not consider in any way that my amendment is comprehensive. My endeavour is to try to have a short debate on this subject and to ask the noble Lord the Minister whether he can give some guidance with regard to the definition of the expression "close connecton", and whether he does not consider that there should be some form of definition in the Bill. I beg to move.
Lord Mishcon: I think this is a very interesting amendment in that it does seek to define words which obviously have no fixed purpose in their actual wording, namely, "close connection". But I remember the noble and learned Lord, I think it was, or the noble Lord the Minister pointing out to us that these words have been used in previous statutes. I know that one of my noble friends asked whether the Government could give any indication as to whether there had been any decisions by way of precedents on the meaning of those words.
I must say that my friends and I sympathise with the wish to have some sort of certainty here, especially when you have the exercise of some sort of discretion with regard to the Home Secretary's interpretation of them. I am a little worried, as was the noble Lord, Lord Geddes, as to whether this list is a sufficiently good one. I hope, as I believe he does, that the Government, if they find this list not acceptable for good reason, will be able to make some suggestions as to how the words "close connection" may be defined.
I hope I shall not be deemed to be facetious in my next remarks, but many of us know that there are people who sever their connection with the United Kingdom for motives not altogether laudable, and it seems to me strange that when we have a definition of "close connection" such as the noble Lord, Lord Geddes, sought to give us, nowhere is there any reference to the fact that a "close connection" could be found by the payment of United Kingdom income tax. It seems to me that if there is to be a definition and somebody is to get the benefit of this, one at least of the ways in which a "close connection" could be found is that United Kingdom income tax is being paid. However, having made that remark, I, like the noble Lord, Lord Geddes, will await with interest to see whether the Government can at least do something to make the words "close connection" have some

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meaning in this Bill so that people know precisely where they stand.
Baroness Elles: If I may intervene for one minute, I very much hope that the noble Lord's proposal that payment of tax might be one of the conditions will not be followed, considering that there are at least 8 million people in this country who do not pay tax but who nevertheless would consider themselves very closely connected with this country.
Lord Mishcon: I intervene again only in order to make my position quite clear. I am dealing, of course, with people who have removed themselves abroad, and they do not normally come within that definition.
Lord Belstead: I am grateful to my noble friend Lord Geddes for putting down this amendment, because I think it is important that we should have a short discussion about this expression which lies really at the heart of Clause 3, although I think the dangers of trying to be specific have already been demonstrated by the short exchange which has occurred between the noble Lord, Lord Mishcon, and my noble friend Lady Elles.
I will come immediately to the point, if I may. Those making application under this provision for their children would be asked to give details of the connections they have with this country through their employment and in other ways. As far as employment is concerned, these inquiries will normally be quite straightforward and we do not think it would often be necessary to go beyond the details of the nature of the employment and the links which that employment involves with the United Kingdom which are supplied by the applicant.
As to the parents' connections with the United Kingdom in other ways, which would be needed to assess whether the parent met the test of intentions in Clause 3(2)(d), detailed inquiries about the nature of these again would not be necessary in most cases. If I may give just one example, and one example only, I envisage that it would be sufficient, for instance, for the parent to give details of such matters as contacts with relatives in the United Kingdom; but that is not supposed to be a test which, if somebody said they had no relatives in the United Kingdom, they would fail. Indeed, the list of items which is given in the amendment is only illustrative, as I think has been made clear, and I do not think the noble Lord intends that an applicant who did not have any of those connections in the amendment but who nevertheless had close ties with the United Kingdom in some other way would necessarily fail to meet the "close connection" requirement. Nor indeed need it follow that an applicant who had only one of these connections would thereby automatically be deemed to have a close connection with the United Kingdom.
I have spoken about the individual. May I give one, and one only, illustration from the point of view of the "close connection" so far as relevant employment is concerned? The noble Lord, Lord Mishcon, spoke about the payment of tax, though there is not agreement on this matter in the Committee this evening. What would be in the applicant's favour, I think,
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would be such a factor as evidence that substantial benefits, financial or otherwise, flow from the company for which the person is working to the United Kingdom; but it does not mean that if that particular criterion is not evident the application would fail.
I want to stress that in operating this provision we should like to aim at a simple and soundly-based procedure designed to help applicants who have links with this country to secure citizenship for their children and not to impede them from doing so. We will do our best to keep the administration of this provision as simple and as straightforward as possible. We do not consider that the definition proposed in this amendment would help and, for the reasons I have given, we think it could hinder matters, since it would be only too readily assumed that the list of illustrations was exclusive. As my noble friend himself has said, that would not be the intention.
8.11 p.m.
Lord Avebury: I have been compelled to rise to speak by the Minister's example, when he said that if it could be shown that substantial benefits flowed from the company to the United Kingdom, that factor might be taken into consideration in determining whether there was a "close connection" within the meaning of this clause. Clause 3(2)(c) states:
"that the nature or terms and conditions of that employment involved a close connection with the United Kingdom".
It is not the activities of the company which are being examined when the Secretary of State tests compliance with that condition. Rather, it is the nature of that person's employment with the company. It would be quite possible for the terms and conditions for that employment to involve "a close connection with the United Kingdom" without the company itself actually complying with the condition which the noble Lord, the Minister, has mentioned.
The noble Lord introduced a new consideration which has left me even more confused about the way in which this clause is going to be interpreted than I was before. As I understand it, the person has first to satisfy the Secretary of State that he has been in "relevant employment". But the applicant has to go beyond that and has to prove:
"that the nature or terms and conditions of that employment involved a close connection with the United Kingdom".
I am reinforced in my opinion not so much that one can write in a precise list of criteria to be taken into account (as the noble Lord, Lord Geddes, seeks to do with his amendment) but that before we reach a conclusion on this Bill the Government should give people a much more precise indication of what is in their minds. The single example which the noble Lord the Minister was good enough to give the Committee should be extended and he should set out in a further speech, either this evening or at Report stage, the kind of criteria which the Government intend to examine in establishing whether Clause 3(2)(c) is satisfied.
Lord Belstead: I believe that if I were to set out at length anything more on this amendment, many of my noble friends and many noble Lords opposite would go into a decline. I must just point out to the noble Lord, Lord Avebury, that he has not quite

1445
brought himself up to date. Almost at the very end of the proceedings when your Lordships were last in Committee on this Bill, my noble friend Lord Geddes successfully moved an amendment so that Clause 3(2)(c) would read:
"That the nature of the terms of that employment involved a close connection with the United Kingdom".
The second example I gave of a "close connection" related to the nature of the employment in which a person is involved.
Baroness White: Can the noble Lord, the Minister, tell me whether if one maintained a subscription to, shall we say, Brooks's, Pratt's, or the Athenaeum, that would be regarded as being an adequate "close connection" with the United Kingdom?
Lord Belstead: I do not think that I can answer that off the cuff. We are, of course, talking about employment. If the noble Baroness was referring to the nature of the person's intention, then this matter is one that would have to be looked at in view of all the circumstances of the case.
Baroness White: With great respect, the amendment to which we are addressing ourselves covers many aspects other than employment.
Lord Belstead: Yes, indeed; and therefore what the noble Baroness has said would need to be looked at in all the circumstances of the particular case.
Lord Geddes: I realised that I might be stirring up something of a hornet's nest, particularly when I said in moving the amendment that I was conscious of the fact that the same words were used in different contexts in subsection (2)(c) and (d). I am very grateful to my noble friend the Minister for the remarks he has made. They have slightly clarified the situation in my mind.
I am unashamedly repeating my opening comments when I say that it does seem to me to be worrying, to say the least, that of the four criteria set out, the first two are clearly defined one way or the other whereas the second two, very clearly, are not defined. I believe this may cause a great deal of concern to what one might call marginal applicants. Those people who quite clearly have an entitlement are not going to be worried whether or not there is a definition of "close connection" in the Bill because they know that they will be all right. But the marginal applicants will be concerned. I suggest that marginal applicants may be few in number but, if it would do no harm, I should like to see something done—although I have not the experience to suggest how it could be done. Perhaps it could be done by way of a Schedule or perhaps, as Lord Avebury said, it could be done by way of further comments from the Front Bench.
I do not pretend that the examples I gave were in any way satisfactory, but I was careful to incorporate in the words of my amendment,
"Which may include, inter aria,".
I hope that will get around the problem mentioned by the noble Minister, that people would claim that the examples given were comprehensive and that only those given would count. I would ask my noble friend the Minister to give further consideration to what I
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believe would be a problem subsequently arising from this lack of definition. Meanwhile, I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.
Lord Mishcon: Before your Lordships' pleasure on the question of withdrawing this amendment is tested, may I be persevering and again refer to the complex provisions of this Bill—as well as to the vague provisions of this Bill with which we have just been dealing. I hope that I will do so in a constructive way. Whatever may be the merits or demerits of this Bill, it seems to me that the public relations exercise in respect of this Bill has been poor indeed. I am nervous and my friends are nervous that when this Bill becomes an Act there will be many people who will not know what their rights really are and what the Home Office reaction to various phrases in this Bill will be.
Previously, I appealed on another matter for some kind of pamphlet. There was support for this idea in Committee and there was also some opposition. May I at least plead that at some stage, which I hope will be rather near to the passing of this Bill, there will be a simple guide that race relations officers and others will be able to distribute? 1 do not mean that such a pamphlet should only be for the ethnic minorities but also for people abroad in our dependent territories and for ordinary citizens who are not members of ethnic minority groups. Perhaps there could be a little booklet which sets out in the simplest possible terms the provisions of this Bill and then, in equally simple terms, provides some rough examples of what "close connection" can mean and would mean. It could be stated in very simple language that these examples were not exclusive. The fact that somebody is able to say that his close connection with this country is that there are many members of his family living here, who are British citizens, can be given as an example of what might well be deemed to be a close connection.
I plead with the Government—whether by way of agreeing to amendments that are being put down for clarification, or in some other way—to realise that when this Bill is passed there will be so many people who will not know what are their rights. So many of us, including the right reverend Prelates, are concerned that there should not be undue disquiet among the ethnic minority groups. It would be so helpful if this booklet could tell people, "Under this Act, you are better off than you were under the old Act", if that be so, and the Government are saying that that is so. Then, again, "Women! You will be better off than you were under the old legislation." If that be so, let the booklet say so.
I feel a sense of grave disappointment when, again and again, we are told of the difficulties of definition, because we are limiting things if we define. At the same time, we know in our hearts that when this Bill becomes law there will be so many of our citizens, and people who want to be our citizens, who will have no simple guide whatsoever as to what this Bill means in regard to citizenship, what their rights are and what the phrases used in this Bill really mean.
It may be that I am slightly out of order—I hope I am not—but I hope that I speak in a good cause. I hope, too, that, at some stage, the Government will

1447
be able to tell us that such a simplification by way of a booklet will be in their programme when this Bill becomes a statute.
Lord Drumalbyn: We are talking here about a definition of the words "close connection". What I understand the noble Lord, Lord Mishcon, has been talking about is not a definition but a description of the way in which the words will be interpreted. If one looks, for example, at the national insurance scheme there is a separate pamphlet for every single item that can possibly be covered by national insurance. So it does not seem to me to be too much to ask that, at the end of the day, there should be a pamphlet about this; not just one giving a description of the whole scheme, such as the red booklet which exists at the present time, but one giving greater amplification of the way in which the scheme as a whole will work. It is for consideration and it is a way out of reaching a decision on this amendment.
Lord Avebury: It may help your Lordships to know that the Action Group on Immigration and Nationality have produced a series of leaflets which explain how the Bill affects particular classes of individuals. In the absence of any proper explanation from the Government, I warmly commend these leaflets to your Lordships. They are available from 44 Theobalds Road, London, WC1.
Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.
[Amendment No. 78 not moved]:
Lord Geddes Lord Geddes moved Amendment No. 79:
Page 5, line 43, leave out ("established in the United Kingdom").
The noble Lord said: With this amendment, I should also like to speak to Amendment No. 81. These two amendments are tied together and they are supported by the meat in their sandwich of Amendment No. 80. Amendments Nos. 79 and 81, taken together, would result in subsection (9) reading:
"For the purposes of subsection (3) a partner in a firm is to be regarded as employed in employment with the firm".
As I see it, that would put a partner on exactly the same footing as an employee and would obviate the necessity of Amendment No. 80. I think that I heard the noble and learned Lord the Lord Advocate touch on this subject when discussing Amendment No. 50A, and I would move my amendment if only to get clarification from the noble and learned Lord as to what his views are on this subject. I beg to move.
Lord Mackay of Clashfern: As I said in answer to Amendment No. 50A, which was moved by my noble friend Lord Drumalbyn, the Government are undertaking to bring forward amendments to deal with this point. I hope that, in a sense, that will be satisfactory to my noble friend.
Lord Geddes: I am most grateful to my noble and learned friend the Lord Advocate. I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.
Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.
Baroness Elles Baroness Elles had given notice of her intention to move Amendment No. 80:
Page 5, line 43, after ("United Kingdom") insert ("or in a firm closely associated with a firm established in the United Kingdom,").
The noble Baroness said: I understood earlier from either my noble friend the Minister or my noble and learned friend that this amendment is also being considered in relation to the text of subsection (9). Therefore, I shall not move it, and leave it to the next time round so as to see what comes out from the Government.
[Amendment No. 80 not moved.]
[Amendment No. 81 not moved.]
Clause 3, as amended, agreed to.
[Amendment No. 82 not moved.]
Clause 4 agreed to.
Clause 5 [Acquisition by naturalisation]:
8.27 p.m.
Lord Avebury Lord Avebury moved Amendment No. 82ZA:
Page 7, line 12, after ("application") insert ("to the Secretary of State").
The noble Lord said: It might be for the convenience of the Committee if we could take with this amendment, Amendments Nos. 82B, 82C, 84A, 84C, 85A and 87A. First, what I have attempted to do is to take out from Clause 5 the words which leave the Secretary of State under a duty to satisfy himself of the applicant's fulfilment of certain requirements. I have provided that the application for naturalisation should still be made to the Secretary of State under either subsection (1) or subsection (2), but the meat of the amendment is the amendments to the schedule which appear in Amendment No. 87A.
What I have done there is to replace the subjective tests, which include tests of character and language, with the objective tests which were discussed in the Green Paper of April 1977. When that matter was under discussion in the Green Paper, no conclusion was reached. The two alternatives, of a set of objective tests and retention of the good character requirement, were set out, the pros and cons were gone into at some length there and the decision was left for further discussion.
I asked, from time to time, whether both the previous Government and this Government would publish the representations which they had received following the Green Paper of April 1977, but I never got anywhere with that. I think the reason for that, so far as the amendment which we are discussing is concerned, becomes clear when one looks at the White Paper. The White Paper says in paragraph 63:
"The limited amount of correspondence which has been received on this topic has tended to favour the introduction of objective tests as to character".
That is officialese for saying that there was no support whatsoever for the proposition that subjective tests of character should be retained. I still think that it would have been very desirable for all the representations on this matter to be published so that people could weigh up the arguments for themselves.
We as a Liberal Party published our own response to the Green Paper in a document entitled Who's Your Father? We published it in July 1977. We came down very firmly against the idea of subjective tests for the kind of reasons which were set out extremely well, as I thought at the time, in the Green Paper itself. The Green Paper said in paragraph 53 that the requirement was imprecise: that it was easier to say that somebody is of good character than to analyse why this is so, that different people are bound to have different views as to what constitutes good character and that while every effort is made to treat applicants consistently and fairly in this matter it is not always easy to administer the good character requirement satisfactorily. Particularly is this so when no explanation is ever given to the person whose application for naturalisation is refused as to what it was in the test which he failed. I mentioned to your Lordships the other day on another amendment that when I probed this in the case of a particular applicant who came to me for assistance, I found that the reasons why he was turned down were, in my opinion, entirely frivolous. Yet the Secretary of State's decision on the matter was final.
The Green Paper went on to say, despite the criticisms which I have outlined, that it was not easy to devise an adequate substitute. They suggested that one way of doing it would be to limit consideration of character to criminal and financial matters: that it might be said that somebody was acceptable for naturalisation who had never been convicted of a criminal offence, with some exceptions, who was not awaiting trial for any offence, or who was not an undischarged bankrupt or a person debarred from acting as a director under the Companies Act. And the excepted criminal offences might be, they suggested, those which were spent under the Rehabilitation of Offenders Act 1974 and offences which led to certain kinds of custodial sentence. I will not go into the details. What I have done in the amendment is to spell out the criteria which were suggested in the Green Paper and to put them into the schedule in place of the imprecise test of character that we have there now.
Again in the Green Paper it was said that an objective test, such as we have in this amendment, has drawbacks: that it cannot measure, for instance, whether a man's general behaviour makes him unacceptable to his fellow citizens even if he may have kept free of the courts. When you come to think about that phrase, it is very objectionable and dangerous. We are going to make a man's entitlement to citizenship depend upon his behaviour. As we said in our discussion of this matter in the document Who's Your Father? behaviour which some people would consider bizarre, such as keeping goats in your bedroom, would not necessarily debar you from entitlement to citizenship. One can think of all sorts of perfectly good and useful citizens of the United Kingdom at the moment whose behaviour is odd, to say the least—some of them in your Lordships' House. But the fact that their behaviour is bizarre or even unacceptable to other people does not make them any worse citizens. So a criterion of that sort which is suggested in the Green Paper is to be deplored.
The Government were going to welcome views on the matter, they said in April 1977, and certain views were submitted. I should like to know what they were because I believe, frankly, that no representations were made on the retention of this extremely vague and general suggestion.
Another effect of the amendment which I am proposing is to wipe out the language test. That is a matter which was gone into at considerable length in another place. It is suggested that a person must have a command of the English language in order to fulfil his duties as a citizen. It was said by the Minister when he came to reply to the amendment in Committee that the language test which was applied was not a very arduous one: that it was based on a fairly straightforward conversation, generally carried out with a policeman.
I think, for a start, that this is not a very good way of looking at a person's capability in English when an enormous amount depends upon the result. A person who probably has only resided in this country for a few years needs to be naturalised for the sake of his future and for the maintenance of his family in this country. And the person who conducts the interview is a policeman. I love the police; I am very fond of them myself. But I know that there are difficulties, particularly in the relationships between ethnic minorities and the police which I do not think need to be underlined just now. All I am saying is that for the interview to test a person's command of English to be conducted by a member of the police force is not necessarily an ideal way of establishing his entitlement.
Secondly, the Minister assured the Committee that policy has moved in the direction of spoken command of the language and away from a written test. He said:
"The terms of the Bill do not say whether it is written or spoken language, but clearly it would be desirable to take a fairly liberal and humane view of the matter".
So we are being asked to take it on trust that this is a very simple test: it will be conducted in simple conversation; nobody will be asked to write anything; and more or less anybody can get through it. I know that this is not true. I have had a case submitted to me recently by a correspondent—not by the person whose English was said to be inadequate but by a friend of his. The friend wrote to me and asked me what I thought should be done to enable this person to comply with the test. I advised him to undertake a course of English. After some months the friend wrote again and said that although the applicant had not in fact enrolled for a course of English, he believed that his command of the language had sufficiently improved to enable him to communicate adequately for his day-to-day purposes. This man did not succeed in his application.
So long as we have the matter left to the decision of an individual officer we are in the difficulty that there is no way in which the process can be examined. We all know that there is no appeal machinery. If a person is turned down, whether it is because of alleged defects in his character, or because of an insufficient command of the language, the decision is always made by an official—ostensibly the decision is made by the Secretary of State but in practice we all know that it is made by somebody at a fairly low level—and it is

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not amenable to either examination or challenge in the courts of law, or even through the intervention of that person's Member of Parliament. I know that in practice many people, faced with a refusal either on the good character test, the language requirement or whatever will go to his Member of Parliament and that the Member of Parliament will write to the Under-Secretary of State and ask him to review the case, but I do not know of any instances where the Secretary of State has overturned the decision of the officials in the department and agreed with the Member who has written on behalf of his constituent or correspondent that, after all, this person was entitled to be registered or naturalised, contrary to the decision which was made by the immigration officer.
I want to put one further argument to your Lordships, and I tried to deploy this on a previous occasion, without making much impact on the Government, but I think it is of some validity at a time when public expenditure is being reduced all round and in the Home Office alone expenditure is increasing and the number of civil servants is rising because of the burdens of coping with the existing applications for naturalisation and registration. I am pointing out, as I have done before, that both the number of staff and the expenditure on the department dealing with applications of this sort has increased markedly in recent years—according to the Government, because of the decisions of the courts in 1977 and particularly the case of Zamir. Surely we do not want to continue this process of expanding the department dealing with naturalisation indefinitely. We want to make the process as simple as possible from the point of view of the maintenance of public expenditure at modest levels, as well as the convenience of the applicants.
I am of course concerned that people should understand the process and know how they go about becoming a British citizen once this Bill becomes law. I am interested primarily that people should see how it works and that they do not have to scratch their heads and wonder what will be in the mind of the person who will conduct the interview and who is going to test their character and their language. I want to make the thing simple from the applicant's point of view, so that he knows before he ever puts in the forms whether he will succeed or fail, but I am trying to look at it from the point of view of the Home Office as well. Surely we want to sweep away the enormous edifice of tests which go on behind closed doors after interviews conducted by many different people who may find it extremely difficult to set common standards. From that point of view, too, this amendment ought to commend itself to the Government.
I take the view that this is one of the most important sections of the Bill. There should be absolute certainty in the minds of the people who come along and ask for our citizenship (which is, after all, a considerable privilege) that they know in advance whether they are going to satisfy the tests and that the Home Office may clearly apply those tests without the difficulties which are inherent—and have always been inherent—in the subjective tests that we have in our law now. I beg to move.
Baroness Birk: I think it would really be helpful
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to the Committee if I were to speak now instead of moving Amendment No. 83 separately, because it really is on the same point. The purpose of Amendment No. 83, together with Amendment No. 87, and then the new clause that we have tabled for inclusion after Clause 43, is to explore very positively the possibility of a completely new approach to naturalisation.
As we know, under existing law the grant of citizenship by naturalisation is entirely at the discretion of the Secretary of State and has been so for many decades. We should remember, however, that, when this power was first given to the Home Secretary in the 19th century, circumstances were very different. For one thing aliens could enter and remain in this country freely without restriction. The first test of their desirability as residents came with an application for citizenship. Nowadays the situation is very different. An alien has to satisfy many strict tests at the point of entry and is also liable to deportation if his character is not conducive to the public good, even if he has lived here for many years. Any alien who succeeds at all in living here for a period of years therefore has had to get over hurdles which used not to exist at all.
It is in that context that we are now discussing this very important part of the Bill. It is true that aliens from the EEC are subject to less stringent tests on entry and residence than other aliens. They can be deported only subject to the limitations imposed by European Community law, but, since EEC aliens can live and work here and enjoy most of the rights of residence and employment that citizens have and since they come from countries very close at hand, there is less incentive for them to seek naturalisation than there is for other aliens who come here.
Different countries vary greatly in their requirements for naturalisation. Many are more restrictive than we are, since they demand longer periods of residence than we do—sometimes of the order of 10 or 15 years instead of five—but at the same time there has been a strong trend in recent decades for democratic states to have systems of appeal against refusal of citizenship.
In Canada, for instance, applications for citizenship are dealt with in the first place by a citizenship judge, who, if he refuses an application, must give his reasons for refusal and notify the applicant of his right of appeal to the trial division of the federal court. In cases where national security or public order may be an issue, the Governor in Council may make a ruling that a particular grant of citizenship would be prejudicial to order or security, and there is then no appeal against his ruling. In this way, Canada retains the safeguards that the Government are concerned about here, while allowing a much more equitable process than we have for the overwhelming majority of ordinary cases where no threat to the public is involved. In the United States of America, an applicant who is refused can go to a nationality court, where both sides can be heard.
So our system, with its unfettered discretion for the Secretary of State and its extremely vaguely defined test that an applicant must meet, is far less satisfactory from the applicant's point of view than the system in Canada and in the United States, countries which certainly face just the same problems as we do concerning national security issues like terrorism, organised crime and

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espionage, and yet do not penalise the great majority of ordinary, law-abiding applicants because of the danger that can be posed by a tiny minority.
Without too many apologies, I am mentioning this question of appeals and objective tests at this moment because it is so central to the whole of the Bill and it is so important that we should get this as right as we possibly can, even though later on we shall be taking the individual amendments. If we do not get some form of objective tests and a system of appeals—and this is relevant to Amendment No. 83—Amendment No. 83 as it stands appears at first sight to confer on any applicant an entitlement to receive British citizenship fairly easily. That is why I have discussed it in the context of tests and appeals.
We are anxious to have the whole question of conditions for naturalisation looked at as soon as we have discussed Clause 5, because naturalisation will be an even more important hurdle in the future than it is now. Under the Bill it will eventually come about that any Commonwealth citizen, any Irish citizen and any woman married to a British man will have to go through naturalisation if they want British citizenship. At the moment people in these categories can be registered instead and this is such an important and such a revolutionary change that we cannot just let it go past quietly or quickly or, so to speak, "on the nod". In the long run naturalisation is to be greatly extended in its application and it is important that, in laying down the conditions for it now, we should get things as right as we possibly can.
I feel quite certain that the Government will take the view that some discretion should be left with the Home Secretary. This is a matter which we can and certainly will argue in Committee as the Bill goes on. The alternative does not have to be between the absolutely unfettered discretion in the Bill as it stands and an absolutely automatic entitlement for any applicant who can meet a short list of requirements.
It is certainly very unsatisfactory that, under existing law, a number of applicants are refused every year without knowing the reasons for refusal. It is also very unsatisfactory that an applicant should know only that he must be of good character without having the least idea, as the noble Lord, Lord Avebury, pointed out, what good character is supposed to be. Mr. Timothy Raison, questioned on this in another place, said:
"Defects of temperament on their own are not normally held to bar an applicant on grounds of character. Heavy drinking, gambling, or a disinclination to work are not in themselves sufficient to warrant refusal. There comes a point in a very few cases, however, where failings of this type become so pronounced or notorious in the locality that it would be unwise to grant naturalisation".
If ever there was a clear example of a subjective judgment on what constitutes good character this is it.
Mr. Raison, of course, mentioned other qualities as desirable, like honesty, integrity, but how are we to know what his department would regard as dishonest. Which would be more serious, petty theft or fiddling on one's income tax and expense accounts, telling lies or exceeding the speed limit? Those who say—and there are many, and we will probably hear it tonight, perhaps from the Government—that the Secretary of State can always be trusted to be humane and just, and he is answerable to Parliament, must remember that
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he does not and cannot personally deal with anything but a handful of cases.
On the last day of 1980 there were 54,309 applications for citizenship outstanding, some for naturalisation and some for registration. How on earth can one man deal with all those, even if he just did it with his eyes shut and cursorily signed or did not sign the papers. To go into them at all is physically and mentally impossible. So, of course, in practice they are dealt with by civil servants, and because of the sheer numbers and weight of the work not always by the most senior civil servants. Therefore, surely in the interests of the applicant, and even in the interests of the civil servants themselves, who have a very great burden placed on them, physically, mentally and emotionally, we ought to establish a more clear and straightforward system than the present one. Above all, applicants should know where they stand.
When I was giving that quote from Mr. Raison it was not criticism of him when I said it was a completely subjective test. It has to be, unless there are objective criteria laid down. Applicants should be clear about what tests they have to meet, and if they can show they can pass the tests they ought not to be subjected to the process of discretion, except in the rare cases where national security is involved. Therefore, when we come to Amendment No. 83 what we propose is to substitute the word "shall" for the phrase "may, if he thinks fit". I will end by saying that this is really on the same point as Lord Avebury's amendment, and it is not only really concerned with the alteration of one word; it goes to the roots of our whole policy on naturalisation and citizenship.
Lord Pitt of Hampstead: It has been suggested to me that I ought to come in at this stage, having regard to my amendment No. 82A. If your Lordships would permit me, I would like to take Nos. 84B, 86A, 90A, 90B, 122A, 122B, 122D, 122E. They are all on the same point. The difference between my approach and the approach of the two Front Bench speakers is that I am suggesting altering the onus of proof. As the Bill now stands, if somebody is applying for naturalisation he has to prove he is of good character, as I read it; what my amendment suggests is that if the Home Secretary thinks that the man is of bad character the onus of proof should be on him. He should have to say, "This man is of bad character and therefore cannot be naturalised", rather than the other way round. The reason for putting it that way is that if there are facts about this person's character they would be known to the Home Secretary and his officers.
I may add that, of course, there are other amendments which I have tabled which would require some form of appeal, and of course it is in that context that this must be read. But the main point about my amendment is that the onus of proof that this person is of bad character should be on the Home Secretary; that it should not be, as now in the Bill, that he has to prove he is of good character. As the Bill reads, there are certain conditions he has to fulfil, one of them being that he must be of good character, which means he has to prove it. If we put it the other way round, since if the applicant is going to be rejected

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he is rejected because the Home Secretary thinks he is of bad character, it should be put that way in the Bill.
Lord Jenkins of Putney: If I may say a word in support of my noble friend's amendment, it seems to me that the object of all these amendments taken together is to strengthen the position so far as the applicant is concerned. I believe the situation in which we are in in the country at the moment requires this to be done. It seems to me that to place the applicant in the position of having to demonstrate that he is of good character places him in an extraordinary position. What is "of good character"? Which of us here, if required to prove that, could not be found faulty in one respect or another by anyone who wanted to show that we are of bad character? It seems to me that the reversal of the onus of proof, to require the Home Secretary to show that the person is of bad character, is a simple piece of justice. It seems to me, therefore, taking the group of amendments, and in particular the one moved by my noble friend, unless the noble Lord who will be answering is able to put up a very convincing case against these amendments, among them are some which I think ought to be pressed in order to improve the Bill. Otherwise we should be accused, I think, of going through some sort of stately saraband in this House while outside citizens are at this very moment living in something approaching a police state, in a borough next to the one in which live. This is a situation in which the people feel themselves to be living under that condition—and, whatever noble Lords may think, those people feel themselves to be living in that situation. We have, therefore, a duty to look after this group as best we can and make sure that the conditions in this Bill are such as to turn the scales a little bit for once in their favour.
Baroness Elles: Would the noble Lord be kind enough to withdraw his remarks about a police state? I think they are thoroughly unacceptable. Many of us have worked for many years in Brixton and in the area, and know the people of all colours to be peace loving people, although there may be a few, both black and white, who are objectionable and behaving badly; but I very strongly resent the implication that any part of this country is a police state, and I hope the noble Lord will be good enough to withdraw the remark.
Lord Mishcon: After that very stern, and it may be well-justified, intervention—I do not in any way wish to quarrel with it—I wonder whether your Lordships would allow me to try to bring a smile to your Lordships' faces. I remember so well the noble Lord, Lord Ave-bury, talking about the sort of people who interview applicants for naturalisation. They are worthy officials, and some of them have an extraordinary way of doing things. I want to tell your Lordships a completely true story of a gentleman whom I dearly loved, and who was a very scholarly man. Having been in this country for some eight or nine years he applied for naturalisation. A police sergeant arrived at his home and thereupon asked him, having taken out a little notebook, why it was that he wanted to become a British subject. This gentleman thought that this
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was a wonderful opportunity for him to express his heartfelt view. He started by saying, "It is because I love your sense of fair play; I have such a respect for your sense of tolerance; I think that your countryside is beautiful; I have admired your poets from afar; and Shakespeare was a great playwright whom I had the privilege of trying to translate into my native tongue". The sergeant listened to what lie had to say, looked at him and said, "May I put for business reasons'?" That was a memory of our police force which I assure your Lordships was an affectionate memory that my dear friend has borne for many years and he still tells this story with great relish, having indeed added in the meantime a considerable amount to our national life.
I should like to try and bring this discussion back—having succeeded in making your Lordships smile—to a serious vein and I do so in the following way. I think that it is a very good idea that this is a broad debate and that we are not narrowly taking it amendment by amendment. What we are really trying to discuss is, first, should a question of naturalisation be in the discretion of the Home Secretary bearing in mind that it has been in the past, under successive Governments of different political complexions, and bearing in mind that now of all times we are looking at matters afresh and that now of all times we have a very different collection of people who come within the naturalisation net? There are wives of British subjects who before automatically would have become British subjects, but who now have to apply for naturalisation. There are other examples that your Lordships know perfectly well without there being a recital from me which again come within the purview of the naturalisation application. So there is a very good reason for looking at the situation again.
Quite apart from the question of discretion, should you, when you are dealing with character, be a little more positive in your description of what you mean and should you shift an onus? I know that my noble friend Lord Pitt of Hampstead will forgive me if I say that in my view he has contributed a great deal to this discussion by at least putting it in the arena, if I may put it that way, and that I recognise fully the difficulty of any Secretary of State having to prove positively that somebody is of bad character. If you put that onus upon him I can think of numerous examples where his life would become extremely difficult.
There may be an application for naturalisation from somebody whom the file shows, on very reliable but private reports, is a gentleman who has been associating with the Mafia for goodness knows how many years, who has been involved in business transactions with them of a highly doubtful character and who has come over to this country and is endeavouring to obtain British nationality in order that he may open a casino somewhere and bring some of his Mafia friends with him. I assure your Lordships that I do not know this person and I am merely giving an example.
Let us take it for granted that the Secretary of State has to prove that this person is of bad character. We all know that if that is challenged by cross-examination or he has to give positive evidence of it he would be in a hopeless position. However, all these amendments are coming forward—and this is why I ask the

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Government seriously to consider the position—because we have so many more naturalisation aspects to look at, because we are reviewing the whole law and because in this Bill there is no appeal procedure.
What I am trying to do is to put into this debate, which is rightly going very wide—but there are respective amendments down to deal with this matter—the whole picture, because then we shall possibly reach a correct decision. I am not necessarily saying to the Government from this Front Bench that there ought to be an appeal procedure where advocates can be instructed on both sides and there can be examination and cross-examination with all the paraphernalia of an appeal trial, if I may put it that way. I am not necessarily saying that that should be the procedure. Again, if I may speak personally, I can see the difficulties of that. I can see the embarrassments of that and I can even see the impossibility of it.
But would the Government at least look at the situation and would the Minister say in his reply that the Government would be prepared to put into this Bill a provision that there is a judge of the High Court specially assigned for this purpose who will, if an applicant asks for it, review the papers that have gone before the Secretary of State and in reviewing the papers see, for example, whether there is any chance of mistaken identity?
Lord Home of the Hirsel: Could he say, for example, that the individual is not a danger to national security? That surely cannot be taken out of the hands of the Home Secretary and given to any judge to decide?
Lord Mishcon: I am much obliged to the noble Lord because he has, in fact, anticipated what I know he would like to see very quickly, and that is the end of my speech. I was going to deal separately, and I assure him very shortly, with the obvious exception that must be made on security matters. I was limiting myself, but had not made that clear yet, to matters of character because we are really dealing with matters of that kind. Obviously if the judge wanted to see the applicant there is nothing to stop him from doing so in order to make sure that the facts which he has in his file appear to be correct. There would be no question of examination and cross-examination and calling witnesses. But what the applicant would be sure of is that a judge of the High Court had seen all the papers and either agrees or disagrees with the exercise of the discretion on the question of good character or anything else.
I come immediately to the point to which the noble Lord made me address myself, and quite rightly. This obviously cannot apply to a security matter. Obviously, on that aspect the decision of the Home Secretary must be a private decision, reached by him on the information that he has. I do not ask, for myself—and I obviously cannot bind anyone else in regard to this view—for any right to review on the security matter, except, of course, that it would not be objectionable, and has been seen in other aspects of our national life, that even on security a judge can see the confidential documents and decide whether or not security of the state is properly involved.
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In replying to this debate, if only the Government, without necessarily conceding the shift of onus of proving bad character, instead of the onus being on someone to prove good character—and we recognise the difficulties of that—would come forward and say, "We are sorry, but we must have a discretion. There cannot be an absolute right even though the question of good character is involved". If only the Government would give the citizen the security of knowing that it is not just some busy Secretary of State who has robbed him and his family of something so essential to them, that it is not even a civil servant who has made a mistake or who finds it easier to say "No" rather than "Yes". It is his right, which is written into this Bill, to have his case reviewed—if necessary in private—by a judge of the High Court. If the Government would go that far, then so far as my noble friends and I are concerned, I believe that they would have gone a distance to meet the various points in this debate that I believe are worrying people on all sides of the Committee.
Viscount Massereene and Ferrard: I should like to ask a question for clarification about this language question and having sufficient knowledge of English or Welsh. I see in Schedule 2 that it says that the Home Secretary may waive this condition owing to the applicant's age or physical condition. I am not quite sure what that means. Does it mean that he is over 20, 40, 50 or 60 years of age? As for his physical condition, does that mean his mental condition?—because presumably we do not want to bring in many people with a mental condition. I ask that for clarification.
9.11 p.m.
Lord Belstead: As that is a waiver that has been put in by the Government, I think that I should try to reply to Lord Massereene's question, but, if he will forgive me, in a moment.
We are considering amendments in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Avebury, which, taken together, seek to give an entitlement to citizenship to an applicant of full age and capacity who can meet the statutory requirements which are set out in Schedule 1 to this Bill. The noble Lord has also proposed in Amendment No. 87A—which among others the noble Lord spoke to—that the good character requirement in paragraph 1 of the Schedule should be replaced by a series of objective tests relating to criminal and financial matters, and that the language requirement should be abandoned altogether. These amendments must presumably be seen in the light of those.
Even if the requirements in Schedule 1 to the Bill are to remain as they stand at present, the Government believe that the amendments of the noble Lord, Lord Avebury, would have some very unwelcome consequences. They would compel the grant of citizenship to anyone who met the requirements in Schedule 1. As Schedule 1 stands at the moment, this would mean that naturalisation could not be withheld from the applicant who has made himself generally unacceptable to the community in which he lives, though he might be said to meet the requirements of Schedule 1. Others who would have to be naturalised are the individuals who, though of good character, in fact.

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have loyalties to another country which are so deep that in anyone's reasonable mind they would cast doubt as to whether they ought to have the citizenship of our country conferred on them.
Then there is the individual who, though outwardly of good character, has associations which raise suspicions that he is a security risk. The preliminary requirements in Schedule 1 are a crucial part of the process, but even in their present form a person who fulfils them would not necessarily be acceptable to those who would be his fellow citizens. That is why, far from making new law, Schedule 1 is, in fact, essentially a repeat of the law which has existed since the last century.
I said earlier that we should no doubt look at these amendments, not merely against the background of the requirements in Schedule 1 as it stands; but we should take account also of the change which the noble Lord, Lord Avebury, has proposed should be made to the requirements in that Schedule in his Amendment No. 87A. Really I think all I can say is that the combined effect these amendments in Clause 5, and Amendment No. 87A to Schedule 1, would be to create a system of naturalisation which would compel the grant of citizenship to an applicant who had served a prison sentence of up to five years which, when all is said and done, is quite a long sentence of imprisonment, or who is a known associate of criminals, or who cannot speak a word of the language of this country.
May I turn now to the question of language, which the noble Lord's amendments also raise. We have provided in paragraph 2(e) of Schedule 1 that, for the first time, the Home Secretary would have a discretion to waive the requirement to be able to speak the English or Welsh language for anyone being naturalised where he considers that, because of the applicant's age or physical condition, it would be unreasonable to expect the applicant to fulfil it. I should like to say to my noble friend Lord Massereene that it is deliberately drawn widely to be as fair as possible to people who would be able to say, "I am too old to learn a new language", or to somebody who says, "There are certain physical reasons why I find it very difficult to be able to speak a new language". We think that this is a fair new provision to put in law.
On this matter of language, I had thought that the Government were at one with the Opposition. In the Green Paper of the previous Labour Government they pointed out that it was difficult for a naturalised person to exercise his, or her, civic duties if the person concerned did not understand the language of the adopted country. Nor was it easy to accept that the person was a sufficiently integrated member of our society. I very rarely come to your Lordships' House without hearing from all sides noble Lords saying, "The one thing we want to do in this country is to make sure that citizens really do have equal opportunities. That there are no second-class citizenships." What a way to start when you encourage somebody to take the citizenship of this country to know that in fact they are not able to understand the language, and that they cannot communicate with their fellow citizens, and that they will find it very difficult therefore to discharge their civic duties, which presumably with citizenship is one of the things they will want to
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do! Moreover, some knowledge of the language, the Labour Government's Green Paper I think quite rightly pointed out, was an indication that an applicant had committed himself to living here and taking part in the life of the community.
We are also looking at the amendments in the name of the noble and learned Lord, Lord Elwyn-Jones, the noble Baroness, Lady Birk, and the noble Lord, Lord Mishcon. They, in just a few words, remove the discretion of the Secretary of State, and they also put into law objective tests. The strange thing, if I may say so with respect to two noble Lords who are lawyers—and the noble and learned Lord, Lord Elwyn-Jones, is not here at the moment—is that the inclusion of the Rehabilitation of Offenders Act 1974 in their schedule of objective tests would, as I understand it, bear more harshly in many cases upon applicants than would be the current practice.
As many of your Lordships are aware, the 1974 Act is only concerned with offences which attract the sentence of imprisonment of two and a half years or less. Under the terms of this amendment anyone sent to prison for longer than two and a half years would therefore never be eligible at all to apply for naturalisation, however long had elapsed since he served his sentence. But I do not rest the case against the Opposition Front Bench amendments on technical grounds. It is because—and I think that the noble Lord, Lord Mishcon, was quite right to direct our thoughts in this way—as a matter of principle I believe, on behalf of the Government, that the Secretary of State's discretion is very important in these matters.
Finally, I come to the large group of amendments which the noble Lord, Lord Pitt, wished us also to look at. They would change the onus of proof from the applicant having to say, "I have to prove that I am someone who should be naturalised" to the Government, the Secretary of State, being required to prove the opposite. I hope that the noble Lord, Lord Pitt, will not mind my saying that Amendment No. 82A, which would put in the words, "whom the Secretary of State cannot show to be of bad character", rather reads as though it were giving a sort of prize to those who can succeed in covering up their tracks.
I know that the noble Lord does not mean that at all, but when one looks at the noble Lord's group of amendments, when one considers that they are to be taken—because the noble Lord said they were—with the knowledge that the noble Lord wishes to inject into the Bill a right of appeal, then one has to take on board that this whole group of amendments, together with that intention of the noble Lord, Lord Pitt, would enormously restrict the discretion of the Home Secretary as to the character of an applicant.
To show to a court that an applicant was of bad character would inevitably mean relying very heavily on the records of criminal convictions or financial insolvency. These have very considerable limitations in assessing character because they would except people who were known or strongly suspected of being involved in criminal or fraudulent activities and, as my noble friend Lord Home of the Hirsel pointed out, these sort of criteria could not possibly be used in dealing with security cases. I return to the amendments standing in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Avebury. These amendments would remove discretion and would

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put instead the series of objective tests which are to be found in the noble Lord's Amendment No. 87A. I am bound to say that on the grounds I have sought to deploy, the amendments are not acceptable to the Government.
Lord Gifford: I do not want to spend time on the various small differences which exist between some noble Lords on this side of the Committee as to exactly what criteria should be included in a provision and exactly what form of appeal should be provided for on a refusal of naturalisation. There is an overriding point of principle raised in all these amendments to which the noble Lord, Lord Belstead, has not addressed himself, and that is the fact that a refusal by the Secretary of State—exercising his discretion and not giving reasons—of citizenship to somebody who believes himself to be closely and loyally attached to this country engenders a sense of outrage and injustice, and a sense of impotence in that they cannot even challenge the decision in any kind of forum. If they appeal to a Member of Parliament to take up the case politically, the MP can do no more than write, with whatever endorsements of the applicant the MP can give, perhaps only to be greeted with the reply, "Having looked at it very carefully, I am satisfied that the right decision has been made", and nothing more can be done.
I have a friend who is not British only by the fluke of having been born in Poland and having come to this country at the age of four months. His parents are naturalised British and his younger brothers and sisters are British. He has applied for naturalisation and has been turned down without being given any reason at all. Nobody knows why he has been turned down. The suspicion is that he works for an organisation called Release, which is looked at with disfavour by the Home Office. One knows not for sure because there is no way of testing it. I mention that not to get an answer about that particular case but to demonstrate that there are many cases known to Members of Parliament where people who are turned down simply do not know why.
What is being proposed in this series of amendments would bring justice and an objective examination into the naturalisation system. What is proposed is not impossible; it has been practised for years in the United States. There, the immigration and naturalisation service makes a decision about an application for naturalisation and if that decision is adverse, the rejected applicant can go before a court. The judge can even deal with whether the applicant is of good moral character and is attached to the principles of the United States Constitution. We think that possibly the British courts would prefer a rather tighter criteria. But the principle is clear; namely, that it works perfectly satisfactorily and that there can be a right of appeal against a refusal of naturalisation.
Have the Government looked at the situation in countries where there is such a right of appeal and where people can go to the courts? Have they made a study and, if so, may we be given the fruits of that study? Can they tell us why what seems to be right for another democracy, with fine traditions of justice, is not right for this country? At least let us know what
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is the objection, other than a clinging desire by the Home Office secretively to control every aspect of the naturalisation process.
In answer to the one argument that the noble Lord, Lord Belstead, put forward—namely, if we have the more clearly defined criteria, some people with undesirable associates might be allowed to be citizens—I would say that this is really a nit-picking approach. So what if some people with undesirable associates happened to become citizens! There are many citizens who have undesirable associates. There are many undesirable citizens. I suggest that it is far more important that we bring justice into this process than that we worry about the odd undesirable who might become one of our citizens.
In this whole series of amendments let us address ourselves to the basic principle which the noble Lord, Lord Avebury, has raised, not be sidetracked by particular objections to particular ideas, and let us change the way in which naturalisation is approached by the authorities in this country.
Viscount Massereene and Ferrard: Before the noble Lord sits down may I say that perhaps one good reason why America has 50,000 murders a year is that in the past she has been too liberal in her naturalisation laws.
The Duke of Norfolk: I should like to say to the noble Lord, Lord Gifford, that I think someone must defend the Civil Service. It is a very great service, and the suggestion that the Home Office is unreasonable, that it sits on cases and is unjust gives an idea that the Bill is racial and discriminatory, which it is in no way. The Home Office handles many cases, and I know that it handles them extremely well. The noble Lord quoted the case of a Pole who was turned down. I can tell the noble Lord that last year I secured nationality for two Poles—noble people, they are—who live in Paddington. I can never remember Polish names, much as I love them all. I secured nationality for them through the Home Office, which came back with one or two questions. The people were old and so on, but they became nationals of our great country.
I say to the noble Lord that his speech implied that we on this side of the Committee are trying to make this country a narrow country. We are in no way a narrow country. We have had our doors open to anyone who has ever had to seek asylum here. We opened our doors to the Empire, and then we had to have immigration Acts, otherwise we would have had 900 million people coming here, which of course was not possible. The Bill is an attempt to try to move towards the system that is in force in the Common Market.
I wish for a few minutes to address my remarks to the noble Lord, Lord Avebury. He implied that there was something wrong with the Bill because it might require an increase in the Civil Service. There is nothing wrong with a Bill that brings about change from one system to another simply because it raises the need for an increase in the Civil Service. We have a wonderful Civil Service. If we have to create a situation which calls for more administration, we must

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have a bigger Civil Service for that. I only hope that it will be cut down somewhere else, because of course we must not have too big a Civil Service. I have served for 30 years in the Civil Service—in the British Army. We keep the Civil Service small because the enemy controls us—not just finance. I say to the noble Lord, please do not say that there would be some merit in the Bill if it did not increase the Civil Service.
I really rose to my feet because the noble Lord, Lord Gifford, was giving the impression to people who might read these debates that we on this side of the Committee are trying to restrict entry into citizenship of this country of people who are already here. We are not doing that in any way. We are merely trying to move across to the system in the Common Market, where they have this other system of nationality, and I believe that we are doing it very carefully and very sensibly.
Lord Gifford: May I ask the noble Duke one question? Is not the logic of what he has just said that one would not allow any appeal to the courts against any executive act because they all acted so fairly, so wonderfully? Whether they are fair in many cases or in all or in a few, that is not an argument, is it, against a right of appeal?
The Duke of Norfolk: I do not know whether this is quite the time to be debating the appeal question, but what I was really saying to the noble Lord was that, if some decision is given by the Home Office, I know that you can go back to them two or three times, you can then go to your Member of Parliament, you can come to your Lordships' House and so forth. I do not necessarily believe there need be a High Court judge. When we come to the appeal situation I will most willingly, it may be, support the noble Lord, Lord Gifford. At the moment, I would just ask him to appreciate the points I have made, which are made very sincerely indeed.
Baroness Birk: I think that when I spoke I mentioned the problems that civil servants have to deal with, and the Secretary of State. I really think the noble Duke has misinterpreted what has been said on this side of the Committee. When you are given that sort of job to do, it does not mean that you start off having a mean attitude towards it, or being unjust. It means that you are given a job to do which ought not to be given. You are also denying the applicant, unless there is a system of appeals, the right to appeal against it. If this is carried to its logical conclusion, one could argue that there should never be any appeals from one court to another. What we are arguing is perfectly reasonable. Both my noble friends and myself have given the examples of other countries which have both objective tests and also appeals. I think it would be right, and I think most fair-minded people in this country would accept the idea, that there should certainly be appeals, although we are not going into the detail now. It is certainly not a slur on the Civil Service to say that.
Lord Elystan-Morgan: The issue before the Committee, as I understand it, is not the question of what has or has not been said in any Green Paper, or what has or has not been enshrined in nationality legislation from 1948 onwards, or what has or has not been done by Home Secretaries from both sides of politics. As I understand it (and I speak with great reservations as a very junior Member of your Lordships' House) the issue is: what principle should be attached in relation to a most important issue in a most important Bill—the issue whether a Secretary of State for Home Affairs, from now onwards if this Bill becomes law, should or should not adopt a more liberal stance and attitude towards naturalisation issues and the method by which they are to be determined?
I would venture to suggest that the principle that is involved here is that a person who has lived in a civilised country for a substantial period of time and who has a genuine desire to become a citizen of that country is entitled, upon making an application to be considered as a citizen, to have that application dealt with in a judicial way. That means that there must be some code of common conduct in dealing with hundreds and thousands of different applications.
Let me come immediately to the point raised by the noble Duke, the Duke of Norfolk. It is not a question of saying that civil servants are less than competent or less than honest or less than genuine or less than compassionate in this matter. However, if one has very wide criteria, if one has matters that have to be decided by value judgments on the part of scores of different civil servants, there will be decisions which have the appearance of being capricious and arbitrary because they will inevitably by definition be inconsistent. That, as I understand it, is the issue. There is no question of any general attack upon civil servants, Home Secretaries or junior Ministers. I was a very junior Minister at one time in the Home Office. Of course, Home Secretaries and junior Ministers are cautious, suspicious and mildy cynical—rightly so—regarding the failings of their fellow men. Of course, they have to bear in mind the issues of national security.
I venture to suggest that on the question of national security, the issue is not determined at the point in time when a person makes application to be naturalised, but at a point in time five years or more earlier when he was allowed into the country in the first instance. It is the presence of that person within our shores that imperils our security, not his status as a citizen or a non-citizen. That surely must follow. My suggestion to the Committee is this. It would be proper to spell out criteria in such a way as to reduce the scope—and inevitably there would be some scope—of value judgments which inevitably have to be made by many different civil servants. One way is to avoid such considerations is the issue of whether or not a person has a sufficiency of language. This is a difficult matter to decide.
May I say in passing how much I appreciate the chivalry of Parliament in including the Welsh language with the English language. The Welsh language has been one of the living minority languages of the United Kingdom. How proper it was to include that. The question of whether or not a person has sufficient language depends entirely upon the viewpoint of he who adjudicates that.

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Let us come to the question of good character. I agree with noble Lords who have already spelt out their views in favour of placing the onus upon the Secretary of State. I know that there are many instances in our legislation where a person who applies for a certain status, be it a licence or a right to do something, must show that he has a good character. In my submission, however, the vast majority of such cases deal with it in a different way and place the onus upon the person who objects to show that that person does not have a good character.
The right to apply for naturalisation and the right to have that application dealt with in a judicial way is a basic and fundamental human right. That is the real significance of the issue that we are discussing at the present moment. I believe that it is right that the applicant should therefore not have to show his good character but the onus of proof should be on he who objects. I believe that it is right that the applicant in the first instance should show that he qualifies according to the basic criterion of having been in the country for five years, of having the intention which is as much a question of fact as anything, at that time of remaining in the country or being closely connected with it. I believe it right, too, on matters of national security that in a genuine and proper case a certificate should be issued by the Home Secretary. There is no other way in which that most important matter can be decided.
However, it is surely right that in a matter which so affects a person's basic human rights as an individual he should know the ground upon which he has been rejected and that he should be entitled in a proper case to take that to a higher and appellate tribunal.
Lord Avebury: I know this is a very important and sensitive issue—one of the most vital we have had to deal with—but I get the feeling that your Lordships would like to come to a decision on this. If I may, I should like to say just a few words in reply to the noble Duke, the Duke of Norfolk. First of all he said in effect that a slur had been cast on bona fide Home Office officials. I do not want to exaggerate the effect of what he said but I speak as one who deals with Home Office matters on a day-to-day basis in a field where discretion has to be exercised by the Secretary of State or by officials acting on his behalf, and that is in the field of immigration. I have submitted for decision something like 320 cases to the Under-Secretary of State, Tim Raison, since he came to office, and out of those which have been decided—and I am confining myself to those which have already been brought to a conclusion and not those which are still be to be decided—something like 56 per cent. have been decided by the Minister in favour of the applicant; so that while there may be no reflection on the ability or impartiality of Home Office officials, it does have to be observed that when cases do come before the Minister, in the majority that he decides, the officials' decision is reversed. The noble Baroness, Lady Birk, tells us that at the end of 1980 there were some 3,000-odd applications outstanding for naturalisation or registration, so it is obviously quite impracticable for all those to be referred to the Secretary of State. Therefore, in practice only a tiny fraction will be referred to Members of
1466
Parliament for his decision. Therefore, we are dealing with a system which is even more prone to error than the one that I am describing—or at least as much so.
On the second point, I only made the remarks about the increase in the number of civil servants because I felt this was an argument which might apeal to the Minister. I asked at an earlier stage whether he could tell us what proportion of the increased expenditure outlined in the Explanatory and Financial Memeorandum was due to this particular duty, and I should still like to know the answer to that question. The Explanatory and Financial Memorandum tells us that the total extra cost of this Bill is £370,000 at 1981 prices, which is 45 additional staff in the Nationality Division of the Home Office. But it does not make it clear how many of them are going to be engaged in processing the large number of additional applications for registration which are likely to arise because of this Bill.
I should like to make a point which has not arisen so far, and that is that very few people are now being admitted to this country to settle and therefore, one expects, there would be a diminution in the applications for naturalistaion over a period of years. It is necessary for a person to satisfy the residence requirement of being here for five years and for the last 12 months free of conditions before he can even make the application. So as we have brought what is called primary immigration to an end and the people who are entering this country now are very largely dependants of those who settled here many years ago—plus, of course, the United Kingdom passport holders—one would not expect a very large number of applications to be reaching the Secretary of State in the later years of this century, when this Bill will have been in operation for a little while.
So if we do have to make a few mistakes, I think it has been said that that would have to be the price to be paid for the objective system; and it is a choice your Lordships have to make, whether you want something which is far easier to understand from the point of view of both the applicant and the Home Office but which, if you like, is slightly more prone to error than the subjective test, or whether you want to go into the elaboration of this character requirement which itself is not foolproof. Because it is within everybody's knowledge that we have given citizenship to people in the past who turned out to be (I think it was the noble Lord, Lord Drumalbyn, who used the phrase) "bad eggs" in the sense that they finished up in the courts or came otherwise to a sticky end. We probably would not have given those people citizenship if we had known what was going to happen. All the elaborate machinery that we have at the moment, about which the noble Lord the Minister has told us, is simply continuing in this Bill the legislation that we had at the end of the last century. The legislation is just the same as it ever was and we still have not been able to make it a foolproof system. I think that puts it in a nutshell.
We could discuss the question of security requirements and so on, but I believe that these are details and that, if we get the principle settled, then the question of a language test and of how we deal with security risks will all be resolved. What has emerged from the debate this evening is a fundamental difference of opinion between the Government and ourselves on this

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issue of objective tests, which I see no way of being bridged. I have no alternative but to test the feeling of the Committee.
9.46 p.m.
On Question, Whether the said amendment (No. 82ZA) shall be agreed to?
Their Lordships divided: Contents, 28; Not-Contents, 66.

CONTENTS

Ampthill, L.

Houghton of Sowerby, L.

Avebury, L. [Teller.]

Jenkins of Putney, L.

Aylestone, L.

Lauderdale, E.

Birk, B.

Llewelyn-Davies of Hastoe, B.

Bishopston, L.

Mishcon, L.

Boston of Faversham, L.

Peart, L.

Chelmsford, Bp.

Pitt of Hampstead, L.

Collison, L.

Ponsonby of Shulbrede, L.

David, B.

Southwark, Bp.

Davies of Penrhys, L.

Thurso, V. [Teller.]

Elystan-Morgan, L.

Tordoff, L.

Evans of Claughton, L.

Underhill, L.

Gifford, L.

White, B.

Henderson, L.

Winstanley, L.

NOT-CONTENTS

Airey of Abingdon, B.

Boyd-Carpenter, L.

Avon, E.

Bridgeman, V.

Bellwin, L.

Campbell of Alloway, L.

Belstead, L.

Campbell of Croy, L.

Bessborough, E.

Cathcart, E.

Boardman, L.

Chelwood, L.

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Cockfield, L.

Lawrence, L.

Colville of Culross, V.

Lindsey and Abingdon, E.

Craigmyle, L.

Long, V.

Croft, L.

Loudoun, C.

Cullen of Ashbourne, L.

Lyell, L.

Denham, L. [Teller.]

Mackay of Clashfern, L.

Drumalbyn, L.

Macleod of Borve, B.

Dundee, E.

Mansfield, E.

Eccles, V.

Marley, L.

Ellenborough, L.

Massereene and Ferrard, V.

Elles, B.

Merrivale, L.

Elliot of Harwood, B.

Norfolk, D.

Falkland, V.

Romney, E.

Ferrers, E.

Sandford, L.

Ferrier, L.

Sandys, L. [Teller.]

Gainford, L.

Selkirk, E.

Gardner of Parkes, B.

Sharples, B.

Geddes, L.

Skelmersdale, L.

Gisborough, L.

Stradbroke, E.

Gowrie, E.

Strathclyde, L.

Greenway, L.

Strathspey, L.

Gridley, L.

Trefgarne, L.

Haig, E.

Vaux of Harrowden, L.

Hives, L.

Vickers, B.

Home of the Hirsel, L.

Vivian, L.

Hornsby-Smith, B.

Wynford, L.

Kemsley, V.

Young, B.

Resolved in the negative, and amendment disagreed to accordingly.
[Amendments Nos. 82A, 82B, 82BA, 82C and 83 not moved.]
9.54 p.m.
Baroness Birk Baroness Birk moved Amendment No. 84:
Page 7, line 18, leave out ("If").
The noble Baroness said: With the leave of the Committee, in moving this amendment I shall speak also to Amendment No. 85. These amendments are of very great importance to women who marry British men after the commencement of the Act, and to men who marry British women. Under the Bill as it stands, both groups are to go through a process of naturalisation if they are to obtain their spouse's citizenship. This will replace the existing inequality between men and women, by which wives of British men are immediately entitled, without any residence requirement, to register as British citizens here, while husbands of British women have no right at all to our citizenship and have to attempt naturalisation as if they had no connection at all with the country. One would have thought that at least marriage would be counted as a close connection and was easy to define in that way. But the sex equality which the Government are claiming to introduce is, frankly, a complete fake. I remember very well being told when I was dealing with the Immigration Rules from this Bench that this particular inequality would be put right in the nationality Bill when it came along, but that is not how it is going to work out.
It is not sex equality, not so much because of the terms of the Bill itself but because of the way the Bill's provisions will depend upon the present Immigration Rules. The wife of a British man is entitled to entry and settlement here, so she will be able in many cases to fulfil the three-year residence qualification without any difficulty. However, husbands have no right of entry. Even a British-born citizen who is a woman has no right to bring her husband here. Entry clearance will be refused if the entry clearance officer has reason to believe that the marriage was entered into primarily to obtain admission to the United Kingdom, or that one of the partners has no longer any intention of living permanently with the other, or that the two parties to the marriage have not met. This last, of course, is a very obvious device for excluding husbands in arranged marriages, but the other two are so absurdly subjective that really anyone could be barred.
How is an entry clearance officer when interviewing a husband alone, or a couple, to come to a reasonable decision that, rather than love or money, the aim of the marriage was to evade entry control? How on earth is he to decide, off the cuff, that one partner is not going to live permanently with the other? Only if the entry clearance officer is satisfied on all these three conditions can he then admit the husband of a woman who was born here or whose parents were born here. Other women born abroad can be refused quite arbitrarily. It is therefore going to be quite impossible for many husbands of British women to come to live in this country so as to build up the residence requirement for naturalisation.
In addition, even the wives of British men are going to be worse off than they are now. If a British man living and working abroad meets a woman abroad whom he marries and if his work is such as to require
1470
him to go on living abroad, under this Bill his wife is not going to be able to be naturalised. Under existing laws, she is entitled to be registered as a citizen here just by virtue of the marriage, but that will no longer be the case. These issues we shall want to look at further on Clause 7, but, as Clause 5(2) is the first opportunity to discuss citizenship through marriage, we want to ensure that at the very least it will be possible in future for a spouse of either sex to gain naturalisation on clearly understood terms and with the least possible practical difficulty.
Spouses of citizens, I am sure noble Lords will agree, are in a very different position from other applicants. They should therefore be given more favourable treatment. To leave them at the mercy of unfettered discretion is quite wrong. Part of this is repeating the same point as was made by my noble friend Lord Gifford on the last amendment: about letting a few people through the net and therefore creating the fear of an inflexible framework which can be unjust to a great many more people.
The noble Lord, Lord Boyd-Carpenter, made exactly the same point when he was discussing employment in an earlier part of the Bill. He made the point that if the legislation was so tightly drawn because we were afraid that a few people who were ineligible might get through the net, it was making it almost rigid and unworkable. This is the same point and it applies in exactly the same way in regard to the marriage rules in the terms of the nationality Bill.
We had this argument over the immigration rules in connection with arranged marriages, which after all is the culture of the people in the countries from which they come and we also had the answers of bogus marriages. Possibly there may be the odd one or two, but that is no reason to bring unhappiness and to create such difficult conditions for other people who honestly and legitimately want to get married, to make it so difficult for them and again to put the decision on an entry clearance officer who has to make up his mind in a very subjective way.
It is for these reasons that these amendments are tabled in this particular part of the Bill. We shall be discussing the same subject further on in the Bill, but at this point I hope to have some words of cheer from the Government and some assurance from the Minister that the Government will at least consider this, because the Minister spoke about sex equality early in the Committee stage, but it does not seem to be working out that way and I think the Government should look at this very carefully. Then, if they do not like these particular amendments they should come back with something which will achieve the same effect but perhaps in language that they would prefer. I beg to move.
Lord Belstead: I do not want to disappoint the noble Baroness who has moved her two amendments in a very moderate and interesting way, but there would be no question of the Government coming back with another amendment in reply to these. I say that for these reasons. The first is the previous Government's Green Paper on this difficult subject—and I acknowledge that it is a difficult subject—the question of what

1471
weight to give to marriage in deciding on naturalisation matters. In paragraph 49 of the previous Government's Green Paper there were four different options as to how sex equality could be dealt with, and it would be tedious if I were to go through the four different options now. However, I should like to make the point that where it is sometimes alleged (not this evening by the noble Baroness) that the Government invariably chose the hardest options in the Green Paper whenever they made a choice, in fact on this subject we did not choose the hardest option. We chose the fourth option in paragraph 49 of the Green Paper, which we thought presented a judicious compromise between the differing points of view which were set out in that discussion paper.
We provided in Clause 5 of the Bill that spouses would have to apply for citizenship by naturalisation although they would have the advantage of not waiting during residence for the normal period of five years but waiting instead for a period of three years. We believe that this approach is preferable to the entitlement which is proposed in these amendments. The approach in the Bill is broadly similar to that followed by other countries, such as the United States, which extends citizenship on equal terms to both men and women.
Incidentally, these amendments would give an absolute entitlement to British citizenship to someone who had never set foot here, who could be unacceptable to his or her fellow citizens on grounds of character, and who does not speak our language at all. I think that to extend citizenship in this way immediately would, moreover, open the way to evasion and would devalue British citizenship.
Instead of that, all we are requiring is that both men and women alike should wait a short time, a good deal shorter than other people, before making application for naturalisation. As the line which we have taken in Clause 5 is along the lines of the previous Government's Green Paper, and indeed not as draconian as one of the lines which was recommended in the Government's Green Paper, I would hope that the Opposition would rethink their line upon this. I believe that Clause 5(2) is reasonable. It is on those grounds that I oppose the noble Baroness's amendment.
Lord Avebury: I wonder whether the noble Lord could enlighten me on one point. If one looks at the existing requirements for naturalisation on marriage as set out in the schedule, they are dealt with in paragraph 3. It sets out the requirements which have to be satisfied by the person who applies for citizenship on marriage by either sex. Going down the list, each of them begins "that he was …", "that the number …", "that on the date …"; then in (e) we suddenly have "the requirements specified in paragraph 1(1)(b) and (c)". I take it that what it means is that he satisfies the requirements in those sub-paragraphs. I should be grateful if the noble Lord could confirm that.
Lord Belstead: Yes.
Lord Avebury: Then we go back to 1(1)(b) and (c), and we see there that the spouse has to satisfy the good character test that we have just been arguing about; furthermore that he has to have sufficient knowledge of the English or Welsh language. So we are making a change in the law which deserves to be underlined at this stage. Just a few minutes ago the Minister was making a great virtue of the fact that the system being carried forward into this Bill has existed virtually unchanged since the end of the 19th century and that it has stood the test of time. I am going to produce a conservative argument now, that the system of granting citizenship to wives on marriage has lasted since I do not know when, certainly since the 1948 Act. No one has ever criticised it, to my knowledge.
Why should we not extend that now to men. Why should we unnecessarily complicate the procedure for conferring citizenship on persons who marry British citizens when we already have a well tried and tested procedure which does not involve the bueaucracy which the noble Lord has admitted we are about to introduce. So I suggest that if the noble Baronesses' amendments are not precisely as they ought to be—no one ever produces drafting acceptable to Ministers—what the noble Lord should do is to consider the spirit and principle of the amendments; that is, whether or not we are going to extend this cumbersome bureaucratic approach that we are adopting to the acquisition of citizenship in general to the particular case of spouses, which has always been dealt with very much more simply and effectively in the past.
Baroness Birk: The noble Lord the Minister, as always, has a very engaging, reasonable manner, but what he said was not reasonable at all, as he knows very well. I cannot really believe that a piece of legislation can be right if it is more restrictive, when we are dealing with human beings and human feelings, and this is exactly what is happening in this Bill. The noble Lord, Lord Avebury, was absolutely right when he supported what I said and enlarged on it even more. It is making it very much more difficult for wives than it was previously and, because of the immigration rules, it is not making it any easier for husbands—indeed, it is making it extremely difficult. Once again it is left to the subjective test of an official, however fair and however reasonable the man or women may be.
The Minister quite naturally keeps referring to the Green Paper. I would again say that it was a Green Paper and not a White Paper. It was a discussion paper. Indeed, if some of the criteria were wrong in that, then they were wrong whether it was the last Government or this Government. It does not mean to say that the Government have to copy something that was put forward for discussion by a Labour Government if they think that it is wrong and not right for the people. If they want to use that argument they can, but it is not the way to legislate. I do not intend to press these amendments tonight. I want to look at them again before the next stage to see how they can be dealt with then. In that case, I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.
Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.
[Amendments Nos. 84A to 85A not moved.]
Clause 5 agreed to.
[Amendment No. 86 not moved.]
Schedule 1 [Requirements for naturalisation]:
[Amendments Nos. 86A to 87A not moved.]
10.12 p.m.
Lord Campbell of Croy Lord Campbell of Croy moved Amendment No. 88:
Page 50, line 12, leave out ("or").
The noble Lord said: We now change to a somewhat different subject. I beg, to move Amendment No. 88 and, as that is a paving amendment, I would suggest that it would be convenient for your Lordships if Amendment No. 89, which is the substantive amendment were discussed at the same time. This is a simple point. The Bill as drafted at present prescribes the English or Welsh languages, but there is a third well-established indigenous language and that is Gaelic. These amendments would add that third language—Scottish Gaelic.
The kind of situation which could arise regarding the Welsh language, for which the Bill provides, could also arise in the case of Gaelic, so I submit that it should be included too. This would produce no precedents or difficulties for the Government because there is no other indigenous language in the United Kingdom; this is the third. Gaelic is spoken in communities in particular parts of Scotland, the Western Isles and the West Coast of the Highlands. There are of course, Gaelic speakers elsewhere in Scotland and the United Kingdom. I do not need to tell my noble and learned friend Lord Mackay, who may be replying on behalf of the Government, because his home is on the west coast of the Highlands and he is certainly familiar with Gaelic, if he does not speak it himself.
There are about 88,000 speakers of Gaelic in the United Kingdom population. For some of them, in the Gaelic-speaking areas, it is their first language. The Gaelic language and its culture have been supported and encouraged by successive Governments and successive Secretaries of State for Scotland, including myself. I would emphasise that it is not a divisive factor in Scotland; tolerance and common sense have prevailed. Those who speak it or want to learn it are able to do so; others are not forced to.
None the less, Gaelic is accepted in Scottish legal proceedings. For the Welsh language, an Act had to be passed in 1967 in order to make it an official language, so that it could be accepted without restrictions in courts in Wales. But no such measure was required for Gaelic, for Gaelic is regarded as an official language, because it has for years been used as such in Scottish courts. Therefore, I hope that there will not be an argument advanced this evening that because Welsh was made an official language by the 1967 Act, then it is an official language and Gaelic is not.
The Law Society of Scotland in its comments on this Bill has stated that there is no reason why a knowledge of Gaelic should not also be included. Those who speak Gaelic today—mostly in the West Highlands and Islands—have roots which have been established in Scotland over the centuries. It is true that the language was proscribed for a period after the '45, but so was Highland dress. Both have been completely reinstated for a very long time. There are
1474
many thousands of Gaelic-speaking Scots who went abroad and the language is still spoken in some areas overseas. For example, it is estimated that there are several thousand Gaelic speakers in Canada.
Therefore, in the same way as the Welsh language has been included in Schedule 1—because in certain circumstances it might be the appropriate language in naturalisation procedures—so Gaelic should also be included. I am not suggesting that there will be a multitude of cases arising; nor will many cases arise with the Welsh language. But provision should be made for both languages. They are indigenous, originating solely in this country, and are spoken in everyday life in the areas concerned of this country. I beg to move.
Viscount Thurso: I consider it a privilege to support the noble Lord, Lord Campbell of Croy, who is moving this amendment. I think that the Government should consider that it gives them an opportunity to do a service for the Gaelic-speaking people of the Highlands of Scotland at this particular juncture, by recognising the position which the language indeed holds within the community, which will be very greatly appreciated, even if it is not frequently used.
But what we are considering, here is the question of someone becoming naturalised, or seeking to become naturalised. When he does, one of the things that he has to do is to demonstrate that he is able to live from day to day within the community in which he seeks to become a naturalised citizen. One can imagine the case, for example, of a Pole serving in the armed forces during the war who has been left behind in a Gaelic-speaking community, and has married a Highland girl; if he lived in a Gaelic-speaking community, his first language, after Polish, would undoubtedly be Gaelic. If one wanted to apply a test to him, as to whether he was able to take part in the community, it would, in fact, be fairer to apply the test of whether he could speak Gaelic than to apply the test of whether he could speak English, because that would be the day-to-day language which was being used in his household and his community.
The noble Lord, Lord Campbell of Croy, has reminded us that in fact after the '45 a number of facets of Highland culture were specifically attacked and proscribed, and anybody using them was liable to imprisonment or possibly worse—probably simple murder—for speaking the Gaelic language, for playing the pipes, or for wearing Highland dress. It was about 200 years ago that this Parliament in Westminster reversed this proscription, and in fact this year we shall be celebrating at Falkirk the bicentenary of the first ever piping competition which was held in Scotland, which was held under the auspices of the Highland Society of London. At that competition a very famous Gaelic bard, Duncan Ban MacIntyre, wrote an ode to Gaelic which was recited at the start of the competition. I shall not read it in full, or indeed in Gaelic, but I shall read a translation of a part of it because it shows to you how honoured the tongue is among the people of the Highlands.
"No one"—
says Duncan Bàn MacIntyre about the Gaelic tongue—
"no one who makes use of it
will betray it for a bribe;
the best point is that it revived,

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after being dormant.
"'Twere a great disaster if the language
of sterling worth should die:
'tis the most trenchant for a bount of wit,
wherever it is spoken;
'tis the best for jocularity,
it has the sweetest, warmest sound;
'tis the music of the pipes and harps,
of minstrels and composers of songs".
Surely this is the kind of language that should be acceptable on the tongue of somebody who seeks to become a citizen of our United Kingdom.
10.22 p.m.
Viscount Massereene and Ferrard: I should like strongly to support this amendment. My name is Irish Gaelic and Scottish Gaelic. It actually means "Queen or King of the Hills". You have Massereene in Scotland and in Ireland. You can spell it any way really. The noble Lord, Lord Campbell of Croy, is quite right—of course I would expect him always to be right—that there are 80,000 Gaelic speakers chiefly in the Western Highlands and the Hebrides, but the majority of them can speak English. But that is no reason why Gaelic should not be inserted in this Bill.
There is one old lady I know—I think she is about 92—who lives in a croft. The only words of English I have ever heard her say are, "You are welcome". She makes the most wonderful girdle scones with salted butter, and I often call on her. I should just like warmly to support this amendment. It is the most beautiful language, but it is very difficult to spell.
Lord Strathspey: I should like to speak to this amendment. I only hope that I do not repeat anything that my noble friend Lord Campbell has said. While there are rather over 80,000 speakers of Gaelic in Scotland there must be many more Welsh speakers in Wales. There are nevertheless many Gaelic speakers overseas, particularly in North America. It is possible that some of them "do not have the English", as the Gaelic speakers express it.
There are, of course, people of Welsh extraction who live, I believe, in South America who also have no English. They have Spanish. But people at home and overseas are learning Gaelic today. I know of one of my clansmen from Pennsylvania who is now brushing up his Gaelic in Skye as he teaches, among other things, Gaelic in a college in Pennsylvania.
There is no doubt that the Gaelic-speaking community is unhappy over the omission of this language from the Bill. Gaelic is the old natural language of at least the Highlands and consequently I deplore this apparent omission. Furthermore, no reason has so far been given by another place to justify the omission of Gaelic from Schedule 1. I have no knowledge of the language. I wish I had, as I would then be able to understand the meaning of the innumerable Gaelic place names on the Ordnance Survey sheets of the Highlands. There does not appear to be quite the same problem over Welsh names, as normally the English interpretation of the Welsh is given alongside, certainly of street names. I therefore urge the Minister to give favourable consideration to the amendment and include this third indigenous language of the
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United Kingdom in the Bill. I do not see that it would hurt the Bill and, so far as I can ascertain, it would mean a tremendous lot to the Gaelic-speaking communities at home and abroad.
The Earl of Lauderdale: It gives great satisfaction to noble Lords on this side of the Committee to know that we have a Gaelic speaker on the Government Front Bench, and no doubt he will reply to the debate on this amendment. Plaudits to my noble friend Lord Campbell of Croy for raising the matter. It amazes me that a Bill of this scale got through the other place without this matter having been alluded to apparently and without any fuss having been raised. It just shows that your Lordships' House is one of many nationalities—if of the same citizenship—and many cultures, and we spot what is going on.
One should say now that having just had a Division on a matter which really was an issue between the Civil Service on the one hand and the London draftsman of the Bill on the other, some of us felt that it was all very fine leaving it to civil servants, but here was a case where a Bill of enormous complexity left out one of the languages of the United Kingdom and got this far without being noticed. I am not a speaker of Gaelic, but perhaps I might warn your Lordships that should you ever find yourselves in the West Highlands or the Outer Islands and you are being offered another drink and yet another drink and they say, "Ulya gallora" and you reply, "This is like mañana", they will say, "Not, at all; mañana puts a real rush on things".
Lord Mishcon: I think that every noble Lord will share the anger of the noble Earl, Lord Lauderdale, at the sheer incompetence of other places—I will merely put it that way—that have seemed to have omitted this important item. I am sure the Opposition would like to associate itself with all the sentiments that have been expressed. I have only one query, and it is addressed to the noble Viscount whose contribution we always love to hear. Would he kindly inform his fellow Peers whether he wishes to be known in future as either the king or the queen of the hills?
Viscount Massereene and Ferrard: I would rather be known as the king.
Lord Mackay of Clashfern: The number of situations in which someone will come along seeking to have the test for naturalisation in Scottish Gaelic is probably likely to be rather small. Indeed, I think that my noble friend Lord Campbell of Croy did not suggest that there were many people who would pass the test in Gaelic and would not be able to pass it in English. Notwith-standing that, it is quite an important question whether Scottish Gaelic should be put into the Bill at this stage—and it is only for this purpose—and I am particularly happy to be able to say that the Government will very carefully consider whether the amendment, or something similar to it, should be added to the Bill.
Lord Campbell of Croy: I am very grateful to my noble and learned friend, whom I felt sure would give this proposal a very sympathetic ear. Being very practical about the matter, I said that I did not think that

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there would be many cases arising which involved Gaelic, but I also added that I did not think there would be many cases arising involving Welsh, either. None the less provision is being made for the Welsh language—rightly so—for the individual case or two that might arise, and what I am asking is that the same should be done for the other indigenous language.
In order to complete this particular debate, may I tell my noble friend Lord Lauderdale that in fact this question was raised in the other place and considered there. But it looked as though those concerned had not considered it fully, and some of the information which arose there was not correct. Therefore, I think it was right that we should have raised it here and so have given the Government an opportunity to look at it. I am most grateful to my noble and learned friend, and I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.
Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.
[Amendment No. 89 not moved.]
10.32 p.m.
Baroness Birk Baroness Birk moved Amendment No. 90:
Page 51, line 22, after ("condition") insert ("or for any other reason").
The noble Baroness said: This might seem to be quite a small amendment, but I think it is an important one for a certain number of people, and I hope that the Government will be able to look on it kindly. While we accept that obviously a sufficient knowledge of the English language, or the Welsh language, or, as now appears, the Scottish Gaelic language, will be required as part of the criteria for naturalisation, as we see in paragraph 2(e) of the Schedule the Secretary of State has power to
"waive the need to fulfil the requirement specified in paragraph 1(1)(c) if he considers that because of the applicant's age or physical condition it would be unreasonable to expect him to fulfil it".
Those are very helpful, very reasonable and compassionate waivers of conditions.
However, I am moving the amendment for this reason. There are, I believe, some people who would not come under the age waiver or the physical condition waiver, but whose situation ought to be looked on rather more compassionately so far as the question of the knowledge of the language is concerned. I am thinking here of a family who have come from overseas. The husband goes out to work and the children go to school. They have opportunities to pick up English, or, if they are somewhere in Wales, it might be Welsh, or in the Highlands, Scottish Gaelic, whereas the wife at home does not have any such opportunity. She might be living in a neighbourhood where the people around her all come from the same country as she comes from, and so she is constantly speaking the language she is used to. She might not be so young. She might find it difficult to learn the new language, but she is perfectly able to go around the neighbourhood. She is a good wife and mother, and a good citizen. She may well be able to walk around and travel on public transport, but she may not have a knowledge of the language, whether it is English, Welsh or Scottish Gaelic, which would come up to the criteria here.
She may, in fact—or he may, because this could apply to a man as well—go out to work and be able to
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shop (because one can shop, as I think we all know from our visits to countries abroad, in countries where one does not speak the language) and yet not be able to pass a test in that language. I personally am very fond, though I do not have the opportunity very often, of speaking French, and in between my visits to France I forget most of what I knew, but I can get around in France, I can shop in France, though I am quite sure that I could not pass any language test unless it was at a very low level.
It is for cases like this, which I think would be difficult to define in any way other than "or for any other reason", that we have proposed this amendment. There may be other considerations. There may be other exceptions that I have not thought of at the moment. Perhaps other noble Lords have thought of them, or the Government may have done; but I think there should be in the Bill this extra proviso, "or for any other reason", which would be able to cover anything that arose and not be quite so restrictive as, even with the waivers that there are now, this particular part of the schedule would be.
I hope that the Government will give this amendment some consideration. I do not expect or necessarily want a reply from the Minister tonight. Unless he is going to say "Yes", I would rather he took it away and thought about it and then let me know, because I think this may be something which, on reflection, he will find it quite useful for the Government to have in the Bill. I beg to move.
Lord Pitt of Hampstead: I should like to support the noble Baroness in this amendment. I am in general practice, and I have patients who have been living here long enough to be able, in fact, to register or be naturalised but who in fact do not speak English. Their lives are well conducted. I am speaking now, in this case, of women who live at home, where the only conversation that takes place is in the language of the country from which they have come. There are a lot of such people, and some of the people I am talking about are not old and their physical condition is good.
It is worth noting that not all people are linguists. For some people, learning a new language is a very difficult thing; and if in fact you are such a person—that is, you have difficulty in learning a new language—and at the same time it is easy for you to talk in the language that you already know, the chances of your becoming fluent in this new, second language are minute. Therefore, I hope that the Government will accept this amendment, for it then allows for there to be reasons other than merely the question of physical condition or age which will permit the Secretary of State to exempt people from the language tests.
Lord Avebury: I should like to support this amendment because I think that if you are going to have a language test at all—and, as the Minister will have realised, I should have preferred to leave it out altogether—then you have got to make it as flexible as you possibly can and you have got to give the Secretary of State the power to cater for every possible eventuality, as he has in other parts of the Bill. One example that occurred to me is this: obviously, if the applicant's physical condition is such as to prevent him learning the English, Welsh or Scottish Gaelic language, that would be a reason for exercising discretion; and in another

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place the Minister gave an example of somebody who was blind, even though, as was pointed out to him, blind people do in fact succeed in learning languages. It is not an absolute barrier. One can imagine physical disabilities of that kind which would make it harder for somebody to learn the language, particularly when one imagines the effects of physical disability combined with advancing age. A person would not need to be over retiring age if he was blind to make it more much difficult for him to learn a language than for a sighted person.
I was thinking, also, as I read this clause, that there might be people with mental conditions that would make it more difficult for them to learn a language, and not just people to whom the noble Lord, Lord Pitt, has referred who, like all too many of us in this country, find it difficult to pick up a foreign language, because they are naturally bad linguists. There may be people who lead a perfectly blameless and useful life, but who are suffering from some mental disability which prevents them from learning the English, Welsh or Gaelic language. If they fulfil every other requirement in the Bill, I do not see why that they should not qualify.
This gives me an opportunity of mentioning something that has been on my mind, and that is the difficulties that people have when they come to this country in acquiring the English language. It came to my notice as a result of conversations I had with a refugee from Latin America what enormous obstacles we place in the way of people who have every intention of learning our language and who are young enough, if they are given the necessary resources, to do so within a reasonable space of time.
The example that I want to mention is the difficulty that they have in obtaining bus passes to get from where they live to the school of English. In the case I have in mind a person was living in Hackney and travelling to a school of English in Holborn. The bus fares came to several pounds a week. That would be impossible to pay that out of money from a social security benefit of £19 for a single person. Until the person obtained a bus pass (which eventually was given by the British Council for Aid to Refugees) it was impossible to attend the classes. I mention that as an example to show that there are other reasons why a person may have failed to acquire sufficient knowledge of the English language which would be very difficult to identify while looking at the Bill as it goes through both Houses of Parliament.
Therefore it would be much better to give the Secretary of State a more flexible power such as was proposed in the amendment. I hope the Minister will take the principle enunciated in other parts of this Bill that maximum flexibility should be given to the Secretary of State and incorporate it in this particular part of the Bill.
10.43 p.m.
Baroness Gardner of Parkes: I am somewhat concerned listening to the debate. I think that very real anxieties have been raised about the mother who is at home and does not have the opportunity to pick up the language. In the whole time that we have been considering these matters, we have been adopting the attitude that everyone settled in the country at the
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moment wishes to take out British citizenship. It may well be that a number will not wish to do so. They will want assurance from the Minister that if the rest of their family chose to take out British citizenship they would have every right to remain in this country as they are presently settled. This is a point which should be clarified because a number of people are beginning to worry about whether they would qualify with the language. I believe that these are unnecessary fears. Perhaps the Minister could clarify this point for me.
I shall have to give thought in the next five years as to whether I shall apply for British citizenship. Perhaps I am the only Member of the Committee who is in that position. I do not think it unreasonable that we should be asked to consider this matter. I should like a comment on what the situation is if people do not wish to take out British citizenship but wish to carry on and live their lives here, as for example do a number of people that the noble Lord, Lord Pitt, described who have already lived here for many years and who have never mastered the language and have no hope of doing so.
10.45 p.m.
Lord Renton: In my opinion, naturalisation is something which should be guarded as a privilege and not too lightly granted; but there are necessarily exceptions, and that is what is envisaged in this subsection in the middle of page 51. But it worries me somewhat that age and physical condition are the only matters singled out for the granting of the exception. One thinks instinctively of, say, an elderly married couple who themselves clearly fufil the conditions but who have a mentally handicapped son or daughter. They would not wish their son or daughter to be left out; and perhaps they may think that because the son or daughter did not become British, they would be deprived of the rights which the parents hope to acquire by naturalisation. Although, from a purely drafting point of view, I am not totally sympathetic to the amendment, I do think that the special conditions required to make the exception are too tightly drawn. I do not say that merely to add the words "mental or" would necessarily be right, but I do think this needs looking at.
Lord Belstead: What I do not think has become entirely evident from the short debate on this, although I think your Lordships are well aware of it, is that this is a new provision which is being put into the Bill and, if Parliament accepts it, it would enable the Secretary of State to waive the language requirement on the two grounds of age and physical infirmity.
Very briefly, we do not believe that the discretionary power should be extended in the way that is being suggested in the amendment. The language test is a very simple one: it is based on the applicant's ability to communicate with an interviewing officer. It is operated in an informal way and circumstances affecting the applicant such as age are certainly taken into account in reaching a decision. I think that is reasonable.
One of the difficulties about the amendment is that it does not attempt to define what other reasons noble Lords opposite have in mind. I think we can

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only speculate that if the amendment were adopted applicants would be in a similar position. They would be aware that there was a discretion to waive the language test but they would not know in what circumstances it would be used, and therefore perhaps they would have less incentive to acquire a sufficient knowledge of the language and might well be tempted to apply before they had reached an adequate standard.
Baroness Llewelyn-Davies of Hastoe: Absurd!
Lord Belstead: This, contrary to what the noble Baroness has just said, is not absurd. We are living through a time when it is in the forefront of all our minds that it is a bad day for this country if people are cut off one from another. Maybe—who knows?— a great deal of the troubles we have in the country arise because we do not in one way or another communicate. One of the barriers—only one—to communication is simply language; and I really do think that to encourage people to take up citizenship in this country when they have great difficulty in communicating with others and, as the noble Baroness's own Government's Green Paper expressly pointed out, would not be able to take up their civic rights, would be a disservice. The thing to do is to try to encourage people to have a command of the language before the conferment of citizenship. I do not think that is unreasonable.
Having said that, of course I will look at the points made by my noble friends Lady Gardner and Lord Renton. If I might, I should like to take those away and look at them. But so far as the principle of the amendment is concerned, I think there are real difficulties in making this general discretion which the amendment would wish to establish.
Baroness Elles: Before the noble Lord sits down, I wonder whether he would allow me to make just one comment. As he may know, I am a Euro Member of Parliament and have in my constituency something like 30,000 Asians. In that particular community there are of course many women who live very much at home and can hardly speak any English whatever. That is the way of life they follow. The husbands, on the other hand, are out at work and speak perfectly good English, or at any rate it is reasonable enough to pass a language test. What I am afraid of, in the way the schedule is worded at present, is that you will get a husband who is perfectly able to pass the test, and children who speak English as good as the English that you or I learnt to speak at school, but the mother who is at home will probably not learn any English at all, or very little, and may not be able to pass the test. Therefore, one might have the situation where the husband and children would be eligible for naturalisation but the wife would not. I wonder if my noble friend would be good enough to look at this case with some sympathy, to see if there can be a form of words to meet the kind of situation which many noble Lords have raised in the Committee tonight?
Lord Belstead: This is a fair point, and indeed it is one that has already been raised in the debate this evening. I know that the Government would be prepared to look at the matter. I do have to say that the
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amendment goes very much wider than the specific point which my noble friend Lady Elles has raised.
Baroness Birk: I should like to thank the noble Lord the Minister for what he has said, and all the noble Lords who have taken part in this short but very useful debate. On the basis that the Minister is going to look into this matter—and, as I said earlier, I am certainly not standing on the suggested words if the noble Lord can find another definition to cover the specific points which have been made—I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.
Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.
[Amendments Nos. 90A and 90B not moved.]
Lord Denham: I think that I ought perhaps to say that I have been impatient for progress at certain stages of this Bill and it would be churlish of me not to tell your Lordships at this stage that I think we have done very well today, comparatively. I should like to thank your Lordships for the good humour which you have shown in doing so.
House resumed.

London Transport (No. 2) Bill
Bill committed to an Unopposed Bill Committee.
Criminal Attempts Bill
Bill returned from the Commons with the amendments agreed to.
Iron and Steel Bill
Bill returned from the Commons with the amendments agreed to.