Lords Sitting of 7 July 1981

Preamble
The House met at half-past two of the clock: The LORD CHANCELLOR on the Woolsack.
Prayers—Read by the Lord Bishop of Liverpool.

Lord Thomas of Swynnerton
Hugh Swynnerton Thomas, Esquire, having been created Baron Thomas of Swynnerton, of Notting Hill in Greater London, for life—Was, in his robes, introduced between the Lord Gladwyn and the Lord Vaizey.

Northern Ireland: Arms from the USA
2.49 p.m.
Lord Gridley: My Lords, I beg leave to ask the first Question which stands in my name on the Order Paper.
The Question was as follows:
To ask Her Majesty's Government whether adequate measures are in force in order to prevent the flood of arms reaching Northern Ireland from the United States of America.
The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State, Northern Ireland Office (Lord Elton): My Lords, the Government are satisfied that adequate powers to prevent the illegal importation of arms into Northern Ireland do exist and that the security forces and other Government agencies are enforcing them. The United States Government, for its part, has taken energetic measures to prevent the illegal export of arms. Of course, the Government cannot be content while any illegal arms reach terrorists in Northern Ireland, but I should emphasise that it is by no means a flood.
Lord Gridley: My Lords, while thanking my noble friend the Minister for that Answer, may I ask whether the situation is really as satisfactory as he has stated? Has my noble friend seen the report in a British newspaper of 22nd June that 8,000 arms were seized from American army depots over a period of three years, enough for up to 10 battalions or 8,000 men, and that these were destined for terrorists? Has my noble friend any statement to make as to whether any attempt has been made to discover the eventual destination of these arms? Finally, has my noble friend noted, as has been alleged in this report, that two M60 machine guns, seized from IRA terrorists in Belfast, were stolen from a national guard armoury in the United States? Has my noble friend any information on that point?
Lord Elton: My Lords, the Government of the United States co-operates actively with Her Majesty's Government in the suppression of illegal trading in arms. A number of successful prosecutions have taken
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place within the last 12 months. A significant quantity of arms was also intercepted on 9th June. Indeed, I would have thought that the statistics my noble friend has given would show that there is a very effective effort being mounted by the Government of the United States to prevent the traffic in illegal arms.
My noble friend also asked about the origin of arms recovered from terrorists in Northern Ireland. It is true that the largest single proportion—amounting, I think, to 47 per cent.—originates in the United States, although there are other countries of origin, notably British arms which have been stolen or misappropriated in the British Isles.

Northern Ireland: Government Policy
2.51 p.m.
Lord Gridley: My Lords, I beg leave to ask the second Question which stands in my name on the Order Paper.
The Question was as follows:
To ask Her Majesty's Government what steps are being taken by them to convey to the people of the United States the basic reasons for our present policy in Northern Ireland.
The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State, Department of Trade (Lord Trefgarne): My Lords, the Ambassador and his staff in the United States are making every effort to explain our policy and to counter malicious or ill-informed reports about Northern Ireland by many methods, including television and radio appearances, letters to the press and personal briefings. A number of Ministers, Members of Parliament and senior officials have also visited the United States to put our own point of view.
Lord Gridley: My Lords, while I thank my noble friend the Minister for that Answer, and of course support the policy of Her Majesty's Government in Northern Ireland, is my noble friend aware that programmes on American television in very recent days can only have resulted in making more difficult the policy of Her Majesty's Government for Northern Ireland? I refer, particularly, to the inflammatory appearances of a young girl of tender age who appeared before millions of Americans on their ABC television; she was appealing for the life of her father. That girl was only 11 years old. May I ask my noble friend whether Her Majesty's Government have made any protest to the American Government about this incident?
Lord Trefgarne: My Lords, I certainly deplore the use of small children for purposes described by my noble friend, but of course the press in the United States is just as free as the press in this country, and the United States Government would, therefore, be no better able to direct their media than we are.
Baroness Trumpington: My Lords, may I ask my noble friend what the qualifications are for officials sent abroad? Are they trained in public relations? Are they experts on advertising? What are the grounds

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for it being thought that they can exert influence over the American media?
Lord Trefgarne: My Lords, the diplomatic staff in the United States who fulfil these tasks are not specifically trained in media promotion activities, as my noble friend suggests, but they are, of course, very fully briefed from London and receive the fullest support from the Government departments here.
Viscount Massereene and Ferrard: My Lords, might I ask my noble friend if Her Majesty's Government have considered taking the centre page in the main American dailies and really putting forward the facts? Is my noble friend aware that even educated Americans are extremely ignorant about the position in Northern Ireland?
Lord Trefgarne: My Lords, I do not think it is true to say that we are losing the propaganda war in the United States. Informed mainstream opinion, particularly in the major United States national newspapers, is very much on our side through the columns of their editorials.
Lord Elwyn-Jones: My Lords, are not members of our diplomatic and consular staffs in the United States highly competent in this field, very energetic, and doing a very good job of work on behalf of this country?
Lord Trefgarne: That is certainly our view, my Lords.
Baroness Bacon: My Lords, is the noble Lord the Minister aware that I was in Washington at the time of the murder of Lord Mountbatten, that I was absolutely appalled at some of the inverviews that took place on the very day of his funeral, and that the position is now very much worse than it was then? Would he not agree that, while there are quite a number of people in the United States who do not understand our position, on the other hand, there are a great many people, some in high places—Senators and Congressmen—who understand very well, but choose to mislead the people because of the effect on their electors.
Lord Trefgarne: My Lords, I cannot answer for American politicians, of course, but the noble Baroness is right to suggest that television is a particular problem, and that especially applies to local television in the United States, which, of course, is a very substantial medium; there are several thousand small television stations in that country. It must be true that they do not all employ the cream of the television reporting industry. We do seek to help and brief their film crews as best we can, but we cannot, of course, compel them to report objectively.
Lord de Freyne: My Lords, may I ask what about our own television media? Do they help the situation in any way, or vice versa?
Lord Trefgarne: My Lords, our television companies, like the American ones, are, of course, free to broadcast as they think fit. But, of course, the Question on the Order Paper does not refer to that.
Baroness Ewart-Biggs: My Lords, I should like to ask the noble Lord, taking into account the difficulty that we have in getting the true position in Northern Ireland over to the people of America, what we do to try to persuade the Government of the Republic of Ireland to unite with us in trying to use their influence over their community in America to explain to them the true facts of our position in Northern Ireland?
Lord Trefgarne: My Lords, the Government efforts in the general propaganda area are as I have already described them, but I would not want to go into detail with regard to the Government of the Republic of Ireland, which does, I think, go a little wide of the Question on the Order Paper.
Lord Monson: My Lords, can the noble Lord say whether the Government will consider adopting the excellent advice given in a recent issue of the Economist; namely, that we should remind the Americans that Britain and people of British stock have just as much right to be in Ulster as the Americans have to be in Texas, and that this comparison is all the more apt in that the much revered American folk hero of the siege of the Alamo, Davy Crockett, was himself an Ulsterman by origin?
Lord Trefgarne: My Lords, we do not seek to lecture to the Americans any more than we appreciate lectures from them.
Lord Gore-Booth: My Lords, as a former director of the operations to which we are referring in the United States, I can assure those noble Lords who have spoken kindly of the information organisation that they are absolutely right: within the money one can get, and given the size of the United States, I can confirm that that organisation is very expert and does the best job possible with the money available, given the size of the United States.
Lord Trefgarne: My Lords, the point the noble Lord makes through the medium of his supplementary question is very well taken. It is not true to say we are losing the propaganda war in the United States. Mainstream opinion is with us.
Lord Bruce of Donington: My Lords, will the noble Lord give the House an assurance that he will resist any kind of pressure upon him to turn our diplomatic staffs into a series of public relations officers? Will he bear in mind that many of us would view with dismay any endeavour to make the British Embassy in Washington a sub-branch of Saatchi and Saatchi?
Lord Trefgarne: My Lords, of course I share the view of the noble Lord the fact remains, however, that there is an important job to be done in this area in the United States, as elsewhere.

BBC External Services Cuts
2.59 p.m.
Lord Strabolgi: My Lords, I beg leave to ask the Question which stands in my name on the Order Paper.
The Question was as follows:
To ask Her Majesty's Government whether they will reconsider their decision to require the BBC to cut seven language services from the BBC external services in view of the damage that will be caused to the worldwide standing and effectiveness of the external services.
The Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs (Lord Carrington): No, my Lords. As I made clear in my written reply to the noble Lord on 29th June, the Government are determined to improve the audibility of the BBC's external services. To this end we would be prepared to make a substantial increase in the grant-in-aid for the BBC's external services. Within this new, increased total I am certain it is right to concentrate the money on a proper modernisation and expansion of the transmitting facilities, even if, sadly, it means a small reduction in some vernacular broadcasts.
Lord Strabolgi: My Lords, while thanking the noble Lord the Foreign Secretary for answering my Question, I should like to ask him whether it is not a fact that the new capital expenditure programme only restores the cuts made by the present Government in 1979. Furthermore, are the Government aware that the European services alone have 5 million listeners? Will the noble Lord the Foreign Secretary reconsider this decision, which has been almost universally deplored, in view of the importance of these foreign language broadcasts and the small expenditure involved?
Lord Carrington: No, my Lords, the noble Lord opposite is really wrong about this. In 1979 the Government announced cuts in the BBC external services amounting to about £2·7 million annually, to be carried on over the years. Those cuts were taken on the capital improvement programme. Since then, in the two years which have intervened the income of the BBC external services has risen from £42·8 million in 1979–80 to £64·5 million in this current year. If the suggestions which we are making to the BBC are accepted, it will mean that there will be a capital expenditure of the BBC external services in the next nine years of well over £100 million.
This is really a question of priorities—what one ought to do first. I think that the most important thing that the BBC external services do is to broadcast in English around the world. That is what is really important. Secondly, it is quite useless broadcasting in English all around the world if you cannot hear it. As I happen to travel about a great deal and try to get the BBC, I know that you cannot hear it. Therefore, in my judgment and in the judgment of the Government, the right priority is to spend the money on audibility and capital programmes. If that means a small loss of the vernacular I believe that that is the right priority.
Lord Strabolgi: My Lords, would the noble Lord the Foreign Secretary not agree that it is quite useless broadcasting in English to a country like Brazil where hardly any of the population understand the language?
Lord Carrington: My Lords, it is, as I say, a question of priorities: you have to choose to make some savings. I should not have thought myself that cutting off the broadcasts in Maltese, which happen for five minutes every day, to an island in which almost everybody speaks English, would be an unparalleled loss to the BBC.
Lord Gladwyn: My Lords, are the Government aware that these programmes, once they are discontinued, will be very difficult, if not impossible, to restore, the audience having been lost? Are they also aware that the Soviet Government will be overjoyed by the news that these programmes are being discontinued; that they will have the field to themselves and that they spend two or three times as much money on this kind of thing as we do?
Lord Carrington: My Lords, I would rather doubt that and I do not agree with the first part of the noble Lord's question. One only hears about cuts, but it so happens that last year we increased broadcasting in Russian by a considerable amount, broadcasting in Turkish by a considerable amount, and introduced a new service in Pushtu to Afghanistan. So it is not all that difficult.
Lord Crowther-Hunt: My Lords, on the question of priorities, I should like to ask the noble Lord the Foreign Secretary how seriously he considered as an alternative priority cutting the costs in our diplomatic service overseas. As I understand it—and is this a fact?—the savings, for example, by cutting the Spanish service of the BBC will amount to £180,000 a year, whereas the staff costs of the British Embassy in Madrid—I am referring to pay and allowances—amount to between £1.25 million and £1.5 million a year. So a 2 per cent. saving there would make it unnecessary to cut the Spanish service at all. I should like to ask the noble Lord perhaps to be kind enough to look at this question of priorities on a cost-effective basis.
Lord Carrington: My Lords, of course we have done that and I think the noble Lord should perhaps have given us the credit for having done it. May I give him a few figures—because I am well armed. Since 1st April 1979 the number of diplomatic service staff has declined by 7.3 per cent.; 15 posts have been closed, eight reduced in staff and the 10 largest posts have been reduced by 10 per cent. Since 1969 over 50 per cent. of the consulates which we have had abroad have been closed. Remembering, as I do, the outcry that there was in this House about the closure of subordinate posts some years ago, I think that your Lordships would be wary to suppose that any further closures would be a very good idea.
Lord Hill of Luton: My Lords, is the noble Lord aware that although it makes sense from time to time to review the overseas broadcasting services in the light

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of the current situation, to look at it and to make proposals almost every year, as has been done in the last few years, is a dangerous folly? An illustration of that dangerous folly is that it was proposed a year or 18 months ago to abolish the Turkish service, but now, because of world events, the Turkish service has had to be strengthened. Does that not make nonsense of this penny-pinching economy in a service that is of unusual value in presenting this country to the world at a time that it needs it greatly?
Lord Carrington: My Lords, I have a certain sympathy with what the noble Lord says. The last thing that in normal circumstances one would want to do would be to cut the BBC external services at all. But the fact remains that we are committed to spend a very large sum of money extra on the BBC external services. It is a question of trying to discover how we can live within our budget, although it is a lot more money, and make a decision as to which are the priorities and which are not. I daresay that sometimes one gets it wrong, but it is a genuine effort to try to decide which is the more important of the activities of the BBC external services. These decisions do mean that there are certain cuts in the vernaculars, but I think that the really important things are retained—and, what is more, we shall be able to hear them.
Lord Morris: My Lords, can it be possible that Her Majesty's Government are unaware of the will of Parliament as expressed in July and November 1979 in your Lordships' House and in another place? Would not my noble friend have been the first to deplore the cavalier attitude which disregards the will of Parliament if the party of noble Lords opposite had been in power? Furthermore, for Her Majesty's Government to take credit for an increase in the budget which they themselves cut in November 1979, is nothing if not misleading.
Lord Carrington: My Lords, I do not think that my noble friend—if he still is!—can have listened to the answer to the first supplementary. Perhaps he would be kind enough to study it. As for the will of Parliament, the will of Parliament is renewable.
Lord Molloy: My Lords, would the noble Lord the Foreign Secretary not agree that there is consternation in the House this afternoon apropos this matter? Despite the figures that he has read out and his reference to a matter of principles and priorities, is there not a danger that whoever provided him with those figures may have fallen into the trap of knowing the price of everything and the value of nothing?
Lord Carrington: My Lords, perhaps the noble Lord also should beware of some of the figures with which he is provided, because I do not know whether they take account of all the things which the Government have to take account of. I assure the noble Lord that the figures which I have given are absolutely right. I would agree with the noble Lord that nobody likes these decisions, but if one is faced with a decision to have to make rearrangements within the BBC external services it is really up to the Government to make a
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decision as to how it is done. Could I just give the noble Lord one figure which is, broadly speaking, right? As regards this very large capital programme, about two-thirds of the increase will, in essence, be paid for by the Government and about one third by these comparatively small savings in the BBC.
Lord Nugent of Guildford: My Lords, is my noble friend aware that, as regards value for money in diplomatic initiatives, the savings that may be brought about in the BBC budget will be more than compensated for by his own, personal, presence in Moscow with a new peace initiative which might bring the Soviets to the conference table in a way in which they have never been seen before? In this context, actions sometimes speak louder than words.
Lord Carrington: My Lords, I am grateful to my noble friend. I do not think that we can go on too long about this. It may be that your Lordships will want to put down a Motion; I do not know. I would simply point out to your Lordships that the decisions taken by the Government will mean that very many millions more people will hear the BBC than can hear it now.
Lord Winstanley: My Lords, is it not rather odd that some of the people who bemoan Britain's declining influence in the world seem to be the same people who are prepared to acquiesce in dismantling the machinery whereby we exert any influence?
Lord Carrington: My Lords, I do not think that the noble Lord can have heard any one of my answers.

Diego Garcia: Discussions
3.11 p.m.
Lord Brockway: My Lords, I beg leave to ask the Question which stands in my name on the Order Paper.
The Question was as follows:
To ask Her Majesty's Government what conclusions were reached in the discussions between them and the displaced community from Diego Garcia when the island was made a military base of the United States of America.
Lord Trefgarne: My Lords, discussions were held in London from 29th June to 2nd July with a delegation from Mauritius, including representatives of the Ilois. We regret that we were unable to reach agreement on our further ex-gratia offer of £1·25 million plus £300,000 of associated aid. The present talks have been adjourned. Discussions will, however, continue.
Lord Brockway: My Lords, is not this rather a sad story? Is it not the case that this archipelago in the Indian Ocean was dismembered from Mauritius before Mauritius even had indepencence, with the result that 3,500 people—members of families of fishermen and peasants—were evacuated? Is it not the case that when they reached Mauritius there were no arrange

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ments for their settlement? Many of them lived in dire poverty and were homeless, and the compensation was absolutely inadequate. Is it not the case that in 1979, when the British Government offered them an additional £1·25 million compensation, it was only on the condition that they would never return to their own country?
Lord Trefgarne: My Lords, as for the condition of the Ilois in Mauritius at the present time, it is the case that they have received a wide range of assistance from the Mauritius social services since their arrival there. In 1972 the British Government paid £650,000 to the Government of Mauritius towards their resettlement and the Government of Mauritius accepted as full and final settlement that payment as meeting our obligation in this matter. Indeed, when the money was finally disbursed in 1978 interest was added to the £650,000 to make it up to £936,000. More recently, there has been the offer of £1·25 million, to which I referred, and finally the additional offer of £300,000 of aid, which my honourable friend the Parliamentary Under-Secretary offered to them very recently.
Lord Brockway: My Lords, the Minister has stated that diplomatic negotiations will continue despite the breakdown of the talks. Would it not be far better if influence could be exerted to have discussions not only with the Mauritian Government but with the whole of the opposition, the whole of Mauritius and the representatives of the exiled people? Will the Government seek to renew those discussions as soon as possible?
Lord Trefgarne: My Lords, I think that the talks are best conducted with those directly involved who are, of course, the Government of Mauritius and the representatives of Ilois themselves. As I said in the original Answer, we stand ready to continue these discussions when the other parties are ready to do so.

Business
Lord Denham: My Lords, it may be for the convenience of the House if I announce that dinner will be available this evening at the usual time. The Committee stage of the British Nationality Bill will be adjourned at approximately 7 o'clock for a short period. During the adjournment the Road Traffic (Car-Sharing Arrangements) (Northern Ireland) Order 1981 and the Supplementary Benefits (Requirements and Resources) Amendment Regulations 1981 will be taken.

Foreign Secretary's Visit to Moscow
3.15 p.m.
Lord Carrington: My Lords, I paid a short working visit to Moscow for discussions with the Soviet Foreign Minister on 6th July. My principal purpose was to present to the Soviet Government the proposal adopted by the European Council on 30th June for a two-stage
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international conference on Afghanistan. Discussion of this matter occupied a full morning of talks.
In explaining the proposal I made it plain that I was speaking on behalf of the Ten member states of the European Community. I emphasised that the problem with which it dealt was one of global significance and whose solution was essential in the interest of peace, stability and the development of East/West relations. I reminded the Soviet Government that the Ten—and indeed the great majority of the international community—are convinced that the complete withdrawal of Soviet troops is an essential element of any solution.
Mr. Gromyko took the view that the proposal by the Ten was, as he put it, "unrealistic", because the main problem was intervention by others in the affairs of Afghanistan, because it was not stated that the present Afghan régime should participate at the outset and because the proposed composition of the conference was unsatisfactory. I told him that I did not find these arguments convincing. Mr. Gromyko did not say that he rejected the proposal and did not exclude further discussion. For my part, I made it plain that the proposal, which has already received an encouraging degree of support in the international community, remains on the table and that its details are open for discussion.
The brief communiqué agreed at the end of the visit refers to the intention of both sides to continue the dialogue. I have made it clear that as far as I am concerned this means about Afghanistan. I shall now wish to consult with my colleagues in the Ten on the next steps.
I also spoke to Mr. Gromyko about theatre nuclear forces, the Madrid Conference and the Middle East. On theatre nuclear forces, I took issue with some of the figures put forward and pointed out that the problem could only be resolved in the negotiations between the Soviet Union and the United States which are due to start before the end of the year. We agreed that the situation in the Middle East was dangerous and that the right way forward was a negotiated settlement even though our views on timing and method differed.
We shared the view that if agreement could be reached in Madrid on the area to which new confidence-building measures would apply, the way should be clear for a rapid conclusion of the conference.
3.18 p.m.
Baroness Llewelwyn-Davies of Hastoe: My Lords, the House will be most grateful to the noble Lord for making that Statement, and I am sure that the whole House will wish to congratulate the noble Lord the Foreign Secretary on making an effort to solve this very difficult Afghan situation and, indeed, the very dangerous international position in general.
In spite of the rather disappointing response, we are glad that Mr. Gromyko did not reject the proposal, and we on these Benches would like to encourage the noble Lord to continue with the negotiations, especially as there is a hint that Mr. Gromyko might consider doing so in September.
We were told that the Middle Eastern problems were discussed and that both sides found it also a very dangerous situation. We have been very concerned by the reports of a substantial arms build-up in Syria, and I should like to ask the noble Lord whether that

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was discussed and whether he could comment on that situation.
We are also glad to know that there were talks about European nuclear arms. I wonder whether, by any chance, Mr. Gromyko confirmed what he is reported to have said to Herr Brandt, that the Russians would propose to stop deploying nuclear weapons once talks have begun—even if the Americans are rather unwilling to start talks as soon as we are perhaps prepared to do—and that they are, in fact, prepared to consider the reduction of nuclear weapons.
One last point I should like to make. Would the Foreign Secretary agree that it was perhaps rather unfortunate that the Italians were affronted for the second time at not being included in talks with West Germany and France about what was a Community matter, especially as this is the beginning of our presidency and because the Italians were so helpful to us last year in our negotiations over the Community budget? In general we wish the Foreign Secretary good luck in his continuing talks, to which we all look forward with some hope.
3.21 p.m.
Lord Gladwyn: My Lords, we too would like to thank the Foreign Secretary for making this Statement. I am sure we can all agree that although the result of his mission was not satisfactory, this was in no way due to the Foreign Secretary himself, but only, I am afraid, to the continued intransigence of the Soviet Government. Did the noble Lord by any chance represent—I imagine he did—to Mr. Gromyko that the continued presence of Soviet troops in Afghanistan will hardly be consonant with the maintenance of what is called détente, and that if the Soviet Government really wish to have any kind of détente they must contemplate some kind of arrangement of a satisfactory nature with regard to Afghanistan?
With regard to the Middle East, I understand that there was some discussion about the Middle East, but there was difference on timing and method. I can well understand that there was a difference on timing, but perhaps the Foreign Secretary would like to tell us what exactly the difference on method is? How do the Soviet Government imagine that the situation on the West Bank, for instance, will be settled satisfactorily? What is their plan? Have they got an idea of a conference, or what is their big plan? Perhaps the Foreign Secretary would tell us that.
3.23 p.m.
Lord Carrington: My Lords, I am grateful to the two speakers. I am sure that it was right to try this proposal on behalf of the Community, and I am sure it is right to go on trying, because the problem is not going to go away. As the Soviet Government themselves admitted in a communiqué signed by Mr. Gromyko and Mr. Gierek after his visit to Poland, the first item in that communiqué was headed "The Problem of Afghanistan". So the Soviet Union recognise that there is a problem. It is undeniably true—and I think that the Soviet Union understand this—that until such time as the problem is solved and there is a complete withdrawal of Soviet
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troops from Afghanistan, there can be no normalisation of relations between Europe and the Soviet Union.
I wonder whether I might duck the question which the noble Baroness asked me about Syria, because I think it really rather widens the scope of the questions. It does not exactly arise from my visit to Moscow, and perhaps on another occasion I might answer that. There were a number of questions which arose from the visit. On the tactical theatre nuclear forces, the difficulty with the Soviet proposal is that they are saying that there should be a moratorium. They are prepared to have a moratorium provided also that there is no preparation and deployment on our side as well. The difficulty with that is that they are in a very considerable state of superiority with these weapons, and therefore a moratorium would perpetuate the imbalance on the Soviet side. As I pointed out to Mr. Gromyko, the only way in which it is possible for a moratorium to be declared is when the two sides have met, agreed on the basic figures and the data, and make sure that neither side is disadvantaged by the proposals which are put forward. So I do not really believe that the moratorium proposal as it is now suggested can possibly go forward.
On the question that the noble Baroness asked me about my meeting with Herr Genscher and M. Cheysson, there are occasions when it is rather useful to meet some of one's colleagues to talk about foreign affairs, and not affairs necessarily connected with the Community. One of the things I wanted to talk to my two colleagues about was Namibia, in which the French, the Germans, and ourselves are in the Contact Group and have a particular interest. There was of course no intention in any way of making the Italians feel that they were left out. I welcomed the opportunity of seeing them, and indeed, to make sure that they did not feel so, I took the opportunity last night to go to Rome rather late and talk to my Italian counterpart. I took the opportunity to speak to him of what had happened in Moscow and to get his preliminary views, which were very valuable, about what the next step should be. So I hope that there is no suggestion of any intention to neglect the Italians, who naturally we consider one of our most important partners in the Community.
The noble Lord, Lord Gladwyn, asked about the continued presence of Soviet troops in Afghanistan. I think I have answered that. The continued presence of Soviet troops anywhere is a disadvantage, if that is what the noble Lord is saying. But on the Middle East, the difference of method was that the Soviet Union is proposing a conference of all the parties concerned to solve the problem, and our view is that, though it may well be that in the end a conference will be necessary to set the seal upon any agreement, at the present time it is not realistic to suppose that a conference, either would be accepted or would be very successful.
Lord Home of the Hirsel: My Lords, I think there is a certain amount of confusion in the country about what is actually happening on the ground in the field of disarmament. I think I understood my noble friend to tell us about the strategic level, and that must be between the Soviet Union and the United States; but is a conference still going on in Geneva on conven

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tional disarmament, or in Madrid, or where? Is something actually happening at this present time?
Lord Carrington: My Lords, my noble friend is quite right. There are the strategic level of conferences, the strategic arms limitation talks, one aspect of which are the talks on theatre nuclear forces, which the United States have said that they are prepared to start before the end of the year and which was part of the NATO double decision on modernisation. There are then the talks on mutual and balanced force reductions, which have been going on in Vienna ever since I can remember, and which are not making very much progress, but at which we are still trying to come to an agreement on the basis, on the data, on which decisions are taken. Then there is the European security conference in Madrid, which is discussing a French proposal for a disarmament conference in Europe, which is still being discussed in rather a positive way, and it is possible that there may be a decision on that within a week or two if we can get agreement with the Soviet Union.
Lord Aylestone: My Lords, in thanking the noble Lord for his Statement may I ask him—
Baroness Gaitskell: My Lords, may I congratulate the Foreign Secretary on the success of his visit—
Several Noble Lords: Order!
The Minister of State, Ministry of Agriculture, Fisheries and Food (Earl Ferrers): My Lords, I think it was the noble Lord, Lord Aylestone, who was first.
Lord Aylestone: My Lords, in thanking the noble Lord for making his Statement, may I ask him whether he is of the opinion that if an agreed composition of such a conference were made—I know an agreement would be difficult—Mr. Gromyko would be prepared to attend such a conference?
Lord Carrington: My Lords, I think that was one of the elements which was put forward as a reason for the European proposals being unrealistic. I would doubt whether a solution to that problem would necessarily tip the scales in the direction of an acceptance by the Soviet Union. But all of us are quite prepared to look at the composition if it would be of any value.
Baroness Gaitskell: My Lords, may I—
Lord Orr-Ewing: My Lords, would my noble friend—
Several noble Lords: Order!
Baroness Gaitskell: My Lords, I was up before the noble Lord. May I congratulate the Foreign Secretary on the success of his visit to the Soviet Union? Anything more that he might have got would, to use Mr. Brezhnev's word, have been unrealistic. He might have been very hostile. He was not. He might have been almost rude and asked for a conference about Northern Ireland, but he did not. So I still maintain
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that the visit was extremely successful and helpful, and I once again would like to congratulate the noble Lord.
Lord Carrington: I think the visit was useful, my Lords. There were those who said before I went that the Soviet Union and Mr. Gromyko would not be prepared to discuss the problem of Afghanistan. In fact, we discussed it and nothing else for two and a half hours, and that in itself was useful. As to the results, I summed it up yesterday when I said that I was disappointed but not surprised.
Lord Orr-Ewing: My Lords, did my noble friend point out that while the Soviet Union is deploying every single week an extra SS20 nuclear weapon in their area aimed at Western Europe, it is very difficult for us to take seriously any disarmament talk—
Lord Peart: Rubbish!
Lord Orr-Ewing:—and that the West is compelled to deploy some cruise missiles unless the Soviet Union stops and withdraws those other SS20 missiles?
Lord Carrington: Yes, my Lords; my noble friend is absolutely right and that is the position which I explained to Mr. Gromyko.
Lord Shinwell: My Lords, may I ask whether the Foreign Secretary is aware that while we appreciate that his approach to Mr. Gromyko was animated by the best of intentions, he should have realised that the subject of the Soviet invasion of Aghanistan was of much wider-ranging concern than to only the European Council; for example, that the United States had made protests on the occasion of the invasion itself? May I ask whether, preparatory to his approach to Mr. Gromyko, he consulted the representative of the United States? Did the noble Lord obtain as much as he expected? Would it not have been more effective if, as representing the European Council, some of the foreign secretaries of France, Germany, Italy and the others (I need mention no more) had accompanied him and had informed Mr. Gromyko that they were there representing not only the Council but personally, being personally concerned on behalf of their respective nations, and even going the length of saying, "We shall not leave Moscow until we get a satisfactory answer"?
Lord Carrington: My Lords, I did not realise the noble Lord was so attached to Moscow. He is, of course, quite right in that we took preparatory action with all our friends, and long before the proposal was revealed we had discussed it with the Americans, Indians, Pakistanis, Iranians—with all our friends—and had got the go-ahead from and blessing of nearly all of them that the European Council, the European countries, should present this plan. That was right, because we had international opinion behind us, and I made that plain to Mr. Gromyko yesterday. The noble Lord asked me whether I was happy with what happened. I had hoped for more, but I could have got less, and that about sums it up. As for the powerful deputation to which he referred, I have a feeling that Mr. Gromyko, faced with 10 European foreign

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ministers, might have been inclined to be more brisk with us than he was with me.
Lord Bethell: My Lords, we are all anxious to hear further details of the Foreign Secretary's visit to Moscow. May I take it that he will be giving those details in another Parliament tomorrow? May I ask him to confirm that his visit to Moscow was a supreme example of the usefulness of political co-operation among the Ten?
Lord Carrington: I think that is right, my Lords; that it added to the weight of what we were doing, in that 10 important countries of Europe supported it and indeed initiated it. Yes, I shall be making a very long speech to another Parliament tomorrow, to which I hope my noble friend will be listening.
Lord Jenkins of Putney: My Lords, would the noble Lord agree that while it is true that the Soviet Union has a preponderance in certain areas—for example, the SS20 and the so-called theatre nuclear missiles—all over the preponderance is with the West rather than with the Soviet Union, so that within that disproportion in that area the West is in fact more nuclear armed all over than is the Soviet Union? May I further ask the Foreign Secretary to say that he will not be put off by any suggestion that his work has not been valuable, and will he bear in mind Winston Churchill's dictum that "jaw-jaw is better than war-war" and persist in pursuing that?
Lord Carrington: I will certainly do the latter, my Lords. But the trouble with the first part of the noble Lord's supplementary is that there really is a difference of opinion about the figures. We in Europe think the Soviet Union have in theatre nuclear force weapons—that is, nuclear weapons in Europe—a superiority in warheads of something like 4 to 1, and the Soviet Union think we have a superiority of 1·5 to 1. Until such time as the parties can get round a table, talk about it and get a base on which they are all agreed, I really do not think it will be possible to get any solution to arms limitation in that particular sphere.
The Earl of Onslow: My Lords, in the first instance we must be grateful for what my noble friend the Foreign Secretary has done—he has put Europe more on the map than it otherwise would have been. Secondly, is he able to answer this question: the Soviet Union say that outside intervention is what caused them to go into Afghanistan. There has been absolutely no acceptable evidence of that to the outside world. Did Mr. Gromyko enlarge on that; did he convince my noble friend that there was any truth in it; and may I ask my noble friend to enlarge on it?
Lord Carrington: Not so much enlarge on it, my Lords, as Mr. Gromyko alleged outside intervention in Afghanistan. The object of the proposal put forward by the Community was, first of all, a conference on international aspects which would cover any allegations which the Soviet Union might make and which, of course, would also cover the occupation
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of Afghanistan by Soviet troops. The object of the conference was to get that out of the way first before tackling the internal problems of Afghanistan with the Afghan representatives. It was extremely disappointing that Mr. Gromyko was not prepared to accept that, since we had been led to believe on a number of occasions that the Soviet Union were prepared to accept a conference to discuss international aspects and not the internal aspects. Mr. Gromyko did not yesterday make plain why he refused it and what he was suggesting by international aspects if it was not what we were suggesting.

Standing Orders of the House
3.38 p.m.
The Chairman of Committees (Lord Aberdare): My Lords, I beg to move the first Motion in my name on the Order Paper. I apologise for drawing your Lordships' attention to rather more mundane matters, but may I say a brief word of explanation of both Motions standing in my name on the Order Paper, as they are complementary. The first refers to Standing Orders relating to Public Business and the second to Standing Orders relating to Private Business. These amendments arise from the Second Report of the Procedure Committee which was agreed to by the House on 5th May last. They make no change in the present procedures followed by the Committee of Selection, nor by me, in making appointments to Select Committees, but they bring these Standing Orders up to date so that they reflect the true state of affairs. I beg to move.
Moved, That the Standing Orders relating to Public Business be amended as follows:—
Standing Order No. 5
Leave out paragraph (1).
Standing Order No. 7
Leave out all the words after "but" in line 5 and insert ("when such a Lord takes the Oath of Allegiance the title or dignity by which he sits in Parliament shall be added in brackets after such higher title or dignity.").
Standing Order No. 60
Leave out Standing Order No. 60 and insert the following new Standing Order—
"Committee of Selection 3rd April, 1973.
60.—(1) At the commencement of each session the House shall appoint a Committee of Selection consisting of the Chairman of Committees and such other Lords as the House shall name.
(2) The Committee of Selection shall select and propose to the House the names of the Lords to form each Select Committee of the House except the Committee of Selection itself, any Committee otherwise provided for by statute or by order of the House and, unless the Chairman of Committees is of the opinion that the members of any such Committee should be appointed by the Committee of Selection or unless two or more members of that Committee request a meeting

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for that purpose, the following Committees:

(a) Select Committees on Private Bills;

(b) Select Committees on Opposed Personal Bills;

(c) Select Committees on Opposed Provisional Order Confirmation Bills;

(d) Joint Committees under the Private Legislation Procedure (Scotland) Act 1936 (Lords Members);

(e) Joint Committees under the Statutory Orders (Special Procedure) Act 1945 (Lords Members).

(3) The Committee of Selection may propose to the House the name of the Lord to be Chairman of a Select Committee.
(4) The Committee of Selection shall select and propose to the House the names of the panel of Lords to act as Deputy Chairman of Committees for each session.
(5) The Chairman of Committees shall have discretion to propose to the House, without reference to the Committee of Selection, the names of Lords to fill casual vacancies occurring in the membership of Select Committees."—(Lord Aberdare.)
On Question, Motion agreed to.

Standing Order (Private Business)
Lord Aberdare: My Lords, I beg to move the second Motion standing in my name on the Order Paper.
Moved, That the Standing Orders relating to Private Business be amended as follows:—
Standing Order No. 95
Leave out Standing Order No. 95 and insert the following new Standing Order—
"Appointment of Committees: House of, Commons, 109, 110.
95.—(1) The Chairman of Committees shall, unless he is of the opinion that the selected and proposed to the House by the Committee of Selection or unless two or more members of that Committee request a meeting for that purpose, name the Lords to form the following Committees:

(a) Select Committees on Private Bills;

(b) Select Committees on Opposed Personal Bills;

(c) Select Committees on Opposed Provisional Order Confirmation Bills;

(d) Joint Committees under the Private Legislation Procedure (Scotland) Act 1936 (Lords Members);

(e) Joint Committees under the Statutory Orders (Special Procedure) Act 1945 (Lord Members).

(2) The Chairman of Committees shall name the Lord who will be Chairman of any Select Committee appointed by him in pursuance of this Standing Order.
(3) The Chairman of Committees shall report to the House any appointments made by him in pursuance of this Standing Order."
Standing Order No. 104
Line 3, leave out "Committee of Selection" and insert ("Chairman of Committees in pursuance of Standing Order No. 95".
Standing Order No. 161
Line 5, leave out "Committee of Selection" and insert ("Chairman of Committees in pursuance of Standing Order No. 95").
Standing Order No. 185
Paragraph (1)(a), line 3, leave out "Committee of Selection" and insert ("Chairman of Committees in pursuance of Standing Order No. 95").
Standing Order No. 190
Line 1, leave out "Committee of Selection" and insert ("Chairman of Committees").
Standing Order No. 191
Paragraph (1), line 6, leave out "Committee of Selection" and insert ("Chairman of Committees in pursuance of Standing Order No. 95").
Standing Order No. 209
Paragraph (1), line 5, leave out "Committee of Section" and insert ("Chairman of Committees in pursuance of Standing Order No. 95").
—(Lord Aberdare.)
On Question, Motion agreed to.

British Nationality Bill
3.39 p.m.
The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State, Home Office (Lord Belstead): My Lords, I beg to move that the House do now resolve itself into Committee on this Bill.
Moved, That the House do now resolve itself into Committee.—(Lord Belstead.)
On Question, Motion agreed to.
House in Committee accordingly.
[The LORD ABERDARE in the Chair.]
Clause 1 [Acquisition by birth or adoption]:
[Amendments Nos. 1Z and 1 not moved.]
Lord Aberdare: I call Amendment No. 2. I have to point out that if this amendment is agreed to, I cannot call Amendments Nos. 3, 4, 5 and 6.
The Lord Bishop of Rochester The Lord Bishop of Rochester moved Amendment No. 2:
Page 1, line 9, leave out from ("citizen") to end of line 12 and insert—("unless—

(a) his father or his mother is a member of a mission within the meaning of the Diplomatic Privileges Act 1964; or

(b) his father or his mother is a member of a Consular post of any State, as defined in section 7(2) of the Consular Relations Act 1968;

and in either case the child acquires the nationality of another State at birth.").
The right reverend Prelate said: The most reverend Primate—
Lord Drumalbyn: Would it be in order that we discuss Amendment No. 3? I do not know what the noble Lord, Lord Aylestone, thinks, but may we

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discuss Amendments Nos. 3 and 5 along with this amendment?
Several noble Lords: No.
Lord Elwyn-Jones: With respect, I do not think that that would be convenient. I think that it would be confusing.
The Lord Bishop of Rochester: The most reverend Primate the Archbishop of Canterbury, who spoke from these Benches during the Second Reading debate on the Bill, is unable to be here until later today because he and the right reverend Prelate the Bishop of Truro are detained at York for an important debate in the General Synod of the Church of England. As some noble Lords will recall, while conceding that at some point a new nationality Act would be desirable, the archbishop insisted that the basis of any such measure must be clearly seen to be equality of respect and regard if it was to give reassurance and confidence to all concerned. He laid great emphasis upon belonging being a basic human need, and it is because we believe that Clause 1 of the present Bill is causing real anxiety and fear among those who thought that they and their children belonged, and would continue to belong, to Britain, that we on these Benches have tabled these amendments.
The effect of the amendment to Clause 1 is straightforward. It is to restore the law to the state it is in at present, under which, with very few exceptions relating to accredited diplomats, every child born in this country acquires British citizenship. As noble Lords will be aware, this provision in the present law is of great antiquity. For at least seven centuries it has been a settled principle of the common law that any person born within the Sovereign's dominions becomes a subject at birth. A similar principle exists in many other jurisdictions.
The present law offers a clear and uncomplicated statement of the principal means by which most people have acquired citizenship by birth in the territory. It is not merely clear and straightforward; it is of great importance as a feature of social policy. For centuries this country has absorbed settlers and refugees, merchants and writers—people from every part of the world who have enriched our life by their labours and gifts. Whatever the initial difficulties which these successive groups of people may have encountered, the fact that their children were British subjects from birth, with a right of abode and other civic rights and responsibilities, did much to integrate them into our society.
Rights and obligations held in common, rather than ancestry, have thus been the basis of citizenship. This is a gain for society. I believe that it also offers benefits to the individual. Noble Lords will recall that St. Paul spoke with pride of his civic status. "I was born free", he said; and this sense of pride in one's own status as a citizen, whatever the complications of one's parents' status, can be only an asset for individuals living in the exceptionally diverse and mobile society which is ours today.
I have tried very hard to understand why the Government feel that there is so pressing a need to change the
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citizenship by birth rule, as Clause 1 of the Bill does. Of course I recognise that there is a certain oddity in people who may be born here in transit, as it were, acquiring citizenship. But to me that seems to be an anomaly that is well worth putting up with in the interests of the substantial benefits which citizenship by birth confers, in particular on those who as children of recent arrivals desparately need all the assurance of a stable future that we are able to give them.
I must say that I find it hard to understand the concern at the possible creation overseas of a pool of British citizens by descent—the children of people who have acquired citizenship as a result of birth in the United Kingdom. Surely some such pool of people is already in existence. Has it hitherto been a matter of concern, would the foundations of the state really be imperilled, if individuals from this pool began to exercise their right to enter and to settle in this society?
What really concerns us on these Benches is the likely consequence of Clause 1 as it stands. As the noble Lord, Lord Pitt of Hampstead, so clearly spelt out in our earlier debate, the departure from the principle of jus soli will create many difficulties, both administrative and practical, and will create much uncertainty, too. It might prove difficult in the extreme for a person to establish to the satisfaction of the Home Office that he is a child of parents settled in this country. The mind boggles at the complications likely to arise where children who thought that they had rights of citizenship later discover that they are deprived of them because their parents who received a valid entry clearance subsequently have it challenged.
Noble Lords will remember the colourful examples of the Russian dancer and the Filipino domestic which the noble Lord, Lord Avebury, gave in the Second Reading debate. I am sure that many similar examples could be quoted, including those of unfortunate children born in Britain of parents who overstay their permit and are later deported.
I recognise that the Government responded to criticism of the clause in another place by introducing the provision which appears in subsection (4). I welcome in particular the fact that citizenship in the circumstances provided for in the subsection is an entitlement, and is not discretionary. Nevertheless, surely we should not underestimate the difficulties that a person is likely to encounter in establishing to the Home Secretary's satisfaction that he was not away from this country for more than 90 days in each of 10 years.
It is important to remember that the minority communities most likely to be affected by this provision have extensive family ties elsewhere in the world and many of them make regular visits with their children to their families. The occasion of applying for citizenship under the subsection might occur several years after the person in question became 10 years old, and in some cases perhaps after the death of both parents. How in such circumstances will such a person be able to collect the necessary documentary evidence? The subsection, indeed the clause as a whole, offers us I believe a bureaucratic nightmare.
Before I sit down I should like to mention that yesterday I received a telegram from the president of the Methodist Conference, which is meeting in Norwich, assuring me of the support of the conference for our

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amendment. Noble Lords will know already that the Cardinal Hume and the other four Roman Catholic Archbishops have affirmed that this Bill is in direct conflict with six of the nine principles set forth by the Roman Catholic hierarchy to guide the framing of a new law. One of the principles stated that anyone born in Britian should thereby acquire British nationality, regardless of race or cultural background. This principle has always been fundamental to our nationality law and should be retained. When one adds to the views of the Roman Catholics those of the people called Methodists and those of the Assembly of the British Council of Churches, your Lordships will see that I have the support today of what one might call that enlarged ecumenical establishment which is now a feature of our national life—something which will find expression in the conduct of the Royal Wedding Service and on all such future national occasions.
On so complex and technical a Bill, I would have felt it presumptuous for me to intervene were I not compelled to do so by the corporate views of the Anglican, Roman Catholic and Free Church leaders of the United Kingdom—views which arise not from academic discussion but from the first-hand experience of clergy and ministers at work, day in day out, in local communities up and down the land. They do not misunderstand the Bill, as has been alleged. They are deeply disturbed by it as priests and pastors of their people. We seek reassurance for those who have turned to us. We see this as a constitutional and pastoral issue which we believe should transcend party politics. I hope we may have the support of members of all parties and of none in making this amendment, so that the law of England granting citizenship by birth may remain as it has been for seven centuries. I beg to move.
3.52 p.m.
Lord Elwyn-Jones: Your Lordships may have been surprised that I did not move the first amendment, which is in my name, and your Lordships may have thought that I was struck by an unusual mood of reticence. But the reason for my decision (and, it may well be, the reason for the decision of the noble Lord, Lord Aylestone) was that certainly we on this side of the Committee thought it was right and fitting that the initial discussion of this crucial clause in the Bill should be in the hands of the Bench of Bishops, speaking, as they do, in a very ecumenical mood and situation on behalf of all the Christian Churches in this country.
They are perhaps a little more qualified than most of us, with their links with the clergy in the field, on the ground, close to the problems of uncertainty and anxiety that those who have come to us from Asia, Africa and the West Indies undoubtedly felt before this Bill and, alas! are feeling more now. The opinion that is coming to us—and some of us, also, have connections in or near the ground—is that real anxiety has been created by the Bill and, in particular, by the first clause of it; and that that should arise at this highly delicate stage in relations between different races and peoples in our island is, indeed, extremely unhappy.
The question has been asked: Why is it that suddenly, now, in 1981, a principle that for 700 years has governed
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nationality in this country is being changed; in circumstances which it is very hard to explain are not on other than racial grounds? What is the reason for it? We have not been told. It is said—and I am grateful to the noble Lord who is to speak for the Government for the notes on clauses that he has supplied to us—that it is the fear about the existence of this pool of people that will, without this provision, flood the country. Who are in this pool? What is the nature of their characteristics that renders them a special liability to this country? What has been the state of the pool up until now? I am not aware that the existing principle and rules provided great problems for this country, namely, concerning children of the strangers who, later on, have left the country and want to come back in again and take advantage of having acquired citizenship through being born here. How many of the transient strangers' children have in the past taken advantage of the rule to our disadvantage? These are real practical questions to which we have had no answer.
What causes us concern is that whereas, as the right reverend Prelate (whose speech I am sure the whole House will have appreciated) has indicated, initially the Bill provided that citizenship would no longer be automatically acquired on every birth in the United Kingdom (full stop), there is now the concession—for what it is worth, of course; it is better than nothing—that is provided for in subsection (4) of Clause 1 of the Bill. One has only to read that—and I congratulate the right reverend Prelate for his analysis of the technical problems that arise from the terms of it—and one sees that the advantage can be taken only by a person born in the United Kingdom after commencement who is not a British citizen by virtue of subsection (1) or (2) if, on an application made at any time after he has attained the age of ten years to be registered as a citizen, he can show that as regards the first ten years of his life the number of days on which he was absent from the United Kingdom in any one year did not exceed 90; and, finally, that the Secretary of State is so satisfied. This is in my submission a recipe for uncertainty, for arbitrariness and, I fear, for very considerable anxiety by those who would seek to take advantage of its provisions.
The Commission for Racial Equality, which has special responsibilities in this field, has strongly urged that the abrogation of the existing rule will produce not only uncertainty but a deterioration in race relations, and we believe that the automatic right of every child born here to be a British subject is a powerful force for strength and cohesion in our society. The great majority of the incomers who have settled here identify themselves strongly with Britain. The Bill, we submit, would tend to weaken that growing sense of patriotism, because a serious doubt would be put upon the citizenship of their children. I submit that that would be a heavy price to pay for whatever benefit it is claimed the proposed change in this ancient law may bring about. We believe that the present principle has caused no substantial difficulties in practice, and that its simplicity and inclusiveness far outweigh its disadvantages. We beg the Government to think again about this matter, particularly at this most critical phase in the relations between the peoples living in this island.
4.10 p.m.
Lord Avebury: I was delighted that the right reverend Prelate introduced this amendment and in doing so had, as he said, the backing not only of the Church of England but of all the Churches in the British Council of Churches, the Roman Catholic Church and, I believe, also of the Chief Rabbi, who has expressed opinions of a similar nature on this Bill. It shows, as the right reverend Prelate pointed out, that we are discussing an issue which goes well beyond the normal cut and thrust of party politics. The development of the case by the right reverend Prelate shows the untruth of the assertion made on several occasions by the Government that the criticisms of this Bill and of jus soli in particular indicate that the bishops and their counterparts in the other denominations have not properly understood the meaning of the Bill. The right reverend Prelate showed clearly that the Churches understand the Bill and that they do not like what they see in it.
Before coming to the substance of the amendment, may I say a word or two about the principle of jus soli? The idea of nationality developed from the allegiance which the subject owed to his sovereign. Bacon spoke of the famous case of Calvin about the
"allegiance of subjects to hereditary monarchs, which is corroborated and confirmed by law but is the work of the law of nature".
Who was a subject? Coke said that there were three tests which had to be satisfied for a person to qualify. His parents must be in actual obedience to the king, his place of birth must be within the king's dominions and the timing of birth might also have to be considered where there was any change in sovereignty, as there was in the case of Calvin. What Coke means by "actual obedience" is that the person must be in the territory of which the king is in possession and not one over which he has claimed.
This doctrine of allegiance as the basis of nationality has been abandoned since the 1948 Act, but one element of it, the element that we are discussing, jus soli, has been carried over into the new legislation. Jus soli has been defined as the rule under which nationality is acquired by mere fact of birth within the territory of the State; and, by custom, the rule is extended to apply to infants abandoned within the territory and presumed to be born there. Again by custom, it does not apply to the children of foreign heads of state, ambassadors or diplomatic staff. Apart from these exceptions, the nationality of the parents has not been considered in the past as relevant and neither has the legitimacy of the child. Until 1922, English law was based almost entirely on jus soli, as it had been for centuries, and since then we have retained the principle intact. But we have gradually extended our law in the direction of jus sanguinis; that is, the principle of acquisition of nationality by descent.
Meanwhile, the notion of citizenship had been gaining importance. Originally, that is what it meant: membership of the city. But even as long ago as the time of Christ, when Saint Paul proudly boasted that he was a citizen of no mean city he meant Rome and not Tarsas, from which he hailed; so that, in that sense, citizenship meant a status in the law which conferred rights and obligations, and those had to be defined by law. In the Roman Empire, the privileges of citizenship
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were extended to more and more people but there were always subjects of the emperor who were not of the city. Even after the time of the Emperor Cavacella, who extended citizenship to all free inhabitants of the Roman Empire, there were still the slaves who, while subjects of the emperor, were not citizens.
In modern times, the notions of nationality and citizenship had become almost co-extensive, but not quite. The case of Joyce versus the Director of Public Prosecutions showed that important distinctions might still exist. Joyce, "Lord Haw-Haw", who broadcast Nazi propaganda during the war, was born in the United States. He was the son of a nationalised American citizen who had emigrated there from County Mayo in Ireland and who, because Ireland was part of the United Kingdom then, was a British subject by birth. His father was the sole survivor of the Maamtrasna massacre of 17th August 1882. The father, Patrick Joyce, was only 12 at the time of the murders, was looked after in an orphanage in County Mayo and then emigrated to the US in 1890; and "Lord Haw-Haw" was born there in 1906. He lived in Ireland from 1909 to 1921 and then in England until 1939. While in England, in 1933, he obtained a British passport by virtue of his birth in County Galway and he renewed it in 1938. He was not born in County Galway but that was the basis on which he obtained the passport. He emigrated to Germany where he was employed in broadcasting Nazi propaganda during the war. Joyce was convicted of treason and was executed after the war. The Judicial Committee of your Lordships' House held that his allegiance continued because he had looked to the Crown for protection, as demonstrated by the act of seeking and obtaining a passport. He was deemed to be a subject although he was not a citizen,
There was another sense in which nationality departed radically from citizenship in the Commonwealth. In the 1948 Act, the terms "British subject" and "Commonwealth citizen" were almost interchangeable. I say "almost" because some people living in the Commonwealth did not acquire any citizenship. The largest number of those were the Indian Tamils in Sri Lanka who were, and still are, British subjects without citizenship. If you were a Commonwealth citizen, you were ipso facto a British subject but you could be a British subject without being a citizen of any country. That created some legal anomalies, in that many countries in the Commonwealth became republics on independence; and, although the Queen, as the head of the Commonwealth, was owed allegiance by the citizens of, for example, India under English law, by contrast, under Indian law, the concept of subject disappeared. The status of British subject nevertheless conferred some privileges on Commonwealth citizens here. This is a matter which we shall come on to later. They could vote, stand for public office, were eligible for jury service, et cetera.
At this point, I must look at the interaction between immigration and nationality law. The rights which I have mentioned could be exercised only by somebody who was physically present in the United Kingdom and, until 1962, anybody from the Commonwealth was free to come here as he pleased. Then we began to impose restrictions on the entry of citizens of other Commonwealth countries so that different classes of

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British subject had different kinds of rights. Even persons who were citizens of the United Kingdom and Colonies were no longer permitted to move freely within the territory of the state that they were supposed to belong to. Once they got here, they could enjoy all the privileges of a British subject but increasingly they were to be confined in practice to people with a close connection with the United Kingdom itself. The nature of this connection is defined in the Immigration Acts and it has always included birth in the United Kingdom.
In the Commonwealth, as countries obtained their independence, they adopted their own citizenship law and in general adopted the rule of jus soli. As the right reverend Prelate said, other countries have similar jurisdictions. If we look at Australia, Canada, New Zealand, the old Commonwealth, they all have it. India and Pakistan have jus soli. Nigeria, Tanzania, Uganda, Gambia, Kenya, all have the jus soli rule pure and simple. So did Trinidad, Jamaica, Barbados, and Guyana. Malaysia and Singapore had it. Guinea, Zambia, Lesotho and Botswana did. We are left with few exceptions: Sri Lanka, which had the additional requirement that a person's father had to have been born there; Sierra Leone and Malawi, which demanded that a person had to be of African parentage and Cyprus, where a person had to have a citizen father. In general, this rule of jus soli has been adopted throughout the Commonwealth.
I know it will be objected, as it was in the other place, that we should look to the European model rather than to the Commonwealth and that in Europe the jus sanguinis is the predominant rule. There is no reason why the United Kingdom should copy what is done elsewhere in Europe, particularly when what we are being asked to do is to abandon in favour of a system deriving from Roman law a principle of the common law which, as the right reverend Prelate mentioned, has been established for over seven centuries. It is worth noting that it is not only the common law countries which have jus soli. Just to mention a couple of examples from the beginning of the alphabet, for instance, Afghanistan, Albania, Argentina, Brazil, Bulgaria and Chile all have this rule of jus soli.
May I come to the merits of the argument. First and foremost, the Government's proposals are racially discriminatory within the meaning of Section 1 of the Race Relations Act 1976, in that the proportion of black people who will be able to comply with it is lower than the proportion of white people. This is a matter of fact; I am not expressing an opinion. Within the meaning of Section 1 of the Race Relations Act 1976, this is racially discriminatory. I know that the Race Relations Act does not apply to legislation of the kind that we are discussing. If it did, then what we are doing would be unlawful. Those who would be excluded from citizenship by the Bill, and who would otherwise have enjoyed it, will obviously be mostly other than of European ethnic origin, and I think that objection to Clause 1 as it stands is absolutely fundamental.
Secondly, because everybody knows that this provision is directed against black people, even though the number of them who are going to be affected may be quite insignificant, doubt is cast over the status of every black person whose citizenship might be unquestionable
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if he could establish it. Perhaps "unquestionable" is the wrong word because his citizenship will be questioned. Every parent who believes that his child has a claim to citizenship—to use the words of the Minister in another place in Committee—would have to write to the Home Office (and I quote from col. 44 of the Committee stage) and seek a letter which sets out the child's status. Is that really what the Government are suggesting? If they cannot provide letters making the status of refugees clear—and as a member of the Standing Conference on Refugees I have been involved in discussions over a considerable period aimed at trying to persuade the Home Office to issue these letters to refugees indicating their status so that when they go to apply for jobs or to seek social security benefits or obtain treatment tinder the National Health Service there is not a long argument about whether they are entitled or not.
At the end of the day the Home Office grudgingly agreed that they would issue these letters in respect of people declared refugees for the first time but that they would not possibly be able to undertake the issuing of letters to people who had already been declared as refugees in the past. If they cannot even do that, how are they going to be able to respond to the requests which are going to arrive for clarification of the status of children under this Bill? How are they going to get money to provide the additional staff for that purpose? Is there any money provided in the Financial and Explanatory Memorandum for this work?
Looking at it from the parent's point of view, he is going to have to go to the trouble of writing this letter providing what the Minister calls the necessary evidence to support his claim. The Minister does not specify what kind of evidence that has to be. Clearly, it would not be enough to show that the parents were within the permitted leave to remain at the time of birth. Otherwise, what happens in the case of a parent who entered with a work permit, had a child, wrote the letter and obtained citizenship for the child and was then found to be an illegal entrant on the basis of references which were incorrect in some minor particular? Is the child's citizenship then to be revoked as the parent's leave to enter would be in those circumstances?
In the case of the child who reaches the age of 10 years the parents will have to provide proof of residence throughout the whole of that period. The Minister in another place suggested that they could do this on the basis of statements from schools, doctors and other reliable witnesses. If the parents believe that the Home Secretary is withholding recognition of citizenship of the child unreasonably then Mr. Raison says that they can pursue their grievance in the courts. Yet in the next breath (at col. 46 of the Committee stage) he says:
"We are certainly not trying to add great layers of complication and bureaucracy to what is being done".
The parents have to trundle round to their doctors, to the teachers, and to "other reliable witnesses", as they are called—numerous magistrates, police officers, deputy secretaries from the Home Office who live in places like Oswald Road in Southall or Brick Lane in the East End, and who have taken one presumes, a close interest in the child throughout the whole of its first 11 years of existence, so close that they can say of

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their own knowledge that the child has never been outside of the United Kingdom for the whole of these 11 years for more than 90 days in any one year. Then the parent has to send this mass documentation to Lunar House.
I should pause here and say that I do not think that doctors are going to be very pleased to have parents coming round to their surgeries asking for affidavits on behalf of little Mohammed Khan or Balbir Kaur to say:
"this child has been a patient on my list throughout the whole of the first 11 years of its life and I know of my own knowledge that he or she has not been outside the United Kingdom for any period of more than 90 days in a single year of its life".
Nor do I think that the teachers are going to be able to provide such affidavits. As I remember it from the days when I had children at school, the summer holidays are longer than 90 days and so the teachers could not make a statement of that kind from their own experience.
Let us assume that the parents have persuaded all these busy people to write out statements. There may be more than one set of them because during the first 11 years of the child's existence the parents may have moved house once or more. Lunar House gets all these papers, and knowing the way that they operate at the Home Office, months go by without any sign of life. The parents then write and ask when they may expect a decision and probably as these work in the Home Office they get a printed acknowledgment from Lunar House saying that they are not to write any more letters and that if they do so it will gum up the machinery and make the processing of the application even more long-winded.
Now, suppose that the parents are fortunate enough to live in a constituency like Rochdale where my honourable friend Mr. Cyril Smith is noted for the hard work that he does on behalf of constituents. The parents go round to Mr. Smith's "surgery"—his advice bureau—and they complain that it is three months since they have heard a peep out of Lunar House. My honourable friend then writes immediately to the Minister sending him copies of all the documents and inquiring why there has been such a delay. The Minister, by the way, is already trying to cope with 1,200 letters a month, as he said in another place, and he cannot afford to give each of the letters he gets at the moment more than three minutes' attention each.
He sends all the correspondence to Lunar House where somebody has to marry it up with the application already made by the parents. They have to examine both files. Let us suppose that in due course the officials reach the conclusion that the child has not satisfied the conditions, and so they write to the parents accordingly. The Minister also writes to my honourable friend notifying him of the decision. Again, knowing the way that these things work in the Home Office, the Minister's letter gets to my honourable friend the day after the parents have received the notification from Lunar House. They have been on the telephone to him in his office in another place and he is in the embarrassing position of having this anguished telephone call from the parents before he knows what is in the Minister's letter. But the following
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morning the Minister's letter will land on his desk and the final paragraph will read something like this:
"I have given this case the most careful consideration in the light of the representations but I am afraid I can see no reason to reverse the decision".
Let us suppose that my honourable friend thinks the Minister is wrong. He makes an appointment to see the Minister, as honourable Members have the privilege of doing, accompanied by the parents. The Minister is flanked by his private secretary and two officials from Lunar House. He sees Mr. Cyril Smith and the parents for three-quarters of an hour. At the end of that time he reaffirms his refusal.
The parents then, advised by my honourable friend—and remembering what the Minister said about judicial review in Standing Committee—apply for legal aid and pursue their case in the Divisional Court. After detailed examination of their means and of the merits of the case, legal aid is granted. Several thousand man-hours of the time of expensive professionals are taken up with the proceedings, whatever the result may be. Layers of complication and bureaucracy? This clause is a mille-feuille of complication and bureaucracy.
Now let me touch very briefly on the Government's arguments, as they were set out in the White Paper and reiterated in Standing Committee in another place. The Government are concerned, they say, not merely with the woman who is in the country for a short stay, and who gives birth unexpectedly early, but with people here for longer periods on conditions, such as students, and with illegal entrants and overstayers. I think we can dispose fairly rapidly of what I might call the "Waterloo Station" case. Airlines will not carry a woman who is more than seven months pregnant, so very few of these are likely to arrive. I think the Minister himself has conceded that what we are really looking at is the case of people who are here for longer periods on conditions, or overstayers or illegal entrants.
As to the students, they have to return to their country of origin at the end of their courses of study, and since they will take with them any children who may have been born here, the children will, almost invariably, assume their parents' citizenship. There may be a few countries where dual nationality is allowed, and where a child could theoretically retain his United Kingdom citizenship—or British citizenship, as it will be called—into adult life, even though he has no practical links with Britain. But the same could be said of the large numbers of other countries which have jus soli and which accept large numbers of overseas students, such as Canada and the United States.
Both Canada and the United States accept proportionately more overseas students than we do, but they do not seem to find any problem about children of overseas students going back with their parents at the end of their university courses, and then, after 18 or 19 years, wanting to re-enter Canada or the United States as adults. If the policies of the present Government are continued for very much longer, not only will the flow of overseas students dry up, but the higher education system will be so severely mutilated that it will be extremely difficult for a future Liberal and Social Democratic Administration to nurse it back to the point where numbers can be restored.

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With regard to the children of alleged illegal entrants, I am extremely unhappy about the Government's policy. I gave the example on Second Reading of the Filipino woman—I shall just repeat it very briefly—who enters this country with a work permit in, say, 1975 and in 1982, after this Bill has come into force, has a child. Then, in 1990, somebody with a grievance against the woman writes to the Home Office, alleging that she worked as a cook at the Marcos Hotel in Manila for only four years instead of the five years that it says in her references. The Home Office causes investigations to be made through our Embassy in Manila and the proprietor of the Marcos Hotel confirms that for the first year this woman was employed by them she was a dishwasher and worked as a cook only for the last four years.
In case any noble Lord accuses me of inventing an outlandish and absurd example, I must say that I am pursuing a case where a person has been declared to be an illegal entrant on precisely these grounds. So the mother is declared to be an illegal entrant and the child, who might have been supposed to be a British citizen for the eight years of her life, is thrown into limbo. Does that child qualify for Filipino citizenship, whether legitimate or not? I do not know the answer to that question. I am asking the noble Lord the Minister. It is not meant to be a rhetorical question.
I suppose that the Minister will have the answer to the question, because he will remember that I raised it on Second Reading. But he must be certain of it with regard to every nationality, because it could be not a Filipino woman but a Cypriot woman, a Turkish woman or a Portuguese woman—any one of the numerous nationalities to whom work permits may have been granted in the past and where, in future, because some defect is found in the references by which she obtained a work permit, the woman is declared to be an illegal entrant.
The Minister said, at column 46 in the Official Report of the proceedings in another place as long ago as 12th February, that the Government were considering what amendments to the immigration rules would be appropriate if Clause 1(1) should become law. Broadly speaking, children born here would not have the right of abode, and that must apply to all children, since at any time the parents may lose their status, But we need to see, I suggest, exactly how this will be expressed in practice, because it is not quite as simple as Mr. Raison appeared to be suggesting. So why can the Government not publish draft amendments to the rules, as was suggested in another place?
Let me give just one illustration to show the kind of problem that may arise. If children are to be brought into line with their parents, which is broadly what Mr. Raison was saying, what is to happen if the parents should die? Suppose that, in the case of the Filipino woman, she is a single parent, and that while the Minister is in the process of making a decision about having her removed back to the Philippines on the basis of false references, she unfortunately dies. Is the child then to be removed to the Philippines at the age of eight, without any checks on the possibility of care at the other end? Of course, the Minister will say that nobody could imagine the Home Office behaving in such an inhumane way, but what I am
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asking is whether they will have the power to do that and, if so, what restraints will be exercised on the use of that power?
I have to point out also that the provisions in Schedule 2 for reducing statelessness, on which the Minister relied so heavily in another place, would be of no assistance in cases of the kind I am mentioning. The Filipino child, if it does not acquire Filipino nationality, would not, as a result of the provisions of Schedule 2, be qualified to receive British nationality.
There are two other matters that I want to touch on—
Several noble Lords: Come, come!
Lord Avebury: I shall be very brief at this stage. I could always make other speeches later. That would be just as easy. After all, we are at Committee stage. This is perhaps the most important amendment that we shall consider during the course of the whole proceedings on the Bill. The General Secretary of the Joint Council for the Welfare of Immigrants wrote to the Home Office on 5th August 1980 asking about the implications of the case of Pieck, which was heard in the European Court, and he has still not had a reply. What that case decided was that the stay of a Community national cannot be restricted to the grant of a limited leave to remain. So the question is whether EEC nationals, who are admitted for the purposes of work, may in future, as a result of decisions which we debated on another occasion, be admitted for purposes other than work.
We want to broaden the rights of residents which are laid down in the treaty, so as to admit people of independent means, the retired and so on. These people, equally, would have to be admitted under the treaty, I presume, without restrictions. So are those people "settled" within the meaning of Clause 1 of this Bill and, if so, would their children automatically qualify for United Kingdom citizenship? If they would, then I am very delighted. I am just pointing it out though, because, if that is so, it is a further step along the road of giving preference to citizens of the EEC as compared with any other part of the world.
The other point that I wanted to get on the record, which has also been the subject of correspondence between the Joint Council for the Welfare of Immigrants and the Home Office, is whether a person who is absent for a period of up to two years may be considered, while he is temporarily overseas, to remain settled here, for the purpose of Clause 1. This, again, is important because if his wife, who is left behind in the United Kingdom, has a baby during his absence and he then returns after a period of, say, 18 months, and the wife is found not to have had proper leave to remain in the United Kingdom, would the child then be a United Kingdom citizen?
I just mention those features to illustrate the appalling complexity to which the right reverend Prelate has already drawn our attention. We are entering a minefield and one which will result in huge amounts of litigation, and huge amounts of work in the office of the Minister. I wonder what on earth can be the object of the Government in creating these enormous problems. Paragraph 43 of the White Paper said that the Government

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were uneasy that a child born here would be able to transmit British citizenship to his own children born years later, and those citizens with a right of abode would form a pool of considerable size having no real connection with the United Kingdom.
The Minister emphasised the numbers argument in Standing Committee when he said at col. 41:
"Even if the yearly figures were as small as honourable Members opposite suggested, they would still mount up over the years, with the effect that the White Paper suggested, namely, an increase in our potential immigration commitment".
Yes, there could be a few people who, though patrial, left the United Kingdom with their overstaying or illegal entrant parents and who possess the right to come back here as adults. Yes, some of them would want to exercise that right. And, yes, the majority of those young people would be black. It is to prevent that trickle of black migrants entering this country after every other door and window has been hermetically sealed against migrants from beyond white Europe and the old Commonwealth that we are overturning common law rights going back over the centuries, souring relations with our old friends and allies in the Commonwealth, rendering children stateless, throwing suspicion on the status of young people and enmeshing their parents in a web of red tape. This must be wrong, and I hope that your Lordships will put a stop to it.
4.31 p.m.
Lord Home of the Hirsel: I am sure that the right reverend Prelate the Bishop of Rochester would not wish to imply that there can be only one view of this Bill which is consistent with Christian morality. That simply is not so. I cannot claim to be as good a Christian as the right reverend Prelate, but I may be as good at detecting flaws in the text of an amendment which would have very undesirable effects. Therefore, it is perfectly possible that we in this House, as Christians, can have very many views on the Bill.
I am by nature a traditionalist but there comes a time when the facts of life compel adaptation and change. I cannot escape the conclusion that jus soli is such a case at this time, and I have risen to say why, as requested by the noble and learned Lord, Lord Elwyn-Jones. In the days that were recalled by the right reverend Prelate and by the noble Lord, Lord Avebury, we could afford to be almost quixotic in our nationality laws and our immigration rules, and they were, of course, widely liberal. Those were the days when we had very few people in this country and when we were in total command of the Commonwealth and all its rules. But now there is a very great change. We are now an overcrowded country which is bulging at the seams. There is fresh evidence of this every day.
As I said at the Second Reading of the Bill, and I shall not repeat it except in shorthand, there are now people in the Commonwealth and outside it who are conducting a profitable business in illegal immigration and who are conducting it quite successfully. A good many illegal immigrants are in this country today. As we all know, thousands of tourists and students visit this country every year or stay in this country for a number of years on a scale which was totally unkown only a few years ago.
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When we have an amendment of this sort we have to look at the text and see what it will do. My noble friend on the Front Bench, Lord Belstead, will correct me if I am wrong, but according to the amendment as it stands the son of an illegal immigrant who has taken the trouble successfully to cheat the immigration laws would, as I understand it, be able to rely on the fact that his son—and not only his son but his grandson—would be able to claim permanent citizenship of this country. That is a proposition which I think will outrage the ordinary citizen who is here legally as a citizen of this country with a right of abode.
In these days of mass travel there are very large numbers of students. If again I am not wrong, let me take as a practical example a boy and a girl coming from Iran who have a child or a number of children. Those children would automatically, in the words which were used by the noble and learned Lord, Lord Elwyn Jones, be citizens of this country—and not only they, but their children in turn. I am all for elasticity in the law, but I cannot really see anything in Christian morality or common sense which dictates that such children should have permanent citizenship of this country. So the right reverend Prelate will not be surprised to hear that I shall oppose this amendment which he has moved, from conviction that these sort of people should not have permanent citizenship of this country. I hope, as I said at the start, that there is nothing in Christian morality which will excommunicate me for holding those views.
4.35 p.m.
Lord Belstead: I wonder whether it would be helpful if I said a fairly brief word on behalf of the Government at this stage of what appears to be a quite lengthy debate. First, the effect of the amendment, and of the amendments which hang with it, would be to remove from the Bill the Government's proposal that in future a child born in this country should be a British citizen if one of the parents, either the father or the mother (because this is a Bill which for the first time in the law of this country will, if Parliament passes it, bring equality of the sexes into our nationality arrangements) is a British citizen or is settled here.
I begin by saying that because, if the noble Lord, Lord Avebury, will forgive my saying so, it sounded from his speech, interesting though the details were, as though the only criterion for citizenship was settlement. This is very far from the case. This amendment, tabled by the most reverend Primate and the right reverend Prelates and moved by the right reverend Prelate the Bishop of Rochester, is more or less word for word identical with an amendment which was moved by the right honourable Gentleman, Mr. Roy Hattersley, at the Report stage in another place.
In today's debate on this amendment it has been asserted that the all-inclusive method of conferring citizenship on anyone who is born here is a matter of great principle. The reason why I refer to the fact that the parentage of this amendment came from the Opposition Front Bench in another place is because it is sensible to look at what the Labour Party actually said about this matter when they were in Government. One has only to look at the Green Paper, the discussion paper produced by the previous Government in 1977,

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which was the run-up to legislation upon this matter. It is quite true that that discussion paper wanted to retain the principle of jus soli, but more as a matter of convenience than as a matter of high principle. Paragraph 34 of the Labour Party's Green Paper said that it favoured jus soli on the whole because of, as the noble and learned Lord, Lord Elwyn-Jones, said, simplicity and inclusiveness. But the discussion paper also pointed out the drawbacks of conferring citizenship indiscriminately.
If there is an issue of principle upon this important amendment, I would put it to your Lordships' Committee that it is arguable that it lies against the amendment. A point upon which there has been unanimous agreement between the previous Government and the present Government is that, if we are to put right the main defect which is to be found in the nationality law of this country today, we need to confer British citizenship upon those who have a close connection with this country. How can it make sense, then, to say that anyone who happens to be born here must be eligible to be a British citizen? And, as my noble friend Lord Home of the Hirsel said, not only that but to transmit British citizenship to their children, even though the person concerned may literally have been born to people who were here in transit and may go off and live elsewhere for the rest of their lives.
Lord Hatch of Lusby: Will the noble Lord allow me to intervene?
Lord Belstead: Of course.
Lord Hatch of Lusby: I am sure that there is no question of a deliberate falsification here, but if the noble Lord will read Hansard tomorrow he will find that he has juxtaposed a discussion paper with a Government decision. Surely the Green Paper that he is referring to was a paper for public discussion which was not, and was never intended to be, Government policy. I think that his argument from that point is quite a false argument, because this was not Government policy; it was a discussion paper that brought out the pros and cons of every issue that is included in this amendment.
Lord Belstead: It is absolutely true that of course the previous Government never got as far as actually turning its discussions and its intentions into policy and into action, but it is quite clear from the preface to the previous Government's Green Paper and from the words which are used, when it says that "the main ideas canvassed in this document are summarised below", that the things which were said in the discussion paper were included because the Government of the day felt that they were worth consideration. Some of the things which were considered in paragraph 34 of that Green Paper were warnings of what could happen if, indiscriminately, citizenship was conferred upon people who were either in transit with the mother, it may be en route elsewhere, or people who gained citizenship for their children and then the children decided that they would live the whole of the rest of their lives abroad, and indeed—and the previous Government put this; I did not—people who simply arranged for citizenship to be acquired because it
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would be useful later. I am saying to the Committee that those were warnings which were put forward in the previous Government's Green Paper, and I really do think that Parliament has a duty to heed the warnings which were given four years ago.
My noble friend, Lord Home of the Hirsel, said in essence in his speech that times have changed, and the European countries, and not least our island, have changed very much in the past 30, 50, let alone the past 100, years. We live in a time when air travel is quick and when the wish to travel in order to study, to work or just to visit has taken on a wholly new dimension. For these reasons people avail themselves of modern facilities to come here in very large numbers, but that does not mean that all their children who may be born here must, as of right, be eligible for British citizenship and have the right to pass on those rights to their children and—I should like to make the point—nor would the majority of our visitors expect it.
The noble Lord, Lord Avebury, again in a most interesting part of his speech, gave examples of countries around the world which retain the jus soli principle. I listened as carefully as I could, but I did not discern in the list which the noble Lord gave very many countries which bore much relation to the demography and the logistics and the general society in which we live in this country today. In Europe, of all the 10 countries of the European Community there is one country, and one country only, which does what the amendment moved by the right reverend Prelate would wish us to do, and that country is the Republic of Ireland. All the other countries of the European Community today require the parent to be a citizen before citizenship can be transmitted to the child, and in many countries it is only the father who can transmit. By comparison, Clause 1 provides that there will be no sex discrimination in our nationality law. For the first time children would be able to take their citizenship from their mother or their father, and unlike most countries relying on citizenship requirement for acquisition, Clause 1 also says that if the mother or the father is settled in the United Kingdom that makes the children citizens by birth.
Upon this the noble Lord, Lord Avebury, has fastened as being something which is racially discriminatory. I really do think that the use of the "settled" criterion in this context indicates an approach which must be wholly non-racial. What Clause 1 is saying is that settled parents who are not citizens can have children born here who would become citizens, a proposal precisely designed to try to integrate children into the community in which they are born. But it is said that the term "settled" includes ordinary residents and that is not a clear concept. For someone who remains out of the country for very long periods that may occasionally be so, although usually a sensible judgment can be arrived at when the facts are examined. Otherwise it will normally be quite clear whether a person is settled here or not and, generally speaking, anyone who is living here free of conditions on his stay will be regarded as "settled". Of course the term "settled" excludes illegal entrants and overstayers, and indeed anyone who is not free of restrictions on his or her stay here; but in the view of the Government it is right that people in those categories should be excluded.

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I should like now to cut my remarks short because I think probably we may go on somewhat longer and there may be questions for me to answer, but I will finish simply by saying this: on top of the criterion of requiring that the parents should be citizens, or settled, my right honourable friend the Home Secretary then said that he would respond to what he realised were concerns about a major change in the law and therefore he would write a major amendment into what is now Clause 1(4). This provides that a child born here who does not become a British citizen through his parents' British citizenship or settled status shall none the less also have an entitlement to registration 10 years later if he or she has resided here continuously since birth and short periods of absence should be permitted. I know that there are amendments tabled to this by noble Lords in different parts of the Committee, and I am sure that the period of absence is something that we shall want to look at. Nevertheless, that is the way subsection (4) will work, and that entitlement can be claimed by children growing up in this country without realising that their parents are not lawfully settled here.
Finally, I know that again it has been claimed that subsection (4) itself contains conditions which it would be difficult to prove that one had met, but I genuinely believe that there is a misunderstanding. There is no need in subsection (4) to produce evidence about the parents: the whole point of subsection (4) is that all that would be needed would be evidence of residence of the child in this country since birth. That does not mean that every day's presence in this country has to be documented. All that the Secretary of State would do would be to take a view of each application on the balance of probabilities, and of course where these pointed to the applicant being entitled to registration, the Secretary of State would be acting unreasonably in denying registration—and that would be a matter for the courts.
So I repeat, because both the previous Government and the present Government have met on common ground, I think it is fair to claim, if we are to try to bring our nationality law up to date, the criterion for British citizenship which would equate with the right of abode in this country should be that people should have a close and continuing connection with this country. But this means that at the same time to confer that citizenship as of right upon children who happen to be born here of parents, neither of whom is a citizen and neither of whom is free of conditions of stay, really is to fly in the face not only of prudence but also of reality. I ask your Lordships to view this amendment in that particular light.
4.50 p.m.
Lord Aylestone: This is probably the most important amendment and the most important clause in the Bill. In not moving my amendment, which until yesterday was No. 1, I followed the lead of the noble and learned Lord, Lord Elwyn-Jones, and I am glad that the right reverend Prelate was able to move his amendment, which was No. 3. My reason for withdrawing was twofold; first, that the right reverend Prelate and his colleagues speak for a much wider audience than I do, and, secondly, because his amendment was a better
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one than mine, in that it took the children of diplomats out of a position, which my amendment failed to do, and it also guaranteed that no child born in this country should be stateless.
We have heard from the noble Lord, Lord Avebury, and from the right reverend Prelate, the principle of jus soli has been with us for many centuries. I do not propose to go through the history of those centuries. In the first place, I could not; I do not understand what happened in that period of time. But I do know now that, if this amendment is not carried, we shall depart from something which has been part of our law in this country for many hundreds of years. The noble Lord, Lord Home, to whom I listened with great care, as I always do, seemed to think that this Bill had something to do with immigration and immigration laws. In fact, it has not. We are given to understand that it is a Bill to deal with nationality and citizenship. I hope that we shall consider it on that basis.
Until 1948, right through the centuries, children born here were subjects of Britain, but from 1948 they became citizens. This system of jus soli is extremely simple; it is readily understood by everyone, which is important when you have many people here who hardly speak English; it is important that they should understand what their rights are. The system is completely unambiguous, and, what is more important, it is certain; if a child is born on our soil, in this country, that child is a British citizen. It has been mentioned by the noble Lord, Lord Avebury, that the United States has the same principle, and surely there you have a country with very many more nationality problems than we have. They do not find any difficulty at all in making it work.
I have wondered why, as was mentioned at Second Reading, the Government wish to end this system of jus soli, and the noble Lord, Lord Belstead, in his first intervention, seemed to suggest that if the former Administration had become the Government at the last general election they would have proceeded on the same lines. If one looks at the deliberative document, the Green Paper—and that is what it is, a deliberative document—it was made absolutely clear that, having examined it, they were of the opinion that jus soli should remain. We are told by the present Government that this is likely to prevent abuse, prevent pregnant mothers coming here, simply to have children and have those children brought up as British citizens. I think we are entitled to ask how much of that takes place in any one year. How many pregnant mothers come here for that purpose? If the Government have decided they ought to end it, they must have an idea of the figures. How many overstayers are there; how many illegals who have children in this country? Are these significant numbers? There may be a significant number of people who get in illegally, but do they all have children who illegally become British? We have had no figures. There has been no proof of any of the assertions. Therefore, it leads one to believe that, although we were told that this Bill has nothing to do with immigration, the noble Lord, Lord Home, may be right; perhaps it has a great deal to do with immigration laws.
May I deal with two anomalies within it. I do not want to take up any more time, as so many people want to speak. Take a child of a foreign family living

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in this country at the moment, foreigners working here, maybe in the catering trade; that child is British. After the passing of this Bill, when it becomes an Act, if it does, that same little family, still working here, legally, may have a second child, and the second child will not be British, unless they take some method of registration, which will not be easily understood and will have to be looked at very carefully before anyone does in fact understand it.
Taking the second point, in the years to come, perhaps when two brothers of a family wishing to go abroad together apply for passports for the first time; they might very easily find that the one who is two years older than the other is entitled to a British passport, but his younger brother, unknown to him, is not entitled to a British passport, because he was born after the Royal Assent to this Act. And so on; we can deal with anomaly after anomaly that is likely to arise. I am of the opinion that the abolition of the principle of jus soli is something, if it is done, we shall regret for a long time. I am of the opinion, too, that it is quite unnecessary, and should the right reverend Prelate decide to take his amendment through the Division Lobbies I will follow him.
Lord Rawlinson of Ewell: My noble friend Lord Home of the Hirsel replied to the right reverend Prelate, who moved this amendment with a speech of great grace and authority. I would not dare to intervene between them. But the right reverend Prelate did refer to the Cardinal Archbishop of Westminster and the Roman Catholic hierarchy. I do propose to intervene, being a member of that Church, between that hierarchy and this House. I do it, also, in the presence of my noble friend the Duke of Norfolk. This is a matter on which, as the right reverend Prelate said, the leaders of other denominations have given their statements. They have made their statements, and I am saddened to see that it is put on the basis as though there is some moral purpose or moral decision. In my view, it is a matter of politics, a matter of administration and a matter of law.
There are, of course, as we have heard many times this afternoon, the two concepts of the jus soli and the jus sanguinis. Both are respectable ethical concepts; both are hallowed in international law. They are practised by differing nations, according to the reasonable interests of those states. There is nothing reprehensible in either. I would, therefore, ask this of the bishops of my Church: Will they say to the bishops in Europe, on the Continent, where the jus sanguinis applies, that that is something immoral, unethical, something that ought to be changed? Of course, not. Jus sanguinis stands in those countries and is supported by the nation states of Europe and by the hierarchies of Europe because it is a system which those countries find most acceptable, a system of devolving national citizenship.
Of course, in certain countries the jus soli has been the historical basis, as it was in this country. Obviously, the United States of America—"Give me your poor, give me your needy"—with all the riches and all the resources and all the great geographical space, always have and always would accept the principle. So in Canada and so in Australia. And in this country, as my noble friend Lord Home said, in
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days gone by, when it was sensible and practicable, so it was accepted, over those hundreds of years. But nowadays, with the space and the population of this country, with the responsibility that we as parliamentarians owe to the people of this country, have we not got to accept and have we not got to understand that it is our duty at this stage and at this time to look after the interests of all the peoples of this country? There are the problems of the end of empire and postwar immigration. Let us remember that there are not queues of people seeking to come to the Continent of Europe—they are only coming to this country. It is to this country that they are coming. It is, therefore, this country which faces the problem and has the necessity for control.
I would only say to those who say that this Bill has nothing to do with immigration that of course it has to do with it. It is fortunately at the end of time, I hope, going to settle all the problems that we have. I think that we are entitled to have a little suspicion of the judgment of those who oppose this Bill because some of them were the people who opposed any form of immigration control whatever in 1962. The Front Bench of the Labour Party at that time opposed it. Their judgment, I would suggest—and, on reflection, I am sure that they would agree—was wrong. I wonder, therefore, whether we should rely upon it now.
However, it is the confusion in the United Kingdom law which is of such great offence to everybody. Citizens of other Commonwealth countries and citizens of the United Kingdom and Colonies are British subjects and therefore British nationals. That is nonsense. British subjects like British protected persons and in a qualified sense even citizens of the Republic of Ireland, are amenable in certain circumstances, odd as it may seem, to British criminal jurisdiction with regard to offences outside the United Kingdom. It is a mess. A distinction between the rights of entry and residence in this country is now made between different categories of British subject and that applies formally without regard to citizenship. There is a hotchpotch of immigration laws, and control is obviously necessary.
We are driven, therefore—driven by national circumstances—to the present position. I am sure that the bishops—and I speak only of the bishops of the Church to which I belong—and I am sure also the right reverend Prelate and his colleagues on his Bench, will not overlook the rights, the desires and the just aspirations of the indigenous people of this country and of the people who have come to this country and who are citizens of this country.
A person who comes to this country as an immigrant takes a conscious act. He comes to this country and accepts, therefore, various responsibilities as well as rights by coming to this country. The responsibilities are to live in accordance with the laws of this country, to play a part within the customs of this country and to give allegiance to this country, and by far the greater proportion of them all do so. However, there is, and always has been, the racket of which my noble friend Lord Home of the Hirsel has spoken and of which I have spoken previously. It is a racket which is sometimes done from this country, sometimes done from Pakistan, sometimes done from India and sometimes

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done from the West Indies. It is a racket which we, as sensible people, must see is driven out. Nationality denotes the quality—
Lord Pitt of Hampstead: My Lords, will the noble and learned Lord—and I do not mind if he does it publicly here—indicate a single occasion on which he has known of racketeers from the West Indies arranging illegal immigration?
Lord Rawlinson of Ewell: The noble Lord asks whether I personally know of it and I must say that I do not personally know of it, but I do know of those who have spoken of it. I believe that there were people who were exploited and who were brought here certainly in the 1960s and in the early 1970s. But if the noble Lord tells me that it does not exist from the West Indies, very well then, it does not exist from the West Indies. However, I believe that there have been unfortunate people who have been preyed upon by excessive prices and costs which have been imposed upon them in attempting to come to this country.
I was saying that nationality denotes the quality of political membership of a state and it is governed primarily by municipal law. In principle it is accepted in international law that the question of nationality is within the jurisdiction of the state. It has been obvious for a long time that this country must establish a firm nationality law.
The Government by deciding, I think rightly, to limit the jus soli has qualified that limitation. It is not very extensive. Some people may think that it is too generous. I do not take that view: I think that it is right. It is for the British citizen; or the parent who is a British citizen; or the person settled here; or the person one of whose parents later becomes settled or resident here; or the person who has lived here for 10 years. That is surely reasonable and sensible when you are faced with a crisis. It is no use noble Lords thinking that there is not a crisis, because a crisis there certainly is.
I do not believe also that there will be such difficulties of proof in later years. If any of us emigrated to a new country and were told that we had to keep records of ourselves and our children until we became a citizen of that country, would we not say that they were perfectly entitled to ask us to do that? Why are we not entitled to ask people to do that? If there is a need for help surely it ought to be given and I am sure it will willingly be given by the clergy. The clergy would assist with persons who were seeking to become citizens of this great country, but there should be records kept and helpful assistance given to them.
We live, as is obvious, in dangerous and troublesome times and if we are seen not to be facing the realities in Parliament, how can we expect other people to meet the responsibilities elsewhere. It is so easy, I suggest, to assume an attitude of confused liberal desire to promote the interests of individuals. We have all that, unless our opponents in this debate accuse us of being evil. We all have that feeling, we all have those beliefs. It is not a matter of ethics: it is a matter of law and the law requires precision. I do not believe that a morality, said to be a muddled morality, should be confused with ordinary political judgment.
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Therefore, it was with the very greatest of respect that I listened to the views of the right reverend Prelate and it was with the very greatest of respect, as I know he will appreciate, that I listened to the views of the bishops of the Church to which I belong. But I believe that this is a matter in which political judgment and lay judgment is superior to that of the clergy.
The Earl of Longford: Before the noble and learned Lord sits down, I should like to ask him to agree that he is speaking entirely for himself and his much respected colleague the Duke of Norfolk, and not for the Catholic Members of this House.
Lord Rawlinson of Ewell: Of course, my Lords, I am sure that that is very obvious because of the intervention by the noble Lord, Lord Pitt of Hampstead, in the middle of my speech. The noble Earl's intervention now makes the situation clear. I speak, as I say, as a member of that Church, and I speak with great and due respect to the views expressed by the bishops in my Church. Nevertheless, these are my views and they are based upon my political judgment, which I maintain.
5.8 p.m.
The Lord Bishop of Liverpool: I follow with all the energy I can my noble friend the right reverend Prelate the Bishop of Rochester in pressing the simplicity and certainty which this amendment would give. The question has been raised again of moral and Christian comment. The noble Lord, Lord Home of the Hirsel, rightly declared his right to speak as a Christian. However, we are not simply swapping different individual Christian views or the views of lay Christians against priestly Christians. There has been very substantial debate in all the Churches for a number of years. There is no subject in which the Christian conscience has become more keenly engaged than in this matter which we are debating today. Within the Churches it has been a debate in which black people and Asian people have played a very full part.
There are very deep feelings held within the Churches. The noble Lord spoke of the Roman Catholic Church. I had the privilege of being a full member of the National Pastoral Congress throughout its time in Liverpool last year. This subject was one of those debated by almost entirely a lay conference in which very strong views were held. The leaders of the Churches speak about this matter out of that continuing debate within their Churches. So often lay people turn to us and say: "Bishop, give us a lead", and of course when the lead comes—and there is a very clear lead from the leaders of all the Churches—it may not be the lead which people want. That does not end the debate. I am not for one moment claiming that kind of authority.
It is a proper calling to the Churches and leaders within the Churches to speak up in particular on behalf of those who feel that their voice is a weak one; in this case, people properly settled in this country, but who view this Bill with a great deal of fear and a great deal of insecurity. I want to speak about the way in which this Bill will be understood in those less sophisticated circles.

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Within the last 24 hours I have had the most sobering illustration of something that we in your Lordships' House need to understand. I was present here yesterday afternoon for the Statement about the troubles in Toxteth, and I listened to the first two comments made about those troubles before I had to leave to catch a train. My personal position is that I am on a sabbatical leave and feeling very frustrated, and not knowing where I ought to have been in the last few days. I went back to Liverpool last night and spent half the night, together with the Roman Catholic archbishop and other colleagues and friends, walking the district, listening to community leaders, and so on. I have to say that the way matters were understood and talked about in this House yesterday and the way in which they are perceived and understood in Toxteth are a very long way apart.
This is true in this matter. If the bishops and their advisers do not understand the Bill, what about the many in those less sophisticated parts of the community who view it with very great fear—those parts of the community where forms frighten people? There are genuine fears, and if we are concerned about good community relations, we must address ourselves to those fears. It is not enough to produce cold, rational arguments in your Lordships' House. Those human fears are part of the reality of what makes up good community relations. There are great fears of bureaucracy, which may not be easy for your Lordships to understand, because all of us have friends who are bureaucrats and we know our way round the system and do not have those fears.
However, cases of the kind which the noble Lord, Lord Avebury, cited are not far-fetched. Those of us who, on occasion, have tried to support those who face deportation under the present regulations have sensed the fear, the insecurity and the sense of rejection in the community. It is not a good track record to encourage people to think—as the noble Lord, Lord Belstead, suggested—that the process may be a simple and clear one. I hope that the Government will think again and accept this clear, clean reassertion of the ancient basis of citizenship rather than to depend on subjective decisions made at the discretion of the Home Secretary. For good relations the goal that we must seek is of black and brown British people who feel that they belong, are wanted and are valued.
Yes, a little country has a moral right and a moral duty to limit the numbers who can come into the country; but it does not have a moral right to say, either in words or in effect, what colour those people should be. The Government rightly say that this Bill does not say in any explicit way that there is a bar by colour. That is absolutely true; the Bill does not say it. But that is what its effect will be in many situations, and that is how it is understood by very many people who are in the weaker position in our country. The vast majority of people for whom this would have some concern—black and brown people born in this country—have no particular ties with or understanding of their parents' country of origin. Let us give them the secure base for their life here. With all the energy that I possess I support this amendment.
5.18 p.m.
Lord Mishcon: I have the feeling, if your Lordships
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will permit me to say so, that the right reverend Prelate the Bishop of Rochester sounded an organ note in your Lordships' Committee and, without any disrespect to subsequent speakers, I thought that I felt and heard very nearly the sounds of a piano afterwards. That is not meant simply to be a picturesque phrase, because to your Lordships there was made an appeal at this moment to stop people in this country from thinking that they do not belong.
Perhaps I could just smile for a moment in the midst of what, I hope, will be a short and serious speech. I find it dangerous to take from the Scriptures any sort of guide as to what happens to you when you plead nationality. I remember so well that, in very eloquent phrases, the example of Saint Paul was mentoned with the proud claim, "Civis Romanus sum". I had an ancester called Jonah and in the midst of a rather perilous voyage he was asked what his nationality was. With great pride he answered: "I am an Hebrew", and after an interchange of courtesies he was promptly thrown overboard. That is the last thing that I want to happen to me in addressing your Lordships this afternoon.
To return to the serious theme, this is not a debate which is being held in 1948, 1950 ar 1960; it is a debate which is taking place in 1981 when, tragically, this country has been riven and horrified by what has happened in three districts within, almost literally, weeks. There is not one person in this Committee, I hope, who will have one word of defence for those who have taken, not the law into their own hands, but who have taken savagery into their own hands in order to express a point of view, which I understand. But I know, and your Lordships know, that that is not the way to solve problems of this sort. But what of the moderate people? What of those who work in race relations? What of people like myself? If I may humbly say so, for many years I was chairman of the board of governors of a large comprehensive school in Stockwell, which is so near Brixton, where there was a very substantial number of black children. The one thing that will solve this problem, although it has many aspects, is to give security to those who, at the moment, feel desperately insecure.
I shall not go into discussions of unemployment, social deprivaton and discrimination this afternoon. If I may, I shall just go into the very matter with which Clause 1 of this Bill deals: the question of security that a child born in this country ought to have, so that when he goes to an English school he is as the boys are who are around him even before he reaches the age of 10; born like they were in this country as British. He may be jeered at because he is black, and maybe black children jeer at a white child because he is white; but the one thing that children are so cruel about is the chap, or the girl, who does not belong to the same sort of family as they do.
It is not an academic exercise that we want to deal with this afternoon. We are in 1981. We are legislating in days of racial tension such as this country has never had before, and never thought it would have. There is no question of party in this. I am not going to swap words on a matter of this kind with the noble Lord the Minister as to whether a Green Paper is a discussion document or not, or as to whether a previous Government said this or that, or the other. If it

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said something wrong as a previous Government, it was wrong, and if it was my Government that said it, it was my Government that was wrong. This is not the plane upon which the discussion and debate ought to take place today.
There is no question, if I may say so with deep respect—I am not going to mention names—of legalistic arguments. Really, do we want to go into the question of racketeers? Will we be stopping racketeers because some children are called British if we pass this amendment, who are not going to be called British if we do not? Is that going to stop racketeering? Of course it is not. The bishops and race relations officers know, and all of us know who try to do something about this problem, that whether you like it or not, unless you pass this amendment you are going to make a few more people feel they do not belong. You are going to make a few more kids unhappy. You are going to close the doors of a country that had the great tradition of which my forebears took advantage. That great tradition was that if you come here and—and I admit this argument—you obey our laws, then you are welcomed into the family.
Are we going to take the punishment of a father to the children if an immigration law is broken? What are these people doing? Have they committed murder? Is the world so nationalistic now that noble Lords seriously considering this amendment take the view that somebody who has tried to get here in order to get employment, in order to live in a free country, is a criminal? Is it such a crime for a human being to wander thus in God's world and to invade just a bit of his territory? Is that a crime?
It may be a necessary thing that we have regulations. Of course it is. Of course there are limits to our areas. Of course we have to limit immigration. I know it. But is the stranger who wanders in and comes through a gate surreptitiously in the eyes of any one of us a criminal? And if he is, are his children to suffer for it? I bring the Committee back not into legal arguments, or dissertations upon examples; I am trying to bring the Committee back to the organ note with which this amendment was moved.
5.25 p.m.
Baroness Trumpington: As I scribbled, better people than I said exactly what I wanted to say, so I have spent a great deal of time scratching out. I hope that I shall not repeat too much of what has been said in other places. I am deeply sympathetic to the worries and fear as expressed by the right reverend Prelates, but I wondered, when they were asked by their parishioners, where they went for help? Where did they go for the answers? Did they come to the all-party meetings which many of us have been attending? I know that they are extremely busy and that their main job is to work in their parishes, but at the same time I wonder where they obtained all the information from which they are so sure they are right and that those who have drafted and proposed this Bill are wrong.
I believe that the noble Lord, Lord Mishcon, introduced an emotional red herring into the debate when he mentioned the appalling violence which has
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been going on recently in various parts of this country. He is right: the odd man is the odd person out; but that has nothing to do with this Bill at the moment. If he is talking about immigrants, may I say, backing up what my noble friend on my right said earlier, that living on the Kentish coast I have seen those hell ships overloaded with people who are would-be illegal immigrants and on whom this Bill does have an effect. It is only they who will be affected and their children: illegal immigrants. I can see no reason why, after 700 years, we should not change our pattern and fit in with our neighbours. We are the odd man out at the moment. Why should we give unconditional citizenship to birds of passage? Why should we not look after the genuine citizens and those who genuinely wish to make their lives here, who have nothing to fear because the Bill makes provision for all bona-fide persons. Indeed, in many cases the people who are worrying the most have nothing to fear, because the status quo in their cases is not altered by the Bill.
I hope your Lordships will forgive this remark—it is meant to be a joke. The right reverend Prelates seem to have reached more ecumenical unity over this Bill than has been reached in other places, which, I cannot help feeling, must be a good start to this Bill, even if for unusual reasons. I hope that the right reverend Prelate will withdraw his amendment and that he will support my very modest one which is in the pipeline further on today.
Lord Hunt: Noble Lords will have noted that my name is on Amendment No. 1, and I should like to say that I am grateful that that amendment was not moved by my noble friend Lord Aylestone, because it has enabled me, at any rate, to listen with all the more attention to the considerable debate that has followed the amendment moved by the right reverend Prelate. All I wish to do is to put the question which comes foremost to my mind at this late stage in the debate on this vitally important question.
We have heard that the Government's intention in abandoning jus soli is, in part, on the grounds of the transients, the tourists, the students, the overstayers, the illegals, and the children whom they may produce while they are here. We have not heard so far—maybe the Government will produce some figures—any statistics. The noble Lord, Lord Home, said large numbers—presumably meaning large numbers of children—born to these categories of people. But we have not heard statistics, nor have we heard of any trouble over all the hundreds of years that have passed, nor, more importantly, in the very different world in which we are living today. Nor have we heard—I should like to know whether the Government are concerned about this—about how they see the future; whether they really see the retention of jus soli, if this amendment were to succeed, going into the Bill and becoming law, resulting in a sudden ingress of pregnant women coming to this country for the precise purpose of having their children here and passing on the convenience of a British passport in later years to their children.
Those questions deserve to be answered. On the one hand we have heard that, while on the other we have heard of the considerable difficulties placed by the consequences of abandoning jus soli on that section of

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our community which is entitled to come here, holders of United Kingdom and Commonwealth passports, who are entitled to come here, taking their turn in the quota, some of whom are already here but who will not qualify when the Bill becomes law because they will not have been in the country for long enough under the terms of the Bill. We have heard of the considerable problems and anxieties caused to parents and the delay, which has been mentioned by several noble Lords, in having their children registered. I thought, until the right reverend Prelate the Bishop of Liverpool referred to it, that we had not heard enough about the feelings, of which I know a certain amount, of those people whose present entitlement will be taken away.
Those are the two things we have heard a lot about and I must therefore ask a question. I hope the noble and learned Lord, Lord Rawlinson, will not accuse me of having confused liberal ideas or muddled morality in asking this question, because it is a practical and simple one: Is it really worth it? Is it worth creating such real difficulties, to which the right reverend Prelate referred, to those who are United Kingdom and Colonies passport holders, whose rights will be removed in this respect. We should think also of the feelings that this will engender, hostile to good community relations, on grounds of what I believe to be the relatively few who are not entitled to stay here and about whom we have had no convincing evidence of their having caused any trouble in the past. That, to me, is the important question.
Lord Underhill: It was not my intention to intervene in the debate until I heard the speeches of the noble Baroness, Lady Trumpington, and the noble and learned Lord, Lord Rawlinson of Ewell. The former accused my noble friend Lord Mishcon of emotionalism. I hope this matter will not be decided on emotion, but emotionalism is not necessarily wrong in this case. I shall determine it on what I believe to be right and what effect it will have on the apprehensions of a minority of people in this country, and we must not forget that.
The noble and learned Lord, Lord Rawlinson, accused—perhaps I should not use the word "accused"—at any rate referred to persons who could be described as liberal moralists (I am paraphrasing his remarks) and talked about confusion. He then went on to introduce every possible confusion he could think of, including the effects of immigration, the possibility of all the British subjects overseas being concerned in this, the question of a crisis, the possibility of a racket and the question of people in transit. Frankly, if the Minister intends to accept any of those arguments, I hope he will do what the noble Lord, Lord Hunt, suggested, and actually give us the figures.
As for the general position on immigration, I believe the latest figures show that more left the country in the last 12 months than actually came in. If it is the case that people come to this country in order to have their children and obtain British nationality for them, how many such people are involved? Statements should not just be thrown out if they will simply appeal to the emotions of those on the other side of the fence, and we should not allow ourselves to be swayed by all sorts of points that are just thrown into the debate without any facts, arguments or statistics being given. In the
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absence of any such facts or statistics, I shall adhere to what I believe is right and proper, compared with the possible terrible effects on a minority of people in this country.
The Duke of Norfolk: I wish at the outset to clear up one point, and I shall do so with my customary brevity. I have talked to many of the Catholic bishops and only last night I talked to the cardinal. I explained to him that the abolition in the Bill of the principle of jus soli was in no way a racial matter. Once I had explained that to him and explained to him that the Bill would give greater security to all races—the blacks, Indians and others who are here—he wisely said that he found it extremely confusing and I said it was a case where the Catholic laiety could take the chance of enlightening the Catholic hierarchy a bit further, something which, I might say, happens quite often in the Catholic church.
I thought the noble Lord, Lord Mishcon, made a most terrible speech; I was appalled by what he was saying. How can one suggest that by us not wanting to believe in jus soli we are in any way being anti-racial? I was in Kenya and made 100 black officers. I am the greatest friend of the noble Lords, Lord Pitt of Hampstead, and Lord Mishcon. In no sense is the abolition of the jus soli principle a racial matter; they will have full and utter citizenship, and that applies to all colours here.
The reason why, as my noble friend Lord Belstead said, we must go for jus sanguinis is the same reason why they have it all over Europe. I have lived in the countries of Europe for a great deal of my life. If one goes to the Frankfurt underground one finds there notices in Greek, Spanish, Turkish and Bulgarian simply because they had 2½ million people working there. The reason we must go to jus sanguinis is that we might have many millions of Frenchmen, Spaniards—I am not talking about black people—and Germans coming here as workers and then, if they had children here, on the jus soli principle they would all become British citizens and we should become even more swamped. For that reason we must have the same principles as they have governing them. We are in no way being racial about this; the only practical modern thing to do in a situation where there are vast numbers of travellers and vast numbers of immigrant workers is to go to jus sanguinis.
Lord Mishcon: If the Roman Catholic archbishop said after hearing the noble Duke last night that he was confused, having heard his speech this afternoon, I am not surprised. Having said that, I wish to make it perfectly clear that I did not use the phrase "anti-racial" once and I did not accuse anybody, on the Government Benches or anywhere else, of being racist. All I said was that this would produce insecurity. I never accused anybody of doing it deliberately.
The Earl of Perth: I came to this debate with an open mind. The only conviction I had was that this was not, or should not be considered, a moral issue, and, having heard a number of noble Lords, including the noble Lord, Lord Home, and the noble and learned Lord, Lord Rawlinson, they have confirmed my feeling that it is not, and should not be, a moral issue, whatever may be the feeling of the Churches. I well understand

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their anxiety—that it is a matter which can be misunderstood and could be interpreted as a racial issue—but I am not convinced that that is the case. What worries me about it is why we are doing it at this moment. The noble Lord, Lord Hunt, asked the noble Lord, Lord Belstead, if he would provide some figures. I know the difficulty of figures, but I believe myself that some sort of an estimate is extremely important. I believe in another place they talked about something between 3,000 and 6,000 a year which could possibly cover the numbers. If we assume that the number was 5,000—I accept this is a realm of great uncertainty—that is one in every 10,000.
A noble Lord: Every year!
The Earl of Perth: Supposing there is this pool of very large numbers, which is the expression the noble Lord, Lord Belstead, used, over the years, would it not be possible, at the time when that is proved, to limit further our immigration numbers so as to take care of the problem? Or again, if we had figures at that time to prove the case, would it not be possible at that time to introduce a similar Bill in the form it is now? To me the issue really turns on the basis of figures; it is a practical issue and not a moral one. Also, it depends on the noble Lord, Lord Belstead, being able to answer the question: Why not, if things prove to be the worst that he fears, change at that later time the numbers which can come in through immigration?
Lord Hylton: I am extremely sensitive to the points made today concerning security and fear. It is for that reason that I wish to point out that the whole of Clause 1 refers to children born after the coming into force of the Bill. The Bill is not retrospective. I should have thought that was quite clear, and I hope that your Lordships will resist this amendment, but, on the other hand, that you will accept Amendments Nos. 12A and 15 which we shall come to later and which will have just a slight softening effect.
Lord Hatch of Lusby: I wonder whether your Lordships realise the character that this debate has taken over the last hour or so. We began with a speech from the right reverend Prelate; it was a speech based on the concept of the human being as a human being, and took the issue of nationality right out of the irrelevant subjects of skin colour, racial origin and cultural background. Over the past hour or so, virtually every speech has been based upon the assumption that this Bill is a part of immigration control—and immigration control not because of the numbers of population in this country, as the noble Lord, Lord Home of the Hirsel, suggested, and not because we are bursting at the seams, but because a new element has grown up in our midst over the past 25 to 30 years, distinguishable by the difference in the colour of their skins.
I think it is a very great pity that we should be debating the Bill in these terms, but to me it is essential to meet the points made by the noble Lord, Lord Home of the Hirsel, and by the noble and learned Lord, Lord Rawlinson of Ewell, and the question
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which the noble Duke asked: What has jus soli to do with race relations? Very briefly, I should like to make this reply. If it had not been for the immigration by what are euphemistically called the new Commonwealth immigrants, then jus soli would not have been touched. It has been a basic principle of the British constitution and of British citizenship for 700 years. The noble Earl, Lord Perth, asked: Why is it now being attacked and why are the Government trying at least to diminish if not to abolish it? The reason seems perfectly clear and obvious to me, and it was spelt out by the noble Lord, Lord Home of the Hirsel, by the noble and learned Lord, Lord Rawlinson, and by the noble Duke. What is this crisis we are in? Where are we bursting at the seams? Are we bursting at the seams today to a greater extent than we were 20, 25 or 30 years ago?
A noble Lord: Yes!
Lord Hatch of Lusby: In fact, there are more people per year who emigrate from this country than who come here as immigrants. What is the difference? Surely the difference can only be that over the past 25 to 30 years a large section of the people who have immigrated into this country have had a differently coloured skin and have come from different cultures, although I must say, with my noble friend Lord Pitt—and I am sure he would bear this out—there are some West Indians who come to this country who are much more British than the British and, in cultural terms, are sustaining the traditions of Britain in a way in which many white British people are not. Nevertheless, surely the history of this country—I am sure the noble Lord, Lord Home, would agree with me in this—is one of mixed cultures, enriching and stimulating each other. Are we now to stop that process? Are we to include in the parochialism which we see on so many sides in different aspects of national life the parochialism of culture? Surely we are being enriched by the ideas, the music and the literature of the West Indies, India, Pakistan and of Africa and surely our culture is being enriched, if we will accept the people who are coming here as human beings and not as skin colours. So where is this crisis? The answer to that question is the answer to the noble Duke: What is the connection between jus soli and race relations? It is that a very high percentage of black people in this country and of all coloured people in this country will believe that jus soli has been undermined because of the colour of the immigrants that have been coming into this country over the past 30 years.
I appeal to Members of the Conservative Party and to Members sitting on the opposite Benches; this is a very deep constitutional issue. You claim to be constitutionalists and to be defenders of the British constitution. Here is a chance to do something in practice to defend a 700-year-old British Constitution which is not threatened by anything today other than by the prejudice of those who dislike seeing people with different coloured skins.
Quite frankly, I should like to see what we saw a few years ago—and I say this deliberately to noble Lords opposite—when one right honourable member was dismissed from the shadow cabinet because he had made a speech that was considered to be racial.

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What do we have today? We have substituted for that action, phrases such as "swamping" and "the size of the pool". These are now racialist terms, and they raise the fears—rightly so—of what are loosely called the ethnic minorities who are now part of Britain.
I feel privileged to follow the right reverend Prelate the Bishop of Liverpool and the noble Lord, Lord Home of the Hirsel. Why do I connect them? It is because this morning I was at the other Lord's, and both of the noble Lords opposite have a deep affection for the game of cricket. What happened at the other Lord's this morning? When the English 12th man came on to the field, it was seen that he was a black man, Roland Butcher. He came on bringing the drinks, as 12th man for England. Is there any noble Lord or noble Baroness who objects to that? Is there any noble Lord or noble Baroness who objects to the sight of the number of black footballers who are seen on television screens every Saturday night during the winter? Are they not British? Are we not threatening them, their families, and their children, by Clause 1 of the Bill? I suggest very strongly to noble Lords opposite that they take note of the situation.
Much has been said about the attitude of the Churches. I believe that all the Churches, without exception, have come out, without reservation, against this clause in the Bill. Of course, every member of a Church has a right to dissent from the hierarchy and the leadership. But I know that the Churches have gone into this issue very thoroughly, and they have agonised over it. They have produced their findings unanimously throughout this country. The British Council of Churches and the Catholic Commission for Racial Justice unanimously have come out against Clause 1 of the Bill.
I conclude on this note. Even before that, way back in January, the Churches had something to say on this matter. It was the combined opinion of the Church of England and the Catholic hierarchy of England and Wales. The bishops of both Churches had this to say—and I would not attempt to equal it as a test:
"Any new nationality law should state as a matter of principle that our national identity is multi-racial, thereby avoiding the potential racial conception of national identity".
I believe that this evening we have the chance to put those words into constitutional practice by supporting the amendment so ably moved by the right reverend Prelate.
5.55 p.m.
Lord Boyd-Carpenter: I came into this debate with a very open mind and, as some of my noble friends know, with no undue enthusiasm for certain aspects of the Bill. However, having listened to the whole of the argument throughout, I have been convinced that though plainly there are defects in Clause 1 (which I hope the Committee will consider amending by later amendments) I must say, with enormous regret, that the amendment moved by the right reverend Prelate is not good enough and would indeed be damaging in its practical effects.
I rise only to make an appeal, based on what might be the feeling in this respect of other noble Lords, too.
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To me, as a member of the Church of England, though I hold the lowest official rank in it, that of church warden, it would be a very unhappy thing to have to vote against an amendment moved in the name of the most reverend Primate—a man for whom we all have an enormous regard—and supported by three right reverend Prelates in your Lordships' House. They speak on most matters for the Church to which I have belonged for most of my life, and I should be very unhappy at being forced to vote against their proposal.
I make this appeal to them because I think that it arises from what was said a few moments ago in respect of the Roman Catholic hierarchy by both my noble and learned friend Lord Rawlinson of Ewell and the noble Duke, the Duke of Norfolk. As I understand it, those two noble Lords, in particular the noble Duke, have spoken to the leaders of the Roman Catholic Church and appear to have made some impact—I do not think I misunderstand them—on the previously strong convictions that the Roman Catholic hierarchy had against this measure. At any rate, that is how I understand what has been said. Well, I do not know what impact the debate in this Committee has had on the right reverend Prelates who head my Church. I would suspect that since they are men of tolerance, wide knowledge and sophistication it must have had some impact on them; it must surely have raised in their minds a doubt as to whether they are necessarily right.
If I am correct in that assumption, may I put this suggestion to them? If this evening they press the amendment to a Division, I do not know what will be the result, but if the amendment is defeated, then there will be created the impression that a provision in the law which will create insecurity for certain sections of our population has been confirmed. I believe that all of your Lordships would regret that enormously. Is it not possible at this moment for the right reverend Prelates to say that if they are unconvinced by the argument, they will have another opportunity at the Report stage to put forward their proposition? Can they not say that in the interval they would like to study what has been said in your Lordships' Chamber? Then they could see whether what has been said by laymen of their Church has had on them something of the same impact as apparently what has been said by Roman Catholic laymen to their hierarchy has had on them.
It might be that when the right referend Prelates consider the matter they will still be of the same mind, but are they tonight absolutely certain that they will be of the same mind? Are they so certain that they are prepared to put it to the decision of a Division? If they are successful, the consequence would undoubtedly be to create a state of great confusion in the Bill, while if they fail—as I have already ventured to suggest to them—there would be much anxiety and unhappiness over precisely those people in this country about whom they are most concerned.
So at this late stage of the debate—in which I had not intended to take part—I rise solely to make this point and to ask the right reverend Prelates just to pause before deciding to put this to the touch tonight. If they decide to wait, they will have ample opportunities to reflect on what has been said. With respect, and (as I know they will assume) without impertinence,

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I beg them to think very hard indeed before they decide to press this amendment tonight.
6 p.m.
Lord Walston: I make no apology for detaining your Lordships for a little longer, and I am glad that there are other noble Lords who will be speaking after me, because, as has already been said, this is one of the most important and far-reaching debates that we have had, whether it be as a general debate in your Lordships' House or at Committee stage. I shall not rehearse the moral arguments. We all have the responsibility of making up our own minds as to whether one course of action is more ethical than another, though I say quite frankly now that I go along with the right reverend Prelates and others who have spoken along that line. Neither shall I rehearse the arguments, which have not been deployed to any very great extent, of the sense of history: the fact that the Government are proposing at the present time to abandon something which has been the pride of this country for many centuries.
I shall merely remind your Lordships of what has already been said by my noble friends Lord Aylestone and Lord Hunt, by the right reverend Prelate the Bishop of Liverpool, by the noble Lord, Lord Mishcon, and by others, about the effect on race relations. We are at the moment, as we all know far too well, teetering on the edge of really serious racial problems in this country. Many of us, especially those who have been concerned with race relations over a long period, have feared that this would come, and have worked against it. We have failed, and this situation which has been for so long feared is now with us. We have to decide whether the action that we are going to take in the Lobbies today will accentuate the feeling of not belonging, the feeling of rejection, the feeling of hopelessness, which there is among the immigrants in this country, and particularly among the coloured immigrants.
I know that the noble Duke and all of us here realise that this is not a racial proposal. We stand in our isolation but in our security, and we know that if we have problems of any kind we have the right people that we can go to—our friends and the friends of friends—and we shall not be imposed upon. But if you are living in Toxteth, if you are living in Southall, if you have not been in this country for very long, even though you speak the language, even though you play cricket and even though you think of the cultures of this country as being the cultures of that colony in which you were born, in the present atmosphere and in the situations of unemployment, hardship and fear it is asking rather too much to say to those people, "Take the same attitude as we do, sitting on these red leather Benches, and realise that this is not a racial matter".
We must assess this in that light—not in the light of our security but in the light of their insecurity—and we must say to ourselves: Is it worth bringing in this new piece of legislation, which inevitably and indubitably is going to exacerbate the racial situation in which we are today, for the sake of—what? My noble friends have asked that question, and we shall get an answer, I hope. How many undesirable births do we
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expect to keep out as a result of this provision that the Government are proposing in their legislation? How many people will come to this country, or have already come to this country, simply in order to make use of our old historical right of jus soli? Those are the questions we must have answered; and when they have been answered we must assess whether the risks which we are running in race relations at this present time are justified by the advantages—the indubitable advantages, because the risks are indubitable—from this action.
Coupled with that, there is a minor point that I think it is worth making. The party opposite has many advantages; it has many good points in its policies. One of the points that appeals to me, and I think appeals to most of us, is its desire to minimise bureaucratic intervention; to have people feel free from the gentlemen in Whitehall. This little piece of legislation is in fact going to put a vast number of people—millions of people—under the threat of minor officials. I know it is the Secretary of State who is supposed to make the final decision, but in fact we know perfectly well that it is the people from the immigration officers upwards who actually have the say. Is it consistent—and here I am talking solely to the Members on the Conservative Benches opposite—with Conservative philosophy to increase bureaucracy, to increase the power of the minor civil servants, in order to get some indefinite and, I would suggest, very minor benefit? I hope the right reverend Prelate will not withdraw his amendment.
Lord Spens: I have listened to almost every moment of this debate, and I must say that I am more and more confused as the time goes on. We have heard a lot of emotional speeches, too, but the only one which really made sense was the very short speech made by a noble Lord on the opposite side of the Committee, who said that we must realise that Clause 1 deals only with children who are not yet born; it does not deal with anyone who is in this country at the moment. Those children who are not yet born, if they are born to a British citizen or to someone settled in this country, will be British citizens; so where are the millions who are going to be worried by immigration officers, and so forth? They are not here. I cannot see what all this worry is about. I believe this clause is perfectly good, and I propose to support it.
Baroness Birk: We are coming towards the end, I think, of a very long debate on this, and there are one or two points that I wanted to pick up without rehearsing so many of the points made by everybody else. I think the noble Lord, Lord Boyd-Carpenter, in a very ingenious speech, was trying to persuade the right reverend Prelates to withdraw their amendment. I am sure he had no intention of implying that they did not know what they were doing, but, quite frankly, I found it slightly offensive. I found it offensive because I believe that four bishops, including the Archbishop of Canterbury, would not put their names to an amendment of this sort without a great deal of thought, a great deal of consideration and a great deal of experience of what is going on in the country.
The noble Lord, Lord Boyd-Carpenter, has, of course, his right to say anything he feels, and I am quite sure his intention was not to cast any aspersions on the right reverend Prelate. Nevertheless, I think

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it was rather mischievous, and also rather helpful. I think it was mischievous because of the impression it could give (but, of course, nobody here would accept that); I think it was helpful because if—and I do not believe this for one moment—there was any doubt in any of their minds, it would have been completely wiped away by what he said.
Lord Boyd-Carpenter: Would the noble Baroness allow me to intervene, as she has referred to me? Is the noble Baroness really suggesting that any of us are so unreasonable and have such closed minds that we must dismiss any possibility that, having listened for some hours to argument on a particular subject, our view may be in some degree modified? If that is her attitude, I despair of her.
Baroness Birk: I hope the noble Lord, Lord Boyd-Carpenter, will not despair of me. I will not despair of him, either. If his mind will open a little, maybe I shall convince him the other way; or even convince him to abstain. That would be victory, indeed. Not unnaturally, there has been a great concentration on the Churches and their views on this Bill. I think it has to be said that there are thousands of organisations all over the country who have almost bombarded Members of this House and another place with their views on this Bill. It is not just a question of the Churches, important though they are. It is teachers, universities, community groups, social groups; it is a whole range of people—and from other countries; and not just those black immigrants we are discussing tonight who so often have been brought into the discussion. They are a wide-ranging group of people.
The noble Baroness, Lady Trumpington, said that we were the odd man out. She asked why we should not get in step—with Europe, I take it. If we are right and are following our own traditions, there is no reason why we should not be the odd man out. If we are right to hold on to our principle on jus soli—a principle against which the Government so far (and we have yet to hear the Minister) have not been able, in either House, to put up really a strong argument—then there is no reason for going back on something which is part of British life. The noble Lord, Lord Belstead, in his intervention said that for the first time in legislation this has brought about equality of sexes. Equality in a bad cause is not good equality. I do not think that is an argument for the Bill. The main objection to ending jus soli—and this was touched upon by the noble Lord, Lord Spens, when he said that this referred to the thousands of children not yet born—is not based only on the situation of children who will be penalised for their parents' status by not getting citizenship; it is based on a concern for many thousands of children yet unborn who, under this Bill, will be entitled to citizenship but who may find it difficult to establish their right to the satisfaction of the Home Office or will not know how to begin to establish their right. This is the problem, this is the other side of the coin.
The Government attitude seems to be that everyone in the country will be able to keep a filing system covering all aspects of their family life and including updated information on all new legislation. This is not how people live. This is what I think the right
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reverend Prelates who spoke this afternoon were bringing out all the time. One must not only consider the principle of this clause, which has been gone over thoroughly this afternoon, but one must turn also to the practical implications which were dealt with by the noble Lord, Lord Avebury, and others.
Anyone who has been a Minister in a Government knows of the numbers of letters coming in, of the amount of time it takes sending out for information and advice and the time it takes to come back. Most Ministers usually are hassling their staff to find out what has happened to letter "X" or "Y" or "Z". That is bad enough; and when it refers to something a little more remote from people's personal life and security then probably reluctantly it has to be put up with. But when it refers to something as basic as this, to one's own citizenship—which really means one's sense of confidence, of belonging, of knowing who one is—it is an entirely different thing. It is impossible for there to be any rapid and almost-instant system by which anybody with a query will be able to have it answered immediately. In another place, the Minister, Mr. Raison, said in answer to this point that this would rise probably only when people wanted a passport. Should not people know who they are, where they belong, what their citizenship is, even without having to ask for a passport? Why should they be left in this limbo until they need a particular paper in order to go abroad?
This Bill is not appearing in a vacuum. This has been said before but I do not apologise for repeating it. There are already many worries and many insecurities in our society, particularly in our large cities. There have been demands—and there is no point in ignoring it, although fortunately they have been few and far between—for repatriation of certain sections of the community. In such a context, the fear of being without citizenship or the even worse fear that your children may not be citizens or may not be able to prove they are citizens is corrosive of one's own sense of security. It is difficult, I agree, to be able to transmit and transfer oneself into this sort of situation when all of us discussing it are sitting in our seats in fairly comfortable security. I do not believe that either in this House or in another aplace—where the Bill has been through its stages; and we all know a great deal about it—a single convincing argument has been advanced for the Government side. It has all been very intricate and confused. I sympathise with the noble Duke, the Duke of Norfolk, about this.
The noble Lord, Lord Home, gave an example of Iranian children. Let us say that a few children of Iranian descent became British, are we all going to lose a great deal by that? If a few babies are born to mothers in transit, is it really going to be so damaging to the fabric of our society? People are anxious to acquire British citizenship. It is something worth having and something which a few extra people are not going to harm. They have not done so in the past. As has been said by many of my noble friends behind me and on the Cross-Benches, there is no case against it.
Finally, I would ask the Minister whether he would spell out what administrative arrangements are envisaged. I am not thinking of the broad terms, as spelt out in another place, but exactly how this is

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going to be worked out. We need to be more specific about it. I do not think there has been any Bill, certainly not within recent memory, that has caused such opposition as has this Bill from so many people, so many quarters, from people of different Churches, religions and different views of life. I think at this point the Government ought to ponder and think, "Are we right?" If the opposition is so much against the Bill—and I am not talking about the official Opposition in this House but of the opposition, the worry and the fears all over the country—I should have thought the Government ought to say "We ought to think again"—and withdraw it.
6.20 p.m.
Lord Drumalbyn: We are really seeking to legislate in this Bill for change. We are legislating because things have changed so greatly since the 1948 Act that it has been recognised that changes are needed in our nationality legisation. I was sorry to hear the noble Lord, Lord Hatch of Lusby, attributing this Bill to prejudice, to closed minds, to racial prejudice even, on this side of the Committee. Of course, on the principle that Britain has been an open country, is already a multiracial country and was so even before the 1962 rush into this country, he is right. There is no reason to change that at all. Over the centuries people have come there to live and have been absorbed into the British nation. I do not think that it has been sufficiently stressed here that what is actually in the Bill has absolutely no racial connotation whatsoever.
Look at the words that the right reverend Prelate wants to leave out:
"A person born in the United Kingdom after commencement shall be a British citizen if at the time of the birth his father or mother is—

(a) a British citizen; or

(b) settled in the United Kingdom".

That means a British citizen totally irrespective of colour, totally irrespective of religion, totally irrespective of race. Secondly, it recognises that it takes some time for people who come to this country to become settled. The noble Baroness has spoken as if she thought that people could be naturalised on arrival as immigrants, that there should be no "playing-in", so to speak, at all. But, of course, we all know that that cannot be so. It is not so in any country except possibly in wartime when you are attracting experts to the country.
What I believe people should accept is that those who are here illegally should not be able to qualify for residence. By the same token, I would have said that their children should not be able to qualify for residence or for citizenship either, until at least they have, so to speak, purged their contempt, and the Bill, as I understand it, makes provision for them to do so.
Those who are pressing for this amendment say that they are doing it in the interests of security and certainty. In the interests of security and certainty we are being asked to condone illegality. I do not believe—and I share the view of my noble friend Lord Home of the Hirsel—that that would be acceptable to the people, and I suggest to the Committee that condonation might well give rise to violent trouble in this country.
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Surely, it is right—and the Bill makes provision for this—for those who are settled here and are acceptable as citizens to be made citizens. I agree entirely that there is bound to be an interval of time—and this is what Members of the Committee, I think, accept, and has been made clear enough in another place—between the actual commencement of the Bill, certainly Clause 48 of the Bill, and the time when those who are eligible to be settled are settled in this country.
I do not think it is unreasonable to accept this when we have a great change, such as is contemplated here, which is dictated by the vast change in our circumstances in the world. It has to be accepted that there may be some difficulties of transition. We are legislating for the future, and the provisions in this clause for the future are better than those proposed to replace it. I do not think that I should say anything more and, despite the displeasure of the Committee at my threatening to carry the debate wider, I do not propose to do so. All I say is that I hope very much that people will accept that on the face of it there is absolutely no suggestion of prejudice—racial or otherwise—in this particular clause.
6.25 p.m.
Lord Pitt of Hampstead: We are told that we are legislating for change. That is perfectly true. We are changing a code of practice that has existed for seven centuries. It is the duty of those who are advocating the change to show why we should have that change. I am suggesting to the Committee that so far this evening we have not had any case made out as to why there should be a change. The closest we have come to it was the speech by the noble Duke, the Duke of Norfolk, in which he said that because we are now in Europe, it is likely that a lot of Europeans will be here and their children will be born here and we would not want them to be British. I am paraphrasing him.
We have heard other speakers who suggest that there are a lot of illegal immigrants, and that there are a lot of racketeers. Members of the Committee will remember that I lost my temper a little and I had to challenge the noble and learned Lord, when he mentioned the West Indies and was talking about racketeers. I resented that. The West Indians came here first of all in the war to defend Britain. Some went and worked in the factories. There were two sets of recruitment: one for the services and the other for the factories. Some had children born here.
What happened after the war was that British Government departments went to the Caribbean and recruited people. There was a recruiting station in Bridgetown, Barbados, recruiting for London Transport. You recruited the nurses from the Caribbean. Now I want to tell you—and you know it; the Minister will know it anyway—that the West Indians have been going back for the past few years. West Indians do not come here. The suggestion—and that is why I resented it very much—that there are racketeers in the West Indies arranging passages is false. The West Indians are in fact going back.
The West Indians are accustomed to migrate. They migrated to the States. I used to have a bet with friends of mine that anybody that I met of any prominence in the States had a West Indian parent or grandparents, and I nearly always won. They are

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accustomed to migrating and they also know when they are not wanted. Therefore, in effect, so far as the West Indies is concerned migration to this country ceased some time ago. The only route is from Britain to the Caribbean. I do not want to continue in that vein, but I was very resentful of the suggestion made by the noble and learned Lord, Lord Rawlinson, that there were racketeers in the West Indies getting people on the boats to come here. There are not.
I want to come back to the debate. The noble Lord, Lord Hylton, made a very important point. It is absolutely true, as the Bill stands, that it does not affect anybody living here. But you know of the suggestion from the Department of Health that visitors should pay when they go to hospital. It is not suggested that the people living here should not be treated; but Members of the Committee read the press, and black people when they go to hospital have been asked to show their passports in order to establish the fact that they have the right to free treatment.
It is that sort of thing that creates insecurity, and that is why I was surprised when the noble Duke, the Duke of Norfolk, suggested that the Bill provides greater security. It does not provide greater security—in fact it provides insecurity. My daughter, Mandy, was born here. She is a British citizen. She has no doubts about that. She is in the United States at the moment, but she knows she is a British citizen because she was born here. I am a little too old now, but presuming that I had another child within the next few years, that child would have to prove that at the time of his or her birth I had a right to be in this country.
This is the whole point; this is what is wrong about the Bill. It has now made children insecure because they have to prove not only that they have a right to be here but that, at the time of their birth, their parents had a right to be here. It is that which creates insecurity. There is no way of getting out of that unless one goes back to jus soli. If the grounds for removing jus soli were strong enough one could understand, and one could look for ways of dealing with these problems. But no one so far has made a solid case for abolishing jus soli, except the fact that we have entered the European Community. It has been mentioned on many occasions that all of Europe uses jus sanguinus. All the countries which have been associated with this country have used jus soli. The United States, Australia, Canada, and all the other countries which have been associated with this country have used jus soli.
Of course there has been a change in attitudes, but one does not turn one's back on the Commonwealth and on everything else except Europe. I have heard that reference to change made lots of times. It may well be so. But if that is so, then let us be sure that when we do make changes we have good solid reasons for making them, and that the difficulties which we create in making those changes are not greater than the gains. I beg your Lordships to accept that the difficulties that we are creating are greater than the gains. We are gaining the minimum. This change would prevent the children of a few illegal immigrants from being British. It is all right to stop illegal immigration, but one should not punish the children. The change would prevent the children of a few foreign students from becoming British citizens, and the children of a few foreign visitors from being British
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citizens. That is all it would do. That is all there is to gain. On the other hand, one will have created the kind of insecurity which I have described; making certain people feel that this is another turn of the screw—that they are being told that they are not wanted and that neither are their children wanted. There are two sides to the coin. I do ask the noble Lord, Lord Belstead, to think about this.
Are the grounds for abolishing jus soli solid enough? I read the debates which took place in the other place and there was nothing solid there. I was hoping that the noble Lord, Lord Belstead, would give some solid reasons why we should abolish jus soli. He has not done that. Mention has been made of close connections with Britain. There can be nothing closer than being born in Britain. The closest connection I had was with my mother, but she is dead now. The closest connection one has is with the place of one's birth, and therefore all this talk about change being needed for the sake of closer connections is spurious. There may be a good solid argument for abolishing jus soli; but one has to decide whether there are conditions now which make jus soli no longer valuable or which make it something of a handicap.
This point has been made in many speeches, but no facts are ever produced which suggest that jus soli is no longer valuable. If it is not longer valuable then the reasons why should be explained to us. The reasons should be spelt out. Then, speaking personally, I might understand the reasons. But if the facts are not there to support the argument the suggestion is merely a thought. There may be a lot of Europeans living in Britain and it may be that many of their children born here will be British. But the chances are that the children will be German, French, or whatever the nationality of the parents is, because that is what their parents will choose for them. So that will not create a problem. I am still unable to understand why the Government are so determined to abolish this ancient principle. The gains, such as they have been suggested so far, are too minimal to justify a change.
6.36 p.m.
Lord Belstead: I am sure that the right reverend Prelate the Bishop of Rochester would want to draw this debate to a close and, because I have already spoken, I beg leave to comment briefly on one or two of the points which have been made. The first point I should like to make arises from the speech which has just been made by the noble Lord, Lord Pitt. The noble Lord was putting forward the case—very ably and in some detail—that as a matter of principle the move away from jus soli is something which he deplores and believes is wrong. I ask your Lordships' Committee to bear in mind that all our partners in the European Community, with the exception of the Republic of Ireland, have the principle of jus sanguinus. I do not believe it is the case that they are all in error. I am sure the right reverend Prelate the Bishop of Rochester would not charge our European neighbours with being in error, and I am sure that the right reverend Prelate, having listened to this debate, will recognise that although we may disagree on many points, a move away from jus soli, as it is reflected in this clause, is not being done without reason.

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The reason is not very far to see and it has been put forward this afternoon by those with great experience. My noble friend Lord Home of the Hirsel and other noble Lords have made the simple point that in the circumstances in which our country finds itself today—increasingly urban, increasingly visited by people who are, of course, welcome—to give the right of abode to anyone who happens to be born here is something which, arguably, is not sensible when one is laying plans for the future. Certainly it is not sensible, arguably, if, as I have always understood, there was an area of common ground—at least between the present Government and the previous one—which was that if we were to overhaul the law of nationality in this country, the cornerstone must be that British citizenship should be conferred on those who had a close and continuing connection with this country, and that that should be the basis of the new citizenship.
The noble Baroness, Lady Birk, asked me, perfectly reasonably, how Clause 1 would work. If I may say so, my noble and learned friend Lord Rawlinson of Ewell really gave the answer very much better than I possibly could, when he said that if we ourselves expected to go go and live in other countries, would we not make it our business to find out what was necessary if we were to take citizenship of that country—not to settle or work there, but to take the citizenship of that country? For the Government, I can only say that we do not see why any great difficulty should arise when a child needs to claim citizenship. In most cases, of course, the parents will do this on behalf of the boy or girl who is concerned, while the child is still a minor. There seems no reason why they should not be able to produce evidence of their citizenship, or, if they are not already British citizens, of their settled status—
Baroness Birk: I wonder whether the noble Lord would allow me to intervene for one moment. I do not want to prolong his speech or to make difficulties, but I hope he will accept that that is not an answer to what I said. That is just a series of generalisations.
Lord Belstead: If the noble Baroness will let me progress a little further, maybe I can give her more satisfaction in this matter. What I would say absolutely openly to the noble Baroness is that there will, of course, be a difference in the application for a passport. Until now, a birth certificate, and a certificate alone, showing birth in the United Kingdom has been given, although, of course, the application has had to be countersigned, as many of your Lordships will know, probably from having countersigned passport applications. In the future the application form could be perfectly simply designed, so that the parent would give details of his or her own claim to British citizenship, or to settled status in the United Kingdom—because we are talking about alternatives—to the satisfaction of the counter-signatory and then of, course, to the satisfaction of the Foreign Office.
I have been asked from all sides to give details of numbers, as they affect the debate this afternoon. This is the other question that must be replied to on behalf of the Government, and I shall give to your
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Lordships quite openly the figures that I have. The facts that I have are these. In 1979, between 59,000 and 64,000 children were born in England and Wales—I must apologise to your Lordships for the fact that I do not have the Scottish figures—to parents both of whom were born outside the United Kingdom. As my honourable friend the Minister of State, Mr. Raison, said in another place, you pay your money and take your choice. No one is quite sure exactly how many of those people were citizens or settled here. But if as high a figure as 90 to 95 per cent. of those people were citizens or settled here, that would still leave up to about 6,500 children born here each year to parents who were neither citizens nor settled.
The point goes a good deal further than that, and I think it is this that your Lordships really have a responsibility to take note of. It is that, with easier travel these days, the admissions of foreign nationals have increased enormously. In 1953, about 850,000 people entered the United Kingdom. Two years ago, in 1979, there were nearly 12 million foreign and Commonwealth citizens admitted. The numbers have increased dramatically and so too, I am afraid, have detected illegal entrants, who have increased from just under 1,000 to September two years ago, to something rather in excess of 1,500 in the year ending last September. I simply repeat to your Lordships that on those grounds, which, of course, are not conclusive, we have a responsibility in this House to take note of the trend in framing our nationality law for the future. If I may finally—
Lord Avebury: I asked the noble Lord whether he would address his mind to the question of EEC citizens here, who, since the case of Pieck, have been declared not to be subject to a grant of limited leave to remain. So that of these 59,000 to 64,000 children, who were born in the United Kingdom in the year in question, cart the noble Lord say how many were born to EEC citizens and were thus excluded from the number to which this clause would apply?
Lord Belstead: No, I am afraid I cannot. I do not have those figures with me. I have an extremely long note on the case of Pieck, but I did not think it would be instrumental in helping noble Lords to decide whether or not they agreed with the right reverend Prelate in this case. The noble Lord, Lord Avebury, made a very important point, as did the right reverend Prelate the Bishop of Liverpool. That was the suggestion that Clause 1 is, in some way, racially discriminatory. I was grateful to my noble friend Lord Drumalbyn, who said it was his view that there is no racial connotation at all in the clause or, indeed, in the Bill.
In weighing the view of my noble friend against what has been said from other parts of the Chamber, I ask your Lordships to take account of the fact that Clause 1 will confer citizenship in the future, not only on those who are citizens already, but also on those who are of settled status, in a deliberate and open attempt to try to make it easier for children when they are born to be integrated into the community into which they are born. There is also the fact that this Bill—and we have not yet come to this—goes out of its way, contrary to the practice in many other countries, to make sure that we retain what we believe is the

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very important principle of dual nationality. So that when people come to this country and are deciding: "Shall I go for British citizenship or shall I not?" there will be no suggestion that, by having the citizenship of this country, the citizenship of their former country will be wrested from them.
The right reverend Prelate the Bishop of Liverpool said that those who are settled here view this Bill with apprehension. I hope that the right reverend Prelate will forgive me if I join with my noble friend the Duke of Norfolk in saying that apprehensions over this Bill can and should be dispelled. I think that it is the responsibility of all leaders in our society to make known the facts of the Bill, in what I realise is a very complex area of the law: that the Bill will, for the first time, give rights of both acquiring and transmitting citizenship to women and to men alike; that this is a Bill which gives rights to transmit citizenship, without any discrimination between people who are born in this country and those who have acquired their citizenship of this country by coming here after birth; that the provisions of Clause 1, which the amendment would reverse, are far more open and easy than the arrangements which are made in the developed countries of the European Community; and that, for the first time, this is a Bill which will enable the vast majority of the people in this country to say: "We are British citizens, and it is a status which gives us the right of abode". I suggest to the Committee that those are grounds for making known what really is in the Bill, so that people will understand and will feel more secure. Those are not grounds for ripping out Clause 1 of this Bill, which would be the effect of this amendment.
6.48 p.m.
The Lord Bishop of Rochester: My Lords, I think noble Lords have recognised that it is only very rarely that we on these Benches venture into the more detailed discussion of legislation, mainly because our duties do not allow us to be here sufficiently regularly to do so. So I ask noble Lords to believe that it is in no sense unadvisedly, lightly or wantonly that the most reverend Primate and the other three of us have put down this amendment but because of the deep concern that has been expressed to us, not only by the clergy but by many lay people of the congregations throughout the land.
I should like to make it quite clear, however, that none of us on these Benches would claim to be the sole spokesman for the Christian community. Bishops speak only for themselves, like every other Member of this House, although, like other Members, we sometimes claim to have a measure of support both within the House and without it. So I hope the noble Lord, Lord Home, will accept that we gratefully and very respectfully listened to his views, as we listened to those of the noble and learned Lord, Lord Rawlinson, to those of the noble Duke, the Duke of Norfolk, and to those of all other lay members of the Christian churches who, with us, share the responsibility of the priesthood of all believers.
The responsibility which those of us who are bishops carry, be we Anglican or Roman Catholic, is for the pastoral care of clergy and lay people living in this country now, in 1981, in this country with its long
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heritage and with its immediate past history. Deep concern was made known to us in many places long before today. I assure the noble Baroness, Lady Trumpington, that representatives of all the denominations have had the opportunity to discuss the Bill with representatives of the Government. Indeed, the Roman Catholic Commission on Racial Justice circulated without comment the reply which Mr. Timothy Raison made to the Roman Catholic representations. And the Roman Catholic hierarchy were first in the field in the declaration of their nine principles in 1979. In a very real sense the rest of us have followed their lead.
Our hope in putting down this amendment was to seek reassurance on behalf of those who are anxious and fearful. I have listened with great respect, as Bishops always do to churchwardens, to the appeal made to me by the noble Lord, Lord Boyd-Carpenter. I do not feel able to say to the Committee that I think I should deny it the opportunity of expressing its view and, I hope, giving the reassurance which we seek by this amendment.
6.51 p.m.
On Question, Whether the said amendment (No. 2) shall be agreed to?
Their Lordships divided: Contents, 92; Not-Contents, 134.

CONTENTS

Ardwick, L.

Jacques, L.

Avebury, L.

Janner, L.

Aylestone, L.

Jeger, B.

Bacon, B.

Jenkins of Putney, L.

Banks, L.

Kaldor, L.

Beaumont of Whitley, L.

Kilbracken, L.

Beswick, L.

Kilmarnock, L.

Birk, B.

Lee of Newton, L.

Bishopston, L.

Liverpool, Bp. [Teller.]

Blease, L.

Llewelyn-Davies of Hastoe, B.

Boothby, L.

Longford, E.

Bowden, L.

Lovell-Davis, L.

Briginshaw, L.

McCarthy, L.

Brockway, L.

Mishcon, L.

Brooks of Tremorfa, L.

Molloy, L.

Bruce of Donington, L.

Noel-Baker, L.

Canterbury, Abp.

Northfield, L.

Chitnis, L.

Oram, L.

Cledwyn of Penrhos, L.

Peart, L.

Collison, L.

Perry of Walton, L.

Darling of Hillsborough, L.

Perth, E.

David, B.

Phillips, B.

Davies of Leek, L.

Pitt of Hampstead, L.

Eldon, E.

Ponsonby of Shulbrede, L.

Elwyn-Jones, L.

Rathcreedan, L.

Ewart-Biggs, B.

Rhodes, L.

Feversham, L.

Rochester, Bp. [Teller.]

Fisher of Rednal, B.

Rochester, L.

Foot, L.

Scanlon, L.

Fulton, L.

Southwell, Bp.

Gaitskell, B.

Stewart of Alvechurch, B.

Gardiner, L.

Stewart of Fulham, L.

Garner, L.

Stone, L.

Gifford, L.

Taylor of Gryfe, L.

Glenamara, L.

Thurso, V.

Gregson, L.

Tordoff, L.

Guildford, Bp.

Truro, Bp.

Hale, L.

Underhill, L.

Hanworth, V.

Wade, L.

Hatch of Lusby, L.

Walston, L.

Hughes, L.

Wedderburn of Charlton, L.

Hunt

Wells-Pestell, L.

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Whaddon, L.

Winchester, Bp.

Wigoder, L.

Winstanley, L.

Wilson of Langside, L.

Winterbottom, L.

Wilson of Radcliffe, L.

Wynne-Jones, L.

NOT-CONTENTS

Abinger, L.

Lucas of Chilworth, L.

Airey of Abingdon, B.

Lyell, L.

Allerton, L.

McFadzean, L.

Ampthill, L.

Mackay of Clashfern, L.

Auckland, L.

Mackintosh of Halifax, V.

Avon, E.

Macleod of Borve, B.

Bellwin, L.

Marley, L.

Belstead, L.

Massereene and Ferrard, V.

Bessborough, E.

Merrivale, L.

Birdwood, L.

Mersey, V.

Boyd of Merton, V.

Monson, L.

Boyd-Carpenter, L.

Mottistone, L.

Brabazon of Tara, L.

Mowbray and Stourton, L.

Brougham and Vaux, L.

Murton of Lindisfarne, L.

Campbell of Alloway, L.

Nathan, L.

Cathcart, E.

Noel-Buxton, L.

Clifford of Chudleigh, L.

Norfolk, D.

Cockfield, L.

Northchurch, B.

Colville of Culross, V.

Nugent of Guildford, L.

Colwyn, L.

Nunburnholme, L.

Cottesloe, L.

Onslow, E.

Craigavon, V.

Orkney, E.

Craigmyle, L.

Orr-Ewing, L.

Crathorne, L.

Pender, L.

Crawshaw, L.

Penrhyn, L.

Croft, L.

Platt of Writtle, B.

Cullen of Ashbourne, L.

Portland, D.

Davidson, V.

Rankeillour, L.

Denham, L. [Teller.]

Rawlinson of Ewell, L.

Dilhorne, V.

Redesdale, L.

Drumalbyn, L.

Renton, L.

Eccles, V.

Richardson, L.

Ellenborough, L.

Rochdale, V.

Elliot of Harwood, B.

Romney, E.

Elton, L.

Rugby, L.

Faithfull, B.

St. Aldwyn, E.

Falkland, V.

Sailsbury, M.

Falmouth, V.

Sandford, L.

Ferrers, E.

Sandys, L. [Teller.]

Ferrier, L.

Savile, L.

Fraser of Kilmorack, L.

Shannon, E.

Gage, V.

Sharples, B.

Gainford, L.

Skelmersdale, L.

Geddes, L.

Soames, L.

Glasgow, E.

Spens, L.

Greenway, L.

Stamp, L.

Gridley, L.

Stodart of Leaston, L.

Hailsham of Saint Marylebone, L.

Strathcarron, L.

Strathcona and Mount Royal, L.

Hawke, L.

Henley, L.

Strathspey, L.

Home of the Hirsel, L.

Swinfen, L.

Hornsby-Smith, B.

Terrington, L.

Hylton, L.

Thomas of Swynnerton, L.

Hylton-Foster, B.

Thurlow, L.

Inglewood, L.

Tollemache, L.

Ironside, L.

Trefgarne, L.

Kemsley, V.

Trenchard, V.

Killearn, L.

Trumpington, B.

Kilmany, L.

Vaux of Harrowden, L.

Kinloss, Ly.

Vickers, B.

Kinnaird, L.

Vivian, L.

Kinross, L.

Wakefield of Kendal, L.

Lauderdale, E.

Westbury, L.

Lawrence, L.

Windlesham, L.

Lindsey and Abingdon, E.

Wynford, L.

Long, V.

Yarborough, E.

Loudoun, C.

Young, B.

Resolved in the negative, and amendment disagreed to accordingly.
Lord Skelmersdale: I think this is probably an appropriate moment to resume the House in order to take other business during the dinner hour, which will last until eight o'clock. I beg to move.
Moved accordingly and, on Question, Motion agreed to.
House resumed.

Road Traffic (Car-Sharing Arrangements) (Northern Ireland) Order 1981
7.2 p.m.
Lord Elton Lord Elton rose to move, That the draft order laid before the House on 28th April be approved.
The noble Lord said: My Lords, the purpose of this short order is to make legislative provision for Northern Ireland, as has been made for Great Britain, for private motorists giving lifts in their cars to passengers on a cost-sharing basis. It follows similar provisions in the Transport Act 1980. Without this order a private motorist who used his car on a cost-sharing basis would have to comply with public service vehicle licensing and road service licensing regulations, and these would require him to hold a public service vehicle licence and a road service licence for his car and a public service vehicle driver's licence for himself. If he did not, apart from anything else, his insurance cover would be invalid. The effect of this order is to relieve him of that necessity and thus make cost-sharing on motor car journeys both a legal and a practical proposition.
In the debate in this House on 13th May last year during the Committee stage of the Transport Bill 1980 noble Lords were particularly concerned about insurance. They will be glad to know that the Motor Conference have agreed to extend to Northern Ireland the undertaking they have given for Great Britain in relation to car-sharing under the Transport Act 1980. That undertaking relates to the whole cover provided by a full third-party or comprehensive policy and not just to the limited field of liability required by road traffic law to be covered by insurance.
The way in which motorists can use their cars in this way is clearly set out in Article 3(1)(a), (b) and (2). In general terms, the conditions are that the car is not adapted to carry more than 8 passengers, that the aggregate of payments for the journey does not exceed the car's running costs for the journey (the running costs do include an element for wear and tear) and that arrangements for payment are made before the journey began. The running costs may include an appropriate amount for depreciation and general wear. The other costs which can be considered include petrol, oil, insurance, vehicle excise duty, servicing and repairs. In fact, however, I imagine that many people will simply share the cost of petrol and oil. The important point is that there should be no element of profit. These provisions are based on those of the Transport Act 1980 and I hope your Lordships will give a welcome to the order. I beg to move.
Moved, That the draft order laid before the House on 28th April be approved.—(Lord Elton.)
Lord Blease: My Lords, I thank the noble Lord for his detailed explanation of this order. He has gone to considerable length in explaining it and I think in total it means that the road services licensing laws, the public service road passenger licensing laws and the insurance coverage as they are at present in Great Britain now apply, to bring Northern Ireland into parity with the arrangements. My understanding is that in many ways the order regularises and legalises the private motoring practices which have been in existence for some time. These private travel arrangements enable friends, neighbours and work colleagues to save money in the course of travel, to their mutual advantage and convenience.
Concerning the wider public implications and claims of the order, that it will reduce traffic on the roads and will save scarce energy fuel and that it will promote a community sense of voluntary service, I am not convinced that these very laudable objectives will be achieved by the provisions of the order. In my view, if the order results in a further deterioration of public transport services, it could have the directly opposite effect on traffic density and on fuel consumption. I certainly feel that an efficient public passenger transport service is in the long run a much more desirable social objective and ought not to be eroded or sacrificed for some apparent short-term gain or the selective interests envisaged in the car-sharing arrangements. Having said that, it is not the intention of this side of the House to oppose the order.
I note in passing that the order was approved by another place on 24th June. It would be helpful if the Minister could indicate whether it is the intention of the Government effectively to monitor the working of the car-sharing arrangements throughout Northern Ireland. We should be particularly concerned to know the effects of the order on the existing public road and rail passenger services, and we should also like the Government to keep under some form of scrutiny the methods employed by private car owners to advertise their travel facilities and the touting of car-sharing arrangements. I shall be glad if the Minister can make some observations on that point.
Finally, there is a point which has been raised with me on which I should like to hear the views of the noble Lord. If, over a period of time, the custom and practice of car-sharing has been established under the order, could this be deemed as a legally enforceable contract? In other words, if a person makes an arrangement to give a lift to two, three or four persons going backwards and forwards to work and in some way opts out of that particular arrangement, could it be considered that he had invalidated an established custom and practice or a contract, even if it was not for profit?
With those remarks I give the order the qualified welcome that I seem to have indicated from this side of the House.
Lord Beaumont of Whitley: My Lords, my noble friend Lord Hampton is sorry that he cannot be here to speak on this order this evening, and I am rising to say that we on these Benches welcome this measure as
638
a very sensible one. We share with the noble Lord, Lord Blease, a certain doubt as to whether in fact it will make a very great deal of difference, and since I am able to lip-read I understand that it is a doubt which I share with the Minister sitting opposite. But even if it does not make a great deal of difference, it is a useful measure.
There is just one question that I should like to ask out of my own personal ignorance. What is the reason for payment having to be agreed before the journey is started? Perhaps the Minister will be kind enough to explain that. Otherwise, we give the measure a warm welcome.
Lord Elton: My Lords, I am grateful to the noble Lord, Lord Blease, and to the noble Lord, Lord Beaumont, for their welcome for this order. I am not certain that I give much of a welcome to Lord Beaumont's revelation of his secret weapon. I think perhaps he ought to check the calibration before he uses it.
The noble Lord, Lord Blease, asked me a number of questions. He is plainly worried about the impact which this arrangement may have on the level of public service transport. Of course, if his own view—that is, that this is going to have rather small results anyway—is borne out, the effects on public transport will be minimal, and I presume what he is doing is guarding against being mistaken in this. The Government regard these arrangements which will be made under this order as being purely private arrangements between individuals, and it would not really be practical to have a monitoring arrangement of all those deals, though doubtless the public services themselves will be the first to let us know if their level of customers is significantly altered. I agree with the noble Lord that public service of a high order is something we all desire. Unfortunately, it is something we cannot afford for everybody. As everyone knows, if you do not live on a bus route life can be very difficult indeed. This arrangement will be extremely helpful to people in that position.
There are no restrictions that I know of on the method of advertising such arrangements. I would expect the postcard in a shop window or at most a notice on an office or factory notice board. Certainly the most you would expect would be a small ad in a local paper, because the whole intention of this order is to provide that there shall be no profit in the exercise, and therefore it will not pay anybody to undertake expense in order to set up such an arrangement. Similarly, the law of contract is not involved because these are private arrangements between people making their own individual arrangements, and my understanding is that the law of contract will not therefore apply. As to why the payment has to be arranged in advance, I am afraid I shall have to write to the noble Lord, Lord Beaumont, on this, because the need for this does not spring immediately to my eye. I think I must take advice before I commit myself. I hope your Lordships will be satisfied with those replies and will agree to authorise this order.
On Question, Motion agreed to.

Supplementary Benefit (Requirements and Resources) Amendment Regulations 1981
7.13 p.m.
Lord Cullen of Ashbourne Lord Cullen of Ashbourne rose to move, That the draft regulations laid before the House on 15th June be approved.
The noble Lord said: My Lords, I beg to move that the draft Supplementary Benefit (Requirements and Resources) Amendment Regulations 1981, which were laid before your Lordships' House on 15th June, be approved. As your Lordships will have observed, these regulations are rather complex and technical, and it may be for your convenience if I first explain briefly why the amending regulations are necessary and then give sonic indication of the main matters of substance which they cover.
As your Lordships will recall, last year 13 sets of regulations were made to give effect to the new supplementary benefit scheme, which was designed to ensure that so far as possible entitlements of claimants are prescribed by law, and to reduce the amount of discretion required to administer it. I know that noble Lords on all sides saw that reform as a major advance on the largely discretionary scheme which it replaced, and I am glad to be able to tell your Lordships that the indications are that the new scheme, which has now been in operation for seven months, is settling down satisfactorily, and working well on the whole.
However, we did not regard the enactment of those regulations as the end of the job. Unavoidably, with a change of such size and complexity, some details of the legislative arrangements were not as tightly drafted as would be desirable; and some problems have become apparent in the course of operating the new scheme. In order to clarify and resolve the outstanding issues, we have therefore decided to lay before Parliament two sets of amending regulations—the set which your Lordships' House is debating tonight, which is subject to affirmative resolution, and another set of miscellaneous amendment regulations, which are subject to negative resolution.
The general thrust of both sets of regulations is to give effect to provisions confirming the policy of the former Supplementary Benefits Commission or the established policy of my right honourable friend the Secretary of State for Social Services, as appropriate. Some provisions clarify the law where doubt has arisen about whether it provides cover for accepted policy. In general, the object of the amendments is to put the regulations into the state in which they should have been if it had been possible to secure everything properly last year. They do not, except in a few instances make substantive changes in the rules then intended. It will be apparent to noble Lords that the amendments in the present set of regulations are substantial in number, and that is even more true in the case of the miscellaneous amendment regulations. The job of translating the supplementary benefit scheme into regulations was, however, an enormous task and, if I may say so, a substantial technical and legislative achievement. The scheme itself is complex, despite a measure of simplification and clarification which we introduced last year. It is therefore unsurprising that the settling down of the
640
new machinery has revealed a need for some mechanical adjustment and refinement. The amendments which we are proposing have resulted from our own experience of the working of the new scheme and from a careful review of the detailed effect of last year's legislation. It would, however, be right at this point also to pay a tribute to the contribution which has been made by others to our understanding of how the scheme operates, including comments from noble Lords, honourable Members in another place, members of appeal tribunals and outside commentators.
I wish also to take this opportunity of thanking the Child Poverty Action Group for their work and to assure your Lordships that we are indeed studying carefully the report which was recently published. My officials will shortly be meeting them to discuss the work they have done to date.
These regulations were fully debated in another place last Tuesday night, and noble Lords who are interested would have read cols. 824 to 842 in the Official Report. So rather than weary the House by unnecessary repetition I propose to draw attention briefly to some of the more important features of the amendments to the requirements and resources regulations. I will take the requirements regulations first. Regulation 2 clarifies the definition of a prisoner, in particular to confirm that people committed for hospital treatment following proceedings are treated as patients, and therefore are eligible for benefit, and not as prisoners, who are excluded from benefit. There are a number of provisions relating to housing requirements, and we have also made amendments which clarify the interaction between different conditions of entitlement to heating additions so as to restore the policy of the former Supplementary Benefits Commission.
In the amendments to the resources regulations we have clarified the interpretative provisions relating to students and fostering of children. We have amended the provisions relating to income tax refunds received by people whose employment is temporarily interrupted whether because of a trade dispute or for some other reason. We have clarified the circumstances in which payments in consequence of a personal or criminal injury which are held on trust may be disregarded for the purpose of the supplementary benefits capital rule. We are amending the regulations which provide for the treatment of past earnings received from employment at the start of a trade dispute. This amendment substitutes a new formula to end confinement of the present provisions to the weekly paid, and also limits its application to entitlement which arises during the strike and not when the striker has returned to work. This provision restores the practice of the former Supplementary Benefits Commission before last November.
My Lords, in conclusion, I repeat that we are aware that much of the content of these regulations, as of the regulations which they seek to amend, is very detailed and complicated. We shall, however, be bringing forward consolidating regulations before Parliament later this year. Perhaps I could just add that the passage of these regulations by your Lordships' House, if it accepts them, does not mean that we have reached the end of reviewing progress with the new scheme. The regulations in no way pre-empt the

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monitoring exercise on which the Social Security Advisory Committee and my right honourable friend's department have now embarked, to which the research I referred to earlier will make an important contribution. We shall, of course, continue also to watch the scheme in operation with great care and we shall be prepared to consider any changes or developments which experience may show to be desirable, although I should make the point that any changes carrying a net benefit or staff cost will have to take their place in the stiff competition for any additional public resources, along with all the other deserving objects of Government expenditure.
I hope that I have answered some of the questions that may have been in noble Lords' minds. I shall try to answer any others that may arise either verbally this evening or by letter. I beg to move.
Moved, That the draft Supplementary Benefit (Requirements and Resources) Amendment Regulations 1981 laid before the House on 15th June, be approved.—(Lord Cullen of Ashbourne.)
7.21 p.m.
Baroness Jeger: My Lords, the noble Lord the Minister has said that these regulations are complex, and certainly his honourable friend in another place at col. 828 on 30th June said:
"The regulations are detailed and complex".
It is rather difficult to follow them because many of the amendments are amendments to amendments. However, I wish to ask certain specific questions. It is very difficult for members of the public fully to understand their rights. I appreciate that one of the intentions of the new regulations was to reduce the discretion of officers so that the claimant could know with greater certainty what were his rights. But I want to ask the noble Minister how the claimant is supposed to know about his rights and about the new regulations.
In another place the Minister promised that a manual would be published next winter. I do not know when winter starts, and I am wondering whether we can have an indication of some date and how much it will cost claimants. I may add in passing that it is very expensive for people to get the publications. I am thinking not so much of claimants as of those who advise them. If people try to buy a book called Law Relating to Supplementary Benefit and Family Income Supplement, plus the regulations, plus the amendment regulations, plus the amendment of the amendment regulations, it will cost them about £30. Surely we must have some simpler and cheaper way of informing people of their rights.
I want to raise one or two points on the details of the amendments which are before us. I regret that there seems to be no reference, no amendment proposed, to the question of supplementary benefit for school-leavers. The noble Lord will recall that we discussed this earlier in this House and that many of us were concerned that school-leavers were cut off from supplementary benefit until September. There is some anxiety among educationists that this could encourage earlier school leaving, which is something much to be deplored.
There seems to be no amendment, which some of us had hoped for, in relation to the capital sum which is
642
disregarded in connection with applicants for supplementary benefit. That sum has been £2,000 since last November. I should have thought that by next November it would be worth very much less. I am wondering whether the Government are giving any consideration to further amendments which would either provide for some tapering off or some inflation-proofing of the £2,000 disregard. I am particularly worried about people who may have £2,000 in the bank for a short period—people who have perhaps collected £2,000 in redundancy pay or from selling some assets. My information is that their supplementary benefit entitlement is immediately cut off and that there is no tied-over period. I should very much have liked to see in the amendments some consideration given to that point.
Next, I should like to ask about heating, which is so important to elderly people particularly and to people who are chronically ill. In the original regulations—I am referring to document 1299 of 1980—Regulation 15 refers to people who pay an inclusive rent. For them there was set out a table of allowable deductions of: £4·35 a week for heating; 35p for lighting; 50p for cooking and 50p for hot water. Surely, in view of the enormous increases in the prices of electricity and gas, there should have been an increase in those allowances. We all know that the price we pay for heating, lighting, cooking and hot water is much more now than it was in November 1980.
In view of the complications of these amendments I am not at all surprised about the low take-up, which is, of course, of great concern to us all. I know that the noble Lord will share my anxiety about making the whole situation clearer. But the figures I have quoted in one aspect of the problem must surely be an illustration of the difficulties which people find in coming to terms with their allowances.
I must refer to another regret of mine, that in paragraph 4 of the 1980 Regulations, which refers to what are called "normal" requirements, there did not seem to be any allowance for household repairs. I can find nothing in the amendments about household repairs, but I do find that there is an amendment which disregards capital of £300 in respect of money borrowed—I am referring to page 19 of document 1299—for certain what I would have thought were absolutely essential improvements such as damp-proofing, the installation of a bath, shower or lavatory; the provision of electric lighting and sockets, the provision or improvement of drainage facilities and the provision of heating. All those things seem to be covered only by help for interest payable on sums borrowed to put them into effect, and not on the capital cost of any of those things. I hope that many of these people will be getting improvement grants, but it seems to me again that if the figure of £300 was fixed as the disregard point in August 1980, it cannot still be relevant.
I am glad that the noble Lord said that consolidating regulations will appear later this year. I hope that they will be in readable English. I hope that they will be in such a form that they will be readily available to those who are most in need of information about their benefits and about their entitlements. I have every sympathy with the noble Lord because he inherited a confusion of regulations—which I readily confess to—but I very much hope that this set of

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amendments will be looked on as a strictly temporary measure. Above all, I regret that there seems to be no account taken of inflation in respect of the £2,000 capital disregard, the £300 disregard and the allowances for heating and lighting in the inclusive rent cases.
With those observations I express sympathy with the noble Lord, and I am sure that he will share my hopes that this whole difficult matter can be simplified. As long as we make these regulations so complicated and so unavailable in easy terms to the public, the take-up will become lower and lower and then we shall all fail to do what, I agree, we all want to do, which is to ensure a maximum take up of the benefits that are available for people in need.
7.30 p.m.
Lord Banks: My Lords, I should like to thank the noble Lord, Lord Cullen of Ashbourne, for his explanation of these amendment regulations. The first thing that strikes me about the regulations as a whole—as indeed it struck the noble Baroness, Lady Jeger, and I think also the noble Lord—is their complexity and complication. In order to advise on the supplementary benefits scheme or to understand one's own position in relation to it, it is necessary to use, first, the Supplementary Benefits Act 1976, as amended, which is found as Schedule 2 of the Social Security Act 1980; secondly, 13 sets of basic regulations; thirdly, three sets of previous amending regulations; fourthly, these amending regulations which we are now discussing; and, fifthly, the Supplementary Benefit (Miscellaneous Amendments) Regulations 1981 issued at the same time and which, as the noble Lord explained to us, are subject to the negative procedure.
As an additional complication, all the amendments in the two new sets of regulations are intended to come into force on 27th July 1981, except it seems one. Regulation 4(8)(d) of the Miscellaneous Amendments includes additions to the list of "essential furniture and household equipment". Although light fittings, towels, push chairs and high chairs are to be added in July, hot-water cylinder jackets await the 23rd November. I wonder whether the noble Lord can explain to us why this extra complication is necessary. The need for consolidation is very clear and, like the noble Baroness, Lady Jeger, I am glad that that is to be dealt with later this year, and I am sure that we all feel that the sooner the better.
While these regulations correct some anomalies, they leave others untouched. As the noble Baroness indicated, there has been much complaint about the capital resources cut-off of £2,000. I should like to ask the noble Lord three questions about that. What is known to the Government of the effects of this regulation? Are the Government considering any alteration to this figure of £2,000, which is felt by many to be too low? Will the £2,000 limit, as a minimum, be uprated in November to cover the expected rate of inflation?
I should like to say a brief word about Regulation 27 of the Single Payment Regulations. This governs entitlements to single payments for clothing and footwear. The regulation is amended by Regulation 4(16) of the Miscellaenous Amendments, but only as regards detail. The regulation will still operate to exclude
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from entitlements to a single payment for clothing and footwear the family with growing children who formerly did obtain intermittent assistance. I should like to ask three questions about that. What have been the known effects of this regulation? Is the noble Lord aware of any consequent hardship, and are there any proposals for amendment under consideration?
In view of the complication and the complexity, do the Government intend to accept the recommendation of the Child Poverty Action Group, to which the noble Lord referred in the course of his speech, that all decisions should cite the particular regulations used? Insurance officers cite the regulations when giving a decision and one wonders why the benefit officers should not do the same.
In conclusion, we on these Benches do not oppose the amendment regulations. We have these and other specific points of concern with regard to the regulations as a whole and misgiving about the scheme as a whole. It was intended to simplify by removing discretion, but the result is—as is generally acknowledged this evening—very complicated. If very large numbers could be removed from supplementary benefit altogether through a tax credit scheme, that would do more to make possible the simplification of supplementary benefits than anything else.
Lord Kilmarnock: My Lords, we on this Bench share broadly the types of concern expressed by the noble Baroness, Lady Jeger, and the noble Lord, Lord Banks. I think that the noble Lord, Lord Banks, brought the grand total of sets of regulations up to 18, some of them amending previous regulations. If we find these regulations difficult to understand, how much harder will it be at the receiving end? Like the noble Baroness, Lady Jeger, I also discovered to my alarm that the cost of the yellow book on the law relating to supplementary benefits and family income supplements, plus the amendment regulations, now comes to something in the region of £30.
This seems to me to raise the whole question of the mounting cost of HMSO publications. A tax lawyer would have no difficulty in purchasing the consolidated tax Acts and regulations to service his relatively well off clients, but this labyrinth of regulations concerning the less well off is not only almost beyond comprehension, but virtually out of reach on the ground of cost, even to those who might advise the potential beneficiaries. Surely an updated handbook is urgently needed. The only little light on the horizon that we were given by the noble Lord, Lord Cullen, was the promise of some measures of consolidation later in the year, and we very much look forward to that. We must be thankful for small mercies.
While on amendments, it seems—and here I very much agree with both the noble Baroness, Lady Jeger, and the noble Lord, Lord Banks—that it is a great pity that advantage was not taken of this batch to amend the £2,000 capital limit rule for supplementary beneficiaries. This rule penalises small savers who have invested in such things as index-linked bonds which they cannot sell without losing on the retirement issue, and those made recently redundant; indeed, anyone who, ever so temporarily, has anything over £2,000 in the bank—for example, as a result of a sale whose

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object was to get another dwelling or pay the entry into an old person's home. I am convinced that this regulation is causing bewilderment, hardship and resentment and is simply an invitation to profligacy among those who would prefer to be frugal. Perhaps when the noble Lord replies he will say whether the Government will consider either raising the disregard in the near future or reintroducing a tapering system.
Lord Cullen of Ashbourne: My Lords, I am grateful to all noble Lords for their instructive comments and for the sympathy of the noble Baroness concerning the complicated job that this is. The noble Baroness asked when the manual will be published and how much it will cost. My right honourable friend the Secretary of State for Social Services announced that the S Manual, as it will be called, will be published next winter. I cannot go much further than say that I think that means that it will be in 1981 and not in January or February next year, but I am not absolutely positive of that. The cost of publication will be decided nearer the time. I will certainly see that account is taken of the noble Baroness's comments on that matter.
The noble Baroness also referred to school-leavers, a subject which, as she said, we have discussed before. As I explained at the time, there is a considerable background to the change. We are very conscious of the concern that has been expressed by educational interests suggesting that the new rules will have had the effect of discouraging pupils from staying on to sit their examinations. The Department of Education and Science will be monitoring the examination position this year. The Government have made it clear that if there is clear evidence that the new rules have had negative consequences, they will be prepared to review the change.
The noble Baroness and the two noble Lords who have spoken referred to the capital disregard. Your Lordships will know that the operation of the new capital rule is the subject of a special inquiry by the supplementary benefit policy inspectorate. We shall consider the application of the rule, including the effect of the level of the disregard, in the light of the inspectorate's report, and I shall ensure that comments made by noble Lords are made known to them. I do not think I can say anything at the moment about the household repairs point that the noble Baroness made. If I may, I will write to her on that.
The noble Lord, Lord Banks, asked about the hot-water cylinder jackets. This seems a surprising point, but the simple answer is one of cost. The financial provision for these payments has had to be found from existing resources, and necessary resources to enable payments to be made for hot-water cylinder jackets cannot be made available until November. Hence the payments cannot be made until then. The noble Lord also asked whether we were going to follow the suggestion by the CPAG on the citing of regulations when a benefit was modified or not given. When the new scheme was introduced it was the intention to follow National Insurance practice, as the noble Lord mentioned, in quoting to the claimant the benefit officer's decision where the decision was a refusal of benefit or an award of a modified benefit, and that the
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decision quoted should give the regulations on which it was based.
Because the forms had to go to print very early before the regulations were published these references had to be in general terms. In reprinting the forms in question the references to this will be more specific. But to give regulation references on all decisions would hardly be practicable. For example, the award of a weekly payment will be based on a whole range of individual regulations, and it would be scarcely feasible to quote them all, so this is really a transitional problem. I hope I have answered at any rate most of the questions I have been asked. I will write to noble Lords if there are any that I have left out.
On Question, Motion agreed to.
Lord Lyell: My Lords, I beg to move that the House do adjourn during pleasure until eight o'clock, as I understand was agreed by the usual channels.
Moved accordingly, and, on Question, Motion agreed to.
[The Sitting was suspended from 7.44 until 8 p.m.]

British Nationality Bill
House again in Committee on Clause 1.
Lord Drumalbyn Lord Drumalbyn moved Amendment No. 3:
Page 1, line 11, after ("citizen") insert ("whether by birth in the United Kingdom, descent, adoption, naturalisation or registration").
The noble Lord said: The subsection as drafted indicates that there will be, after commencement, two ways of becoming British citizens at birth. The first is by being born in the United Kingdom of a British parent or British parents and by being legally settled in the United Kingdom; and, secondly, the offspring of parents who are not British citizens are to be British citizens if they are born in the United Kingdom and their parents are settled in the United Kingdom.
I am sure my noble friend is aware—certainly this was expressed in the British Nationality White Paper—that there is considerable concern among what one might call second generation British citizens; that is, those who are born abroad of British citizens and whose children, the third generation, would not be able to transmit their British citizenship to their children. There is considerable concern about this and we shall of course be returning to that subject when we come to the whole question of being born abroad, but Clause 1 deals with people who are born in Britain.
Following on the Division we have just had, it would be absurd to confer British nationality on everyone born in the United Kingdom; whether their parents wanted it, whether they had any connection with Britain, whether they were going to be brought up in Britain, and even if by pure chance the child was born in Britain perhaps prematurely or because its parents were delayed in transit through Britain. While that would be absurd, it would be equally absurd if British nationality were to be denied to children born in the United Kingdom to parents who happened to have been born abroad themselves, and so are British

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citizens "merely" by descent—they would be rather second-class British citizens—but who, for all that, are desperately, possibly even fiercely, anxious that their children should be British citizens.
Subsection (4) enables a child born in the United Kingdom who was not a British citizen at birth, because his parents were British citizens merely by descent, to become a British citizen by registration after reaching the age of 10, provided that in the first 10 years of his life he has been absent from the United Kingdom for only 90 days in each year. If I read that subsection aright, it means that after his 10th birthday, he could safely go and live abroad and could claim his British citizenship whenever he chose to come back, even if by that time he was a citizen of some other country. I should like to know if that is a correct interpretation of the provision; it seems to be so.
Subsection (3) provides another avenue for British citizenship, through the child's father or mother becoming a British citizen after commencement—for example, through settlement or residence under Clause 6 or naturalisation under Clause 5—always on condition that the application is made for the child to be registered as a British citizen while he is still a minor. So far so good, but what I should like to be reassured about is that by one way or another, all children born in Britain of British parents, whatever their race, colour or religion, can become British citizens provided their parents want them to be. It seems to me that the mere fact that the parents have ensured that the child was born in the United Kingdom, even though neither of them was—or perhaps I should say particularly because neither of them was—born in Britain, should entitle the child of a British citizen by descent to be a British citizen from birth. I hope my noble friend will be able to satisfy me that under the Bill they are already so entitled and that, if not, he will at least consider how to ensure that they will be so entitled before the Bill leaves your Lordships' House.
What I am aiming at is that subsection (1) should express clearly what is the scope and compass of the phrase "British citizen" as well as the phrase "settled in the United Kingdom". As the meaning of the word "settled" is the subject of the next two amendments, I shall not pursue that, other than to say it would be unfortunate if no clue were given of the meaning of the word "settled" at the very outset of the Bill. I suggest that the same applies to the phrase, "British citizen". I know that the expression "British citizen by descent" is already in use, but if I am not mistaken, it is mentioned for the first time almost casually in Clause (2)(1)(a) and then in Clause 3(6) and is not defined until Clause 13. Surely there should be at least a pointer in Clause 1. That is in a sense a drafting point, but a more than usually important one, for if a false impression is given at the start of the Bill, it could have consequences from the point of view of the way in which people will regard it, and that false impression would be very difficult to remove.
My main point is that the children of British citizens by descent should from birth be British citizens if born in Britain. I cannot believe it is satisfactory to declare in Clause 1 that a person born in Britain whose parents are British citizens—or one of whom at any rate is a British citizen—shall be a British citizen, and then to
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qualify that statement later by saying that it applies only if the parents are British citizens by descent, and that if they want their children to be British they must come back and live in Britain, and do that right away. I want to know whether, if they are in Britain and the child is born in Britain and they are British citizens by descent, that child will be a British citizen without qualification.
Lord Renton: Apart from the point of substance which my noble friend Lord Drumalbyn has raised about citizenship by descent, with which I have great sympathy, his amendment should appeal to the Committee as a matter of improving the drafting and presentation of the Bill. It has been said—I have said this myself—that this is a Bill which has been unnecessarily misunderstood, and of course one cannot have Bills drafted in such a way that they are always certain of legal effect and at the same time be abundantly plain to lay people. I see the noble Lord, Lord Mishcon, on the Opposition Front Bench smiling at that; I think he is smiling in agreement, having full knowledge of that. There are, however, times when, without impairing the legal effect, and perhaps indeed giving greater clarity to it, we can make an amendment to a Bill which also makes it more easily understood by people at large. The amendment of my noble friend Lord Drumalbyn does just that. It is placed at this strategic point in the Bill—the very first subsection upon which a great deal else in the Bill depends—and I think that if we were to spell out in the way he has suggested the ways in which one can be a British citizen, that could only be an advantage.
8.10 p.m.
The Lord Advocate (Lord Mackay of Clashfern): The substance of the matter that has been raised by my noble friend's amendment is the question whether the phrase "British citizen", where it occurs in Clause 1(1), includes British citizens by birth, descent, adoption, naturalisation or registration. To that question of substance, the answer is clearly, "Yes". The phrase "British citizen", as it is used in the second line of the Bill, includes British citizens by all methods by which it is possible to become a British citizen under the Bill, and I am greatly indebted to my noble friend for giving an opportunity for me to say that as clearly as I can. It follows that the differences between the various ways in which one can attain British citizenship are of no importance so far as the citizenship of a child born to that person in the United Kingdom itself is concerned.
The next question is whether it would be an improvement as a matter of drafting to extend the phrase "British citizen" in the manner proposed in my noble friend's amendment. This is obviously a question which we have tried to consider carefully, and the phrase "British citizen" occurs not only here but in many other places in the Bill. Therefore if one is going to elaborate upon it here so as to make it clear that it includes all the methods by which citizenship can be attained, the same would require to be done in every other place where it has the same meaning: otherwise one would be ready to conclude that in a later place where that amplification is not given there is a distinction and some restriction of British citizenship is required.

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The distinctions that are made are made only where they are relevant, and Clause 2(1), to which my noble friend Lord Drumalbyn referred, is one of these where the distinction is taken in respect of a child born outside the United Kingdom to a parent who is a British citizen otherwise than by descent and, of course, a parent who is a British citizen by descent. So the distinction is taken where it is relevant and a qualification is then put in on the British citizenship that is in question.
I therefore say to my noble friend Lord Renton, who I know is a great expert in these matters and takes a great interest in the clarification of our drafting—and we do our best to follow the good advice which his committee gave on this matter—that I do not feel in this instance that it would be an improvement on the drafting, for the reason, as I have said, that the phrase "British citizen" where used in the Bill without qualification covers all the possible ways in which that citizenship can be attained. I hope that in the light of that explanation my noble friend will feel able to withdraw his amendment.
Lord Renton: My noble and learned friend the Lord Advocate has raised an objection that if these words proposed by my noble friend Lord Drumalbyn were inserted here at this point where he suggests, they would have to be inserted forever after wherever the phrase "British citizen" appears in the Bill. I do not accept that. If the noble and learned Lord the Lord Advocate really feels that that is a difficulty, it is one which is easily overcome by adding, after the words which my noble friend Lord Drumalbyn proposes shall be inserted, something to this effect:
"and wherever the expression 'British citizen' is used hereinafter, it shall be deemed to include those circumstances"—
or something like that. I am not drafting but only paraphrasing what the draft might be. In other words, by inserting at this point a clear indication that the expression "British citizen" would always be qualified or, as it may be, comprehensively described within the terms of the amendment of my noble friend Lord Drumalbyn, we should gain the advantage of having this clarification at this early stage of the Bill without the disadvantage of having to repeat it every time the expression "British citizen" was used.
Lord Geddes: I strongly support the words of my noble friend Lord Renton and also the phrasing of the amendment put down by my noble friend Lord Drumalbyn, if for no other reason than that among the words just given by my noble and learned friend the Lord Advocate, in Clause 2(1)(a) immediately there is a variation on the theme of the definition of "British citizen" where it says "otherwise than by descent". I would suggest to your Lordships that unless you have had a full definition of "British citizen" prior to that, you are floundering.
Lord Avebury: As this may be the only opportunity I shall have during the whole of this Committee stage to agree with the Minister, I think I should say just one or two words in support of the status quo. It seemed to me that the words proposed to be added to the Bill would create serious complications not only
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in the way mentioned by the Minister, necessitating including the same reference wherever "British citizen" occurred, but also, when the noble Lord, Lord Renton, tries, off the cuff, to deal with that objection, he is adding still more words to paragraph (a), which at present is plain and simple. Everybody can see if they read the Bill what a British citizen is and the various methods by which British citizenship may be acquired. The fact that in other parts of the Bill we discuss British citizenship of particular kinds—in Clause 2(1), for example, we are talking about British citizens otherwise than by descent—makes it absolutely clear that when we speak of "British citizen", pure and simple, we mean however that status may have been acquired. So I very much hope the Committee will see fit to leave the Bill as it was and to reject this amendment.
Lord Mishcon: If I may follow the line of courteous discussion that is taking place, I hope this will be the only time when I shall disagree with the noble Lord, Lord Avebury. I confess that I have not really had time fully to consider the implications. Obviously I am taking for granted now, as one has to do, that Clause 1 stays as it is. But if you are looking at the Bill and you want to know in what circumstances a child born in this country is entitled to British citizenship, I think it helps if you can see immediately that it is not just a British citizen by birth, as a requirement of one or other of the parents, but it is, as the amendment suggests, a British citizen who acquires that British citizenship in one of the ways set out.
One knows perfectly well that the noble Lord, Lord Renton, need be given only a couple of minutes and his drafting is absolutely perfect. If only we had given him a couple of minutes I am sure he would have done it. But really the matter is simple, is it not? The term "British citizen" shall bear the meaning given in the Bill, unless from the context it appears otherwise. In subsequent clauses it is apparent from the context that the term cannot have the specific meaning. Therefore I should have thought that there are advantages in the amendment. I have not had an opportunity to consider all the implications, but on the face of it what is proposed would appear to add clarity, certainly to the lay reader, who would then know what was encompassed in Clause 1(1). It would also give clarity to the rest of the Bill, unless the context makes it quite clear that the definition of "British subject" already given does not apply in the clause in question.
Lord Renton: There is yet another way of achieving the purpose, though it is nothing like so good as that already referred to. That would be to include something in the definition clause, Clause 49. But that would mean that it would be necessary—as I shall later propose in relation to the word "settled"—to have a reference to Clause 49. I hope that my noble and learned friend will not at this stage turn down this drafting proposal finally and out of hand. In view of what the noble Lord, Lord Mishcon, has said, I feel that, despite what the noble Lord, Lord Avebury, has said, there is here a matter worth considering. Even if I have achieved nothing else, I have got the noble

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Lord, Lord Avebury, to agree with the Government on a drafting matter—and that is something.
Lord Mackay of Clashfern: Perhaps it would be right for me to congratulate my noble friend on that particular achievement, and I hope that the noble Lord, Lord Avebury, will agree with us further as he listens to the persuasive arguments that are to be put forward. It would be churlish now to turn down finally and out of hand proposals coming from such eminent quarters, and certainly I shall be very glad to consider further what has been said, to see whether we can improve the Bill. I must say that so far I have not been entirely persuaded that we shall achieve that objective easily, but we shall certainly try.
Lord Drumalbyn: I am extremely grateful to my noble friend for having made quite clear that the substance of what I wanted is already in the Bill. As to the rest of the matter, I appear to have thrown the helmet of discord among lawyers, and I am quite happy now to leave the matter to the lawyers to sort out. I am grateful to my noble and learned friend for saying that he will look at this question again. I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.
Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.
8.23 p.m.
Lord Aylestone Lord Aylestone moved Amendment No. 4:
Page 1, line 12, leave out ("settled") and insert ("ordinarily resident").
The noble Lord said: With the agreement of the Committee I should like to speak to Amendments Nos. 4, 8 and 10 together, since they all seek to do precisely the same thing. I seek to replace the word "settled" with the words "ordinarily resident". If members of the Committee turn to Clause 49 for the definition of the word "settled", they will find on page 42 of the Bill that
"'settled' shall be construed in accordance with subsection (2)".
If one then refers to subsection (2) of the same clause, one finds the following:
"Subject to subsection (3), references in this Act to a person being settled in the United Kingdom or in a dependent territory are references to his being ordinarily resident…".
So in fact the definition of "settled" is "being ordinarily resident". I heard what the noble Lord, Lord Renton, said at an earlier stage; the simpler we can make matters, the better. I propose that we replace the word "settled" with the words "ordinarily resident". It is clear what they mean. The word "ordinarily" is also used in Clause 3(8), where there is a reference to "ordinarily works". So there is nothing difficult about the word. I hope that the Government will consider whether it is possible to include the term in the three places that I suggest. I beg to move.
Lord Drumalbyn: May I ask my noble friend whether the words "ordinarily resident" do not themselves require to be defined? Is there any legal definition of the term? At what stage does a person become ordinarily resident? Does it at all matter that he has a home to which he returns for one month in each year?
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Does that make him ordinarily resident? These are difficult problems. I hope that my noble friend will save me the trouble of moving the next amendment by agreeing to consider it along with the amendment that he has already said he will consider.
Lord Avebury: I should like to say a few words on the amendment, since it is important that people should understand what is the meaning of the word "settled" within the context of the Bill. This can make an enormous difference to their entitlement in a number of respects. We are involved here with an idea that is not universally understood. The case has arisen, and has been put to Ministers, of the person who might be absent overseas for a period which is within the 2-year time limit normally applied by the Home Office to returning residents. Does he then remain ordinarily resident? Does he remain settled for the purposes of the Bill or of any other legislation? The answer that has been given to that question by officials in the Home Office is that a person who has indefinite leave to remain in this country and who qualifies for re-entry as a returning resident, can remain settled here while being temporarily overseas, provided he remains ordinarily resident here. That seems rather circular, but that was the answer that the Home Office gave to a recent inquiry on this subject.
What I think is important from a practical point of view is this. A person has been here on conditions. He has had the conditions revoked, and so he has indefinite leave to remain in the country. He then goes overseas and is absent for, say, 18 months. At the end of that period he returns, so that he is within the 2-year period which, as I say, the Home Office applies by custom—I do not think that it is included anywhere in the innovaton rules—and which allows a person to come back as a returning resident. Meanwhile his wife, who has remained in the United Kingdom and who is not settled here, has a child. The important question is whether the child will qualify for British citizenship under the Bill. Judging from what the official said in answer to Mr. Ian Martin, the general secretary of the Joint Council for the Welfare of Immigrants, it seems to me that the person probably qualifies; but this needs to be spelt out during the Committee proceedings on the Bill, so that people know exactly where they stand in this respect.
Lord Elwyn-Jones: It would seem that it is not merely any Home Office designation that has made this matter circular. If one looks at the definition clause, Clause 49, one sees at the foot of page 42, in line 35 that,
"'settled' shall be construed in accordance with subsection (2)".
When we then look at subsecton (2), eureka! what do we find? The subsection states:
"Subject to subsection (3), references in this Act to a person being settled in the United Kingdom or in a dependent territory are references to his being ordinarily resident in the United Kingdom…".
If that is right, perhaps the suggestion of the noble Lord, Lord Aylestone, may not be necessary. But what troubles me is the considerable uncertainty involved in the words "ordinarily resident". It is notorious, the uncertainty in the construction of "ordinarily resident". It has different meanings in tax law, in divorce law and in immigration law.

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I wonder whether the purposes of certainty are furthered by the amendment we are discussing.
Lord Belstead: This is indeed not a very easy problem, and I hope I can add to what has been said. I am genuinely grateful, not only to the noble Lord, Lord Aylestone, who moved the amendment, but also to Lord Avebury, who is conversant with these matters and to the noble and learned Lord and my noble friend who have spoken on this amendment. Incidentally, if the argument is circular it has not got such a bad pedigree. I think one of the few pieces of legislation which I am capable of remembering is that, if I remember rightly, the definition of "charitable purposes" in the Charities Act 1960 is,
"those purposes which can be said to be charitable".
"Ordinary residence", as I understand it, is a question of mixed fact and law. It is not defined, of course, in the amendment moved by the noble Lord, Lord Aylestone, and I make no criticism of that because it is not defined in the Bill. That is because the Bill adopts the definition of "settled" which is used in the Immigration Act 1971, where the term is not defined, either. I think it is generally accepted that the concept of "ordinary residence" can be a difficult one, and it has not been interpreted by the courts, as far as I know, in a nationality context. In other contexts, however, I am advised the courts have held that someone present in this country is not necessarily ordinarily resident here. Conversely, someone who goes outside the country for quite long periods could be regarded as still being ordinarily resident.
This leads, of course, to the sort of situation which the noble Lord, Lord Avebury, has perfectly reasonably raised. He asks: What is the conclusion to be drawn? The advice that I have is that one thing one has to be certain about is that so far as ordinary residence is concerned it all depends on the facts that surround the case. If I may try to be a little more helpful in saying that, I would interpret that as meaning, inter alia, that it depends also on the intention of the person in the case.
The Government believe that this lack of clarity in the concept of "ordinary residence" is a more serious drawback on its own than when it is part of the wider concept of "settled". "Settled", speaking for myself, I find rather easier. "Settled" means, basically, ordinarily resident without being subject to restrictions under the immigration laws on one's stay. One can therefore be much more confident that if someone is free of restrictions on stay under the immigration laws he or she is in fact also very likely, if resident in the country, to be ordinarily resident. The amendment proposed by the noble Lord would omit this vital element of having to be free of restrictions on one's stay, and it would then become very much more difficult to say of someone who is subject to such restrictions whether or not he or she was ordinarily resident.
I must confess to the Committee that I asked, not very long ago, before we began this Committee stage, why it was not possible simply to kick over the whole mentioning of "ordinary residence" because it was so unclear, and just stick to the definition of "settled", which to me seems much clearer—that you have to be
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clear of restrictions upon one's stay. But, of course, the definition of "settled", which relies on both "ordinary residence" and being clear of restrictions on one's stay, were included in the Immigration Act 1971, and really we cannot kick over that definition because, otherwise, we would be removing clarity and certainty from people who have known in the past that they were settled and would suddenly say to the Government, "But you are changing the whole definition". Really the definition therefore needs to remain the same in this Bill as it is in the 1971 Act.
For that reason I do not see how any change can be made in the definition of "settled". But if a change were to be made, with the very greatest respect to the noble Lord, Lord Aylestone, I do not think that this amendment would be the right way to do it. I would argue that the Government's approach is very much the clearer way; and it is also in principle, I think, better. The Government believe that there can be no real justification for conferring citizenship on people whose stay here is subject to restriction. They are here only temporarily, and have not been accepted under our immigration laws for permanent residence.
I have ventured to say to the Committee before today that I think the one real area of agreement between the previous Government and the present Government was that if the law of nationality were to be modernised we should make a close and continuing relationship with this country a qualification for a new British citizenship. The future of any children born to people who are here only temporarily would lie outside the United Kingdom, and this, I think, would not be the way to go about this. The amendment, by removing that part of the definition of "settled" which refers to restrictions upon somebody's stay but by retaining the less clear part of the definition which refers to ordinary residence, would I think not only be very unclear but, with respect, run wholly counter to one of the main purposes of this Bill.
Lord Mishcon: I make no apologies to the Committee for prolonging this discussion, because I know that the Committee feels that this is a vital part of the Bill. Having decided, as I said before, that this clause, certainly for the moment, remains as in the Bill, what we must do—and this is an essential purpose of us all—is to see that those who have this right, or those who have not got this right, know precisely where they stand. One of the problems that I have still, after having the Minister speak, is that this, it seems to me, is going to be in the purview of a civil servant to decide in the ordinary case, based on the facts as he sees them put in an application. Is this man ordinarily resident or is he not? There may be certain guidelines—we are not even in a position to see the guidelines at this moment, and we may not approve of them—but is the whole question of nationality to be decided in this arbitrary and very unclear way?
Listening to the Minister, I came to the conclusion—and he and other noble Lords may think that I came to the wrong conclusion—that if somebody is born in this country and one of the parents has an unqualified permission to be here, then without any doubt at all the parent who has that unqualified permission to be here has a vital connection with this country, otherwise

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he would never have been given the unqualified permission. If one could therefore simplify this, in spite of what the Minister said, by saying that somebody born in this country has the right to British citizenship if either of his parents is a British citizen or if either of his parents has unqualified permission to be here, I would have said that you have the nexus then, you have the obvious connection with this country, which makes the thing certain beyond a peradventure and no longer at the whim, as I have said, of a perfectly honourable (I am sure) civil servant who may make quite the wrong decision on the facts.
Lord Drumalbyn: If I understood my noble friend correctly, he said that there were two elements to being settled, but there seems to be only one in the definition. Perhaps when we come to the definitions that would be an appropriate time to deal with the matter.
Lord Belstead: May I say that I owe my noble friend Lord Drumalbyn an apology. I am looking also at Amendment No. 5 in the name of my noble friend. Amendment No. 5 has a similarity with Amendment No. 6 in the name of my noble friend Lord Renton. I feel sure that my noble friend will be moving that amendment; therefore probably my noble friend Lord Drumalbyn will have two bites of the cherry. While on my feet, and subject to any correction, may I say that I feel that the definition of "settled" has two limbs to it. The first limb is being ordinarily resident and the second limb, which goes with it, is being not subject under the immigration laws to any restriction on the period for which the person may remain.
Lord Hylton: The noble Lord, Lord Mishcon, has referred to questions of whether a person is settled or not being decided by civil servants. Could my noble friend the Minister say whether Clause 1(1)(b) could be decided in a court of law, bearing in mind the definition to which he has already referred in Clause 49(2) and bearing in mind also that there is a question of a person's intention and certain other facts and legal matters to be interpreted?
Lord Avebury: While the Minister is thinking about that, I believe the question of whether a person is or is not ordinarily resident here is amenable to a decision of the courts. There is a case which I requested him to look at, Regina v. Immigration Appeal Tribunal, ex parte Manek, where judgment was delivered on 5th May 1978. It was in The Times Law Report of 9th May 1978. It is an important case because it was decided by the Master of the Rolls that the person in question, although she had left the United Kingdom nearly a year before, was nevertheless both ordinarily resident and settled. It was that case which was quoted by officials in the context of the question about absence from the United Kingdom and which I wanted to get more confirmation on than the Minister so far has given. I do not think we want this Bill to result in a lot of litigation. That is the answer to the noble Lord, Lord Hylton.
If it were possible to clarify the meaning of the term "ordinarily resident", in particular about the case of these individuals to whom I am referring, the person
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who will be a returning resident, who has been absent from the United Kingdom for a shorter or longer period but who has left behind a wife here who subsequently gives birth and has not herself the qualification which is required under the Bill. Her husband has. He is absent temporarily from the United Kingdom but he is due to return. Then there will be the question of deciding whether or not at the time of birth he was still ordinarily resident. As the Minister has said, this is partly a question of fact and partly one of law. Does the man have the intention of returning? That is decidable in the course of time by whether he exercises the right of return within the two years. If we do not seek to write into this Bill more information about the circumstances in which a person can be deemed to be settled, notwithstanding his temporary absence from the United Kingdom I am afraid, as the noble Lord, Lord Hylton, has just said, that we shall be leaving a lot of work for the courts to do in the future.
Lord Belstead: I do not think that at this stage I can add to what I have said. The question which my noble friend Lord Hylton has asked has been answered by the noble Lord, Lord Avebury. The only thing that I would add is that I sought to explain why, in the Government's view, we cannot change horses in midstream. We have got the definition of "settled" in the 1971 Immigration Act. It is that definition which has been reproduced in Clause 49(2) of this Bill. That is the reason why we have gone about it in that way. Of course I will look carefully at what has been said in this debate, but that is not the same as saying that I am looking at it with a view to making a change. I will seriously look at it and ask members of the Home Office to look at what has been said, because this is important. I am sure that the noble Lord, Lord Aylestone, will not mind my saying that the one thing that I am certain about is that, with respect, I do not think this amendment is right. This amendment removes what is certain in the definition of "settled" and leaves us with the greyer area. That would not be something that the Committee would want to do.
Lord Aylestone: I started off this amendment with the idea of simplifying it for the lay mind. I have succeeded in making it more difficult for my own. I have listened to the lucid explanation of the noble Lord on the Government Front Bench. I am persuaded by what the noble Lord, Lord Drumalbyn, has said, that we ought to look again at the definition of "settled" and perhaps of "ordinarily resident" when we reach Clause 49. In the circumstances, I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.
Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.
8.46 p.m.
Lord Drumalbyn Lord Drumalbyn moved Amendment No. 5:
Page 1, line 12, at end insert ("within the meaning of section 49 of this Act.").
The noble Lord said: Amendments Nos. 5 and 6 are the same in meaning. I do not know whether my noble friend will be willing to discuss the two together.
Lord Renton: Certainly.
Lord Drumalbyn: In that case, may I say why I did not put down the words that he put down. It was because I thought that Section 49(2) falls short of a definition. That is why I put down the words that I have. I beg to move.
Lord Renton: My noble friend Lord Drumalbyn and I are each trying in our similar ways to make a further attempt to improve the clarity of Clause 1(1). It so happens that in spite of the discussion that we have just had, I feel bound to point out that when we come to Clause 49 the definition of "settled" requires nearly a whole page of description. It is in subsection (2), subsection (3) and subsection (4) of that clause; and it occupies nearly a whole page. As my noble friend Lord Drumalbyn pointed out, we shall have to discuss that, when we come to Clause 49. But whatever the contents of that Clause will be when we have done so, it would surely be a good thing to give a guiding light forward at this stage. I naturally prefer my own amendment to that of my noble friend because my own amendment is a bit shorter; but they are of exactly the same effect. Therefore I do not know whether it is right to say that I support him, but I think he is on the right lines.
Lord Avebury: There is one problem that I mentioned on Second Reading which the noble Lord, Lord Belstead, may recall. That is the position of refugees. A person who comes here as a refugee normally lands and makes application to be treated as a refugee, and then as much as two years may elapse before the Home Office arrive at a decision on the matter. The noble Lord may have seen the case reported in the Observer the week before last of a Pakistani citizen, Brigadier Usman Khalid who fled from Pakistan because he considered the rule of the Generals was subverting the constitution. He arrived here and was admitted. He made application to the Home Office for refugee status and now, something like 20 months later, the brigadier's case is still being examined by the Home Office. He is not settled in the United Kingdom. He is not ordinarily resident here. There are many people in the same kind of position. The Home Office may take a longer or shorter while to process these cases but at any one time there may be many dozens of them before the Minister awaiting decision. They come from all over the world. They may come from Eastern Europe; they may come from Pakistan or Latin America. I do not say that this is a very large number at any one time; but to the people concerned it may be of vital importance if they have children in this country that their children's status shall be determined. If they are not ordinarily resident, not settled within the meaning of Clause 49, then the children will be in a type of limbo. If they remain here for as much as 10 years, then they will qualify under another part of Clause 1. Particularly with refugees who may have suffered greatly in their countries of origin and come here hoping to find peace and security, it is absolutely essential that right from the start their children are given the same privileges as if they were British citizens. I hope that when we consider the references to Clause 49 we might make some modifications so that the position of refugees is fully taken into account and that their children are accorded the
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privileges that we are conferring on those who are born British citizens under the Bill.
Lord Bowden: May I raise a comparable question not about the political refugees but about the kind of migrant worker who is much more common in Europe than here? It is notorious that Mercedes cars are built by Turks and that the whole of the Swiss building industry is run by Italians. These people move from place to place in search of work and in search of livelihood. They often find themselves deprived of any form of civil rights. As I understand it, they have no opportunity to become citizens themselves. They have no rights under the law except the very crudest and if there is any form of unemployment they will be sent home.
The German economic miracle has been caused in effect by the fact that they have been able to import millions of Turks, keep them while they could work and ship them home again. We have never adopted a system of that kind. It seems that our membership of the Common Market and this particular change in the law governing citizenship may make this problem much more important that it has hitherto ever been.
I should like to ask the Minister whether the rights of citizenship and all other civil rights of what the Germans call the Gastarbeiter have been considered and, if so, how far they affect such a thing as the status of ordinary residents? Labourers may come from Turkey and spend a couple of years in Germany and then be sent abruptly home when the work that they were doing is no longer available to them. What would happen here? Is there any possibility that our law may be moved closer to that obtaining in Europe? If so, has its effect been allowed for in this Bill and particularly the clause that we are now discussing?
The Duke of Norfolk: That is exactly what I was talking about. The Gastarbeiter, if they come here and have children, should not become British citizens. I have the greatest sympathy for anybody suffering from tyranny; but the Gastarbeiter must not be allowed to become British citizens. That is why jus soli was wrong. My answer to the noble Lord opposite is that the Gastarbeiter must be a citizen from where the arbeiter came from, from the country he quoted.
Lord Hylton: Is it not entirely wrong to invite workers into one's country for however long a period—let us assume it is at least six months or a year—and then deny them rights of voting and many other civil rights?
8.55 p.m.
Lord Belstead: We began this amendment with a requirement that the insertion should be made in Clause 1, page 1, line 12 that "settled" is "as defined in section 49". If I may address myself to that first, this is really the effect of both Lord Renton's and Lord Drumalbyn's amendments. The difficulty is that the term settled appears in the Bill many times. It is not only used here in Clause 1(1). It appears again both later on in this clause and in other clauses of the Bill. Every time that it appears it has the same meaning and it is this meaning that is set out in Clause 49(2). But it seems to us that this identity of meaning might

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not be so clear if the term "settled" in Clause 1(1) alone were to be followed by a reference to the definition in Clause 49. Readers of the Bill might then be in some doubt about what the meaning was when the term "settled" appeared again. I put this to my noble friends for their consideration. May be they will not agree but that is the feeling that we have about it at the moment.
We are on a point which to me is an easier one than the one to which my noble and learned friend the Lord Advocate replied; namely, the amendment which my noble friend Lord Drumalbyn put down about the definition of British citizen. There was no definition in the interpretation clause of a British citizen. In practice, I did not think that any great difficulty should arise for readers of the Bill because they turn to the interpretation clause, Clause 49, and there they will see the definition.
I was intending to endeavour to say something about the definition of "settled" but the lengthy discussion we had on the previous amendment obviates any necessity to do that again. My noble friend Lord Renton quite rightly pointed out that the definition of "settled" in Clause 49 is not quite as straightforward as I was making it out 10 minutes ago when I ventured the view that it had two limbs and the two limbs relied on the interpretation of "ordinarily resident" and "being here without any conditions on your stay".
There is more to it than that. There are some complicated parts in subsections (3) and (4) of Clause 49. Subsection (3) deals essentially with those entitled to diplomatic immunity or members of visiting armed forces and the like who are exempt from immigration control by virtue of Section 8 of the Immigration Act 1971. This subsection in Clause 49 provides that such people are not to be regarded as settled for the purposes of the Bill. Children born to them here therefore will not be British citizens. A proviso of this kind is necessary to ensure that we do not confer our citizenship automatically on those born here to diplomats and people of visiting forces who come here as official representatives of their Governments. This is in accordance with international practice. As I understand it, our own people in the same way have the same treatment when they go abroad.
Subsection (4) is a saver which says "however, if you are a junior member of the staff recruited in this country and working in a diplomatic mission then subsection (3) does not apply to you and you fall within the terms of the definition". Having said that, may I come back to the main point. My noble friend Lord Renton, who knows so much more about drafting than I do, may disagree, but I have ventured to set out the reasons why we would prefer to rely upon the interpretation clause and not put in a definition of "settlement".
May I try to reply to the two questions which were asked? The noble Lord, Lord Avebury, asked me about refugees. They are normally subject to conditions of stay for four years; but not, incidentally, the Vietnamese refugees, who have been admitted for settlement upon arrival. Under normal conditions, they have to have stayed here for four years, so they would not be settled until the conditions were lifted
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then. When conditions are lifted on a refugee under Clause 1(3) of this Bill, the refugee's children will be entitled to be registered as British subjects.
The noble Lord, Lord Bowden, raised the question of migrant workers. Migrant workers do not normally have restrictions on their stay removed until they have been in approved employment for four years. They are one of the categories admitted, initially at least, only temporarily—and if I may venture a view, I believe that is not unreasonable.
Finally, there was the question put to me by the noble Lord, Lord Hylton. My noble friend asked whether it was not wrong that workers should be invited into a country and then prevented from having civic rights. One of the important things that were said by my right honourable friend the Minister of State, Mr. Raison, in the other place, and he has said it on several other occasions, was that this Bill does not deal with a statement of civic rights. The reason is simple. It is because the rights of citizens are set out in such a mass of different pieces of legislation; it is for that reason that one does not find a statement of civic rights in this Bill; this Bill deals with nationality, but it is, of course, from nationality that civil rights flow in other pieces of legislation.
Lord Renton: I am grateful to my noble friend for his explanation. He has raised a point very similar to that which was raised by the noble and learned Lord the Lord Advocate on the previous amendment. The more that one thinks about this drafting problem—speaking for myself anyway—the more one feels like suggesting that the draftsman should be asked to insert a new subsection (2) to follow subsection (1), to cover the point that was made in Amendment No. 3. So far as Amendments Nos. 5 and 6 are concerned, the point could be covered by wording such as this:
"The term 'settled' shall in subsection (1) and wherever else it is used in this Act have the meaning given to it in Section 49".
May I leave that with the noble Lord the Minister and the draftsman?
Lord Belstead: I am grateful to my noble friend. I certainly give an undertaking that I shall make it my business to consult the parliamentary draftsman, and I think this is a point on which I should get in touch with both my noble friends.
Lord Drumalbyn: I am much obliged to my noble friend the Minister. Before withdrawing the amendment could I just comment that when my noble friend the Minister said that he did not see any point in putting in the signpost that I was suggesting here, he gave as the reason the point that has been picked up by another noble friend, Lord Renton, that the use of the word "settled" is the same throughout the Bill. It seems to me that that is exactly the reason why the signpost should be put in. If there was any doubt and the word "settled" was being used in different ways in different parts of the Bill, then that would be a good reason for not putting in the signpost. May I ask my noble friend to take that into account also when he comes to examine this point with the draftsman? With that, I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.
Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.
[Amendment No. 6 not moved.]
The Deputy Chairman of Committees (Earl Cathcart): In calling Amendment No. 7, I should point out that if this amendment is agreed I cannot call Amendment No. 8.
[Amendments Nos. 7 and 8 not moved.]
The Deputy Chairman of Committees: In calling Amendment No. 9, I should advise your Lordships that if this amendment is agreed I cannot call Amendment No. 10.
[Amendments Nos. 9 and 10 not moved.]
The Deputy Chairman of Committees: In calling Amendment No. 11, I should advise your Lordships that if this amendment is agreed I cannot call Amendments Nos. 12, 12A, 13, 13A, 13B, 14, 14A and 15.
[Amendment No. 11 not moved.]
The Deputy Chairman of Committees: In calling Amendment No. 12, I should advise your Lordships that if it is agreed I cannot call Amendments Nos. 12A, 13, 13A, 13B, 14, 14A and 15.
9.5 p.m.
Lord Aylestone Lord Aylestone moved Amendment No. 12:
Page 2, line 12, leave out from ("citizen") to end of line 16 and insert ("to be registered as such a citizen.").
The noble Lord said: The Bill as it now stands means that a child over 10 years of age may be registered as a citizen provided that the Secretary of State is satisfied that the child has not been absent for 90 days in one of the first 10 years. My amendment seeks to ensure that child to become registered as a citizen without any reference whatsoever to the Secretary of State's discretion, and that the child, at the request of the parents and on application by the parents, could be registered as a British citizen from birth if they so wished. I beg to move.
Lord Belstead: This amendment would give anyone born here after the commencement of the Bill who did not become a British citizen at birth an unqualified entitlement to British citizenship and the right of abode in this country—an entitlement which he or she could exercise at any time. This amendment would restore a form of jus soli almost in the way that it was before we began to debate Clause 1. We have discussed all that and I will not reiterate the views which I endeavoured to put then. The noble Lord may say that I am not being entirely fair and that this amendment avoids the drawbacks of the jus soli in its full form. After all, those born here who do not acquire British citizenship at birth would, under the amendment, have to make an application for that citizenship. They will have to do some positive act to take up British citizenship and will not, as it were, have it thrust upon them.
But the entitlement, which the noble Lord would write into the Bill by this amendment would be drawn very broadly indeed. Nothing would be demanded of an applicant beyond showing that he was born here and did not become a citizen at birth. It is reasonable to assume that such a broad avenue to citizenship
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would attract very many applicants, including many who had no connection with this country but wanted the convenience of British citizenship and the right of abode here—a citizenship and the right of abode which they could transmit to their children born abroad. I have to say bluntly that the additional immigration commitment which would flow from this is something which would cause very great concern to the Government.
Moreover, this entitlement could be exercised as soon as the child was born. It would be most attractive to the parent, who was here in breach of conditions or illegally and wished to defer removal, to put forward an application for his or her child born here to acquire British citizenship here and to press that, pending a decision on the application, proceedings for removal should be deferred. I know that I am sounding very suspicious in saying those things, but may I just remind your Lordships that the whole point of subsection (4), which we have now reached—the 10-year period offered—is to catch the compassionate cases, the people who have not, for some reason which one would not necessarily be able to foretell, been able to qualify under Clause 1(1), in that one of the parents was a British citizen or settled in the United Kingdom, or that either the father or the mother had become a British citizen or had become settled in the United Kingdom under Clause 1(3), and had to fall back on this extra facility which is being offered.
The noble Lord, Lord Aylestone, referred to this as being a discretion. With respect, it is not; it is an entitlement. This is most important. Subsection (4) gives an entitlement to someone, after being here for 10 years, to apply for British citizenship. If the Secretary of State refused that entitlement, that would be something which would go to the court. If the court found that the Secretary of State had been unreasonable on matters of fact, there would be no discretion in it; the court would, quite rightly, find in favour of the applicant.
The Government accept that a child born here to a parent who has no connections with this country should be able to secure citizenship if real links with this country can be said to develop. We have, therefore, provided in Clause 1(3) that such a child will, while a minor, be entitled to British citizenship if either the mother or the father becomes a British citizen or becomes settled here. We have also provided in the subsection, which this amendment seeks to alter, for the 10-year period. But we do not think it would be right to go beyond this in the way that the amendment proposes. The amendment would virtually nullify the restraints on the jus soli which are in Clause 1(1) and which we feel are amply justified, if British citizenship is to reflect a real link with this country and, by virtue of that link, to carry with it the right of abode. It is on those grounds that I feel I must resist the noble Lord's amendment.
Lord Aylestone: I accept what the noble Lord has said, that this is, in a sense, a watered-down part of jus soli. But that was my intention. I wanted to make it possible after the birth of a child, after the commencement of the Act, for any parent, on behalf of the child, to register the child as British if he or she so I wished, without going through the procedures which the

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Minister regards as safeguards. But in view of the Minister's clear view on this and the attitude he has taken, I shall think again between now and Report stage. At this stage, I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.
Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.
9.13 p.m.
Lord Pitt of Hampstead Lord Pitt of Hampstead moved Amendment No. 12A:
Page 2, line 13, leave out ("ten") and insert ("five").
The noble Lord said: I begin by telling the Minister that I do not intend to divide on this amendment, but I beg the Government to think again on the question of the term. I know that during the Committee stage in another place three, five and seven years were suggested and rejected. My reason for choosing five years is that that is the age when children go to school. Parents are accustomed to doing things for their children at the age of five. The likelihood of a parent registering a child at that age is quite strong. This could obviate some of the difficulties that are envisaged for people applying for citizenship long after the time when they could have had it. It is difficult for them to provide the material to prove that they are entitled to citizenship. That difficulty would be obviated because when the parents go to the school the head teacher will ask them whether they have registered and, if they have not registered, will advise them to get a form from the Home Office to register their child. The parents would do that. I am not going to divide the Committee, but I should like the Government to give careful thought to this point.
An additional reason is that a Commonwealth citizen who is resident here is entitled to register after five years; so five years is a period of time to which people are accustomed. It is not only a question of children going to school at the age of five. A five-year period is also very convenient because people know that after they have lived here for five years they can register. Therefore five years is the optimum period if you are to reduce the difficulties which are envisaged in this clause.
I know that this clause is a well-meant concession, but there are inherent difficulties in proving that a child has lived here for 10 years. There may be difficulty in proving that a child has not been away from this country for more than 90 days in any one of the 10 years. If it were a period of five years I think we should reduce that difficulty, simply because at the age of five people do something about their children. That is the age at which they go to school. Therefore, it is the right time to invite them to register. I am not going to push the Government tonight because I want them to think about this point. I shall bring it back at Report.
While I am on my feet, may I deal with the other amendments, in particular Amendment No. 14A. The point about Amendment No. 14A is that to insist on an exact period of 90 days in each year would cause a great deal of difficulty. When this point was raised in another place, the Minister pointed out that people can have two periods of 90 days; therefore it can be stretched to 180 days. However, it depends upon their birthday. It would be difficult in family terms. If
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the Government were prepared to accept my amendment, that it should be an average of only 90 days, I should be quite prepared to add a proviso that no absence should be for longer than 180 days. I should be quite happy to meet the Government in that way.
To say that people cannot be away for longer than this rigid period of 90 days will create difficulties. We have here many children from the Asian sub-continent. A child with a tendency to bronchitis may benefit from a few months in Bangladesh; then it could come back and would not suffer from frequent coughs and colds. If anybody wanted to do that, this 90-day period could be a difficulty. I am prepared to concede that an average of 90 days should be accepted only if a specific absence is for not more than 180 days. Then children can be sent to their families because of asthma, bronchitis and other reasons. Or it may be that the parent of the child is ill. The mother may wish to send her child to her own mother or sister to be looked after for a period. If we insisted upon a rigid 90-day period we could create hardship for people in that situation.
I am sure that the Government want to be helpful, but they have probably not thought out this point very thoroughly and I invite them to think again. My view is that if we have an average period of five years and allow for a maximum, we shall meet many of the difficulties.
Lord Elwyn-Jones: I hope the noble Lord will be able to take a sympathetic view of this matter, particularly the first amendment. As I have discovered from a number of grandchildren recently, five years is indeed a turning point in a child's life. It is the year of admission to an infants' school proper, and therefore it is valuable and gives an element of certainty if, at that stage, its citizenship could be and should be established. In regard to Amendment No. 14A, similarly I think hardship, which could well arise, could be avoided, while fulfilling the objectives of the Government in this matter, if my noble friend's amendment could be accepted.
Baroness Trumpington: On the face of it, the noble Lord's amendment has great appeal, but unless things have changed, when my child went to school he went in his fifth year. That meant that, as his birthday was on the 31st August, he was four years old, his fifth year starting on the 1st September. He went to school when he was four and about 10 days-plus. He was in his fifth year when he started school. It is not as easy as the noble Lord, Lord Pitt, has made out. It is not a question of going to school on your fifth birthday. I hope I am right in saying that this is still the case. I fear that the position is much more complicated than the noble Lord anticipates. He has already said that he is not going to divide the Committee but, much as it sounds a quite sympathique amendment, I could not support it for the reasons I have given.
Lord Avebury: I wish to support the noble Lord, Lord Pitt, in this amendment, for several purely practical reasons which I will attempt to outline. I accept the point made by the noble Baroness that the child's entry into the infants' school does not necessarily precede the fifth birthday and therefore the formalities

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of application to be carried out under the clause, as the noble Lord, Lord Pitt, would have it amended, may not have been completed by the time the child enters school. But I think the important point he was trying to make was that once the child enters school that is something of a watershed in the child's life, and at roughly the same time, if not at exactly the same time, one would hope that his future citizenship could be determined once and for all. Even if it is some months after the child first enters school, the two events would be more or less contemporaneous. I think that was the sense in which the noble Lord was suggesting that it should be five years.
I want to put forward some considerations as to the kind of people who would benefit from this concession. The categories of persons who may give citizenship to their children purely by the lapse of time are not British citizens, and they are not persons who have settled here; they are either people who are here on conditions or they are illegal entrants or overstayers.
The principal category of persons here on conditions for any length of time is of course the student, and the student who comes here to take a university degree normally remains either for three years or, at the most, four. There may be a few students—and they must be wholly exceptional and extremely fortunate in this day and age, when we consider overseas students' fees—who remain after the first degree and go on to do a PhD; then they might be in the United Kingdom for as much as five years. But if they bring their spouses with them and have a child more or less immediately after they enter the United Kingdom, the child will still not have attained the age of five years by the time they have completed their studies and they leave. So if one of the purposes of the Government in designing this nationality legislation is to prevent students from transmitting British citizenship to children born while their parents are undertaking a course of studies here, and when they have the intention of going back overseas at the end of it (which of course they are obliged to do under the immigration rules) that intention would have been accomplished if this amendment were to be accepted.
Turning to the illegal entrants and the overstayers, any person in that position who formulates an application for his child to be registered as a British citizen is bringing himself to the attention of the authorities. He is unlikely to do so, therefore, for the purpose of conferring citizenship on the child, if he thinks that as a result of notice being taken of his presence here he himself will be declared an illegal entrant and will be removed back to his country of origin. So I do not believe that whether the period is five years, 10 years, or whatever other periods were suggested in the Committee stage in another place, it would make any difference to him. By requiring the parents' request for registration of the child you are making it virtually certain that the person who is not here lawfully will not seek to make such an application. So, from their point of view, I do not think it makes any difference whether it is five years or 10 years.
Finally, I think what is required above all in citizenship is certainty. To allow a period as long as 10 years to elapse before a child can have citizenship determined is very unsettling for the whole family, Therefore, other things being equal, we should make the period as
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short as possible. For the practical reasons that I have suggested five years would be quite sufficient for the purposes of the Government, and I hope the amendment moved by the noble Lord, Lord Pitt, will be found acceptable by the noble Lord, Lord Belstead.
Lord Hylton: Earlier today I indicated support for Amendment No. 12A and consequential ones. I hope the Government will consider this not only very carefully but very sympathetically. The noble Lord, Lord Pitt, moved this in the most persuasive way. I would only add this. It is surely desirable from the point of view of the child that these matters should be cleared up while the child is still in the primary school and before he is moved on to a secondary school.
Lord Belstead: I am grateful to the noble Lord, Lord Avebury, on one point. The noble Lord put with absolute clarity for the benefit of the Committee the people whom we are actually talking about in this subsection (4). If I may in a few words repeat what the noble Lord said, we are talking about people who have still got conditions on their stay, or they may be illegal entrants or they may be overstayers. Therefore, we are not talking about people who have been able to claim citizenship for a child because one of the parents is a citizen, under Clause 1(1), or can say quite definitely that they are settled, under Clause 1(1), or who have become citizens or become settled since the children began to grow up, under Clause 1(3). We are not talking about those people at all. We are talking about the people the noble Lord has identified.
The purpose of subsection (4) is not to try—as I think the noble Lord was suggesting—in a sense to count off the days until the 10 years is up and then the Home Office say, "That is a good thing; we are going to get rid of those people". That is not the case. The whole idea of the Government in drafting subsection (4) was to save the compassionate cases where the parents really thought they were settled and found that by a decision of the courts they were not, or maybe more likely, that the child is beginning to grow up and as the years go by the child is beginning to think, "I am here for all time and my parents are here for all time". Then the child does not realise it, but the parents ought not to be here at all. Here again there is a compassionate avenue for being able to pick that child up and allow citizenship after the period of 10 years.
The noble Lord, Lord Pitt, indeed most persuasively argued the case for a five-year period. We have chosen the 10-year point in Clause 1(4) for a reason which I think I ought again quite bluntly to refer to. It is because the Government would not wish to insist on the deportation of a child born here who had lived here for 10 years. If the child's parents were here subject to conditions of stay or in breach of immigration control, those problems would normally have been resolved one way or another during the 10-year period.
A shorter period—I cannot agree with the noble Lord, Lord Avebury—would definitely be unsatisfactory. In saying that I am not trying to say that I disagree wholly and totally with what has been said, but when the noble Lord, Lord Avebury, said, "Look here, five years would be all right from this point of view", then I think I must take issue with the noble

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Lord. For perfectly good and compassionate reasons, there are people in public life—among whom is the noble Lord—who will take up, quite understandably, the cases of people who otherwise may be deported from these shores, and deportation does not take place while those cases are being considered, and those matters can go on for a very long time indeed. I do not think that I need say any more than that to indicate why I believe that the five-year period could be a good deal too short.
Having said that let me turn to the second aspect of Lord Pitt's amendments and that is the averaging out of the periods of absence from these shores. The noble Lord explained why he has gone for this solution: it is because he wants more flexibility and again he wants to try and pick up the difficult cases. Let us suppose that I were to meet the noble Lord's first group of amendments. A child aged five who had been out of this country for a period of 450 days—nearly 18 months—at any one time would be eligible. If we are talking about the Government's 10-year period, a child could be out of the country for 900 days—not far off three years—at one time and remain eligible. The essential criterion the applicant has to meet is that he or she shall have been continuously resident in the United Kingdom during the qualifying period. We feel that that would be going too far. Therefore, the principle behind this second group of the noble Lord's amendments would permit a child to spend nearly one-third of his life overseas in the qualifying period and I think that that is asking too much.
None the less, the noble Lord made a telling point when he said to the Committee, "What happens if a child goes abroad, wants the qualifying 10-year period and falls seriously ill and is simply prevented from coming back?" There is nothing in the Bill to save that kind of case. I say quite frankly that I would like to try to meet the noble Lord in expressing the concern, which he has on this second group of amendments, to try to get more sensible flexibility. But I would prefer, before committing the Government, to explore it further under a subsequent amendment which my noble friend Lady Trumpington has put down. I am referring to Amendment No. 15. I hope that the noble Lord, Lord Pitt, will bear with me. We shall reach Amendment No. 15 quite soon when perhaps we can look at the matter again to see whether it is possible that that might be a better way of going about this problem.
Having said that, I come back to the original point about the 10-year and five-year periods. The noble and learned Lord, Lord Elwyn-Jones, really led the attack on this in saying, "Look at the child's school career". It would be churlish of me to say that we simply will not look at subsection (4) in that light. But it would be two-faced of me if I did not remind the Committee what I endeavoured to say at the beginning. I know that the facts sound harsh, but there are deportation reasons for choosing a 10-year period and certainly the Government must bear that in mind in also considering what may be best for the child. Certainly, because I am dealing with this amendment, I will look at the matter, but I must look at it from those two points of view. If the noble Lord feels that he does not need to press these amendments as he said, I gladly
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give the undertaking, without any commitment, to look at the matter in that light and, so far as the second group of amendments is concerned, I would prefer, if I may, to look at those again in the light of Amendment No. 15.
Lord Drumalbyn: Before the noble Lord, Lord Pitt, does what he intends to do, I should like to revert to a question which I asked previously. Is it the case that, once the 10-year period is over and the child has been given British citizenship, he can then leave this country and spend the rest of his life abroad? Of course, we hope that he will be given a sound educational foundation in this country. All the same, in a way the 10-year period seems to fall between two stools. If you are to be educated here, you might as well be completely educated here, and we would hope that if he was a worthy citizen, he would stay here.
Lord Belstead: I will correct myself before many minutes have passed if I am wrong, but my understanding is that the answer to my noble friend is, Yes, because the person concerned will be a British citizen, and with British citizenship goes the right of abode.
Lord Elwyn-Jones: After 10 years' education in this country, no doubt he will be a noble one too!
Lord Pitt of Hampstead: I have always indicated that I would not press this amendment to a Division. Having listened to the Minister, I was almost tempted to do so, but I shall withdraw it and come back to it on Report. I hope that the Government will give careful thought to what I have said. It is all very well to be guided by deportation procedures, but there are things that are more important than deportation procedures, and I should have thought that what happens to a child and his whole life is important enough to warrant even a certain amount of flexibility about deportation procedures. If the Government are going to make the concession that they have obviously indicated they will make, the choice of five years is just about right in terms of being the best time to do it, with the minimum amount of difficulty. I know only too well that children often go to school before they have actually reached five years of age. But, if the head teacher knows that a child is to register at five, then the head teacher will ensure that the parent does so. This is one of the reasons why I have suggested that we use the age of five. I have said that I will withdraw the amendment, so I beg leave to withdraw it.
Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.
The Chairman of Committees: I have to point out that if Amendment No. 13 is agreed to, I cannot call Amendments Nos. 13A, 13B, 14 or 14A.
9.38 p.m.
Lord Hunt Lord Hunt moved Amendment No. 13:
Page 2, line 13, leave out from ("citizen") to end of line 16 and insert ("unless, as regards each of the first ten years of that person's life, it is shown that the number of days on which he was absent from the United Kingdom in that year exceeds 90.").
The noble Lord said: We have heard a good deal during the earlier stages of this debate and during the

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Second Reading debate about the difficulty, the anxiety and perhaps the expense to which an applicant under subsection (4) will be put, possibly many years afterwards, when he applies for a passport and finds that he has to prove that he complied with the rules about the 10 years and the 90 days. The difficulties have been underplayed by some speakers on the Government side, but I think that we should take very seriously the emotional feeling and the problems which have been put to us by those close to the ground who know how the feelings about this are running.
The purpose of this amendment is to alleviate those feelings. The method by which it purports to do so is to shift the burden of proof as regards the absence or otherwise for 90 days during any one of the first 10 years from the applicant or the applicant's parents—but more likely the young man himself or the young woman herself—to the Home office. Instead of the applicant having to satisfy the Secretary of State that he or she has not been absent for more than 90 days during any one of those first 10 years, the amendment would have it the other way round: that the Secretary of State has not got to be satisfied on an application and proof from the applicant, but has to show the applicant that he has in fact exceeded the time of 90 days in any one of those years. I regard this as an important change which will undoubtedly alleviate the anxiety. I am greatly comforted to hear from the noble Lord, Lord Belstead, that a decision on that matter, if I understood him correctly, could be challenged by the applicant in the court. If that is so, it greatly reduces my anxiety about subsection (4). I beg to move.
Viscount Colville of Culross: I wonder whether I might use this opportunity to ask my noble friend Lord Belstead about certain words in this subsection which are going to turn up again in various other places in the Bill; in other words, to seek from him some information which may be relevant to some later amendments. They are the words, "if the Secretary of State is satisfied". There are two points about this. First, the noble Lord, Lord Hunt, has spoken in terms of the anxieties that the Bill creates, and this has been a theme that has run through everything that has been before the Committee today.
One finds, strangely enough, in the drafting of this Bill that there is a formula that has been used here and in Clause 3(2) and also in Clause 5(1) which requires the Secretary of State to be satisfied. In fact, the remedies that are available, whether or not the Secretary of State is satisfied, are very different. In the case of this subsection and in the case of Clause 3, as I understand it, it does not really very much matter in the end whether it is the Secretary of State who is satisfied or not, because the matter being put forward as one of entitlement, as my noble friend said just now, the ultimate arbitrators will be the courts, and the Secretary of State's satisfaction will be neither here nor there in the end.
However, under Clause 5, and particularly if one refers to Clause 43 further on whereby any decisions which are at the Secretary of State's discretion are removed from the jurisdiction of the courts, we also have the same formula. And under Clause 5 there is no doubt whatever, as I read the debates in another
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place and here, that there is no entitlement at all, and it is purely a matter of discretion, and one will not be able to take a dissatisfaction on the part of the Secretary of State to the courts at all, particularly because of Clause 43.
There are two points on this. If there is to be an entitlement and people are to be able to take these matters on appeal—and this is one which is purely a matter of fact, so that although I take Lord Hunt's point the facts will have to be threshed out and will be decided by the courts—why use the same formula, which is also used for the case under Clause 5 of naturalisation, which is not susceptible to any sort of appeal?
If you want to differentiate between the cases where there is an entitlement to go to the courts and thereby disquiet may be dispelled because people will know that they can take their case on the facts to the courts, why use the same formula that looks as if it is a matter of discretion when, after all, you could draft it in a perfectly satisfactory way by leaving the words out altogether? The noble Lord's amendment not only reverses the burden of proof but it also leaves out these words in subsection (4). That is the first point. If you want to go to the psychology of it, why use these words at all when it is a matter of entitlement?
Lord Gifford: I am sure that the noble Viscount will be glad to hear that both in the next amendment and in 21 amendments standing in my name through the Marshalled List, I am seeking to delete the words "if the Secretary of State is satisfied" wherever they occur. But I shall not add to my speech on that until I move the next amendment.
Viscount Colville of Culross: I am obliged to the noble Lord, but I am differentiating between the places where they occur and am trying to find out what is the justification for having them here as opposed to having them in Clause 5. The second point—I expect the noble Lord, Lord Gifford, will be taking this up at length—is to know what the effect will be of having these words in when, in the ultimate, it is intended that the courts should have the final say. Supposing the Secretary of State certifies that he is satisfied: is the Minister sure that the courts will definitely be able to go behind a certificate of satisfaction of that sort? There is a good deal of case law under all sorts of legislation which suggests that there is at least a danger that when one uses a formula of this sort, it cuts out any jurisdiction in the courts if the Secretary of State simply says that he is satisfied.
After all, the object of the exercise, as I understand it, is plainly to make the matter appealable. Why, then, I ask again, use a formula which could, at any rate in the initial cases until it has been threshed out in the courts, cause a potential difficulty? And really as a trailer for some later amendments, my noble friend may like to deal with this point and give some information, so that we can think about it when we come to some of the later amendments and particularly when we consider, much later in the Bill, the provisions about excluding recourse to the courts in certain circumstances.
Lord Belstead: It may not entirely surprise the Committee that, with unerring accuracy, I have

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marshalled the Lord Advocate to reply to any amendments on which I thought that Members of the Committee who are learned in the law might speak. Therefore, when I saw Amendment No. 14, the one with which we shall be dealing next in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Gifford, I asked my noble and learned friend if he would deal with that, and I hope my noble friend Lord Colville will not mind if he receives his reply at that time. The only thing I would say in passing is that I should have thought—and I speak without advice—that there was a considerable distinction between the use of the words in the subsection which we are considering, Clause 1(4), where it refers to the Secretary of State's being satisfied, and the use of similar words in Clause 5, the naturalisation clause, where it refers to the Secretary of State "if he thinks fit". I think there is a difference between the use of the words in those two provisions. However, if the Committee will allow, my noble and learned friend the Lord Advocate will reply to the substantial point which my noble friend made when he is dealing with Amendment No. 14.
That brings me back to the amendment in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Hunt, which reverses the onus of proof so far as subsection (4) is concerned, and I have to say that that would cause difficulties of a practical kind. After all, most of the evidence relating to an applicant's residence here during the first 10 years of life will be much more readily available to the applicant than to anybody else. The applicant will know, for instance, where he has been, what he has been doing and what evidence he can easily lay his hands on, or his parents will know, rather than somebody coming along and being required, as the amendment would require him, to ferret it out.
The alternative to the onus of proof as we have it in the subsection would, under the amendment, be to accept the application which is made and not make any inquiries into whether the applicant had been absent from the United Kingdom during the first 10 years of his life. That would mean, in effect, that anyone who applied under this provision and who could show both that he was born here and had reached the age of 10 would be registered as a British citizen. Again, that would leave the whole matter as a very unsatisfactory situation and contrary to what is the aim in the Bill. I feel therefore that there really is a difficulty here. I hope that the noble Lord, Lord Hunt, will not feel I am just being bureaucratic and deliberately obstructive. I assure him this is not the case.
I should like just to say that earlier the noble Lord, Lord Pitt, was good enough to say that there really is an intention in subsection (4) to try to be as helpful as possible, and I have put to the Committee previously that the genuine intention in putting subsection (4) into the Bill, which of course was by way of an amendment by the Government in another place, was to try to pick up the compassionate cases; but in finding out whether the compassionate case is genuine, I think the person or the parents concerned really must be required to produce the evidence. It is on those grounds that I really do not think I can accept the noble Lord's amendment.
Lord Elystan-Morgan: I rise very briefly to support the amendment of the noble Lord, Lord Hunt. In my
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respectful submission, this amendment certainly would improve the Bill. I would suggest that there are two reasons of principle why this amendment should be made and why the onus of proof should be upon authority rather than upon the applicant. The first is, as the noble Lord, Lord Belstead, has said, that this is a case of an acknowledgement of an entitlement. If it is an entitlement, why on earth should the onus of proof be upon the person who claims that entitlement rather than upon authority that seeks to overthrow it? Secondly, and following very closely upon it, as the noble Lord will appreciate, it is one of the most fundamental principles of the English criminal law that any person who seeks to claim any exception to the generality of an English statute places upon himself the onus of proof in relation to that contention. It would therefore be in line with that important and hallowed principle of our law that the amendment should be allowed.
The Minister speaks of this concession—and a generous concession it was—as one that was made in order to accommodate those cases where compassion should freely be shown. I totally accept that but, in my submission, the machinery the Government have sought to use is unworthy of the Government's motivations and generosity. I would have wished the Minister to have given fuller consideration to the amendment relating to the five-year period. Ten years is a very, very long period and I believe I am correct in saying that it is exactly twice as long as the longest transitional period that our immigration laws at the moment possess. I think I appreciate exactly what the noble Lord the Minister had in mind when he said there were deportation reasons here, but this is really a matter of principle and of what is right and balanced, rather than of what is perhaps technically convenient for authority.
The 90-day rule, in my submission, is one that is fraught with possibilities for endless embarrassments and inconsistencies in this situation. There will be a vast amount of legislation—perhaps, as a practising barrister, I should not cavil at that—but I am sure it will be legislation that will cast its shadow well beyond the immediate provisions of this particular part of the Bill. As far as the 90 days is concerned, I think it will make the whole concession made by Government almost worthless. Others far more eloquent than myself, both in another place and here, have drawn attention to its massive potential anomalies. A child in his first year can be out of the United Kingdom for 91 days and then for the next 15 years cannot leave these shores at all. Yet as far as this provision is concerned—it may well be that the discretion of the Home Secretary would be applied in another context—a person would not be able to avail himself of what after all the Government call an "entitlement".
Therefore, I urge the Minister and his colleagues to reconsider this matter, to ask of themselves whether there is any magic in the 90-day rule? Must it be the laws of the Medes and the Persians? Would it not be possible to reconsider giving the same entitlement in a more meaningful way and perhaps referring not to a 90-day absence, but to persons who were in fact ordinarily resident for a period of 10 years? As I understand it, if a person is ordinarily resident, that is a test not far different from the test of domicile that we know so well in the context of our laws of

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divorce and probate, so that even when a person leaves the United Kingdom for a substantial period, if he has the genuine intention of returning—the animo revertendi—then he is deemed not to have left at all, because in spirit he was still here; here was his home. Is the 90-day period all important if in fact it is to undermine the very purpose of the Government in regard to allowing the amendment in the first place?
Lord Boyd-Carpenter: I understand that under the amendment in the name of my noble friend Lady Trumpington we are to have an opportunity of discussing the 90-day rule, in regard to which I must say I have much sympathy with the noble Lord who has just spoken. However, I must remind him that in this amendment in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Hunt, the 90-day rule is enshrined. Indeed to my mind the 90-day rule is one of the defects of this amendment, and apart from other things one of the reasons that I find it necessary to oppose the amendment is that it repeats this rule.
I do not at the moment want to take up the time of the Committee with discussing the 90-day rule, because I hope to have an opportunity of doing so, subject to what my noble friend on the Front Bench says, on the amendment of my noble friend Lady Trumpington. However, I think it necessary to remind the Committee that the amendment now before us enshrines and reproduces this particular rule.
Lord Hunt: I am most grateful to the Minister, and I assure him that I do not find his reply in any way
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obstructive. Let me assure the Committee that I do not propose to press the amendment to a Division at this stage. However, I must tell the Minister that I am not by any means persuaded regarding what he has said about there being no difficulty in an applicant showing that he has not been absent for more than 90 days in the first 10 years. I think that that might be very difficult in quite a number of cases where the applicant does not make his application—because he does not need to leave the country and does not need a passport—for perhaps 10 years after the first 10-year period. He might find it very difficult indeed if, 10 years or more on from the date, he has to show cause and satisfy the Secretary of State. I take great comfort in the point made by the noble and learned Lord that this is a matter of fact, and being a matter of fact it can be challenged in the courts.
I also take note of what the noble Lord, Lord Boyd-Carpenter, said, and I agree with him. I am not by any means happy about the 90-day rule, and I very much hope that when the Bill comes before your Lordships again at the Report stage there will be tabled at least one amendment in this sense. Perhaps we shall hear more about this in a moment from the noble Baroness, and I am certainly in sympathy with the point. However, on the understanding that I shall be looking at this question in the meantime and that I may well want to put down an amendment in a different form at Report stage, I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.
Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.
[Amendments Nos. 13A and 13B not moved.]
9.59 p.m.
Lord Gifford Lord Gifford moved Amendment No. 14:
Page 2, line 14, leave out from ("life") to first ("the") in line 15.
The noble Lord said: As I indicated a moment ago, the effect of the amendment is to delete the words,
"the Secretary of State is satisfied that".
The case for deleting the words is a clear one. In the first place they are simply unnecessary. In the second place they introduce a thoroughly undesirable barrier to people who are claiming what is said in the Bill to be an entitlement. Let this be confirmed, that in this subsection, as in many other parts of the Bill, we are not talking about a discretionary decision of the Secretary of State. The words of Clause 43(2) do not apply, and the person who can fulfil the conditions of the subsection is entitled to be registered as a citizen as a matter of right.
When someone is entitled to something, one looks to see what the conditions are. In this case there is, first, the need to bring the applicant within the residence condition, and then there is the requirement, which is to satisfy the Secretary of State. Of course, in practice this means not satisfying the Secretary of State but satisfying the immigration officer or citizenship officer who happens to be dealing with the case. Those who deal with immigration matters in the Home Office, as many noble Lords who have to deal with such matters know, are suspicious about the applications which are made to them.
They are suspicious, sometimes, to the point of obsession. They deal with applications, in part in writing in part after interviews, which contain none of the safeguards of a court; and in this subsection, as in other parts of the Bill, they are having to deal with a matter which, as was said a moment ago, can often be factually very complicated. As the noble Lord, Lord Hunt, said, a man of 20 or 30 may be saying to the citizenship officer, "I was here for the first 10 years of my life", but that may be difficult to prove. There may have been an absence for some months, and there may be a dispute as to the actual length of that absence.
We have not started to go into this, but I should imagine that one question that is going to arise on this kind of application is whether the Home Office computer records, with which arrivals and departures are tallied, are accurate in a particular case. For instance, in the case of someone whose parents' passport is lost, it may be a question of controversy whether an absence which the Home Office think was an absence of a year was in fact an absence of a year or an absence of two months. These are the kind of questions which will come up and which the civil servants will have to deal with; and in the nature of things they are bound in a number of cases to get it wrong, and to declare to someone that they are not satisfied when in fact the conditions for entitlement exist. So the applicant will have to go to court.
The noble Viscount, Lord Colville of Culross, is absolutely right to be worried about this formula. I made the point on Second Reading that the court's role on an application to review the Secretary of State's decision in a case like this is a limited role. It does not act as a court of appeal from the Secretary of State; it is merely there to see that the Secretary of State or
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his officers have applied the right legal principles, have had a fair review of the facts and have taken into account the evidence which they ought to have taken into account. If that has been done, the court is not concerned with whether or not they have in fact got it right.
Viscount Colville of Culross: May I interrupt the noble Lord? I understood from reading reports about this matter in another place that the Government were not anticipating that it would be done by way of judicial review in one of the senses of prerogative orders, but that it would be done by an application for a declaration. Therefore, it may be possible to go into rather more of the facts by way of appeal on fact, as it were, than perhaps the noble Lord has in mind.
Lord Gifford: It is a point which is slightly technical and on which lawyers have to tread very carefully. Of course, I shall be awaiting and reading very carefully the reply of the noble and learned Lord the Lord Advocate; but I am assuming that whatever procedural form the case may take, the principles that will be applied will be the principles that have been applied in the similar jurisdiction of immigration which the House of Lords has had to consider very recently in the case of Zamir. The Immigration Act does not even use these words, "if the Secretary of State is satisfied". It contains reference to a number of rules. But the House of Lords expressly decided the case of Zamir as if that formula had been incorporated into the Act, and their view was that it was not for the court to go into the factual question of whether an immigrant in this case had entered by fraud. The decision, said the noble and learned Lord, Lord Wilberforce—and I quoted this on Second Reading, but I make no apology for doing so again:
"can only be attacked if it can be shown that there were no grounds on which the Secretary of State, through his officers, could have acted or that no reasonable person could have decided as he did".
That is a very limited form of review.
What I ask myself and what I ask the Committee is this: what is the purpose of inserting this formula at all? If your Lordships would look for a moment at Clause 7 of the Bill, you will see a completely different approach to the question of an entitlement to registration. In Clause 7, a woman, it is said, shall be entitled on an application for her registration as a British citizen made within five years after commencement to be registered as a British citizen if—and then the conditions which have to be complied with are set out. But there is no insertion of the words "if she satisfies the Secretary of State that" the conditions are set out. There is no doubt in that case that a dissatisfied applicant could go straight to court for a declaration. I ask why that same simple formula cannot be used in these other cases where an entitlement to registration is spelled out. If it is not, it raises serious questions. What will be happening is that decisions will be made behind closed doors by civil servants, without legal safeguards and with limited judicial review. What we need is decisions made by civil servants and, if they are wrong, the power to go to court, rehearse the evidence and get the court to make

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the final decision one way or the other. That is how questions of this magnitude should be decided. I beg to move.
Lord Elwyn-Jones: I should like to support the views expressed by my noble friend Lord Gifford on his amendment. Subsection (4) of Clause 2 is a very important concession. It was made in another place and was so described. I think it is an important concession. It does away with at least some of the mischief of the abolition of the jus soli. It seems to me to be regrettable that it should be whittled away or thought to be whittled away by the introduction of the apparent ability of the Secretary of State to put a spanner in the works, as the words, "if the Secretary of State is satisfied" enables him to do. I agree with my noble friend that the introduction of the words limits considerably the power of the court to intervene. For that reason, and in the context of the bestowal of a clear entitlement, I submit that it is imperative to make a reality of the concession, to eliminate the words.
Lord Avebury: I want to say a word or two in support of the amendment, which seems an extremely important one bearing in mind the fact that even lawyers in your Lordships' Committee cannot agree on what the power of the courts will be to review the decision of the Secretary of State. The noble Viscount, Lord Colville of Culross, has a slightly different view of the extent of the powers of the court from that of the noble Lord who moved the amendment. Whatever the truth may be, it is inevitable (as in the case of Zamir which has been quoted) that the courts will not overturn this decision of the Secretary of State unless it is manifestly unreasonable. I cannot understand why, when dealing with a simple matter of fact such as presence in this country during the first 10 years of a person's life, except for absences of not more than 90 days in any one year, that should be left to the Secretary of State to determine. It should go straight to the courts if there is any dispute, and this can better be provided for by leaving out the offending words.
Lord Mottistone: The noble Lord, Lord Gifford, has called our attention to Clause 7. Having looked at the clause it seems to me that he did the well-known thing of quoting part of subsection (1) but did not go on to subsections (2) and (3) where the point on which he is disturbed about the Secretary of State's being involved in making a decision is pre-eminent. Quoting Clause 7 as an example, as a clause, probably does not support his case.
10.10 p.m.
Lord Mackay of Clashfern: It may be right for me to say to the noble Lord, Lord Avebury, that the mere fact that lawyers may take a different view about a certain matter does not necessarily mean that the matter is not reasonably clear. May I deal with the point that my noble friend Lord Colville of Culross raised? He drew our attention to the provisions of Clause 5 and wished to comment on their relationship to the present clause. If members of the Committee would be kind enough to look at Clause 5(1), they will see
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that the provision is that on certain facts the Secretary of State has to be satisfied that the applicant fulfils the requirements of Schedule 1 for naturalisation as such a citizen under the subsection. If that happens he may, if he thinks fit, grant a certificate of naturalisation.
The contrast between a discretion in the words "may, if he thinks fit", and the words "the Secretary of State is satisfied" is clearly pointed out. I therefore suggest that the Bill as drafted draws a fairly clear distinction between the situation where entitlement depends upon the satisfaction of the Secretary of State, which is not a discretion, and the case of discretion where the Secretary of State may, if he thinks fit, do something. Clause 7 contains a discretion of that kind. Clause 7 is simply following the precedent of Section 6(2) of the 1948 Act. We thought it better, since this is continuing that in another form, that the words of the 1948 Act should simply be repeated.
The next question I was asked was: What is the effect of the words "if the Secretary of State is satisfied"? Putting these words in indicates to whom the applicant should apply in the first instance. It is not a question of needing in every case to go to the court. It is only if one fails with the Secretary of State that there should be any question of going to the court. Accordingly, it is useful to indicate that the Secretary of State is the person to whom one should apply to seek his satisfaction on these matters of fact. It is also reasonably plain that the jurisdiction of the court to deal with that entitlement would not be ousted except by very plain words. I certainly take the view that if the court were satisfied upon the facts by evidence in the cases we are dealing with here, the Secretary of State would be perverse if he were not prepared to accept them; in other words, if the facts can be demonstrated to the standard of proof which will satisfy a court of law, the Secretary of State can hardly refuse to be satisfied in that situation.
On the other hand, it may be possible to satisfy the Secretary of State with evidence which, on a balance of probabilities, might fall short of the standard of proof which would be required in a court of law. On balance it seems to us that the phrase to which the noble Lord objects is helpful to the applicant and enables the Secretary of State in a difficult case—a case in which the evidence may be a little scarce—to be satisfied without going to the full length of the sort of proof that would satisfy a court of law.
Some question was raised about the procedural route by which an applicant who was dissatisfied with the lack of satisfaction on the part of the Secretary of State might seek redress. I should have thought that in the courts of this country an application under the new Order No. 53 would be appropriate because it includes the possibility of a declaration as well as review under the former prerogative orders. So far as the courts of Scotland are concerned, a somewhat similar procedure would be available. Accordingly, the answer to the questions which have been put is that it would not make much difference to leave these words out altogether; the effect would be very much the same, but their presence may, in a marginal case, be of use to the applicant and so we feel that it would be wise to leave them in the Bill. In the light of that explanation, I hope that the noble Lord will feel able not to press the amendment.
Viscount Colville of Culross: Would the noble Lord, Lord Gifford, allow me a few words before he decides what to do with his amendment? I should like to ask my noble and learned friend to have one more look at this point. I fully take the point that there may be cases where the Secretary of State does satisfy himself on the basis of information which might fall short of proper proof required in a court of law. Similarly, it is useful to have a signpost covering to whom it is that one should apply. Both of those could be perfectly well supplied with the words "on application to the Secretary of State", without saying anything about satisfying him. One could simply provide that the first application was to go to the Secretary of State, which means that the first decision would be his. If it is a more lenient decision than might have been obtained in a court of law, then so much the better.
There is a much more serious point. My noble friend Lord Mottistone pointed out that there were provisions in subsections (2) and (3) of Clause 7, where it is perfectly plain, I would have thought, that we are back into the area of complete discretion. The formula in subsections (2) and (3) is one which is similar to that in Clause 5 to which my noble friend referred—"if he thinks fit". As I understand it, that does not apply to Clause 7 (1), to which the noble Lord, Lord Gifford, referred. There one has a case of plain entitlement, if one can fulfil the provisions. Incidentally, the subsection does not say that one has to apply to the Secretary of State, although no doubt one does have to do so, and perhaps that might be corrected as well.
The point that really concerns me is that the courts, when they are construing the extent of their jurisdiction under Order No. 53—or, no doubt, the Scottish equivalent—are feeling their way at the moment. The new order has not been in the rules of the Supreme Court for very long, and the way in which it is to be applied to the various legislation under which it arises is still being worked out. The courts will not be allowed to read the speech which has just been made by my noble and learned friend, in order to seek to construe the powers that have been conferred upon them, or which have been conferred upon the applicant to them, under this Bill when it becomes an Act. They are simply precluded from looking at it. What they will have to do is to look at the Act itself.
What are the courts going to say about the contrast between Clause 1(4) and Clause 3—both of which are said to provide for entitlements, if you can show that you have satisfied the criteria there—and Clause 7? In the first two cases, there is an extra hurdle provided in the Bill; in other words, in the first two cases the Secretary of State has initially had to be satisfied. But under Clause 7(1) he does not have to be satisfied. Are the courts not likely to wonder why it was that Parliament drew this distinction?
Very well, it may be a historic relic from the 1948 Act, and one does not wish to change the words of that. But how are the courts to know that that is the significance of it? Is there not a danger, if we do not do something about this, that they will think there is some significance in having left out the requirement in Clause 7 to satisfy the Secretary of State, which imposes
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some restriction upon their jurisdiction under this subsection that we are talking about and under Clause 3? Why, otherwise, would Parliament have made a differentiation in the words that they used? This is the kind of way that the interpretation of statutes goes.
It is of vital importance, if what my noble friends on the Front Bench and their colleagues in another place have said is to be fulfilled, that there shall be a proper method of appealing these matters of entitlement without some procedural impediment, or some shortfall in the jurisdiction of the courts. It is of vital significance that it should be clear upon the face of the Bill. I would respectfully suggest to my noble and learned friend that, with the contrast that has been pointed out, it is very far from clear. We are going to have a substantial amount of time before this Bill comes back. Would my noble and learned friend have another look at this, to see whether there is something which can be done by way of genuine clarification, which will deal not only with the points of anxiety but with the point which has been raised in this debate?
Lord Mackay of Clashfern: It is plain that this is a matter not so much of the intention, but of how the intention is to be achieved. I should be very happy indeed to reconsider the position in the light of what has been said in this debate, because it is plain that we want to make it clear if we can.
Lord Gifford: I am very grateful to the noble and learned Lord for that indication, and I am also grateful to the noble Viscount, Lord Colville of Culross, for his very pertinent contribution to this little debate. Before seeking leave to withdraw the amendment, I wish to put it clearly before the Committee that I am not satisfied that the case which I put in support of this amendment has been met by the reply of the noble and learned Lord the Lord Advocate.
Dealing shortly with his points, he said that the formula helped to show to whom you are to apply. Really, that was a very weak point. It is clearly written all over the Bill, including Clause 40(2) which deals with the making of regulations, that you apply to the Home Secretary if you want to be registered. There are no "ifs" or "buts" about that. But he went on to talk about the standard of proof which is acceptable in a court of law, and I ask him to consider that the kind of safeguards that pertain in a court of law are not there, when it is just a question of the initial consideration by the Home Office.
For instance, an applicant does not have any rights of discovery of any documents until he can get to a court of law. He may have a case which is disbelieved by the Home Office civil servant, but which he could make good with proper safeguards in a court of law. It is not right to say that this formula is helpful to the applicant. When these matters are raised, they go first to the Home Office. The Home Office can look into them and, if they think that the conditions apply, they can register the applicant. We are concerned only with cases which the Home Office have rejected. We are concerned only with providing a fair means

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of resolving disputes. When the noble and learned Lord said that the right way to proceed would be by Order 53, I suggest that he gave the game away because the case of Zamir which I have quoted was a case under Order 53.
When further consideration of this matter takes place, I would ask the noble and learned Lord to inform us whether he thinks that under this formula the criteria laid down by Lord Wilberforce in the Zamir case would be applied to an application to the courts in a case such as this. If the same criteria are to apply, then all our concerns are fully justified. If the Government intend that they should not apply, the best way is to delete these words and to restore the formula in Clause 7(1) which, as the noble Viscount, Lord Colville of Culross, said, has stood the test of time and is a perfectly straightforward test, and there is absolutely no need to insert these words. I apologise for taking so long to reply. I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.
Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.
[Amendment No. 14A not moved.]
10.26 p.m.
Baroness Trumpington Baroness Trumpington moved Amendment No. 15:
Page 2, line 16, at end insert—
("The Secretary of State may however in exceptional circumstances use his discretion should absence from the United Kingdom in any one year exceed 90 days.").
The noble Baroness said: I have put down this amendment because it occurs to me that exceptional circumstances may well occur when, through no fault of either parent, a child under the age of 10 may exceed the limit of 90 days' absence from the United Kingdom in one year. Let us take, for example, the hypothetical case mentioned by the noble Lord, Lord Pitt of Hampstead, of the child who becomes gravely ill, possibly suffering from a contagious disease, towards the end of a 90-day visit overseas. It is impossible to transport this child home within the given statutory time limit.
I realise that the situation will apply to a minority of cases whose circumstances do not fit in with subsections (1), (2) and (3) of Clause 1. However, let us take the example of an academic who is granted sabbatical leave of absence for one year. Dons or schoolteachers may wish to use their time to pursue a particular course of study in another country. Are they expected to leave their families in the United Kingdom? As the clause stands at present, they may well have to do so. My noble friend the Minister well knows that doctors, scientists and businessmen often exchange working visits on an international basis, visits which frequently last over a period of several months or years.
My noble friend the Minister is a very kindly man, and I know that he will sympathise with the emotional angle which I have introduced. I feel sure that he would never wish to be responsible for keeping families apart. I believe that I have given sufficient practical possibilities as to why the clause as it now stands is somewhat bleak in outlook to allow me to hope that the Government will accept my amendment.
The Lord Bishop of Rochester: Although I think it is more than she deserves after her indulgence in the national sport of bishop baiting, I should like to respond to the earlier invitation of the noble Baroness and assure her of my support for this amendment. If this rather complex procedure has been devised in the interests of the exercise of compassion, then surely this additional discretion for the Secretary of State is much to be encouraged.
Lord Boyd-Carpenter: My noble friend may or may not be a kindly man but I hope that he is a logical one. Therefore, I hope he will appreciate that the clause in the Bill as it stands is very illogical. As I read it, a child can be absent from this country for 89 days in each of 10 successive years which, if my mathematics are right, totals about 2½ years. But if he or she is absent for one day more than 90 days in one of those years, then they fall down on their application for registration. That really cannot make sense. There must be some flexibility in the system. It seems to me that the amendment devised by our noble friend Lady Trumpington, by giving to the Secretary of State a discretion to prevent a ridiculous situation arising, meets the case and I hope he will accept it.
Lord Belstead: The permitted absence specified in subsection (4) is, as we all know, 90 days in each year since the date of birth. Taking that as a base line, I think it is a reasonable provision. Earlier this evening I ventured to give reasons as to why the Government felt that the 10-year period was reasonable, but if your Lordships will bear with me for one minute I will explain why I think the 90-day period is reasonable. I repeat, we are talking about people who have not been able to go through the ordinary avenues of citizenship from their parents or citizenship from settlement, or because their parents have become citizens or have become settled after the children have been born. Therefore these are difficult cases. I think there is a very strong case for saying that they should therefore show that they really are intending to live in this country, and in cases where they want to be abroad for longer it does not seem unreasonable that there should be a requirement that such a child should eventually apply for naturalisation or, if a minor, for registration under the Secretary of State's discretionary power to register any minor under Clause 3(1).
Nevertheless, having said that, I accept what my noble friend Lord Boyd-Carpenter and, in essence, what the noble Lord, Lord Pitt, has said on different amendments, and of course my noble friend Lady Trumpington and the noble and learned Lord, Lord Elywn-Jones. They have all said at different times this evening that this seems very rigid, even if the principle seems a good one in the view of the Government. Of course there can be the case which the noble Lord, Lord Pitt, put first, where a child might fall ill and simply could not come back, but in addition to that there is the case where someone may want to apply for this 10-year concession but very much later on in his life. He could not possibly come back to the Secretary of State under the general discretion to register a minor under Clause 3(1) and he would find that there was no discretion at all.

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So, for these reasons, I think that we ought to look at this again. I will not conceal from the noble Lord, Lord Pitt, that we would prefer to look at it along the lines of this amendment rather than reducing the 10-year period, although I feel sure that we shall be discussing that again before the stages of this Bill have been completed. Therefore, so far as this amendment is concerned I am prepared to consult with my noble friend Lady Trumpington about a suitable amendment, because I hope my noble friend will not mind my saying that we think the drafting of her amendment could be improved. That is why we should like to look at a revised amendment for the Report stage. In principle I accept the case put forward by my noble friend.
Baroness Trumpington: I thank my noble friend very much for his reply. At least my drafting shows that I was independent in spirit as well as in thought. I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.
Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.
Lord Elwyn-Jones Lord Elwyn-Jones had given notice of his intention to move Amendment No. 16:
Page 2, line 19, leave out ("in the United Kingdom").
The noble and learned Lord said: In view of the content of Amendment No. 17, which I think is rather better than Amendment No. 16, the latter is not moved.
10.34 p.m.
Lord Avebury Lord Avebury moved Amendment No. 17:
Page 2, line 19, leave out ("in the United Kingdom") and insert ("and that order is recognised as valid by a court in the United Kingdom").
The noble Lord said: This amendment concerns the question of adoptions of children in other countries, the procedures of whose courts are recognised in the United Kingdom. The amendment was discussed in another place at Committee stage. It was a rather wider one than this, in that it referred to adoption of any kind, whereas this amendment is limited to adoptions in courts overseas whose jurisdiction is recognised as valid by a court in the United Kingdom. So at this moment we would exclude countries where there is what I believe is known as customary adoption, such as is performed in a fairly informal manner without its being registered in a court of law. There are countries where that still occurs, such as, I believe, Pakistan. However, in this amendment we are dealing only with countries with a recognisable adoption procedure which is valid so far as the British courts are concerned.
There was an amendment of a similar nature moved in Committee in another place. The main reason given for its rejection, as in many cases in this Bill, was that it could involve considerable immigration commitment. I would suggest that that argument was misconceived. I do not think very many people born and brought up in Great Britain are going to wish to adopt children in some overseas country; so we may confine our attention to those who may come here from abroad and would like to adopt a child from the
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culture and background which they know. Those are a diminishing number because primary immigration into this country has to all intents and purposes come to an end. So the number of people who would wish to go back to the country of their origin and adopt children there would be very small indeed.
I do not think the argument put forward by Mr. Richard Luce in the Committee in another place really holds very much water. There were other points he made, but as the hour is very late I will not rehearse them at this stage. I should like to hear what the Minister has to say on this more limited procedure I have recommended; perhaps we can do that this evening, and I shall not weary the Committee with a long discussion of the merits of the amendment. I beg to move.
Baroness Birk: I support the amendment moved by the noble Lord, Lord Avebury. The Bill gives citizenship by adoption only by virtue of an adoption order made in the United Kingdom. However, adoption orders made overseas are recognised by our law for purposes other than citizenship and a parent is bound by legal responsibilities under them. This amendment would allow British citizen parents to confer citizenship on children adopted abroad by a court order under the other country's laws. This seems only reasonable as the parent who has to live and work abroad finds it necessary very often to make an adoption overseas and not here.
In answer to the point, which has been foreseen by the noble Lord, Lord Avebury, the Government have said it might be adoption of convenience to circumvent entry control if the Bill were amended. However, I would submit that if a court adoption order was required it would not be possible for people to adopt children casually without proper safeguard, because the amendment does not omit the requirement for a court order. In any case under the immigration rules and orders it would be possible then to deal with something which was a matter of convenience. I hope the Minister will look on this amendment with some benevolence.
Lord Trefgarne: This amendment would mean that a child adopted by a British citizen would automatically be a British citizen if the adoption was made by a court order and was recognised as valid by a court in the United Kingdom. This would mean that adoptions overseas by court orders which are later recognised by a court in the United Kingdom would confer British citizenship if the child was adopted by a British citizen. The process of later recognition by courts in this country seems a somewhat cumbersome procedure, and I am not sure whether it was really intended by the noble Lord, but it is what his amendment seems to say.
It may be that the noble Lord has in mind in particular that adoptions should in these circumstances confer citizenship where they are made in those countries whose adoption laws have under the Adoption Act 1968 been designated by the Secretary of State although this amendment does not in fact quite

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achieve that. A child who is adopted under the laws of such a country enjoys broadly the same status in our law as a child adopted here, and for instance can inherit property. This, however, does not apply as far as nationality law is concerned. It was originally envisaged that the recognition of overseas adoptions under the Adoption Act 1968 should extend to nationality matters. But for reasons which apply to this amendment equally and which I shall set out in a moment, the relevant subsections of the Adoption Act 1968 were not implemented when the order was made in 1973 to recognise adoption orders in specified countries under the 1968 Act.
In 1975, under the previous Administration, the relevant subsections of the Adoption Act 1968 were repealed in Section 108 and the Fourth Schedule to the Children Act 1975. So it can be said that successive Administrations of different political complexions have accepted that the recognition of overseas adoptions under the 1968 Act should not apply as far as the nationality law is concerned. The noble Lord is presumably concerned in this amendment to alter this, but I am afraid that we continue to see difficulties in this approach and perhaps I may explain why this is so.
First, it would involve, as the noble Lord has already recognised but somewhat rejected, I think, as a criticism, a considerable immigration commitment. It would enable anyone who was a British citizen to go abroad and adopt children in one of a very considerable number of countries, and these children would be entitled to British citizenship and have the right to abode here. There would be a considerable temptation for people to adopt children in this way as a means of evading immigration control on the entry of children, and there is the risk of children being adopted for purely financial reasons. Of course the authorities in the countries concerned will do their best to see that the adoption is a proper one; but we cannot expect them to monitor our immigration control. That is not, of course, their main concern.
Secondly, the child who acquired British citizenship in this way would be able to transmit this citizenship to his or her children born abroad. The adopted child himself might have very limited connections with this country. His children could have even fewer ties. British citizenship and the right of entry to this country would thus be extended to people who might have few links with the United Kingdom. Thirdly, there could be serious citizenship anomalies. A child born to a British citizen abroad would only be able to take his parents' citizenship in certain cases—where, for instance, his father or mother had been born or registered or naturalised here. But a child adopted by a British citizen in a country whose adoption laws are recognised would have an entitlement to British citizenship which could not be withheld. So the adopted child in a family would have a claim to British citizenship which the natural-born children in the family might not hold.
We believe that these arguments are powerful ones and justify limiting the conferment of British citizenship by adoption on children adopted by British citizens in the United Kingdom and Islands. I am prepared to say more, but I hope that I have said enough to
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persuade your Lordships and, indeed, the noble Lord, Lord Avebury, that this amendment really does not bear critical examination.
Lord Avebury: I am afraid that the noble Lord has not said enough to convince me that the amendment does not bear critical examination, and I hope that he will agree, on reflection, that this is a matter which we should explore further, perhaps not at this late hour, but at the Report stage.
I should like to get one or two matters on the record so that we do not lose sight of them when we come back to this matter on Report. First, the noble Lord mentioned that there was a procedure for countries to be designated under the Adoption Act 1968 and that although this had never been extended to nationality and citizenship provisions that was originally envisaged, although under the previous Administration I think he said that the relevant provisions were repealed by Section 108 and Schedule 4 to the Children Act 1975. I know that that was mentioned in another place. I have not had the opportunity of referring to the relevant section of the Children Act 1975 nor am I aware that that necessarily indicates that the present Opposition when they were in power agreed with the view that the Government are taking on the question of adoption extending to citizenship. Certainly from what I have heard from the Opposition Front Bench this evening that did not seem to be the case. If they took that view in 1975—as in many other matters, as we have seen concerning the Green Paper of 1977—there have been opportunities for second and better thoughts on the part of the official Opposition.
Secondly, the noble Lord seems to imagine that under this provision foreigners, having become naturalised in this country, would be going abroad and adopting children in their countries of origin on a more or less unlimited scale. I do not believe that that would be the case because we have provided that the adoption must be recognised in a court of law whose jurisdiction is recognised in the United Kingdom. The noble Lord says that people would adopt children for purely financial reasons. Does he imagine that the courts in any country will allow someone to come over from Great Britain, pick up a child and present it to the court saying, "I wish to adopt this child", without proper inquiries being made by the court into the connections that the would-be adopter has with the child? Of course not. The courts would make proper inquiries and establish the bona fides of the would-be adopter, and make sure that the relationship with the child was not one of the character mentioned by the noble Lord.
The noble Lord did not deal at all with the point that I made which, if I may say so, is ofsome importance; that is, that as primary immigration into this country has virtually come to an end, there will not be any potential parents who could go overseas and adopt these children other than EEC residents, whom I mentioned earlier. Unfortunately, we did not complete the discussion that we were about to have on the case of Pieck where I said that citizens of the EEC were able to come here and be free of conditions immediately.
So citizens of the EEC who come here and work and who become naturalised would, in any case, be able to go to, say, France or Germany and adopt the children

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there and bring them into the United Kingdom, because those children ultimately would have the right of entry under the free movement provisions—perhaps not at the moment when the entry of EEC citizens has to be purely for the purposes of work, but (as I have already mentioned when I spoke to an earlier amendment) there is already movement in the Common Market to widen the circumstances in which people may move freely from one country to another.
Therefore, I do not think that the noble Lord answered any of the arguments that I put forward, but I quite recognise that it would be preferable if we did not reach a conclusion on the matter at such a late hour in the evening. I shall, indeed, return to this on Report, but in the meanwhile I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.
Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.
[Amendments Nos. 18, 19 and 20 not moved.]
Clause 1 agreed to.
Lord Denham: I think that this is probably about the sort of time when we might adjourn for the first day. Therefore, I beg to move that the House do now resume.
Moved accordingly, and, on Question, Motion agreed to.
House resumed.

SOUTH YORKSHIRE BILL
Reported from the Unopposed Bill Committee without amendment.