HL Deb 02 July 1981 vol 422 cc328-40

6.1 p.m.

Report received.

Clause 3 [Power of Secretary of State to give directions.]

Lord Underhill moved Amendments Nos. 1 and 2:

Page 3, line 37, leave out ("(notwithstanding any duty imposed on them by section 3(1) of the Transport Act 1962)")

Page 3, line 39, at end insert (": Provided any such directions are not contrary to any duty imposed on the Board by section 3(1) of the Transport Act 1962).

The noble Lord said: My Lords, it may be to the convenience of the House if Amendment No. 2 is taken together with Amendment No. 1. During the Committee stage a number of noble Lords expressed concern about the general contents of Clause 3 in regard to the powers that it gives to the Secretary of State. The clause empowers the Secretary of State to give directions to the Railways Board, to establish subsidiaries, and to dispose of the whole or part of the undertaking of a subsidiary. I would draw your Lordships' attention to subsection (2), which reads as follows: It shall be the duty of the Board (notwithstanding any duty imposed on them by Section 3(1) of the Transport Act 1962) to give effect to any directions given under this section". At a later stage, when speaking to another amendment, I will deal with the general question of the power of the Secretary of State to give such directions, but this amendment relates solely to the duties placed on the board by the 1962 Act.

I believe it would be useful if I explained exactly what Section 3(1) of the Transport Act 1962 says, and I quote: It shall be the duty of the Railways Board in the exercise of their powers under this Act to provide railway services in Great Britain and, in connection with the provision of railway services, to provide such other services and facilities as appear to the Board to be expedient, and to have due regard, as respects all those railway and other services and facilities, to efficiency, economy and safety of operation". That is precisely what the subsection says.

At the Committee stage I proposed an amendment to ensure that any disposal of assets, or of a subsidiary of the Railways Board, should not relate to the establishment of a company to operate a particular railway line or network. The noble Lord the Minister assured me that such fears were unnecessary. I note from col. 1384 of the Official Report for 4th June that the noble Lord the Minister said: The board have a duty under Section 3(1) of the Transport Act 1962 to provide railway services and these disposal powers do not override that duty. If the board chose to sell part of the network as a going concern they would be in clear breach of that duty".

I now refer to the words set out in the amendment before your Lordships, namely: (notwithstanding any duty imposed on them by Section 3(1) of the Transport Act 1962) I ask the Minister to study those words carefully. In the light of what the noble Lord the Minister said at Committee stage—that if the Railways Board went against the powers of the 1962 Act they would be wrong—I cannot see how we can now give powers in this clause to the Minister to direct the board to do things notwithstanding the powers placed upon them. It seems that one or the other of those statements is contradictory. What the two amendments seek to ensure is that the Secretary of State shall not give directions irrespective of the powers given to the Board by the 1962 Act but instead that any direction he gives shall not be contrary to those powers. It seems to me that those two amendments are very reasonable and would be fully in line with what was said by the noble Lord the Minister at Committee stage. I move the amendments.

The Deputy Speaker (Baroness Wootton of Abinger)

Does the noble Lord, Lord Underhill, wish the two amendments to be moved en bloc?

Lord Underhill

Yes, my Lords.

Viscount Simon

My Lords, I should like to support these amendments, but before doing so may I humbly suggest to the noble Lord, Lord Underhill, that he made a slip of the tongue. He spoke about the "powers" of the Railways Board but I believe it is the duties of the board which we are concerned with here. It seems to me that if the board has these duties and if the Minister has said that the board would be failing in its duty to adopt these other duties, then it is quite incredible that the Minister should have power to instruct the board to do something that it is not allowed to do under the Act. I do not believe there is anything more I wish to say. I fully support these amendments, although when the time comes I would actually prefer Amendment No. 4 to these amendments.

6.6 p.m.

The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State, Department of the Environment (Lord Bellwin)

My Lords, I do not wish to explain at length at this point the philosophy underlying Clause 3 because I think that the proper place to do that will be when we come to discuss a later amendment which seeks to delete the whole clause. I merely wish to repeat a point that my colleagues and I have made on many occasions already: that the Government are proceeding with the agreement of the Railways Board, and that they are in the lead. However, having allowed the board to take the initiative, it is surely reasonable that the Government should protect its position by having reserve powers—powers of last resort—to direct the board in carrying through the policy. By now your Lordships may be a little weary of hearing me say that these are "reserve powers", but this is such an important and fundamental point that I must emphasise it again here before passing to the specific amendments.

Powers for Ministers to give direction to nationalised industries are common enough in existing legislation. In quite a few cases these powers enable a Minister to direct an industry to dispose of assets or to cease a particular activity. Both sides of the House have promoted legislation of this kind when in government and I will give examples of that when we debate Amendment No. 4. However, I believe it is common ground between us that it is necessary for Ministers to have certain powers to direct nationalised industries. I believe that both sides of the House would also agree that where powers of direction exist, they need to be clear and effective. There is no point in enacting powers which are ambiguous and which are therefore open to legal challenge. Such powers are generally unusable and there is simply no point in putting them on the statute book.

This brings me to the purpose of subsection (2) of Clause 3, and particularly to the words between brackets which are at issue here. But before I explain their purpose I should like to point out that subsection (2) in its present form is the result of an Opposition amendment which the Government accepted at Committee stage in the other place. There it was suggested that the original drafting, which referred to the board's duties under "any other enactment", was too wide, and we accepted that a specific reference to Section 3(1) of the Transport Act 1962 should be substituted. The purpose of subsection (2) is to place the Railways Board under a duty to comply with any direction given under Clause 3. This is a necessary and conventional provision. The words in brackets provide that the board's duty under this subsection shall override their duty under Section 3(1) of the Transport Act 1962. This is essential to avoid any ambiguity and to ensure that if it is necessary for the Secretary of State to give a direction it will be clear beyond all doubt that the board's duty under this Bill is the one that it must follow.

I agree that this is an unusual provision, but then the circumstances are unusual. The point is that the board's main statutory duties under Section 3(1) of the 1962 Act are drawn very widely. They are: To provide railway services in Great Britain and, in connection with the provision of railway services, to provide such other services and facilities as appear to the Board to be expedient It is in effect the board itself that determines the extent of its statutory duty. Although this is similar in some respects to the duties of the other boards set up under the 1962 Act, it seems to have no parallel in other nationalised industry legislation.

Your Lordships will, I am sure, see that, if these amendments were accepted, the Government might find themselves in the position in which the board went back on their undertaking to introduce private capital into, let us say, Sealink and, on receiving a direction to dispose of a controlling interest in the company, claim that they regarded it as expedient to continue to provide shipping and harbour services as an adjunct to the railway, and that therefore they were under a statutory duty to do so. This would probably frustrate the Secretary of State's purpose in giving a direction.

So these amendments are, in practice, wrecking amendments so far as Clause 3 is concerned. If they were carried, the Government's position would be undermined as surely as if the whole of Clause 3 were deleted from the Bill. For that reason I have to say that they are not acceptable to us and, in view of the rather detailed explanation I have given, I hope the noble Lord may feel able not to press the amendments.

Lord Underhill

My Lords, I am grateful to the noble Lord the Minister for his detailed reply, but it does not help me at all; perhaps it is because I am dense. It is suggested that we must avoid any ambiguity, but frankly any ambiguity must be in existence when one says that a board must adhere to the duties and powers placed upon it by an Act but then goes on to say that the Minister can give powers notwithstanding those obligations. That seems to me to create ambiguity itself and that is what the Bill is doing. The question of the reserve power is completely irrelevant at this stage. As the noble Viscount, Lord Simon, said, that is something that we can discuss when we come to other amendments.

The reference to Sealink is very interesting, and maybe I can quote that when we come to Amendment No. 3, which is a rather important one. It is clear that the Government and I do not see eye to eye on this question. I will read very carefully what the Minister has said to see whether or not there is still so much ambiguity that we may have to come back at Third Reading, but at this stage I beg leave to withdraw the amendments.

Amendments, by leave, withdrawn.

6.13 p.m.

Lord Underhill moved Amendment No. 3:

Page 3, line 39, at end insert— ("( ) In the event of the Board being of the opinion that any directions which are proposed to be given or are given in accordance with subsections (1) and (2) hereof are contrary to the best interests of the Board or are not in accordance with its duties under section 3(1) of the Transport Act 1962, the matter shall be determined by an enquiry. Any such enquiry shall be conducted in accordance with regulations to be made by the Secretary of State by statutory instrument which shall be subject to annulment in pursuance of a resolution of either House of Parliament.").

The noble Lord said: My Lords, this amendment continues the consideration that we have been giving to the power of the Secertary of State to give directions to the Railway Board. I must point out that the clause says that he can give such directions to the board to act in a specified manner. At the Committee stage the noble Lord, Lord Bellwin, stressed that it was not expected to have to use these powers, but it was reasonable that, if necessary, the Secretary of State should have such powers. The noble Lord emphasised, as he has again tonight, that these are only reserve powers.

At the Committee stage various other noble Lords stressed that there were no criteria in the Bill for invoking these provisions as a reserve. It was suggested, also, that there should be provision for some form of inquiry or arbitration should there be disagreement between the Rail Board and the Secretary of State. Naturally, if both the board and the Secretary of State are in agreement, there is no need whatever for the Secretary of State to give directions. Therefore, the use of what is called a "reserve power" would be only when the Secretary of State considers that the situation is such that he has to direct the board. So the amendment seeks to make provision where any directions by the Secretary of State are considered by the board to be contrary to their best interests, or they consider that such directions are not in accordance with the powers placed upon them by the 1962 Act.

The noble Viscount, Lord Simon, has referred to "duties". The Act says, shall be the duty of the Board in the exercise of their powers under this Act", and the side heading refers to "duties and powers of the Railway Board"; therefore I take it that it refers to both duties and powers. The amendment seeks to provide that where any directions by the Secretary of State are considered to be contrary to their best interests or contrary to the provisions of the 1962 Act, the question shall be determined by an inquiry. The amendment goes on further that any such inquiry shall be conducted in accordance with the regulations which shall be made by the Secretary of State. Again, this seems to be a reasonable amendment. We are saying, "All right, reserve powers the Government feel that they must have; therefore if the board considers that these are against its interests or against the provisions of the 1962 Act they should have opportunity to make representations". We are suggesting that these should be made by some form of arbitration or inquiry and that such inquiries should be conducted in accordance with regulations made by the Secretary of State himself. I beg to move.

Lord Bellwin

My Lords, I made the point when we were discussing the last pair of amendments that, if there was to be any point in taking powers of direction, the powers needed to be as clear as possible. If there is ambiguity about the way they are drafted or if the uses to which they can be put are uncertain, the powers are not worth having. The powers are wanted to ensure that the Government's policy of privatisation can be achieved—it is not an appropriate role for an independent inquiry to examine the merits of declared Government policy. For that the Secretary of State is answerable to Parliament. When, during the Committee stage of the Bill, the noble Viscount, Lord Simon, originally suggested the possibility of arbitration or an inquiry to settle differences of view between the board and the Government, the noble Lord, Lord Mishcon, said: Arbitration or an inquiry on a matter of this kind may be difficult ".—[Official Report, 3/6/81; col. 1409.] Clearly, he did not convince his noble friend Lord Underhill, but I think that Lord Mishcon's first reaction on that occasion was right, because this proposal is full of difficulties. Clearly the Secretary of State would not in normal circumstances need to give the board a direction to do something which they were prepared to do of their own volition. If a direction were given, it would be to an unwilling board who would not regard it as being in their best interests. So an inquiry would not be an exceptional happening, used to marshal the arguments in some particularly knotty case. On the contrary, it would presumably be necessary in every case and such a system would be unprecedented.

There are numerous powers for Ministers to direct nationalised industries in existing legislation and in no case are these subject to this kind of provision. In all other cases Parliament has given the last word to the Secretary of State. He is charged with oversight of the industry and, where he considers it necessary to give a direction, he will take account both of the interest of the industry concerned and of the wider national interest. He is accountable to Parliament for the way in which he uses his powers. An inquiry would merely go through the same processes of weighing all the factors that the Secretary of State must himself go through before giving a direction. It could not be asked to interpret the law because that is a matter for the courts and it should not be asked to consider whether the policy is right because that is an issue for Parliament. It is not necessary and, to the extent that it would create uncertainty and give scope for delaying tactics, it would be positively undesirable in a reserve power which we have made clear will be used only in circumstances where the board and the Secretary of State do not see eye to eye on their objectives.

I hope the House will agree that the Secretary of State has been quite open about his intentions towards the board's subsidiaries. He has told Parliament which businesses into which he wishes private capital to be introduced and has given notice that there are some other areas which, in his view, may benefit from private capital but for which there is at present no settled policy. He has undertaken to report any significant extension of the policy to Parliament. He is content for the board themselves to take the lead in implementing the policy, leaving them a large area of discretion as to how to do this but he wishes to have reserve powers to safeguard his position. It is after all a joint policy and both parties need the power to ensure that it is implemented. The board themselves understand and accept this. In view of what I consider to be the eminently reasonable and responsible attitude that the Government have taken, we do not feel that there is any need for this amendment.

Viscount Simon

My Lords, I feel that we shall really want to discuss the broad matter on Amendment No. 4. I wanted to ask one question. He did say that the directions given by the Minister would be subject to Parliament, but, with respect, that does not appear to be in the Bill; he merely gives the direction. I admit, of course, that Members of Parliament can then ask the Minister why he has done it, but the directions are not subject to parliamentary control.

Lord Bellwin

My Lords, surely in all situations of this kind all matters that would indicate a deviation from anything which has been said as regards the general policy are normally reported to Parliament. It was in that sense that I said that Parliament would then be able to have its say. It was in that sense I meant it rather than the wording of the Bill.

Lord Underhill

My Lords, my noble friend Lord Mishcon did say it might be difficult to have an inquiry but he did not say it would be wrong to try to have an inquiry. We do not avoid things that are difficult if they are desirable and necessary. In moving the amendment, I did so because I thought it was desirable. I am inclined to agree with the noble Viscount, Lord Simon, that we can dispose of this possibly far better by dealing with the whole of the provision, Clause 3. Therefore, I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

6.22 p.m.

Lord Underhill moved Amendment No. 4: Leave out Clause 3.

The noble Lord said: My Lords, as I have said already, I regret that the Minister has not seen fit to accept what from these Benches we regard as very reasonable amendments to ensure that any directions given to the board shall not be contrary to the provisions of the 1962 Act and provide for an inquiry where the Minister may consider the reserve powers are necessary. Therefore, I think there is no alternative but to move the amendment to leave out the entire clause. Extreme arbitrary powers are given in this clause to the Secretary of State. He can give directions, and frankly that means instructions, to the board to establish a subsidiary. We all know that the purpose of giving such an instruction to establish a subsidiary is for the purpose of eventually disposing of that undertaking. Or he can give instructions to dispose of the whole or part of any undertaking. He can also direct the board to carry this out in any manner that he shall prescribe.

Admittedly the clause says he has to consult the board, but that is all he has to do. He can consult the board, but if the board says, "Sorry, Minister, we do not agree", he can still give them instructions to carry it out.

We have been told time and time again that it is the purpose of this Government not to interfere with the general management of nationalised industries. We have this power here for which there is no criterion for the reserve power. That is why I proposed the amendment for some form of inquiry. The Minister has repeatedly said that this is a reserve power, that I can trust the Secretary of State. But I remind your Lordships, as I said on Committee stage, that whatever may be the merits of the present Secretary of State he may not always be there; other Secretaries of State might like to use this power, and instructions can be given under this clause which are not necessarily a reserve power. The claim that a thing is a reserve power when there are words in the Bill which do not make it a reserve power is surely something your Lordships must consider.

Time and time again it has been said, and I have always been told this when I have been dealing with resolutions and what is in a constitution, it is what is written down that matters, not all the speeches, not all the assurances. In this Bill quite definite powers are given to the Secretary of State which we regard as completely excessive. In the light of these points, in the light of the failure of the Government to agree to reasonable amendments, I move the amendment to delete the entire Clause 3.

Viscount Simon

My Lords, I should like to support this amendment. I do not particularly like doing it. I appreciate it is part of the scheme which the Government have thought out, and as the Bill has been given a Second Reading we must try and help it to work. But I really feel that the power given to the Secretary of State to interfere in these matters of detail—not merely to tell the board what to do but to tell them how to do it, to tell them to dispose of things, even what price they are to get for them and so on—really involves the Minister in far too much interference. The noble Lord says—and I cannot challenge it because I do not carry these things in my head—that other nationalised industries have similar powers for the Minister. I know they do in some cases. I would have thought that the party opposite were on the whole rather opposed to that and preferred to think of the nationalised industries as being run by a competent board of management and that provided they kept within the Act which established them they should not be interfered with. Certainly there are always a great many complaints when Ministers issue instructions to the nationalised industries to do this, that or the other.

There is another point which has worried me about this. I think the Government will still say they do not want Parliament to get involved in the detailed day to day running of the nationalised industries. The Minister protects himself by saying he does not want to get involved in the detailed running of the industries. But surely if we give the Minister power to do these things we give Parliament, every Member of Parliament in this House and another place, the right to ask the Minister and to press the Minister to exercise these powers. This seems to me one of the great objections to giving Ministers these sort of blanket powers in the running of nationalised industries. They really cannot logically then hide behind the smokescreen that they do not want to interfere. If Parliament thought that they should interfere they can press them to do so; they can say, "You have got the powers. We have the right to press you to use them".

For that and other reasons I am in support of this amendment. The Minister took the case of Sealink. If I may say so, it was not a very good case because Sealink is dealt with as the Railways Board shall secure, so the Railways Board already have that duty. If the Minister meant that if they failed in that duty he could exercise the powers that would be understandable. But these powers are not confined to forcing the Railways Board to do something they are required to do. In fact, they go quite the opposite way; they can even insist on the Railways Board doing something which they are not empowered to do, which they are forbidden from doing. That does seem to me a very wide power to give. That is why I felt that we should try and find some means of resolving any honest differences of opinion between the Minister and his advisers on the one hand and the board and their advisers on the other. I imagine any sensible Minister will try to resolve these things, but giving him these powers without any provision for machinery to try to resolve differences seems to me to invite a conflict between the Minister and the board, which is something we would all wish to avoid, whoever the Minister was.

Is it really impossible at this stage to find some means of resolving these honest differences of opinion? I would start with the assumption that the board probably know more about it than the Minister. But even leaving that on one side, if they have honest differences of opinion as to whether this particular part of the undertaking should be privatised (to use this horrid word) why should not there be some means of resolving them other than by the Minister saying, "I say you must, and that is the end of it". I wonder whether even at this late stage there could be any means of trying to avoid what otherwise one feels are likely to be from time to time very unpleasant head-on collisions.

Lord Bellwin

My Lords, I do not see why we should be so pessimistic. The scenario which noble Lords opposite have painted is certainly not one which I envisage at all. The fact is that the Government's whole policy is founded on their agreement with the board that something must be done to improve the prospects of their subsidiaries. This agreement is the keystone of the policy and has shaped the provisions which are now included in the Bill. If that had not been the case it would have been quite feasible for us to take a different approach and introduce a Bill transferring certain businesses to the ownership of the Secretary of State and empowering him to dispose of them as he thought fit, the whole of the proceeds going straight to the Exchequer, with some reduction in the board's debt to take account of the loss of the assets concerned. These are publicly-owned assets and that would have been a justifiable way to treat them. It would have given the Government direct control over the exercise. I do not deny that such a course would have raised some difficult problems or that the legislation involved would have been much more complicated than that which we have before us. But it would certainly have been possible.

However, we have not chosen that course. Instead, we have looked for the common ground between the board and ourselves. We have tried to identify objectives and methods which are acceptable to both sides. We have agreed that the board should take the lead, consulting the Government as appropriate. It has been hinted in our early discussions of the Bill that it was a shot-gun marriage, that the board had no choice but to acquiesce. However, that is not so. Would anyone seriously believe that men of the experience and integrity of Sir Peter Parker and his fellow board members would have accepted such pressure without a fight?

When we say that we want to proceed in agreement with the board, we mean just that. The board understand and accept the Government's position. They know that we shall not fiddle the rules to allow the subsidiaries to escape public sector controls and yet to remain in board control. On the other hand, they also know that so long as they adhere to the agreed policy the Government will be perfectly happy to let them decide, consulting the Secretary of State as necessary, how to carry it out. So the board have the initiative and they have a large degree of discretion as to how they implement the policy. It seems to me that this was a big concession for the Government to make and it is not one that has been sufficiently recognised by those who oppose Part I of the Bill.

The noble Lords opposite have asked why, if the Government and the board are proceeding in agreement, we do not trust the board sufficiently to do without powers of direction. The answer is that the Government must take measures to protect their own position. The Government are promoting Part I of the Bill specifically to ensure that a particular set of events, a series of privatisations—and I agree with the noble Lord about that word, but there it is—will take place. Fortunately, there is joint agreement on that policy, but it is only right and sensible that both parties—the board and the Government—should have the ability to see it carried out. If Clause 3 were removed from the Bill, as this amendment proposes, the Government, having left matters in the hands of the board, would be without any remedy if the board went back on its agreement with the Government. I do not believe for one moment that the board, in fact, would do this, but the Government have obviously to take account of the possibility. That is why the powers of direction are in the Bill. I can say with absolute sincerity that we neither expect nor want to use these powers. But we insist that it is right that we should have them in reserve.

I have been asked to give examples of when these powers might be used. That is difficult because it is a hypothetical matter. But I suppose that the most obvious example of their potential use would be if the board decided not to proceed with the privatisation of a particular business, or part of a business, for reasons which did not seem to the Government to be valid. Another situation in which they might be used could be if the board had made little progress with implementing the policy and chose to reject opportunities to get in private capital for no good reason. As I have said, I do not think that that will, in fact, happen. Indeed, the board have already made an excellent start by disposing of a controlling interest in some of their Scottish hotels. But I say again that the Government have to protect their position.

It is true that the powers in this clause are wide-ranging; they have to be. It is self-evident that if the Government are to be able to carry through the policy in the face of the board's unwillingness to do so, they have to be able to direct the board to do the things that the board would themselves have done if they were acting of their own volition. It is important that the powers should be clear and unambiguous, and that they should be seen by all to be capable of effective use without inviting wrangles about the legal validity of any direction which might be given. The result is that the Secretary of State's powers in Clause 3 more or less mirror those of the board in Clause 1.

I do not think that I should go on at length. I shall sum up by saying yet again that these are reserve powers and we hope and fully expect that it will not be necessary to use them. But we do insist on the right to have them in order to protect the Government's position. If it does prove necessary to use them we shall certainly do so. But we have no intention of using these powers in an underhand or vindictive way or in a way which damages the interests of the board's main activity—the railway—or of the businesses themselves, or of their staff. We shall try to use them, if it becomes unavoidable to do so, in a way which will leave the board the maximum of discretion. This is a fundamental part of the whole Bill and I know that both the noble Lords opposite who have spoken on it realise that. Therefore, I hope that they will understand why we could not possibly accept the amendment that the clause be left out. I hope that they will not press the amendment.

Lord Underhill

My Lords, I make it absolutely clear that there is nothing in this amendment to challenge the main principle of this part of the Bill, otherwise I would have tabled quite a number of amendments to deal with the question of subsidiaries. Those issues were dealt with in Committee.

The board is given quite definite powers under Clause 1. Then, under Clause 3, the Government proceed to take away those powers. Despite their expertise in these matters and what is best for their undertaking, the Secretary of State can give them clear instructions to proceed in a certain way. What is more, he can proceed to give instructions to the board to act contrary to the duties and powers of the board under the 1962 Act.

The noble Lord has made a very reasonable speech, but we have to deal with what is actually contained in the Bill—in the clause. The clause deals with the power of directions: the power of directions, if the Secretary of State so desires. There are no criteria laid down. The noble Lord, Lord Bellwin, said that the board know only too well that the Government would not fiddle the rules. I am not suggesting that the present Secretary of State would do so, but there are powers in the clause for any Secretary of State to do that if he so desired. If the clause is deleted the board will still have the powers which the Government want to give them under Clause 1.

I believe that this is such an important principle—and the noble Viscount, Lord Simon, agrees with me—that we ought to delete this clause and then, if the Government feel that they want to come in to lay down criteria for the reserve power, they themselves could introduce an amendment to lay down the criteria for using it at Third Reading. There is an absence of criteria for using the reserve power, and we cannot obviously pass a clause which relies upon good faith irrespective of the words which are contained in the clause. Therefore, I must insist on the House declaring its view on this matter.

6.38 p.m.

On Question, Whether the said amendment (No. 4) shall be agreed to?

Their Lordships divided: Contents, 53; Not-Contents, 88.

Ardwick, L. Loudoun, C.
Aylestone, L. McGregor of Durris, L.
Barrington, V. Masham of Ilton, B.
Bernstein, L. Mishcon, L.
Beswick, L. Noel-Baker, L.
Bishopston, L. Peart, L.
Blease, L. Phillips, B.
Boston of Faversham, L. Pitt of Hampstead, L.
Collison, L. Ponsonby of Shulbrede, L. [Teller.]
David, B.
Davies of Leek, L. Rochester, L.
Diamond, L. Ross of Marnock, L.
Elwyn-Jones, L. Seear, B.
Ewart-Biggs, B. Shinwell, L.
Garner, L. Simon, V.
George-Brown, L. Stedman, B.
Greenway, L. Stone, L.
Houghton of Sowerby, L. Taylor of Blackburn, L.
Jacques, L. Taylor of Mansfield, L.
Jeger, B. Tordoff, L.
Jenkins of Putney, L. Underhill, L.
John-Mackie, L. Wallace of Coslany, L.
Kilmarnock, L. White, B.
Kinloss, Ly. Wilson of Langside, L.
Kirkhill, L. Wilson of Radcliffe, L.
Llewelyn-Davies of Hastoe, B. [Teller.] Wootton of Abinger, B.
Young of Dartington, L.
Longford, E.
Airey of Abingdon, B. Eccles, V.
Allerton, L. Elibank, L.
Auckland, L. Elles, B.
Avon, E. Elliot of Harwood, B.
Balfour of Inchrye, L. Falkland, V.
Bellwin, L. Ferrier, L,
Belstead, L. Fortescue, E.
Bessborough, E. Fraser of Kilmorack, L.
Boardman, L. Gardner of Parkes, B.
Boyd-Carpenter, L. Gridley, L.
Brougham and Vaux, L. Hailsham of Saint Marylebone, L.
Caithness, E.
Campbell of Alloway, L. Henley, L.
Cockfield, L. Hornsby-Smith, B.
Colville of Culross, V. Hylton-Foster, B.
Colwyn, L. Kemsley, V.
Cork and Orrery, E. Killearn, L.
Croft, L. Kinnaird, L.
Cross, V. Kintore, E.
Cullen of Ashbourne, L. Lane-Fox, B.
Daventry, V. Lauderdale, E.
Davidson, V. Long, V.
de Clifford, L. Lucas, B.
Denham, L. [Teller.] Luke, L.
Drumalbyn, L. Lyle, L.
McFadzean, L. Sandford, L.
Mackay of Clashfern, L. Sandys, L. [Teller.]
Macleod of Borve, B. Selkirk, E.
Marley, L. Shannon, E.
Massereene and Ferrard, V. Sharples, B.
Monk Bretton, L. Shepherd, L.
Mottistone, L. Skelmersdale, L.
Mountevans, L. Stamp, L.
Mountgarret, V. Stodart of Leaston, L.
Moyne, L. Strathcarron, L.
Murton of Lindisfarne, L. Strathclyde, L.
Northchurch, B. Swinfen, L.
Nugent of Guildford, L. Trenchard, V.
Onslow, E. Vaizey, L.
Penrhyn, L. Vivian, L.
Portland, D. Wakefield of Kendal, L.
Rankeillour, L. Waldegrave, E.
Rawlinson of Ewell, L. Ward of Witley, V.
Reigate, L. Westbury, L.
Rochdale, V.

Resolved in the negative, and amendment disagreed to accordingly.

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