HL Deb 17 February 1981 vol 417 cc582-92

4.49 p.m.

The Lord Chancellor (Lord Hailsham of Saint Marylebone)

My Lords, I rise to move that this Bill be now read a third time. As there are a number of amendments it might be for the convenience of the House if any general comments were on the Question, That the Bill do now pass. I beg to move that the Bill be now read a third time.

Moved, That the Bill be now read 3a.—(The Lord Chancellor.)

On Question, Bill read 3a, with the amendments.

Clause 4 [Contemporary reports of proceedings]:

The Lord Advocate (Lord Mackay of Clashfern) moved Amendment No. 1: Page 2, line 40, leave out from ("section") to ("if") in line 41 and insert ("8 of the Magistrates' Courts Act 1980").

The noble and learned Lord said: My Lords, it may be for convenience if I take Amendments Nos. 1 and 2 together. These two amendments to Clause 4 simply replace references to Sections 3(3) and 5 of the Criminal Justice Act 1967 with references to the corresponding provisions of the Magistrates' Courts Act 1980, the consolidation Act which has recently passed. The Act of 1980 is not yet in force but it almost certainly will be before the Contempt of Court Bill becomes an Act, and therefore it is convenient to make these amendments. I beg to move Amendment No. 1.

On Question, amendment agreed to.

Lord Mackay of Clashfern moved Amendment No. 2: Page 2, line 43, leave out from beginning to ("is") and insert ("Subsection (9) of the said section 8").

On Question, amendment agreed to.

4.50 p.m.

The Lord Chancellor moved Amendment No. 3:

Page 5, line 25, leave out subsection (4) and insert—

("(4) The following provisions of the Magistrates' Courts Act 1980 apply in relation to an order under this section as they apply in relation to a sentence on conviction or finding of guilty of an offence, namely section 36 (restriction on fines in respect of young persons); section 75 to 91 (enforcement); section 108 (appeal to Crown Court); section 136 (overnight detention in default of payment); and section 142(1) (power to rectify mistakes).").

The noble and learned Lord said: My Lords, I rise to move Amendment No. 3, I hope very shortly. The House will remember that on a previous stage of the Bill my nble friend Lord Renton, whose interest in such matters I can only welcome because they are both interesting and important, called the first two lines of this subsection (4) of Clause 11 a "flagrant example of non-textual amendment". I did promise to put this matter to the draftsmen. I discovered that the lines were put there when the Bill was in preparation a year ago to facilitate the consolidation of a provision in the Act of 1980, but now that the purpose has been lost and the Act of 1980 has been passed they are no longer required. One effect of this amendment, if not its only purpose, will be to remove the flagrant example to which my noble friend drew attention.

The rest of the amendment is very highly technical, and is, I think, explained by the brackets against the particular sections which are now to be attracted, if the amendment is passed, from the Magistrates' Courts Act 1980. They are all either restrictions on enforcement, or of the power to rectify mistakes, contained in Section 142 and Section 108 of the Magistrates' Courts Act, which ensures that there is an appeal, which was always the purpose of the subsection. I beg to move.

Lord Renton

My Lords, may I say to your Lordships how grateful I am to my noble and learned friend, and I wonder whether I may just congratulate him and the draftsmen upon the neat way in which they have overcome the problem of dovetailing Clause 11 as it now stands in the Bill with the contents of the recently consolidated Magistrates' Courts Act 1980. I did attempt to overcome the difficulty in a different way by tabling a re-draft in a textual manner amending the 1980 Act, but without altering its meaning and scope.

Yesterday, however, my noble and learned friend the Lord Chancellor had published an amendment—No. 3, which we are now discussing—and made it available to us. It widens considerably, as the Lord Chancellor has mentioned, the application of the Magistrates' Courts Act to orders for contempt of magistrates' courts made under this Clause 11, and it does so not by amending the 1980 Act in any way at all, textually or non-textually, but by applying the relevant provisions of that Act to the orders made under this clause. I am content that the problem shall be by-passed in that way; it means that my own amendment, No. 4, has been overtaken and is no longer necessary, and I shall not move it. I realise that my noble friend Lord Morris will be disappointed, because he wanted to move an amendment to my amendment. There is nothing, however, I can do about that.

In conclusion, may I refer to what my noble and learned friend the Lord Chancellor said at the Report stage, when I could not be here. At col. 193 on 10th February he said this: I said that I would take the draftsman's advice, which I have done, in spite of my noble friend Lord Renton, who rather thought it was a wicked thing for Lord Chancellors to take the draftsman's advice". My noble and learned friend was, of course, there in one of his jocular moods, which we always enjoy; but lest anyone should be so misguided as to take him seriously on this occasion, may I assure your Lordships that no such thought has ever entered my mind, nor indeed has ever passed my lips.

But may I nevertheless remind your Lordships, and my noble and learned friends on the Front Bench and my noble friends on the Front Bench who are not learned—not technically at any rate, not within the conventions of your Lordships' House—that when the draftsman does not get it right it is Ministers who are responsible and constitutionally should be blamed. But the responsibility does not end there, because surely it is the responsibility of Members of both Houses of Parliament to ensure that the laws which we make are well made and are a credit to our democracy. I am grateful to my noble and learned friend.

Lord Elwyn-Jones

My Lords, I am sure the House will welcome this amendment. Although it has shot the foxes of both the noble Lord, Lord Renton, and the noble Lord, Lord Morris, in that no longer will their amendments have to be discussed in the House, and as there are one or two other matters of the business of the House to follow, I am sure this will be received with enthusiasm.

The Lord Chancellor

My Lords, I am grateful both to my noble friend and to the noble and learned Lord for what they have said, and I will not detain the House, I never suggested for a moment—although my noble friend was perfectly correct in thinking that perhaps I was not entirely serious at Report stage—that Ministers are not responsible for the drafting of Bills or that Parliament is not free to alter them. But parliamentary draftsmanship is a rather skilled professional business, and the responsibility of Ministers is, I think, usually to take professional advice about the actual problems of draftsmanship. There is a saying in my profession that the man who is his own lawyer has a fool for his client, and I am sure a Minister who is his own draftsman is in a similar position.

On Question, amendment agreed to.

[Amendment No. 4 not moved.]

Lord Morris

had given notice of his intention to move Amendment No. 5 as an amendment to Amendment No. 4: In subsection (1) of the proposed new section 121A, leave out ("wilfully") in both places where it occurs and insert ("intending to do so"). The noble Lord said: My Lords, although I appreciate that my fox has been well and truly shot, it is still wriggling a little. The only reason why I tabled this amendment at this stage was to give my noble and learned friend the Lord Chancellor an opportunity to give your Lordships' House the benefit of his further reflections on the point so brilliantly argued by the noble and learned Lord, Lord Scarman.?

Lord Elwyn-Jones

My Lords, with great respect to the noble Lord, Amendment No. 4 not having been moved, and as this amendment purports to amend an amendment which was not moved, I am afraid that this amendment falls as a consequence of the falling of the previous amendment, delightful as it would be to hear the continuance of the discussion on wilfulness.

The Lord Chancellor

My Lords, I think my noble friend has only me to blame because I inadvertently called his amendment, but he now knows the facts.

Lord Morris

My Lords, I just wanted to ask my noble and learned friend the Lord Chancellor whether he would be good enough to give us the benefit of his further reflections, which he did say he would do on no fewer than three occasions during the substantive debate on this point at Report stage.

The Lord Chancellor

My Lords, I cannot do so now as I would be out of order in doing so, for the reason the noble and learned Lord stated. I will try to remember when we come to the Question, That the Bill do now pass.

5 p.m.

Clause 13 [Superior courts, county courts and magistrates' courts]:

Lord Mackay of Clashfern moved Amendment No. 6: Page 6, line 16, leave out from beginning to ("the") in line 17 and insert ("In any case where a court has power to commit a person to prison for contempt of court and (apart from this provision) no limitation applies to the period of committal").

The noble and learned Lord said: My Lords, I beg to move Amendment No. 6. This amendment is designed to make it clear that the restrictions imposed by Clause 13(1) on sentencing powers in contempt cases are not confined to superior courts, but apply to all courts whose powers are at present unlimited. It is little more than a drafting amendment. I beg to move.

On Question, amendment agreed to.

Schedule 4 [Offences of contempt of magistrates' courts):

Lord Mackay of Clashfern moved Amendment No. 7: Page 16, line 18, leave out from the beginning to ("shall") in line 19 and insert ("Articles 32, 33, 36 and 40 of the Legal Aid, Advice and Assistance (Northern Ireland) Order 1981").

The noble and learned Lord said: My Lords, I beg to move Amendment No. 7, and it may be for the convenience of your Lordships if I seek to explain also Amendments Nos. 8 and 9. These three amendments replace references in Schedule 4 to provisions of the Legal Aid and Advice Act (Northern Ireland) 1965 with references to the corresponding provisions of a consolidating measure which will shortly supersede them. The Legal Aid, Advice and Assistance (Northern Ireland) Order 1981 was approved by your Lordships' House on 12th February and by the other place on 11th February. It is due to go to the Privy Council tomorrow and, if approved, will come into force on 25th February. This would, therefore, be a convenient moment to replace the references to the Act of 1965 with references to the new order. I beg to move.

Lord Elwyn-Jones

My Lords, I agree that that is obviously sensible.

On Question, amendment agreed to.

Lord Mackay of Clashfern moved Amendments Nos. 8 and 9:

Page 16, line 20, leave out ("Part II of that Act") and insert ("Part III of that Order")

Page 16,line 22, leave out ("section 21 of that Act") and insert ("Article 29 of that Order").

On Question, amendments agreed to.

The Lord Chancellor

My Lords, I am reminded that there is a privilege amendment.

An amendment (privilege) made.

The Lord Chancellor

My Lords, I beg to move that this Bill do now pass. I am very grateful to my noble friend for having prevented a great crisis between the Lords and the Commons, which he did by his superior memory and knowledge of procedure. I would not have made a speech opening the Motion, That the Bill do now pass, but for the fact that my noble friend Lord Morris invited me to do so. I am afraid that the further consideration that I have given to the question of "wilfully" is identical with my last appearance.

I would agree straight away that there is a problem relating to the mental element in crime with which the Law Commission has dealt in a separate report, but that is a comprehensive problem. I think that it is also true to say that the Law Commission is of the opinion that in a new clause, which technically this is, a new nomenclature should be adopted and words like "maliciously" and "wilful" should be avoided where possible.

None the less, where a clause textually reproduces the language of a clause in a previous Act which is still in force—and will remain in force after the passage of this Bill, if it does pass—and means the same thing, I think that it would be wilful (if I may be forgiven for using the word) to make the statute book even more complicated and ridiculous than it admittedly is, as would be the case were I to admit into this clause a different form of words meaning exactly the same thing. I should have thought that it was a fundamental rule of draftsmanship that where the statute book already contains a clause which means the same thing, the same language should be used in subsequent clauses. I think that I may add that the point is almost of academic significance now, since the fox—if I may borrow the noble and learned Lord's simile—has already been shot by your Lordships' Appellate Committee in the case of Shepherd at the end of last year. I beg to move.

Moved, That the Bill do now pass.—(The Lord Chancellor.)

Lord Elwyn-Jones

My Lords, I do not think that we ought to pass from this Bill without recognising that we have had a valuable discussion to which noble Lords, learned and unlearned—although I do not know whether "unlearned" is quite appropriate as an adjective—have contributed from all sides of the House. I venture to think that it is in better shape now than when it was introduced.

This is an important Bill. It touches upon two crucial elements in our democratic society: first, the right of an accused person to have a fair and unprejudiced trial, and secondly; the freedom of the press to comment upon and to discuss public affairs and other matters of general public interest. Usually, those do not conflict with each other but it is when they do, or appear to do so, that the trouble arises. I think that the Bill does, to some extent at any rate, strengthen the ability and the freedom of the press to report, by reducing the risk and fear of contempt proceedings. The most significant provision in the Bill which has that effect is Clause 2(2). We were very happy that the noble and learned Lord, the Lord Chancellor, was able to agree to make it even more effective from the point of view of the press by requiring that the risk involved shall be a substantial risk.

Clause 5 of the Bill is also, I think, helpful in regard to enlarging and strengthening the field for discussion of public affairs, although we still think that the inclusion of the words "in good faith" have possibly reduced the value of the protection which is provided by the rest of the clause.

The restatement of the defence of innocent publication or distribution in Clause 3 is helpful, but I am afraid that we must record our disappointment that the Government remain unyielding on a number of issues which were raised in the course of the debates which we on this side of the House at any rate think results in the Bill being less effective than it could have been for its purposes, and I have no doubt that there will be considerable discussion of these matters in another place.

Without taking up too much time of the House, I should like to refer in particular to Clause 7 of the Bill, which leaves uncertain the scope of the extension of the risk of contempt of court to a potentially large area of inferior courts and tribunals. If I may say so, if the Lord Chancellor's Office finds it impossible to identify them in advance of contempt proceedings being taken to test the matter, how can editors be expected to know better?

The debates on Clause 8 dealing with publication of jury deliberations have highlighted the concern as to the damage the provisions of the clause may cause to the privacy of jury deliberations. What is said in the jury room and which juror thought this or that ought to be almost sacrosant. I believe—and I think that the House probably generally agrees—that confidentiality is of the essence as regards jury deliberations, and a juror doing his or her duty there should be absolutely protected from harassment or even embarrassment. Those who would seek to probe the jury's deliberations for their own purposes ought to be prevented from doing so. We do not think that Clause 8 has got it right.

The provision in the Bill which has met with wide condemnation, particularly from the Law Society and all the serious newspapers, is the provision in Schedule 1 paragraph 4 regarding the time at which criminal proceedings become active within the meaning of Clause 2 of the Bill. This provision constitutes a serious departure from Phillimore. Other noble Lords whose amendments were rejected will no doubt have their sense of disappointment, and I apprehend that some of their proposals will also be discussed in another place, particularly the amendment, so ably moved by my noble friend Lord Gifford, about the reporting of the contents of documents disclosed in the litigation. In the meantime, although I have—I hope not too churlishly—criticised some aspects of the Bill, we of course have no intention of seeking to impede its further progress.

5.11 p.m.

Lord Wigoder

My Lords, in bidding farewell to this Bill, I do so in the confident expectation that your Lordships are not saying goodbye, and that in due course it will be returned here in, I hope, a somewhat improved form. I am, of course, assuming that some time can be found this Session to consider amendments from the other place, on the basis that sooner or later we shall end the Committee stage of the Wildlife and Countryside Bill.

My first task is to express, if I may, with every possible respect, our congratulations to the noble and learned Lord on the Woolsack for the way in which he has—I was going to say "steered", but I am not sure that "steered" may not be too moderate a word—driven, sometimes with his characteristic vigour, this Bill on its passage through your Lordships' House. As has been said many times in the course of our debates, the Bill attempts to draw a difficult balance between the right of the public to a press which is free and the right of the public to a system of justice which is pure and unsullied by prejudicial comment. Despite all our debates and despite, at any rate, the one concession that the noble and learned Lord on the Woolsack made in considering Clause 2, I still believe that we may not have that balance completely right and that it may be that at the moment the balance is tilted slightly too much against the proper, legitimate interests of the press.

I mention in particular two aspects. One is Clause 7, to which the noble and learned Lord, Lord Elwyn-Jones, referred, where strict liability—as the Bill is at present drafted—will exclude any form of press comment upon any form of proceedings in any tribunal set up in this country—and that includes a vast range of tribunals—provided that it is a tribunal which is defined in Clause 7 as being such as constitutes: any part of the judicial power of the state". I believe that that will turn out to be a quite unacceptable definition. I believe that if ever a case arises in which it has to be decided whether a particular tribunal, rent assessment committee or whatever is such a tribunal as exercises that power, in all probability it will eventually come before the Appellate Committee of your Lordships' House and there be decided by three judgments to two one way or the other. I do not think that that puts a fair burden on any representative of the media who has to decide at short notice whether that particular tribunal falls into that category, or that he should be at risk if he decides that the two votes may be right rather than the three.

I also believe that the proposal of a list of tribunals would be very much more satisfactory. The noble and learned Lord on the Woolsack will no doubt recollect that the late Lord Dilhorne, when he was giving his judgment in the BBC case, himself indicated that certainly Treasury counsel in that case were arguing that there were only a very limited number of tribunals —I think that he named 13 in all—as to which it was necessary that strict liability should run. I hope that in due course it might be found possible that a short and succinct list of the principal tribunals could replace the general phrase in Clause 7.

The other matter where I still think that the balance is tilted unreasonably against the press is in paragraph 14 of Schedule 1 to the Bill, where the press are forbidden to comment on any criminal matter once it has been concluded at the Crown Court and is on its way to the criminal division of the Court of Appeal. I cannot believe that our judges in that division need mollycoddling to that extent; I cannot believe that they have asked for that protection, that they desire it or that they need it. I should also like to add my support to what the noble and learned Lord, Lord Elwyn-Jones, has said about the unsatisfactory nature of Clause 8 of the Bill, which deals with juryroom deliberations. I am not criticising the Government's objectives at the moment, but I believe that the unintended consequences of that clause may, in fact, be quite disastrous.

The only other observation that I would venture to make is that when the other place considers this Bill I hope that it will not be regarded as a lawyer's Bill. In your Lordships' House we have been fortunate from time to time to have had contributions from those who are not lawyers. But this is in no sense a lawyer's Bill. It raises very much wider issues than issues of construction or interpretation of the law. I very much hope that in the other place those issues will be given careful consideration and that in due course we shall have the opportunity of improving this Bill still further.

Lord Renton

My Lords, I would have said that this is an even better Bill, both in substance and in drafting, than it was when it first came to us. It clarifies and modernises the law relating to contempt. It extends it where necessary. I reckon that some very difficult decisions have had to be made by the Government and by your Lordships in reaching the conclusions of substance on the Bill. But after some hesitation and one or two doubts, I think that the Government now have it about right or as near right as is possible.

It was certainly a good thing to have had removed the uncertainties, which have existed for a long time and which have caused much trouble, about the publication of various matters which might be thought to affect judicial proceedings, especially in criminal cases. I am glad that some of the procedural steps that have had to be taken are now simplified, especially in relation to contempts in magistrates' courts, for formerly the procedure was much too cumbersome.

On Second Reading, with regard to Clause 7, I said that there should be a list. I listened very carefully to what my noble and learned friend the Lord Chancellor said at the Committee stage and I went along with him, but I must confess with a little hesitation. I hope that we shall not have cases taken right up to the highest tribunal in order to decide these matters. If we do, we may very well find that we shall have to have what my noble and learned friend the Lord Chancellor has so aptly called a little list. Perhaps that may not arise and perhaps our fears are unfounded.

Lastly, I should like to pay tribute to the fact that when existing legislation has had to be repealed by this Bill, the word "repeal" is used and that the nonsense of the phrase "cease to have effect" has been avoided. As my noble and learned friend the Lord Advocate very well knows—because I challenged him about it on the Criminal Justice (Scotland) Act in the last Session —time and again that phrase crept into our legislation in the last Session. I hope that the secret priesthood will now be converted by the eminent draftsmen who have assisted my noble and learned friend the Lord Chancellor in drafting this Bill.

Lord Ardwick

My Lords, I think that all editors will be grateful for the improvements made to the Bill and hopeful that further improvements will be made when the Bill goes elsewhere. I think that they will also be very grateful to the noble and learned Lord the Lord Chancellor, and to the legal luminaries who have done so much work on this Bill and who have been very conscious of the need to balance the freedom to publish with the right of the citizen to a fair trial.

5.20 p.m.

The Lord Chancellor

My Lords, I am very grateful to noble Lords who have taken a part in this debate. I am particularly grateful to my noble friend Lord Renton who thought we had got it about right. That exactly represents my own opinion, if he will allow me to say so. I could not have put it better myself. The last thing I would do is to call the noble and learned Lord, Lord Elwyn-Jones, churlish. He is never churlish. He is sometimes, if he will forgive me saying so, a little mischievous, but he is not churlish.

May I answer some of the points made by both him and the noble Lord, Lord Wigoder. I think both of them got lost among the trees and forgot the wood over Clause 7. I would just like to put the record straight. I would not have put Clause 7 in the Bill at all if it had not been for this extraordinary case in the House of Lords which took place in the last few months. It would otherwise have been totally unnecessary. There never has been any problem about tribunals, so far as I know, between the press and the law. Somewhere in the middle of the last century it was decided that consistory courts and courts martial and coroner's courts were covered by contempt, and then at last in the year 1980, or thereabouts, the House of Lords decided that local valuation courts were not covered by contempt.

Unfortunately, the experts in my office discovered a marked divergence between the speeches. They all agreed on the result, all five of them; but of the noble and learned Lords on the Cross-Benches, they all agreed about the result but the speeches diverged a little. The point was that the Lord Chancellor's Department—and I fully accept my responsibility for it, if I may prejudge any criticism which comes from my noble friend Lord Renton—thought that Lord Scarman's version was the true milk of wisdom, and so we put in Clause 7, or the words which have been subjected to criticism in your Lordships' House, from the noble and learned Lord, Lord Scarman, thereby jettisoning the less attractive versions from the others.

If I had been required to make a little list I could not have done so. The noble and learned Lord, Lord Elwyn-Jones, reminded us that Treasury counsel thought that there would be at least 13 on the list and that would be rather long, and that there would have had to be a rule-making power to take away from and add to it and define what was meant by the proceedings. I would have left out Clause 7 perfectly happily, but the trouble about that is that the law would have been less clear, and not more clear, if I had done so. The purpose of Clause 7 was always to make the law more clear by preferring the gospel according to Scarman to the gospel according to one or two of the others. I think, on the whole, it was the right decision.

As regards Clause 8 I was of course all along aware that the legal profession was keen on making it a criminal offence for jurors to talk. I was also aware that the Government, if they ever prosecuted a juror for telling his wife or his son-in-law what had gone on in the jury room, would make asses of themselves. I do not believe in making new criminal offences which cannot he enforced. Therefore, I firmly and severely reject the view of the legal profession on this rather narrow point. I think we have got it about right, as the noble Lord, Lord Renton, suggested. Indeed, the New Law Journal said exactly the same thing, using that exact phrase.

I think we would be absolutely mad to start saying that a juror is committing a criminal offence if he ever talks. I endorse the view expressed both by the noble and learned Lord, Lord Elwyn-Jones, and the noble Lord, Lord Wigoder, to the effect that I regard the juror as under an obligation of honour not to talk, or to be very careful how he talks. But I do not believe that he ought to be prosecuted if he does, because most jurors think that being a juror is an exciting experience and they do talk in the bar parlour, they do talk to their family, and they do talk fairly freely. I really do not think that it ought to rest with the Attorney General as to whether he prosecutes them or not. I think Parliament should realise that there is a sort of parliamentary virtue in the general rule de minitnis non curat lex.

Then we get to the schedule. It is true of course that prior to the Sutcliffe case quite a lot of fuss was being made implying that we had got it wrong. Although the noble and learned Lord, Lord Gardiner, cited a great number of cases of people who thought that we had got it wrong, the Phillimore Committee 10 years ago thought it was fairly evenly balanced. I thought it was fairly evenly balanced at Second Reading. But when the Sutcliffe case came along nobody suggested that any post-Sutcliffe complaint had been made, and I doubt if they would get very far with public opinion if they did. However, that is a matter of opinion.

I was grateful to the noble Lord, Lord Ardwick. I should like to say to our friends of the press that I believe the courts and the press ought to regard themselves as partners in this matter. I do not think we should regard ourselves as potential antagonists. The press are the guardians of freedom of discussion and freedom of information. The courts are the guardians of a fair trial. These are not inconsistent requirements, and I think we should be much more in each other's confidence than we have been in the past. There should be a free interchange of opinion, perhaps on an informal basis, as to what is and is not tolerable. On the whole during my professional life, which is now disgustingly long since I was called to the Bar in 1932, relations have almost consistently improved, although of course there have been occasions when moments of controversy have arisen, because the courts have the function of deciding what is what when things come up for decision.

One other thing I should like to say to the noble Lord, Lord Wigoder, about his point on Schedule 1 is that it is not the judges whom you are mollycoddling; nor do judges need mollycoddling, goodness knows. I do not know what they would say if they thought I was rather mollycoddling them in this Bill. They would be furious. It is not the judges we are mollycoddling at all in the period between conviction and appeal; it is that there may be a new trial, and furthermore that judges do not like to have information about which they have then got to perform the intellectual gymnastic of excluding it from their mind, because although they say "I rigidly exclude it from my mind" they would not say it if it was not already in their mind. Therefore, I think that perhaps we have got it right there too.

I am very grateful indeed for the general welcome. It has been a good-tempered discussion from beginning to end. I am glad to end on a fairly genial note, even though I have not secured universal approval for every one of my individual opinions. I do not think I drove it through the House. I only say this to the noble and learned Lord, Lord Gardiner: when Lord Campbell said that law reform is by consent or not at all, he did not mean thereby that every single item in a Bill should meet with universal approval, because the answer would then be, "Not at all, at all".

What was really in his mind was that you are very apt to lose a proposal for law reform if you do not remember at every stage that the best is very often the enemy of the good. I have deliberately curtailed the sphere within which this Bill operates, because I regarded it as a matter of enormous importance that we should legislate Phillimore now at last after 10 years, and that we should conform with the European Convention as it was decided by a majority of 11 judges to nine to be the law of the European Convention. I have deliberately therefore rather resisted any attempts to enlarge the scope of the Bill. I think my judgment on that is right, and I am not here in sackcloth and ashes at all, but I am very grateful indeed to noble Lords who have played a part in these interesting discussions for having helped me to do my best to improve the Bill; I hope we have done that a little bit. I beg to move.

On Question, Bill passed, and sent to the Commons.