HL Deb 19 May 1980 vol 409 cc559-645

3.17 p.m.

The PARLIAMENTARY UNDERSECRETARY of STATE, DEPARTMENT of the ENVIRONMENT (Lord Bellwin)

My Lords, I beg to move that the House do now again resolve itself into Committee on this Bill.

Moved, that the House do now again resolve itself into Committee.— (LordBell-win.)

On Question, Motion agreed to.

House in Committee accordingly.

[The EARL OF LISTOWEL in the Chair.]

Clause 24 [Duty to give traffic commissioners information about vehicles]:

Lord UNDERHILL moved Amendment No. 101: Page 24, line 13, leave out ("passengers") and insert (" occupants of the public service vehicle ").

The noble Lord said: This amendment seeks to change the word "passengers" in line 13 for the words "occupants of the public service vehicle ". The provision in subsection (1) is that the holder of a public service vehicle operator's licence shall report to the traffic commissioners any failure or damage— and I quote— calculated to affect the safety of passengers or of persons using the road ".

The amendment seeks to ensure that anything calculated to affect the safety of the driver, and also the conductor if there is one, is also covered by this provision. It would appear that if the wording is left as it is this matter will not be covered in the clause. I beg to move.

Lord MOWBRAY and STOURTON

On such a sunny afternoon I am very happy to start off on a very sunny atmosphere and say that I thank the noble Lord for this most helpful amendment, which has the effect of ensuring, as he has said, that the driver of the vehicle is included in the category of those protected by the clause. I am most happy to accept it.

On Question, amendment agreed to.

3.20 p.m.

Lord MISHCON moved Amendment No. 102: Page 24, line 14, after ("practicable") insert (" or in any event within seven days ").

The noble Lord said: I hope that the sunshine may continue at least for a few moments while I move Amendment No. 102 and, with your Lordships' permission, speak to Amendment No. 102A. At the Committee stage in the other place the Minister, Mr. Kenneth Clarke, said that a previous phrase, "as soon as may be" was something which was meaningless to him and that therefore he was substituting for that the words, "as soon as practicable". The matter of reporting the bad state of a vehicle is a serious one; and the words "as soon as practicable" have such an uncertainty that, while still wanting to adopt them, I would ask the Committee to say that at least a maximum period should be inserted. That is the reason for the insertion after those words of "or in any event within seven days". The same point applies to Amendment No. 102A and I will not burden the Committee with the same remarks in regard to that amendment. I beg to move.

Lord MOWBRAY and STOURTON

I fear that a cloud is coming over the sun at this particular moment. There is, I am afraid, in our opinion no point in spelling out a time limit in these cases. The time within which it is practicable and reasonable to report these occurrences or to supply the information must depend on the circumstances. For example, a driver who suspects that he has a mechanical defect might have the vehicle tested before reporting or it may occur at holiday times; so that an exact requirement of one week might be quite unreasonable for reporting a defect of a comparatively minor nature. The words "as soon as practicable" adequately cover the merits of each case better than the exact timing of "within seven days". I hope that the noble Lord will see that this is not a matter of our being obstructionist. We think that our wording is better.

Lord LLOYD of KILGERRAN

May I endeavour to remove what the noble Lord has said was a small cloud? It seems to me that in relation to an important matter like this, "practicable" is too general and unrealistic a word. I believe that there should be some time limit in addition. It is realistic to have a time limit. If we leave in the clause words like "when it is practicable", all kinds of parameters and difficulties arise. On an important matter like this there should be a time limit. There is no magic in the words "seven days"; and I do not think that the noble Lord, Lord Mishcon, would necessarily tie himself to a limit of seven days. But a time limit should be introduced rather than to leave this airy-fairy word in the Bill.

Lord DERWENT

What happens if the time limit decided upon is not practicable?

Lord MOWBRAY and STOURTON

I think that my noble friend Lord Derwent has a good point. I am conscious that I am speaking to two "legal gentlemen" in the noble Lords Lloyd of Kilgerran and Lord Mishcon. I am assured by learned counsel that there is judicial authority for construing "practicable" as meaning "capable of being carried out in action or feasible"— that is the meaning to be found in the Oxford English Dictionary — and as imposing a stricter standard than "reasonably practicable". What is "as soon as is practicable" must be determined on the facts of individual cases. The expression "as soon as practicable" can be compared perhaps with the expression "forthwith". There is a judicial authority for the view that "forthwith" is stronger than "within a reasonable time" and implies prompt and vigorous action. Whether there has been such action is a question of fact to be determined in the circumstances of the individual case. Also, there is judicial authority for construing "forthwith" as meaning "at once, having regard to the circumstances of the case" or "with as little delayas possible". It is considered, all in all, that in this context the expression "as soon as practicable" is clearer and more apt than "forthwith".

Lord ROBBINS

Would not the insertion of the word "immediately" satisfy-both parties— "immediately practicable"?

Lord MOWBRAY and STOURTON

I shall certainly ask our Parliamentary draftsmen to look at that. But "immediately", as my noble friend Lord Derwent said, can be impossible to comply with— for example, as I said, during holiday times. "Immediately practicable" really means "as soon as practicable".

Lord MISHCON

We have a long day before us and I do not intend to take up the time of the Committee on matters of this kind. I would only observe that I always find the tones of the noble Lord, Lord Lloyd of Kilgerran, so mellifluous when he agrees with what I say. I found his voice very acceptable on this amendment. I would only ask the Minister to consider this point before Report stage. Where there is serious risk (as is implied in the clause) to the safety of passengers and crew, it does seem to be so foolish, if I may use the term, to have an offence prescribed in a Bill for the contravention of the duty to inform the authorities of such a bad stage of repair or danger, and to leave the question so arguable before the courts as to whether or not the report was made "as soon as practicable". It means that in every single case there will be an argument. That was the reason I believe that inspired the agreement of the noble Lord, Lord Lloyd of Kilgerran. I merely ask the Minister if he will have another think about it before Report. I do not want to detain the Committee any longer on this.

Lord MOWBRAY and STOURTON

I shall certainly have another think, but I must point out that in another place we resisted this particular amendment in several Divisions. I have very little doubt that my answer will be the same at Report stage and at Third Reading as it is now. I shall certainly take on board what noble Lords have said.

Lord MISHCON

In the circumstances, I ask leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

[Amendments Nos. 102A and 102B not moved.]

Lord BELLWIN moved Amendment No. 103: Page 24, line 40, leave out (" knowingly ").

The noble Lord said: I have spoken to this amendment with Amendment No. 20. I beg to move.

On Question, amendment agreed to.

Clause 24, as amended, agreed to.

Clause 25 [Certificates of qualification]:

3.30 p.m.

On Question, Whether Clause 25 shall stand part of the Bill?

Lord LUCAS of CHILWORTH

May I ask my noble friend whether it is intended that the provisions for certificates of professional competence applicable to Northern Ireland are those that are currently ruling in this country? If so, is he able to say anything at all about the continuance of the current scheme whereby the qualifications are vetted by a group (including trade unions) before the certificate of professional competence is granted; or whether in fact (as seems to be felt in some quarters) the present method of awarding the certificate is going to be changed?

Lord BELLWIN

I am not sure that I can help my noble friend regarding the intention on this point. So far as I am aware, there is no intention to change the basic procedure as to that; the basic requirements now being set down in the Bill, which calls, as he knows, for the certificate as to good repute, professional competence, and so on, will apply generally. I would not have thought there was any reason why what will pertain here will be any different from what will pertain in Northern Ireland. I will gladly undertake to have a look at this point and see if I can confirm this and satisfy my noble friend.

Clause 25 agreed to.

Clause 26 [Appeals to the Minister]:

3.31 p.m.

Lord MISHCON moved Amendment No. 104: Page 26, line 6, after (" may ") insert (" within 14 days in the case of a decision under paragraphs (a) or (b) below, or 7 days in the case of a decision under paragraph (r) below ").

The noble Lord said: Clause 26 deals with the appeal to the Minister against first of all the refusal of an application by the holder against the removal or variation of any condition or indeed of his actual licence. Therefore these are important matters to any licence holder. Under subsection (9) of this clause provision is made for regulations which relate to those appeals, and there is a provision thereto that time limits shall be laid down in the regulations.

I have heard Members of the House of Lords from many quarters say that regulations are confusing to the citizen, and when his rights are very much an issue it is correct to try to put any time limits and any procedures, where possible, in an Act. I do not ask for the procedure in regard to appeals to be put in an Act; but I ask that in the Act somebody who wishes to appeal against something which is so vital should know by looking at the clause within which time it is that he has to appeal. Therefore I ask the Minister to make up his mind now as to that time limit and to put it in. I beg to move.

Lord BELLWIN

Time limits must of course be laid down within which appeals can be made. At present they are contained in regulations under the Road Traffic Act 1960 along with other necessary requirements about the procedure for making appeals. Subsection (9) of this clause provides that such matters must be prescribed in regulations and this amendment therefore is not necessary. In any case, the time limits suggested are very short— much shorter than at present. It would be unreasonable to impose such stringent requirements on licence holders. They are entitled to a reasonable time for consideration of whether or not to pursue an appeal, and time to prepare their case. At present one month is allowed and we will be discussing— and this really is moving towards what the noble Lord, Lord Mishcon, is wanting— with the industry and other interested parties whether this should be changed when we consult with them on the new regulations. I hope with that reply that the noble Lord may feel able to withdraw his amendment.

Lord LLOYD of KILGERRAN

The Committee will not be surprised that I am again supporting the noble Lord, Lord Mishcon, in view of the charming and attractive words that he used in relation to one of my previous speeches! To treat the matter seriously: in the Bill there should be a time limit introduced, particularly having regard to the words of subsection (9) of this clause. It is all very well to say that subsection (9) says: (9) An appeal under this section must be made within the prescribed time and in the prescribed manner, … ". The person reading this of course will immediately know that there is a definition section, Section 23A, and that the word "prescribed" means "prescribed by regulations made by the Minister". Then of course he will know that there are regulations and he has to find these regulations.

One is now dealing with matter of fact affairs of transport involving drivers and people of that kind. It seems unrealistic to approach the matter in the way the Government are doing at the present time and that it would be helpful for the ordinary person to know some limits about the prescribed time. There is no magic about the actual times set out in this amendment; but I agree, despite the possibility of masses of legal opinions which the Government have received about this and judicial decisions about other matters which we heard from the noble Lord who is supporting the Minister, that as a practical matter time limits should be introduced in some form at this stage in the clause.

Lord BELLWIN

It seems that I will have to alter my approach in the way I refer to the noble Lord, Lord Lloyd of Kilgerran, if I am to get his support to a greater degree than I seem to be doing at present. I should have thought the point I made regarding the intention to consult with the industry and with other interested parties was the relevant one. We are not saying— are we?— that there should be no time. We are certainly very dubious about the time of seven days proposed in the amendment. Perhaps it would be helpful if I were to add that in addition to the present regulations there is a leaflet fully explaining the procedure. We intend to amend that leaflet and ensure its widest distribution. It will contain, in so far as time is concerned, that which comes forth from the discussions that I referred to. I hope that in the light of this the noble Lord may feel able to withdraw the amendment.

Lord AIREDALE

Has there not been time already for consultation with the industry with a view to putting the time limit in the Bill? The disadvantage of doing it by ministerial regulation is that Parliament can only either agree to the regulation or else throw it out and require the Government to come forward again with some other regulation giving some other time limit and the matter cannot be freely debated in Parliament, whereas if these important matters are put not in regulations but in the Bill, then in Committee stage in both Houses of Parliament the matter can be properly debated. A time limit can be arrived at of which Parliament approves.

Lord BELLWIN

I cannot tell the noble Lord the extent of the consultations or discussions— call them what you will— which have taken place already. That I do not know. The fact that at the present time one month is allowed— and here we are talking in an amendment of seven days— illustrates the point that there clearly needs to be something more than we have at the present time. Whether that should be done in the procedural way suggested or in the way that the noble Lord says, is a matter of opinion. At the end of the day what really matters is that we get a time that is reasonable to all concerned— and who more concerned, I would have thought, than the people within the industry and the interested parties themselves. I do not think I can add much more, although I am trying to be helpful. For the third time I wonder whether the noble Lord feels able to withdraw the amendment.

Lord MISHCON

I find the tones from the Liberal Benches most harmonious. The only principle that I am advancing is that the citizen shall know, on looking at a clause of the Bill which affects him vitally, what his time limits are. They should not be put in regulations. The question of how long the period of time should be is unimportant as compared with that principle. Regarding local government, consultations have been des- cribed by the noble Lord, Lord Bellwin, in a previous debate that we had in Committee as unending and difficult. It seems extraordinary that with an existing time limit of one month it is not possible, the industry having considered this matter no doubt very carefully, between now and Report stage or now and Third Reading to find whether or not the industry agrees with 28 days— which has been the period up to now— or whether they want a shorter or longer term and for the Minister to make up his mind. Therefore if the noble Minister will kindly say that he will endeavour to hurry up negotiations and consultations on this small matter, and if he finds, miraculously, that there is agreement between the Minister and the trade on this, it can be brought into the Bill and noble Lords who have been kind enough to agree with this amendment will no doubt be as pleased as I shall.

Lord LLOYD of KILGERRAN

May I, too, encourage the noble Lord, Lord Bellwin, to take this course, because it seems to me that what he is saying to an applicant is really: "Do not bother about the Act; all you need bother about are the regulations". That seems to me to be rather the wrong way round. The Act must be before the applicant on many occasions, and I should have thought that the introduction of a time limit of some kind would be the appropriate way of dealing with this matter.

Lord BELLWIN

I gladly undertake as the noble Lord, Lord Mishcon, said, to see whether by the time of the Report stage we have something which may enable him to feel happier about what we have here. At this moment I cannot offer anything, but I will certainly undertake to do that.

Lord MISHCON

On that basis, I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

3.41 p.m.

Lord MISHCON moved Amendment No. 105: Page 26, line 23, after (" may ") insert (" within 3 days of such refusal ").

The noble Lord said: This is not an appeal we are dealing with but a pro- cedure under which the traffic commissioners can decide or not that on an application by a licence-holder whose licence may have been suspended or indeed withdrawn, the effect of their decision shall not come into operation until the expiration of the period that is allowed for appeal to the Minister. Against that decision of the traffic commissioners there is a right of the licence-holder to go to the Minister and ask the Minister for a stay of execution— which I think is the appropriate term— and the time limit within which the Minister must do that is very sensibly laid down in the clause.

This is not governed by subsection (9) because it is not an appeal, and therefore there is no question of the Bill saying that regulations will be made about time limits. The one thing which is absent here is the time limit within which the aggrieved person wanting to appeal and wanting a stay of execution has to lodge his application for the Minister's determination. The 14 days is there for the Minister but not for the applicant. I have no doubt the Committee will take it for granted that the person concerned would want to do this as expeditiously as possible, and no doubt he would; but the real question is that the traffic commissioners ought to know where they stand. It may be a very bad case, and normally would be when they have revoked a licence. They would want, having refused a stay of execution of their decision pending an appeal, to know what was being done in the meantime by the operator. Is their decision to revoke to be operative and to continue to be operative until the Minister has come to his decision? Therefore the purpose of my amendment is to say that the person who is aggrieved by the traffic commissioners' decision not to have a stay of execution must make his application to the Minister— I repeat that it is not an appeal— within three days. I beg to move.

Lord MORRIS

I can see a practical problem with this amendment. If the traffic commissioners were to hear a case on Friday and if it happened to be a bank holiday weekend it would not leave very much time for the applicant to make his application to the Minister.

Lord MISHCON

If I may say so without sounding pompous, lawyers are used to that difficulty and rules are made which do delete non-working days, holidays and so on. But once again may I repeat to the Committee that it is not a question of time that binds me in this amendment; it is a question of principle.

Lord BELLWIN

Subsection (4) empowers traffic commissioners, if so requested, to suspend the operation of a change in the conditions of a licence or its revocation, suspension or curtailment until the expiration of the period within which an appeal must be lodged, and then until the appeal is disposed of. If the commissioners refuse to grant such a suspension of the operation of their decision, there may be an application to the Minister to direct them to grant it and there must be a decision on such an application within 14 days. A similar provision is to be found in the goods operator licensing system for goods vehicles.

Revocation of an operator's licence can destroy someone's livelihood perhaps beyond the possibility of repair, even by a successful appeal. On the other hand, to allow a criminal or utterly reckless operator to continue in business for the months it may take to determine an appeal could positively endanger the public and it would be wrong to make suspension of the commissioners' action an automatic consequence of an appeal. Therefore, for justice to be done there must be provision for a quick decision by the appellate body as to whether execution should be stayed. A special procedure will be required for dealing with applications for directions under this subsection.

They are not appeals and the procedure will not have to be laid down specifically or to be the same as prescribed under subsection (9). It is not envisaged that any time limit will need to be specified. In effect, an application could not be made once the time limit within which the appeal itself could be made had passed. In practice, if the matter is of such importance to the holder— and I believe the noble Lord, Lord Mishcon, made this point too— that he wishes to seek a direction, he might be expected to apply instantaneously. Even so, it would appear to be unreasonable to prevent the holder from applying at any time up to the end of the appeal limit, if he so wishes.

Lord MISHCON

I confess to some disappointment that the noble Minister read to the Committee a definition, description and clarification of a clause which I believe, if I may say so with deep respect, was clear to them before the explanation was even given. It does not deal in any way with the point which I tried to make to the Committee. I said, as the Minister was fair enough to repeat, that obviously the person concerned will, one would imagine, make his application as soon as possible. What I said was that because there is no time limit here, the traffic commissioners will not know what the position is because the application can be made at any time up to the time of the expiration of the appeal period. Again, because I feel this is a rather technical point, although I believe an important one, I wonder whether the noble Lord the Minister will be good enough to look at what has been said between now and the Report stage and possibly find that he can be rather more helpful on that occasion.

Lord BELLWIN

I was aware that I was in fact stating the position, but I felt that it was, as the noble Lord has said, such a complex subject that there was no harm in doing that. Indeed we may well feel the need to do that again before the day is out. I take the point that is being made and I have found difficulty in trying to be precisely clear as to exactly what is the point which has most concerned the noble Lord. I think I would have no difficulty at all in saying that we will consider this very carefully again before Report. I gladly undertake to do so.

Lord MISHCON

On that very courteous basis, I ask for the Committee's leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

Lord MORRIS moved Amendment No. 106: Page 26, line 25, at end insert, (" and pending this decision the licence shall remain in force.").

The noble Lord said: My only regret, in view of what has gone before, with regard to this amendment in this rather strange melange of names is that the name of the noble Lord, Lord Lloyd of Kilgerran, has not been added. I believe this amendment would make an improvement to the Bill. The point is very simple and not dissociated from the previous point made by the noble Lord, Lord Mishcon. As your Lordships are aware, Clause 26 (4) envisages the procedure in which the licence-holder has specifically requested a moratorium during the time allowed for appeal. If the commissioners agree to delay the operation of their decision to allow time for an appeal, there is no problem. If they refuse, there could be a period during which the contested decision is enforced, even though it may yet be overturned by the Minister.

The provision does not relate to urgent safety requirements and does not affect the power to put dangerous vehicles off the road. It does not involve a protracted delay, because the Minister has a maximum of only 14 days in which to decide that he will deal with a licence holder's application to him. In these circumstances, it is respectfully submitted that variations of the licence imposed by the traffic commissioners should not become operative during the few days until the Minister's decision is given. This is a short delay, which could prevent considerable hardship and disruption to the operations of a licence holder. I beg to move.

Lord BELLWIN

I listened very carefully to what my noble friend Lord Morris said on this amendment, but I should have thought this was essentially a matter of judgment. How far should we go in laying down safeguards for every eventuality? When do we reach the point when we say that we should leave it to the good sense of the traffic commissioners? After all, why do we have independent tribunals if we are not prepared to trust them with this kind of judgment?

What we are considering is what happens to a licence during the very short period of 14 days after application has been made to the Minister. It is extremely unlikely that the commissioners will take any action during that short period. Indeed, I feel there must be some presumption against it. There could be exceptional circumstances in which the commissioners believed that they could not, in the interests of the public, let an operator continue for even one more day, but is that not a matter of judgment? I stress that the circumstances would be exceptional, and is not that judgment one that we could trust the commissioners to make? I should respectfully have submitted that it was.

I must say, without any commitment, that if my noble friend really feels that this is a matter of such moment that he would like me to pursue it further, then I am certainly in a position to say that I will so do, which, perhaps, is not the kind of observation one makes when one first comes to the Dispatch Box. But, quite frankly, I am today in the business of getting on with this Bill, and if I feel that there is something I can do I am going to say so. Before sitting down, I hope my noble friend may feel that in the light of the explanation I have given, and despite my offer, he may be able to withdraw the amendment.

Lord MORRIS

I am most grateful to my noble friend. In the light of his remarks, I am most happy to withdraw this amendment.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

Lord BELLWIN moved Amendment No. 107:

Page 27, line 15, at end insert— (" In this subsection "local authority" means— (i) in relation to England and Wales, any local authority within the meaning of the Local Government Act 1972; (ii) in relation to Scotland, a regional, islands or district council.").

The noble Lord said: Clause 26 (8) defines the third parties who have a right of appeal on certain road service licence matters. They include local authorities. It was originally thought unnecessary to define "local authority" as we were making no change in the present position. However, one or two queries have made us realise that ambiguity, even ambiguity of long standing, is undesirable and this amendment therefore introduces a definition. I beg to move.

Lord UNDERHILL

I am delighted to see this amendment, because, in effect, it brings in the district councils, which is what we have tried to do by proposed amendments. Therefore, we express great appreciation to the Government for bringing in this amendment. But in view of what appears to us to be a conflict with a clause which the Minister rejected, I shall be writing to him to see whether that can be reopened.

Lord LLOYD of KILGERRAN

I feel that I should give some satisfaction to the noble Lord, Lord Bellwin, by saying that on this occasion I warmly support what he has been saying.

On Question, amendment agreed to.

Clause 26, as amended, agreed to.

3.54 p.m.

Lord BELLWIN moved Amendment No. 107A:

After Clause 26, [in substitution for Amendment No. 113], insert the following new clause: (" Further appeals on points of law . — (1) An appeal lies at the instance of any of the persons mentioned in subsection (2) on any point of law arising from a decision of the Minister on an appeal from a decision of the traffic commissioners for any area— (a) to the High Court where the proceedings before the traffic commissioners were in England or Wales; and (b) to the Court of Session where the proceedings before the traffic commissioners were in Scotland. (2) The persons who may appeal against any such decision of the Minister are— (a) the person who appealed to the Minister, (b) any person who had a right to appeal to the Minister against the relevant decision of the traffic commissioners but did not exercise that right; and (c) the traffic commissioners whose decision was appealed against. (3) The High Court or Court of Session may on an appeal under this section— (a) give any decision which might have been given by the Minister; or (b) remit the matter with the opinion or direction of the court for rehearing and determination by the Minister. (4) No appeal to the Court of Appeal may be brought from a decision of the High Court under this section except with the leave of the High Court or the Court of Appeal. (5) An appeal shall lie, with the leave of the Court of Session or the House of Lords, from any decision of the Court of Session under this section; and such leave may be given on such terms as to costs, expenses or otherwise as the Court of Session or the House of Lords determine.").

The noble Lord said: It will, I hope, aid clarity and understanding and save time for your Lordships if I deal with this new clause along with Amendment No. 112 and two very small consequential amendments to Schedules 5 and 9 (Nos. 128 and 193). There is currently a right of appeal to the High Court on a point of law from any decision of the Minister on bus licensing appeals of the kind covered in Clause 26 of this Bill. That right is provided in Section 13 of the Tribunals and Inquiries Act 1971.

But the fact is that the references to appeals on traffic commissioner cases in the 1971 Act are misplaced in that Act. No one involved in a bus licensing appeal would expect to look in the Tribunals and Inquiries Act, for his rights of further appeal from the Minister's decision. He would reasonably expect to find those rights spelt out along with his other appeal rights in the relevant bus licensing enactment. That is what this group of amendments achieves.

The first amendment inserts into the Bill the right of appeal to the High Court, which is now provided in a similar form in Section 13 of the Tribunals and Inquiries Act. Amendment No. 112 provides for a parallel right of appeal from the Minister's decision on the new London appeals. This will be placed in Section 23 of the Transport (London) Act 1969 where the London appeal provisions will be found. The minor amendments to Schedule 5 and, in particular, Schedule 9 take out the references to traffic commissioner appeal cases in the 1971 Act.

Your Lordships will appreciate that the amendments do not reproduce exactly the wording of the 1971 Act. That wording was not the most appropriate for this subject. Furthermore, legal practice and usage has moved on since 1971 and the wording is, therefore, brought up to date. I would also stress that the appeals with which these amendments are concerned are not further appeals on the merits of the decision reached by the Minister. His decision on the balance of the arguments is final. Further appeal to the High Court is provided only where there is a point of law at issue. I beg to move.

Lord MISHCON

May I first welcome the very correct dictum of the noble Lord the Minister, which I should have loved to hear before, that in order that people may know what are their rights, these should be incorporated in the Bill and not referred to in a schedule. It is absolutely correct, as the noble Lord has said, that there is a right under the Tribunals and Inquiries Act 1971 to take the traffic commissioners, and, indeed, the Minister, on appeal to the High Court or to the Court of Session in Scotland, and, indeed, to the Court of Appeal if suitable permissions are given on a point of law. It is also absolutely true that this is a reproduction of Section 13 (5), which is now repealed by this Bill. But there is an odd situation arising out of the closing words of the Minister who said that it will not be for the High Court or the Court of Session, on an appeal, to go into the merits of a case before the traffic commissioners or before the Minister, and the sole point will be one of law.

Peculiarly enough— and I hope that the Minister will have taken advantage of this— in the old Section 13 (5) of the 1971 Act, which Act deals with tribunals that are very different in their objects and areas from those of the traffic commissioners, there is a power which is reproduced in subsection (3) of this amendment. That states that: The High Court or Court of Session may on an appeal under this section— (a) give any decision which might have been given by the Minister ". That means literally what it says: that the High Court and the Court of Session in Scotland arc empowered, if they want to on hearing an appeal and deciding that the traffic commissioners or the Minister misdirected themselves in some way on the law, to say, "We notice that under this section we are given the power to make the same decision as the Minister or the traffic commissioners might have made, and in the case of transport this is ludicrous.".

The Minister may well be thinking at this moment of saying to me in reply that this has been perfectly all right until now; we have not walked into any difficulties since the 1971 Act. However, the Bill now before the Committee deals with a very different situation: that there is a difference so far as onus is concerned before the traffic commissioners. An applicant can come before them and the traffic commissioners can refuse an operator's licence only if they find that to grant it would be contrary to the public interest. That would be a complete change of onus. Therefore your Lordships ought to envisage that there may be a number of matters now coming before the High Court on which the traffic commissioners can be challenged, and so can the Minister because of that change of onus where there is refusal of a licence.

Very helpfully to the Committee the Minister said that he was dealing not only with Amendment No. 107A but also with Amendment No. 112 which deals with appeals from the London Transport Executive to the Minister. This is now possible, whereas it was not possible under the old legislation. Amendment No. 112 deals with the situation where the London Transport Executive say that they do not want to have an agreement with somebody over transport in the London area. How extraordinary it would be if the court were given the power to do what the London Transport Executive and ihe Minister could do; namely, to sanction an agreement or to say that an agreement should not lake place. These are not considerations in transport which can lie with the High Court or the Court of Session.

This section of the 1971 Act having been repealed— I think it is Amendment No. 193 or Amendment No. 198 which does that in the case of the London Transport Executive, while an earlier one relates to the other matters coming before the traffic commissioners— I hope that the Minister will consider wiping out that provision which negates the very thing which he made so clear to the Committee; namely, that the High Court and the Court of Session cannot go into the merits of the matter.

Having said all that, I do not expect anything more from the Minister than again the statement that having possibly surprised him with this point— it is a new amendment and I had no opportunity to give the Minister notice of it— he would like to consider it and then let me know his views between now and Report stage so that I can consider whether or not to put forward an amendment.

Lord BELLWIN

Before I answer the noble Lord, may I ask him whether he has overlooked subsection (3) of Amendment No. 107A which says: The High Court or Court of Session may on an appeal under this section ", deal with any point of law arising? I wonder whether the noble Lord still feels the same having considered, I repeat, that An appeal lies at the instance of any of the persons mentioned in subsection (2) on any point of law arising and then, underneath, "under this section ". If the noble Lord still feels that he would like me to pursue the course that he proposes, I shall have no difficulty at all in so doing. The noble Lord may wish to consider this. If so, perhaps we can deal in any case with the whole matter in the way he suggested, which I am glad to do.

Lord MISHCON

I shall detain the Committee only for one minute. I should have been delighted to accept that point were it not for the wording in the second line of subsection (1): … on any point of law arising from a decision of the Minister ". Since the word "decision" is used there, and not in regard to a point of law, there is in any view dubiety as to whether or not the decision later referred to is a decision on the merits.

Lord LLOYD of KILGERRAN

I did not want to interrupt this bipartisan conversation, but I spoke at Second Reading about appeals generally, and it seems to me that the amendment now introduced by the noble Lord, Lord Bellwin, clarifies many of the points and difficulties I had seen in the original Bill. I was glad to hear the Minister say that legal practice has moved on since 1971. It is always a great thing to have official recognition by the Government that legal practice is sometimes modified.

With great respect to the noble Lord, Lord Mishcon, I am sorry that on this sunny afternoon I cannot recognise the odd situation which he says arises from the speech of the noble Lord, Lord Bellwin. I am not quite clear as to the point he is endeavouring to make, but that is entirely my fault on this sunny afternoon.

On Question, amendment agreed to.

4.7 p.m.

Lord BELLWIN moved Amendment No. 108:

After Clause 26, insert the following new clause: (" Partnerships and related matters .— (1) Provision may be made by regulations for modifying the provisions of this Part, and any other statutory provisions relating to public service vehicles, in their application to the operation of vehicles and the provision of services by persons in partnership. (2) A road service licence or PSV operator's licence shall not be granted to an unincorporated body as such or to more than one person jointly except in cases permitted by regulations under this section.").

The noble Lord said: This clause puts the position of partnerships beyond doubt by making it clear that licences can be held by partnerships though not by other unincorporated bodies. Regulations will spell out the details about good repute and the like. It will be made clear in the regulations that an individual can hold an operator's licence in his own name and as one of a partnership. I understand that this has been a matter of concern to the industry and I am sure that they will welcome this assurance. I beg to move.

Lord MISHCON

I am sure that the industry will be heartened by this amendment. Perhaps I can save the time of the Committee by speaking now to Amendment No. 139 which stands in my name and those of my noble friends. First, I repeat the point about the inappro-priateness of dealing by regulations with matters which really ought to be in a Bill. May I express the hope that the consultations the Minister may be having will enable him at the Report stage not to deal with this matter by way of regulations but to make it part of the Bill.

The reason that this matter is considered to be of considerable importance to operators is that it deals with Clause 18 (3) of the Bill which prohibits any person from holding two public service vehicle operators' licences in the same traffic area. There are many circumstances in which independent operators who are in partnership also own and operate public service vehicles as individuals; but because this partnership does not have a separate legal entity the operators concerned would be unable to continue the practice unless one or more of the existing firms was made into a limited company with a separate legal personality.

If the law can be evaded in that way, there seems to be no purpose in it and no reason to put people to the extra cost of company incorporation merely to protect the way in which they wish to operate. If the Minister could kindly give me an assurance that in his view the regulations will cover this point, I shall not be troubling the Committee with my amendment when it comes to be moved.

Lord BELLWIN

I am not sure that I can give the noble Lord that assurance. I can only say— and I seem to be saying it very much this afternoon because the sun is, apparently, still shining— that we will look at that as a possibility. I fear that it cannot by itself preclude— and I am sure the noble Lord does not expect it— my moving the amendment. I can only say again that because we are anxious that at the end of the day the Bill should be the very best Bill and that it should allow for all possible eventualities that one can foresee, of course we will take note of what the noble Lord has said.

Lord TEVIOT

Like other noble Lords I will speak only briefly, to remind my noble friend of his cardinal principle that statutory regulations should be avoided except when demonstrably necessary. One finds it difficult to see why it should be necessary to deal with this particular issue by way of regulations. I suggest to your Lordships that, so far as this Bill is concerned, the problems of operators brought together by partnership agreements can readily be covered by the Bill itself. I hope your Lordships will agree with me that, by including a definition of the word "person", which is in Amendment No. 139 in Clause 36, the practical problems which might be encountered in the operation of Part I of this Bill can be overcome.

The amendment to this effect is considered to be of great importance by many independent operators, in membership of the Confederation of Passenger Transport, in family businesses where for good reason a complex pattern of vehicle ownership may arise. I support the amendment.

On Question, amendment agreed to.

4.11 p.m.

Lord MOWBRAY and STOURTON moved Amendment No. 109:

After Clause 26, insert the following new clause: (" Death, bankruptcy, etc. of licence-holder — (1) A road service licence or PSV operator's licence is not assignable or, subject to the following provisions of this section, transmissible on death or in any other way. (2) A road service licence or PSV operator's licence held by an individual terminates if he— (a) dies; or (b) is adjudged bankrupt or, in Scotland, has his estate sequestrated; or (c) becomes a patient within the meaning of Part VIII of the Mental Health Act 1959 or, in Scotland, becomes incapable of managing his own affairs. (3) In relation to a road service licence or PSV operator's licence held by an individual or by a company regulations may specify other events relating to the licence-holder on the occurrence of which the licence is to terminate. (4) The traffic commissioners by whom a road service licence or PSV operator's licence was granted may— (a) direct that the termination of the licence by subsection (2), or under subsection (3), be deferred for a period not exceeding 12 months or, if it appears to the commissioners that there are special circumstances, 18 months; and (b) authorise the business of the licence-holder to be carried on under the licence by some other person during the period of deferment, subject to such conditions as the commissioners may impose.").

The noble Lord said: This is an unexciting but useful new clause which clarifies the law on this matter and meets more precisely the requirements of the Community Access Directive as to the circumstances in which businesses can continue to operate for short periods on the death of the holder or when other disruptive events occur. The clause will provide assurances to those who hold licences that, in the event of their death or incapacity, their business will not simply fold up owing to the termination of their licences, but their heirs or personal representatives will be able to carry on the business for a temporary period until more permanent arrangements are made. I beg to move.

Lord MORRIS

I rise to support this amendment but I am in need of clarification with regard to subsection (2) (c). It appears from the wording of this subsection that there is a presumption in Scottish law that if anyone becomes incapable of managing his business affairs he must necessarily be a lunatic. I may have misunderstood it but that is how it appears to me.

Lord MOWBRAY and STOURTON

I am not sure that I am able to satisfy my noble friend at this moment, but I will certainly find out and will let him know.

Lord MISHCON

I wish only to raise two points on this new clause. I think it is a most sensible clause and I am sure that the members of the Committee are glad to see it on the Marshalled List. One of my two points is major and the other, I must confess, is minor. The major one arises under subsection (3). The Committee will be aware that this is a question of a power to terminate a licence. Without any doubt at all, if we look at the matters in subsection (2), subject to the point raised by the noble Lord, Lord Morris, with regard to subsection (2) (c), it is eminently fair and reasonable; but hidden in subsection (3) we find that the regulations: may specify other events relating to the licence holder on the occurrence of which the licence is to terminate ". I hope that anyone interpreting this subsection would say that it must be other events similar to those in subsection (2). That would be a reasonable interpretation, but it is an interpretation which is open to argument, and I do not feel that the Committee would be happy to give an overriding power without any discussion in Parliament with regard to the serious matter of the termination of a licence, by saying to the Minister: "That is perfectly all right, you may make regulations, if you will, which can terminate a licence; we do not know now what the occasions will be which are broadly described as ' other events' but we are perfectly happy with it." That does not seem to me to be a proper way to carry out our duty to examine legislation carefully, especially when it comes from another place and we are expected to devote that amount of skill and care which is not always apparent in the other place, but I hope is always apparent in your Lordships' House. In those circumstances, I ask the Minister if he will be good enough to look into the question of "other events."

My minor point is that there is also a phrase which is used in subsection (4) (a) where the termination can be deferred if it appears to the commissioners that there are special circumstances. Professional colleagues will know the trouble that those words "special circumstances" have caused in the Road Traffic Act in regard to endorsements and suspension of licences. There has been great argument and decisions have been made in the courts as to whether it is special circumstances relating to the person or special circumstances relating to matters in general. Here, one ought to know: are they special circumstances relating to the individual concerned— the personal circumstances— or are they special circumstances relating to a traffic problem, or are they meant to be both?— in which case, again for clarification, the Act ought to say so.

I merely ask that those two points should be looked at because they are of some importance, and if they can be looked at between now and Report stage, and if the noble Lord can repeat the words which are now happily heard on this side of the Committee, that these matters will be looked into (because they are points of substance) I certainly would not ask the Committee not to accept this new clause at this juncture.

Lord MOWBRAY and STOURTON

I understand that the regulation-making power in subsection (3), to which the noble Lord referred, enables events like bankruptcy and mental incapacity, which happen outside United Kingdom jurisdiction, to be covered. It will also enable other such parallel events in relation to a company winding up or the appointment of a receiver to be dealt with. But on this sunny day, like my noble friend I will certainly take this matter back and have a look at it, although I think we shall probably find that it is all right as it is.

Lord HARMAR-NICHOLLS

I want only to say a word on the point made by the noble Lord, Lord Mishcon, which was very impressive as it stood but, having had a little experience as a magistrate dealing with the particular example that he raised, I thought he should have gone a little further. He made his general point but I think he should have given a hint as to how he would interpret it: how he thinks the special circumstances ought to be written into the Bill. While I have a lot of sympathy with the point he made, that it is so much easier if you know exactly where the boundaries are in this sort of legislation, at the end of the day and no matter how hard you try you never can find words to cover everything; and what we are aiming to do is to educate people, who in the end have to give a decision, to use sensible discretion. If you try to remove all the discretion by trying to spell out everything you might well not enable people to dispense justice.

Lord HALE

The noble Lord, Lord Mowbray and Stourton, made some observations about the position of the holder and the heirs or relatives or successors of the holder, or very often those who had been working his business during the holder's long illness, and what would happen on his sudden death. What is the authority for carrying on pending an application to the traffic commissioners? Obviously one could expatiate at considerable length on this point. The PSV holder could be a victim of an air crash in Tenerife or something like that, or could be missing for a time. How is the operation of the licence to be continued pending the hearing by the traffic commissioners? Can the application to the traffic commissioners by the heirs be heard with a certain guaranteed speed, and can a temporary authority be issued from the office?

Lord MOWBRAY and STOURTON

I think it is precisely to deal with such a case, an accident in Tenerife or one of those tragedies, that this amendment is framed. The local service does not want to have to fold up, and this is precisely to cover this sort of eventuality. I do not think there is any problem for the son, daughter, daughter-in-law or representative. I will look at what the noble Lord has said, and if there is anything more that I can add I will write to him, but if he will read what I have said, I think the position is clear.

On Question, amendment agreed to.

Lord BELLWIN moved Amendment No. 110:

After Clause 26, insert the following new clause: (" Fare-paying passengers on school buses .— (1) Subject to subsection (2), a local education authority may— (a) use a school bus, when it is being used to provide free school transport, to carry as fare-paying passengers persons other than those for whom the free school transport is provided; and (b) use a school bus, when it is not being used to provide free school transport, to provide a local bus service; and the following provisions, that is to say, section 144 of the 1960 Act (public service vehicle drivers' licences) and sections 15, 16, 17 and 18 (1) of this Act shall not apply to the driving or use of a school bus in the course of its use by a local education authority in accordance with this subsection. (2) Subsection (1) does not affect the duties of a local education authority in relation to the provision of free school transport or authorise a local education authority to make any charge for the carriage of a pupil on a journey which he is required to make in the course of his education at a school maintained by such an authority. (3) In this section— free school transport" means transport provided by a local education authority in pursuance of arrangements under section 55 (1) of the Education Act 1944 for the purpose of facilitating the attendance of pupils at a place of education; local bus service "means a stage carriage service other than a service as regards which the condition specified in section 3 (3) (A) above is satisfied; school bus ", in relation to a local education authority, means a motor vehicle belonging to that authority which is used by that authority to provide free school transport. (4) In the application of this section to Scotland— (a) for the references to a local education authority there shall be substituted references to an education authority; (b) in subsection (2) for "maintained by" there shall be substituted "under the management of"; and (c) in subsection (3) for the definition of "free school transport" there shall be substituted— " free school transport" means transport between a pupil's home and place of education provided in pursuance of arrangements under subsection (1) () of section 51 of the Education (Scotland) Act 1962 (pupils for whom such transport facilities are necessary) or, in pursuance of subsection (2) of that section (other pupils allowed to use vacant seats free of charge) ". (5) The repeal by this Act of section 12 of the Education (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 1953 and section 118 (4) of the 1960 Act shall not affect the operation of those provisions in relation to any consent given under the said section 12 which is in force immediately before that repeal takes effect.").

The noble Lord said: I spoke on this amendment with Amendment No. 4. I beg to move.

Lord UNDERHILL

There is just one minor point. When we discussed this in conjunction with Amendment No. 4, I raised the question of the definition of "local bus service" that appears halfway down on page 5 of the Marshalled List. While the definition is given here, the point I raised was whether or not the local bus service was to be in the locality covered by the education authority or whether it could be anywhere. It would appear to me that that needs to be clearly defined one way or the other; otherwise there could be quite a lot of controversy and argument later on. We, of course, would prefer it to be within the area of the education authority. It needs to be defined.

Lord BELLWIN

I hear what the noble Lord says and I presume he said the same thing when we discussed it earlier. As I recall, I think I answered then by saying that a definition of this would take into account the 30-mile limit which we were talking about then. I will certainly refer to this again when we come to look at it, as we shall be doing.

On Question, amendment agreed to.

Lord MOWBRAY and STOURTON moved Amendment No. 111:

After Clause 26, insert the following new clause: (" Use of certain vehicles by educational and other bodies. — (1) In subsection (1) of section 1 of the Minibus Act 1977 (exemption of certain vehicles from requirements applicable to public service vehicles) for "vehicle which is adapted to carry more than seven but not more than sixteen passengers" there shall be substituted "small passenger-carrying vehicle", and after that subsection there shall be inserted the following subsection— (1A)] f a large pasesenger-carrying vehicle is used for carrying passengers for hire or reward, then, if and so long as the conditions set out in paragraphs (a) to (c) of subsection (1) above are satisfied, the following provisions shall not apply to the driving or use of the vehicle, namely— (a) section 144 of the Road Traffic Act 1960 (public service vehicle driver's licences); (b) section 23 (2) of the Transport (London) Act 1969 and section 4 of the Transport Act 1980 (licensing of stage carriage services); and (c) section 18 (1) of the Transport Act 1980 (PSV operator's licences).". (2) In section 1 (2) of that Act (persons authorised to grant permits) — (a) at the beginning of paragraph (a) (powers of traffic commissioners) there shall be inserted "in the case of small passenger-carrying vehicles,"; and (b) at the beginning of paragraph (b) (powers of designated bodies) there shall be inserted "in the case of small or large passenger-carrying vehicles.". (3) After section 1 (3) of that Act (designation orders) there shall be inserted the following subsection— (3A) Different provision may be made by orders under subsection (3) above in relation to large passenger-carrying vehicles from that made in relation to small passenger-carrying vehicles."; and a designation order made under the said section 1 (3) before the commencement of this section shall not apply in relation to large passenger-carrying vehicles. (4) In section 3 (1) of that Act (power to make regulations), in paragraph (e) (power to prescribe conditions of fitness) for "vehicles" there shall be substituted "small passenger-carrying vehicles". (5) After section 3 (1) of that Act there shall be inserted the following subsection— (1A) Regulations made by virtue of any of paragraphs (a) to (d) of subsection (1) above may make different provision in relation to large passenger-carrying vehicles from that made in relation to small passenger-carrying vehicles.". (6) In section 3 (2) of that Act (consequences of breach of regulations) for "Section 1 (1) "substitute" Subsection (1) or, as the case may be, subsection (1A) of section 1 ". (7) In section 4 (2) of that Act (interpretation) after paragraph (b) there shall be inserted the following paragraph— (bb) "small passenger-carrying vehicle" means a vehicle which is adapted to carry more than eight but not more than sixteen passengers, and "large passenger-carrying vehicle" means a vehicle which is adapted to carry more than sixteen passengers; ".").

The noble Lord said: In moving this amendment, I would like to speak to Amendment No. 131 as well. I am sure this new clause is one which will be welcomed on both sides of the Committee. Perhaps it would help if I explained a little of the background to it. In recent years it has become increasingly difficult for charitable organisations, schools, church and youth groups and so on, to continue to offer transport, organised trips or whatever, on a purely charitable basis. The costs are often just too high, and they have had to recoup these costs by asking passengers for a contribution. This of course brings the vehicles into the PSV licensing net, with all that that implies. The Minibus Act 1977 was passed to deal with this problem by exempting from the PSV regime minibuses used by voluntary and other similar bodies, pro-voided that certain safety standards are met and that there is no question of profit-making or running services for the public at large. All the indications are that the Act has worked extremely well.

During the passage of the present Bill in another place it was put to the Government that the Minibus Act was proving unduly restrictive in one particular respect; it did not cover vehicles with more than 16 passenger seats. The stark difference in licensing requirements for the small and large vehicles forces voluntary bodies, schools and so on, into choosing small vehicles, not because they are the most suitable size for their needs but because they can charge fares in them without getting involved in licensing. With this new clause we are seeking to provide a way round the difficulty without opening the door to lower vehicle safety standards or to unfair competition. The new clause provides certain licensing exemptions for larger vehicles used within the normal Minibus Act framework. There is no question of running for profit or picking up members of the general public.

There will be additional safeguards. First, although no PSV licence will be required for operator service or driver, the vehicles will remain PSVs and be subject to the normal PSV conditions of fitness. They will be subject to examination by the PSV examiners. Secondly, only specially designated bodies will have the power to grant permits for these larger vehicles. Our intention is to designate only local authorities and to describe in the order the kinds of bodies to which they may grant permits. In this way the authorities can exercise some control over the use of the larger vehicles. This is a small measure. I accept that very few organisations will need to make use of it, but it may be of considerable help to particular community welfare schemes whose need is for a larger vehicle. I recommend it to the Committee. I beg to move.

Lord UNDERHILL

I wish to thank the noble Lord for his explanation. When we first heard the noble Lord, Lord Bellwin, mention the possibility that the introduction of an amendment was in mind, we were frankly, apprehensive. The explanation we have heard, together with the notes on clauses which the noble Lord, Lord Bellwin, kindly made available to us have removed a lot of those apprehensions.

There are two questions that I should like to put to the noble Lord. We readily accept that the proposals in the amendment confine the use of these vehicles to community organisations or educational organisations. Therefore, we can understand why there is no need for a road service licence or a PSV operator's licence. We are pleased to note that the normal safety provisions will continue to apply because they are public service vehicles. The first question that I should like to put to the noble Lord relates to the fact that there will be no PSV driver's licence required. Bearing in mind that all the Act says about the size of these vehicles is "over 16 passengers", there is no limit; they could be double-decker vehicles, and no PSV driver's licence is apparently to be required. Surely this is a vital question of safety which the Bill omits to deal with. I should like to hear the Minister's comment on that.

Secondly, as I understand from reading the Bill and hearing the noble Lord's explanation, the granting of a permit by traffic commissioners will be confined to the small minibuses; they will not be able to give permits for the larger vehicles. On the other hand, the local authorities, if they are going to be the designated bodies will be able to give permits for the small and the larger vehicles; in fact, permits for the larger vehicles will only be able to be given by the local authorities. Why is there that distinction? I cannot understand why the traffic commissioners, who are very experienced people, should be confined solely to issuing permits for the smaller vehicles.

Lord MOWBRAY and STOURTON

The noble Lord has very ably made his point about the PSV driver's licence. I agree that it is a matter of judgment and opinion. We did not want to impose additional requirements, for example, where a driver is already used to driving larger vehicles other than for hire and reward. This is the type of area where we should see how things go. If what the noble Lord is frightened about were to come about, and there is a problem, then I can assure him that the Minibus Act contains a power to prescribe conditions to be fulfilled by drivers. Of course, in any event all drivers must be over 21.

He also asked why the local authorities will be particularly involved in this exercise and not the traffic commissioners. I think that it is really a matter for local charities, and local councils will probably know more about these local charitable bodies. Sometimes the local councils will themselves be involved. As the noble Lord is probably aware, one of the instigators of this clause was the London Borough of Camden which wished to help disabled people in its borough with these type of vehicles. I do not think that there is a serious matter of principle at issue here. I hope that I have sufficiently explained the situation to the noble Lord to remove his worries on the two matters which he raised.

Lord TEVIOT

While not wishing to pour cold water on the amendment, which has been very well expressed by my noble friend, I, too, share the forebodings or share the idea that has been put forward about the non-PSV driver driving a group of 16 people or more. I cannot see why it would be an impediment for the drivers of these minibuses, larger minibuses, or indeed double-deckers to take a PSV licence. It is not a terribly difficult thing to acquire and I should have thought that it was in the interests of everyone for the driver to go somewhere and take a course and take a PSV licence. As my noble friend has said, we must see how it goes. But I should have thought that that was a matter at which he should look immediately.

Viscount SIMON

I should like to support the noble Lord as regards the point he raised about the drivers' licences. I think that it is rather shocking that we should allow them, whether for charitable or whatever reasons, to have a driver who is not fully qualified to drive this type of vehicle. I do not know whether my recollection is at fault, but I can remember that not so long ago there was a tragic accident somewhere in Yorkshire in just such a case where a party of old age pensioners were being taken out. I do not know whether in that case the drivers had a licence, but I should have thought it very desirable that anyone taking such a coach for a trip with old people should have a proper licence for driving a large vehicle.

Lord MOWBRAY and STOURTON

I seem to be getting advice from all sides of the Committee. I shall certainly take the matter away and consider what noble Lords have said. As I said at the beginning of my remarks, it is a matter of judgment. We thought— and we still think— that it would be better not to require it at this stage, but I shall take the matter away and we shall consider the points that have been made by noble Lords on all sides of the Committee.

Lord UNDERHILL

I am grateful to the noble Lord for that kind gesture. I should like to make one final point before I leave the matter. The noble Lord said, "Let's see how it works." However, there could be a fatal accident while we are seeing how it works. Even if there were only one accident it could be a great tragedy; it could ruin a scheme; and it could lead to loss of life. Therefore, we hope that the matter will be looked at very carefully.

On Question, amendment agreed to.

Clause 27 agreed to.

Clause 28 [Amendment of Transport (London) Act 1969]:

Lord BELLWIN moved Amendment No. 112:

Page 29, line 18, at end insert: ("Further appeals on points of law (23B.— (1) An appeal lies to the High Court at the instance of any of the persons mentioned in subsection (2) of this section on any point of law arising from a decision of the Minister on an appeal under section 23A of this Act. (2) The persons who may appeal against any such decision of the Minister are— (a) the person who appealed to the Minister; (b) any person required to be notified of that appeal under subsection (2) of section 23A of this Act; and (c) the Executive. (3) The High Court may on an appeal under this section— (a) give any decision which might have been given by the Minister; or (b) remit the matter with the opinion or direction of the court for re-hearing and determination by the Minister. (4) No appeal to the Court of Appeal may be brought from a decision of the High Court under this section except with the leave of the High Court or the Court of Appeal.").

The noble Lord said: I spoke to this amendment with Amendment No. 107A. I beg to move.

Lord MISHCON

When dealing with Amendment No. 107A I made the observations that I wanted to make as regards Amendment No. 112, so I shall not repeat them. The Minister has been kind enough to give an assurance that he will look at certain points and I am grateful to him.

On Question, amendment agreed to.

Clause 28, as amended, agreed to.

On Question, Whether Clause 29 shall stand part of the Bill?

Lord UNDERHILL

This Clause deals with the abolition of the need for conductors' licences. It may seem rather a small matter, but when I have explained a few points your Lordships will see that it could be of some consequence. First, I wonder whether or not there have been consultations with the union which covers the personnel involved. The Transport and General Workers' Union, which covers a great number of these personnel, has made certain points quite clear to me. It is concerned that the conductors' licence, which is at present required, gives some partial protection to conductors. It gives them a greater authority to collect fares. The union feels that the absence of a licence could expose a conductor to a greater degree of assault from those who seek to avoid paying fares.

Your Lordships will know that the licence is covered by a badge which the conductor wears and that is considered to be a partial protection. It carries a number and it is seen by most people to be a badge issued by a public authority and, therefore, it has some standing. The badge also bears the conductor's licence number. Therefore, if there is a complaint or any other matter arising to which reference needs to be made, the public or anyone else can easliy see the number of the conductor's licence.

Moreover, the removal of any control or licensing of conductors will, it would seem to me, carry also the abolition of the requirement that conductors must be at least 18 years of age. There will be nothing to stop an operator employing a 16-year-old. I know that the EEC regulations lay down that conductors must be over 18 for journeys of more than 50 kilometres. As regards that matter is not, in law, a conductor in charge of the vehicle, except for driving— or, if not in law, is it not generally recognised that the conductor is the person in charge other than actually driving the vehicle?

Conductors have responsibility for handling all types of problems and difficulties that arise. I know that it appears that the main purpose of the abolition of this provision by this clause is to remove the huge administrative task of issuing some 30, 000 individual licences for conductors. I do not know the views of the Transport and General Workers' Union on this matter, but in order to cover the legitimate points which I think it makes, I am wondering whether consideration has been given to issuing a block number of licences to an operator for the operator to issue and if necessary to report thereon to the commissioners. That would save the administrative problem, but it would also guarantee these points of partial protection which the personnel involved consider so important. I think that your Lordships will agree that we wish not only to save any bureaucratic administration but to ensure that the status, standing and authority of people such as conductors is not minimised in any way.

Lord TEVIOT

I thoroughly agree with what the noble Lord, Lord Underhill, has said. I believe that this clause was in no way discussed in the other place during all their 110 hours of discussion, and therefore it is very proper for the noble Lord to have raised it today. I know there is a need for cutting out administration and perhaps this is a very good way of doing it. The noble Lord mentioned a number of points and I would only dwell on one— namely, the conductor being in charge of the bus. The badge rather accentuates that point. He is very much in charge of the bus and has to deal with all sorts of funny situations. There are also times when he may threaten to call, or may even have to call, the police in dealing with someone who, say, is intoxicated or not very well in one way or another. That badge gave him some authority. I do not know what kind of brief my noble friend has at this stage, but I am eager to hear what he has to say on all these matters.

Lord BELLWIN

I am rather surprised that the noble Lord, Lord Underhill, made some of the points which he has made. In fact, the noble Lord may know that there were consultations with the trade union to which he refers; quite what the outcome of those were I am not in a position to say. But, for myself, I had assumed that that trade union had not objected to what is now being proposed.

This clause removes the requirement in Section 144, of the Road Traffic Act 1960 that public service vehicle conductors be licensed. We think that this is now an anachronistic function which the licensing authorities have performed since the controls were introduced on PSV operations in the Road Traffic Act 1930, and that it should now be abolished. The need for statutory screening of conductors to ensure that operators could employ only those licensed by virtue of physical fitness and good character might have been defensible in the early years, but nowadays conductors' suitability should properly be a matter for their employers or prospective employers, as it is in almost all other kinds of works. In fact, over the past decade only a handful of applications have been refused or licences revoked.

The noble Lord, Lord Underhill, very fairly referred to the point that I would have made; namely, that there is a considerable bureaucratic involvement here and an enormous clerical effort in handling some 30, 000 applications a year. Whether or not his point about issuing a block number of licences to an operator is an interesting, practical and valid one, I do not know, but I am quite sure that the fact that he has made it ensures that it will be considered elswhere. On the point of the badge, which my noble friend Lord Teviot and, indeed, the noble Lord, Lord Underhill, mentioned, surely there is absolutely nothing to stop an operator supplying a badge with a number to every conductor, if that is something he wishes to do.

Altogether, I should not have thought that this was particularly contentious; certainly we had no intimation that it was. In fact, I thought that it was so logical in what it sets out to do that it would automatically have been quite welcomed. However, I take the point about the possibility of a block number of licences. Of course we shall look at that, as, indeed, we intend to look at many of what I consider to be constructive and helpful suggestions that have been made earlier today.

Clause 29 agreed to.

Clause 30 agreed to.

4.44 p.m.

Lord UNDERHILL moved Amendment No. 114:

After Clause 30, insert the following new clause: (" Repeal of s. 29 (4) of Transport Act 1968 . The provisions of section 29 (4) of the Transport Act 1968 (which relate to the Railways Board not having power to carry passengers by road) shall cease to have effect.").

The noble Lord said: On a number of occasions the Minister has explained that one of the purposes of the Bill is to bring more operators into the operation of public transport; in his words, to provide the opportunity for greater competition. The Bill provides that new applicants to run a service shall be granted a licence, unless to do so would be against the public interest. The provisions of Section 29 (4) of the Transport Act 1968 prevent the Railways Board from making any arrangements to carry passengers by road, except where a railway service has been temporarily interrupted or discontinued.

It seems unreasonable that in the light of all the new circumstances to be provided under the Bill, this bar should continue. My information is that although British Rail has power to provide bus services where a service is interrupted or closed, it does not go in for direct operation of buses itself, but relies upon reputable operators to do this under contract. I further understand that if this amendment is agreed, the relaxation of the powers would almost certainly be developed through contractors. This relaxation would not only be equitable— and if we are to have free competition for everybody, there is no reason whatever why it should be denied to British Rail— but would also enable increased development of integrated rail-bus services (which is something that all noble Lords would like to see) with, in particular, the provision of bus services to railway stations. This could possibly be developed on a general scale if this amendment is agreed. I beg to move.

Lord BELLWIN

As I understand it, the legal position at present is that the Railways Board has powers to operate bus services where the rail service has been temporarily interrupted or in replacement of a railway passenger service which has been closed. The Government are not aware of any circumstances which might arise in the future which would make it necessary for the board to have wider powers to operate bus services than those which it already has. The Railways Board has made no representations to my right honourable friend the Minister about the need for wider powers, although of course, it is always open to them to do so.

However, even if wider powers were thought appropriate, I do not think that an amendment along these lines would be sufficient. The intention of this amendment appears to be to attempt to resurrect the somewhat complex and qualified powers to operate bus services granted in 1928 to the four main private rail companies by the four railway-road transport Acts of 1928. Those local acts relate to quite different circumstances from those of today, and would be a quite inappropriate way of granting to the Railways Board broad powers to operate bus services. In these circumstances, we could not agree to accept this amendment.

Lord UNDERHILL

I am sorry to learn from the noble Lord that the amendment cannot be accepted because one would have thought that this would fit in with the very thing which the Government seek; that is, the widest possible competition. I simply cannot understand why British Rail should be the one body that is precluded. I do not know whether or not British Rail has made representations to the Minister's noble friend the Secretary of State, but I do know that the right honourable Albert Booth, Member of Parliament, has raised this matter with the Secretary of State as recently as early in April. What the outcome of that was, I do not know. However, I should seriously like to ask the Minister to take a look at this in order to follow the Government's own desires for competition.

Lord BELLWIN

Obviously, I do not know what representations Mr. Albert Booth has or has not made. What I do know is what I have already said, that, to the best of my knowledge and information— and as recently as today no one has altered it— the Railways Board has made no such representations. I should have thought that that was most apposite. However, I shall, of course, make inquiries along the lines which the noble Lord, Lord Underhill, suggests. If there should prove to be a need further to consider the point, the noble Lord can be assured that it will be considered. However, as I stand here at the moment I should have thought that the most significant point is the one about the attitude of the British Railways Board.

Viscount HANWORTH

What matters to many of us is that the consumers should have a reasonable transport service. Of course, since the Beeching axe, in many cases they have not had one. It seems that what the railways provide could often be improved by a bus service which would be linked in with the railway timetable. I can appreciate the view that one does not want to start the railways running their own buses, which, in a way, is diversifying, and this might be a temptation. But it seems to me that it would be perfectly reasonable to allow them to do so as long as they did not run their own fleet.

Lord TEVIOT

I have hesitated to intervene so far on this, but it is an amendment on which I disagree with the noble Lord, Lord Underhill, and one viewed rather with pessisism by the transport industry. I take the point of the noble Viscount, Lord Hanworth, but I think he ended up by saying that the existing operator should run these services. In that case surely the bus companies concerned ought to be responsible for this, and so far as I know they do not want to ask British Railways to run any trains. Therefore, I would say that it is better to leave matters as they are.

Viscount HANWORTH

One must realise that many bus services are in fact supported by the local council, and of course the railway would be free to alter their timetable to suit themselves without any notice to the bus company. One hopes that they would give it. I think there is a case for allowing a limited number of connections organised by the railway but using an outside contractor.

Lord BELLWIN

There are already circumstances and situations in which British Rail make arrangements with bus operators to provide bus links to rail networks. I am reminded that a recent example is the new Kettering to Corby bus service. All I can add to what I said before is that for myself the mind boggles when one considers some of the problems that would face both kinds of service. If we were to have it laid down that there should be obligations for them to coordinate in the way that I understand the amendment means, then I can think of all sorts of great problems which would arise. However, bearing in mind that there obviously is flexibility, or room for flexibility, at the present time, I thought that that might have satisfied noble Lords.

On Question, amendment negatived.

Clause 31 agreed to.

Clauses 32 and 33 agreed to.

4.52 p.m.

Lord MISHCON moved Amendment No. 115:

After Clause 33, insert the following new clause: (" Temporary modification of penalty . In section 96 (11 A) of the Transport Act 1968, at the end add— Provided that, until 31st December 1983 or such later date as the Minister may by order for the purposes of this subsection prescribe, where a driver or member of the crew of a motor vehicle has contravened any such requirement of the applicable community rules but— (a) has not, insofar as is material to the offence, driven or been on duty for more, or been off duty for less, than the periods provided in the domestic drivers' hours' code, or (b) the offence relates to distance driven, the fine shall not exceed £ 1." ").

The noble Lord said: I hope that the Committee, and certainly the noble Minister, will have realised that the attitude of the Opposition throughout in regard to the Committee stage of this Bill has been, as was said at Second Reading, to adopt the democratic decision in another place in regard to the philosophy of this Bill, and then try to do its best to help noble Lords, wherever they may sit, to make this an effective Bill. I cannot think of a more constructive example of that than the amendment I am about to move, which has indeed nothing to do with philosophy at all but an awful lot to do with practicability.

The first thing I want to stress regarding this proposed clause is that it is transitional and aimed at meeting what is felt to be a temporary situation. The United Kingdom is in the process of phasing in the Community rules contained in regulation EEC 543/69, as amended. The phasing in will not be completed until the end of this year, but next year, in 1981, Britain will be following the Community regulation, in so far as it is applicable, in its entirety.

There are a number of matters which the United Kingdom has been seeking to have amended in the EEC regulations; notably, the retention of the fixed week, Sunday to Saturday, as opposed to the rolling week of any seven consecutive days. There are other matters which other countries want to raise. It is anticipated that if the subject is reopened by the Council of Ministers there would be a broad reconsideration of the existing regulations, possibly involving a number of changes.

Because of the phasing-in arrangements the worst of the regulation has not yet had impact on British transport operations. It is thought that it would be undesirable for heavy penalties to be imposed in respect of legal provisions which it is widely recognised will require alteration. Indeed, quite apart from the question of heavy penalties there is the question of whether prosecutions ought even to be instituted. It is to cover the period of negotiation of these changes that the proposed new clause envisages modification in the present British law regarding enforcement for a three-year period. Because it cannot be certain that negotiations can be completed in those three years, particularly having regard to the proposed expansion of the Community, provision is made for further temporary extension of the period by ministerial order.

I wish again to make it clear that what is proposed by this amendment is a transitional arrangement based on a rational approach to the subject, and is certainly not meant to be an irresponsible attack upon regulations which Britain agreed to accept on joining the EEC. The need for transition has been recognised in other member States, even those who were parties to the formulation of the requirements laid down in Regulation 543/69. The notable example of this is France, but I shall not bore the Members of the Committee by saying how France and other countries are dealing with these transitional matters unless the Minister— which I do not anticipate— is unhelpful in his reply, in which case I may have to trouble the Committee with those details in order to show how justified this amendment is.

There is a substantial body of opinion in the transport industry which feels that the current European regulation, which is being severely enforced in the United Kingdom, is working to the detriment of British operators as compared with those in other member States, and that it is both logical and desirable to relax the level of enforcement until final agreement and harmonisation of conditions are achieved for the whole of the enlarged Community.

It is obviously important that any change sanctioned by Parliament does not leave a vaccum in enforcement in this country, and therefore the amendment is designed to continue the same strict level of enforcement where anyone contravenes our pre-EEC law. To achieve this the proposed clause envisages two levels of offence with maximum penalties appropriate to each, although the offence would continue to be against the European regulation as incorporated into the provision of Part IV of the Transport Act 1968, as amended.

If I may use the analogy to the Committee, it is rather like saying that if a motorist exceeds the 30 mph speed limit but does not exceed 40 mph the penalty will be X pounds but if in a 30 mph restricted area he exceed 40 mph the penalty will be 2X pounds. This is a decision within the jurisdiction of Parliament, which has the responsibility for enforcing the European law. I commend this amendment to the Committee.

Lord TEVIOT

I cannot be sufficiently strong in my support of this new clause. It is the most important amendment we have had this afternoon. Your Lordships will remember the problems of reforming law on drivers' hours which started with the Transport Act 1968, at which time, during the long Recess, I conducted my own experiments to support the arguments on the views presented to the House. My main memory of driving coaches throughout that summer was the need for flexibility in the law. A long day's driving might be followed by a short one— excursions to the seaside, with plenty of time to relax. The work could be hard, but it had its compensations. So I understand the problems of the industry with this very rigid EEC regulation.

This rigidity means that the European law must inevitably be amended in the near future. It seems that everyone in Europe wants to see changes, and the trouble is that there is no unanimity on the precise changes which should be made. It is because of this— to allow time for the law to be amended— that this new clause is necessary as a temporary transitional measure. It must be understood that the question of fixing penalties is left within the discretion of individual member states. That is stated in Article 18 of this regulation, No. 543/69, so if it is a matter for the member states, then the "competent authority" is our British Parliament. In other countries they treat this regulation in a rather more cavalier fashion. It is openly admitted that 543— a number quoted with much disaffection— is frequently honoured in the breach.

The noble Lord, Lord Mishcon, mentioned France and said he would not bore the Committee. I too do not want to bore the Committee but I must mention a few points about France in this connection. While the Government in France say that the provisions of 543 are the law, the Secretary of State for Transport has made it clear that his enforcement staff have been instructed not to prosecute unless other, more relaxed, limits have been contravened. These limits are, in fact, similar to the old British law, which still applies where transport operators in Britain are outside the scope of the EEC regulation. I have with me copies of the French journals in which these matters are clearly set out, but that is well known to the Government. One appreciates that this is a subject on which it might be inappropriate for the Government themselves to introduce this temporary change in the law, but, if it is the will of Parliament, I feel sure they would be glad to accept it.

Without wishing to be patronising, one appreciates that the Committee will not be familiar with the technical complexities of a regulation such as this. As I say, it is the rigidity and complexity which create so many problems. To give one example— and the noble Lord, Lord Mishcon, mentioned this— the greatest single problem in Britain in this sphere is the rolling week of any seven days, whereas we have always used a fixed week, from Sunday to Saturday. The effect of the change is that a new week starts or finishes every single day, and operators have to schedule for seven rolling weeks every fixed week. That has to be done in a demand-responsive industry, where, for example, a fine summer day may bring out two or three times as many trippers as would have travelled if the day were wet. That is not a trivial example because it is not our bus services, which are exempt, but the express and excursion coaches which are now beginning to suffer from this EEC restriction.

I have tried to concentrate on the aspects of the new clause of which I have personal knowledge. The noble Lord, Lord Mishcon, explained its implications in a way which the Committee will have appreciated. I have been anxious to add the views of the driver who, at the end of the day, is the man who suffers from a theoretical, insensitive and frequently misguided piece of European legislation. The new clause offers a sensible and necessary bridge until such time as the regulation can be brought nearer to reality. It is with some fervour that I appeal to noble Lords on all sides of the Committee to agree to the new clause.

Lord BELLWIN

I do not know if the noble Lord, Lord Mishcon, will consider my remarks helpful. I suspect he may consider them not unhelpful, but perhaps not sufficiently helpful to get him to where he would like to be. The noble Lord will be aware that the EEC rules on drivers' hours were agreed long before we joined the Community. Thus, we had no say in their drafting, and certainly many of the provisions are not those we would have chosen for ourselves. Nevertheless, I am encouraged by the industry's attempts to adapt to this more stringent regime. The effect of the amendment would be to nullify the EEC drivers' hours rules where they apply in this country, as nobody would take a £ 1 fine seriously. Indeed, to put a £ 1 fine in the amendment is derisory, as doubtless it is intended to be. Regretfully, therefore, I have no alternative but to reject it. I am advised that in any case it would be a breach of the Treaty of Rome and would be overridden by the provisions of the European Communities Act. There is now European Court case law making it clear that national law which obstructs the implementation of EEC regulations is of no effect

I listened carefully to the points which were made and the reference to EEC Regulation No. 543/69, which says that it is "binding in its entirety" and is "directly applicable" to all member states. Whether or not that is, as my noble friend Lord Teviot said, honoured in the breach rather than in the observance, is something of which I am not aware. That and the whole question of how far a country like France does or does not observe the regulations is a very wide subject indeed, but, so far as we are concerned, we try to abide by the regulations, and try, if we do not like them, to have them altered by negotiation. I can tell noble Lords that most member states are at present against any changes in EEC regulations. We watch the position very closely in Brussels. The three years we negotiated were the maximum we could get and, as for the rolling week point to which my noble friend referred, there is no evidence yet that it is causing many problems, though of course it is something we shall have to watch very carefully.

A ruling by the European Court in 1978— the Ratti case— found that national law that obstructed the implementation of EEC regulations was of no effect, and thus the amendment could be interpreted as bringing the law into disrepute. I am not without sympathy, despite what I have said, with what the noble Lord, Lord Mishcon, said, because quite clearly there are arguments which, in my view, are strong. But I think the overriding factor here has to be the position in regard to the EEC regulations, to which we at least try to conform, and the fact that the case law which is now being built up on this is not without relevance. Therefore, perhaps not without some regret, I must advice the Committee to reject the amendment.

Lord MISHCON

The forecast of the Minister, that I would have some pleasure and some displeasure at his remarks, was completely accurate. My pleasure is that I have his sympathy. My displeasure is that it is passive sympathy and that nothing has been proffered by the noble Lord to deal with the situation which he himself acknowledges is unjust. Are we really to continue to be faced with a situation where other Governments in the Community decide to do various things to protect their trade and industry and our Government sit idly by?

I promised noble Lords earlier that I would not bore the Committee, unless I had to, with examples of what happens elsewhere, but I am afraid the Minister has made it necessary for me to bring to the Committee's attention what is being done elsewhere in regard to Regulation No. 543/69— for example, in France. I am reliabily informed that the regulation did not start to be seriously applied in the original six member states until the mid 1970s. In the summer of 1975 M. Marcel Cavaille, the French Secretary of State for Transport, made it known that for a transitional period after 1st September 1975, while the law would remain in accordance with Regulation 543/69— as would be the case with the new clause proposed by the amendment— transport operators would not normally be prosecuted if they did not exceed certain limits which were more relaxed than those prescribed in the EEC regulations.

It is interesting to know what the limits were: maximum period of continuous driving, five hours as against the EEC requirement of four hours; maximum driving in a day, 10 hours as against the EEC requirement of eight hours; minimum daily rest, eight hours as against the EEC requirement of 10 hours, with compensation allowed. If an offender were to be prosecuted, it was made clear that the courts would apply the European regulation but it was understood that this would happen only if prosecutions were initiated on other grounds beyond those I have just indicated.

I had hoped that at the very least the Minister might have said that perhaps it is not appropriate to include such a situation in an Act of Parliament, though I am advised that it is perfectly proper for our Parliament to decide— while acknowledging thatthis isthelaw— what the penalty shall be during the transitional period while these matters are being looked at. If the Minister is advised to the contrary— that it is not proper for Parliament to pass such an amendment; and I do not concede that that is so— then I should have thought that at the very least the Minister would have said that he would if necessary confer with his right honourable friend the Secretary of State for the Home Department, and see that an intimation was given to the police in regard to these offences that, for a transitional period, if there was merely a breach of the regulation— and it is not a home-based situation, as it was, and still may be after negotiation— prosecution should not normally be brought.

I personally regard that as being possibly less advantageous to the point that the Minister is apparently making; namely, that what is being considered here would be a breach. I should have thought that to repeat the law and to say that the EEC regulation is binding, but that there should be only a nominal penalty, would be the way to get over the matter; and I cannot see the slightest harm in that. But for us to place our own operators in a disadvantageous position as compared with other members of the community— when everyone knows what is happening and when these matters are being negotiated— seems to me to be entirely wrong. Unfortunately without such a provision as that contained in the amendment our courts will be completely misled when prosecutions are brought and the matters come before them. There may be imposed convictions and fines which are completely out of proportion, having regard to the situation which your Lordships' Committee has patiently listened to me develop this afternoon.

Lord BELLWIN

I do not think that I can go much farther on this matter. I am surprised if in fact the noble Lord, Lord Mishcon, is really pressing the point that we should follow the French example which in so many ways we deplore when they depart from the regulations. I should not have thought that that was the way we wanted to go. Nevertheless the noble Lord made some very telling observations in his closing points. I certainly cannot agree that we can accept this matter. I repeat what I said previously; namely, that we are obliged to consider carefully the points that the noble Lord makes, particularly his final points. I assure him that we shall look at them very carefully, but for the moment I cannot accept the amendment as it stands.

Lord MISHCON

It is with some hesitation that in regard to this amendment I take the course that the Minister has invited me to take. I know how helpful the Minister tries to be, and I know that he, like so many of us, wishes the Bill to be as effective as possible, whether or not we like the original policy in regard to it. I am accepting his assurance in its literal sense: that he will really have the matter looked at very carefully, with those of his colleagues who may be able to assist in regard to questions of police prosecutions and so on. On the clear understanding that he will be good enough to let me know— and no doubt the noble Lord, Lord Teviot, would also wish to be informed— of progress regarding his thoughts and those of his right honourable friend on this matter, and will do so well before Report stage, so that if necessary we shall know that we have to repeat the amendment in some form or other at that stage, I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

Schedule 4 agreed to.

Clause 34 [Supplementary provisions with respect to offences]:

5.15 p.m.

Lord MOWBRAY and STOURTON moved Amendment No. 116: Page 32, line 2, leave out (" body corporate ") and insert (" company ").

The noble Lord said: I spoke to this amendment when dealing with Amendment No. 78. I beg to move.

On Question, amendment agreed to.

Lord MOWBRAY and STOURTON moved Amendments Nos. 117 to 119:

Page 32, line 5, leave out (" body corporate ") and insert (" company "). line 7, leave out (" body corporate ") and insert (" company "). line 9, leave out (" body corporate ") and insert (" company ").

On Question, amendments agreed to.

Lord MOWBRAY and STOURTON moved Amendment No. 120: Page 32, line 12, leave out (" body corporate ") and insert (" company ").

On Question, amendment agreed to.

Lord BELLWIN moved Amendment No. 121: Page 32, line 13, leave out subsections (3) to (8).

The noble Lord said: This is a largely technical amendment consequential on the new clause about partnerships. Any special provisions about partnerships will, under that new clause, be made in regulations. There is no need to have special provisions about unincorporated associations, since they will not be permitted to hold licences as such. Therefore we can simplify the Bill and delete the subsections in question. I beg to move.

On Question, amendment agreed to.

Clause 34, as amended, agreed to.

Lord BELLWIN moved Amendment No. 122:

After Clause 34, insert the following new clause: (" Defences available to persons charged with certain offences. .— (1) It shall be a defence for a person charged with an offence under any of the provisions mentioned in subsection (2) to prove that there was a reasonable excuse for the act or omission in respect of which he is charged. (2) The provisions referred to in subsection (1) are— (a) sections 7 (7), 14 (6), 23 (5) and 24 (4); (b) in the 1960 Act— (i) so much of section 144 (8) as relates to contravention of section 144 (l) (a); (ii) sections 146 (2) and (3), 147 (2) and 148 (2); (iii) so much of section 232 (3) as relates to failure to comply with the requirement of section 232 (2) (6); and (iv) section 239. (3) It shall be a defence for a person charged with an offence under any of the provisions mentioned in subsection (4) to prove that he took all reasonable precautions and exercised all due diligence to avoid the commission of any offence under that provision. (4) The provisions referred to in subsection (3) are— (a) sections 4 (5) and (6), 16 (3), 17 (8) (Z>), 18 (5) and 21 (7); (b) in the 1960 Act— (i) so much of section 144 (8) as relates to contravention of section 144 (1) (); and (ii) sections 148 (2) and 157 (2).").

The noble Lord said: I spoke to this amendment along with Amendment No. 20. I beg to move.

Lord MISHCON

I rise only to ensure that a point that I previously made when the noble Minister spoke on this matter has been looked at by him. Alternatively, if he has not had the opportunity to do so, which I can quite understand, I should like to know whether he still has the point in mind. I should like to take the Committee through only the four matters dealt with in subsection (2) (a) of the new clause; namely, Clauses 7 (7), 14 (6), 23 (5) and 24 (4). With regard to all those matters it is a defence to prove that there was a reasonable excuse for the act or omission in respect of which the defendant is charged.

Clause 7 (1) deals with failing to supply particulars of a change in fares. I have not the slightest quarrel in regard to a reasonable excuse for the act or omission being a defence in that case. Clause 14 (6) deals with failing to give or publish a notice in regard to stage carriage services in trial areas. I have not the slightest quarrel with the provision that a reasonable excuse should be a defence in that connection. Clause 24 (4) deals with failure to give traffic commissioners information about certain matters. Again, though the Bill originally included the word "knowingly", I have not the slightest objection to the fact that now a reasonable excuse for the act or the omission is a defence.

However, I have the strongest feelings regarding Clause 23 (5), which deals with failure to give the commissioners information of relevant convictions. The only defence in that regard in the Bill as drawn was that the person concerned did not knowingly commit the offence. To alter the situation from that which included the word "knowingly" to a defence that there is a reasonable excuse for the act or omission seems to open an avenue of defence in regard to failure to give details of a relevant conviction which may be of the utmost seriousness and importance in regard both to the traffic commissioners and the question of safety of transport. I asked the Minister to look at that again. I do not know whether he has had the opportunity to do so. If he has, he will doubtless intimate it; if he has not, I merely ask for his assurance that he will look at it very soon.

Lord BELLWIN

I can gladly assure the noble Lord that we are in fact looking at it, and that I will certainly let him have this decision, and anything else which goes with it, by the time we come to Report stage.

On Question, amendment agreed to.

5.21 p.m.

Schedule 5 [Minor and consequential amendments relating to public service vehicles]:

Lord MOWBRAY and STOURTON moved Amendment No. 123: Page 62, line 10, leave out paragraph 13.

The noble Lord said: In order to simplify the provisions governing a breach of regulations, we have decided that all aspects of the keeping and producing of documents required for international services should be dealt with in the regulations which govern the operation of international coach services. This paragraph is therefore no longer necessary. I beg to move.

On Question, amendment agreed to.

Lord MOWBRAY and STOURTON moved Amendment No. 124:

Page 62, line 42, at end insert— (" TRANSPORT ACT 1962 (c. 46) In section 4 (5) (by virtue of which the Railways Board are not authorised to carry passengers by road in certain hackney carriages adapted to carry less than eight passengers), for "eight" substitute "nine".").

The noble Lord said: This is a purely consequential amendment. It brings the passenger seat threshold in this subsection of the 1962 Act into line with the definition of a public service vehicle in Clause 2 of this Bill, where the threshold has been increased from 8 to 9. I beg to move.

On Question, amendment agreed to.

Lord UNDERHILL moved Amendment No. 125: Page 63, line 7, after (" 1980) ") insert (" and if in relation to a new bus service it is available to the general public ").

The noble Lord said: In moving Amendment No. 125 I should like, in addition, to speak to Amendment No. 181. This amendment, No. 125, proposes the insertion, in the place specified in the amendment, of the words: and if in relation to a new bus service it is available to the general public ….".

Amendment No. 181 proposes to omit, from the place specified in the amendment, the words, is available to the general public and ….".

These two sets of words may seem contradictory, but I shall endeavour to explain as simply as I can. These two amendments both relate to amendments which the Bill as at present worded would make to subsection (8) of Section 92 of the Finance Act 1965, which applies to new bus grants and reimbursement of fuel oil duty for bus services.

In trial areas, with which Amendment No.. 125 is concerned, under the Bill any operator could convert a regular contract into a fare-paying service so as to qualify for this Government support; and we must keep in mind that there will be no licensing or other controls in trial areas. Moreover, a change of this kind could be purely artificial. An operator could arrange that a company hiring its vehicle for the purpose of transporting the company's workers should charge the workers a nominal fare. This would make the service one which was eligible for the Government support. I am certain that this is not what the Government intend, but I am advised that this is what could take place under the present wording of the Bill.

Amendment No. 181, which relates to Clause 52, is the reverse situation— the position outside the trial areas. There are at present bus services which may carry only certain persons; for instance, a fare-paying school bus and a works' bus service. Passengers on those services are restricted by the licence to pupils of a school or employees of a particular works. These services qualify for Government support. I am advised that under the terms of the Bill they would cease to do so. The fact that the Government are changing various definitions in the Bill should not penalise these special regular services. So existing operators, in the circumstances outlined, should not be penalised; and in the trial areas there should surely be a safeguard for the expenditure of public money. These are the two points which these two amendments seek to deal with. I beg to move.

Lord BELLWIN

I think the need for this amendment falls with the amendment to Clause 52. If there was no general test of availability to the general public for eligibility for fuel duty rebates and new bus grant, I can see that one might be required in trial areas; but it must surely be right for the availability test to be general. The new bus grant and fuel duty rebate have always been designed to help the local bus network. As a consequence of the changes in definitions of the different categories of bus service made by this Bill, it has been necessary to change the criteria for eligibility for these grants. In doing this we have kept the basic purpose of the grants always before us. They were not intended to help services with a special clientele, and, in the past, most of these have been excluded by the minimum fare condition of the stage carriage. We are now excluding them in so many words.

Admittedly, a few services now eligible for grant will either lose their eligibility or will have to be opened to the general public. If they are so opened, this may mean a new public transport facility. If they are not, then those benefiting from them— say, the workers or the employer— will have to meet some (presumably a little) extra cost. But there is an important point of principle here on which we are firm. Parliament has agreed to make available money as an aid to public transport, not for private arrangements. We must maintain this important distinction.

Lord UNDERHILL

The noble Lord has explained quite definitely that some services outside the trial areas will lose Government grants. What he has not explained is why these grants have been paid for some period but the Government have now decided to stop them, because it is in completely changed circumstances that they have decided that they shall no longer continue. What I did not gather from the noble Lord— and it may be my own fault that I did not grasp it— is this. He did not deal with the point I made, which is the second amendment, dealing with the position in the trial areas. Here, undoubtedly, there could be artificial arrangements which could mean the expenditure of Government grants in circumstances which, frankly, cannot possibly be justified. On that point, perhaps the noble Lord would say why, there, they are prepared to expend Government money, whereas in the case of other services, which have continued for some time now to have Government grants, the Government propose to stop them outside the trial areas.

Lord BELLWIN

All I can add, really, is that since availability to the general public is to be a criterion of eligibility throughout Great Britain, there is no need for any special provision for the trial areas. As to the other points made, I fear there is nothing more I can add at this time; but I would have thought that the arguments made were pretty convincing in this instance. I hope the noble Lord may feel so.

On Question, amendment negatived.

5.30 p.m.

Lord BELLWIN moved Amendment No. 126:

Page 63, line 41, at end insert ("; and (b) for the definition of "bus service" substitute— "bus service" means a stage carriage service within the meaning of Part I of the Transport Act 1980 which is neither— (a) an excursion or tour; nor (b) a service as regards which the condition specified in section 3 (3) () of the Transport Act 1980 (long journeys only) is satisfied;"").

The noble Lord said: This amendment is purely consequential on the re-definition in the Bill of "stage carriage" and "express carriage" and brings the definition of "bus service" in the Transport Act 1968 into line with the Bill. I hope the Committee will feel able to accept the Amendment. I beg to move.

On Question, Amendment agreed to.

Lord MOWBRAY and STOURTON moved Amendment No. 127: Page 64, line 4, leave out paragraph 2.

The noble Lord said: This small amendment corrects an error in Schedule 5. It deletes a provision which need never have been included. I beg to move.

On Question, amendment agreed to.

The DEPUTY CHAIRMAN of COMMITTEES (Baroness Wootton of Abinger)

If Amendment No. 128 is agreed to, I shall not be able to call Amendment No. 128A:

Lord BELLWIN moved Amendment No. 128: Page 64, leave out lines 8 to 13.

The noble Lord said: I spoke to this amendment when moving Amendment No. 107A. I beg to move.

On Question, amendment agreed to.

Lord MORRIS moved Amendment No. 128B.: Page 65, line 20, leave out (" of operator ").

The noble Lord said: I hope it will be for the convenience of the Committee if, in moving this amendment, I speak to Amendment No. 129. I am rather at a loss as to why Amendment No. 128A falls, but that is another matter. This amendment is a purely drafting amendment of sublime simplicity. It corrects two references in the Bill in Schedule 5 to the description of Clause 14 of the Bill. The rubric to Clause 14 reads: Duty to publish particulars of stage carriage services in trial areas ".

I believe it would be helpful if references in other parts of the Bill to what will become Section 14 of the Transport Act 1980 are consistent and precise. I beg to move.

Lord MOWBRAY and STOURTON

I am grateful to my noble friend Lord Morris for his helpful drafting amendment which provides consistency in the reference in Schedule 5 to the description of Clause 14. I am pleased to accept it.

On Question, amendment agreed to.

Lord MORRIS moved Amendment No. 129: Page 65, line 21, leave out (" bus service in trial area ") and insert (" stage carriage services in trial areas ").

Lord MOWBRAY and STOURTON

I should like to thank my noble friend for this amendment. The Government willingly accept it.

Lord MISHCON

May I inquire whether the noble Lord, Lord Morris, is thinking of changing his profession and becoming a parliamentary draftsman?— because the number of occasions on which he has suggested drafting improvements which have been accepted by the Government, while possibly making the responsible parliamentary draftsman not so happy, makes the Committee happy that they have Lord Morris in their midst.

Lord MORRIS

All that I would say to that is, God forbid!

On Question, amendment agreed to.

Lord BELLWIN moved Amendment No. 130:

Page 65, line 22, after (" 2 (9) ") insert— (a) in the definition of "commercial vehicle" for "not more than five passengers" substitute "not more than eight passengers"; and (b) ").

The noble Lord said: The Passenger Vehicles (Experimental Areas) Act 1977 permits various relaxations to the bus licensing system on an experimental basis but limits those with commercial vehicles to vehicles adapted to carrying not more than five passengers. This limit of five is out of line with that of eight which we are adopting generally in the Bill. The small increase on the limit will facilitate experiments with the use of commercially operated small minibuses. I beg to move.

On Question, amendment agreed to.

Lord MOWBRAY and STOURTON moved Amendment No. 131: Page 65, leave out lines 31 to 33.

The noble Lord said: I spoke to this amendment when moving Amendment No. 111. I beg to move.

On Question, amendment agreed to.

Lord MOWBRAY and STOURTON moved Amendments Nos. 132 and 133:

Page 67, line 25, leave out (" Subsections (6) and (7) ") and insert (" Subsection (6) ") line 28, leave out (" they apply ") and insert (" it applies ").

The noble Lord said: I spoke to these amendments when moving Amendment No. 20. I beg to move the two amendments en bloc.

On Question, amendments agreed to.

Schedule 5, as amended, agreed to.

Clause 36 [Interpretation of Part I]:

Lord MOWBRAY and STOURTON moved Amendments Nos. 134 and 135:

Page 33, line 13, at end insert— (" "company" means a body corporate; ") line 18, at end insert— (" "director", in relation to a company, includes any person who occupies the position of a director, by whatever name called; ").

The noble Lord said: I spoke to these amendments when moving Amendment No. 78. I beg to move the two amendments en bloc.

On Question, amendments agreed to.

[Amendment No. J36 not moved.]

Lord MOWBRAY and STOURTON moved Amendment No. 137: Page 33, line 29, leave out from (" concerned ") to (" the ") in line 31 and insert (", whether or not any driver leaves or enters ").

The noble Lord said: This is a useful Opposition amendment to the definition of "international operations" and was accepted in Committee in another place. We have since discovered that the definition can be expressed more clearly and concisely. This is what this amendment does. I beg to move.

On Question, amendment agreed to.

5.38 p.m.

Lord UNDERHILL moved Amendment No. 138:

Page 33, leave out lines 36 and 37 and insert— (" "operating centre" includes office and shop premises and maintenance facilities owned or rented by a holder of or an applicant for a public service vehicle operator's licence and, in relation to a vehicle, means the place at which the vehicle is normally maintained or based; ").

The noble Lord said: This amendment seeks to give a more precise definition of "operating centre "by substituting the words in the present Bill for those that are on the scheduled list. The words in the Bill are: ' operating centre', in relation to a vehicle, means the base or centre at which the vehicle is normally kept".

We regard that as totally inadequate, Every public service vehicle business, noble Lords will agree, should be properly conducted. This requires a suitable operating centre. It can be safely left to the traffic commissioners to decide what is suitable in each individual case. Where the operator carries out his own maintenance the provision of the necessary facilities will have to be taken into account. But where maintenance is contracted out, there should be suitable parking arrangements for vehicles and also there is a need for each operator to have office facilities adequate for his type and size of operation. These things are essential to good public service and should be specifically referred to in the legislation.

While Clause 18 (3) of the Bill limits any one person to one licence in any traffic area, Clause 18 (2) provides for a licence holder having: one or more operating centres in that traffic area ".

Indeed, facilities may often be shared among different centres and the position required to be looked at as a whole. For example, minor maintenance may be carried out where the vehicle is based or kept but all major work should be carried out at other premises. Again, a small operator may keep vehicles on a coach park or car park overnight and have them maintained by someone else, perhaps on a wholly satisfactory contract basis, but would also need to have office premises. These facilities must be looked at as a whole. This approach which, it is submitted, is the only practical one means that the operating centre needs to be defined. The proposed definition to replace that at present in Clause 36 reflects a situation which, in moving this amendment, I have endeavoured to set out. I beg to move.

Lord BELLWIN

I am bound to say that this amendment makes nonsense of the phrase "operating centre" as used in the Bill. Under Clause 18, licences can only be granted by the traffic commissioners in whose area the applicant has an operating centre. The same clause provides that the vehicles authorised to be used under the licence are only those whose operating centre is in the area of the commissioners who granted the licence. Clearly, the operating centre must be identifiable at a particular place. It cannot be any number of different places. If the operator has a large concern, such as an NBC subsidiary, these places may not even be in the same traffic area.

The noble Lord, Lord Underhill, is apparently concerned that commissioners should be able to look at an operator's premises in deciding on a licence application. I fail to see why. The commissioners are only concerned with the operators' suitability to run public service vehicles. They will be interested in where those vehicles are maintained— but this may not be at the operator's own premises. He may have a contract with another operator or a nearby garage. Hence the wording of Clause 20 (3) which directs the commissioners' attention to maintenance facilities or arrangements. The commissioners will be interested in how the operator proposes to run his business— his financial standing, professional competence and good repute. But they have no interest in the state of his shops or offices; and, as I have said on an earlier amendment, they have no locus in environmental matters.

Lord UNDERHILL

I will take note of what the Minister has said and look at this more carefully in the Official Report. We are anxious that the licensing commissioners should be able to look at the whole question of an operation which in proposing the amendment we had in mind would cover all the points to which I referred. In view of the Minister's reply, I beg leave to withdraw my amendment.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

Lord MISHCON had given Notice of his intention to move Amendment No. 139:

Page 33, line 43, at end insert— (" "person" includes any unincorporated body such as a partnership, club or association, which is for the purposes of this Part of this Act a separate entity from its members; ").

The noble Lord said: We have had a full discussion before the Committee regarding Amendment No. 108. Now that this amendment is called, apart from partnerships, clubs or associations that arc dealt with in the amendment, would the Minister please, in accordance with his kind undertaking, also look at clubs and associations in the light of what I said? On that basis, I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

[Amendment No. 140 not moved.]

Lord MOWBRAY and STOURTON moved Amendment No. 141: Page 34, leave out lines 20 to 22.

The noble Lord said: I beg to move this amendment and to take with it Amendment No. 185. These are standard definitions which are needed to avoid doubt as to the meaning of "modification" and "statutory provision". They are now placed in Clause 58, and apply to the whole Bill. Without these amendments, the use of these expressions in Clause 58 could have been open to some confusion. The definitions provided are well prece-dented. I beg to move.

Lord MORRIS

May I ask a question regarding the amendment to Clause 58? The amendment inserts the definition of "modification" and reads: includes addition, omission and alteration, and related expressions shall be construed accordingly". To my mind this means that "modification" has some other meaning. I wonder whether my noble friend would be good enough to tell me what meaning it could possibly have other than the meaning as defined.

Lord MOWBRAY and STOURTON

I should not like to reply off the cuff. I will certainly find out and let my noble friend and anyone else who is interested have the answer.

On Question, amendment agreed to.

5.45 p.m.

Lord UNDERHILL moved Amendment 142:

Page 35, line 7, at end insert— (" (4) In this part of the Act "prescribed" means prescribed by regulations and "regulations" means regulations made under section 160 of the Road Traffic Act I960.").

The noble Lord said: We hope that it is considered helpful to move this amendment. We are trying to identify the powers of the Minister for making the various regulations envisaged in the Bill. We think that our cross-reference to the 1960 Act may do this. I beg to move.

Lord MOWBRAY and STOURTON

I am advised that this amendment is unnecessary, although we sympathise with the noble Lord for moving it. Clause 1 of this Bill, subsection (3), provides for the construction of Part I as if it were contained in Part III of the Road Traffic Act 1960. We must read the two together as if they were a single enactment.

Some sections of Part III of the 1960 Act have of course been repealed. The rest remain, some with amendments. Section 160 is one of those. It enables the Minister to make regulations for any purpose for which regulations may be made under "this Part of this Act "and for prescribing anything which may be prescribed under this Part of this Act ". Because of Clause 1 the term this Part of this Act will on enactment include Part I of this 1980 Bill. Moreover, Clause 1 (3) specifically mentions that the interpretations in Clause 36 will apply to the 1960 Act. It is therefore not only unnecessary to refer to regulations being made under Section 160 of the 1960 Act but it would be a rather odd interpretation to apply to that Act. All this to-ing and fro-ing between enactments is, of course, confusing. Consolidation is needed and as my noble friend Lord Bellwin indicated at Second Reading, it is already underway. I am afraid that is very complicated but I hope my speech was intelligible to the noble Lord opposite.

Lord UNDERHILL

I thank the noble Lord for explaining why we cannot be helpful to him. I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

Clause 36, as amended, agreed to.

Clause 37 [Transfer of undertaking of National Freight Corporation]:

Lord MISHCON moved Amendment No. 143:

Page 35, line 22, at end insert— (" Provided that no such order shall be made until a draft thereof has been laid before, and approved by a resolution of, both Houses of Parliament.").

The noble Lord said: We are now entering into a different part of this Bill, one which deals with the demise of the National Freight Corporation, its resurrection— if I may say so— into that of a limited company and its consignment to heaven or hell dependent upon who in private enterprise manages to succeed. In another place a Member— understandably passionately— described the various stages. He also apparently had great powers of elocution: he described it as the write-off rip-off followed by the sell-off rip-off and then by the strip-off rip-off!

In the very delicate and gentlemanly atmosphere of this Committee, I do not copy these descriptions at all; and by agreement— as Members of the Committee know— there will be no argument about policy but only how to carry out the policy dictated— "dictated" is the wrong word— decided in another place to the best advantage of the industry and those engaged in it.

The amendment before the Committee at the present stage is that no order shall be made fixing the appointed day until a draft has been laid before both Houses of Parliament and approved by a resolution.

The amendment is not intended in any way at all to be a trick amendment, a delaying amendment or an obstructive amendment. It is to preserve the sovereignty of Parliament in dealing with a matter which is of great importance to the nation.

At the moment, when the appointed day occurs, the whole of the National Freight Corporation goes "without further assurance", if I may use the term in the Bill, to a company which is defined as a company limited by law or an ordinary limited company. As from that stage— but one does not know when— two things will follow. One is a complete write-off of the indebtedness of the National Freight Corporation, amounting to £ 100 million, which takes place just before the appointed day. One does not know what the precise amount will be on the appointed day, because one does not know when the appointed day will be.

Then it is the intention of this Bill that there shall be a sale thereafter, again at a date unknown, on terms unknown and to purchasers unknown. The company will be operating under a memorandum and articles of association, the terms of which have not yet been disclosed to either House of Parliament. I need not tell your Lordships, many of whom are experienced in commercial matters, how vital memorandums and articles of association are. For example, they deal in matters of this kind with provisions which safeguard the question of sale to foreign interests, which is a matter that has been of some concern to the nation in other industries in recent times.

Therefore, what my noble friends and I are seeking to do by this amendment— and, I repeat, with no wish to delay or impede— is to see that when an order is made (I repeat that we do not know when it is going to be) for the appointed day to occur, Parliament shall have an opportunity of considering that order, the terms of it, the relevance of that date to various considerations: I shall not repeat those to which I have already drawn your Lordships' attention. It seems to me that, unless Parliament is to throw its obligations upon Ministers, which has been criticised in very many places and indeed in this Chamber and in another place by those independent Members who believe in preserving the sovereignty of Parliament, and unless we are to fail to follow the principle of parliamentary responsibility, then it is absolutely wrong for anyone to oppose this amendment too.

That does not mean that the Minister will not seek to do so, but I hope that, having heard this speech, having been imbued, as he was in his local government days, with the independence of individual councillors when they sat at a council meeting, and having now learned— as I am sure he has done so easily— what parliamentary duties mean to those of your Lordships who still keep your independence and what they will mean to honourable Members in another place, he may be converted and in those circumstances will gracefully accept this amendment.

Lord BELLWIN

The matter has been so beautifully put that I should like only to say that, although it is quite true that in another incarnation I was always impressed by the independence of individual councillors, I was also impressed by the fact that when the time came to put your hand up to vote you alv/ays voted in line with the party, and so I fear that the independence broke down at the end of the day.

Lord MISHCON

May I intervene, with your Lordships' permission, to say that that is not the experience in this place, as I hope the noble Lord will find in a few minutes.

Lord BELLWIN

No, I have already found that is not the experience in this place: I entirely accept that without question. I must say in fairness, however, before I leave this, that I occasionally found the same thing in another sphere. I accept that the appointed day order is an important technical device in determining exactly when the NFC's undertaking is to be transferred to the successor company; but the appointed day will not represent any new policy departure or give rise to any new issues of substance. It will merely give effect to the provisions set out in Part II of the Bill and to which Parliament will have already given approval. Thus, it is quite inappropriate for the appointed day order to be subject to an Affirmative Resolution or, for that matter, to any additional parliamentary procedure. It would simply mean repeating discussion which had already been held, and extensively held, on the Bill itself.

The noble Lord, Lord Mishcon, was concerned that the Bill is not specific enough on the nature of the successor company or on the Minister's intentions. The Bill is quite specific as to the nature of the successor company. Subsection (5) provides that the company must be a standard Companies Act company, limited by shares and with all the shares held by or on behalf of the Minister. The Government's intention on the use of the provisions is quite clear. The Minister will form a company, acting under powers already available to him as a natural person, for the sole purpose of nomination as the successor company to the National Freight Corporation.

I do not share the fears of the noble Lord, Lord Mishcon, as to all the dreadful things that might happen under this part, and indeed under the whole, of the proposals as regards the NFC and I fear that on this occasion I would have to oppose the amendment.

Lord MISHCON

The Committee will have noticed that not one single reason has been given by the Minister as to why the order should not be affirmed by both Houses of Parliament. The Minister has not pleaded that this would in any event mean a delay— it would have been extraordinary if he had because, as I have said, the appointed day has not yet been fixed. Nobody knows when it is going to be. There will not be any hurry thereafter. It is a question of a sell-off and it is purely a question of becoming, as we have heard, an ordinary limited company.

It is not very common for any transfer of this importance to take place without— and I am repeating some of the things I said before, but I am going to add to them— Parliament knowing the amount of the debt that is, the precise nature and amount of the debt to be extinguished by means of a Bill; without knowing what are the powers, duties and rights by way of protection in regard to new shareholders, who may become shareholders of the company limited by shares; and without knowing— I did not mention this before— the nature of the securities to be given to the Minister in compensation, among other things, for the debt which is to be extinguished; without knowing what the intention of the Minister is after the appointed day in regard to the date of sale; without knowing the nature of the purchaser the Minister is going to find. I could in fact dilate upon this, because the Minister was kind enough to write to me but I shall be dealing with his letter in regard to another amendment and I will not embarrass him unnecessarily by quoting his letter now.

It is completely uncertain— this I can tell your Lordships— as to the type of purchaser that is to be found. It may be thrown to the market and so on. In all those circumstances, I ask your Lordships, wherever you may be sitting, to have regard to the sovereignty of Parliament in a matter of this kind, and I ask all your Lordships, regardless of party or of no party at all, to have that principle in mind when voting on this amendment— and we shall in fact be dividing upon it.

Lord BELLWIN

I really feel that we are making of this something which it is not. I should repeat what I said before, but perhaps in another way. The fact is that on this matter of such great moment, to which the noble Lord, Lord Mishcon, is drawing attention, the order designating the appointed day will not be subject to parliamentary procedure, as it will not involve any new policy departure. The noble Lord said that I had not given any reason why we take this line, but I thought that I had given the very best reason of all; namely, that the matter would have been extensively discussed on the Bill itself. That has been so in another place and will be so here.

This procedure is simply the mechanical step which is necessary to bring into operation the relevant provisions in Part II of the Bill. It is desirable to retain maximum flexibility as to the date on which the NFC's undertaking is transferred to the successor company, and the appointed day procedure is the technical means intended to achieve this. But the designation of the day will not give rise to any policy issue of substance. It will merely put into effect— and this is the key part— provisions that have been fully debated in Parliament.

I am not sure whether the noble Lord would like me to go into greater detail as to the kind of company it will be; I suspect that he does not wish me to do that. But the point is that I am satisfied, and I feel that this Committee will be satisfied that the proposals here are entirely in keeping with what has gone before as a matter of policy in another place, with which we are concerned on this part of the Bill in this Committee. Therefore, if the matter is pressed to a Division I hope that your Lordships will accept the Government's line on this, which I think is a very fair one in all the circumstances.

Lord MORRIS

I rise to support my noble friend on this point. The noble Lord, Lord Mishcon, showed a certain fear for putative shareholders, but it is worth saying that any future shareholder has the ultimate right of protection. He does not have to buy shares in this company when it is formed. He will have every opportunity to decide whether or not to do so. I do not think there is any reason for the noble Lord, Lord Mishcon, to express fear on behalf of any future shareholder.

Lord MISHCON

I rise only to clarify the point and will do it very quickly. I was not expressing fears on behalf of shareholders. I was expressing fears on behalf of the nation, as to who the shareholders might be.

Viscount SIMON

When I first read the amendment and heard what was said. I was inclined to support the noble Lord. Lord Bellwin, but I wonder whether he could help by explaining this to me. As I understand the position, the order will simply establish the appointed day. Does it do anything else? Does it simply say "The appointed day will be such-and-such "'? Does it give any of the information for which the noble Lord, Lord Mishcon, has asked'.' If this is the only way that we are to know how the outline of this plan is being filled in, then I agree that we should like to see that outline filled in before Parliament. But, on the face of it, all that the order will do is to say, "The 1st January shall be the appointed day". It will not say anything else.

Lord BELLWIN

That is absolutely right. The purpose and effect of the amendment, as I am advised and as I interpret it, is to make subject to Affirmative Resolution the order whereby the Minister, with the consent of the Treasury, appoints the day on which the NFC's undertaking is transferred to the successor company. As drafted, the order is not at all subject to parliamentary procedure.

Lord MISHCON

Will I be forgiven if I rise— and I promise that it will be for the last time— in order to make one point abundantly clear? It is a completely truthful answer which the Minister has given, as one would expect of him, but the truth has been expressed in a summarised form. It is absolutely correct that all it will say is, "This is going to be the appointed day", but whether Parliament agrees that that should be the appointed day and that vesting should take place depends on the situation at that time, for the very good reason that immediately the order is made certain things flow, of which Parliament will be completely unaware. I must repeat them, only because the noble Viscount, Lord Simon, who is always so clear on these matters, appears to be under a possible misunderstanding which may be shared by other noble Lords.

The fact of the matter is that on that day vesting takes place into a limited company, the memorandum and articles are not seen by Parliament, the nature of the provisions to protect against foreign shareholders and so on are not seen by Parliament, and the amount of the debt to be extinguished— which is completely dependent on when that day is— is not known. All those things will be before Parliament, because questions could be asked in this House and in another place, in order to clarify certain issues before an Affirmative Resolution was made. That is the importance of the whole matter. If it were a technicality, I should not have been taking up the time of your Lordships as I have done. It is a matter of principle in regard to the sovereignty of Parliament.

Lord BELLWIN

I must make one

further point which was touched on by the noble Lord, Lord Mishcon, and which is relevant to the concern expressed by the noble Viscount, Lord Simon. The fact is that when the company is set up, the memorandum and articles must be registered at Companies House. There will be no secret about that and, for convenience, we can arrange for a copy to be placed in the Library of the House as, in any case, they will have to be in existence before the appointed day. That would avoid the charges of noble Lords opposite about the NFC being transferred to some shadowy, unknown organisation. I could elaborate on this again, but there is probably no point at this time. As I said originally, the essence of the amendment concerns the appointed day. The noble Lord, Lord Mishcon, was quite right. Yes, I interpreted it as it was literally set out, and that is what we have to do when considering this amendment.

6.8 p.m.

On Question, Whether the said amendment (No. 143) shall be agreed to?

Their Lordships divided: Contents, 48; Not-Contents, 98.

CONTENTS
Ardwick, L. Gosford, E. Peart, L.
Bacon, B. Hale, L. Pitt of Hampstead, L.
Beswick, L. Houghton of Sowerby, L. Ponsonby of Shulbrede, L. [Teller.]
Blease, L. Janner, L.
Boston of Faversham, L. Jeger, B. Sefton of Garston, L.
Brockway, L. Leatherland, L. Shinwell, L.
Caradon, L. Lee of Newton, L. Stewart of Alvechurch, B.
Cledwyn of Penrhos, L. Leonard, L. Stone, L.
Collison, L. Llewelyn-Davies of Hastoe, B. Strabolgi, L.
David, B. Lovell-Davis, L. Strauss, L.
Davies of Leek, L. Maelor, L. Taylor of Mansfield, L.
Davies of Penrhys, L. Milner of Leeds, L. Underhill, L.
Donaldson of Kingsbridge, L. Mishcon, L. Wallace of Coslany, L. [Teller.]
Fisher of Rednal, B. Noel-Baker, L. Whaddon, L.
Gaitskell, B. Northfield, L. Wootton of Abinger, B.
Glenamara, L. Oram, L. Wynne-Jones, L.
Goronwy-Roberts, L.
NOT-CONTENTS
Ailesbury, M. Cathcart, E. De Freyne, L.
Alexander of Tunis, E. Chesham, L. Denham, L. [Teller.]
Alport, L. Chitnis, L. Drumalbyn, L.
Amory, V. Cockfield, L. Ellenborough, L.
Armstrong, L. Colville of Culross, V. Elliot of Harwood, B.
Auckland, L. Cork and Orrery, E. Exeter, M.
Avon, E. Cottesloe, L. Faithfull, B.
Beaumont of Whitley, L. Craigavon, V. Ferrers, E.
Bellwin, L. Craigmyle, L. Fortescue, E.
Belstead, L. Cullen of Ashbourne, L. Gainford, L.
Brougham and Vaux, L. Daventry, V. Glasgow, E.
Caithness, E. Davidson, V. Glenkinglas, L.
Campbell of Croy, L. de Clifford, L. Godber of Willington, L.
Gowrie, E. McFadzean, L. Romney, E.
Gridley, L. Macleod of Borve, B. Sandford, L.
Grimston of Westbury, L. Mansfield, E. Sandys, L. [Teller.]
Hailsham of Saint Marylebone, L. (L. Chancellor.) Margadale, L. Selsdon, L.
Marley, L. Sempill, Ly.
Hampton, L. Masham of Ilton, B. Sharpies, B.
Harmar-Nicholls, L. Merrivale, L. Simon, V.
Hatherton, L. Morris, L. Spens, L.
Henley, L. Mottistone, L. Stamp, L.
Hereford, V. Mowbray and Stourton, L. Strathspey, L.
Hornsby-Smith, B. Murton of Lindisfarne, L. Teviot, L.
Hylton-Foster, B. Northchurch, B. Trefgarne, L.
Keyes, L. Nugent of Guildford, L. Trenchard, V.
Killearn, L. Orkney, E. Trumpington, B.
Kilmany, L. Orr-Ewing, L. Vaux of Harrowden, L,
Kimberley, E. Rawlinson of Ewell, L. Vickers, B.
Lauderdale, E. Redmayne, L. Vivian, L.
Long, V. Reigate, L. Wigoder, L.
Lucas of Chilworth, L. Renton, L. Wynford, L.
Lyell, L. Rochester, L. Young, B.

Resolved in the negative and amendment disagreed to accordingly.

6.16 p.m.

Lord MISHCON moved Amendment No. 144: Page 35, line 27, leave out subsection (4).

The noble Lord said: Members of the Committee will know that this amendment relates to subsection (4) of the clause which transfers the undertaking of the National Freight Corporation to a company limited by shares. What subsection (4) seeks to do is to extinguish immediately before the appointed day the commencing capital debt of the corporation and outstanding loans to the corporation from the Minister. The total of that amount appears to be some £ 58.72 million of the commencing capital debt and some £ 41.3 million of subsequent borrowings, making a total of £ 100 million. This is money that is owed to the nation. It was being repaid, in regard to interest payments, by the National Freight Corporation at the rate of £ 8 million a year.

The Committee may well wonder why that debt should be extinguished if the company to which the corporation is to be transferred is to be sold off on the market or to some other purchaser or purchasers in the private sector. As I understand it, at the moment the Minister is not sure which way he is going to dispose of this undertaking— or, if he is sure, his decision has not been communicated to the House.

It seems wrong that the nation should be deprived of these very substantial sums merely because it would benefit a private purchaser or private shareholders. I observed that at the Second Reading in another place the Parliamentary Secretary said: One of the immediate effects of our proposals is that the capital structure will be very much more attractive ".

I have no doubt that it will be more attractive, but the taxpayer, and the nation, ought to find it much more unattractive.

It may be argued that this is a sensible provision, because the Minister is going to get some securities in place of the loans and the initial capital outlay of £ 57.3 million, and that if those securities are sold on the market or to the public they will be that much more valuable by virtue of the extinguishment of the debt and therefore the nation will get it back in that way. With great respect to any such argument, that just is not the way— and your Lordships will know this very well without any word from me— in which a valuation will take place. It will not be upon the value of net assets if shares are sold, and certainly if they are sold in sections where only a minority interest is passed. These shares will be bought upon the basis of past earnings and some computation will be made by those skilled in these matters as to what, on the basis of past earnings and on the anticipation of future earnings, the shares may be worth. In the interests of the shareholders and the nation, subsection (4) should not be part of this Bill. I beg to move.

Lord BELLWIN

There is no question whatsoever of the Government's existing financial interest in NFC just being thrown to one side. The debt will not be written off without further ado. The liabilities will instead be exchanged for securities which the successor company will be required to issue to the Government under Clause 38. In other words, the Government's financial interest will take the form of securities rather than capital debt as at present. The exact nature of these securities stands to be decided nearer the appointed day. It is likely that they will consist mainly of shares but there will also be scope for other types of security (for example some fixed interest loan stock) if that is thought appropriate.

Noble Lords opposite really have no grounds to complain about the writing off of debt because I should like to remind them that their Government's capital reconstruction wrote off entirely debts totalling £ 53 million. So, all else apart, I do not think the noble Lord will be too surprised to hear that we oppose this amendment.

Lord MISHCON

Nor will the noble Lord the Minister be surprised if in one sentence I answer his last observation: it is a very different thing to write off part of a debt for the benefit of the nation represented by the National Freight Corporation. However, if one writes off a further £ 100 million for the benefit of the subsequent purchaser in the private sector one is dealing with a very different matter— and the noble Lord knows it.

Viscount SIMON

I should like to ask the noble Lord, Lord Mishcon, to help me again. It seems to me that the way in which people will assess the value of these shares (or whatever it is that are sold) is a complicated matter but surely when buying shares in a company which owes £ 100 million and buying shares in a company which does not, the amount to be paid for the shares will take that into account, will it not?

Lord MISHCON

I know that when the noble Viscount addresses questions to me he always does so in order to be helpful and I take that question in precisely that spirit. Of course it is correct— and I cannot deny it— that any purchaser will very much prefer to buy his way into a company which owes £ 100 million less than otherwise would be the case. The point that I am making is that the nation will lose by it, in the sense that the price that will be offered, although it may be a more beneficial price, would not be so to the extent of £ 100 million, whereas, if the £ 100 million remained as a debt and had to be paid off subsequently, the full £ 100 million would be paid.

If I may try to clarify what I have said, it would be a perfect argument if one could say that the £ 100 million was going to be represented by an additional £ 100 million (if we wipe it off) that would come to the nation. The noble Viscount himself has said that calculations are not made in that easy way and he has indicated— and he is quite correct— that a bigger price would definitely be given if the £ 100 million were extinguished. Of course he is right, but my point is that it would not be to the extent of £ 100 million. Therefore if the £ 100 million had remained as a debt for the private sector to take over, the nation could have expected to receive the full £ 100 million.

Viscount SIMON

The noble Lord is more confident than I am about inflation being caught. I am not sure that I would not prefer to receive £ 75 million in cash as a result of the difference in the price rather than get £ 100 million paid over a period from the loan to the company.

Lord MISHCON

I will answer that question from the noble Viscount very briefly. There would not be any question of waiting. As I understand it, it is not a deferred loan; it is a loan which could become immediately payable. Therefore the purchaser would have to provide for the repayment of the loan since the National Freight Corporation would be passing on this liability to the company and therefore presumably the company would have to pay. The securities would be sold and the loan would have to be repaid.

Viscount SIMON

We can turn this into a discussion between the noble Lord, Lord Mishcon, and myself, but I think he has made my point. If in fact the company has to repay the loan at once it will have to recover the cash and where would it recover the cash from, except by selling the shares?

6.27 p.m.

On Question, Whether the said amendment (No. 144) shall be agreed to?

Their Lordships divided: Contents, 48; Not-Contents, 87.

CONTENTS
Ardwick, L. Hale, L. Peart, L.
Bacon, B. Houghton of Sowerby, L. Pitt of Hampstead, L.
Blease, L. Janner, L. Ponsonby of Shulbrede, L. [Teller.]
Boston of Faversham, L. Jeger, B.
Brockway, L. Kaldor, L. Ritchie-Calder, L.
Cledwyn of Penrhos, L. Leatherland, L. Sefton of Garston, L.
Coliison, L. Lee of Newton, L. Stewart of Alvechurch, B.
David, B. [Teller.] Leonard, L. Strabolgi, L.
Davies of Leek, L. Llewelyn-Davies of Hastoe, B. Strauss, L.
Davies of Penrhys, L. Lovell-Davis, L. Taylor of Mansfield, L.
Donaldson of Kingsbridge, L. Maelor, L. Underhill, L.
Fisher of Rednal, B. Milner of Leeds, L. Wallace of Coslany, L.
Gaitskell, B. Mishcon, L. Whaddon, L.
Glenamara, L. Noel-Baker, L. Winterbottom, L.
Goronwy-Roberts, L. Northfield, L. Wootton of Abinger, B.
Gosford, E. Oram, L. Wynne-Jones, L.
Gregson, L.
NOT-CONTENTS
Ailesbury, M. Gainford, L. Mottistone, L.
Airey of Abingdon, B. Glasgow, E. Mowbray and Stourton, L.
Alport, L. Glenkinglas, L. Murton of Lindisfarne, L.
Amory, V. Godber of Wellington, L. Northchurch, B.
Auckland, L. Gowrie, E. Nugent of Guildford, L.
Beaumont of Whitley, L. Gridley, L. Orkney, E.
Bellwin, L. Grimston of Westbury, L. Rawlinson of Ewell, L.
Belstead, L. Hampton, L. Redmayne, L.
Caithness, E. Hatherton, L. Reigate, L.
Campbell of Croy, L. Henley, L. Renton, L.
Cathcart, E. Hereford, V. Rochester, L.
Chesham, L. Hornsby-Smith, B. Romney, E.
Chitnis, L. Hylton-Foster, B. Sandford, L.
Cockfield, L. Killearn, L. Sandys, L. [Teller.]
Colville of Culross, V. Kilmany, L. Selsden, L.
Cork and Orrery, E. Kilmarnock, L. Sempill, Ly.
Craigavon, V. Kimberley, E. Sharpies, B.
Craigmyle, L. Lauderdale, E. Simon, V.
Cullen of Ashbourne, L. Long, V. Spens, L.
Daventry, V. Lucas of Chilworth, L. Stamp, L.
Davidson, V. Lyell, L. Strathspey, L.
de Clifford, L. McFadzean, L. Teviot, L.
De Freyne, L. Macleod of Borve, B. Trenchard, V.
Denham, L. [Teller.] Mansfield, E. Trumpington, B.
Drumalbyn, L. Margadale, L. Vaux of Harrowden, L.
Ellenborough, L. Marley, L. Vickers, B.
Elliot of Harwood, B. Masham of Ilton, B. Vivian, L.
Faithfull, B. Monson, L. Wigoder, L.
Fortescue, E. Morris, L. Wynford, L.

Resolved in the negative, and amendment disagreed to accordingly.

Clause 37 agreed to.

Schedule 6 [Supplementary provisions with respect to transfer under section 37]:

6.37 p.m.

Lord BELLWIN moved Amendment No. 145:

Page 68, line 36, at end insert— (". The transfer to the successor company by virtue of section 37 of the property, rights, liabilities and obligations of the Corporation shall have effect notwithstanding any statutory or other restriction on the powers of any other body affected by the transfer.").

The noble Lord said: This amendment appears rather general and its purpose may not be immediately clear. However, I can assure noble Lords that the amendment is aimed at a particular problem. This concerns British Transport Advertising Limited, a non-profit-making joint subsidiary of the British Railways Board and the National Bus Company. They have a contract with the NFC whereby on an agency basis they enter into contracts with third-parties for display of advertisements of those third parties on NFC property. It appears that, although under Clause 37 this contract will be transferred from the NFC to the successor company, BTA will, as the Bill now stands, be unable to perform it. This is because they are limited by Section 14 of the 1962 Transport Act to dealings with other transport boards, to which select group the NFC will on the appointed day cease to belong.

The amendment, therefore, seeks to safeguard this contract. It does this by ensuring that the transfer to the successor company on the appointed day of the property, rights, liabilities and obligations of the corporation shall have effect notwithstanding any statutory or other restriction on the powers of any other body affected by the transfer. This overrides the general limitation of British Transport Advertising to dealings with transport boards and therefore makes it possible for BTA to continue to fulfil their contract.

I should perhaps also add that the effect of the amendment will be of a transitory nature only. It applies only to obligations, et cetera, which are transferred under the Bill on the appointed day. These will run their course, but there is no permanent widening of the powers of British Transport Advertising or any other body in a similar case. Indeed, no other bodies are known to be affected in such a way. I beg to move.

On Question, amendment agreed to.

Lord BELLWIN moved Amendment No. 145A: Page 68, line 40, leave out (" (a) ").

The noble Lord said: It would be convenient, with your Lordships' permission, to take with Amendment No. 145A, Amendment No. 145B, to Schedule 6, No. 164A to Clause 41 and Amendments Nos. 180F and 180G to Clause 51. The amendments are essentially technical, but, even so, your Lordships may like to have some explanation as to their purpose, which will probably not be apparent from the Marshalled List. It is the policy of the Bill that, on the appointed day, the successor company should step into the shoes of the corporation. Clause 37 and Schedule 6 are intended to secure a smooth transition. They transfer the rights, liabilities and obligations of the corporation to the successor company. However, an agreement can refer to the corporation without imposing obligations or conferring rights. We have discovered one such reference in the trust deed constituting the NFC (1978) Pension. Fund. There may be other such references lurking in other documents. The amendments to Schedule 6 widen the existing transitional provisions so as to convert, as from the appointed day, any such reference into a reference to the successor company. The amendments to Clauses 41 and 51 are associated drafting amendments. I beg to move.

On Question, amendment agreed to.

Lord BELLWIN moved Amendment No. 145B: Page 68, line 42, leave out from (" 37 ") to ("a") in line 3 on page 69 and insert (" that agreement shall have effect on and after that day as if— (a) the successor company had been a party to the agreement; and (b) for any reference (in whatever terms and whether expressly or by implication) to the Corporation there were substituted, in relation to anything falling to be done on or after that day, a reference to the successor company; and (c) for any reference (in whatever terms and whether expressly or by implication) to an officer or employee of the Corporation, not being a party to the agreement and beneficially interested therein, there were substituted, in relation to anything falling to be done on or after that day, ").

The noble Lord said: I spoke to this amendment with Amendment No. 145A. I beg to move.

On Question, amendment agreed to.

Lord BELLWIN moved Amendment No. 145C:

Page 69, line 37, at end insert— (" Pension schemes . — (1) Subject to sub-paragraph (2), the provisions of section 74 of the Transport Act 1962 (Minister's powers to make provision about pensions in the nationalised transport industry) shall have effect on and after the appointed day as if— (a) the expression "Board" included the successor company; and (b) the references in subsection (l) (a) (ii) of that section to the Commission included references to the Corporation; and (c) the reference in subsection (2) (e) of that section to a pension scheme in which employees of the Commission, or a subsidiary of the Commission, participated before the date there mentioned included a reference to a pension scheme in which employees of, or of a subsidiary of, the Corporation participated before the appointed day. (2) Except on the application of the successor company, no order shall be made under the said section 74 on or after the appointed day which has the effect of placing the successor company or a subsidiary of the successor company in any worse position; but for this purpose the successor company or a subsidiary shall not be regarded as being placed in a worse position because an order provides that any changes in a pension scheme are not to be effected without the consent of the Minister. (3) An order such as is mentioned in subparagraph (2) which is made without the application of the successor company shall not be invalid because in fact it does not have the effect of securing that the successor company and its subsidiaries are not placed in any worse position, but except in so far as the successor company approves the effect of the order the Minister shall as soon as may be make the necessary amending order. (4) Subject to sub-paragraph (6), any order under the said section 74 and any regulations to which paragraph 17 of Schedule 7 to the Transport Act 1962 applies (which continues in force certain earlier pension provisions) which— (a) are in force immediately before the appointed day; and (b) relate to the Corporation, its employees or its pensions schemes, shall continue in force, subject to any provision made by virtue of sub-paragraph (1), and as respects anything falling to be done on or after the appointed day shall have effect as if for any reference (however worded and whether express or implied) to the Corporation there were substituted a reference to the successor company. (5) A person who on the appointed day— (a) ceases to be employed by the Corporation and becomes employed by the successor company; or (b) is employed by a company which immediately before the appointed day was a subsidiary of the Corporation but on that day becomes a subsidiary of the successor company, shall not thereby cease to be eligible to participate in any pension scheme in which he was a participant immediately before the appointed day. (6) Subject to sub-paragraph (5), a person who on or after the appointed day leaves or enters the employment of the group consisting of the successor company and its subsidiaries (in this sub-paragraph referred to as "the NFC group") shall not be eligible by virtue of any provision of an order under the said section 74 made before that day— (a) to participate in any of the Corporation's pension schemes by reason of any employment outside the NFC group; or (b) to participate in a pension scheme other than one of the Corporation's pension schemes by reason of his employment within the NFC group. (7) In this paragraph— (a) "participant", in relation to a pension scheme, means— (i) in relation to a scheme under which benefits are or will be receivable as of right, a person who has pension rights under the scheme (whether he has contributed or not); and (ii) in relation to a scheme under which benefits are not or will not be receivable as of right, a person who (whether he is referred to in the scheme as a member, as a contributor or otherwise) has contributed under the scheme and has pension rights thereunder; and "participate" and "eligible to participate" shall be construed accordingly, (b) " pension", "pension rights" and "pension scheme" have the same meaning as in section 74 of the Transport Act 1962; and (c) references to the Corporation's pension schemes are to schemes established by the Corporation or in relation to which the rights, liabilities and functions of the Transport Holding Company were transferred to the Corporation by the British Transport (Pensions of Employees) (No. 1) Order 1968.").

The noble Lord said: Amendment No. 145C is to do with pensions, but it has nothing to do with Clauses 41 and 42 or with Part III of the Bill. It inserts into the Bill transitional provisions to secure that the transmutation of the NFC into the successor company has no untoward consequences on the pensions front. The background to the amendment is this. First, until recently, it was the practice for many nationalised transport industry pension arrangements to be embodied in orders made under Section 74 of the Transport Act 1962. Many such orders are in force, and some have a continuing effect. Some existing pension schemes cannot be amended except by such an order. Secondly, there is a measure of criss-crossing of pension scheme membership between British Rail and NFC schemes. About 3, 000 British Rail employees are members of NFC schemes and about 1, 500 NFC employees are in British Rail schemes.

The amendment provides for existing orders to remain in force after the appointed day and for references in them to be read as references to the successor company. So— and it is important to note this— the rules of existing pension schemes will not be affected. The amendment also provides— and this is also an important point which must be understood—that nobody will have to change his pension scheme in consequence of the conversion of the NFC into the successor company. In particular, the existing criss-crossing of pension scheme membership can continue, though after the appointed day employees who transfer to or from the successor company will have to join their new employer's pension scheme, which is, of course, the normal practice in the private sector.

The amendment also provides for a limited order-making power to continue in relation to the successor company's schemes. I should say that we have no desire to use this power and it is most unlikely that we would do so except on the application of the successor company. The power is necessary, however, to provide a means of amending existing orders if this should turn out to be desirable. I beg to move.

Lord MISHCON

The Committee will have observed that this is a new amendment which found its way on to the Second Marshalled List. Unfortunately the Minister has not been able to accord the usual courtesy of supplying notes on clauses and he must, therefore, forgive me if the questions that I pose to him turn out to be misconceived. We have done our best in the interval— it has been a very short one— with such expert guidance as we have, to understand the amendment which in general terms seems acceptable, but upon which certain questions do arise.

I am perfectly sure that the Minister will not be able— or possibly even if he were able would not wish— at this time to give answers to these questions. Therefore, I assure him that all that I expect this evening is that a record should be made of the questions that I pose and if, with his usual courtesy, he could let me have replies at his convenience, I would be most grateful because, as he will realise, dependent upon his replies would be the decision as to whether amendments are put down at a further stage.

The first question is as follows. Suppose British Rail wished to give their own employees in membership of the NFC group pension funds an option to join the British Rail pension schemes, and the successor company object on the ground that it would weaken the financial position of their pension funds, how can the successor company be compelled to allow such transfer to take place? Obviously, if they cannot, some amendment will be needed.

Secondly, suppose in future a ministerial order is made which causes an extra liability to arise in respect of members of British Rail pension schemes, what provision is there to ensure that the NFC group meet their fair share of the burden in respect of their own employees who belong to the British Rail pension schemes so that that portion of the liability does not fall on the British Railways Board? Again, such a provision should be included if it is not there.

Thirdly, and finally, there seems to be an ambiguity about persons who are transferred from the corporation to the NFC group on the appointed day— and I emphasise the word "on". It seems clear that such persons can retain their membership of their former pension scheme but do they do so by virtue of subparagraph (5) or by virtue of an order made under Section 74 of the Transport Act 1972? If— and I think that this seems likely from the wording, but one is not sure— it is by virtue of sub-paragraph (5), what provision is there to ensure that the NFC group reimburse to British Rail an appropriate share of the costs? I am advised that this happens at present in the case of the NFC. As I have said, if the Minister would be kind enough to consider those questions and on advice, very probably, let me have replies to them, I shall know where to go from there.

Lord BELLWIN

Of coure, I gladly undertake to do that. I am sorry, indeed, about the inability to deliver the notes on clauses. We have done so as regards just about all the clauses in the Bill as best we could, but with the great pressures of time and the pressures that there are on everybody it sometimes happens that it is not possible, and this was one of those times. Yes, of course, I shall endeavour to see that the noble Lord has a reply to his three questions. I was wondering whether he would have asked a fourth question!

On Question, amendment agreed to.

Lord UNDERHILL moved Amendment 146A: (" 9. The obligations of the Corporation transferred by virtue of section 37 include— (a) the settlement by negotiation of terms and conditions of employment of persons employed, (b) the resolution of trade disputes within the meaning of the Trade Union and Labour Relations Act 1974, (c) the promotion and encouragement of measures affecting efficiency, in any respect, in the carrying on of the activities by the Corporation and any subsidiary company, and (d) the discussion of other matters of mutual interest to the parties to the agreements.").

The noble Lord said: May I first apologise to the Committee for having to put down this manuscript amendment in place of Amendment No. 146. In fact, the only change in the manuscript amendment arises in the introduction. That was changed to enable it to fit into the appropriate place in the Bill.

The purpose of the amendment is to protect the machinery of negotiation within the National Freight Corporation and to maintain trade union rights on consultation. Since the creation of the corporation in 1969 the industrial relations issues have been pursued through an agreed machinery of negotiation. The machinery operated was built on the well-established system followed on the railways. In addition to a machinery of negotiation, there is also provision for trade union consultation within subsidiary companies of the National Freight Corporation and direct with the corporation.

Section 45 of the Transport Act 1968 imposed a duty on the Railways Board and the NFC to undertake reviews of the affairs of the respective organisations and to report to the Minister. Subsection (2) of that section of the 1968 Act also laid down that, before reaching conclusions in consequence of a review, the board or the corporation should seek consultation with organisations representing those employed.

The NFC and, in particular, National Carriers, a subsidiary, have been exemplary employers so far as consultation is concerned. National Carriers have gone so far as to invite the trade unions to become involved in corporate planning. Schedule 9 to the Bill now before us repeals that part of the 1968 Act relating to consultation with National Freight Corporation employees, presumably on the basis that there is no longer any obligation to report to the Minister. That repeal is regrettable.

While the Government remain the major shareholder and the current composition of the board of the Freight Corporation remains largely unaltered, there is no reason to believe that consultation will not continue with the unions as hitherto. However, in the event of a change of ownership that cannot be guaranteed. In a situation where the ownership of the corporation is transferred, the amendment seeks to provide for the maintenance of machinery of negotiation, and for the continuation of existing arrangements for staff consultation; that is, that consultation will continue to take place at company level and with the National Freight Corporation or the successor company. I beg to move manuscript Amendment No. 146A.

Lord BELLWIN

This amendment would impose duties concerning industrial democracy on the successor company along the lines of those to which the NFC is subject as a nationalised transport industry. The Government are very much in favour of genuine consultation and participation in industry. Their commitment in this area is demonstrated by the insertion in the Companies Bill, at present before Parliament, of a provision to require directors to have regard to the interests of the company's employees in general as well as the interests of its members.

I welcome the progress that the NFC has made in developing machinery for participation. This has proved invaluable in the past, as the noble Lord, Lord Underhill, has said, and also to the benefit of the corporation and its employees. No doubt the successor company will wish to build on this. But this will be a matter for the company itself to decide. It is an essential feature of a policy that the successor company should be a normal Companies Act company, subject only to the general legislation which governs all companies, and not to special statutory duties. Therefore, I am sure noble Lords will not be too surprised to hear that the Government must also resist this amendment.

Lord UNDERHILL

I am very sorry to hear what the noble Lord has had to say because I am sure that the whole Committee will wish to see, in undertakings of this kind, that there are not only satisfactory industrial relations but also opportunities to consult with the appropriate unions on the workings and efficiency of the company. In the past when companies have been transferred or broken up, maybe under separate public ownership, we have been able to maintain these provisions. But in the light of what the noble Lord has said, it is clear that there is no intention of including this in the Bill. Therefore, we shall read very carefully what he has had to say in the Official Report. I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

6.52 p.m.

Lord UNDERHILL moved Amendment No. 147:

Page 70, line 41, at end insert— (" Promotion of research and development 9. The obligations of the Corporation transferred by virtue of section 36 include any obligation under subsection (2) of section 46 of the Transport Act 1968 to promote research into matters affecting the functions of the Corporation or any subsidiary and the doing of such work as is requisite to enable the results of such research to be turned to account.").

The noble Lord said: This amendment asks, not for the insertion of trade union rights, but that we should make certain that in the successor company there will continue the promotion of research and development. Section 46 of the 1968 Act imposed on the board, constituted under that Act, a definite duty to carry out research. As was stressed during the Second Reading debate, all sections in the other House praised the National Freight Corporation for its efficiency and for the fact that it had a very high reputation within the road haulage industry for its research and development work. For example, the Freight Corporation's project on energy saving is unique to the industry, and recently the corporation also carried out a detailed study of the economic and operational potential for heavier lorries.

It would appear from the Bill that Section 46 of the 1968 Act is not being repealed, and the National Freight Corporation will continue to have a duty to undertake research. This is what we are endeavouring to write into the Bill.

The Price Commission Report on the road haulage industry found that the National Freight Corporation was by far the largest individual operator. In 1977 the turnover from the corporation's freight services was almost three times that of the largest private operator. As your Lordships will be aware, road haulage is a highly fragmented industry with 85 per cent. of the 46, 000 professional hauliers operating five vehicles or fewer. Possible fragmentation through the breakup of the National Freight Corporation could only be considered a backward step, as it must inevitably make research and development in the industry more difficult. The amendment seeks to ensure that the promotion of research and development will continue, and that is the purpose of the amendment which I beg to move.

The DEPUTY CHAIRMAN of COMMITTEES (Lord Alport)

I have to advise your Lordships that in the second line of this amendment "section 36" should read "section 37".

Lord BELLWIN

The section of the 1968 Act which this amendment seeks to apply to the successor company typifies the unnecessary restrictions under which the NFC is forced to operate as a nationalised industry. Clearly the successor company will, while operating commercially, carry out research in those areas which may be of value to it. To impose a statutory obligation to do so on a private company would, however, be totally inappropriate, and contrary to the aims of the Bill, which seeks precisely to remove restrictions of this kind. Like some other amendments on this part of the Bill by noble Lords opposite, this amendment seeks to impose on the successor company statutory obligations of exactly the kind which this Bill seeks to remove. These are the very kind of public sector obligations which many think have held back the NFC from achieving its potential. We cannot accept this amendment.

Viscount SIMON

I wonder whether the noble Lord, Lord Bellwin, can tell us what will happen to the staff of the National Freight Corporation who have been engaged in these research activities. Are they to be split up and thrown on one side?

Lord BELLWIN

As I speak, I do not know how many of the staff are engaged on research facilities. I do not know if any are engaged solely and only on research facilities. Clearly I do not know that at this moment in time. But the intention of the Bill is to transfer the ownership of the successor company and that will operate as a commercial company. If in the past this activity has been proven by carrying out research as it has been carried out— or in some other way that they may so wish— then, of course, they will continue to do so. But clearly it would be impossible to impose a statutory obligation on a company— to which, in effect, we shall be selling the NFC— that they should among other things carry out research for some purpose which may then be entirely inappropriate to what they are doing. As to what the staff would do, I repeat that it depends on what staff we are talking about, what exactly they are doing and what the direction will be of the successor company.

Lord UNDERHILL

I am very sorry to have to be critical because the noble Lord has been so helpful and co-operative on other matters. But I am surprised that in the light of this amendment, frankly, the department has not supplied the Minister with the figures as to the number of personnel in the corporation and its subsidiaries who are engaged on research and development work, particularly in view of the praise from a number of places that has been given to this development work.

I am also surprised at the reasoning given by the noble Lord as to why this provision should not go in the Bill, because it is an admission that when it is a public corporation there is a statutory responsibility as regards research and development. Now the noble Lord says that it will be transferred to a private company and it will be up to that company to decide whether or not it does it. If ever there was a justification for a public corporation, and in view ofits good record, this is it. There is obviously a clear difference between us and, although I shall not divide the Committee, I shall not withdraw the amendment.

Lord BELLWIN

I should like to make one further observation on this. If the successor company should be satisfied that what is being achieved by the research is indeed of such importance to the future advancement of the National Freight Corporation, I have no doubt whatever but that they will continue to do exactly the same thing. If it really is so good, they would be rather foolish not to go on doing so. But who is to say and who is to know?— certainly not us at this moment.

Lord MISHCON

I think what hurts so badly to those who sit on this side of the Committee— and I have an idea that this concern will be shared by many in whatever parts of the Committee they may sit, including the noble Viscount, Lord Simon, who has already put a question on this— is that it just shows— and I am not trying to make any dramatic point— the complete callousness with which the transfer of a great corporation such as this to private enterprise is made that, when we come to the Committee stage (and the Bill has already been through another place), the Government are unable to say, this amendment having been put down for some time, how many employees there are who are engaged on research; whether indeed they are engaged on research exclusively, or not. The noble Viscount's question was most pertinent. Possibly he was as surprised as I was when there was a reply such as that given by the noble Lord, Lord Bellwin.

Lord BELLWIN

With respect, I should have to say that it is not the Government that does not know, it is I, speaking here, who do not have this particular information at my fingertips. I am quite sure that there will not be the slightest difficulty in my getting this information. Whether it has relevance to the issue, I doubt very much.

Will your Lordships excuse me for one moment? I am still not in a position to give the actual numbers of people concerned. I think it is fair to say that the comment just received says in fact that the R and D of the NFC should not be overestimated. The research, on the other hand, is commercially orientated. If that is so, then I should have thought it highly likely that, if it is achieving what it should do in a commercially orientated way, then it will continue. But of course, a guarantee I cannot give. I need hardly say that the numbers in question will certainly be sent to noble Lords opposite and to anyone who is interested.

Viscount SIMON

As we cannot get any further on this at the moment, can the noble Lord give us an assurance, or obtain an assurance before the next stage of the Bill, that, in the interim period after the appointed day when the shares are vested in the Minister but before he has disposed of them, he will undertake not to dismantle the organisation that does research and development, and indeed the organisation that looks after the industrial relations?

Lord BELLWIN

There is no problem at all in my confirming that, because it is the clearly expressed intention that the Government want the NFC to go over in its entirety to the successor company, so there is no difficulty in my saying "yes" to the noble Viscount.

Lord MISHCON

Will the noble Minister please carry on with that undertaking before we adjourn and say that he will also see that such a department is not shut down, and that people in research are not dismissed on any sale of the securities from the company to the market?

On Question, amendment negatived.

Schedule 6, as amended, agreed to.

Lord BELLWIN

I beg to move that the House do now resume.

Moved accordingly, and, on Question, Motion agreed to.

House resumed.