§ 215 After Clause 45 insert the following new clause:
§ "Prohibition on stock exchange deals by insiders, etc.
§ .—(1) Subject to subsection (8) below, an individual who is, or at any time in the preceding six months has been, knowingly connected with a company shall not deal on a recognised stock exchange in securities of that company if he has information which—
- (a) he holds by virtue of being connected with the company;
- (b) it would be reasonable to expect a person so connected and in the position by virtue of which he is so connected not to disclose except for the proper performance of the functions attaching to that position; and
- (c) he knows is unpublished price sensitive information in relation to those securities.
§ (2) Subject to subsections (8) and (10) below, an individual who is, or at any time in the preceding six months has been, knowlingy connected with a company shall not deal on a recognised stock exchange in securities of any other company if he has information which—
- (a) he holds by virtue of being connected with the first company;
- (b) it would be reasonable to expect a person so connected and in the position by virtue of which he is so connected not to disclose except for the proper performance of the functions attaching to that position;
- (c) he knows is unpublished price sensitive information in relation to those securities of that other company; and
- (d) relates to any transaction (actual or contemplated) involving both the first company and that other company or involving one of them and securities of the other or to the fact that any such transaction is no longer contemplated.
§ (3) Subject to subsections (8) and (10) below, where—
- (a) any individual has information which he knowingly obtained (directly or indirectly) from another
1117 individual who is connected with a particular company, or was at any time in the six months preceding the obtaining of the information so connected and who the former individual knows or has reasonable cause to believe held the information by virtue of being so connected; and - (b) the former individual knows or has reasonable cause to believe that, because of the latter's connection and position, it would be reasonable to expect him not to disclose the information except for the proper performance of the functions attaching to that position;
§ (i) shall not himself deal on a recognised stock exchange in securities of that company if he knows that the information is unpublished price sensitive information in relation to those securities; and
§ (ii) shall not himself deal on a recognised stock exchange in securities of any other company if he knows that the information is unpublished price sensitive information in relation to those securities and it relates to any transaction (actual or contemplated) involving the first company and the other company or involving one of them and securities of the other or to the fact that any such transaction is no longer contemplated.
§ (4) Subject to subsections (8) and (10) below, where an individual is contemplating, or has contemplated, making, whether with or without another person, a take-over offer for a company in a particular capacity, that individual shall not deal on a recognised stock exchange in securities of that company in another capacity if he knows that information that the offer is contemplated or is no longer contemplated is unpublished price sensitive information in relation to those securities.
§ (5) Subject to subsections (8) and (10) below, where an individual has knowingly obtained (directly or indirectly), from an individual to whom subsection (4) above applies, information that the offer referred to in subsection (4) is being contemplated or is no longer contemplated the former individual shall not himself deal on a recognised stock exchange in securities of that company if he knows that the information is unpublished price sensitive information in relation to those securities.
§ (6) Subject to subsections (8) and (10) below, an individual who is for the time being prohibited by any provision of this section from dealing on a recognised stock exchange in any securities shall not counsel or procure any other person to deal in those securities, knowing or having reasonable cause to believe that that person would deal in them on a recognised stock exchange.
§ (7) Subject to subsections (8) and (10) below, an individual who is for the time being prohibited as aforesaid from 1118 dealing on a recognised stock exchange in any securities by reason of his having any information, shall not communicate that information to any other person if he knows or has reasonable cause to believe that that or some other person will make use of the information for the purpose of dealing, or of counselling or procuring any other person to deal, on a recognised stock exchange in those securities.
§ (8) The provisions of this section shall not prohibit an individual by reason of his having any information from—
- (a) doing any particular thing otherwise than with a view to the making of a profit or the avoidance of a loss (whether for himself or another person) by the use of that information;
- (b) entering into a transaction in the course of the exercise in good faith of his functions as liquidator, receiver or trustee in bankruptcy; or
- (c) doing any particular thing if the information—
- (i) was obtained by him in the course of a business of a jobber in which he was engaged or employed; and
- (ii) was of a description which it would be reasonable to expect him in the ordinary course of that business;
§ (9) In subsection (8) above "jobber" means an individual, partnership or company dealing in securities on a recognised stock exchange and recognised by the Council of the Stock Exchange as carrying on the business of a jobber.
§ (10) An individual shall not, by reason only of having information relating to any particular transaction, be prohibi-ted—
- (a) by subsection (2), (3)(ii), (4) or (5) above from dealing on a recognised stock exchange in any securities; or
- (b) by subsection (6) or (7) above from doing any other thing in relation tion to securities which he is prohibited from dealing in by any of the provisions mentioned in paragraph (a) above;
§ (11) Where a trustee or personal representative, or, where a trustee or personal representative is a body corporate, an individual acting on behalf of that trustee or personal representative, who, apart from subsection (8)(a) above, would be prohibited by this section from dealing, or counselling or procuring any other person to deal, in any securities deals in those securities, or counsels or procures any other person to deal in them, he shall be presumed to have acted as mentioned in that paragraph if he acted on the advice of a person who— 1119
- (a) appeared to him to be an appropriate person from whom to seek such advice; and
- (b) did not appear to him to be prohibited by this section from dealing in those securities."
§ 9.5 p.m.
§ Viscount TRENCHARDMy Lords, I beg to move that the House doth agree with the Commons Amendment No. 215. I will, with the permission of the House, speak at the same time to Amendment No. 216. These are the first two clauses, perhaps the most important of the first of the clauses, in the insider dealing section of the amendments, which was Clause 5 in the other place, and to Amendment No. 215 a number of amendments have been tabled. These two clauses are, as I say, concerned with insider dealing and there is wide agreement, both in this House and outside, that insider dealing should be made a criminal offence.
Noble Lords will no doubt recall that when this Bill was last before us we said that the Government's view was that insider dealing was wrong and should be discouraged and condemned in every way possible. We pointed out, however, that the task of sorting our the problems was not a straightforward one and that the dangers involved in getting the legislation wrong were very great. We therefore resisted the attempt of noble Lords opposite to include in this Bill provisions on insider dealing which we considered carried with them a real risk of doing damage to desirable market functions and normal investment functions. We said we would be reconsidering the topic and undertaking further consultations before bringing forward legislation. That we have done. We issued a Consultative Document in October of last year which took the form of draft clauses. These commanded considerable support and, as a result, as I have said, the clauses were introduced, with minor modifications, during the Committee stage in another place.
They are different in a number of respects from the 1978 Bill. One of the central issues is, of course, the definition of what we can loosely term inside information. The 1978 Bill contained a very wide definition: it was simply information which the individual knew was not generally available but which would, if it were 1120 so available, be likely materially to affect the price of those securities. "Generally available" was at that time to be defined by an amendment put forward by the Government as:
available on request to those members of the public likely to take an interest in it".We felt that this was imprecise, and that it would have hindered, or prevented entirely, legitimate activities. Indeed, this was the view of a considerable number of bodies who criticised the definition, among them the Council for the Securities Industry, the Confederation of British Industry, the Engineering Employers' Federation, the Industrial Society, and the Law Society.We have therefore drawn the definition much tighter in our new clauses; in particular in subsection (1)(a),(b) and (c) of the new clause contained in Amendment No. 215. There are three elements, all of which have to be met. First, there is information which the individual holds by virtue of being connected with the company. We are therefore focusing now on insiders, and their tippees, who receive certain information because of their employment, or connection with the company. The second element is that it is information which it would be reasonable to expect a person in the position by virtue of which he is connected with the company not to disclose, except for the proper performance of the functions attaching to that position. What this means is that we are talking of information which should be kept in confidence, or used only for the purposes of the company, for example, information which could quite properly be made available generally would therefore not be inside information. The third part of the definition is that it is information which the individual knows is unpublished price-sensitive information. The key elements here are a restriction to specific matters and a better test of price sensitivity.
I should like to say one or two things about subsequent clauses relating to insider dealing. The definition is set out in the interpretation clause, which is contained in Amendment No. 220, which we shall be considering shortly. We have omitted the requirement in face-to-face transactions of disclosure of an insider's connection with a company. We felt that that was an unsatisfactory approach, 1121 and instead we have extended the prohibitions to cover certain off-market deals. This is provided for in Commons Amendments Nos. 217 and 218. Finally we have dropped the powers to appoint inspectors to investigate suspected insider dealing cases. We do not believe that such special powers are necessary or justified.
These are significant changes from the previous Act. However, we should not overlook the common ground, the central issue of which is of course that these clauses will make insider dealing a criminal offence. The penalties are spelt out in Commons Amendment No. 219. I believe that these clauses deserve the support of the House, and I trust that they will receive it. I beg to move.
§ Moved, That this House doth agree with the Commons in the said amendment.—(Viscount Trenchard.)