Defence

HL Deb 03 December 1980 vol 415 cc397-405

2.57 p.m.

Earl Cathcart rose to call attention to the vital importance of the United Kingdom maintaining a full defence capability both at home and abroad; and to move for Papers.

The noble Earl said: My Lords, I beg to move the Motion standing in my name on the Order Paper. In doing so, I do not think that we should begin our debate on defence this afternoon without first paying tribute to the noble Lord, Lord Ballantrae, whose death last Friday we all regret and to whose service, both to the country and to the Commonwealth, we all owe so much. He had a very varied career, with a wide range of interests and activities. After long and distinguished service as a regular soldier, which included being ADC to Lord Wavell and being in Ord-Wingate's expeditions in Burma with the Chindits, it was in fitting recognition of his devotion to his regiment that in 1969 he should have been appointed Colonel of the Black Watch. But we must also recall that, in later life, he became Governor-General of New Zealand and also Lord High Commissioner of the General Assembly of the Church of Scotland, Chancellor of St. Andrew's University and chairman of the British Council. Throughout his career he was a very distinguished author, not least of military history. He will be a great loss to your Lordships' House.

This debate comes at a time of great instability and world tension, when there is a clear need for this country to maintain a full defence capability, both at home and abroad. The importance of this debate is borne out by the large number of noble Lords who have put down their names to speak. Some of my noble friends who are taking part in this debate have agreed to deal with certain specific aspects of defence, rather than try to cover the whole range of this very large subject in one speech. By this means, we hope to keep our speeches short, while still doing justice to the subject as a whole.

If each speech averages 12 minutes, I calculate that my noble friend the Minister will rise, by leave, to reply at 9.45, excluding time spent on the Statement. If that is so, I believe your Lordships will agree that we shall have given reasonable attention to this important subject today. If, however, the average length of your Lordships' speeches is increased by three minutes to 15 minutes each, he will not be able to rise until 11.30, excluding the Statement, and I think your Lordships will agree that we shall have done more than justice to the subject this afternoon.

There are three reasons why we need to debate defence matters today. First, there is the ever-growing size and strength of the Soviet forces on land, sea and air and in nuclear weapons, both tactical and strategic. Russia spends 14 per cent. of her gross national product on her armed forces, which even at this moment are deployed in action in at least one theatre of operations, if not more, and in no way in a situation of self-defence.

Secondly, inflation leaves its mark on all forms of national expenditure and this applies equally to defence. There is anxiety as to whether we can afford to continue spending such large sums on defence even though the need to do so does not appear to grow less. Can we afford to be in the "first eleven" on the Continent and at the same time to protect our sea routes? Can we afford the nuclear deterrent or should we simply provide our full defence capability within NATO in those spheres for which we are best suited? These anxieties are heightened by the Government's recent forecast decision to cut defence spending by £200 million. The third reason for this debate is the decision of the Socialist Party Conference at Blackpool to adopt a policy of unilateral nuclear disarmament while still remaining in NATO and to ban the basing of American nuclear weapons in this country.

We shall almost certainly have to wait until next year's defence White Paper to learn what economies will have to be made to save the £200 million. One must hope that the cuts are only temporary measures. If they fall purely on domestic items, such as new buildings or savings in heating and light, then I am sure the reasons will be appreciated by the servicemen themselves, and indeed there will be relief that the services are playing their part in helping to overcome our present difficulties of recession. But there is anxiety that it will affect the operational efficiency of the armed forces. Already one hears of shortages of spare parts and the limitations on the use of petrol. Driving instruction is being curtailed and flying time for training pilots is greatly limited, just to give two examples. If we place our operational capability in doubt we cast doubts on our will to defend ourselves and we lose a major deterrent effect.

When we speak of "the deterrent" we are all inclined to think only of the nuclear deterrent, but of course the ability to deter is not the exclusive prerogative of nuclear weapons, although they are the ultimate in deterrents and almost certainly the most decisive. A sound home defence structure, for example, is also a vital deterrent in itself, and this must include the security of people and key buildings, air defence, protection against subversion and civil defence. To be effective deterrents, they must be seen to exist.

Many people have doubts about the policy of dual basing and our ability to mobilise and apply our reserves and territorial units to their battle stations with the British Army of the Rhine during a period of rising tension leading to all-out war. For this reason the recent Exercise Crusader and the practice call-up of reservists a weekend or two ago were watched with interest because they show that we are determined that these two problems shall be overcome, and that in itself is a deterrrent. I hope that both these matters will be referred to in some detail in next year's defence White Paper.

To turn now to the Labour Party's decision on defence policy, taken at Blackpool, the decision means that the Labour Party, if returned to power, would not only scrap our existing British nuclear weapons but would also ban the positioning of American nuclear weapons in the United Kingdom. This would greatly weaken our contribution to NATO. But supposing Western Europe, including the United Kingdom, were threatened by aggression and the United States, as a member of NATO, tried to deter that aggression by the threatened use of its own nuclear weapons, would a Labour Government accept that protection or would they then withdraw from NATO? Perhaps if Western Europe was threatened by aggression, France who signed the North Atlantic Treaty, might join forces with the West and also attempt to deter the aggressor by the threatened use of her nuclear weapons.

NATO cannot defend itself against Russia by attempting to match the military strength of the Warsaw Pact countries. They must depend on the threat of use of nuclear weapons. NATO, which is a defensive alliance of collective security, needs the deterrent effect of the nuclear weapons to deter aggression from ever occurring. I believe it is a sounder and safer policy if nuclear weapons are possessed by two, or, in the case of France, three member nations of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation rather than just by America.

When France left NATO and ceased to play any further part in its peacetime infrastructure it seriously damaged the defence posture of the alliance, and NATO cannot be weakened further at this juncture. Certainly we should like to see the bomb banned. Certainly we should like to be able to negotiate disarmament but, as the noble Lord, Lord Stewart of Fulham, said last week in your Lordships' House, we must be patient; we must make full use of the existing fora of disarmament in order to achieve this most difficult target. If the bomb is to be banned and disarmament effective it cannot be achieved by the example of one nation alone; it can only be done by negotiation, and we cannot approach the conference table with any certainty of success if we have already effected the greater part of that disarmament by our own unilateral action.

I hope the message that will go forth from this debate will be that we continue to support NATO fully and in all its aspects of collective security; that we continue to maintain the balance of power, including the allocation of our nuclear weapons to NATO, while at the same time making it clear that if we receive a clear indication from Russia to discuss gradual disarmament of the two opposing pacts we shall always be very ready to join those discussions. My Lords, I see that I am just inside my 12 minutes! I beg to move for Papers.

3.9 p.m.

Lord Peart

My Lords, first may I endorse the tribute which the noble Earl, Lord Cathcart, paid to the noble Lord, Lord Ballantrae. "Fergie", as he was known to many of us, was a distinguished author, a distinguished soldier and a remarkable man. I first met him in New Zealand when he was Governor General and we have been friends ever since. He was a kindly man, a brave man. He experienced tragedy when his wife was killed in an unfortunate accident and I do not think he ever really got over it. He was a great man, so I join 100 per cent. in the warm tribute that the noble Earl, Lord Cathcart, paid today.

To turn to other matters, the noble Earl mentioned the views of the Labour Party, but I am going to leave that to my noble friend Lord Brooks of Tremorfa to reply to later because I believe that my noble friend Lord Stewart of Fulham answered it admirably when he wound up the debate the other day.

This is a debate on defence and I think we can all endorse the words of the gracious Speech. Indeed, I pay tribute to the two movers in what was virtually a defence day. I am thinking of the two proposers of the Motion who spoke admirably. However, I wish to deal with some policy aspects. First, I should like to say that I think we can become too much involved ad nauseam (if I may use that phrase) about whether or not one is a multilateralist or a unilateralist. To be quite frank, I have always believed in adequate defence. I believe that we should achieve disarmament by multilateral means, if we are going to do so. I would not accept a policy which would give carte blanche to a complete removal of the strength of our country. That is my view and I know that my noble friend will endorse it.

Indeed, my party as a whole over the years has provided many fine Ministers. For example, my noble friend Lord Shinwell was Minister for Defence. There have been many fine Foreign Secretaries like Ernest Bevin. All of them gave strength to the organisation that was created in Europe; namely, NATO. So, it would be very wrong if noble Lords sought to attack us for our attitude. We have always supported NATO and we believe that that is the right forum for most decisions to be taken in.

The Prorogation speech states: My Government attach the highest importance to ensuring the security of the nation and the maintenance of peace. They have played a leading role within the North Atlantic Alliance to ensure that the defence capability of the West is such as to deter any would-be aggressor. British defences have been strengthened and action has been taken to improve the morale of the armed forces". It goes on to say: My Government have taken steps to maintain the effectiveness of Britain's nuclear deterrent into the 1990s and beyond. Realistic, balanced and verifiable arms control measures have been sought in the Committee on Disarmament and in other negotiations". I basically endorse that. I do not think that this is a party issue. So, today's debate is important. As I have said, we can argue ad nauseam about unilateral and multilateral disarmament. But I recognise the sincerity of those who disagree with that approach. After all, in my own party there are strands of Christian socialism—people who genuinely believe that they should not kill—and there are others who feel that arms can merely tempt people to have conflict. I disagree with that view and that is why, as I said earlier, I believe that it is right and proper that we should have a defence system coming under NATO and that we should make our contribution to the alliance in Europe.

I should like to ask one or two questions on many matters affecting defence, matters which may seem humdrum but which are really important from the point of view of our defence capability. We are committed to NATO, but when I think of the running-down of our railways which the Government have undertaken, I remember the part that the railways played in the last war as regards the important matter of getting goods and services to distant parts of the country. I understand that there is even a suggestion of selling off some railways. That affects inevitably the transport system which, in a period of crisis, is so important, as it was in the last conflagration.

What about the steel industry? I remember chiding noble Lords opposite about this matter. It is a key industry which is essential to the armaments industry. What are the Government doing? They are running down steel production. That, in the end, will harm the power strength of our nation as regards the armaments and the weaponry which we build. I point out to the noble Lord, Lord Soames, that, as head of the Civil Service, he is responsible for the industrial Civil Service—the dockyards employing men and women who make a valuable contribution to any defence effort. I believe that at times their morale has been bad and that perhaps all parties have been to blame. However, when we discuss defence we are really discussing not just soldiers, but the skilled men in factories, ordnance factories and other institutions.

I have said that transport is essential. I believe that the attack on the steel industry will harm our armaments production. I should also like to ask about commodities. There was an interesting article in the Guardian the other day which dealt with metal production and minerals. The article says: The Materials Forum was set up in 1978–79 by a group of professional institutions concerned with metallurgical science and metals-using industries". In other words: It reflected a growing anxiety about the availability of metals [to us], some of them of critical importance to the future of British industry "— and important as regards defence. The article continues: The Materials Forum has just produced its first annual report. It summarises the proceedings of a number of conferences at which expert authorities analysed the dependence of industrial nations on imported metals. A number of countries, among them the UK, are totally dependent on a number of key so-called strategic metals. France, Germany, Japan and the US have identified their strategic metals, and have been creating stockpiles. As for the UK, the Materials Forum reports: 'In the UK little attempt has been made to identify strategic metals'". I cannot understand why there has been such a lack, and I would like the Minister who is to reply to deal with this very problem because it is a key problem. These metals are essential to our weaponry, and indeed to the development of our tanks, ships and other defence matters. So I would remind noble Lords of the importance of this. The article goes on: Sir Alan Cottrell, a former chief scientific adviser to the Government, is quoted as saying at a conference: 'As regards specifically assessing the assurance of future materials supplies, this country is largely sailing blind today'". That really is a terrible thing to say. We should be strong in that regard because it is essential to the building-up of our defence organisation.

To move to another matter, I believe that we should also ask the noble Lord, Lord Strathcona and Mount Royal, who is to reply, what is the present position in relation to the armed forces. Is there to be a limit of 6 per cent. as regards their pay? I should like the noble Lord to spell it out in his reply. It is a very important matter, which of course, affects morale.

I have always argued that, if we are to have a proper defence policy, then in the modern world we must have allies in Europe. I believe that one of the best allies that we still have is Helmut Schmidt, who I am certain is anxious to play his part to ensure that we shall not have a battlefield in Europe, but will have peace. I believe that Helmut Schmidt has shown great vision. I hope that the British Cabinet will support him in everything that he has done so far. I think that he has been a credit. I believe that he does not want his Germany to be a battlefield for the two super powers of the United States and the USSR. However, I think that he is a realist. He fears that they will maintain their territorial sovereignty and might not use the inter-continental ballistic missiles against each other after they see the effects of the devastation of Europe.

Russia might be needing a move towards détente in Europe. Overspending of their GDP on armaments by the Soviet Union has resulted in consumer dissatisfaction even in the satellite countries like Poland and at home. The economies of the Comintern countries have also been affected by recession. We must not assume that all is strength there. The question of defence and interests in the Middle East and the China border are among the other problems which affect these countries in a very important way. Therefore, we ourselves can play our part in really seeking allies in Europe, strengthening men like Helmut Schmidt and the German people, and having a European forum which deals with defence matters—in other words, we should still pursue NATO and also continue in the way that I have suggested. I think that that is a reasonable approach.

So in this debate, in which we are to limit our speeches—I said that I would limit mine to 10 minutes and I think that I have spoken for 10 minutes—please do not let us have party claptrap; let us deal with the essential issues—those which I have mentioned. If we do that, then this debate will be well worth while.

3.20 p.m.

Lord Gladwyn

My Lords, I also would like to pay my tribute to that splendid Scot, Lord Ballantrae, who was, as I think, one of the great personalities of this House. My own most endearing recollection of him will be, as I thought, his incomparable mastery of the English language and his unfailing wit. We shall all miss him very deeply.

A week ago when I reproached the Labour Party for apparently—and I repeat the word "apparently"—hoisting the white flag alongside the red, I was upbraided by the noble Lord, Lord Cledwyn of Penrhos, who said that I had not been in politics for very long—in fact it is about 15 years, I think—that I might not therefore know that party political decisions could be reversed; that anyhow the Liberal Party was just as divided as the Labour Party on this issue. Well, I have been long enough in politics to understand that decisions are always taken by majority vote. So I maintain that whereas the Labour Party by a large majority is for the moment at least in favour of unilateral nuclear disarmament, the Liberal Party by a considerable majority is not. That is not to say that a Liberal minority is not in favour of unilateral nuclear disarmament; indeed many Liberals are, and I think I am right in saying you will hear a Liberal spokesman for this school of thought later in the debate. Nor would I deny for a moment that if you are a pacifist—that is to say, somebody who would refuse to fight in any circumstances—it is a perfectly logical, indeed necessary, attitude to adopt. I think the noble Lord, Lord Peart, said this in his remarks. What I do resolutely maintain, alongside the Liberal majority, is that, unless you are a pacifist, approval of unilateral nuclear disarmament is highly dangerous and probably fatal, because as I tried to demonstrate last time, and certainly will not try to do so again, adoption of such a policy by the Government of this country would inevitably involve the disruption of NATO and the consequent placing of Western Europe at the mercy of the Soviet Union.

So let us assume, God willing, that we do not have a Government so committed in a few years' time, but rather a Government which, pending successful negotiations for disarmament and the limitation of armaments, are resolved to defend the country to the best of their ability. If so, the guiding principle, surely, must be that this country, whatever the sacrifices, is prepared, if necessary, to fight and is not simply relying for its safety on a deterrent, so-called, which, though it could well deter the use of nuclear weapons by the adversary and is therefore essential for that specific purpose, could not by itself be relied on to deter, still less to counter, any determined conventional assault. For the first kind of deterrent, that is to say the nuclear deterrent, however, we must, I believe, on the assumption that NATO survives, rely primarily on the Americans. For the second—namely, the deterrent to conventional war—we must to a large degree, surely, rely on ourselves. It follows that for any kind of safety we must not spend many billions of pounds on the first but rather on the second, and if we can afford the one, as the Government say, then we can certainly afford the other.

Supposing, therefore, that the Government go back on their provisional Trident decision and decide to spend the money, or much of it, on improving our conventional defences. What might they then profitably do? As I see it, much of the £500 million extra for defence each year during the next 10 years, which we are going to spend—or preferably, I would think, an extra £1,000 million for the next five years—which comes to much the same thing, should be devoted to increasing and maintaining the stocks of conventional armaments of all sorts held in support of the British Army on the Rhine, which at the moment, as I understand it, are in fairly poor shape, indeed dangerously so. After that, a considerable sum should be reserved for the inevitable extra cost of any new weapons that may come into service during this period, since it is an unfortunate fact that they usually increase by two or three times after the order has been placed until they become available. This would especially apply to any new anti-tank or anti-aircraft weapons and devices, to say nothing of possible replacements for the Harrier and the Jaguar aircraft.

Next—this is quite an important point—for as long as our voluntary system continues we must presumably put by extra money for attracting suitable recruits out of a diminishing total number available in a few years time. And, lastly, if there is still a bonus, and I think there might well still be, we can suitably produce more vessels for the Navy and for the protection of our sea lanes generally, and more especially for the oil rigs in the North Sea. All this could almost certainly be done for less money than it would take to produce the renewed strategic nuclear deterrent, the expense of which will, of course, increase from year to year.

It is naturally evident that if such a policy is going to make the Russians think twice about engaging in war in the event of some crisis arising in the Middle East or elsewhere, it should in a general way be adopted by our allies as well. Is there any chance of this happening or moving in that direction? As I understand it, the Foreign Secretary would be well advised to get our European colleagues at least to consider taking some steps towards it by arranging to give some political direction to the "Independent European Programme Group", which for the past five years or so and in default of any such direction has been more or less languishing in Rome. What is clearly wanted here is that the Ministers of Defence of the nine, soon to be the ten, or such of them as wanted to do so, should occasionally meet with the Foreign Ministers in order to consider what should now be done in a general way. If one or more of the nine refused to join in, that would not matter very greatly. They would not leave NATO as a result.

In any case, some common European effort in this direction, in the direction of the production of the necessary modern defensive weapons, would take place, after all, in the context of the North Atlantic alliance, and would hence, I think, be greatly welcomed by the Americans. Anyhow, since such development would be outside the Treaty of Rome, there would be no legal objection to it, and even some legal justification, for the Ministers of Defence who might meet would probably be those representing countries already members of the Western European Union, a body which, after all, still exists and even from time to time passes meaningful resolutions.

The main point is that unless we can persuade our peoples that Western Europe must and can be defended by conventional means, which admittedly must involve some additional effort, but which I believe is perfectly possible, in spite of what the noble Earl, Lord Cathcart, said—for, after all, we can defend ourselves conven- tionally against very great conventional superiority and it is quite possible to have a conventional defence which would make sense without any very great expense—unless, in other words, we can give the impression that we can defend ourselves conventionally against the Russians, the spirit of defeatism and surrender, which is now making progress in many of our countries, more especially among young people, may well gain the upper hand. That would result in the departure of the Americans, who would then proceed, as the isolationists have always wanted, to organise what is called "Fortress America". I am afraid in the long run nothing is more likely than that to result in general nuclear war.

When I last spoke I was so rash as to intervene in an apparent struggle between the noble Earl, Lord Longford, and his conscience. The noble Earl was arriving at his conclusion—a very proper conclusion I think as such—that there were circumstances in which the British Government would be morally entitled to use nuclear weapons. At that stage I ventured to inquire whether such circumstances would include their possible use on a first strike, and I asked this because ever since the Russians achieved nuclear parity, and even superiority, it has always struck me that such action, using nuclear weapons on a first strike, if not morally indefensible, would be practically suicidal.

This is surely not a technical point, as the noble Earl suggested; it is a very real issue that is posed. As I see it, the reason for the possession of nuclear weapons is to deter their use or the threat of their use by other Governments, and in practice by the Soviet Government, and not to use them when their use, however justified, would undoubtedly result in our total obliteration as a nation.

This is a truth which ought to be accepted and proclaimed if only for the reason that, unless it is done, many of our young people, and perhaps a majority in the country, will conclude that nuclear war is a strong possibility and the only possible course if one is to survive is to become a pacifist—whereas if it were a clear question of fighting and even dying in a conventional war, if necessary, to defend our liberties and our way of life against unprovoked aggression, like the Afghans or conceivably the Poles, most would respond willingly, I believe, to the call of duty. Certainly it would be interesting to know whether, in addition to the noble Earl, Lord Longford, the Bench of Bishops has been addressing itself to the all-important, if philosophically difficult, point of what constitutes a just war in the horrible conditions of the late 20th century, and notably whether it believes that it would be morally right for the leader of this country ever to authorise the use of nuclear weapons on a first strike.

I revert in conclusion to the first premise advanced in my speech last week. The whole point of our defence, which must of course be a collective defence, is to make it abundantly clear to any adversary that no kind of war, whether nuclear or conventional, would be profitable to him. Besides possessing nuclear weapons as a second strike deterrent, the alliance must therefore, as I think, put itself in a position if necessary to wage a successful conventional war; and this it has not yet done though, as I repeat, it easily could.