DEFENCE

HL Deb 26 June 1979 vol 400 cc1330-49

2.57 p.m.

The MINISTER of STATE, MINISTRY of DEFENCE (Lord Strathcona and Mount Royal)

rose to move, That this House welcomes the Government's intention to accord a higher priority to defence and to strengthen our contribution to the North Atlantic Alliance. The noble Lord said: My Lords, I should perhaps begin by explaining that we had intended to move the Motion to approve the Army, Air Force and Naval Discipline Acts (Continuation) Order today, but there has been a procedural problem in that the Joint Committee on Statutory Instruments has not yet been set up. Moreover, as the order is not required as a matter of urgency, we did not think it right to ask the House to suspend Standing Order No. 68 which requires that the House should not consider an affirmative instrument until it has been reported on by the Joint Committee. So, with the leave of the House, I shall proceed straight to the substantive Motion standing in my name, which I am delighted to see has attracted no fewer than four maiden speeches—including that of a former Chief of the Defence Staff—and we shall look forward very much to hearing them.

I think that we should all be grateful for this further opportunity of discussing defence matters. Noble Lords on all sides of the House felt that we had not done justice to defence last month during the debate on the Queen's Speech. I very much regretted the fact that on that occasion the lateness of the hour prevented me from responding to that debate as fully as I would have wished. Therefore, I should like to open today's debate by responding to some of the defence issues which were raised on that occasion.

During that debate a number of noble Lords spoke about the future of the British strategic deterrent and nuclear matters generally, and others raised the very important question of the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks. On that last point, the Government welcome the signing of the SALT II agreement last week by President Carter and President Brezhnev, and we hope that the treaty will be ratified by the United States Senate. The Americans have fully consulted us throughout the negotiations and we have long supported efforts to achieve strategic arms limitation.

The Government are fully committed to maintaining the effectiveness of Britain's nuclear deterrent, which is a most valuable part of our contribution to NATO's collective defence. In conjunction with conventional forces, strategic and theatre nuclear weapons—the so-called "triad"—deter aggression by making it clear to any potential adversary that NATO is able and willing to defend itself and to respond to any aggression. By providing a second centre for nuclear decision-making with NATO, the United Kingdom's independent nuclear forces increase the uncertainties faced by an aggressor, and our allies, including the United States, value the addition to the cohesion and the deterrent capability of NATO, which is thereby provided.

At the strategic level, we intend to continue the programme to improve the present Polaris force so that it remains a powerful ultimate deterrent to aggression in the 1990s. But we shall also be considering what steps should be taken to maintain this capability thereafter. As for theatre nuclear weapons, which are the subject of much current discussion in NATO, I listened with great interest to Field Marshal Lord Carver's excellent maiden speech during the debate on the Address last month, in which he referred to the new Soviet SS-20 missile. I quite take his point that there is nothing new about the fact that Russian nuclear weapons could be delivered on to targets in Western Europe; the SS4 and 5 ballistic missiles and the medium-range Badger bombers have given them this capability for many years. The introduction of the mobile SS-20, with its so-called MIRVed warheads, and the long-range backfire bomber does not initiate a threat, but these new weapons do modernise and expand it considerably, and their deployments are entirely unconstrained by SALT limitations.

I share the view of the noble Lord, Lord Carver, of the danger for the cohesion of NATO of trying to strike some kind of nuclear balance in Europe by matching the Soviet Union nuclear weapon for nuclear weapon. We see theatre nuclear weapons as allowing the Alliance to respond to aggression at whatever level it occurs. In particular, they give us the flexibility to be able to use nuclear weapons to contain the conflict without an immediate resort to strategic forces. At the same time such limited use would indicate NATO's readiness and will to respond. By pointing to the risks of further escalation, it provides an essential linkage with strategic forces, and for this purpose we do not need to provide a mirror-image of the Soviet Union's theatre forces. What is needed is a relatively smaller number of weapons with a range of capabilities at all levels, from the battlefield through to the longer range, so that an adversary cannot find any loophole in our deterrence which would allow him to attack in such a way that NATO's only options are either all out response or no response at all. Any such gap in our capability would seriously undermine the credibility of our deterrence.

Therefore, far from attempting to give Europe a separate nuclear capability, the deployment of limited numbers of theatre nuclear weapons in Europe enhances and strengthens the link with the United States' strategic deterrent by ensuring what is sometimes called the "continuum" of deterrence. In concept, the delivery systems required for the more limited theatre role are, therefore, different from those needed at strategic level to give an assured capability to inflict unacceptable damage on an enemy; and strategic systems may not always be suitable for the long-range theatre tasks.

Against this background the Alliance is looking carefully at the options for modernising its existing long-range theatre nuclear forces. This again is not a new departure; rather, it is the evolution of existing capabilities, such as that provided by the United Kingdom Vulcan bomber force which is due to be phased out in the early 1980s. The possibilities for an arms control approach in these so-called "grey areas" are being assessed in parallel. The Alliance is looking to make decisions on these issues in the near future, and Her Majesty's Government are taking an active part in the discussions and place great importance on NATO achieving a satisfactory solution. This in itself would be an indication of the ability of the Alliance to act with cohesion and decisiveness.

I can assure the noble Lord, Lord Carver—and I hope that he will forgive me for aiming some parts of my speech at him in this way, but he gave us some excellent trigger points—that the Government attach very great importance to both the vital nuclear and equally vital conventional contribution which the United States makes to the defence of Europe. Of course, the commitment of all the NATO allies is important in furthering Alliance aims and in reducing the risk of external aggression. But an essential feature of the North Atlantic Alliance is undoubtedly the link it provides between Western Europe and North America. We and our European Allies benefit from the protection and deterrence afforded by the strategic nuclear forces of the United States; while the presence of United States forces on the European mainland is indispensable in both political and military terms. Therefore, we welcome the firm commitment of the United States to NATO and hope that they will continue to share our belief in the cohesion and importance of the Alliance.

During last month's debate the noble Lord, Lord Balfour of Inchrye—and I regret that he is not present today—spoke of the inadequacy of the number of fighters dedicated to this country's air defence. This is a deficiency to which we have long drawn attention and which was finally publicly admitted by the previous Administration when they announced a decision on the principle of increasing the number of United Kingdom-assigned fighters last March. However, we found—and this may be slightly at variance with some of the implications of some remarks made by a Member of another place—that no money was allocated for such an increase. The difficulties in the way of a short-term improvement have been compounded by the pilot shortage, caused at least in part by the former Government's policies on Service pay. We have already made it clear that we shall put money behind our support for strong defence, with a pledge of 3 per cent. real growth in defence expenditure to 1986. If we project that forward, although 3 per cent. sounds comparatively modest, it does mount up.

Nevertheless, even with increased resources, we shall be hard pressed to fill all the gaps in the forces bequeathed to us. We face difficult decisions in allocating the resources available, and I cannot prejudge these issues. However, I can assure the noble Lord, Lord Balfour, that the Air Staff are closely examining the practical possibilities of making improvements to our fighter strength, and that we consider this area to be one of very high priority.

Another high priority project in the programme for the re-equipment of the RAF is the planned replacement for the 1990s of the Harrier and Jaguar aircraft which currently provide our front line offensive support. Initial studies have been completed; further studies are now in hand to refine the requirements and, very importantly, we are having discussions with some of our European allies, in particular France and Germany, to determine whether national requirements and time scales can be aligned as a basis for a collaborative project.

These are two, but only two, of the important projects for consideration in a defence equipment programme which this year amounts to some £3½ billion. This figure represents over 40 per cent. of the defence budget and includes £l¼ billion spent on research and development. Two-thirds of the research and development money, which amounts to 14 per cent. of the defence budget, is spent with industry. These are formidable figures indeed.

The great majority of the equipment we buy comes from the United Kingdom, but international collaborational projects account for some 15 per cent. of our equipment spending and, with the increased sophistication of modern weapon systems, this collaboration assumes increasing importance in our plans. I think it is common ground between all members of NATO, and indeed possibly of the Warsaw Pact as well, that equipment is becoming more and more expensive in real terms and that there are very few of us who can afford to introduce as much new equipment as we would wish. Even the Americans admit this. To get the best value for money, especially where large and sophisticated projects are concerned, we shall examine carefully the prospects for collaborative development and production with NATO allies either in Europe or in North America.

We recognise, however, that the right conditions for collaboration are far from easy to achieve. It is not always easy to agree on operational requirements or on the time scale for replacement, and we have to consider carefully both the political and industrial factors in the equation. I think it goes without saying that it is always more expensive and difficult to manage a collaborative programme than a national one. Yet despite this, there have been some marked successes in the field of European equipment collaboration. Tornado is by far the largest but there have been considerable successes with helicopters and field artillery. Despite the problems which are fully recognised, it is the firm intention of this Government to pursue actively all realistic possibilities for international equipment co-operation in either development or production, or both.

And now a few words about the members of the armed forces, their pay and conditions. The Government have fulfilled their pledge to implement in full from 1st April 1979 the pay rates for the Services recommended by the Armed Forces' Pay Review Body in its Eigthh Report. The Government have also promised that they will thereafter maintain the pay of servicemen at the levels of their civilian counterparts. We are confident that these two measures will lead to an improvement in the morale of the armed forces and they will, it is expected, reduce the very damaging outflow of experienced and skilled officers and men which the armed forces have suffered from most particularly in the last two years.

In Opposition we were very concerned about the manning of the armed forces. I am sorry to say that this concern has been fully confirmed now that we have taken office. All three Services are below planned strengths and there are serious shortfalls in a number of areas. Recruitment over the last year has been generally good, certainly in comparison with recent years, but the losses of trained and experienced men through premature voluntary outflow have been substantial. The armed forces have been losing highly skilled men who cannot readily be replaced, and of course it is no use spending a lot of money on equipment if you have not the men to man it.

It is, as yet, too early to see the beneficial effects of the pay award reflected in recruitment or retention figures. We shall be watching these figures very closely over the coming months to ensure that the turn-round in manpower we expect is happening and that the armed forces are restored to a level necessary for the proper defence of the country and of our allies. In the meantime, we are considering means of mitigating the effects of the present shortages on front-line forces, and we shall not shrink from some of the disagreeable decisions which that may make necessary. However, I think it is fair to say that pay is not the only factor in encouraging young men and women to make the armed forces a career. The Armed Forces' Pay Review Body pointed out in its recent report that the conditions of service of the armed forces have not kept pace with changes in the social and economic environment. The Government are therefore reviewing other conditions of service. The House will be aware that a special study group has been set up within the Ministry of Defence to look at the conditions of service appropriate for the armed forces in the 1980s.

The reserve forces of all three Services have a vital part to play, and this Government are fully committed to maintaining their efficiency. The main seagoing role of the Royal Naval Reserve is in mine-counter measures in support of the regular forces who are being re-equipped with the new Hunt Class mine-counter measure vessels. This area concerns us greatly. Earlier this year, a decision was announced to procure a new class of 12 Extra Deep Armed Team Sweep vessels based on a commercial trawler design to counteract the increased threat of mine laying in deeper waters. These craft will be operated by the RNR and, to gain experience of operating vessels of this character, the RNR have commissioned two chartered trawlers. The RNR would also man in war time some vital shore-based appointments.

Turning now to the Army, the Territorial and Army Volunteer Reserve in particular would play a crucial part in the nation's defence in war, both in reinforcing the peacetime strength of the British Army of the Rhine, and in undertaking tasks in defence of the United Kingdom, with its vital national and NATO installations. The rate of manpower turnover in the TAVR has, however, been allowed to reach a serious level, and urgent steps are necessary to encourage volunteers to serve longer and to carry out more training if the operational effectiveness of the force is not to fall short of what is required. The Government are, therefore, giving urgent consideration to the recommendations of the Shapland Committee, which the previous Government set up—and all credit to them—to study all the factors affecting the rate of wastage in the Territorial Army Volunteer Reserve. Decisions on this matter will, we hope, be announced shortly.

It was announced recently that the RAF is to evaluate the use of volunteer RAF Regiment auxiliary units to defend Service airfields in the United Kingdom. Three Royal Auxiliary Air Force Regiment Field Squadrons will be formed—the first time we have had such auxiliary squadrons since 1957—each having a strength of about 150 officers and airmen including a small core of regular personnel. If the scheme is a success, it could lead to auxiliary units being used at other RAF stations, I very much hope that the public will support this effort, which will give the chance for them to join in the defence of their country.

Finally, let me summarise the approach of the Government to defence. Broad defence strategy will not change under this Government. We remain wholly committed to NATO and the belief that a collective stance against the threat from the East remains our best chance of survival. We shall make improvements in defence equipment, but procurement timescales are long and will not permit rapid changes. What can and will change is the climate. Indeed, I think it is fair to claim that it has already done so with the award of fully comparable rates of pay to the armed forces. We shall lose no opportunity of making it clear to members of the forces and the very important civilian component that the Government care about them and recognise the vital tasks they discharge. We shall explain to the country at large the need for adequate defence forces and the respect and gratitude that they are entitled to expect from the public whose protection they ensure.

This same spirit should imbue our participation in NATO. The NATO countries are looking for a lead and they will get it. We must take a lead in the enormously difficult task and try to achieve a greater degree of standardisation, harmonisation and interoperability—three horribly long Latin words, but very important ones—within NATO. The potential benefits are enormous, yet progress in this area has been discribed as "glacial". Without belittling the problem, we must redouble our efforts in Europe in order to compete on a much more equal footing with our American allies, who have recently made important initiatives in this field. I beg to move.

Moved, That this House welcomes the Government's intention to accord a higher priority to defence and to strengthen our contribution to the North Atlantic Alliance.—(Lord Strathcona and Mount Royal.)

3.24 p.m.

Lord PEART

My Lords, I am grateful to the noble Lord, Lord Strathcona and Mount Royal, for introducing this debate. For a Front Bench speech, his was short and concise, although he may recall that when speaking to a Motion on agriculture the other day I said we should try to keep our speeches to 15 minutes; and I will try to do that today.

I remember a year ago opening a debate such as this and in reality I see very little difference between the approach I took then and the approach of the Minister today, except on the question of armed forces' pay; instead of holding up one section of it, the Government have decided to pay it in toto. But the basic quality is still the same, and I am glad there has been no change, and I believe I see the noble Lord nodding in assent at that. In my view that is right; I believe our policy must be within NATO and, above all, within the nuclear umbrella of the United States. The United States must be supported in the field of defence, and I shall be dealing specifically with what has emerged from the Vienna talks because it is an important matter which we cannot shrug off, and we must give the United States President, Mr. Carter, all the support we can.

I know there is great controversy in the United States about the strategic talks and what has happened in Vienna and there are elements there, in the Senate and Congress, who want to oppose what the President has done. I hope there will be no one in this House, or indeed in this country, who will let down the President. President Carter has done a marvellous job, in my view, in the strategic talks, and I believe he has paved the way for détente with the Soviet Union. I know a lot of people dislike this. Some people think we are playing up too much to the Russians, but if the American President can get what I believe he has got, then we shall have moved a long way and should approve what the President has done.

I have carefully read the official text. It is a long document of some 15 pages, together with all the annexes, and I recommend it to be read carefully by those who are interested in defence. It is a major step forward and I hope President Carter will win the political battle in the United States. He has been and is being opposed by some distinguished Congressmen and Senators, but I believe that in the end he will triumph. I note that today in the international section of the Herald Tribune there is a statement by the Russians, who are now coming on to the attack, if I may put it that way, in the verbal battle: Gromyko Warns US on Changes in SALT-2 Pact the headline reads, and the paper goes on: Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko warned the US Senate today that amendment or rejection of the Strategic Arms Limitation Treaty signed in Vienna a week ago would mean 'the end of negotiations', which he called 'a fantastic situation'. Mr. Gromyko's statement was made during a wide-ranging news conference apparently intended to give broader exposure to the Soviet view of the summit between President Carter and Leonid Brezhnev. 'I tell you frankly', Mr. Gromyko said in English to a US corespondent who asked what would happen if the Senate rejected the treaty, ' it is impossible to resume negotiations. It would be the end of negotiations, the end, no matter what amendments would be made'. Mr. Brezhnev said in Vienna that attempts to change the agreement could cause it to collapse. Mr. Gromyko's stronger words are probably what the Senate Democratic majority leader, Robert Byrd of West Virginia, will hear when he arrives here to discuss the treaty with Soviet leaders next Tuesday". Here, therefore, is a stage in our history when we can go forward or there can be a retreat, which would be disastrous. I do not detect all that enthusiasm from some people about what President Carter has achieved; I notice that some people dissent. I hope they will have the courage to make such speeches today. I know that one noble Lord has already done so, and I respect him for his position, but I think he is wrong. I hope we shall emphasise the main points of the Vienna agreement—they have been quoted often in our papers; the terms appeared in the Guardian the other day and each article has been listed—and give our full support; and I hope that in his reply to the debate the Minister will finally state the policy of the Government on this issue.

Head-counting is now starting and I believe this could create difficulties, in America in particular, and I hope Britain will stand firm. Mr. Callaghan, my leader, has come out strongly on this, and I know that Helmut Schmidt has, though the French are a bit careful about it because of their independent deterrent and their own view of having an independent strategy. Nevertheless, I believe that if we in Europe, in particular, and in NATO can stand by President Carter and what he has proposed, this will be regarded as one of the main events in our history.

Lord ORR-EWING

My Lords, I hope that the noble Lord will allow me to intervene. I am most grateful for his courtesy. Can he tell us how we can ensure that the Russians do not cheat? They have transgressed on 11 occasions in SALT I. They have disobeyed almost every agreement they signed in Helsinki. They have in Vietnam provoked the other side to disobey every treaty signed on their behalf. How can we make sure that they are not going to cheat on SALT II—as they have on SALT I?

Lord PEART

My Lords, the noble Lord knows that that is not strictly true. After all, if we are to have a major agreement of this kind, there must be trust on both sides. I suspect that people who do not wish to see détente working successfully are trying to create an atmosphere. The noble Lord and others who do not want the agreement to succeed are saying, "We can't trust the Soviet Union". But we have to trust them. We also have to trust the people who created the treaty. One reads that there will be continual consultations, monitoring, and other action—I cannot go into too much detail. I believe that if we trust the Soviet Union, then despite our differences, we can show that the treaty can work.

Let us remember that we won a major war with the help of the Soviet Union. Many people forget this. The Soviet Union broke the back of the German Army. I recall that in my maiden speech in the other place, upon returning home from the Army, I was rather pleased that we should defend the Soviet Union. I believe that we are now entering another era, and noble Lords opposite who may have Right-Wing views, and extreme views, should realise that this is a moment of history.

What is the alternative? Is it for us to have bad international relations? Do noble Lords wish that we should have more arms and more arms? Does not the noble Lord realise that we are now in a nuclear age and that if war broke out, it would be frightening. Our entire survival will depend upon trust. I strongly stress this, even though I know that many people will disagree with me. I believe that we are right to defend President Carter, and I consider that the speeches he has made to the Senate should be read by every noble Lord. I should like to give one example here. It is what President Carter said when speaking to Congress. I quote from the full text of his speech issued by the American Embassy. He said to Members of Congress: The truth of the nuclear age is that the United States and the Soviet Union must live in peace—or we may not live at all. From the beginning of history the fortunes of men and nations were made and unmade in unending cycles of war and peace. Combat was the measure of human courage. Willingness to risk war was the mark of statecraft. My fellow Americans, that pattern of war must now be broken forever. Between nations armed with thousands of thermonuclear weapons—each capable of causing unimaginable destruction—there can be no more cycles of war and peace. There can only be peace". I hope that noble Lords agree with that eloquent statement. President Carter continued: About two hours ago I returned from three days of intensive talks with President Leonid Brezhnev of the Soviet Union. I come in a spirit of patience, of hope, and of reason and of responsibility—patience because the way is long and hard, and the obstacles ahead are at least as great as those which have been overcome in the last 30 years of diligent and dedicated work". Thus, what I regard as an eloquent report to the American people.

I say to noble Lords, whatever their political faith, that they must at this stage of history defend this agreement, because if negotiations break down, we shall enter another, bigger arms race which will cripple our economies in Western Europe—and I hope that that is what noble Lords do not wish. I also hope that the better elements of the Conservative Party, who feel more positively and constructively about defence, will realise that this is a period of history. I hope, too, that Mrs. Thatcher will stand firm, as have Mr. Callaghan, and Helmut Schmidt in Europe. This is an important event, and we must think of it in those terms. For that reason I am making my speech sharp and short. T feel strongly about the matter, and I hope that my point of view will be supported in the House.

3.35 p.m.

Lord GLADWYN

My Lords, first, I, too, would wish to congratulate the noble Lord, Lord Strathcona and Mount Royal, on confining his remarks from the Front Bench to, I think, 22 minutes—a notable performance. I myself propose to speak for a little longer than the noble Lord, Lord Peart, but I hope not to exceed a quarter of an hour by very much. Once again, I propose to confine my remarks to the general strategy of our defence, on which, after all, our future may well depend. It was essentially because they had a defective defensive strategy that the French were overwhelmed in 1940. It was because theirs was almost equally unsound that the Russians were very nearly vanquished in 1941–42. Yet both the French and the Russians are nations with a great military tradition, and both had the benefit, presumably, of the advice of great military experts. Are we sure, therefore, that we ourselves have found the right way to avoid possible defeat in the years to come? Is our present strategy the right one? I am afraid that, despite the classical thesis developed by the noble Lord, Lord Strathcona and Mount Royal, I have considerable doubts.

Of course, our defence must rest primarily on the maintenance in being of the North Atlantic Alliance and of its operative arm, namely NATO. In other words, in default of satisfactory measures of disarmament, or the limitation of armaments, which we must do our utmost to promote—and here I entirely agree with the noble Lord, Lord Peart—the defence of the United Kingdom, as things are, can be ensured only by the continued presence of substantial United States forces in Europe and by the presumed willingness of America in the last resort to employ nuclear weapons in their support. Yet, as realists, we must recognise that this is not all that is necessary for salvation. Why is that?

Well, in the first place, no one can say whether there will be another world war in the 'eighties, but equally—in default of a not very probable general peace settlement—no one can deny that some kind of "confrontation" between East and West is, on the whole, likely. And it may well come about outside the NATO area; in, say, the Middle East, or further East, or even in Africa. It could also easily come about in the Mediterranean. If there is confrontation, then either the one side or the other will give in, or some kind of hostilities will result. One thing, is certain: the Soviet Union will not engage in hostilities unless it is pretty sure that it is going to win.

Another certainty to my mind is that hostilities, if they do break out, will inevitably be general, the issue being decided in Europe and its surrounding seas. So it is obvious that, once committed to war, the Soviet Government will feel impelled to mount a powerful and, if possible, unheralded assault in Germany before allied reinforcements can arrive, possibly backed up by the use of some kind of nerve gas, as I see is now being suggested.

I know, my Lords, that this thesis is disputed by some, but just consider the situation. If the "confrontation" involves any act of war, if, for instance, a Russian or an American ship is torpedoed, or even if the vital tankers are held up in the Persian Gulf, or are themselves torpedoed in the Indian Ocean, and all the more of course if either Norway or Turkey is invaded—because then the treaty would apply—a state of war will undoubtedly exist. And how could you be at war with the Soviet Union in, say, the Indian Ocean, and not at war with it in, say, the Barents Sea? Moreover, at the first sign of such trouble, would not the Americans and ourselves have to begin to reinforce our armies in Germany? We should be mad if we did not. Perceiving this, the Russians, if, as I say, they are committed to war anywhere, are bound to strike in Europe before the Western reinforcements can arrive. If they did not do so, they would obviously be in danger of losing the war.

In the second place, if there is war in Europe—and this is a point I have always emphasised, receiving not much support from anybody—we cannot be certain that the American President (still less, of course, the British Prime Minister or the French President) will authorise the first use of nuclear weapons, at least before Russian troops have penetrated deeply into the Federal Republic. We cannot be sure. If he does not, then we shall either have to face a long conventional war with small prospect of success or we shall have to make peace pretty quickly. Now, if he does give the signal, then, even though the United Kingdom and France, along with America, will no doubt be protected, presumably, by their own power of nuclear retaliation, great areas of Western Europe will, in view of the Soviet nuclear comeback, which is inevitable, be largely devastated by Russian so-called tactical modern weapons only a few days after hostilities have begun. I canot see how that can he disputed.

My Lords, this would be so even if we had the means, which we do not now have, of "deterring", as they say, from continental Europe, the employment of the SS-20s. For the first use by NATO of any tactical nuclear weapons or devices, which must surely be on a considerable scale if they are going to hold up the assault, must result in a corresponding nuclear riposte by the Soviet Union. That also seems to be inevitable. We really cannot safely act on any other hypothesis. The idea, for instance, that we could halt a major and long-planned offensive by some "warning shot across the bows", has never made the slightest sense, at any rate to me.

Horrifying though such a scenario may be, I believe it cannot be dismissed and that our general policy must therefore somehow take account of it. Perhaps the Soviet Union might be deterred by the possibility of a nuclear war even though, given nuclear parity, it would almost certainly be waged outside the frontiers of the Soviet Union. After all, if there were hostilities it would mean no trade with the West and hence grave dangers to the Soviet economy and to its unity. But perhaps it might not be deterred. So the real question is how best, apart from negotiating some acceptable follow-up to SALT II and, of course, in respect of MBFR in Vienna, we can avoid such a terrible sequence of events in, say, 1984.

To this question there is one obvious answer. If our conventional forces, notably in Western Europe, are judged capable—and judged capable by the Russians—of at least blunting, or holding up more or less within the border area for, say, 10 days or so, any Soviet armoured assault, that would be the best and perhaps the only real deterrent to World War III. For, unless demented, the Soviet Government, in view of the appalling consequences, could hardly be expected to employ nuclear weapons on a first strike; and if it believed it could not break through without the use of nuclear weapons, then, logically, it would not try to break through.

But, for such a forward defence to become credible, as the saying goes, there must clearly be a far greater effort on the part of the NATO allies, and notably the European allies, to achieve it. It need not be intolerably expensive. It is commonly thought that, broadly speaking, the defence need not have available much more, in principle, than, say, a third of the attacking forces. Nor need it run counter to any possible agreement in Vienna. For its accomplishment would not necessarily postulate any more men: only a new mentality, sufficient standardised purely defensive arms and devices of the latest type, and, above all, a common will.

At the moment, the many different types of modern conventional weapons at the disposal of SACEUR is something that tells against an effective defence, if only because of the difficulty of maintaining adequate stocks of ammunition and of achieving what is called "interoperability". Nor has much thought, I believe, been given up to now, in the event of war, to the possibility of moving special units across the border for the purpose of disrupting the adversary's communications. There is no time to dwell on such weaknesses; we all know of them. For years SACEUR and other experts have been pointing them out, and they still are. The Euro-group certainly has been doing what it can to rectify them, but given the relentless increase in the strength and efficiency of the opposing forces it is obviously, at any rate to my mind, not enough.

So my conclusion is this. Profiting by what I hope will be an improvement in our relations with France—a country which, if I heard him aright, was not even mentioned by the noble Lord, Lord Strathcona—which country, after all, holds the key, as I see it, to any real improvement in our general scheme of defence in Europe, Her Majesty's Government might, and I think should, first, take the lead in animating by every means the Independent European Programme Group, which has the task of getting agreement between all the European members of NATO, plus France—and I repeat, "plus France"—on the production in common of essential modern conventional weapons, notably by proposing (this is perhaps a daring suggestion) that, as has been the case with the Euro-group, whose functions it has, after all, largely taken over, it should periodically be attended by Ministers, the French having the permanent chairmanship (and why not?) should they so desire, and the Group itself being moved from Rome to Paris. Second, Her Majesty's Government should devote more time and energy, in all the relevant NATO bodies, to working out a credible forward defensive system in Germany based on the mass deployment of the most modern anti-tank and anti-aircraft weapons and devices.

Third, they should be prepared to spend more money to this end, as also—and I think this is a very important point—for the reinforcement of our naval and air capability to counter any conventional blockade of these islands. Fourth, they should take steps to protect at least key personnel against the effects of the employment of nerve gas. Fifth, they should encourage the Germans, on the maintenance of whose morale so much depends, by expressing willingness, in principle, to accept in this country any new weapons deemed necessary if Europe is to find some answer, other than the strategic forces of Britian and France, to the Soviet SS-20 missiles, which in view of the latest United States/Soviet agreement on the cruise missile is perhaps unlikely.

Sixth, Her Majesty's Government should be in no hurry to spend large sums on the renewal of our own strategic nuclear force, utilising part of the money so saved to strengthen our conventional forces, as already suggested, notably as it affects our defence against blockade. Finally, they should not turn down immediately any proposals by the new European Parliament for the occasional presence in the Committee of Foreign Ministers of Ministers of Defence, even if these were in practice limited to those members of the Community who are also members of the Western European Union.

I do not think that any of these proposals are vitiated by SALT II, which in principle we on these Benches, at any rate, support, and I think my noble friend Lord Banks will elaborate on that point. For they are based on the assumption that if we are clever and far-sighted we shall all avoid nuclear war and, indeed, avoid any general war during the 'eighties. Besides, I hold the view that, even if the Russians do cheat a bit—and they may—essential nuclear parity between the super-powers will probably be maintained, in the sense that even if the bulk of the missiles of one power could in theory be knocked out on a first strike, there would almost certainly be enough remaining capacity, whether submarine or airborne, to inflict quite unacceptable damage on the aggressor.

It is true that SALT II, by banning the long-range cruise missile, has resulted, pending any other proposals, in what is, in theory, a great disadvantage for the European members of NATO, because, if Hamburg or Dusseldorf can be obliterated without a corresponding obliteration of, for instance, Kiev or Minsk, the Russians will, again in theory, have a strong black-mailing card to play against the European members of NATO, and especially the Federal Republic, who have no strategic nuclear weapons of their own. But, for this to happen, we must imagine either that the Russians have had first recourse to the nuclear arm (which seems improbable) or that NATO has done so, in both of which cases there would inevitably have been an interchange of so-called tactical nuclear weapons which could have inflicted almost as much damage as the SS-20 missiles themselves. So though I think it is wrong for the USA to have, in effect, abandoned the cruise missile, I do not think that such abandonment is fatal if—but only if—we manage to construct over the coming years some credible conventional defence.

What it boils down to is this. Unless we and the French do now pull ourselves together and put more effort—if not within NATO, which the French will not rejoin, then, at least, within the framework of the North Atlantic Alliance—into creating some adequate forward defensive system we are, even without a war, in grave danger of defeat or, perhaps even more likely, of some major climb-down in, say, four or five years' time. Nobody suggests that the Russians want a war but they do want oil; and they certainly would like to have, as it were, "client" states in Western as well as in Eastern Europe, so at some stage—and always, I repeat, in the absence of some general settlement—a confrontation may take place which will settle our fate during the 21st century.

European unity is the way to prevent such a settlement being arrived at to our detriment. Unfortunately, however, the British people appear to be quite unaware of the great issues involved, being apparently solely concerned with butter mountains and whether we should pay rather more or rather less to the EEC budget. It seems to me, with great respect, that it is the responsibility of Her Majesty's Government to enlighten them or, at least, to tell them how dangerous the present position is.