Lords Sitting of 16 July 1979

Preamble
The House met at a quarter past two of the clock: The LORD CHANCELLOR on the Woolsack.
Prayers—Read by the Lord Bishop of Peterborough.

LORD GALPERN
Sir Myer Galpern, Knight, having been created Baron Galpern, of Shettleston in the District of Glasgow—Was, in his robes, introduced between the Lord Segal and the Lord Wells-Pestell.
LORD RENTON
The Right Honourable Sir David Lockhart-Mure Renton, KBE, TD, QC, having been created Baron Renton, of Huntingdon in the County of Cambridgeshire—Was, in his robes, introduced between the Lord De Ramsey and the Lord Drumalbyn.

FOG DISPERSAL AERODROMES
2.43 p.m.
Lord BRAYE: My Lords, I beg leave to ask the Question which stands in my name on the Order Paper.
The Question was as follows:
To ask Her Majesty's Government whether, in view of the fact that England remains one of the most fog-bound countries in Europe, some suitable fog dispersal unit, burning natural gas, could be installed at one of our major airports, as, despite the advent of the electronic landing system, considerable delays to passengers and mail occurred last winter owing to fog.
Lord TREFGARNE: My Lords, the matter of suitable equipment for use at United Kingdom aerodromes to promote regularity and safety of operations comes within the responsibility of the Civil Aviation Authority. However, as the noble Lord will recall, studies were conducted in the early 1970s into the possi-
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bility of developing a fog dispersal system similar to the FIDO system used during the 1939–45 War. Use of natural gas as a fuel was included in these studies. The conclusions reached were that the installation and running costs of such a system, however fuelled, would be too high and there would be unacceptable safety hazards. I understand that there are no indications that these conclusions would be any different today. The expert view in this country, in common with that in other leading aviation States, is that electronic approach and landing systems provide the best means of promoting regularity and safety in conditions of low visibility, and development remains concentrated on such means.
Lord BRAYE: My Lords, while thanking my noble friend for that reply, I should like to ask him a supplementary question regarding the electronic landing system. Why was it that last winter there were so many delays, despite the fact that aerodromes had the electronic landing system?
Lord TREFGARNE: My Lords, even the electronic system is not capable, except in the most favourable circumstances, of bringing aircraft in to land when visibility drops to the very lowest levels which we sometimes experience, but even if we had had the FIDO system last autumn the regularity of operations would not have been improved.

GHANA: REPRESENTATIONS AGAINST EXECUTIONS
2.46 p.m.
Earl GREY: My Lords, I beg leave to ask the Question which stands in my name on the Order Paper.
The Question was as follows:
To ask Her Majesty's Government what representations the High Commissioner in Ghana has made to the military régime with regard to the execution of the Head of State and members of the Supreme Military Council.
The SECRETARY of STATE for FOREIGN and COMMONWEALTH AFFAIRS (Lord Carrington): My Lords,

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on 26th June, our High Commissioner in Accra expressed to the Armed Forces Revolutionary Council the Government's abhorrence of these executions, which have aroused widespread revulsion in this country. Our High Commissioner also participated in representations which were made jointly by EEC heads of mission on behalf of all EEC Governments on 28th June.
Earl GREY: My Lords, while thanking the noble Lord the Foreign Minister for that satisfactory reply, may I ask him one or two questions which are perhaps a little outside the main Question? Will the Government impress upon Flight Lieutenant Rawlings the urgency of accepting the will of the people of Ghana by handing over power completely to the new democratically-elected Government? Also, can the noble Lord say who is going to represent Ghana at the Lusaka conference?
Lord CARRINGTON: My Lords, I am afraid I do not know the answer to the second part of the question. In answer to the first part of the question, we look forward to working with the newly-elected and democratically-elected President of Ghana.
Lord GORONWY-ROBERTS: My Lords, will the noble Lord the Foreign Secretary bear in mind that we, the Opposition, join with Her Majesty's Government in expressing abhorrence of practices such as these in that country or in any other country, but, equally with Her Majesty's Government, we hope that Ghana will find its way back to democratic practices and certainly will be represented in Lusaka.
Lord CARRINGTON: My Lords, I am grateful to the noble Lord for what he has said, and I think the whole House will share in his wishes. It is interesting to note that after the representations made by the High Commissioner and by the EEC in Accra, Flight Lieutenant Rawlings in a broadcast on 30th June said that Ghana would not abandon her traditional respect for the rule of law and the principles of justice and human rights. I think that was a clear indication that there would be no further incidents.
Lord SHINWELL: My Lords, in view of executions having become in some countries almost a national pastime, I should like to ask the Foreign Secretary whether he can give any guarantee that the newly-elected person, to whom he has referred, will not be executed shortly?
Lord CARRINGTON: My Lords, I could not, on behalf of any other Government, anywhere, give any promises about anything.

BELIZE AND GUATEMALA
2.48 p.m.
Baroness VICKERS: My Lords, I beg leave to ask the Question which stands in my name on the Order Paper.
The Question was as follows:
To ask Her Majesty's Government whether any agreement has been reached between Belize and Guatemala, and, if not, what action they propose to take.
Lord CARRINGTON: My Lords, no agreement has been reached. Her Majesty's Government will continue to pursue a negotiated settlement.
Baroness VICKERS: My Lords, in view of the fact, as I understand it, that the majority of countries at the United Nations supported Belize recently, may I ask the noble Lord whether they are planning to take action? If not, will Her Majesty's Government reopen the matter with the United Nations? Are they continuing to build the new capital? Is the new mental hospital under construction?
Lord CARRINGTON: My Lords, my noble friend is, of course, quite right about the United Nations, and in common with noble Lords opposite we all of us want to see a settlement here, so that Belize can get its independence. But I do not think there is much point in starting negotiations, unless one can see that progress is likely to be made. As my noble friend knows, there is going to be an election in Belize in the not very distant future. Perhaps we shall have a better idea after that about what the situation is likely to be.
Baroness VICKERS: My Lords, could my noble friend answer my last two points concerning the new capital and the mental hospital?
Lord CARRINGTON: My Lords, I very much regret that I could not without notice; but I will write to the noble Baroness.

NUCLEAR DEFENCE SYSTEMS
2.46 p.m.
Lord WIGG: My Lords, I beg leave to ask the Question which stands in my name on the Order Paper.
The Question was as follows:
To ask Her Majesty's Government whether the policy Statement on Nuclear Defence Systems announced on 21st December 1962 and amplified by the Statement of 1st October 1963, by which Polaris submarines and elements of the United States strategic forces are targeted jointly in accordance with a NATO plan, is still in operation.
The MINISTER of STATE, MINISTRY OF DEFENCE (Lord Strathcona and Mount Royal): My Lords, I can confirm that the arrangements for the assignment and targetting of our Polaris force, and elements of the United States' strategic forces, remain in accordance with the criteria laid down in the Statement on Nuclear Defence Systems of 21st December 1962 and subsequent Statements, such as that of 1st October 1963.
Lord WIGG: My Lords, would the noble Lord not agree that the Polaris force, whether it is owned by this country or by the United States, is in an advanced stage of obsolescence? We have four, not more than one of which is at sea. They are not independently targetted. They have a very limited range. The United States has 10, which are now assigned to secondary roles, and are being phased out with the emergence of Trident. As we are now five generations behind the United States, is there any useful purpose, except the political one, in claiming that we have an independent nuclear force?
Lord STRATHCONA AND MOUNT ROYAL: My Lords, I would not accept the noble Lord's statement that they are in an advanced stage of obsolescence. It is recognised that they will have to be replaced in the 1990s.
Lord WIGG: My Lords, how does the noble Lord manage to make that statement—I am sure he believes it—when the United States are phasing theirs out as fast as they can? They have 10 Polaris, and, as I say, all assigned to secondary roles, 27 Poseidons armed with C3, all of which are multiple independently targetted, which Polaris is not, plus Tridents armed with C4. They also have the U.S.S. "Ohio" coming into operation next year, with one generation being developed beyond that.
Lord STRATHCONA and MOUNT ROYAL: My Lords, I would not contest with the noble Lord that the United States' nuclear forces are more modern and no doubt more dangerous than our own. But I would still like to point out to the noble Lord that I think it would be exceedingly unpleasant to be on the receiving end of our Polaris.
Lord GLADWYN: My Lords, is it not a fact that the Government have turned down the possible employment of cruise missiles as substitutes for the renewal of our Polaris force in 10 years' time?
Lord STRATHCONA and MOUNT ROYAL: My Lords, it has not been turned down.
Lord SHINWELL: My Lords, is the noble Lord aware that the question just addressed to him about the cruise missile is completely irrelevant? The issue is whether some weapon we have in our possession is comparable to weapons possessed by one of our allies. Is he aware that the answer he has given might have been understood if it had come from the previous Government? But as it is coming from a Government that have believed in building up a realistic defence, why does he not accept that the Polaris missiles are completely outmoded? The Americans have produced something very advanced, which proves conclusively that the reference to the Polaris being completely outmoded is absolutely accurate.

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Why not be realistic about it? Would it not be far better to admit that, with weapons which are no longer of any value, we are weak instead of pretending that we are strong?
Lord STRATHCONA and MOUNT ROYAL: My Lords, the noble Lord has raised a fair number of questions which we have dealt with to some extent during the defence debates. I would say this, that we believe that our Polaris force, as modernised, remains a weapon capable of inflicting damage on a potential adversary, and they would not lightly put themselves in a position where that could happen.
Lord SHINWELL: My Lords, is the noble Lord aware that what he is talking about is 1962? This happens to be 1979. Many years have passed and certain weapons have now become obsolete. Why do we not admit it?
Lord STRATHCONA and MOUNT ROYAL: My Lords, I have nothing to add to my previous reply; I can only repeat it.
Lord WIGG: My Lords, the noble Lord said "the Polaris force, as modernised". However, once we modernise it we go into a different generation. We either take on the Poseidon, which is itself becoming out of date, or we take on the Trident at tremendous cost. Which is it? We should not claim an independence which, in fact, we do not have.
Lord STRATHCONA and MOUNT ROYAL: My Lords, I shall get into some difficulties if I try to elaborate on exactly what is meant by modernising the Polaris missile. I can only repeat that the Government are satisfied that the Polaris missile will remain a deterrent into the 1990s, and we shall then have to look at what is to replace it.
Lord BROCKWAY: My Lords, does the Minister agree that, however modernised, these forces would be insignificant compared with those of the Soviet Union and the United States of America, and would have no effect at all if war occurred? Would they not be an invitation to an enemy to bomb the people of this country?
Lord STRATHCONA and MOUNT ROYAL: No, my Lords, that is the philo-
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sophical question about which we have argued many times in this House. We do not aim in any way to measure up to the capabilities of either the Soviet Union or the United States. However, we believe that the independent nuclear deterrent possessed by this country is sufficient to deter, and will continue to be so until the 1990s.
Lord ORR-EWING: My Lords, will my noble friend bear in mind that there are many other people in this country who believe that it is very important that we should retain this deterrent? We would not wish France to be the only country in Western Europe operating a nuclear deterrent. We are sharing the burden with her and, if NATO is involved, of course, with the United States. In the meantime, it is no comfort for the Russians to say, "We are being bombarded by 16 atomic weapons which are slightly obsolescent". In that case obsolescence is of no importance as long as the range is adequate—which it is—from the launching areas which we have within our operational sphere.
Lord STRATHCONA and MOUNT ROYAL: My Lords, I am very grateful to my noble friend.

LABORATORY ANIMALS PROTECTION BILL [H.L.]
2.57 p.m.
The Earl of HALSBURY: My Lords, I beg to introduce a Bill to regulate the use of laboratory animals and related matters; and for purposes connected therewith. I beg to move that the Bill be now read a first time.
Moved, That the Bill be now read 1a.—(The Earl of Halshury.)
On Question, Bill read 1a, and to be printed.

LORDS' EXPENSES
The LORD PRESIDENT of the COUNCIL (Lord Soames)The LORD PRESIDENT of the COUNCIL (Lord Soames) rose to move, That this House approves the following
(1) Members of this House, except members of the Cabinet, shall be enabled to recover, in addition to the

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costs of travel for which other provision is made, but within the limits hereafter mentioned, expenses incurred after 30th June 1979 and certified by them as—

(a) expense incurred (otherwise than as mentioned in (c) below) for the purpose of attendance at sittings of this House or of Committees of this House other than judicial sittings; or

(b) expenses incurred (otherwise than as mentioned in (c) below) for the purpose of attendance at judicial sittings of this House or Committees of this House or under section 9 of the Appellate Jurisdiction Act 1876, if incurred by Lords of Appeal who are neither Lords of Appeal in Ordinary nor holders of high judicial office within the meaning of that Act; or

(c) expenses incurred in staying overnight away from their main or only residence, where this is necessary for the purpose stated in (a) above and also, if incurred by such Lords of Appeal as are mentioned in (b) above, where this is necessary for the purpose stated in (b) above; or

(d) expenses incurred in the performance of their parliamentary duties as general office expenses or on secretarial or research assistance.

(2) The limits are—

(a) for (1)(a) and (1)(b) above, £9 for each day of attendance;

(b) for (1)(c) above, £18·50 for each day of attendance;

(c) for (1)(d) above, the sum arrived at by multiplying the number of days of attendance falling within (1)(a) or (1)(b) above by £8·50;

and for any expenses recoverable under (1) above by the Chairman or Principal Deputy Chairman of Committees or by a member who receives a salary under the Ministerial and other Salaries Act 1975, £700 per annum.
The noble Lord said: My Lords, I beg to move the first Motion standing in my name on the Order Paper.
The intention of this Motion is to give effect to the changes in Peers' expenses allowance proposed in my Statement on
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21st June. I explained to your Lordships on that occasion that the Government accepted the recommendations made by the Review Body on Top Salaries for increasing the allowance limits and making certain changes in the definition of eligible expenditure. I should now like to explain these proposals to the House in more detail.
The Review Body on Top Salaries commented in their 9th Report, published in 1977, that the coverage of Peers' expenses allowance, since its first introduction in 1957, had never been clearly defined. To remedy this they proposed that there should be a clear specification of the items of expenditure that could properly be claimed in attending the House. The Review Body therefore recommended that the single overall allowance which then existed should be split into separate elements, each with its own limit. The separate limits were to cover night subsistence, day subsistence, secretarial expenses, and postage together with certain other expenses—that is four separate categories.
The previous Government said that they welcomed the Review Body's analysis of this problem, but in the light of their incomes policy, decided to defer detailed consideration of the recommendation. It was agreed, however, that Peers who had to stay overnight in London should be able to claim up to a maximum of £16·50 for each sitting day instead of f13·50.
The Review Body was invited to look at the Peers' expenses allowance again last year, as part of a general review of parliamentary pay and allowances. The conclusion reached in their 12th Report is that the grouping system previously suggested should be adopted but with a total of three instead of four categories. The Government accept this.
The limits which have now been recommended, and which I propose should apply from the beginning of this month of July, are as follows. For Peers who necessarily have to use overnight accommodation away from their usual residence, a daily—perhaps I should say nightly—limit of £18·50 will apply. For day subsistence—that is, to cover meals and incidental travel—the limit will be £9. Secretarial costs, postage, and certain

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additional expenses as defined in the Review Body's report, may be met within a cumulative limit of £8·50 a day—in other words, claims may be arranged to recover expenditure over a period. These daily limits together total £36. However, I must make clear that we are talking about a maximum figure within which Members of this House may reclaim those sums which they have actually spent in attending to their parliamentary duties.
Thus, only those Peers who actually have to incur overnight accommodation expenses in London will be eligible to claim within the £18·50 limit. Other Peers will be restricted to the £17·50 total provided under the second two categories. In this connection, I should like to draw to the attention of your Lordships and to others the concluding remarks made by the Review Body in their 9th Report. My predecessor quoted these remarks in his Statement in 1977, but I think they warrant quoting again:
"We have observed during the course of this review that an impression exists outside Parliament—and, indeed, that it has been fostered over the years—that the Peers' expenses allowance is a daily attendance fee that Peers can claim as of right by attending the House of Lords. The impression is false, but it has persisted in spite of periodic restatements of the facts … The allowance has always been a maximum daily amount against which Peers can claim reimbursement of at least some of the expenses that they have actually incurred in attending parliamentary business".
My Lords, I beg to move.
Moved, That the aforesaid Motion be agreed to.—(Lord Soames.)
3.3 p.m.
Lord SHINWELL: My Lords, recently in your Lordships' House we have had some most interesting and illuminating debates in which I have refrained from participating, largely because I sometimes come to the conclusion that although the speeches are, in substance and in delivery, impeccable, illuminating, informative, interesting and sometimes fascinating, at the end of the day the one thing we forget or ignore is implementation. That derives from the peculiar position of your Lordships' House; that is, we are not vested with authority, which is regrettable.
On this occasion—and there is nothing illuminating or fascinating about it, although it is informative, which is something to be going on with—I find
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myself in a quandary. It is not very pleasant to find oneself in a quandary. One seeks a means of escape. The only possible means of escape that occurs to me—it is almost an afterthought for I have not indulged in any research into it—is to send this proposal back to the Review Body with our compliments and, I would add, with our contempt.
I start with a question, Socratic-fashion. As noble Lords know, I have great respect for the noble Lord, Lord Soames, the Leader of the House. I have known him for many years; we have always been friendly towards each other—at least I have. The noble Lord referred almost apologetically—I emphasise the word "apologetically"—to the maximum sum mentioned and to the vast sums that we are to receive! Obviously he had in mind the honourable Members of another place who dislike us and want to abolish us. It cannot be that they want to abolish us on the ground that our expenditure is excessive—not at all.
A thought has suddenly occurred to me, and because I do not want to forget it, I shall refer to it now. Occasionaly in our debates we have discussed the subject of comparability, which is very relevant to this matter. Along the corridor they have been moaning and groaning—I hope that those words are not regarded as unparliamentary by the noble and learned Lord who sits on the Woolsack—about their financial emoluments. I use the term "financial emoluments" because there are other emoluments about which we hear very little, but that is another story. Comparability? Their salaries have gone up sky-high, and we are to have another £8·50 a day. That is the assumption underlying the proposition. Let there be no nonsense about this. The maximum? Yes, but on the understanding, on the assumption—it is not a certainty; details are not requested, or at least may not be requested—that there is expenditure on research, office equipment and secretaries.
What will happen as a result of all this? Those in another place will continue to do what they have been doing for some considerable time; that is, they will continue to complain about the sums that we have been receiving. Time and again I have noted in the Press references that emerge from another place

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about the £16·50 that Members here have received. Of course, they received nothing of the sort. That sum applied only to those who required overnight accommodation when they came to the Metropolis. The proposition is that we are to receive £9 per day. That is automatic.
Several noble Lords: No.
Lord SHINWELL: My Lords, by "automatic" I mean that that is what we shall expect to receive for our daily attendance. If it is not automatic, what is it? If it is not automatic, it must depend on circumstances, on conditions, on this or that, or what-have-you. At any rate, I suggest that the proposition is that we can claim £9 per day if we attend. You must attend before you can receive it. Members of another place do not necessarily have to attend in order to claim their allowances; they can go off for a week or so. The Whips may complain, but they receive their salary regardless. During the Recess—and one is almost upon us—we receive no attendance allowance. In another place Members receive their salary, even for a two-and-a-half-month recess. As to expenses, I cannot say.
Let us consider this addition of £8·50. Of course, this £8·50 depends on conditions. There must be research. There must be secretarial assistance. There must be offices available. If I may say so, putting it bluntly, that is treating the House with contempt. Indeed, that is all we deserve unless we face up to it. This is not a question of wanting more money. There may be Members of your Lordships' House who may need it, but most of us do not. This is of very little consequence. It is a question of prestige; a question of not being regarded as inferior or treated with contempt.
Despite the apologetic references that the noble Lord made—almost saying, "Don't blame us for doing this. We didn't want to do it, but we couldn't help ourselves. It was the Review Body from whom the proposition emerged "—are the other side going to thank us for this? They would still repeat their cry "Abolish the Lords", even if we made it £20 a day.
I want to ask this question. The Review Body has been operating for some
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time. We can claim £17·50, provided all the conditions—and the noble Lord assents to it—contained in the document are observed. I wonder what the Review Body received per day. It would be interesting to know what they received per day. I will wager with the noble Lord £100 to £10—I will take a chance—that they got far more than £17·50 a day. Why? Of course, they are engaged in this most difficult operation of-deciding what we should receive. That requires research; office equipment; secretarial assistance; and a great deal of thought and meditation, et cetera—unlike ourselves. I wonder what they are receiving per day.
This ought to be sent back to them. Indeed, I never have been satisfied with the Boyle reviews, and there are other noble Lords who are in a similar position. I do not personally complain. I have not complained about my pension. But if I could be assured that there was anybody willing to support me in your Lordships' House on this subject as a Teller, I would vote against it and send it back to them. It is not good enough. Now what is going to happen? In the Press I can imagine, "The House of Lords has provided itself with an increased allowance". We shall have Mr. Arthur Lewis in particular making speeches on this subject. I single him out because he has been notable on this subject. It is not good enough. I could go on for a long time.
Several noble Lords: No!
Lord SHINWELL: Of course I could. Indeed, I am entitled to. That is what I claim my allowance for. I know that I am not making the speech that I ought to be making. I ought to be just making fun of the whole business, and indeed that is all it deserves. I can imagine that you get your £9—just imagine the sum, £9!—and then you can claim £8·50, the assumption being that you have got secretaries, research, office equipment, and all the rest of it. You claim it, and you feel you have done your duty. Your responsibility has been fulfilled. But in all this I wonder really whether he has any office equipment, or even indulges in any research, or requires secretarial assistance. On that subject I can give some information right away. Unfor-

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tunately, sometimes I indulge in observations and, to my surprise and astonishment, I get fan mail in consequence running almost to 100 letters. My letters are not franked, as is the case in another place. I get stamps. Do I have to give details of that? Of course not. I am not expected to furnish details. But what is the assumption outside? "Is he actually buying the stamps? Is he answering the letters? Does he deserve the £17·50 a day that is now available?"
I treat the whole thing with contempt, and that is what we should all do. I should rather that it had been left at the £13·50, except of course for the provincial Members. On this subject of provincial Members, I am on the record for many years. Some of my colleagues will recall that many years ago I said that some of those provincial Members who come and have to get accommodation in London certainly could not afford it. But, £3 a night was provided. What sort of accommodation were they expected to get for £3 a night? Was that not treating them with contempt?
I said at the time, "Never mind about the London Members. They can manage". Even that was objected to by a Member of your Lordships' House, the noble Baroness, Lady Hornsby-Smith, who said at the time, "What about the accommodation we have to provide ourselves with in London? The rents are so high", and the rest of it. The provincial Members, yes, that I accept; but for the London Members there is no reason why there should be any change.
I do not expect that I shall get much support. That will not matter. I will hold strongly to the opinions I have just expressed. I shall tell the people in another place what I think of them. I have often done that in the past, and I hope that I shall get a little more time to do it in the future, and this will afford me another opportunity and a substantial reason. That is all I have to say. I am not blaming the noble Lord. Far from it. I know that he is affable, pleasant, benevolent, even generous, but for Heaven's sake do not be apologetic for what we are doing! I think that that is enough.
Lord PANNELL: My Lords, can the noble Lord tell the House whether the £9 a day is in substitution for the £13·50 that we are entitled to claim now?
3.18 p.m.
Lord SOAMES: My Lords, with the permission of the House, may I respond to the few questions that have been put to me. The noble Lord, Lord Shinwell, said that he was in a quandary. I have seldom known him not to find his way out of a quandary. He said today that too often do we discuss in this House matters which do not later come to implementation. Well, we are discussing the implementation of a decision taken by a Review Body to which successive Governments put the question of how to handle the matter of expenses for this House. They were asked to look into the expenses, not into a salary. This House has traditionally been a House that has not had a salary but whose expenses have, to some extent, albeit not very generously, been met up to now at least.
The noble Lord, Lord Shinwell, asked me what the Review Body had got. I am afraid I cannot tell him what they got in the way of expenses. What I can tell him is that they were unpaid for the job that they did. I am quite sure that where expenses were concerned they were not entitled, neither would they have wished, to claim anything beyond what they actually spent on expenses in the course of their duties.
That is the case I am putting to the House today. I am not saying that the sum of £18·50 for an overnight stay in London is all that generous, but it is at least £3 more than it has been up to now. As to the question whether the £9 should be seen in relation to the £13, the answer is that the £9 plus £8·50—in other words £17·50—if it be spent in duties incurred by noble Lords in attending this House and fulfilling their duties within this House, means that what was one has been split into two, as it were; and, as for the total for sitting days as opposed to expenses incurred by an overnight stay in London, I suppose if one were to compare like with like, it would be £17·50 compared with £13.
I am sorry that the noble Lord, Lord Shinwell—for whose judgment and feelings I have long had the greatest respect—

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should feel that this has not been well done and that the Review Body has not done a good job, and that he would apparently have liked to see the Government turn down the Review Body report, feeling that either it should have been more or it should have been a lot less. I am sorry about that, but at least the Government this time have felt it right to accept in toto what the Review Body, which was set up to do a specific job under the very able chairmanship of my noble friend Lord Boyle, recommended.
Lord PEART: My Lords, I feel that I should now thank the noble Lord the Leader of the House for his Statement, and I am sure the House is grateful to him. He has given a clear explanation of the increases in the Peers' expenses allowance and I believe the figures will show that this is a sensible advance. I had the privilege of giving evidence, with my noble friend the then Chief Whip, to the Boyle Committee, and I suggest we should now move on to the next Business of the House; I see no reason why we should not now accept the Motion.
On Question, Motion agreed to.

EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT
3.23 p.m.
Lord SOAMES Lord SOAMES rose to move, That, with effect from 17th July 1979, the order designating certain Lords members of the European Parliament dated 3rd July 1975, as amended by the orders dated 21st February 1978 and 29th June 1978, be discharged. The noble Lord said: My Lords, I apologise for taking up so much of your Lordships' time today, but I think I should explain briefly the purpose of this Motion. Noble Lords will be aware that the European Parliament will meet tomorrow to begin its new life as an Assembly composed of directly elected Members. The present Motion discharges the existing orders of the House which designated the Members of this House who have served on the United Kingdom delegation to the European Parliament until now.
It also provides me with a welcome opportunity to express the appreciation which is felt in all parts of the House for the first-class work done by all those noble Lords who have served as members of the
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delegation from this House. I should also like to offer my personal contratulations and those of the House as a whole to those in this House who have been elected to serve in the newly constituted European Parliament. I wish them well in this exciting enterprise, and I wish them boundless energy because I know they will need it.
Moved, That, with effect from 17th July 1979, the order designating certain Lords members of the European Parliament dated 3rd July 1975, as amended by the orders dated 21st February 1978 and 29th June 1978, be discharged.—(Lord Soames.)
The PRINCIPAL DEPUTY CHAIRMAN of COMMITTEES (Lord Greenwood of Rossendale): My Lords, I wish briefly on behalf of the Select Committee to echo the felicitous words that the Lord President has spoken. We should like to thank the Members of the European Parliament for the help they have given us on many occasions and, if I may say so, for the great service they have rendered to this House and the country. They rendered it under very difficult circumstances, and in some cases at least they rendered it at some peril to their own health.
Now we wish to extend our best wishes to the Members of the new Parliament. We remember, at a time when Her Majesty's Government were not the most popular member of the Community, in what respect the Members whom we sent to them were held. We are sure the new Members will be held in equal respect and we hope before long to hear what steps have been taken to ensure that the same happy relationship is established between this House and the new Parliament as has existed in the past. We are most grateful to them and to the Lord President for what he said.
On Question, Motion agreed to.

LIMITATION AMENDMENT BILL [H.L.]
3.26 p.m.
The LORD CHANCELLOR (Lord Hailsham of Saint Marylebone): My Lords, I beg to move that the House do now resolve itself into Committee on this Bill.
Moved, that the House do now resolve itself into Committee.—(The Lord Chancellor.)
On Question, Motion agreed to.
House in Committee accordingly.
[The BARONESS WOOTTON OF ABINGER in the Chair.]
Clause 1 agreed to.
Clause 2 [Limitation if case of theft]:
The LORD CHANCELLOR The LORD CHANCELLOR moved Amendment No. 1:
Page 2, leave out from beginning of line 21 to end of line 13 on page 3 and insert—
(" 3A.—(1) Where a chattel is stolen from any person, sections 2 and 3 of this Act shall have effect in their application to his case subject to the following provisions of this section.
(2) Nothing in section 2(1)(a) of this Act shall bar any right of action accruing to him in respect of the theft or any related conversion.
(3) Section 3 of this Act shall apply to his case without modification where the original conversion is an innocent conversion preceding the theft.
(4) In any case not within subsection (3) above, section 3(1) shall not bar his right to bring an action in respect of any conversion following the theft except as provided by subsection (5) below.
(5) If any such conversion is an innocent conversion, section 3(1) shall have effect in relation to his right to bring an action in respect of any further conversions (innocent or otherwise) following that conversion as if that conversion were the original conversion.
(6) In any case not within subsection (3) above, his title to the chattel may be extinguished under section 3(2) by reference to the expiry of the time within which he may bring an action in respect of the first innocent conversion (if any) following the theft.
(7) Where the chattel is stolen a second or subsequent time from the person in question before he recovers possession of it, references to the theft in subsections (3) to (6) above shall be taken as references to the first theft".)
The noble and learned Lord said: This is a rather long Amendment and my brief contains this significant sentence: "There is no substantial change of policy and the amendments may fairly be described as drafting and indeed technical". The Committee may be slightly surprised at those words, having regard to the rather formidable length and complexity of this and other amendments, and perhaps I should therefore—I have satis-
1146
fled myself that those words represent the truth—say a word in support of them.
The clause as originally printed has thrown up two minor defects, both of which were spotted by a lawyer who serves in the Home Office. The first is that, in failing to gloss Section 3(2) of the Limitation Act 1939, the clause does not convey sufficiently clearly the policy that an owner should lose his proprietory rights in stolen property six years after the property had been bought by a bona fide purchaser but he should at the same time retain indefinitely his rights in respect of a theft or other conversions preceding the bona fide purchase. Section 3(2) provides for the extension of title when the limitation period has gone, and the present draft might allow an owner to say as against a bona fide purchaser that his, the owner's, title has never disappeared because the time of suing the thief had not expired.
Secondly, as printed the clause fails to deal with successive thefts; it is wonderful what things people can think of! In some circumstances a second thief in a chain of conversions would be able to set up the first theft as the point when time began to run in the second thief's favour as against the original owner. This is because subsection (3)(b) provides for Section 3(1) to have effect in relation to any innocent conversions following the theft as if the theft had not taken place, thus allowing a subsequent thief to claim the benefit of Section 3(1) without any amendment. In the course of eliminating these rather esoteric defects, the draftsman has taken the opportunity to recast the clause without any further changes of policy but perhaps in a rather simpler form. I beg to move.
Lord ELWYN-JONES: I am inclined to agree with the noble and learned Lord the Lord Chancellor that the amendment is indeed drafting and technical. The degree of detail and elaboration involved in dealing with the, presumably, exceptional case of successive thefts not only of the same object, but from the same person, must be piling Pelion upon Ossa, or whatever the appropriate metaphor is. However, I agree with the noble and learned Lord.
On Question, amendment agreed to.
Clause 2, as amended, agreed to.
Clauses 3 to 5 agreed to.
3.32 p.m.
Viscount DILHORNE Viscount DILHORNE moved Amendment No. 2:
After Clause 5, insert the following new clause:
Extension of time for disability not to apply if action previously brought
In section 22 of the principal Act (extension of limitation period in case of disability) the following new paragraph shall be inserted after paragraph (c) of the Proviso—
"(d) no action shall be brought by virtue of this section by any person who has previously brought any action (whether by virtue of this section or not) in reliance on the right of action in question".
The noble and learned Viscount said: On Second Reading I drew attention to a problem of some difficulty, and I invited the Lord Chancellor to find a solution to it and to propose an amendment to the Bill or a new clause giving effect to that solution. I may say straight away that that was rather a tease because I do not think there is any solution to the problem. So I was not disappointed to find no amendment or new clause tabled in the name of the noble and learned Lord, but I am most grateful to him for allowing parliamentary counsel to draft this new clause, with a request that I should put it down, which reached me at the same time as I wrote to the Lord Chancellor saying that I thought a clause on these lines should be tabled. The new clause, though not a solution, will I believe constitute an improvement on the present position.
I believe that everyone recognises the desirability that personal injury actions should be tried within a reasonable time. If there is a great deal of delay there may be great injustice, and indeed the administration of justice becomes very difficult. Of course, sometimes the injury or disease does not become apparent until many years after the cause of action has arisen. Our law makes provision for that, and my amendment does not alter it in any respect.
Between 1939 and 1954—quite a considerable period—an adult could start an action for tort at any time before the expiry of six years from the date of the cause of action arising. In 1954 Parliament thought that that period was too long and reduced it to three years generally in respect of an action for tort. But special provision before then, and since
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then, has always been made where the person claiming is under a disability, and from 1939 to 1954 such a person, as a general rule, might start his action at any time within six years after the ending of his disability. That meant that an infant who suffered an injury during that period could start his action at any time before he was 27. If injured when a child of two, he had consequently a quarter of a century in which to start his action, and after the lapse of anything like that time witnesses may well have forgotten entirely what happened at the time that the cause of action arose.
Parliament in 1954 must have thought that something should be done about that, for in that year the law was altered. An Act was passed in that year which provided that if at the time the infant suffered his injury he was in the custody of a parent, he should have no extended time within which to bring his action, it had to be brought within three years just as if he had been an adult. But if the infant was not in the custody of a parent, he could sue at any time before the expiry of three years of coming of age.
Parliament presumably thought that parents with an injured child in their custody could be relied upon to see that a claim for damages would be made speedily; but, for reasons that I need not go into, difficulties arose with regard to that. So in 1975 Parliament abolished the different treatment of children in the custody of a parent from that of those who were not, and Parliament then made it a general rule that actions for negligence, nuisance and breach of duty could be brought by infants at any time within three years of their attaining their majority; that is to say, now at any time before they reach the age of 21.
I reminded your Lordships on Second Reading of a case that we had recently heard in this House, and which shows I believe that the present position is not at all satisfactory. The facts of the case, shortly stated, were as follows. In 1964 an infant girl, 2½ years old, was walking along a pavement holding her mother's hand. She put a foot into the roadway, and she was struck by a car; and it was alleged that the driver of that car was guilty of negligence. Nearly three years later, just before the expiry of the time limit within which an action could have

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been brought if she had been an adult, a writ was issued against the motorist. That was in 1967, and then for the next 10 years nothing was done. Why that was I do not know. It may have been thought that the action had little chance of succeeding. It may have been—one does not know—that there was some neglect on the part of the solicitors then acting. Then, in 1977, there was a change of solicitors and notice was given of intention to proceed with the action and a statement of claim was delivered.
What, then, was the position of the defendant to that action, and of his insurers? All police records of the accident had been destroyed. All the statements of witnesses had disappeard. There can be no doubt that if this action now comes on for trial, the defendant will be gravely prejudiced by the delay; and whatever conclusion is reached—whether that the motorist was guilty of negligence, or was not—there is bound to be doubt as to whether the conclusion is the correct one. That there was gross and inexcusable delay in the prosecution of this action is beyond doubt, and the defendant tried without success to get it dismissed for want of prosecution. He failed because there was no point in dismissing that action when a fresh writ could immediately have been issued.
The amendment does not seek to alter the position where no writ has been issued claiming damages for an infant. If the amendment is carried, he will still have until he is 21 to issue a writ for damages for personal injuries for negligence, nuisance, or breach of statutory duty. But should an infant be allowed more than one bite at the cherry? If he has issued one writ, the action should be proceeded with; and if that had been done in this case, the interests of justice would have been achieved. If a writ has been issued, what further protection, as my noble and learned friend Lord Wilberforce said, do the interests of the infant require?
"Why",
he said,
"when proper steps have been taken in accordance with the law to enforce her rights, should she have the opportunity to start another action 15 years after the event and 12 years after the action had been started?
It is to deprive such a plaintiff of that opportunity that this amendment is de-
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signed, for I do not see why, when one writ has been issued claiming damages for the injury, it should, after great delay, be possible to issue yet another one. It really is not fair to a defendant, and must make the administraion of justice very difficult, if not impossible.
This is a technical and difficult subject, but not without importance; and I commend this amendment to the Committee in the belief that, if accepted, it will make an improvement to the present situation. I beg to move.
3.41 p.m.
The LORD CHANCELLOR: First of all, I should like to thank my noble and learned friend on the Cross-Benches for the trouble he has taken over this matter, for bringing it to the attention of the Committee and for putting down an amendment. I hope I have played absolutely fair about this business. I do not find it at all as easy as perhaps one often does in the case of highly technical matters. As I said on Second Reading, my judgment was rather against an amendment of this kind, and I think it probably still is, for reasons which I shall elaborate. But the weighty authority of my noble and learned friend on the Cross-Benches—and I think he was supported by the noble and learned Lord, Lord Diplock; I think he said that on Second Reading—obviously deserved a airing of this matter in one way or another so I lent him the full resources of my Office and, so far as I was able, the parliamentary draftsman. This amendment is therefore what has emerged, and I hope the Committee will think that in that respect I have acted fairly.
Viscount DILHORNE: If I may interrupt the noble and learned Lord, I do not think anyone would suggest the contrary. I implied, if I did not say it expressly, that I am most grateful indeed for the help that the noble and learned Lord has given.
The LORD CHANCELLOR: I am indeed grateful to my noble and learned friend. I do not want to appear either unfair or ungracious in this matter, but I do want to explain to the Committee what has caused me to have my doubts about this. I am only too conscious that I may be wrong; and, if I am wrong, the Committee will say so, and I shall not take the smallest umbrage about it. In

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the first place, I steered clear of the rather boggy ground of personal injuries altogether in this Limitation Amendment Bill. It has a habit of turning out to be controversial, and if it is controversial one is apt to lose one's rather humble little effort at law reform altogether, because it bogs down in a Committee somewhere at the other end of the corridor.
I do not think this would have been quite so important to me as one or two questions of principle which I should like to put before the Committee. If the Committee likes this amendment, I do not want to stand in its way at all, but I should like the Committee to know exactly what it is doing. This amendment is, of course, cutting down the rights of a child: do not make any mistake about it. It cuts down a child's rights to compensation for personal injuries—I do not think this applies only in personal injuries cases, but in practice that is what we are talking about—and I do not think the Committee should cut down the rights of a child to compensation for personal injuries unless somebody, at any rate (and it ought to be the Lord Chancellor), explains to it exactly what is being asked of it. As my noble and learned friend has lucidly and quite correctly explained, if a personal injuries claim is not prosecuted diligently, it may be dismissed. I am not now talking solely about children or minors. Incidentally, may I correct a slip of the tongue which my noble and learned friend made? The age is 18 now, not 21.
Viscount DILHORNE: Eighteen plus three I made 21.
The LORD CHANCELLOR: Then I apologise for any error I may have made, but as I caught it I thought it was incorrect. At any rate, if an action for personal injuries is not diligently prosecuted, it may in certain fairly extreme circumstances be cut out and dismissed for want of prosecution, and the plaintiff then loses his rights—unless, of course, he can get them by a side wind, by bringing an action for negligence against his solicitor or somebody else. That is fair enough, or may be fair enough, in the case of an adult; but what the Committee is being asked to do is to say that it should be so in the case of a child. In other words, the child is being deprived
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of his rights to damages for personal injuries if his father or mother, his next friend or what-have-you has had his action dismissed for want of prosecution, or is liable to have his action dismissed for want of prosecution.
What the House of Lords, in its judicial capacity, decided in Tolley v. Morris, which is the case my noble and learned friend was deciding upon, was that you could not do that because the child could of course have a new writ issued the next day, and therefore could not be deprived of his rights. We are now being asked to deprive the child of that right which, in Tolley v. Morris, the House of Lords, by a majority—and the fact that it was decided by a majority shows that this is a very difficult subject, about which one may well be wrong—decided it should have. There cannot be any doubt, I think, about the fact that if this amendment is carried then, of course, if Tolley v. Morris represents a wrong—and my noble and learned friend clearly thinks it did, and put very powerful reasons in support of it—it will correct that wrong.
But there is a new anomaly now created. Suppose a child is injured in the road and an action is duly brought by the next friend (say the father) and is not diligently prosecuted. If that action is dismissed for want of prosecution, the child's rights are extinguished, if my noble and learned friend's amendment is carried. On the other hand, if he has a still more negligent father who does not bring an action at all, and nobody brings an action on the child's behalf, there is therefore no question of the child's action being dismissed for want of prosecution and the child is still able to bring an action within three years of his attaining majority. So you may get the situation of two children, both injured in a road accident at, say, the age of two. In the case of one, the action is brought, is negligently prosecuted and is dismissed, and therefore that child gets no damages. In the other case, no action is brought owing to the extreme negligence of the father or mother, and the result is that there is nothing to dismiss and the child can pursue his remedy after majority. Does that make sense?
The answer, of course, as my noble and learned friend candidly admitted at the beginning of his speech, is that there is no

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solution to these problems. One has frankly to admit that there is no solution. The fact is that this is a highly technical matter. I do not want to stand against two very eminent members of the Appellate Committee of your Lordships' House, but I should rather like to know what the Committee thinks about it; and I hope I have explained it fairly.
Lord ELWYN-JONES: I am sorry the noble and learned Lord the Lord Chancellor is having difficulty. We have sympathy with him, and he must not worry about the fact that he is not quite as consistently articulate as we normally have the pleasure of enjoying him.
I do not find this an easy matter, but I am bound to say that the kind of anomalous situation which would result in the state of the law if this amendment were approved would render the law a little ridiculous. The noble and learned Viscount, Lord Dilhorne, does not like the idea of the infant we are concerned with in the amendment having two bites of the cherry. But he does not really get a single bite of the cherry because of the negligence, either of parent or solicitor or whoever may have purported to act for him in initiating the action with the issuance of a writ in the first place, in simply failing in his duty to carry it through. Therefore, we should be penalising the infant who would have to prove the sufference of disability. Yet if there was a situation where a disabled infant did nothing at all during the period of minority, the prejudice to the defendant—and one fully sympathises with that—would be all the greater than in the particular case that the noble and learned Viscount, Lord Dilhorne, has brought before us. We are always grateful to him for his persistence and energy in bringing forward these difficult legal issues. I am bound to say that, although what will emerge by leaving the law as it is will produce difficulties and grievances for insurers and defendants, my inclination is to prefer that they should suffer rather than the injured infant.
Lord MISHCON: May I follow my noble and learned friend with one short observation? If I say immediately that I happen to agree, most respectfully, with what the noble and learned Lord the Lord Chancellor has said, I hope that he will
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take it as an inducement to be equally gracious to me when I rise later to move three amendments. I want to offer this short point. The noble and learned Viscount, Lord Dilhorne, remarked that it was a great injustice to a defendant if, after many years, he suddenly finds that an action which had once been brought against him is brought again; because in that event he may find himself in great difficulty in respect of the evidence that he requires in order to refute the allegations of negligence that may be made against him.
I did not quite follow that point, because the fact is that, from a practical point of view, when you are acting for a defendant, once the writ has been issued, you are certainly not looking after him with that degree of care which you should as a lawyer if you do not immediately try to get such evidence as is available at that time. If you are taking statements from witnesses, you obviously endeavour to get the signatures of the witnesses to the statements. In certain eventualities, if, say, after the passage of time a witness has passed to a better world or for some other reason is not procurable, it may be possible to get in that evidence under the Civil Evidence Act and the defendant does not suffer that handicap.
If, on the other hand, without any action being brought at all, all of a sudden after many years the defendant finds himself faced with a writ and then comes to his advisers, he is in a far greater difficulty because indeed he has had no warning of the proceedings which has enabled his advisers to procure the evidence which may be furnished in a defence to his case. I add that short point, in support of what the noble and learned Lord the Lord Chancellor has said and of what my noble and learned friend Lord Elwyn-Jones has said, in saying that this amendment is, I feel, not one that should be supported.
Viscount DILHORNE: The noble Lord, Lord Mishcon, certainly has made a short point but I cannot agree with him that it is a very good one; and for this reason. Although it is true that in a perfect world the solicitor would keep everything, including all statements of witnesses, duly signed by them, the fact is that this particular case is an indication of what can happen. The insurers who, no doubt, had a very eminent firm of

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solicitors acting for them had not got—after 10 years when nothing had been happening—the statements of witnesses; the police had no records at all—and I need not elaborate on that. Of course, it may be that if an action is started by an infant only when the infant is 20 years old, and without any previous notice, the defendant will be in very great difficulty. That is recognised.
The noble and learned Lord the Lord Chancellor has said that this would be cutting down children's rights. I would ask the Committee to bear in mind that there have over a considerable period been differences between children's rights. In 1954, if a child was in the custody of a parent, the time within which an action could be brought in respect of injuries to that child was three years. Until 1975, that was the position in relation to a child in custody of the parents. If the child was not in custody of a parent, it still had a period of years after attaining its majority within which to bring an action.
I myself think that it is unlikely, if an infant has suffered injuries, that there will be a wait of 18 to 20 years before an action is brought. I do not believe that there can be many cases of that kind. What I am concerned with are the cases of which one has had illustration, where a writ has been issued, perhaps without undue delay, and then everything has been allowed to go to sleep. I think that when the noble and learned Lord the Lord Chancellor made some comments about the case of Tolley v. Morris, he was, perhaps, thinking of another case which came before your Lordships' House, the case of Birkett v. James. In Tolley v. Morris, it was the case that a majority decided that the action should not be dismissed; and they did so because, as I said, they felt that there was no point in dismissing it. On the other hand, a minority in the House—my noble and learned friend Lord Wilberforce and I—thought that the present law was that if a writ was issued on behalf of an infant during the extended period, that was that and another writ could not be issued. It was Birkett v. James in which it was held that you could issue as many writs as you liked before the period of limitation had expired. But there was that difference of view in the case of Tolley v. Morris as to what the law, in fact, was.
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This amendment would, I have to admit, bring the law in this narrow field back to what my noble and learned friend Lord Wilberforce and I thought it was by Act of Parliament. It is cutting down, it is true, in respect of some infants, rights that they have had since 1975; but from 1954 to 1975 there was different treatment of children depending on whether or not they were in the custody of their parents. The change made in 1953 was, I am sure, made after consideration by one of the committees which considered this subject in view of the need for justice to be done that the actions should be tried soon after the personal injuries were suffered. It is a case of striking the balance. I think that the balance would be wrong if the law were left as it is at the present time. But, in view of the opinions expressed by two noble and learned Lords who followed me upon the Woolsack, I will not press this amendment.
Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.
Clause 6 [Effect of acknowledgement or part payment]:
On Question, Whether Clause 6 shall stand part of the Bill?
4 p.m.
Lord MISHCON: A moment ago the Committee heard falling from the lips of the noble and learned Viscount the statement that he was talking about a very human problem. If I may say so to the Committee, in moving this amendment which seeks to leave out Clause 6, I too am dealing with a very human problem; and it is somewhat easy to solve if the Committee will agree to the omission of Clause 6. Indeed, it would leave the law exactly where it stands at the moment.
Before I embark on an explanation of why I think that the Committee should agree to leave out Clause 6, may I make it quite clear that my amendment, and indeed the following amendments, would not have the respect which I would hope for if they merely came from me. They do in fact come at the instance of the Law Society, who I know have communicated, as they always do, with the noble and learned Lord the Lord Chancellor in order to give him a clear intimation of the views they hold.
The problem is not a difficult one. It is this. When one is dealing with the matter

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of the statutes of limitation—the old phrase that lawyers and many laymen alike know well—one is dealing with the balance of justice between a claimant and a person against whom a claim is being made. What one is trying to do is to say: "I will not deprive somebody of a remedy unless it is just to do so; on the other hand, I will not allow a defendant to go for year after year almost into eternity wondering whether a remedy by way of an action is going to be instigated against him"—if one can instigate a remedy; I am not sure whether that is right, but let us take it that one can—because a plaintiff suddenly decides to issue a writ so many years after the cause of action arose.
There is no difficulty about the situation, once one has fixed the number of years whether it be, as in the instance that the Committee were discussing a moment ago, the question of a personal injury case where by and large the period is three years, or whether, as in the ordinary case, one is dealing with a debt and is considering a period of six years. If during that period of six years a debtor acknowledges in writing that the debt is due to his creditor then the period—the six years—commences to run again from the moment of that acknowledgment. Furthermore, if the debtor makes a part payment of his debt, and that happens in the course of the six years, again the period of six years starts to run from that moment. Indeed, that is the position if either the acknowledgment in writing or the part payment takes place only one day before the expiration of the six years.
What is the position, however, under the present law if the six years has already expired? It is this. Again, because the law says that it is not the rights that the creditor has lost, but only the remedy of action—and, incidentally, he does not lose his other rights of recovery; if indeed he happens to have a lien or a set-off he can exercise it even after six years—and no writ has been issued, be it because the creditor could not find the debtor, or be it because the creditor is one of those rather more merciful people who do not decide to issue writs as long as they feel that they are dealing with somebody honourable who one day will pay them, if the six years has expired and after that the creditor receives from the debtor an acknowledgment that the debt is still due,
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or a part payment, the law says, one might think very justly: "Now the period starts to run again". There is no injustice in that, obviously, to the debtor. The Committee may feel that there would be an injustice if there was a disputed claim—an obviously disputed claim—where all of a sudden it is for some reason resurrected. But here there is a debtor who has to acknowledge in writing his indebtedness or who has to make a part payment. It would be the odd situation indeed if this were a matter of dispute thereafter. It could happen but it would be the exception to the rule.
The Law Reform Commission sat upon this matter and others, and I must at once tell the Committee that they did not (if I may use the phrase) get very hot and bothered about it. What they said—if your Lordships will allow me to read it out—at paragraphs 270 and 271 of their 21st Report, on page 24, is this:
"In our consultative document we sought views on the desirability of changing that rule. There was general support for the principle that once lapse of time had extinguished a title no subsequent acknowledgment should be capable of reviving it. But there was a marked difference of opinion on the question"—
and this is the question we are considering—
"whether a similar principle should apply to the barring of a remedy where the right still persisted. It was argued in favour of making the change that the contrary rule gives rise to such uncertainty and is also something of a trap in that for example a company's accounts required by law to be published may have to include a balance sheet showing statute-barred debts and these may then be revived having been 'acknowledged', although no such revival was intended to be the result of the publication of the accounts. On the other hand, we recognise that the current rule"
that is, if I may say this in parenthesis, the law as it is at this moment—
"by which legal effect is given to an out of time acknowledgment is logically consistent with the principle that limitation only bars the remedy and leaves the right unaffected. Nevertheless, we think the rule is somewhat unreal and serves no very useful purpose".
Then I miss out the next sentence. The report continues:
"Therefore although the issue is not one of prime importance, we think the law should be changed".
I am leaving out the rest of that sentence.
We have the position therefore that not even the committee whose recommendations in the main have been followed in this Bill thought this a matter of prime importance. The Committee may there

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fore feel that, if they are not dealing with a matter of prime importance, why alter the law as it stands, if the position seems to be just and if it seems to follow the situation which I have tried to explain to your Lordships, where no great hardship would seem to occur to the debtor? The noble and learned Lord the Lord Chancellor was good enough to listen to the point on Second Reading and to give what I hope was a provisional reply. He then said that he thought the change that was recommended in Clause 6, which would no longer give the creditor any right at all to pursue his remedy by issuing a writ after the termination of the limitation period, made for more certainty. I am afraid I do not follow that because, as I explained to the Committee, if anything like this happens—the acknowledgment in writing or the part payment—in the course of the six years, then the whole of the period commences to run again, and once more in those circumstances there is a period of uncertainty.
In the example given of a company's accounts, there again the question of certainty is by no means answered if you admit that rather odd example. I describe it as an odd example, because in fairness I must say it was a matter dealt with in a case only a few months ago. In that case it was held, as I understand it, that although a company has to put in its balance sheet an account of statute-barred debts, which may be a document which in law is directed to the creditor, the creditor has to receive it before it can be deemed to be an acknowledgment. The Company Law Committee of the Law Society, consisting of very experienced company practitioners in the law, have decided that, in their view, this is unlikely to create any difficulty at all and certainly no substantial difficulty. Indeed, your Lordships may wonder whether it is just that a company in these circumstances should be exempted from paying what they have freely admitted to be a statute-barred debt.
In any event, how does it help on the certainty point?—because if this is law it would mean that a company's balance sheet issued six months before the expiration of the period, although the creditor may not know about it, would start the period running all over again; so,
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again, there is no certainty in regard to this. I think that is all I can usefully say to the Committee in support of a plea that the law should remain as it is.
I should like to add only one observation and, with respect, I would ask that the noble and learned Lord the Lord Chancellor should deal with it. There occur now in this Bill, even if Clause 6 is accepted, not only the words "written acknowledgement" and "part payment", but the additional word "promise"; in other words, not even a promise after the termination of this period would allow the time to be revived. The word "promise", in addition to a written acknowledgment and the question of part payment, does possibly pose questions for the future in regard to interpretation. Of course, it does not say a promise with or without consideration, and it may very well be that a promise with consideration would amount to a new contract.
To give a quick example, if the creditor happens to have a right of set-off or a lien upon certain documents and is induced by a promise not to exercise his right of set-off or his lien upon the documents, it may be said that a new contract has arisen and that the time may run again, if he is not paid, and therefore he may again be able to institute proceedings. That may be the answer, but it is not quite clear, especially when the loose word "promise", if I may say this with deference, is used and there is clear indication that the promise does not amount to an enforceable contract.
Lord LLOYD of KILGERRAN: I should like to presume to support the noble Lord, Lord Mishcon, over this amendment, which he has so ably presented. I hesitate to intervene in any argument which involves so many noble and learned Lords, but when I examined the previous consideration given by your Lordships to this matter I did not, with great respect, follow the arguments of the noble and learned Lord who sits on the Woolsack on the question of certainty.
I agree that certainty is to some extent essential in this kind of company law matter, subject to the fact that the principle of certainty does not conflict with natural justice. The Company Law Committee of the Law Society has adopted a very realistic view of this. Examples are given

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by the Law Reform Committee in paragraph 270 on page 24 of their report, dealing with the traps which arise in this matter in relation to so-called admissions made in relation to balance sheets. Therefore, may I simply support the arguments put forward on this matter by the noble Lord, Lord Mishcon.
4.17 p.m.
The LORD CHANCELLOR: Nothing ever amazes me so much as the conservatism (with a small c) of my profession and of the solicitors' profession. Perhaps that is a good thing—and who am I to say that it is not ? Indeed, the noble Lord, Lord Mishcon, whom I should like to thank for his lucid and courteous approach to this question, made what I think is almost the classical argument for Conservatism (with a big C) when he said: "If not of prime importance, why alter the law as it stands?" That seems to me to be one of the foundations upon which the party of which I am a member would wish to rely, and base its case against its enemies on all the opposite sides of the Committee.
All the same, I am not altogether happy about it in this instance. As the noble Lord, Lord Mishcon, candidly admitted, we are in the face of a unanimous recommendation—and I apologise in parenthesis for having inadvertently let your Lordships believe on Second Reading that the recommendation was not unanimous—of the Law Reform Committee, after taking evidence from every kind of body. The evidence, of course, was not unanimous but moved in different directions.
I am bound to say that my general policy on law reform is to make it as uncontroversial as possible and also to accept, where I can, the recommendations of a committee of this kind or of the Law Commission, as the case may be. I applied my mind to this, both before introducing this Bill and after having heard the speech of the noble Lord, Lord Mishcon, on Second Reading. I am afraid that my own inclination remains exactly where it was; namely, that the Law Reform Committee was right and that the Law Society, for whom I entertain the very greatest possible friendliness and respect, have possibly allowed their learning to run away with them on this occasion.
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I was mildly encouraged in my radical approach to this matter by what I understood the noble and learned Lord, Lord Elwyn-Jones, to say on really the same sort of material. He, without feeling that it would be the end of the world if somebody took a different view—and I cannot pretend that I do either—had rather come down on the same side as me. I do in fact come down in the end on the same side as I did before. This is really the old argument about the Pharisees and the Sadducees. The view of the Pharisees is that there is, or ought to be, resurrection after the cause of action has died. On this occasion, heretical as it may sound, I am with the Sadducees, that after death—of the remedy, to be pedantic and correct—there should be no resurrection.
The case to which the noble Lord referred, which I understand is called in re Campania de Electricidad and which, if my Spanish is correct, means the Company of Electricity, rather indicates the pitfalls which might beset an accountant who published a statute-barred debt in his company accounts, only to find the cause of action revived as a result of his doing so. I think that that is a pity. I do not myself find any difficulty in the conundrum which the noble Lord, Lord Mishcon, put to me at the end of his speech. I do not think there is any doubt that if, for consideration, or in some other way carrying out a legal obligation, parties to a contract decided to revive their obligation, the old obligation would revive. All we have said in the Bill is that after death part payment and acknowledgment or the other acts in the subsection will not suffice to revive the cause of action.
It is true that we were taught in the law schools that what died was not the right, but the remedy. But I am bound to say that I agree with the committee in their report, when they say that in this kind of action logic is rather unreal, and that the rule is rather unreal and serves no very useful purpose. They went on to say—and I think these are the words which were omitted by the noble Lord, Lord Mishcon, but they are relevant to my own argument:
"If the debtor and the creditor both wish to preserve the former's liability, they can do so easily in some other manner, and it seems to us to be better and make for a greater measure of certainty, once a debt has become statute-barred, that it should remain irrecoverable by action".

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Another argument, although it is not a conclusive one, in favour of the clause as it stands is that the history of limitation since 1939 shows that the fact that our law extinguishes the remedy and not the right has never been allowed to stand in the way of changes that are regarded as justified on other grounds, particularly on grounds of principle. For instance, Section 3 which deals with chattels, or Section 16 which deals with land, are in fact extinctive, and if there is to be a change of classification that could be dealt with separately from the question whether the right or the remedy is extinguished.
I also ought to point out to the Committee that the decision of the Law Reform Committee, which is at page 29 of their report, about the whole question of time running might have been different had they not come to this conclusion in paragraph 271, which has now been referred to by both the noble Lord, Lord Mishcon, and myself. I am not going to pretend that there is the smallest question of confidence or amour-propre about this, but I still remain of the same opinion. I do not know what the noble and learned Lord on the other Front Bench thinks, but I should be very glad to hear it if he has anything to say.
Lord ELWYN-JONES: I cannot resist that invitation. I do not find this easy, but I am bound to say that while Parliament is under no kind of obligation to accept recommendations of law reform committees, however eminent, my inclination is to consider very carefully indeed their conclusions and, unless there seems to be some good reason to the contrary, on the whole to accept them. There is, after all, as the noble and learned Lord the Lord Chancellor has said, a fairly elaborate process of consultation and discussion with interested parties. When one looks at one of the annexes to this report, there is an impressive list of those who were consulted, those with interests which might be affected, and I am inclined to the view—although I would not go the stake for it—that probably the Bill is right as it stands.
I shall not enter into the theology of resurrection. I thought that the noble and learned Lord was extending his range of theology rather dangerously wide at
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one point. The happy event of the arrival of the right reverend Prelate occurred, alas! too late. Otherwise, we might have had the benefit of his views on the merits of resurrection, which were adumbrated by the noble and learned Lord. But, broadly speaking, in the sphere of the law of limitation, once the cause of action is dead, then dead it should remain. I am afraid that I still hold the same view.
4.26 p.m.
Lord DOUGLAS of BARLOCH: I am sorry for disagreeing with the Lord Chancellor and with an ex-Lord Chancellor, for both of whom I have the greatest regard and respect, but this problem is a little different from the ordinary problems with regard to limitation of actions. It is nothing like, for example, the one that we discussed a few minutes ago, where indeed people may be put to severe disadvantage by actions being brought many years after the cause arose. Here we have a simple case in which the debtor does not deny the debt; in which, on the contrary, he acknowledges it. He writes a letter to say, or presumably indicates, that he intends to pay up or else he makes a payment on account. He is at no disadvantage. The Statute of Limitations is not injuring him in any way. He is willing to pay his debt.
Lord ELWYN-JONES: Will my noble friend allow me to intervene? Why does he not pay up, if he feels so virtuously about it? There is nothing to stop him.
Lord DOUGLAS of BARLOCH: There may be the simple reason that he does not have enough money. That is one of the most common reasons why people do not pay their debts. Anyway, if he acknowledges that there is a debt and indicates that he is willing to pay it, I do not see why he should be prevented from doing so, and that is the object of my noble friend's amendment which I think ought to be carried.
Lord MISHCON: I have indeed a formidable opposition. I was endeavouring to use all my powers of hypnotism from this Back Bench on to my own Front Bench, but those powers have obviously failed. For the purpose of the record, and in the hope that something may intervene between the Committee

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stage and the Report stage, I should like very briefly, I promise, to deal with a couple of the points that have been made. I, too, will not follow the noble and learned Lord the Lord Chancellor into the division into which my noble race was once divided; namely, those of the Pharisees and the Sadducees. I shall only, for a moment, tell him that, as a rule, sitting on these Benches, there is no difficulty in deciding what we want to alter, and what we regard as of prime importance to alter. If the noble and learned Lord the Lord Chancellor finds difficulty over altering anything, because he cannot decide what is or is not of prime importance, that is a matter of difficulty for those who sit on his Benches, not for us.
To be serious for one moment, the noble and learned Lord the Lord Chancellor very fairly read out a sentence from the Law Reform Committee's report which said that the two parties, if they wanted to, could very easily come to some sort of agreement. I ought to be the last person in the world to force people away from lawyers' offices, but the fact remains that in order to obtain a document of that kind, legal advice would be necessary both for the creditor and the debtor, although in normal human affairs that is not so. I can only say, to follow the noble and learned Lord the Lord Chancellor into the New Testament for a moment, that if the creditor happens to be a Good Samartian and does not rush into the issue of a writ and if the debtor is honest enough afterwards not only to acknowledge the debt but even, in the language of this clause, promises to pay in writing, surely the creditor should not in those circumstances be robbed of his rights.
As I have said, it would not be a very practical exercise for me to try to divide the Committee, in view of the opposition, couched in the most courteous and gentle language, of the noble and learned Lord the Lord Chancellor and my noble and learned friend Lord Elwyn-Jones. Therefore—
Lord LLOYD of KILGERRAN: I wonder whether the noble Lord would be good enough to give way to me. One phrase was used by the noble and learned Lord the Lord Chancellor which I could not understand. He referred to the Company Law Committee of the Law Society as, "having allowed their learning
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to run away with themselves". I understand that the noble Lord, Lord Mischon, comes here with the support of the Company Law Committee. If ever there was a committee—and I appreciate its membership—which adopts a realistic approach to the practical matters with which companies are concerned, that is it. I wonder, therefore, whether the noble Lord, Lord Mishcon, would care to deal with this expression which was used in passing by the noble and learned Lord the Lord Chancellor when he suggested that perhaps the Company Law Committee have "allowed their learning to run away with themselves", whereas it is their realistic approach to the matter which is clearly to be seen—and whether or not this is an amendment which the noble and learned Lord might care to take away and reconsider
The LORD CHANCELLOR: I do not know whether that question is addressed to me or to the noble Lord, Lord Mishcon.
Lord LLOYD of KILGERRAN: I was addressing both noble Lords.
Lord MISHCON: I do not intend to follow up this question, although it was a most helpful intervention, because I do not think it will help my amendment. I am trying hard to persuade the noble and learned Lord the Lord Chancellor, with such powers as I have, to agree with me, and to quarrel over the composition of the Company Law Committee of the Law Society is hardly likely to accelerate that end.
There is one point which I forgot to mention, of which I have been reminded by the intervention of the noble Lord. Therefore I am grateful to him. The noble and learned Lord the Lord Chancellor did not deal in any way with my question with regard to the word "promise". Obviously he would have dealt with the question in the event of a new contract. I am not quite sure what "promise" means in this context and why it has to be added to the usual words "acknowledgment of indebtedness". It seems to me to be an example of tautology which may very well lead to misunderstanding in future cases, if this clause becomes a section of the Act. Nevertheless, in view of the opposition which has been expressed but still in the lively hope

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of second or third thoughts being applied to it, I shall not press the matter any further.
Clause 6 agreed to.
Clause 7 [Postponement of limitation period in case of fraud or mistake]:
4.36 p.m.
Lord MISHCON Lord MISHCON moved Amendment No. 3:
Page 6, line 5, leave out from ("defendant") to end of line 10.
The noble Lord said: As I have already said, this amendment has been inspired by the Law Society, and I have the privilege of moving it. It is one which can be described as a probing amendment, because I should very much like to have, as would others, some elucidation of its subsections. I promise again not to be legal and to try to speak in what I believe is described as "layman's language".
This clause deals, very understandably, with the fact that no relief should be given to anybody in regard to the limitation period if that person has been guilty of fraud, or if that person has, with another person, made a mutual mistake. It deals with a third matter: cases where there has been a deliberate concealment. I believe that it would be far better if the rubric referred to concealment. In fact, it does not. It refers only to fraud and mistake, but it is very important that the clause should deal with concealment.
If noble Lords will look at Section 26(2) they will find that it deals with concealment. It says that:
"…the period of limitation shall not begin to run until the plaintiff has discovered the defendant's concealment of the fact in question or could with reasonable diligence have discovered it"
The whole clause, however, depends upon two paragraphs with regard to the concealment. They are paragraphs (a) and (b) at the top of page 6 of the Bill. Paragraph (a) states that the period of limitation shall not begin to run until the plaintiff has discovered the defendant's concealment of:
"any fact relevant to the plaintiff's right of action [which] has been deliberately concealed from him by the defendant".
That would obviously seem to be a correct way to deal with the matter. Indeed, the
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committee, which cannot always be relied upon to be omniscient and all-wise, suggested that the word "dishonestly" should occur. It was suggested by the Law Society that it was not necessary, surely, to go so far as to have to prove dishonesty and that to know that there had been a deliberate concealment was surely enough. I am glad, as I believe the committee will be, that that point has obviously been taken up in the drafting of this Bill.
To turn to the subject matter of my amendment, my suggestion to the Committee is that the next paragraph should be deleted. Your Lordships will find that the word "or" does not occur at the end of paragraph (a); the word "and" occurs there. Therefore, quite apart from a deliberate concealment, it is necessary to prove that it would be unjust, in view of the defendant's conduct in that or any other relevant respect, to allow him to rely for his defence on the expiry of the period of limitation otherwise prescribed by this Act. It may be difficult enough to show that there has been a deliberate concealment. However, the committee may well feel that once having shown there is a deliberate concealment, it would be quite wrong for the person who had deliberately concealed to be able to take avantage of the termination of the period of limitation.
This Bill seeks to go further and says, in effect, not only that the onus is upon the person concerned to show that the defendant deliberately concealed something from him; he also has to go on to show to the court that it would be unjust, in view of the defendant's conduct, to allow him to rely for his defence on the expiry of the period of limitation otherwise prescribed by the Act. The Committee may well feel that this is a completely unnecessary onus. I ought to say that both paragraphs are new and that therefore they ought to be looked at by the Committee with the greatest of care. So far as I know, they have not occurred in any previous Act. As I have said, this is more or less a probing amendment. I feel that unless the noble and learned Lord the Lord Chancellor can give a justification which satisfies the Committee for the additional onus of proving sub-paragraph (b)—namely, that it would be unjust to allow the defendant to rely for his defence on the expiry—I hope that what the noble and

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learned Lord the Lord Chancellor will do in addition will be to explain to the Committee the reason for these clauses (I am of course speaking only in regard to Clause 2) because I believe that, as they are new clauses, it will be most valuable to have at the Committee stage his explanation, which is always a lucid one, upon the record of the Official Report. But in particular by this amendment I am endeavouring to exclude this additional onus put upon a plaintiff by subsection (2)(b) at the top of page 6. I beg to move.
The LORD CHANCELLOR: The noble Lord, Lord Mishcon, said that he would try to explain his amendment in layman's language. I am not absolutely sure, either that he has succeeded in that ambition or that in my reply I shall be able to use only layman's language in order to explain what the clause is about. The background, at any rate, is a perfectly simple one: it is that, if somebody has deliberately hidden his own wrongdoing or in certain other cases where his action has been such that it would be unconscionable for him to rely on the limitation period to save him from the consequences of his wrongdoing, he should not be able to take advantage of the limitation period. The noble Lord quite rightly says that it is a new clause but the purpose of the clause is to restate the law more or less as it is, in language which is more or less contemporary, because the old law has come to be interpreted by the courts in such a way that the old language is no longer contemporary and this is thought to be an easier way of putting it.
Basically speaking, I understood that the noble Lord was really probing when he proposed his amendment. The amendment would omit subsection (2)(b) in cases where a plaintiff seeks an extension of the limitation period on the grounds that a fact relevant to his right of action has been deliberately concealed. This imposes an additional requirement, namely that the court should be satisfied that the defendant's conduct was such that it would be unjust to allow him to set up a defence of limitation. The reason for this requirement, in one word, is "un-conscionability". It reflects paragraph 2.22 of the Law Reform Committee's report. They emphasise there that the
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essential feature of the concealed fraud approach is reformulated in subsections (2) and (3) of the new clause and is that it operates on some degree of blameworthiness on the part of the defendant over and above his failure to comply with his strict legal obligations. The traditional expression used is "unconscionable conduct". Subsection (2)(b), as to the meaning of which I am now being asked, will be useful to the courts because it will leave them with as much flexibility as they had before in interpreting fraud in the old Section 26 which is being replaced, in order to determinine when a defendant has behaved so badly that he should not he allowed to rely on the expiry of the relevant limitation period.
As I understand the Law Society's problem, they would like to know, first, why in subsection (2)(a) it is not the right of action which must be concealed but any fact relevant to the plaintiff's right of action which should be concealed. The present Section 26 operates on the date of the discovery of the fraud but this phrase cannot be reproduced in the new clause because the purpose of the clause is to get rid of the term "concealed fraud" as a concept, as a term of art. So one needs some new expression for the event which is to trigger off the limitation period.
The Law Reform Committee in their draft clause—and that is found in paragraph 2.24 of their report for those who desire the reference—suggested the phrase, "the discovery of the right of action", but we think it would be safer to use the expression which we have used—"fact relevant to the right of action". That is closer in concept to the discovery of fraud and it is only on his discovery that the defendant has concealed a relevant fact from him that the plaintiff will realise that he has any surviving right of action, so as to bring the section into operation. What will amount to a relevant fact will of course be a question for the court to decide.
There is a further point which I understand to be raised on behalf of, and indeed in correspondence by, the Law Society. That arises on Clause 3(3), where the definition of a "deliberate concealment" is extended to include the deliberate commission of a breach of duty in circumstances in which it is unlikely to be discovered for some time. That is required

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since it is not intended that the new section should be in any way more restrictive than the present law. There was a case of the Court of Appeal—and again for the sake of those who like references and may want to refer to it again it is Beaman v. A.R.T.S. Ltd. and was reported in 1949 King's Bench, 550.
The Court of Appeal held that the plaintiff's right of action was concealed by fraud simply because of the surreptitious way in which the defendants had committed their breach of duty. On such facts, subsection (3) as at present drafted could make a difference. So, for example, a builder might take no steps deliberately to conceal his breach of duty but he might know perfectly well that it would not be discovered for some time. Then subsection (3) would bring his conduct within the ambit of the clause and the plaintiff would be entitled to the extension of time that it confers.
It could be argued against this part of the clause that the Law Reform Committee stated their considered preference not to include any reference to the likelihood of a defendant's wrongful act remaining undiscoverable for a substantial period or at all. Again the reference is paragraph 2.25 of the report. But against that I think it should be explained that the committee took the view that it would be wrong for the operation of the provision to depend solely on the probable undiscoverability of the defendant's breach of duty. The clause follows this view, in that undiscoverability is not such a prerequisite to the operation of the clause but comes in as a rider in certain cases only.
I realise that I have not succeeded entirely in using layman's language in that explanation. Probably those who are interested in it would like to read it rather than make up their minds about it in the course of what is necessarily an oral exposition. I hope that that will, at any rate, help the noble Lord, Lord Mishcon, either now, having heard it, or later, having read it, to feel more certain about the purpose and meaning of the rather technical matter which we are discussing.
4.50 p.m.
Lord ELWYN-JONES: I am bound to say I have a degree of sympathy with the approach of my noble friend Lord Mishcon
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about this matter. It seems to me that where a defendant has by his conduct deliberately concealed from the plaintiff some circumstance which would establish the plaintiff's right of action, that course of conduct is not only blameworthy but, I should have thought, unconscionable. I am not at the moment fully satisfied with the need of a double proof of that blameworthy conduct required by the plaintiff, to establish not only deliberate concealment but also what is presumably intended as a further element in the burden of proof upon him, namely, to prove that
"it would be unjust in view of the defendant's conduct (in that or in any other relevant respect) to allow him to rely for his defence on the expiry of the period of limitation…".
All I would say at this moment is that perhaps the noble and learned Lord would be willing to look at this again, as we who have listened to his explanation will, of course, be ready to review the matter ourselves in the light of reading that which, however clearly expressed orally, may nevertheless need a little time for full consumption and understanding.
The LORD CHANCELLOR: If I may say so, the noble and learned Lord has made a very reasonable request. These are very recondite matters and the last thing I want to do is stand on my dignity, if I have any. At any rate, I make the promise which the noble and learned Lord has asked me to make. I hope everybody will meditate upon these words. I shall certainly not only do so myself but will ask my advisers to help me in the course of my lucubrations.
Lord MISHCON: In view of the assurance the noble and learned Lord the Lord Chancellor has been good enough to give in response to the gracious words, that I could not have uttered but would love to have done, which were uttered by my noble and learned friend Lord Elwyn-Jones, I beg leave to withdraw the Amendment.
Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.
Clause 7 agreed to.
4.52 p.m.
Lord MISHCON Lord MISHCON moved Amendment No. 4:

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After Clause 7, insert the following new clause:
Suspension of limitation periods during emergency period
The following section shall be added after Section 26 of the principal Act—
30A.—(1) The Lord Chancellor may by order made by statutory instrument perscribe the dates for the commencement and the termination of an emergency period.
(2) Where under any provision of this Act a period of limitation would otherwise expire during an emergency period that period of limitation shall expire one month after the termination of the emergency period".
The noble Lord said: I rise, hopefully, your Lordships may think, for the last time in order to move an amendment by way of an additional clause. If ever there was a clause which could be understood by lawyer and layman alike it is certainly this one. I have to add the word "unfortunately", because the clause endeavours to deal with the situation, which has becomes a little too common, that arises as a result of industrial action. Recently, of course, we suffered in the metropolis—and it was suffered elsewhere—in that the work of the courts was interfered with.
This clause asks, and it provides, that in these circumstances the limitation period may be extended by order. This, unfortunately, has already been done in Scotland; I say "unfortunately" only because of the necessity that arose there for it to be done. I have endeavoured, with the help of the Law Society obviously, whose wording this is, to forward this amendment in roughly the same form as occurs in the Scottish Bill. I feel that I need only add these couple of sentences. Your Lordships may feel that this really comes outside the scope of this Bill, in that we are dealing with a general situation and not one limited to the situation created if this Bill becomes law or indeed created by the whole question of the Statute of Limitations and limitation periods.
As we have heard time and again in the discussions that have taken place in the Committee, the fact is that no court has the power except in very limited circumstances, which have been defined in the course of the discussions here this afternoon, to extend the period of limitation. Therefore, the situation is that if—and it could be for a very good reason—a creditor, relying, if you like, until the very last moment upon the goodwill and good sense and decency
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of a debtor to pay his debt or satisfy his claim, whatever it may be, may suddenly find himself beaten by a situation completely outside his control, namely, that the courts are not open to receive a request for the issue of a writ on the very last day or last day but one before the period expires. As we are dealing with a situation where the time limit is a fixed one, and in the sort of case I am talking about there is no discretion for an extension, your Lordships may think it convenient to put this clause in the Bill and to see that proper machinery is available for the state of emergency to be covered by an extension.
I entirely realise, as does the Law Society, that this may be thought to be only a draft which ought to be considered between now and Report stage. As I have said, the copy is from a Scottish Bill and it may very well be that our circumstances may need different wording. I am really trying to get the principle accepted this afternoon, and would of course look with great respect upon any alteration in the wording that might turn up by the Report stage.
The LORD CHANCELLOR: Again I am delighted in one sense, but surprised in another, that this suggestion should come from the Benches opposite and not from behind me. What the noble Lord, with all the authority of the Law Society behind him, is saying is that I should use a non-contentious law reform Bill as a vehicle for making contingency provision against the possibility of future strikes in the public service. I am advised that this might make the Bill contentious in another place, and unless the amendment is absolutely essential it ought not for that reason to be agreed to, law reform being by consent or not at all. I think this is really the stage at which the politician takes the place in my heart in preference to the lawyer. Of course, if the noble and learned Lord, Lord Elwyn-Jones, were to assure me that his party were solidly behind the Law Society and the noble Lord, Lord Mishcon, then it is conceivable that my heart might soften towards Lord Mishcon. But unless I get such an assurance I am bound to advise the Committee that this is not really a good thing to do in the way suggested.
I am a little less sympathetic to it than I would otherwise be because I always have an element of want of sympathy to people

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who leave things to the last possible moment. But I am now about to embark upon a very highly technical argument, in which I have some confidence because I have confidence in my advisers, that really this is not necessary. Therefore, on the ground that unless the amendment is essential it ought not to be agreed to because it might be contentious in another place and so prevent our little Bill from getting through, I must remind the House of the case—why litigants always have such funny names I never know—of Pritam Kaur v. S. Russell reported in 1973 Queen's Bench at page 336. It was there decided that an extra day for the issue of a writ could be allowed in any case where a limitation period expires on a day when the court office is not open. They never said, because it was not relevant to that case, that the reason it might not be open was a strike. However, I do not think that it is limited to cases where it happens to fall on a Bank Holiday, a Sunday, or whenever it may be.
Therefore, I am told that there is no reason why, in principle, the authority in Pritam Kaur ought not to be applied in cases where the office of the court is closed through industrial action instead of merely at the weekend or on a holiday. Of course, if the industrial action were so serious that it was physically impossible for litigants to approach the court for a period, I imagine that Parliament would have to legislate ad hoc. But my advice at present to the Committee, to the noble Lord, Lord Mishcon, and to the Law Society is that—although, quite obviously, a Conservative Government do not view this with any hostility—we must try to keep our proceedings as amiable as possible both here and elsewhere; and unless the noble and learned Lord who represents his party in this House has really got them all in control down the corridor and can tell me so, I think that I must turn a blind eye, or rather a deaf ear, to the eloquence of the noble Lord, Lord Mishcon.
Lord ELWYN-JONES: The questions that the noble and learned Lord has addressed to me namely, whether the Labour Party is fully in support of the amendment of my noble friend Lord Mishcon, rather reminds me of Serjeant Sullivan's famous answer when there was a great argument in the court about the
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application of the principle of volenti non fit injuria He said,: "Yes in Ballymena"—or wherever it was—"they talk of nothing else, my Lord" or whatever the phrase may be.
I do not think that I can give either my noble friend or the noble and learned Lord the assurance which they seek. If it be that the case of Pritam Kaur—whatever his circumstances may have been and whom God no doubt will preserve—has clearly established that to achieve the purpose of my noble friend's amendment the proposal in the new clause is not necessary we are certainy treading on, to call it delicate ground would be an underestimate of the situation. It would really mean as I understand it that the Lord Chancellor of the day before a proclamation of a state of emergency had been determined by the Cabinet would with his undoubtedly great and abundant authority, plunge himself in the middle of the industrial dispute. And, in order to protect the sanctity of his courts—no doubt a worthy consideration—and what is more important their daily working efficiency, he would declare his own little state of emergency. All would then he resolved, because all so impressed by the majesty of that intervention would quickly come to heel. It is a little unreal. It is dangerous ground and I hope that my noble friend will not push us into it.
Lord MISHCON: The last thing in the world that I would ever do is to push in any direction which my noble and learned friend Lord Elwyn-Jones advised me not to push. However I should like to make a few observations. First, if I had ever raised a discussion about the causes of an industrial dispute I could well understand that there could be political differences. I was endeavouring to deal in a very limited way with the results of an industrial dispute when the law courts were not available. I frankly thought—and obviously I am disappointed about what I had hoped for—that I was not embarking on any opportunity for the noble and learned Lord the Lord Chancellor to make a political point. He always finds it so tempting that I cannot blame him if he has taken advantage of the opportunity and has endeavoured to make one.
However, what I do want to say is that I am very glad that at least the point has

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been ventilated so that it can be considered. If indeed it is covered by the existing case then, of course, I am absolutely content. However, the noble and learned Lord the Lord Chancellor realised I was not speaking in any way for my party; I was not even speaking on behalf of these Benches. It so happens that my location—and I am proud that it is my location—is in these Benches; but I was speaking, as I said, on behalf of the Law Society. In the circumstances, I beg leave to withdraw the Amendment.
Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.
Remaining clauses agreed to.
Schedule 1 [Amendments]:
5.05 p.m.
The LORD CHANCELLOR The LORD CHANCELLOR moved Amendment No. 5:
Page 11, line 20, leave out paragraph 5 and insert—
(" 5. In section 3—

(a) the words "or wrongful detention" and the words "or detention" shall be omitted wherever they occur in subsection (1); and

(b) in subsection (2), the words from 'and for' to 'aforesaid' shall be omitted").

The noble and learned Lord said: I beg to move Amendment No. 5, and, with your Lordships' permission, I shall speak to Amendment No. 6. These two amendments appear to be related to the same subject. Again, it is wonderful what people think of. These are rather technical amendments and they remove an obscure anomaly in Section 3(2) of the Limitation Act 1939. The present law appears to be that if there is a conversion from a sane owner who goes mad before a second conversion from the first converter, the owner's title against both converters will not be extinguished until six years after the owner recovers his sanity. That ought not to be the law since the subsequent disability should not deny the first converter his rights under Section 3 declaring that the owner's title is extinguished. I beg to move.
Lord ELWYN-JONES: May I ask whether that brilliant piece of intervention is the product of the Home Office mind or what the Lord Chancellor's Department is pleased to call its mind?
The LORD CHANCELLOR: These matters are wrapped like others in impenetrable mystery and I can only remind the noble and learned Lord of the words of the White Knight in Alice Through the Looking-Glass, when he said, "It is all my own invention".
On Question, amendment agreed to.
Schedule 1, as amended, agreed to.
Schedule 2 [Enactments Repealed]
The LORD CHANCELLOR The LORD CHANCELLOR moved Amendment No. 6:
Page 12, line 25, column 3, at end insert—
("in sub-section (1), and in subsection (2) the words from 'and for' to 'aforesaid'.").
On Question, amendment agreed to.
The LORD CHANCELLOR The LORD CHANCELLOR moved Amendment No. 7:
Page 12, line 30, column 3, at end insert—
(" In section 22, paragraph (e) of the proviso.")
The noble and learned Lord said: I beg to move Amendment No. 7. This is a drafting amendment which repeals paragraph (e) of the proviso to Section 22 of the 1939 Act and is consequential on the repeal of Section 2(5) in Schedule 1, paragraph 2.
On Question, amendment agreed to.
Schedule 2, as amended, agreed to.
House resumed: Bill reported with the amendments.

COMPANIES BILL [H.L.]
5.10 p.m.
Report received.
Clause 5 [Re-registration of private companies as public companies]
Lord LYELL Lord LYELL moved Amendments Nos. 1 and 2:
Page 5, leave out lines 38 and 39 and insert—
(" (i) that the special resolution mentioned in subsection (1)(a) above has been passed and that the conditions specified in subsection (1)(c) above have been satisfied; and").
Page 6, line 6, leave out from ("evidence") to end of line 7 and insert ("that the special resolution has been passed and the said conditions have been satisfied").
The noble Lord said: My Lords, at the outset I should like to say a few words of apology to the House. The House will note a series of Government amendments in the names of my noble friends Lord Trenchard and Lord Cullen of Ashbourne and myself. My noble friend Lord Trenchard is unavoidably prevented from assisting and partaking in your Lordships' deliberations because, as noble Lords may be aware, he has responsibilities for one or two other matters besides the Companies Bill. I hope that the House will accept his apology that he is unable to be here this afternoon to move some of the amendments standing in his name. However, he intends no discourtesy at all. Having said that, I hope that the House will permit me to speak to Amendments Nos. 1, 2, 4 and 5.
The first two amendments with which we are dealing—Nos. 1 and 2—are purely drafting amendments. They are exactly parallel amendments to those in Clause 8. In Clause 8 we find Amendments Nos. 4 and 5. With your Lordships' permission, I shall deal with them all. These amendments are needed in this Bill to cure some confusion which at present exists in Clause 5 and in Clause 8 between "conditions" and "requirements". Your Lordships willl see that Clause 5(3)(e)(i) refers to the requirements of sub-section (1)(a) and (c) of Clause 5, whereas in fact those provisions do not impose requirements but lay down conditions. The amendments recognise this small point of drafting and I hope that what I have said will satisfy the House. I beg to move these Amendments en bloc.
On Question, amendments agreed to.
Lord LYELL Lord LYELL moved Amendment No. 3:
Page 6, line 11, at beginning insert ("subsection (1) of").
The noble Lord said: My Lords, this is a purely drafting amendment, which I beg to move formally.
On Question, amendment agreed to.
Clause 8 [Old public companies]:
Lord LYELL Lord LYELL moved Amendments Nos. 4 and 5:
Page 11, line 8, leave out from second ("the") to end of line 10 and insert ("resolution mentioned in subsection (3)(a) above has been passed
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and that the conditions specified in subsection (11) below were satisfied at the time of the resolution.").
Page 11, line 12, leave out from ("evidence") to end of line 13 and insert ("that the said resolution has been passed and the said conditions were so satisfied").
The noble Lord said: My Lords, I have already spoken to these amendments. I beg to move Amendments Nos. 4 and 5 en bloc.
On Question, amendments agreed to.
Clause 13 [Registration of joint stock companies as public companies]:
5.15 p.m.
Lord LYELL Lord LYELL moved Amendments Nos. 6 to 8:
Page 17, line 7, leave out ("this section") and insert ("subsection (4) below").
Page 17, line 13, leave out ("(1)(a)").
Page 18, line 8, leave out ("subsection") and insert ("paragraph").
The noble Lord said: My Lords, with the approval of the House, I seek to speak to and deal with Amendments Nos. 6, 7 and 8. These are all simple drafting amendments. I hope the House will agree that I may deal with them formally. I beg to move these amendments en bloc.
On Question, amendments agreed to.
Clause 14 [Authority of company required for allotment of certain securities by directors]:
Lord CULLEN of ASHBOURNE Lord CULLEN of ASHBOURNE moved Amendment No. 9:
Page 19, line 36, leave out from ("on") to ("the") in line 37 and insert ("conviction on indictment to a fine and on summary conviction to a fine not exceeding").
The noble Lord said: My Lords, during the Committee stage I undertook to your Lordships to bring forward amendments to Clauses 14 and 34 to increase the penalties for breach of these provisions. Amendment No. 9 amends Clause 14, as I undertook, and Amendment No. 17 makes a similar amendment to Clause 34. Both amendments increase the penalty from a fine of £200 on summary conviction alone to an unlimited fine on indictment and a maximum fine of £1,000 on summary conviction.
During the Committee stage the noble and learned Lord, Lord Elwyn-Jones,

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indicated that the approach in these amendments seemed reasonable, and he said he would like to see the colour of these amendments on Report. I hope that he will find the colour to his liking—neither too strong nor too weak. I beg to move.
Lord ELWYN-JONES: My Lords, happily I am not colour-blind. I am grateful to the noble Lord for tabling these amendments. They make the penalties realistic and more fitting to the offending conduct complained of.
Lord LLOYD of KILGERRAN: My Lords, I should also like to support the noble and learned Lord, Lord Elwyn-Jones, in saying that these penalties are more realistic than they were in the original Bill. If it is not improper, I should like to take the opportunity to congratulate the noble and learned Lord, Lord Elwyn-Jones, upon his election to one of the highest offices in the legal hierarchy; that is, Treasurer of Gray's Inn.
Lord ELWYN-JONES: My Lords, I thank my noble friend, who has the benefit of being a member of that great establishment.
On Question, amendment agreed to.
Lord CULLEN of ASHBOURNE Lord CULLEN of ASHBOURNE moved Amendment No. 10:
Page 20, line 2, after ("re-registration" insert ("or registration").
The noble Lord said: My Lords, Amendment No. 10 to Clause 14 is a technical amendment. There are parallel amendments to other clauses—Amendments Nos. 16, 20, 21 and 24. With your Lordships' permission, I shall take them all together. The amendments all deal with what might be called transitional arrangements for the introduction of new rules and provisions. Therefore, they apply to all existing companies. However, in one case it does not work quite as intended. For old public companies and private companies which are re-registered as public the phrase "re-registration" is appropriate, but there will be companies which became public companies under Clause 13 and they have never been registered before, and therefore the phrase "re-registered" is not appropriate to them. In that case the appropriate phrase is "registration" and
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this is what the amendment seeks to achieve. I beg to move.
On Question, amendment agreed to.
Clause 31 [Application of ss. 20 to 30 in special cases.]:
Lord LYELL Lord LYELL moved Amendments Nos. 11 and 12:
Page 39, line 35, after ("resolution") insert ("to be re-registered").
Page 39, line 37, after ("resolution") insert ("to be re-registered").
The noble Lord said: My Lords, I hope it will be for the convenience of the House if I deal with, and speak to. Amendments Nos. 11 and 12 together. These are once again drafting amendments, I hope that the noble and learned Lord, Lord Elwyn-Jones, will accept that this is indeed the case. I assure him it is, and I beg to move.
Lord ELWYN-JONES: My Lords, the noble Lord, Lord Lyell, having more than once assured the House that these Amendments are drafting, he does not need to repeat the assurance too frequently.
On Question, Amendments agreed to.
5.22 p.m.
Clause 32 [Variation of rights attached to special classes of shares]:
Lord LYELL Lord LYELL moved Amendments Nos. 13 to 15:
Page 42, line 11, after ("above") insert ("or 47 below").
Page 42, line 13, after ("members)") insert ("and").
Page 42, line 14, leave out from ("companies)") to end of line 15.
The noble Lord said: My Lords, with the permission of the House I would speak to a long list of Amendments—Nos. 13, 14, 15, 18, 19, 30, 32, 33, 36, 38 and 41. This collection of amendments appertains to what is now Clause 47 because at Committee stage this new clause was added to the Bill. It was to provide better protection for minority shareholders. Section 210 of the 1948 Act, together with Section 35(2) of the 1967 Act, is therefore to be repealed since both these provided a lower level of protection than is envisaged in the new Bill. The amendment I have just moved, Amendment No. 13, together

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with the long list of other amendments, replaces references in the Bill that your Lordships are discussing today, and indeed in other Acts, to Sections 210 and 35 with references to Clause 47. The other amendments which, with your Lordships' permission, I shall not go through individually, are the numbers I dealt with.
There is a further point on Amendment No. 13 in that Schedule 3, paragraph 4 of the Bill in front of us—I think we find it on page 103 of the Bill, as reprinted—amends Section 5 of the 1948 Act by adding three new subsections. Section 23 of the 1948 Act refers to this Section 5 that we are adding to today, and Section 23 applies to many of the provisions of Section 5 of the old Act. Thus, it is now necessary to refer also to those new provisions which are added to Section 5 of the 1948 Act by the present Bill. This is what Amendment No. 30 does. That is a little less technical than the other amendments, but they all stand together.
Lord ELWYN-JONES: My Lords, these amendments flow from the acceptance by the Government of the Opposition's proposal that a number of the provisions included in the Labour Government's Companies Bill should be included in this Bill. Unhappily we were only able to persuade the Government on three items in the Labour Bill, if I may call it that for short, and some of the more important items in the Labour Bill they have presistently refused to embody in this; such as insider dealing, loans to directors, and many other matters that are notoriously needing urgent attention. But I shall not repeat that argument. However, it will be repeated most vigorously, I am quite sure, in another place when it comes along, particularly at a time when, I understand, Her Majesty's Government are contemplating highly controversial legislation in the field of industrial relations.
I have no doubt that the stark contrast between their refusal to deal with these company scandals compared with the eagerness with which they go into the field of industrial relations is going to cost them a great deal of trouble. We warned them about it. They have taken no action (which they could have done on this Bill) to prevent that criticism, and here we are. For what it is worth, we must be thankful for this modest accept-
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ance of what was proposed. It is rather like the pea which St. Anthony is supposed to have had presented to him by the devil, about which he said, "It is good, so far as it goes." That is about as far as this goes. But I should like, if I may, to thank the draftsmen and officials who had to translate into the minutiae of the Bill the effect of the inclusion of Clause 47. They have not had much time to do it, and least of all have we had much time to absorb what they have done, but I am sure that they have pretty effectively given effect to the inclusion of Clause 47.
Lord LYELL: My Lords, I would suggest to the noble and learned Lord that never could I have received such reprobation and a word of caution with such charming demeanour. I should like to thank him, and also take careful note of what he has said. Although, if the noble and learned Lord believes that legislation is dealt with in another place with more contumely, perhaps he will recall some of the later stages of the Committee stage of this Bill in your Lordships' House, when some of us on the Government Front Bench felt—I seem to remember myself quoting—something like a rabbit in a shooting gallery as the points rained down. We fielded some of them. We moved three amendments. I take note of the pea of St. Anthony, so carefully put forward by the noble and learned Lord. I hope we can suggest that this is a mere pod of peas, but at least that this is a start to the stew.
On Question, amendments agreed to.
Lord CULLEN of ASHBOURNE Lord CULLEN of ASHBOURNE moved Amendment No. 16:
Page 42, line 20, after ("re-registration") insert ("or registration").
The noble Lord said: My Lords, this amendment is consequential. I beg to move.
On Question, amendment agreed to.
Clause 34 [Obligation to convene extraordinary general meeting in event of serious loss of capital]:
Lord CULLEN of ASHBOURNE Lord CULLEN of ASHBOURNE moved Amendment No. 17:
Page 43, line 35, leave out from ("on") to ("the") in line 36 and insert ("conviction on indictment to a fine and on summary conviction I to a fine not exceeding").
The noble Lord said: My Lords, this also is a consequential amendment. I beg to move.
On Question, amendment agreed to.
Clause 35 [Acquisition of company's shares by the company]:
Lord LYELL Lord LYELL moved Amendments Nos. 18 and 19:
Page 44, line 23, after ("above") insert ("or 47 below").
line 24, leave out from ("objects)") to second ("of") in line 25.
The noble Lord said: My Lords, Amendments Nos. 18 and 19 are consequential to Amendment No. 13, to which I have already spoken. I beg to move.
On Question, amendments agreed to.
Clause 38 [Charges taken by public companies on own shares]:
5.30 p.m.
Lord CULLEN of ASH BOURNE Lord CULLEN of ASH BOURNE moved Amendments Nos. 20 and 21:
Page 47, line 24, after ("re-registered") insert ("or registered under section 13 above").
Page 47, line 26, after ("re-registration") insert ("or, as the case may be, registration").
The noble Lord said: These are both consequential on Amendment No. 10. I beg to move.
On Question, amendments agreed to.
Lord CULLEN of ASHBOURNE Lord CULLEN of ASHBOURNE moved Amendment No. 22:
Page 47, line 30, leave out ("in accordance with section 8(7)") and insert ("under section 8").
The noble Lord said: This is also a drafting amendment, but to remove an error. Clause 8 has been redrafted in the Bill and the reference to Clause 8(7) in Clause 38, which was carried forward from the previous measure, is incorrect. I beg to move.
On Question, amendment agreed to.
Clause 40 [Restriction on distribution of assets]:
Lord LYELL Lord LYELL moved Amendment No. 23:
Page 49, line 12, leave out from ("articles") to end of line 15.
The noble Lord said: This is a drafting amendment. The provision contained in the words of the amendment seeks to leave out words already provided for by Section 394(2) of the Companies Act 1948. Noble Lords will find that the words we are seeking to leave out are an unnecessary duplication of Section 394(2), and if these words were left in the Bill there would be serious doubt as to the effect of the subsection in the 1948 Act, and for that reason I beg to move.
On Question, amendment agreed to (Clause 45 [Ancillary provision]:
Lord CULLEN of ASHBOURNE Lord CULLEN of ASHBOURNE moved Amendment No. 24:
Page 56, line 36, after ("re-registration") insert ("or registration").
The noble Lord said: This is consequential on Amendment No. 10. I beg to move.
On Question, amendment agreed to.
Clause 47 [Power to court to grant relief against company where members unfairly prejudiced]:
Lord LYELL Lord LYELL moved Amendment No 25:
Page 57, line 14, leave out ("of the members (including") and insert ("part of the members (including at least").
The noble Lord said: This amendment deals with Clause 47, which we think is a important provision, and indeed noble Lords have recognised it as such; I eschew the comment of the noble and learned Lord about a pea in a pod, but I hope this is a starting point. It has been put to us that the clause as drafted could not be used by one single member of a company whose complaint was that his interests alone had been unfairly prejudiced. The argument put to us was that the words in the subsection:
"unfairly prejudicial to the interests of some of the members (including himself)"
necessarily imply that the interests of two or more members must be in question. Having considered the matter, we have come to the view that such an interpretation is indeed possible, and since that was not our intention the amendment makes it clear that we are not arbitrarily excluding from the clause cases where acts complained of prejudice just one member of the company.
Lord ELWYN-JONES: I recognise that the amendment is an improvement to the clause as originally drafted, and I say the same—perhaps it is a little out of order but it will save time—about Amendments Nos. 26 and 27 which will follow in respect of the same clause.
On Question, amendment agreed to.
Lord LYELL Lord LYELL moved Amendment No. 26:
Page 57, line 38, leave out paragraph (b) and insert—
(" (b) require the company to refrain from doing or continuing an act complained of by the petitioner or to do an act which the petitioner has complained it has omitted to do;").
The noble Lord said: Subsection (4)(b)
of this Clause describes one of the orders which the court may make if it, the court, is satisfied that the petition is well-founded. The court is limited in the present draft to ordering a company not to do something, but it has been pointed out to the Government that a petition may be on an unjustified omission, and the amendment seeks to substitute a new paragraph which covers cases of commission and of omission, and for that purpose I beg to move.
On Question, amendment agreed to.
Lord LYELL Lord LYELL moved Amendment No. 27:
Page 58, line 15, after ("order") insert ("or such longer period as the court may allow").
The noble Lord said: This follows on from the previous amendment, still dealing with Clause 47. When the court wishes to make an order, an office copy of the order is drawn up. Where this order alters or adds to or gives leave to alter or add to the company's articles and memorandum, subsection (6) will require an office copy to be delivered to the Registrar of Companies within 14 days of the court making that order. The Registrar of the Companies Court has suggested that it could in difficult cases present some problems to comply with this timetable and the Registrar has suggested that the court should be empowered to set a somewhat longer period for delivery to the Registrar of Companies. This seems sensible, and that is what the amendment would achieve. I beg to move.
On Question, amendment agreed to.
5.38 p.m.
The Earl of LAUDERDALE The Earl of LAUDERDALE moved Amendment No. 28:
Before Clause 48, insert the following new clause:
Directors' Report to include particulars of consumption of fuel and electricity and of energy conservation measures
.—(1) In this section the directors' report" means the report by the directors of a company attached to a balance sheet of the company prepared under section 1 of the Companies Act 1976 (or under that section taken with section 150 of the principal Act).
(2) There shall he contained in the directors' report—

(a) particulars of the consumption of fuel and electricity in the course of the company's business during the financial year to which the report relates; and

(b) a statement of the measures, if any, taken by the directors in that year to further the conservation of fuel and electricity in relation to such consumption.

(3) The Secretary of State shall have power by regulations made by statutory instrument to prescribe the extent of the particulars to be given under subsection (2)(a) above and the methods according to which they shall he given, and such regulations may make different provisions in respect of different categories of company specified in the regulations.
(4) The Secretary of State shall have power by regulations made by statutory instrument to exempt any company or any category of company specified in the regulations from the requirements of this section.
(5) A statutory instrument containing regulations made under subsection (3) or (4) of this section shall be subject to annulment in pursuance of a resolution of either House of Parliament.
(6) This section shall not apply to the directors' report in respect of a financial year ending before this section comes into operation.
The noble Earl said: My Lords, I should first apologise to the Committee that this amendment went down for the Report stage rather than for the Committee stage. That was due to a series of circumstances; I was away and my attention had not been drawn to this opportunity. I therefore hope noble Lords will accept my sincere apology for any discourtesy in advertising this matter so late on in the progress of the Bill.
The object of the amendment would be to require companies to produce energy as well as financial accounts, and at a time when we are dominated today, of all days, after President Carter's speech, by the problems of energy pricing and the need to conserve, I should have thought that the principle of this amendment

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required very little advocacy. Speaking broadly, Britain's energy use is roughly about 28 per cent. in buildings, largely housing; about 20 per cent. in transport; and about 44 per cent. in industry. Thus industry are really the largest group of energy users in the country, and that goes for industry using energy either as feedstock or as a necessary support supply. It is instructive that the chemical industry, which is highly capital-intensive, has actually over the last 11 years cut its energy consumption per unit of output or per hundred units of output by some 30 per cent. It is a very considerable achievement, which has gone largely unremarked in the media and elsewhere, but of course it means that the chemical industry still accounts for about 30 per cent. of all industrial use. So it may be said that there is no need of a physician here, and I do not think that there is where the capital-intensive chemical industry is concerned.
But what about the rest of industry? If the rest consumes about 30 per cent. of all energy use, the physician here is very urgently required. How many factory managers know as much about the boiler fuel consumption in their plants and about its heat and power generation as they do about miles per gallon of their company-supplied motor car? The fact is that every factory manager, every factory foreman, every factory workman knows all about miles per gallon in his car, but very few of them know, and still fewer of them care at all, about the energy consumption of the factory as a whole.
The amendment as drafted might be said to be defective: I have no doubt that my noble friends on the Front Bench will say that and other things. But the short point is that unit cost is a familiar notion to production managers; it is a familiar notion to sales managers; and it is a familiar notion to purchasing managers in regard to the input of materials. But the energy unit cost is another matter altogether. I think that the concept of the energy unit cost in any particular product is a relatively new one, speaking generally.
With the indulgence of the House (which I must ask for) it may be to the advantage of your Lordships, and later to that of those who will read the report of the
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debate, if I quote a very remarkable report produced last year by the Watt Energy Committee, which is a group of professional persons in all walks of life who have assembled themselves voluntarily and unpaid to look at aspects of our energy problem.
In a large and rather expensive document on the Rational Use of Energy they include a chapter on instrumentation, motivation, and human relations. This was composed by representatives of the Institution of Plant Engineers, the Royal Aeronautical Society, the Institute of Cost and Management Accountants, and the Institution of Mechanical Engineers. There are some passages in this document which struck me so forcefully when they were drawn to my attention that I believe they are worth quoting here.
The report points out that comprehensive instrument panels
"are most often found in the energy intensive industries where professional fuel engineers supported by instrument engineers are employed. It does not follow, however, that such industries employing competent staff are always provided with comprehensive instrumentation. Indeed many engineers are very frustrated because of the lack of instrumentation or because a system of instruments, once effective, has become worn out or no longer applicable to the work in hand."
"In this area"—
the report goes on —
"the obsolete panel or partly effective panel is now very common so that decisions are often based on incomplete data".
The report goes on to say that by law all boilers need a pressure gauge and, where applicable, a water level gauge as well for safety. Has not the time come, the report asks, for equipment which assists in the reduction of waste also to be made a compulsory feature—and I stress the word "compulsory"—of all new installations?
The report continues:
"Many energy systems … are still being installed with a complete lack of appreciation of the need for measurement of vital parameters … The lack of thermometers in offices is just one example of … a measuring device which could assist to conserve energy.
"The reliance of many processes on rule of thumb methods shows a disregard for the maintenance of production standards as well as waste of resources including energy. The over-drying of materials is a good example … In one case it was found that only 5 per cent. of metal purchased was sold as final product but the remaining 95 per cent. had been heated and cooled during processing to no ultimate effect. Furnaces of all

1191
types are operating on gas or oil firing with no individual meter to give vital data of day to day and hour to hour performance.
"There is nearly always the instrument which is due for a visit from the Service Engineer—usually the CO2 recorder—and the inevitable instrument whose chart has not been changed for weeks—or whose chart is missing altogether.
"On the other hand there are cases where instruments are well maintained but whose readings are never consulted, the charts being stacked, as is the custom, in neat but useless piles.
"The calibration of many instruments leaves a great deal to be desired and it is not uncommon to find that an inferential type flowmeter has been moved from one position to another with no attention being paid to the basic calibration conditions of temperature, pressure and orifice to pipe ratio".
Then the report continues with regard to maintenance:
"Most instruments … are delicate machines; however they are frequently required to operate under conditions of corrosion, vibration, heat and/or cold, in dirty or humid atmospheres.
Great stress is therefore laid on the need to provide a maintenance service which ensures that the instrument is available and accurate at all times.…
"The object of instrumentation … is to measure energy usage not only at the boiler or at the process plant but in terms of 'Energy per unit of production per unit of time'."
The report concludes—and I come within sight of the end of my quotation:
"It is not enough to change charts and file data regularly, but the daily chart change, where carried out, should be the start of a daily question time, e.g. Why are the charts showing the same readings? Was the weather the same?
"These are the basic questions from which other relevant questions can arise to point the way to optimum fuel usage per unit of production.
"The ideal, of course, is to planimeter the charts to obtain average daily readings as a base for daily costings but rarely is this seen to happen."
My Lords, the House will be relieved to know that that is the end of my quotation.
I am told by my friends in industry there are many furnaces using gas or oil, and yet they carry no meter on day-to-day, let alone hour-to-hour, performance. So the object of the amendment is to lead to managers facing up to the need for energy accounting, to face up to an area of critical responsibility. It would not surprise me if my noble friends on the Front Bench, despite their enthusiasm for the new, the novel, and the revolutionary, somehow find that their hearts quail a little at the introduction of this notion into a Bill of this kind at this stage. They may say that my amendment is defective in drafting. It may even
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be considered that such an amendment is rather out of place for such an important issue to be started up as a kind of fudge among miscellaneous provisions at the tail end of a Bill like this.
However that may be, it is essentially an enabling amendment. It requires directors to report once, and only once, the Government have prescribed the data that need to be collected, analysed, and published, and once the Government have decided how consumption of energy is indeed to be measured. It leaves it to the Government to prescribe the particulars required, and it leaves it to the Government to prescribe the categories of company to be subject to such obligations.
At this time, when we are literally engulfed by a frightening problem of energy shortage, on the one hand, and public resistance to or an anxiety about rising energy costs, on the other, here, surely, is a simple and modest contribution to the start of a campaign, which we trust the Government will further and prosecute, to enable the country to conserve energy in every possible way, but especially in industry. With that purpose in mind, I beg to move.
5.51 p.m.
Lord LLOYD of KILGERRAN: My Lords, may I strongly support the general principle behind the amendment which has been moved by the noble Earl, Lord Lauderdale, that company reports should include particulars of the progress, at least, of energy conservation measures which they have introduced during the previous year. It really is about time that many companies, apart from those in the chemical industry, applied their corporate minds to this important question of the conservation of energy. It is in my view a matter of corporate social conscience, to preserve our national assets in energy. The question comes: How can any progress be made in this important matter?
Of course, exhortations by Ministers and Government departments are helpful; and public announcements on the television are obviously a part of the educative principles in relation to assisting towards the conservation of energy. But in my view it would be very helpful if, ill this

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part of the Bill, relating, as it does, among the miscellaneous matters, to certain assets, the Government were to support in statutory form some general expression as to how energy could be conserved by companies. There is no need to introduce any kind of clause saying, "If you do not do this you will be fined", or something; but a general indication to companies in a Bill of this kind would in my view be very helpful in this important matter.
Of course, as the noble Earl, Lord Lauderdale, has indicated—and I am sure he will not be offended if I say so—there are certain drafting difficulties in introducing a provision of this kind, and I am sure he would agree with me that this is not an amendment in its final form. But I ask most earnestly of the Government that, in the present circumstances of the conservation of energy and the conservation of our national assets, they should think about this amendment, even though it has been introduced at this rather late stage—and the noble Earl has expressed his apologies and indicated the reasons why it is late in its introduction.
Lord MOTTISTONE: My Lords, I hope my noble friend Lord Lauderdale will forgive me if I say that I think that this clause is unnecessary. The fact of the matter is that things have been happening very fast in industry during these last two or three months. I have a lot of contact with several companies, and it is quite remarkable how they have reacted to the fact that their fuel costs have gone up by something of the order of 50 per cent. The fact is that the hard economics of life are being a much more effective disciplining weapon, if you like, to persuade people to take the very measures that my noble friend so rightly says should be taken; and it is happening so fast that, unless you are quite closely in contact, which I have to be, you are not aware of precisely what is happening.
The fact of the matter is that this sort of extra "Auntie Government tells you what to do" attitude is not really necessary in this regard, as it is not in many other regards, with great respect to noble Lords opposite—but that is another point. The fact is that companies are taking all sorts of measures, and are seeking ways of taking even more, in just the way that my noble friend said they should. There are
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difficulties. My noble friend mentioned the importance of having, in offices, thermometers which work, and of reading them. I know of a case where a thermometer in a warehouse had the reverse effect to that which might be intended because of a thing called the Offices, Shops and Railway Premises Act 1963, which says that warehouses must be kept at 60 degrees Fahrenheit, or some such temperature. In this case, when the temperature was below that, the Government inspectors insisted on this temperature even though the chaps working there were given Fearnaught clothing, and the like, and there was no need for it.
So there are in fact times when it is perhaps better to have a thermometer which suffers from the same sort of defect as Nelson's eye; and one cannot be sure that all the things mentioned in the report that my noble friend react out to us should be taken absolutely at face value. Therefore, my Lords, I hope that my noble friends on the Front Bench will find some way to persuade my noble friend Lord Lauderdale not to press his amendment.
Lord LLOYD of KILGERRAN: My Lords, before the noble Lord sits down, may I ask him whether he would be prepared to disclose to this House those companies which, within the last two or three months, as he said, have taken very active measures, because of the increase in the cost of fuel, to pursue a course in relation to the conservation of energy? My experience, which is not too bad in relation to industry, is that many companies are not worrying about the conservation of energy. They are not prepared to consider, at board level, how to conserve energy. I have had that experience. We have had from the noble Lord, Lord Mottistone, a generalisation, trying to persuade us to leave companies to do what they like. I am not prepared—
Lord LYELL: My Lords, I should like to remind the noble Lord, Lord Lloyd, that this is Report stage. Perhaps he could ask a question. If he could draw his remarks to a conclusion, they ought to be in the form of a question.
Lord LLOYD of KILGERRAN: My Lords, I am very grateful to the noble Lord on the Government Front Bench for having reminded me that, in my

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enthusiasm for supporting, this most important matter, I was not conforming to the traditions of this House but was making a second speech. I apologise to the House. The only question I should like to ask the noble Lord, Lord Mottistone, therefore is: Would he disclose the names of those companies which are doing such wonderful work in the conservation of energy?
Lord MOTTISTONE: My Lords, with the leave of the House, no, I am afraid I cannot tell your Lordships. No, do not laugh. I cannot tell the House publicly the names of the companies because I know them confidentially; but I am very prepared to tell the noble Lord, Lord Lloyd, at any time privately, and on his promise not to disclose these names, exactly what I am talking about. I can tell your Lordships that, of the companies with which I am closely in touch, I know for a fact that 25 per cent. of them are talking very active measures, and another 25 per cent. are starting to do so. I cannot go further than that.
Baroness PHILLIPS: My Lords, I know that the noble Earl will forgive me for saying that it seems to me as a layman, perhaps, though I do have to work under the control of the Companies Act, that this is not quite the right place to put this new clause. Nevertheless, I should like to congratulate him on raising this very important point and perhaps draw his attention to another path along which he could pursue it. Undoubtedly some of the greatest sinners—even more than industry, I would suspect—are the public corporations. I know for a fact that schools, hospitals, and so on, have a totally arbitrary period of the year in which boilers are stoked up, irrespective of the weather, or damped down even though you may well be freezing. So it seems to me that an intelligent approach to the use of fuel in our public corporations would also be very worthy of the attentions of the noble Earl. This is not only to support him in this, but indeed, to thank him most cordially for bringing forward this very important point.
Lord CULLEN of ASHBOURNE: My Lords, my noble friend Lord Lauderdale apologised for raising this matter
1196
on Report and not at the Committee stage. I think that he did us rather a good turn, for we have had a most interesting and informative period in the middle of a lot of rather dull drafting amendments. I think he has done very well to raise the matter. The Government have considerable sympathy with the purpose underlying his amendment. Whether it is appropriate in a Companies' Bill or not is a matter of opinion. The Government recognises the importance of the need to conserve energy and to support measures designed to give a fresh impetus to creating public awareness of the need for efficient use of finite energy resources.
However, for the reasons which I shall give, the Government do not believe it would be profitable at this stage to pursue in legislation the idea of mandatory reporting by companies in their annual reports on energy usage and conservation. In July 1977 the then-Government published a Green Paper, The Future of Company Reports. One of the suggestions aired in the Green Paper was that a statement on energy usage might be made a requirement in the company report. The Department of Trade consulted widely on the Green Paper proposals and found that the vast majority of those organisations specifically commenting on the energy suggestion was strongly opposed to any mandatory requirement. Commentators on the Green Paper recognised that the intention behind such a requirement was to highlight energy usage and therefore to focus the attention of companies on the need to avoid wasting fuel, but pointed out that in practice the likely impact would be marginal. Companies by their nature were concerned with cost saving wherever possible and energy saving was a matter of day-to-day discipline and the operation of technical developments at operating unit level. Furthermore, it was considered that such a statement would not enable readers to judge how efficiently a company managed its fuel resources unless it was supported by a comprehensive and detailed energy audit. This would be time-consuming and expensive to produce, particularly in a report covering a large group of companies.
I believe that there is considerable weight in these views which were advanced by a wide spectrum of respondents to the Green Paper. Any measures which com

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panies may voluntarily undertake to publicise their efforts in energy conservation are fully supported and welcomed by the Government. But we do not wish to add to the legislative burden on British industry where the overall benefits of doing so are in doubt. A mandatory requirement to disclose energy usage and conservation measures would be an extra burden, and while I would wish to associate myself with my noble friend in his most worthwhile overall objective of achieving a saving in energy usage, I hope that he will recognise the merits of not proceeding by legislation in this particular matter and that he will not press his amendment.
Lord ELWYN-JONES: My Lords, I should like to echo the view that has been expressed, but it is most laudable of the noble Earl, Lord Lauderdale—and I hope I do not get too confused by those two conceptions—to express the need to emphasise energy conservation. I am bound to say that I am inclined to agree with the noble Lord, Lord Lloyd of Kilgerran, that a great deal needs to be done in many companies affairs where the saving in energy conservation is thought to be fairly minimal compared with major operative costs of a company's activities. For that reason very often that factor is not sufficiently taken into account. I think there is need for a great deal more energy—if the Government do not mind my saying so—on their part in emphasizing the crucial role that conservation should play in respect to our fuel problems at the present time. Therefore, it is excellent that they should be prodded—I was about to use an unhappy phrase—from behind (shall I say?) in this direction.
However, whether a Bill which is described as
"An Act to amend the law relating to companies."
is appropriate for this purpose is another matter. This is not the first time that the Government have paid a high price for the Long Title of the Bill; nevertheless, I think that on this occasion I should not twist their arm too strongly myself—but this is not to under-estimate the importance and value of the point which the noble Earl has raised.
Lord LYELL: My Lords, one or two points have come to my notice. First, I would apologise to the noble Lord,
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Lord Lloyd of Kilgerran. I felt that his enthusiasm was approaching my enthusiasm, which may spill over, but I shall be brief. I was interested to hear the views of my noble friend Lord Lauderdale. I think that in both what I had in mind and in what he has in mind, we should pay attention to the great bard from our country, Sir Harry Lauder, who said:
"Though the way be long, let your hearts be strong."
I would stress that the Government's hearts are strong in this matter of energy conservation and energy saving; but I would reiterate that the Government do not see the need to demand further legislative burdens and what I would say would be a costly audit to fulfil mandatory requirements which, as we heard from my noble friend Lord Mottistone, are in the forefront.
The object of any mandatory requirements, we believe, can be achieved by the soaring costs of all forms of energy. I think it was the noble and learned Lord, Lord Elwyn-Jones, who mentioned that these costs of energy might not he very great; but I think they are certainly rising significantly in percentage terms so far as energy is concerned and also that this must increase costs to be borne by the British economy and on a world scale. The comments of the noble Lord, Lord Lloyd of Kilgerran, are helpful; but he believes that we need to watch the expenditure on energy. I wonder whether he has considered the hugely expensive process involved—which I think is suggested and, indeed, laid out in the noble Earl's Amendment—in an energy audit. I think that quis custodiet ipsos custodes? comes very much to mind. Company directors are watching very carefully their energy expenditure; and I wonder whether the House would deem it necessary that there should be a further mandatory requirement and an audit to verify something in the minds of the directors themselves.
Certainly we should like to thank my noble friend for his Amendment and for his statement. He need have no fears. The Government are full of support for his objectives; but I think that the matter was put more succinctly than I put it by the noble and learned Lord, Lord Elwyn-Jones, who wondered what energy conservation had necessarily to do with a

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Companies Bill—although I took the noble and learned Lord's sally about the broad title of the Bill.
The Earl of LAUDERDALE: My Lords, I think that the last 20 minutes have not been wasted. I cannot help thinking that the happy mood which has spread through the House following my intervention means that noble Lords on all sides have taken as their tag:
Quis diligit deum diligat et fratrem suum.
But never mind about the Latin. I thought I must cap that of my noble friend Lord Lyell. The critical argument used by the Front Bench is that mandatory requirements of this sort were rejected three years ago. May I say that they were three "OPEC years ago" and not three ordinary years.
The second point that was made just now by my noble friend, Lord Lyell, and also by my noble friend Lord Mottistone was that energy prices are rising so fast in all directions—and all energy prices are rising so fast—that these provide the motive for such conservation. I wish that were true. The point which it seems to me should be made to the House at this time is that, while our new and splendid Government are wedded to the market economy, they have signally failed to respect it in one aspect of the energy picture. There has been no mention either in the Budget Speech or since of any proposal to amend the Gas Act so that the Gas Council can sell gas at the market rate. Gas continues to be subsidised to the domestic consumer and, as a result of that, industry can only get it on an interruptable basis at an absurdly subsidised rate. So in fact the case that has been made by the Front Bench that all energy prices are rising and therefore that provides the motive, is incorrect. I have no doubt that my noble friends will take note of what I have said in that regard and pass on my message in the sweetest way they know how through their Departments to the Department of Energy and get that point home.
Having said that, may I add that there are several noble Lords who have already spoken on this subject in broad support of the idea of my amendment, and I take that to mean that there must be some demand in this House for a comprehensive
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Government programme in regard to conservation. I have not seen any hint of such a programme yet, no doubt it is coming, no doubt raising gas prices and amending the Gas Act will be part of that programme when it comes. I take the point made by the noble and learned Lord, Lord Elwyn-Jones, and others, that this perhaps is not the most apt vehicle for launching a conservation campaign. Therefore, with the leave of your Lordships, I beg to withdraw my amendment.
Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.
Clause 48 [Trading under misleading name, etc.]:
6.12 p.m.
On Question, Whether Clause 48 shall stand part of the Bill?
Lord MOTTISTONE: My Lords, I beg to leave out Clause 48. The object of this amendment is one of purely probing the Government. Your Lordships may remember that at Committee stage I had amendments down to what was then Clause 46, which has now become Clause 48—to be nore specific, to subsection (3) of that clause—to the effect that the six months' period that public companies will be allowed to change their name wherever that occurs—whether on stationery, packaging, vans, or on the facias of banks—really was not enough. Your Lordships will remember that the noble Lord, Lord Lyell, at the Committee stage (in column 155 of Hansard) said that there would be consultations before this present stave of the Bill. I am deeply grateful to my noble friend, and to my noble friend, Lord Trenchard, who was there too, for those consultations. It was possible for experts in this field to put the facts before my noble friends. They have, I understand, been very accommodating, and I shall be most interested to hear what they have to say. I beg to move.
Lord LYELL: First of all, I particularly should like to thank my noble friends Lord Mottistone and Lord Redmayne for raising this very important question of the time which is to be allowed for public companies to make this particular changeover from their old to their new name. The noble Lord, Lord Mottistone, has pointed out that I gave various assurances during the

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Committee stage, but I would stress once again that we are very anxious to ensure that the changeover should be as smooth, efficient and, above all, as economical as possible for companies which may have to make the changes to which my noble friend Lord Mottistone has referred.
He pointed out that we have between the last stage and today considered this matters of name changing further and, as a result of these considerations, it is quite clear to us that the clause as drafted, without amendment, would still cause industry significant problems and, above all, a great deal of unnecessary expense. This is certainly not the wish of the Government. Therefore we propose to suggest a number of amendments to this clause. These amendments will require very careful preparation and thus they will be introduced in another place.
With the leave of your Lordships, I should like to outline the Government's intention. First of all, we think that the actual offence which is set out in subsection (2) is at present too widely drawn. Noble Lords will see that in subsection (2) it is stated that a public company, other than an old public company, shall be guilty of an offence if it carries on any trade, profession or business under a name which is likely to give the impression that that company is a private company. However, we consider that this ought to be an offence only where the company gives such an impression to a person in circumstances where it is likely to be material to that person that the company is a public limited company and not a private company. The effect of such a change would be that public companies which continued to use their old names in circumstances where it really did not matter would not be committing an offence.
The second point that we would propose is that companies should be allowed a longer time to make the changeover from their old name to the new name. It has been pointed out to us—particularly by the noble Lords, Lord Mottistone and Lord Redmayne—that the six months' period after re-registration is too short. Even allowing a 12 months' period for durable items like containers and the packaging material that has been mentioned in the previous stage, this would not remove all the problems and the expense
1202
for industry. On the other hand, we have to ensure that the period of changeover is not so long that the use of both old and new names by public companies would lead to confusion. We hope that those who are pressing and desire a longer period of changeover recognise that it is a transitional provision which we believe has to be of limited duration.
The question to which we address ourselves is: How long a period should be allowed? I hope that we first may take Section 108 of the 1948 Act. This relates to the publication of the name of the company. In Section 108 we will find mention of the company's name on its business letters, official publications, on its seal and so forth. From the representations we have received a clear consensus has emerged, that 12 months would be about the right length of time for these purposes. Indeed, this was the period of time which was suggested by my noble friends Lord Mottistone and Lord Redmayne in their amendment at the Committee stage. The Government would therefore propose that 12 months' interchangeability should be allowed for the provisions of Section 108 of the 1948 Act which, as I referred to, deals with the company's name on business letters, publications and the seal. But it is also clear to us that this 12 months' period would not be long enough for other purposes.
As the noble Lords, Lord Mottistone and Lord Redmayne, are aware, there are regulations on the labelling of goods which require the correct name of the company to be shown. There are a number of products which are covered by these regulations which are nothing to do with the Bill we have before us. These regulations deal with such items as medicinal and pharmaceutical products. Especially in these cases there is a fairly long lead time for production. It is some time before the product is actually sold or put on the retailers' shelves. The Government will need to consult further, but it is clear that a significantly longer period is necessary for these purposes. We wonder whether a period of perhaps three years of interchangeability of names would be justified in the bulk of these cases.
These questions are very important and need careful consideration and, above all, preparation. We are, therefore, during

1203
the summer going to consult with interested persons who will, of course, include the noble Lords who have put their names to this amendment. The Government will be introducing amendments to this clause on the lines I have indicated, when the Bill reaches another place.
I must apologise for this lengthy and detailed statement, but it is an important matter and such a statement is the least that my noble friends Lord Mottistone and Lord Redmayne deserve. I hope your Lordships will see the reason for it and will accept it.
Lord MOTTISTONE: My Lords, I am most grateful to my noble friend for the statement, which goes as far as we could have hoped for in our happiest moments. I can speak also on behalf of my noble friend Lord Redmayne, who most unfortunately had another appointment at this time and has asked me to apologise to your Lordships for his absence. I beg leave to withdraw this amendment.
Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.
In the Schedules.
Schedule 3 [Minor and consequential amendments]:
6.22 p.m.
Lord LYELL Lord LYELL moved Amendment No. 30:
Page 103, line 44, at end insert—
("In section 23 (alteration of memorandum)—

(a) in subsection (1) for the words "two hundred and ten of this Act" there shall be substituted the words "47 of the Companies Act 1979"; and

(b) in subsection (3) for "(3), (4)" there shall be substituted the words "to (4C).").

The noble Lord said: My Lords, I spoke to this amendment with the group of amendments earlier. I beg to move.
On Question, amendment agreed to.
Lord LYELL Lord LYELL moved Amendment No. 31:
Page 104, line 34, at end insert ("(within the meaning of the Companies Act 1979)").
The noble Lord said: My Lords, I think it would be for the convenience of the House if I were to speak to Amendments Nos. 31, 34 and 35 together. These three amendments are purely drafting amendments. I beg to move.
On Question, amendment agreed to.
Lord LYELL Lord LYELL moved Amendment No. 32:
Page 106, line 12, leave out from ("section") to ("after") and insert ("394 (effect of registration under Part VIII)—
(a) in subsection (2)").
The noble Lord said: My Lords, this amendment is consequential on Amendment No. 13 and I have already spoken to it. I beg to move.
On Question, amendment agreed to.
Lord LYELL Lord LYELL moved Amendment No. 33:
The noble Lord said: My Lords, this amendment is also consequential, and I beg to move.
Page 106, line 15, at end insert—
("(b) in subsection (6) for the words from "this Act" to "thereof" there shall be substituted the words "the Companies Acts 1948 to 1979 (apart from those of section 47(5) of the Companies Act 1979)".").
On Question, amendment agreed to.
Lord LYELL Lord LYELL moved Amendments Nos. 34 and 35:
Page 108, line 15, leave out ("value") and insert ("amount").
Page 109, line 21, leave out ("within the meaning") and insert ("for the purposes").
The noble Lord said: My Lords, with the leave of the House I should like to move Amendments Nos. 34 and 35 together. They are consequential on Amendment No. 31, and I have already spoken to that. I beg to move.
On Question, amendments agreed to.
Schedule 4 [Repeals]:
Lord LYELL Lord LYELL moved Amendment No. 36:
The noble Lord said: My Lords, this amendment is consequental on Amendment No. 13, to which I have already spoken. I beg to move.
Page 111, column 3, line 10, at end insert ("Section 210").
On Question, amendment agreed to.
Lord CULLEN of ASHBOURNE Lord CULLEN of ASHBOURNE moved Amendment No. 37:
Page 111, column 3, line 26, at end insert ("Section 440(1)").
The noble Lord said: My Lords, at Committee stage what is now Clause 51 was, together with Schedule 2, added to the Bill. Clause 51 introduces certain amendments to the law apart from providing the authority for Schedule 2. These changes call for certain consequential amendments to other provisions, and Amendments Nos. 37, 39, 40 and 42 make the necessary technical and drafting changes. I beg to move.
On Question, amendment agreed to.
Lord LYELL Lord LYELL moved Amendment No. 38:
The noble Lord said: My Lords, this Amendment is consequential on Amendment No. 13: I have already spoken to it and I beg to move.
Page 112, column 3, line 8, at end insert ("and subsection (2)").
On Question, amendment agreed to.
Lord CULLEN of ASHBOURNE Lord CULLEN of ASHBOURNE moved Amendment No. 39:
The noble Lord said: This amendment is consequential, and I beg to move.
Page 112, column 3, line 8, at end insert ("Section 49(1)").
On Question, amendment agreed to.
Lord CULLEN of ASHBOURNE Lord CULLEN of ASHBOURNE: moved Amendment No. 40:
The noble Lord said: this Amendment is consequential and I beg to move.
Page 112, line 26, at end insert—

("1977 c. 45.

Criminal Law Act 1977.

In section 63(2), Act 1977.the words "Companies Act 1967". In Schedule 12 the entry relating to the Companies Act 1967.").

On Question, amendment agreed to.
Lord LYELL Lord LYELL moved Amendment No. 41:
The noble Lord said: My Lords, this is consequential upon Amendment No. 13, and I beg to move.
Page 112, line 28, at end insert—
("( ) The repeal by this Schedule of section 210 of the 1948 Act and section 35(2) of the 1967 Act shall have effect subject to the saving in section 47 (10) above;").
On Question, amendment agreed.
Lord CULLEN of ASHBOURNE Lord CULLEN of ASHBOURNE moved Amendment No. 42:
The noble Lord said: My Lords, this is consequential and I beg to move.
Page 112, line 30, at end insert—
("( ) The repeal by this Schedule of section 49(1) of the 1967 Act (and the consequential repeals made in the Criminal Law Act 1977) shall have effect subject to the saving in section 51(5) above").
On Question, amendment agreed to.

ROSS AND CROMARTY (COASTAL WATERS POLLUTION) ORDER CONFIRMATION BILL
Brought from the Commons and read 1a; then, pursuant to the Private Legislation Procedure (Scotland) Act 1936, deemed to have been read 2a and reported from the Committee.

DEALINGS WITH WITNESSES BILL [H.L.]
6.26 p.m.
Lord WIGODER: My Lords, I beg to move that this Bill be read a second time. Four weeks ago today, Mr. Justice Cantley began his summing-up at the Central Criminal Court. There followed, as your Lordships will remember, a lengthy retirement by the jury and, as the minutes passed into hours and the hours passed into days, so I am sure all your Lordships will have shared with me a feeling of deep sympathy with those who were undergoing the agony of that very great ordeal, because their whole future was in jeaopardy and depended upon the verdicts of the jury. I have in mind particularly the journalists and the witnesses who stood to make so much money if only there were a conviction, and whose fondest hopes were so bitterly dashed by

1207
the unkind acquittals which the jury in due course returned.
One had hoped since 1966 that this situation would never occur. I say "since 1966" because, as your Lordships will remember, there then occurred the Moors Murder trial, in the course of which it transpired that the chief witness for the prosecution had been paid by a newspaper under a contract that involved his providing information to them. The noble and learned Lord, Lord Elwyn-Jones, will remember this well because he was Attorney General at the time. It is right to say on that occasion there was no evidence that a bigger sum was offered to the witness in the event of a conviction; hut misgivings were felt as long ago as that time that those payments might lead to the colouring of evidence and might prejudice the proper conduct of a trial.
In the result, the Press Council made a declaration of principle about this matter. What they said was this:
"No payment or offer of payment should be made by a newspaper to any person known or reasonably expected to be a witness in criminal proceedings already begun in exchange for any story or information in connection with the proceedings, until they have been concluded".
Unhappily, the Press Council then left a "get-out" clause at the end, which said this:
"The Council does not intend that the principles enunciated shall preclude reasonable contemporaneous inquiries in relation to the commission of crime when these are carried out with due regard to the administration of justice. There may be occasions on which the activities of newspapers are affected by over-riding questions of public interest, such as the exposure of wrongdoing".
In other words, the Press Council left it to each newspaper to be the judge in its own cause as to whether the situation was such that the principles might be flouted.
However, little happened in the succeeding years as to this form of journalism. It was considered by the Phillimore Committee on Contempt of Court in 1974. Perhaps I might define "contempt of court"—because it may become relevant in the course of this short debate—as conduct which tends to obstruct, prejudice or abuse the administration of justice. What the Phillimore Committee reported in 1974, with some prescience, was this:
"One particular activity referred to is the offer by the Press, or indeed anyone else, to
1208
purchase a story from a witness in legal proceedings, usually for publication after the trial, the purchase being made contingent upon the outcome of the case. The object of the Press in making the offer contingent would be to ensure that it did not buy a worthless asset. If in a criminal case, for example, the trial ended in an acquittal the story could well be unpublishable for fear of defamation proceedings. The purchaser would probably not intend to pervert the course of justice nor even necessarily foresee this as a likely consequence unless the offer was very large, in which case intention or foresight might legitimately be inferred. But the offer could clearly have serious effects upon the way the witness gave his evidence, and if the position was revealed at the trial upon the witness's credibility and the outcome of the trial."
That was in paragraph 78.
The Committee went on to say in the following paragraph:
"We regard the potential dangers as sufficiently grave to warrant further inquiry as to its prevalence and if found necessary legislation to restrain or wholly prohibit this practice. We recommend that such inquiry should be carried out."
Such inquiry was not carried out, and the matter was next considered by the Royal Commission on the Press, presided over by Lord McGregor, which reported, as your Lordships will remember, in 1977. It was then able to report that, as a result of what it had been told by the Press Council—this is in paragraph 10.150—
"There has been a decline in certain kinds of complaint and in degrees of gravity within complaints relating, for example, to cheque book journalism."
It was able to report in the same chapter at paragraph 10.147:
We inquired of the newspapers and the Press Council about cheque book journalism. As was to be expected, we found no evidence of payments to witnesses or potential witnesses of the kind which were criticised so widely in 1966."
It concluded that section by saying:
"We do not recommend legislative measures to deal with cheque book journalism. We do, however, urge the Press Council to keep a special watch to ensure that its declaration is obeyed."
It is clear, therefore, from what has happened in the course of the Phillimore Committee and the Press Council's declaration, that cheque book journalism of a kind which involves payments to witnesses may well be a breach of the Press Council's declaration, and may well amount to a contempt of court. Despite that, there have been in the recent trial a series of instances that must cause grave anxiety. I do not propose to refer to them all; four, I think, will suffice.

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There was at some stage—and I do not know the date nor the precise terms—a contract between the London Evening News and one of the prosecution witnesses, a Mr. Newton. Mr. Newton was asked as to what that contract was about, in the course of an American television programme on 10th September 1978. What Mr. Newton then said—and I quote from the transcript—was this:
"The deal that the London Evening News wanted was that if I could reveal conspirators in this, the conspiracy to murder, they would offer various sums of money. They had a price on the heads of various people—£150,000, which is 300,000 dollars, for Harold Wilson, the Prime Minister, 200,000 dollars for Jeremy Thorpe and 120,000 or 130,000 for David Holmes, if I could prove to them that they were involved in the conspiracy to murder".
That is such a fanciful, preposterous suggestion, that any newspaper could seriously have indulged in any discussion of that sort, that one would have expected the London Evening News at once to issue the most indignant denial. But, in fact, the editor of the London Evening News took part in the programme and his immediate comment, following upon Mr. Newton's statement, was this:
"There were discussions with him about the people who would be implicated if he were to tell his full and true story, and in the course of this discussion he and his solicitors who were representing him were seeking to place different values upon different people".
So far as I know, to this day the London Evening News has never denied Mr. Newton's extraordinary account of those negotiations.
The second instance was this. On 10th November 1977, after the police inquiry had started, the Sunday People entered into a contract with another prosecution witness, Mr. Miller. They were to pay him £8,000 for various writings, and also very substantial subsidiary rights under the contract, such as a 50 per cent. share of the worldwide syndication rights in due course. It is right to say that that is not a contingent payment. On the other hand, it is equally right to say that the offer of substantial subsidiary rights of that nature clearly must have indicated to the witness how very much more likely he was to obtain a substantial sum of money if there were a conviction, than if his story had to be based on the comparatively uninteresting and unsensational fact of an acquittal.
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The third instance was 13th October 1978, when the Daily Telegraph Ltd., and a company called Milbest Publications Incorporated, acting for another witness called Mr. Bessell, entered into a contract, the effect of which was—and I stress "the effect of which was"—that Mr. Bessell would be paid £50,000 if there were a conviction for certain writings, and £25,000 if there were an acquittal. Let me say at once that, of course, the lawyers who drew up that contract did not indulge in any crude language of that kind. It was disguised very simply in this way. In Clause 1 of the contract it was stated that, in consideration of the sum of £50,000 sterling, the licensor granted to the publisher exclusive world rights to publish extracts from his book. Then in clause 4 it was stated:
"If, on the advice of his legal advisers, the publisher is not able to publish the extracts then instead the publisher will pay £25,000 for up to six articles".
What that meant was what Mr. Bessell understood it to mean, that in the event of an acquittal the book he was writing could not be published because of the laws of libel, and, therefore, in effect, the substance of the contract was that Mr. Bessell stood to gain very handsomely if there were a conviction. I should add in relation to that contract that it was entered into after Mr. Bessell had made his statement to the police. That was a matter which Mr. Justice Cantley referred to specifically in taking the view that it might not amount, therefore, to a contempt of court. In view of the evil that was created by this form of activity by various newspapers, which I shall come to in a moment, I am bound to say that it seems to me to be wholly irrelevant whether a contract of that nature is entered into before or after a witness makes his statement to the police.
The fourth instance refers to a Mr. Scott who entered into a contract with the Daily Mirror group—Mirror Books to be precise—on 30th November 1978, on a day when Mr. Scott was actually giving evidence at Minehead and being cross-examined. The contract provided that Mr. Scott should receive the sum of £3,000, plus very substantial royalties and other rights, and the amount quite clearly would depend—although it was not expressed as depending—upon the sensational value of his story, which in

1211
due course would depend upon whether or not there was a conviction.
The effect of those various contracts—there were others but these were the principal ones—was that there were twin evils. There was a twin interference with the administration of justice. I say at once that I do not for one moment suggest that any of the newspapers involved intended that there should be this effect, or contemplated that this effect would necessarily follow.
First, witnesses in that situation are bound to have a financial incentive to secure a conviction. This means that they are bound to have a financial incentive to adhere to their statements, if they have already made one, to the police, which is why the fact is irrelevant in relation to the Daily Telegraph's contract. They are bound to seek to adhere to their statement, to embroider their statement, and to press as hard as they can to ensure that a conviction should result. The second evil was that once this web of contracts came to light, as it did during the trial, doubt was cast upon the whole of the evidence of those witnesses as to whether it was truthful. It was in both of those ways that danger existed over the proper and fair administration of justice.
Clearly, those contracts, or some of them, were in breach of the Press Council's rulings. I note that the Press Council is to reconsider the matter and I am glad that it should do so, although I have no great confidence that much can result because of its inevitably limited powers. The Press Council has the power of public rebuke, and that is all. It is an effective power in 99 per cent. of the cases which it investigates but, as we have seen in recent months, it is not effective when newspapers decide that a case is so sensational that they are prepared to break the Press Council's rulings. Not only were some of those instances—clearly, I would suggest—breaches of the Press Council's rulings but some of them certainly provided substantial evidence that they were contempts of court.
I mention this in particular, because I know that in the course of the gracious Speech the Government indicated that they were going to bring forward this session
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legislation to deal with problems of contempt of court. I wait with interest to hear if the noble Lord, Lord Belstead, is able to assist as to whether there is a reasonable possibility that this problem which I am putting before your Lordships today will be dealt with in that Bill. Unless it can be dealt with in that Bill in that way, then I see no alternative but to proceed with the Bill whose Second Reading I am moving today.
This Bill provides, quite simply, that any person who makes any contingent payment to any witness—that is, a payment which is dependent in any way, whether in whole or in part, upon the outcome of the proceedings—shall be guilty of a criminal offence. Although it is a simple Bill, I accept that certain problems arise from it. Those problems are two-fold. First, as was made clear by some of the instances to which I referred your Lordships, payments which are not expressed as being dependent upon the result of the proceedings may, in certain circumstances, be just as harmful to the administration of justice as payments that are dependent upon the outcome of the proceedings, yet it would be difficult to frame legislation that would cover all such payments.
Secondly, I have certainly found the greatest difficulty in drafting this Bill so as to lead it to cover the sort of conflict that went on in the course of the recent case while at the same time not covering innocent conduct, such as offers of payment to informers which were made dependent upon a conviction being obtained—the ordinary kind of offer that is sometimes made by insurance companies. As I say, I appreciate that there are those difficulties. Nevertheless, this seems to me to be an urgent and pressing problem about which steps must be taken in one way or another in the near future.
May I end by saying, perhaps somewhat unusually, that I bring forward this Bill with real regret. It is with regret because I have always been one of those who have sought to uphold the freedom of the Press and to maintain that freedom against unnecessary legal restraints. I believe, and always have believed, that with that freedom there must go some sense of responsibility. Unhappily, the recent occasions which I have indicated have shown

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that some parts of the Press have fallen somewhat short of the high standards that we, perhaps rightly, expect in this country. I beg to move.
Moved, That the Bill be now read 2a.—(Lord Wigoder.)
Lord DAVIES of LEEK: My Lords, may I, as a layman, ask a question. The noble Lord has kept on using the word "Press". But what about the media and other methods of communication which might find it a viable proposition to pay somebody for information?
Lord WIGODER: My Lords, I am grateful for that observation. I kept using the word "Press" because I think that most recent instances have directly concerned the newspaper industry. However, my observations certainly should be taken to cover the media in general terms, and the Bill, whose Second Reading I am moving, is certainly not limited to the Press.
Lord DAVIES of LEEK: My Lords, I thank the noble Lord.
6.47 p.m.
Lord HARTWELL: My Lords, everybody will agree with the object of the Bill which has been moved by the noble Lord, Lord Wigoder. Speaking as a layman, the Bill seems to me to impose severe penalties on anyone who tampers with witnesses in criminal cases. The preliminary question, therefore, as to whether we should proceed with the Bill is whether the existing law is important and, if it is, whether a Private Members' Bill—introduced without consultation and, I was going to say, without knowing all the facts but having garbled some of the facts—is the right way to put it right. It is not for me to cross legal swords with the noble Lord, even though I am his target. All I can do is to seek independent legal advice for myself, and I have it here. There is a great deal of citation of cases and judgments, and I shall detain the House only with its final paragraph:
"With regard to Lord Wigoder's Bill, it will be seen that the existing criminal sanctions of contempt of court and of perverting the course of justice are quite adequate. They have in fact been frequently used in recent years. They have the advantage that they are common law offences, which means that they can be adapted by the
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judges to meet the needs of the times. It also means that the penalties are at large and entirely in the discretion of the judges".
Meanwhile, both the Attorney General in another place and the Lord Chancellor have been asked a question, and both have replied that they are inclined to wait for a considered recommendation from the Press Council before deciding whether action is required. However, the noble Lord has persisted with his Bill. Is it possible that its purpose is not to stop a legal loophole which has suddenly and indubitably been revealed, but to take the earliest opportunity to counter-attack those newspapers which are alleged to have hounded the fallen idol of the Liberal Party? Indeed, the noble Lord has indicated as much to me. With his customary courtesy he wrote to me the day following the First Reading of his Bill, giving me the longest possible notice of this debate.
In his letter he said that, while he would speak mostly about the future, others would speak a great deal about the past. It seems to me that he has himself talked a great deal about the past. So I am speaking early in the debate in order that before noble Lords deliver judgment upon what has passed they shall know exactly what did happen in the sphere of my responsibility—and it is not what has been said inside and outside the court room.
I am the editor-in-chief of the Sunday Telegraph and I take personal responsibility for what the Sunday Telegraph has done. It was mentioned in the contract that it was the Daily Telegraph Limited, which was quite true, but the Sunday Telegraph is a wholly-owned subsidiary of the Daily Telegraph and it is the Sunday Telegraph which is concerned. I take the personal responsibility, not in the heroic sense but because I personally knew and approved beforehand all the major steps which were taken by the newspaper. Before I come to that, the House may want to know why notorious trials cannot merely be reported—in extenso, if you like—and then finish with the observation of the judge, such as, "You leave this court without a stain on your character" or alternatively, "It was proper that this case should he brought and I do not award costs".

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If the Press were to confine itself to what is put in front of its nose there would be no need for its multiplicity. A single paper would be enough to duplicate the news agencies, but apart from every other aspect of news, when a case has attracted enormous and prolonged public interest—and I do not mean prurient interest—and which concerns people who have an important influence on public affairs, all the public, and I venture to include your Lordships, want to know what it is all about. So every newspaper, every television company and many radio stations regard it as routine to prepare for publication, as soon as a big case is over, what is described in the more sedate media as "background news" and in the more exciting media "early investigative journalism". In the event of an acquittal with honour the baffled investigative journalist may have to fall back on abusing the police for bringing the case in the first place.
The point I am making is that these investigations—call them what you will—have to be done in advance. Queueing up outside the court after the verdict would be a sterile option and of course they take time and money. In this particular case, I calculate that a total in excess of £300,000 was committed by the media in advance, mostly by TV and radio. There were agreed plans to transport and interview some of the witnesses. Very little of that has been used. Nor are media inquiries confined to something that they can publish after a court may have given them protection. The case we are talking about would never have taken place had it not been for some newspapers. It had been investigated by two police forces and finally dropped by the office of the DPP. Yet investigations by the London Evening News, the Daily Mirror and some other newspapers finally led to the case being reopened. At the Old Bailey it was admitted by counsel for one of the principal defendants and accepted by the judge that there had, after all, been a conspiracy to threaten murder.
The Sunday Telegraph did not play any such leading role. What it did was to buy Mr. Bessell's partly written memoires; what might have been called "My life and times in the parliamentary Liberal Party". That is the bald fact of the
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matter. The setting and sequence of events was (excluding names) as follows: A senior member of our staff happened to be introduced to Bessell in California. Bessell mentioned to him that he had begun work on a book which was to be his life story; it would embrace his early years, his years as a Liberal MP, his rise and fall as a businessman and, of course, his close association as a friend and colleague of Jeremy Thorpe—an association which, according to Bessell's account, had dominated his public life. A double check by a most experienced and trustworthy journalist showed that Bessell appeared to have a remarkable story to tell and had already done a good deal of work on the manuscript. Indeed, as the judge was to say later, he is a very articulate man.
Bessell's standing at this time, the autumn of last year, needs to be considered. He was known as a man who had served as a Liberal MP under Mr. Grimond and then under Mr. Thorpe, having won the Bodmin seat in 1964. He had incurred no public odium at Westminster and had left the House voluntarily in 1970. He did not contest Bodmin at that election because his business affairs were in disorder and he needed to spend most of his time in the United States attempting to save himself from financial disaster. In this he failed, but at the time we were in touch with him he had made a settlement with his creditors, was free to visit this country as he wished, without fear of action by his creditors and had never been accused (still less convicted) of any crime.
Here I should interpolate that political memoires, particularly those involving colleagues, are a normal art form, indulged in by many distinguished members of both Houses over the years. Their market price is influenced by their topicality. The negotiations with Bessell continued. The price which Bessell put on his book was £50,000. It was a high price, but not outstandingly high as topical newspaper serials go, given the expectation that much of the price would be recovered by reselling the material to newspapers and magazines in other countries.
Bessell conceded that there could very well be legal problems affecting the publication of his book. He said that it would

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be very frank and would put a number of political figures in a light that was embarrassing or even defamatory, according to the very stringent libel laws which we enjoy. Chief among these, naturally, was Thorpe, and if Thorpe would have been acquitted at the Old Bailey then a substantial section of the book would be unpublishable, he supposed, in Britain. After we had agreed in principle to buy his book, therefore, he proposed that if publication were to be frustrated on legal grounds then he would undertake to write some articles of an acceptable kind drawing upon his former close friendship and political collaboration with Thorpe and incorporating some material from his book, and for these he suggested that the fee should be reduced to £25,000.
The proposed deal raised two questions. One was the propriety of the financial terms. The other was the propriety of agreeing to any such deal with a prospective witness. As to the first, we consulted our own legal adviser, who said that in the circumstances he thought the terms were unexceptionable. Bessell consulted his own London solicitor, who gave him similar advice, but went significantly further. He spoke to a senior official of the Director of Public Prosecutions and explained to him the nature of the proposed agreement. "Would the DPPs department", he asked, "see anything objectionable in the precise financial terms outlined?" The answer was that the department would raise no objection and did not think it would prejudice the case.
Lord WIGODER: My Lords, if the noble Lord will forgive me, is that contained in a written communication from the Director of Public Prosecutions, or is that what Mr. Bessell has said?
Lord HARTWELL: No, my Lords, it is not what Mr. Bessell has said; it was his London solicitor, a man of standing, who, if necessary, is prepared to swear an affidavit to that effect. I know the name of the official, but I do not want to name him in this place.
After that, thus fortified, we had to consider the propriety of doing any deal with a prospective witness. The chief point of relevance here was that Bessell had already made full statements of his evidence to the police. The police officer in charge had visited Bessell in California for
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several days many months earlier, to take his statement in detail. Overall there were, finally, six Bessell statements on various points. On the basis of all this evidence, and that of the other prosecution witnesses who had also completed their statements to the police, Thorpe and the other three men had already been charged with conspiracy to murder, and in Thorpe's case with incitement to murder. The prosecution case rested upon that evidence, already set out in their depositions, which had been made available to the defence. They could not be altered in evidence without the defence swooping on it. Thus Mr. Justice Cantley said in his summing-up at the trial that Bessell's evidence had already crystallised before the contract was signed on October 13th 1978, and that because of that fact the contract could cease to have the significance it would otherwise have had.
That was a point very much in our minds, but we were not in any case buying Bessell's evidence. That would have been told twice already. We were buying the right to serialise his autobiography upon which he had already begun work and provided a part synopsis. In the nature of things, Thorpe and his troubles would loom large within it, but there was much more to it than that. It was to be a wide-ranging book of memoirs by one of a tiny band of Liberal MPs who had had unique opportunities to observe a section of political life over a number of years at close quarters.
The question then must be: Why, after this contract had been given this weight of legal sanction, did it attract hostile comment when the trial took place? The answer must lie in the manner in which the defence chose to conduct its case. Thorpe and two other of the accused declined to go into the witness box to deny the charges on oath; they preferred to remain silent throughout. In place of evidence for the defence their counsel relied upon a protracted process of destruction of the characters and credibility of the prosecution witnesses, including Bessell. The contract which he had signed for the publication of his book was employed as ammunition for this purpose.
The extraordinary or bizarre aspect of the trial was the relish with which the judge made himself the ally of the defence

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in this connection. Between them the judge and the defence counsel savaged the prosecution witnesses, including Bessell. His book contract was savaged in the process, the judge even giving it the unfair description of a "double-your-money arrangement", the point upon which this Bill has fastened. In view of this turn of events the contract has been made the subject of controversy and misrepresentation. Yet on any fairminded assessment of the circumstances in which it was entered into, and the exceptional precautions taken to obtain legal guidance in the matter, it was a proper arrangement for a responsible newspaper to enter into. In view of the unusual way in which the defence at the trial was conducted it was unfortunate that the contract was made, but at the time it was a reasonable step.
It was not for this reason that in the end we cancelled the contract. We did this at the Old Bailey, at the conclusion of Bessell's cross-examination in which he was broken down by defence counsel. Though he had maintained that everything he said relevant to the trial was true, he admitted that some of his past statements had been untrue. As what we would have published concerned that past, and was not a rehash of his trial evidence, we concluded that his historical narration and personal allusions could not be relied upon, irrespective of the verdict. We, therefore, before the final speeches and before the summing-up, decided to cancel the contract and advised Bessell's solicitor accordingly.
Finally, I must say that there is one aspect which eluded everyone until a fortnight ago, when the Lord Chancellor published his answer to an inquirer We thought we had been fair to the defence, but have we been fair to the prosecution? Even the office of the DPP had not thought of that one.
7.9 p.m.
Lord ELWYN-JONES: My Lords, the House will have listened with great attention to the speech of the noble Lord, Lord Hartwell. While noble Lords will appreciate the fact that he has come to make his statement, I doubt whether they will have appreciated his attack, first of all, upon the motivation of the noble and learned Lord, Lord Wigoder, suggesting
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that he has been motivated by a purely party political attempt to vindicate the reputation of Mr. Thorpe; and, secondly, the House may well wonder whether it was appropriate for him to make such a direct attack upon the learned judge who conducted this most difficult case, when he spoke of him as making himself "the ally of the defence" in the course of a long and careful summing up.
The debate tonight about this Bill is not confined to the discussion of the Sunday Telegraph contract with Mr. Bessell, but is concerned with a very serious question affecting the administration of justice in the criminal courts. I venture to think that the noble Lord, Lord Wigoder, for the second time within two weeks, has rendered a service in having a crucially important issue affecting the integrity, fairness, and effectiveness of the administration of justice—upon which so much of the rule of law depends—examined by the House.
I gathered from the beginning of the remarks of the noble Lord, Lord Hartwell, that he was against tampering with the administration of justice. One form of tampering is, of course, to influence witnesses in criminal proceedings. It is not the first time that this problem has arisen and I faced it in a very direct degree when I was Attorney-General and, indeed when I conducted the prosecution in the Moors Murders case. There the complaint was that the News of the World had carried out a series of interviews with a key witness for the prosecution, David Smith, who was present when the last of the murders was committed. In that case the News of the World entered into a contract with him to pay him £500—and an additional sum for resale of the material throughout the world—for his story of the events leading to the charge of murder against Brady and Hindley. He further agreed that he would sell the information to nobody else.
One of the advantages of a wealthy paper, of course, "buying-up" a witness is to withold any information he may have from any other rival in the publishing field. That is one of the elements and features of "cheque book journalism" as it used to be called. After that case the matter was naturally referred to me as Attorney-General, and the course that the Lord Chancellor of the day and I decided

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upon was to raise the matter with the Press Council. That we did and the noble Lord, Lord Wigoder, has read out what happened.
I make no apology for talking about the past—a matter which the noble Lord, Lord Hartwell, thought was an undesirable state of affairs. This threat to the administration of justice is not something new; it has happened before. The noble Lord, Lord Wigoder, read out the Declaration of Principle of the Press Council. I think it bears repetition. It said:
"No payment or offer of payment should be made by a newspaper to any person known or reasonably expected to be a witness in criminal proceedings already begun in exchange for any story or information in connection with the proceedings, until they have been concluded".
It could not be much clearer, could it?
"No payment or offer of payment should be made by a newspaper to any person known or reasonably expected to be a witness in criminal proceedings already begun in exchange for any … information".
It is very clear and specific. It goes on:
"No witness in committal proceedings should be questioned on behalf of any newspaper about the subject matter of his evidence until the trial has been concluded".
It is true, as the noble Lord, Lord Wigoder, has said, that there were some general words in the culmination of the statement, but I doubt whether Lord Hartwell would seek protection from those governing words.
The outcome of that Declaratoin of Principle was—so far as I know, at any rate—that there was no complaint in the intervening years about the activities of the media and I agree that this potential danger applies to television as well as journalism. But then the matter suddenly flared up in view of the sensational character of what the newspapers called "The trial of the century"—especially some of the newspapers that had entered into agreements of this sort.
The matter was considered, as the noble Lord, Lord Wigoder, has said, by the Phillimorc Committee. If I may say so, I think that he read rather hurriedly over the relevant passage, and I venture to think that we did not get the full sense of what the Phillimore Committee concluded. Paragraph 78 deals in particular with the offer of a contingent payment, to which I shall come in a moment.
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Indeed, the object of the Press in making the offer contingent would be to ensure that it did not buy a worthless asset. The Committee said:
"If in a criminal case, for example, the trial ended in an acquittal, the story could well be unpublishable for fear of defamation proceedings".
That is clearly so. It goes on:
"The purchaser would probably not intend to pervert the court of justice"—
and I do not think that the noble Lord, Lord Wigoder, has alleged that against the noble Lord, Lord Hartwell—
"nor even necessarily foresee this as a likely consequence (unless the offer was very large, in which case intention or foresight might legitimately be inferred)".
I think that one of the things that the learned judge at the trial also pointed out was that Bessell's income at the material time was £2,500 and an offer of £50,000 is not an inconsiderable inducement—that at any rate is what the judge seems to have thought. It goes on to say:
"but the offer could clearly have serious effects upon the way the witness gave his evidence and, if the position was revealed at the trial, upon the witness's credibility and the outcome of the trial".
The learned judge at the trial in dealing with the matter—and, of course, he had to depend upon the information that was available to him as given in evidence at the trial—described the contract that the Sunday Telegraph entered into as "a deplorable contract". The noble Lord is completely opposed to that assessment of it and is apparently totally unrepentant.
What I think would have been of interest to noble Lords would be to learn whether those who made this offer of £50,000 or £25,000 really regarded that as a contingent payment. This is how the learned judge dealt with the contract in his summing up. He said:
"It provides for the payment of £50,000 to Milbest Publications Incorporated"—
that was simply something set up by Bessell—
"for the exclusive world rights to publish up to six extracts not exceeding 30,000 words from a book … for immediate publication by weekly instalments as soon as the present criminal proceedings against Mr. Jeremy Thorpe and his co-defendants are completed".
The House will note that he had the courtesy to refer to "Mr." Jeremy Thorpe. However, paragraph 4 of the contract, which is then referred to, read as follows:

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"If on the advice of its legal advisers the Publisher"—
that is to say the Sunday Telegraph—
"is not able to publish the extracts then instead the Publisher will pay £25,000 for up to six special articles…".
Then the comment of the learned judge was:
"So, as Mr. Bessell said, he, or, if you like, Milbest Publications Incorporated get double for a conviction what they would get for an acquittal. It is not put that way, of course, but their legal adviser would have some strong advice to give about the publication of, no doubt, the original manuscript in the event of an acquittal. I cannot myself see, but you can consider if you like what other point there is in this double your money except to provide for the eventuality that the Publishers may not dare to publish the original manuscript".
That was his judgment. One would have liked a little more explanation from the noble Lord and a little less counter-attack in regard to that factor in the contract.
Lord HARTWELL: My Lords, the noble and learned Lord wants a further explanation. I have already explained that the reason we entered into the contract and thought that it was all right to do so was because our own legal advisers said that it was all right, as did the office of the Director of Public Prosecutions.
Lord ELWYN-JONES: My Lords, I do not want to cross-examine the noble Lord in the House. It is always a painful thing to have to undertake, but I still have not learned whether or not he thought that it was a contingent payment. However, the House will have heard what the noble Lord said, and no doubt in due course we shall hear some comment from the Director of Public Prosecutions about this statement that apparently he, or someone in his department, gave a fair wind to what was afoot. That is, indeed, a very remarkable state of affairs, about which it may well be that we shall hear more in due course. I make no further comment about it than that. But, at the end of the day, I think that the public of our country have a deep sense of unease about what has been done, not only in this matter but in the other instances to which the noble Lord, Lord Wigoder, referred. I think that this is a very serious matter which needs our careful concern.
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As I see it, the real difficulty is whether tampering with witnesses in a way which would lead them to say that which they might not otherwise have said but for the inducement, in a way which, when the contract is exposed, clearly causes grave damage to the prosecution case because it exposes what kind of people the witnesses were who were prepared to enter into such contracts, should be dealt with within the ambit of the law of contempt, or whether it should be dealt with separately as a criminal offence. So far as that issue is concerned, I confess that I do not find it an easy matter upon which to adjudicate.
The law of contempt is, of course, under constant attack, and it is right that we should again be re-examining it. I agree with what the noble Lord, Lord Wigoder, has said; we await with very great interest the outcome of the present Government's deliberations upon it. The outcome of the previous Government's deliberations are set out in the Green Paper. It will be interesting to see what emerges. I confess that I have a certain reluctance about creating new criminal offences if we can possibly deal with a public mischief in matters other than by criminal proceedings. But I have no doubt that this is a serious matter.
The Press Council itself has not yet adjudicated upon the whole of this affair, and the outcome of this debate may not take the matter very much further. As I have said, I do not see why the noble Lord, Lord Hartwell, should submit himself to cross-examination by me here or, indeed, whether that would be a desirable exercise for us to embark upon in the House. However, we await patiently the outcome of what the Press Council has to say. But that some statement by the Council needs to be issued is certain.
The fact is that the Declaration of Principle that was pronounced in 1966 is—in my view at any rate—something which became, alas! a dead letter during the currency of the recent Old Bailey trial. It is a deeply worrying matter. Once the fountain of justice is polluted by pressures upon witnesses from outside, first, the successful prosecution of criminal cases may founder; secondly, innocent men may gravely suffer, innocent men may he convicted by the tendency to embellish a little or, indeed, to maintain an original lie. Those are the perils.

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I confess that I am not totally convinced that because Mr. Bessell had already given a statement to the police, that concluded the matter from the point of view of the law of contempt. If that original statement was a lie, then the persistence in the lie, encouraged by the inducement of the contract, could effect a grave injustice to the accused. On the other hand, at the very least there would be a temptation to desperate men in financial difficulties to embellish their evidence to get the result that would give them £50,000. The dangers are so apparent. I confess that I am a little surprised that that did not become a little more apparent, and that the noble Lord did not show some concern in his speech about what has occurred.
But, as I say, this debate is on the serious question that we need to protect the integrity of what goes on in the criminal courts. If we fail to do so, the administration of justice in this country will embark upon very dangerous days. On the whole, my view at present is that perhaps the better course is to await what the Government propose in the area of contempt of court, and if the matter can be made as tight and as effective as it is hoped for dealing with this mischief, on the whole that may be the best way in which to proceed. In the meantime, I think that the House should be grateful to the noble Lord, Lord Wigoder, for introducing this Bill.
7.28 p.m.
The PARLIAMENTARY UNDER- SECRETARY of STATE, HOME OFFICE (Lord Belstead): My Lords, the Government share the concern of the noble Lord, Lord Wigoder, about the issue with which the noble Lord's Bill attempts to deal. It would seem that there are three main grounds on which we may all properly be anxious about payments which are made to witnesses. The first is the possibility that the payment of any money to a witness, or a potential witness, whatever the circumstances, would influence the evidence which that person gives. By the payment he might be persuaded to say something that was untrue, or to embroider or exaggerate his evidence; or he might be persuaded to maintain an earlier statement which was untrue which, but for the payment, he would have had the good sense to withdraw when under
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oath. It goes without saying that for a witness to lie in order to receive a payment—whether or not this is known to the jury—is a practice which might be wholly contrary to the interests of justice.
There is, I think, a second ground for disquiet. If a payment to a witness becomes known it will affect the credibility of the witness and the standing of the case he represents. If somebody is known to have received a sum of money associated with his appearance in the witness box, then people generally and the jury in particular will be influenced by that knowledge in a way which may have nothing to do with the intrinsic quality of the evidence which will be given. Either the prosecution or the defence may be discredited in this way and the evidence concerned will lose, or will be thought to lose, credibility. The noble Lord, Lord Wigoder, and the noble and learned Lord Lord Elwyn-Jones, have explained both those grounds for disquiet.
My third reason for expressing disquiet about payments to witnesses is that they may bring the administration of justice into disrepute. It is that general objective with which this Bill is designed to deal. May I make it clear to your Lordships that the Government are determined to do whatever is necessary for their part to safeguard the good name of the administration of justice in our courts.
The Bill focuses, understandably, on contingent payments, but it is worth recalling that when the Press Council issued a declaration of principle on the matter in 1966 it did not draw such a distinction. In plain terms the Press Council said that payment, or offer of payment, to witnesses should be condemned.
Lord ELWYN-JONES: My Lords, may I intervene in order to explain one matter in this connection which I should have made clear; namely, there was no evidence in the News of the World incident of any contingent payment being involved in the approaches to David Smith. The criticism there was on the lines that the noble Lord is now speaking about. But I thought it right, and I owe it to the News of the World, to make that quite clear from my knowledge of what was contained in the contract and the interviews which the police had with the journalist concerned.
Lord BELSTEAD: My Lords, I am grateful to the noble and learned Lord for making that clear both to me and to your Lordships' House. So far as the Press Council declaration in 1966 was concerned, the noble and learned Lord read out the exact words of that declaration which amounted, as I have said, in plain terms to a condemnation of payments, or offer of payments, to witnesses, including witnesses in committal proceedings until the trial itself is over.
I am expressing sympathy for the objects of the Bill and also concern about events which have given rise to it. None the less, the Government have reservations about the wisdom of proceeding to legislate now on the basis of this Bill. Our concern springs from the answers to three questions which can be asked. Those questions are: How widespread is the abuse? Is it such as to require legislation, or is some other remedial action appropriate?
Thirdly, even if legislation is needed, is it needed now and will this Bill meet the case?
Would your Lordships bear with me for a moment while I try to answer those three questions in turn. While payments of this kind are deplorable when they occur, there is, I think, no evidence that they are widespread. Indeed, before this year the last occasion when the matter achieved notoriety was in the case of the Moors Murders when the noble and learned Lord was Attorney General. This led the Press Council to issue, after consulting newspaper editors, the declaration of principle to which the noble Lord, Lord Wigoder, and indeed the noble and learned Lord have referred. The Royal Commission on the Press examined the matter, and in its report in 1977 recorded that it found no evidence of the payments to witnesses, or potential witnesses, which had earlier caused such concern.
In case that sounds rather complacent, it may be that payments have been made in other cases. Indeed, I think it would be naive to claim that they have not. But there is no evidence of what, if your Lordships will forgive me saying so, I would call a major problem. Indeed, the immediate consequence of the recent case was to provoke a further Press Council inquiry; widespread expressions of concern in both Houses of Parliament and in the
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Press; and last, but not least, the noble Lord's Bill. That shows that this single instance is taken as being a very great problem in itself. I am sure, and very much trust, that Fleet Street will catch what I believe is the public mood and will not ignore these clear signs of disquiet.
In any event, is the abuse such that legislation is needed to stamp it out? The Government have noted that the Press Council has initiated an urgent examination of the ethical issues involved, and will, I hope, pay due regard to the views expressed by your Lordships in this debate today. The Press Council has also appealed publicly for help from prosecuting and defending lawyers in providing information and supporting evidence. The Government believe that in the first instance we should look to the Press to take the necessary action, and it is to be hoped that the Press Council will be able to give a clear lead on this matter.
We should not forget that, in certain circumstances, the criminal law may already be relevant, and both the noble Lord, Lord Wigoder, and the noble and learned Lord have referred to this. Payments which are intended to prejudice proceedings, whether by inducing the witnesses to lie, or by some other means, would almost certainly constitute an offence under the general law. Moreover, the courts' inherent powers of contempt may also be relevant. In certain circumstances payments to witnesses, particularly if substantial, might well amount to contempt, and even if a person did not intend to prejudice proceedings in the sense of setting out with that objective in mind, the payments might be so large as to make it obvious to any reasonable man that this was likely to be the consequence.
The Government are committed to bringing forward legislation on contempt of court, which I am afraid I cannot anticipate this evening. In its Report on Contempt, the Phillimore Committee specifically considered payments to witnesses, and concluded that they should not fall within the ambit of the law of contempt being proposed. Nonetheless, before considering legislation in this field we need to bear in mind that there are, and will continue to be, provisions

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which will bear at least on some of the activities that this Bill is concerned with. The noble Lord, Lord Wigoder, has asked me specifically whether forthcoming legislation or contempt will deal with this problem. We have also had a few words from the noble and learned Lord on the subject of contempt. If your Lordships will allow me, I should like to return again to the subject in a few moments before I finish speaking.
The third question which I asked, and which I think needs an answer, is: Does the noble Lord's Bill meet the case? It would be tedious in a debate of this kind to dwell at any length on drafting difficulties. However, I think that there is a problem about tackling the abuse at which this Bill is aimed if the legislation is to achieve the requisite precision. It is not unlikely that difficult cases could arise from payments, or offers made conditional on something such as the publication of a book which was, or which purported to be different from the outcome of the proceedings. The Bill does not provide very much guidance about how to handle such situations.
Because the offence is one of strict liability, as it has to be to deal with the abuse in question, and because the Bill is silent, again as it probably has to be, about what the payments are for, there is a risk that it would catch a number of innocent payments. Because it covers any witness, or potential witness, it would apply to payment to a defendant in a criminal case or to a party in civil proceedings. Thus, I think the Bill would probably have the effect of prohibiting the offering of a reward for the recovery of stolen property which is dependent on the conviction of the thief. It might make it an offence to offer to pay someone else's fine—which I am sure your Lordships would tell me is not a desirable thing, but it is not clear that it ought to constitute a criminal offence. Similarly, an agreement to settle out of court in civil proceedings might technically also be caught by this Bill.
There is also a real problem in being unsure which way to turn in drafting legislation on this subject. The noble Lord's Bill is limited to contingency payments, but the Phillimore Committee warned that this would create obvious difficulties of proof because the contin-
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gency aspect can be concealed. On the other hand, there is a case, apparently accepted by the Press Council in issuing its declaration of principle, for prohibiting all payments to witnesses, whether contingent or not. But if the Bill were to be amended in that way the likelihood of catching innocent payments becomes even greater. For example, a payment to a bona fide expert witness might be caught. I do not mention these—and I think there are some other difficulties—with any sense of satisfaction. We are all grateful to the noble Lord for bringing forward this Bill. Rather, my purpose is to demonstrate the truth of the proposition that, before we consider legislation on this difficult issue involving Press freedom, we need to take a longer look at the issues involved.
The issues which the noble Lord's Bill raises are therefore, in the Government's view, both urgent and important and are engaging urgently the attention of the Government. Both my learned friend the Attorney General and my noble and learned friend the Lord Chancellor have been in correspondence with the Press Council and each has expressed the view that though the matter clearly cannot be left as it is, it would be better to await the result of the Press Council's deliberations before taking any steps to deal with the matter by changes in the law or otherwise.
Nevertheless, if for any reason these approaches are found in the event not to be sufficient in themselves, we shall clearly have to think again. Fortunately, the Bill dealing with contempt of court which Her Majesty's Government are committed to introducing during the present Session, will form a convenient opportunity for the discussion of the matter again, either at the Second Reading or, with greater precision, at the Committee stage. I am authorised to say that the Government will carefully consider anything the noble Lord or other of your Lordships may wish to say on the Second Reading of that Bill or, in the event of their putting down any specific amendment or any amendment which the noble Lord or any of your Lordships may choose to move in Committee. I give the noble Lord and the House that undertaking. In the light of it, I would ask the noble Lord to consider whether he wishes to proceed to the Committee stage of his Bill.
7.42 p.m.
Lord WIGODER: My Lords, I am grateful to the noble and learned Lord, Lord Elwyn-Jones, for the powerful support he gave to my argument. I am grateful also to the noble Lord, Lord Hartwell, for having the courage to come forward today and participate in this debate. It would have been easy to stay away. It must have been much more difficult to come and put forward as he did, the spirited defence of the particular matter into which his newspaper entered. I know enough from life at the Bar to recognise skill and ability in putting forward a somewhat tenuous case when I see it, and I indeed respect the way in which that has been done.
I would only add that I am sure the noble Lord, Lord Hartwell, would want on reflection perhaps not to persist in his observations about the learned trial judge, particularly when he himself criticised the judge because of his observations about one of the witnesses called Mr. Bessell, and then the noble Lord himself said a little later that the Sunday Telegraph had decided to avoid the contract into which they had entered with Mr. Bessell because Mr Bessell had been so broken down in the course of his evidence by defence counsel. It is a little hard in the circumstances to blame the trial judge if he made a comment about that in due course.
I would add only two other observations in relation to what the noble Lord, Lord Hartwell, said. The first is to make it clear, as I do, that it has never been suggested that either his or any other paper that was involved in these matters intended to have the harmful effect on the administration of justice which cumulatively I believe all the papers did have. Secondly, the noble Lord put himself in the firing line this evening when there are in fact other papers, as I tried to indicate, involved very substantially; and I would not want it to be thought for one moment that if one was obliged to criticise what had happened in recent months, it was all to be directed towards the paper on which the noble Lord plays such an extremely distinguished part.
I am grateful for what the noble Lord, Lord Belstead, said on behalf of the Government. What it comes to, as I understand it, is really that the Govern-
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ment recognise that this is an urgent problem, that it is an important one and that they are prepared to look again at the problem after the Press Council has considered it in the context of a contempt Bill which the Government are already committed to introduce during this Session. In those circumstances, I agree particularly with what Lord Elwyn-Jones said, that it is undesirable to seek to create specific criminal offences if matters can be dealt with on another basis. It is undesirable to try to proceed in a piecemeal fashion if there is an opportunity for proceeding, in a more comprehensive way. In view of the very clear indication which the noble Lord, Lord Belstead, has given that the Government are prepared to look again most seriously at this problem in the very near future, I accept what the noble Lord said, that that is perhaps the most helpful and sensible way to proceed in dealing with this important matter. In those circumstances, I ask leave to withdraw the Bill.
Motion for Second Reading, by leave, withdrawn.
Bill, by leave, withdrawn.

INTELSAT (IMMUNITIES AND PRIVILEGES) ORDER 1979
7.46 p.m.
Lord TREFGARNE Lord TREFGARNE rose to move, That the draft order, laid before the House on 12th June, be approved. The noble Lord said: My Lords, with permission I will speak at the same time to the Oslo and Paris Commissions (Immunities and Privileges) Order 1979 and the International Oil Pollution Compensation Fund (Immunities and Privileges) Order 1979. These orders, which will be made under the International Organisations Act 1968, were laid before the House on 24th May and 9th July.
The first of these orders relates to the International Telecommunications Satellite Organisation and will revoke the order made in 1972 in respect of this organisation. It is required to give effect to the Protocol on INTELSAT Privileges, Exemptions and Immunities which was signed by the United Kingdom on 23rd August 1978 and laid before the House on 2nd November 1978.

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The United Kingdom has been associated with the development of satellite communications since the first experimental launchings of such a satellite in 1962. We were one of the founder members of the consortium which was set up in 1964 as an interim measure pending the conclusion in 1971 of an agreement establishing the International Telecommunication Satellite Organisation "Intelsat". One hundred and two States have now signed this agreement, which the United Kingdom ratified on 16th February 1972.
The purpose of INTELSAT is to continue the design, development, operation and maintenance of the satellites and associated systems which provide, on a commercial basis, a reliable, high quality international public telecommunications service to all areas of the world. The two essential elements in this service are, first, the space segment, which at the moment comprises 13 satellites in geostationary orbit at various locations over the Atlantic, Indian and Pacific Oceans at a height of some 22,240 miles; and, secondly, the ground segment, consisting of 160 earth stations located in 100 countries. The combined system of satellites and earth stations provides approximately 685 earth station-to-earth station communication channels.
Your Lordships may be interested to know that the Protocol on INTELSAT Privileges, Exemptions and Immunities is the first multilateral non-regional agreement on privileges and immunities to be concluded for some time. It was agreed upon at a conference held in May 1978 in Washington, where the organisation has its headquarters. The general trend of the conference was towards a limitation of the privileges and immunities to be accorded to INTELSAT, and persons connected with it, because of the semi-commercial nature of the organisation.
Accordingly, the order provides a more limited range of privileges and immunities than is customary for most international organisations of which the United Kingdom is a Member State. Thus, INTELSAT is to be exempted from taxation and from Customs duties, not on all of the items it imports or purchases for its official use, but only in respect of "the exempted items"; that is, communications
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satellites, and components and parts for them, which are to be put into orbit or carry out the organisation's main function. This means that, in respect of Customs and taxation exemptions, the draft order now before your Lordships is giving no more, and I would like to stress this, than is already being given to the organisation by the existing order which is now being revoked.
As regards the staff members of the organisation, the Protocol requires that they shall enjoy immunity from jurisdiction in respect of their official acts and, in member countries of which they are not nationals or permanent residents, exemption from income tax on their salaries and emoluments from INTELSAT. When taking up an appointment in another member country they are also to be granted exemption from Customs duties and taxes on the importation of their personal effects. These are the basic privileges and immunities which the United Kingdom has recognised as necessary and appropriate for the staff members of international organisations. The order accordingly gives effect to those provisions, but your Lordships will appreciate that we are unlikely to have to implement them in this country, since there is no proposal that INTELSAT should set up an office here.
The Protocol also requires that representatives of the contracting parties shall be granted immunity from suit only in respect of their official functions. A similar provision extends to the members of an arbitration tribunal which may be established under the provisions of the INTELSAT agreement or operating agreement to settle disputes arising between the organisation and contracting parties or between parties of signatories themselves. Thus, if such a tribunal were to be set up in this country, the arbitrators and witnesses participating in the arbitration proceedings would be accorded immunity, but again only in respect of their official functions. I should like to emphasise however, that for these persons, as also for the officials of the organisation, immunity does not extend to motor traffic offences or accidents. From what I have said, your Lordships will realise that the making of this order will not result in any significant extension of immunity from the jurisdiction of our courts; nor will

1235
its effect on the Exchequer be more than minimal.
May I now turn to the draft Oslo and Paris Commissions (Immunities and Privileges) Order 1979, which I shall move separately. This is required to give effect to the agreement relating to the commissions established by the Convention for the Prevention of Marine Pollution by Dumping from Ships and Aircraft 1972, and the Convention for the Prevention of Marine Pollution from Land-Based Sources 1974.
The Agreement was laid before the House on 10th May 1979. Happily, rather than use the full and very lengthy title of the agreement, the order refers to the shorter titles by which these two separate, but related, commissions are generally known.
The Oslo Convention has as its object the protection of the marine environment from dumping by ships and aircraft. The convention which now has 12 parties, resulted from a meeting of some North Sea States, convened in 1971 on the initiative of the United Kingdom. The convention came into force on 7th April 1974. It requires all dumping in the North Sea and North-East Atlantic (but excluding the Baltic and the Mediterranean) by ships and aircraft to be authorised by national authorities. It prohibits the dumping of certain substances such as compounds of heavy metals, organo-chlorines, and carcinogenic substances, and others which might find their way into the food chain. Specific permits are required for the dumping of other, less harmful, substances, and the convention has provisions regarding the characteristics of the waste, packing methods, and the location of the dumping site.
The Paris Convention, which concerns the prevention of marine pollution from land-based sources including rivers and estuaries, arose from a French initiative in 1973. It was welcomed as a much needed supplement to the Oslo Convention, covering, as it did, the same geographical area, and was closely modelled on that earlier convention. It came into force on 6th May 1978, and eight of the 14 signatories have so far ratified it. Parties to the Paris Convention undertake as a matter of urgency to eliminate pollution
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of the sea, from land-based sources by certain defined substances, to limit strictly pollution by other substances, to monitor marine pollution, and to co-operate in research.
Each of the conventions established a commission, composed of representatives from each contracting party, to oversee its operations. The Oslo Commission based its secretariat in London where it could maintain close liaison with the Inter-Governmental Maritime Consultative Organisation, which is the secretariat body for the London Convention on the Prevention of Marine Pollution by Dumping of Wastes and Other Matter. With the entry into force of the Paris Convention it was agreed between the two commissions that their affairs could be most economically handled by a single secretariat. Thus the joint secretariat came into being in London to act on behalf of both the Oslo and Paris Commissions.
The draft order confers legal personality on the commissions and exempts them from the payment of direct taxes. Unlike most orders of this kind, it does not confer any privileges or immunities upon representatives of Member States, since none were requested. The five staff members are to receive only such privileges and immunities as are necessary for this small joint secretariat to function effectively here. I hope that your Lordships will approve the draft order, thus confirming your support for the valuable work which is being carried out by the Oslo and Paris Commissions.
The last draft order before your Lordships is also connected with marine pollution, but in a rather different way. This order relates to the international fund set up to deal with the payment of compensation as a result of pollution damage caused by the escape or discharge of oil from ships.
The "Torrey Canyon" incident in 1967 demonstrated that there did not exist in international law adequate provision to enable those affected by marine oil pollution damage to recover the considerable cost of carrying out preventative measures, and in effecting cleaning-up operations. The United Kingdom Government therefore took the initiative in measures which led to an inter-govern-

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mental conference negotiating in 1969 the International Convention on Civil Liabilities for Oil Pollution Damage. This convention, which entered in to force in 1975, has now been accepted by 39 countries, including almost every significant maritime power. The major exception is the United States. While being a great step forward in making shipowners strictly liable for oil pollution damage caused by laden tankers, the limit of their liability at £9·5 million was still inadequate to cover a major disaster.
Accordingly, a further inter-governmental conference adopted in December 1971 the International Convention on the Establishment of an International Fund for Compensation for Oil Pollution Damage. This fund is financed by levies on imported oil which are paid by the oil companies of contracting States. The oil companies have no control over the disposal of monies from the fund. It makes compensation available to victims of oil pollution, when adequate compensation could not be obtained under the earlier convention from the shipowners concerned. Your Lordships will recognise that these provisions follow the "polluter pays" principle. The owner of a laden tanker that spills oil is liable to meet a first tranche of compensation under the Civil Liability Convention, with a second tranche being financed by the oil industry. The United Kingdom ratified the fund convention in 1976 and made an order to give effect to its provisions on privileges and immunities. The convention entered into force on 16th October 1978, and compensation from it is now obtainable up to a maximum of £29·3 million sterling per incident. The original maximum was £19·5 million sterling, but this amount was increased in April this year.
The presence in London of the Inter-Governmental Maritime Consultative Organisation, with which the fund requires to work in close collaboration, was one of the incentives which led the fund's members to accept Her Majesty's Government's invitation to establish its headquarters in London. When IMCO move in two or three years' time into the new building which is being constructed for them on the Albert Embankment, the fund will have its own offices in that building. At present it is housed in
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separate premises which IMCO have leased close to their existing headquarters. We have negotiated an agreement with the fund setting out the conditions under which its small staff will operate here. This agreement was laid before the House on 21st June. A new order is required to give effect to that agreement. It incorporates the fiscal reliefs provided by the earlier order, which it revokes, and accords the additional privileges and immunities which are specified in the agreement.
The scale of these privileges and immunities is comparable with that accorded to most of the other international organisations having their headquarters in London. However, a significant difference is that the fund's immunity from suit is more limited in certain respects. For example, action may be taken against the fund in the courts of this country in relation to the compensation provisions of the convention. I am sure that your Lordships will also recognise the additional benefits which will accrue to this country from the receipt of the levies paid to the fund by the oil companies. For these reasons, therefore, I ask your Lordships to endorse the important and useful work of this organisation by approving the draft order. I beg to move.
Moved, That the draft order, laid before the House on 12th June, be approved.—(Lord Trefgarne.)
8 p.m.
Lord GORONWY-ROBERTS: My Lords, I shall detain your Lordships for only a very few minutes because the Minister has most carefully and precisely defined the purport of these three orders, two of which are, of course, quite closely related. As to the first, dealing with Intelsat, this is an order conferring privileges and immunities on this organisation and certain of its representatives, and, as the Minister explained, it is in accordance with the agreement and protocol signed by the United Kingdom in, I think, August 1978. As such, the order flows from that agreement and that protocol, and it is therefore common form in that sense and, indeed, in content and purport. It does not, at least significantly, derogate from similar orders related to similar requirements. We note with satisfaction

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that the Joint Committee of both Houses on Delegated Legislation have reported that they see nothing in this order that they should specially bring to the attention of both Houses, and we are very glad to support the motion for the approval of this order.
As to the twins, the Oslo and Paris Commissions Order, they are of course closely related and they deal with an extremely important, and perhaps increasingly important, fact of modern international industrial life. I am sure that the Minister and the whole House (such as it is) would agree with me that we have not by any means solved this problem. In recent weeks we have had to consider new developments in this field, which has caused us great concern; but for the moment we are concerned with the order, and here again the Joint Committee which scrutinises these instruments has returned a clean bill of health in both cases. I would merely add here that the Oslo order, as I shall call it, certainly flows from an agreement which orginally was the subject of a British initiative. I think that to some extent that is true of the Paris order, which deals with land-based problems arising in this field. These two orders are in fact relatively common form, and we are glad to support the motion.
As to the third, relating to the International Oil Pollution Compensation Fund, this, too, is acceptable to us; and here again the Joint Committee on Delegated Legislation see no need to draw our attention to any particular feature of the order. I turn to my noble friend for adventitious technology. This, of course, limits immunity from suit, does it not? I think I heard the Minister make this point, and I was very glad to hear him make it because any limitation on immunities, so long as it does not impair the efficiency of the organisation concerned, is always most welcome to either or both Houses. I have my own views on this, as noble Lords know, but I am sure the House has heard with gratification that this is the case with this particular order. This flows from an agreement between this country and the fund, and I think it is very important to underline what the Minister has said about the fund as a separate entity. I was glad that he
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described how the fund was assembled, how the fund is funded, and the system of levies—the dual system of levies, in fact—which seems to be a fundamentally sound way of doing it.
Quite apart from the order, however, I am sure the House will feel that we shall have to look at the whole question of compensation again; but that does not concern this country only, and I shall not go down that path because it does not really relate to the requirements of the order which the House is asked to approve. The Minister reminded us that 39 States, I understand, have adhered to this, and I take it that they comprise most, if not all, of the major maritime States—with, however, a notable exception; that of the United States of America. This is not the time or place to go into the reasons why certain adherencies have not been forthcoming, even when it involves a country of the importance of the United States in this as in other matters; but it is encouraging to find that in both the East and the West, if I may put it like that, in both political areas of the world, there has been agreement about this fund. It is not confined to the Western democracies, if I may put it in that way, for I understand that there has been support and agreement for it from beyond the Curtain; and I also understand that countries to which we in the Community look with favour and anticipation as future members of the Community, such as Greece, have adhered to it. I think I am right on that, and perhaps the Minister will tell us. Greece has an extremely important role to play, as she always has had, in these matters.
So, my Lords, as the Minister, as he must, moves each order in turn we shall join with him in expressing, in response to each of the three motions when we come to it, our contentment with the purpose and content of these orders. Having taken a little time over the last two sentences so that the Greeks may arrive, I now invite the Minister to respond to the one or two small points that I have made.
Lord TREFGARNE: My Lords, the Greeks may not arrive during the course of our deliberations, I am sorry to say. I am very much obliged to the noble Lord, though, for his helpful and constructive approach to these orders. I do not think I really need to detain your Lordships for much longer, hut the interesting points which the

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noble Lord has raised I will deal with more effectively, perhaps, in correspondence. That being so, I hope your Lordships will agree to the first order standing in my name on the Order Paper.
Lord GORONYWY-ROBERTS: My Lords, before the Question is put, perhaps I should have said, not that the Greeks should arrive but that the marines should arrive.
On Question, Motion agreed to.

OSLO AND PARIS COMMISSIONS (IMMUNITIES AND PRIVILEGES) ORDER 1979
Lord TREFGARNE: My Lords, I beg to move that this order be approved.
Moved, That the draft order, laid before the House on 25th June be approved.—(Lord Trefgarne.)
On Question, Motion agreed to.

INTERNATIONAL OIL POLLUTION COMPENSATION FUND (IMMUNITIES AND PRIVILEGES) ORDER 1979
Lord TREFGARNE: My Lords, I beg to move that this order be approved.
Moved, That the draft order, laid before the House on 9th July, be approved.—(Lord Trefgarne.)
On Question, Motion agreed to.

INHERITANCE (PROVISION FOR FAMILY AND DEPENDANTS) (NORTHERN IRELAND) ORDER 1979
8.10 p.m.
The PARLIAMENTARY UNDERSECRETARY of STATE, NORTHERN IRELAND OFFICE (Lord Elton): My Lords, I beg to move that the Inheritance (Provision for Family and Dependants) (Northern Ireland) Order 1979 be approved. Another order, the Capital Transfer Tax (Northern Ireland Consequential Amendment) Order 1979, is a minor consequential measure, and I shall move that order also after this debate. Your Lordships may,
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however, find it convenient to discuss both orders together and I shall therefore outline its purposes and effects briefly before I conclude introducing this order.
The Inheritance Order replaces the existing legislation on family provision in Northern Ireland. In the interests of equity, and to minimise avoidable distress, it enlarges the category of persons entitled to apply for financial provision out of the estate of a deceased person. In the case of a surviving spouse, it raises the standard of provision which can be made. In all major respects it thus brings the law of Northern Ireland on these matters into line with that of England and Wales as embodied in the Inheritance (Provision for Family and Dependants) Act 1975 which, your Lordships will recall, gave effect to the recommendations made by the Law Commission in 1974 and published in its Second Report on Family Property: Family Provision on Death.
The Order extends to 28 Articles. Article 1 sets out the title. Article 2 deals with interpretation. Articles 3 to 9 determine the powers of the court to order financial provision from the deceased's estate. Of these, Article 3 permits certain people who are not at present entitled to reasonable financial provision under the will of the deceased person or under the law of intestacy to apply to the court for an order making such provision. Article 2 provides that the term "reasonable financial provision" in the case of a surviving spouse means such provision as it would be reasonable for a husband or wife to receive—whether or not it is required for his or her maintenance. In the case of other applicants, it denotes such provision as it would be reasonable for the applicant to receive for the purpose of his or her maintenance.
This is a new and more generous criterion for measuring "reasonable financial provision" in the case of an application by a surviving spouse. It is intended to ensure that, so far as possible, a husband or wife whose marriage is ended by the death of their spouse is at least as favourably placed as, under the Matrimonial Causes (Northern Ireland) Order 1978, would be someone whose marriage ended in divorce. The list of those entitled to make applications is set out in Article 3. This includes all those categories of people at present covered

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by existing legislation. It also includes, as an innovation, some new categories, notably those of persons who were unrelated to the deceased but who, prior to his death, had been dependent upon him; and also children of the deceased who have achieved the age of 21 but are still in full time education.
Article 4 would give the court, provided it is satisfied that provision should be made for the benefit of an applicant, wider powers to make orders which would, in effect, alter the distribution of the deceased's estate from what would otherwise have taken place. The power of the court to order financial provision is discretionary, but in deciding whether or not it should be exercised, and, if so, how, it must have regard to the criteria set out in Article 5. These include the financial needs and resources of the applicant, and the needs and resources of other persons whose position might be prejudiced by the making of an order for the benefit of an applicant. The conduct of the interested parties is also a relevant consideration. Article 6 limits the time within which an application may be made.
Where an applicant is in immediate need of financial assistance and delay could cause hardship, Article 7 empowers the court to make interim orders for money payments to the applicant. If and when a final order is made, any sum paid to the applicant by way of an interim order may be taken into account. The remaining provisions of this order are technical in nature and detailed in presentation. I do not think your Lordships would wish me to catalogue them now. It is, however, open to any noble Lord to raise any matter pertaining to them in the course of this debate.
My Lords, I turn now, therefore, to the Capital Transfer Tax (Northern Ireland Consequential Amendment) Order 1979. If your Lordships agree to it, this minor consequential order will be made under Section 38(2) of the Northern Ireland Constitution Act 1973. It will ensure that the Finance Act 1976 will operate in relation to Northern Ireland court orders in the same way as it does in relation to court orders in England and Wales. Section 122 of the Finance Act 1976 ensures that the effect of a court order made under the Inheritance (Pro-
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vision for Family and Dependants) Act 1975 is followed for capital transfer tax purposes. Thus, for example, where the court orders that provision shall be made out of the deceased's estate for his surviving spouse, the effect of Section 122 is that the "Capital Transfer Tax Exemptions" shall apply. The Inheritance (Provision for Family and Dependants) Order will help therefore to relieve the financial hardship of people in distressing circumstances. I beg to move.
Moved, That the draft order laid before the House on 22nd March, be approved.—(Lord Elton.)
8.16 p.m.
Lord BLEASE: My Lords, I would wish to thank the Minister for the detailed, comprehensive, and explicit way in which he explained these two orders. The orders are generally helpful to the people of Northern Ireland and bring the provisions concerning inheritance and tax-related matters into line with the provisions at present pertaining to England and Wales. We, on this side of the House, support the orders. However, I think that, having stated my position for the present, I would wish to qualify my support for the orders by placing on record my opposition to the capital transfer tax system as it applies to the United Kingdom. I realise that this is neither the time nor the occasion on which to press my views on this subject, but I think that I should say that I believe that the capital transfer system is based on what is defined as the estate principle; that is, where the size of the gift or legacy is the only consideration in connection with the estate principle and transfer tax arrangements.
Other countries exact death duties and gift taxes on the inheritance principle as opposed to the estate principle. The United Kingdom transfer tax makes no distinction between giving £100,000 to a millionaire and a similar amount to a pauper. I believe that the system penalises workers and particularly, I think, manual workers who have invested in homes and in their personal savings. It is particularly harsh in Northern Ireland in the context of small farmers and small businesses. My view is that the inheritance tax principle is fair. It encourages savings and it upholds the concept and the values of

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a property-holding democracy. No doubt we shall return to this aspect at a later date. In the meantime, I should like to assure the noble Lord the Minister that we on this side of the House support the two orders at present before us.
Lord ELTON: My Lords, I am obliged to the noble Lord for his intervention. It is refreshing to hear from his side of the House arguments in support of a property-holding democracy. I see that we are going to have increasingly fruitful co-operation in a widening sphere of our activities. I accept that this is not the forum in which to debate the merits of the various forms of taxation. I am grateful to the noble Lord for his support of the order.
On Question, Motion agreed to.

CAPITAL TRANSFER TAX (NORTHERN IRELAND CONSEQUENTIAL AMENDMENT) ORDER 1979
Lord ELTON: My Lords, I beg to move.
Moved, That the draft order laid before the House on 22nd March be approved—(Lord Elton.)
On Question, Motion agreed to.

HM INSPECTORATE OF CONSTABULARY
8.22 p.m.
Lord INGLEWOOD Lord INGLEWOOD rose to ask Her Majesty's Government whether they will give a summary of the duties of Her Majesty's Inspectors of Constabulary and say how far it is normal routine when reporting to the Secretary of State on a police force under Section 28(2) of the Police Act 1964 to include a confidential report on the senior police officers in the force concerned and on the key members of the police authority, whose leadership must have an effect on the efficiency of that force. The noble Lord said: My Lords, I beg to move the Question standing in my name on the Order Paper. This order refers to Her Majesty's Inspectors of Constabulary who are a very important link between the Secretary of State, the Chairmen of Police Authorities and Chief Constables. Looked at one way, one can
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say that they are the eyes and ears of the Secretary of State, and I would submit that all too little is known about them and their function.
I touched on this question a year ago when we had a debate on the unhappy events in Lancashire. The debate was answered by the noble Lord, Lord Harris of Greenwich, at some length and it was very impressive to listen to it. But when I read his speech the next day I found no real replies to any of my questions about the part that HMIs had played in Lancashire. He told us that they were very distinguished men, former chief constables, which we all knew. But why should the Home Office be so secretive? I am hoping that this opportunity we are giving the Minister this evening will enable him to tell us and the country outside this Chamber a little more.
There is much that we could be told. We talk about the Post Office, health and defence; they all have their confidential sides. People talk about us—and we think it a good thing that they should. They even say that we should be abolished. When they say this we are not unduly upset because we have heard it before. Yet there are some people who represent that it is almost blasphemy to talk about the police in Parliament. I would claim, on the contrary, that there should be discussion about the police and that your Lordships' House is in the best place for intelligent discussion to take place. If there were more knowledge, there would be fewer articles in the Press, like the recent poisonous article in the Guardian with fashionable slanging of special patrol groups.
This next sentence is not relevant to the Question but I want to say it all the same. I have had the privilege of contacts with a special patrol group and have nothing but admiration what what I have seen. Until anyone produces evidence of serious criminal acts or wrong-doing—I do not mean just naming a scapegoat—my voice will be raised in their support, however small the minority.
Now I should like to suggest that we consider in more detail the duties of HMIs. First, why is the Metropolitan police treated exceptionally? It is the only force in this country which is not inspected independently. Most of us have some idea of how that grew up. Most of us

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would feel that it is outdated and it would greatly help the part-tarnished image of the Metropolitan Police CID if there were an inspection by independent HMIs rather than by their own officers.
All of us know that HMIs carry out formal inspections of provincial police forces after prior notice. I imagine there is a certain amount of button and boot polishing, and I understand that after the first formalities the chief constable sees that the HMI is guided round a safe route which he will find impressive. We know that the origin of these inspections was to ensure that the Home Office—that is, the central Government—got value for money for the big subsidy that it found towards the cost of maintaining provincial police forces. But we should like to know more. The Minister can correct me if I am wrong, but I have never heard of a case where an HMI turned up unannounced and in a friendly way said to the chief constable that he hoped he did not mind but he was going to stay with him through the day and see what happened.
I have heard recently that more staff officers have been appointed. I think that I can see the sort of duties that they can usefully carry out. I know that the assistant HMIs are not all police officers by profession. Are all the staff officers police officers or are some of them drawn from other walks of life? If not, why not? Surely the things they are looking into, such as skills in man management and administration, are not only to be found in police circles. The idea that only police officers can understand police problems is really a police and Home Office "con" which they have succeeded in putting across the country.
On the more confidential side, chief officers of police serve until they are 65, 10 years longer than major generals, who serve until they are 55; five years longer than ambassadors, who serve until they are 60. Of course, flesh and blood being what they are, it is too much to hope that nothing should ever go wrong. But when things do start going wrong, do the HMIs report in confidence to the Secretary of State, or do they turn a blind eye? If they make reports on these personal things, does the Home Office take any rapid action?
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Just to show that there are grounds for these misigvings, may I explain that I live in a county in the far North West of England. If you cross the boundary to the South you are in Lancashire where last year the chief constable was removed from office, but not thanks to anything an HMI or any senior police officer or anything that the police authority did. It was thanks to a detective sergeant who lodged a complaint, a detective sergeant who only had a few weeks left of his service before he retired. And now, after further inquiries which lasted a whole year, I saw in my newspaper over the weekend that summonses have been taken out against the late chairman of the Lancashire Police Authority; and since they are sub judice I shall say no more.
My Lords, if you cross our county boundary to the East, you will find yourselves in County Durham where recently the chairman of the police authority served a time in prison. If you go over our North-East boundary into the County of Northumberland, you will find that the head of one of the specialist squads was recently given a prison sentence, and there is an inquiry proceeding about the wrongdoings of some of his underlings. I shall not say any more and I shall not dig further into the past. But your Lordships will see that there that are reasons for misgivings. When a man at the top goes wrong, the harm that he does spreads downwards and can quickly have a devastating effect. Surely, it is very important that the HMIs should in fact be on the lookout for these things and help to check them before they have gone too far.
I find it incredible that the HMIs, all of them one time chief constables, have apparently been so ineffective in the instances that I have mentioned; and I do not put it down to what I have sometimes heard said, that it is really something of an "old boy" net, which would be dreadful.
Let us compare the police with the Army and the Foreign Service again. Senior officers in the Army and, I think, junior officers too—I see the noble Lord, Lord Mottistone, in his place; he can probably tell us whether it is the same in the Navy—are subject to regular confidential reports; and medical checks are routine. In many private businesses there are regular health checks of senior staff. Why are there no such checks for

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chief constables and other senior police officers who are operational all the time? I have heard that most county authorities, before appointing a chief constable, ask for a medical report; but I have also heard it said that those overweight police constables whom one sees standing in the street outside New Scotland Yard building, not so very far from here, have probably never had a medical check-up since they were accepted and joined the force a number of years ago.
Sixty-five may be too old for senior officers who are operational all the time. At any age over 60, I would submit that while some few men are still in superb order, most of us are slowing down physically. Even if we have no definite disability such as early signs of arthritis or emphysema, we are none the less slowing down physically. There may also be a slowing down mentally—lack of imagination is a well-known police short-coming—and we all can suffer from what I call, "running out of steam" sooner or later. Then there is another failing which is very widespread, particularly among many men of middle age; that is, excessive drinking. Noble Lords may say, "Speak for yourself"! Most of us at one time or another have had to consider whether or not we were drinking too much. It is a temptation that we all have to face; but it is a very unhappy situation when a man holding a senior appointment gets the reputation of drinking too much.
A year ago the noble Lord, Lord Harris of Greenwich, in a winding-up speech told us that the Home Office would be issuing a memorandum for discussing the procedures for dealing with allegations of misconduct by chief officers, which mercifully are very few. I have read the paper and am glad to see in it that, apart from references to criminal acts and obvious breaches of a disciplinary code, there is reference to another field where trouble can be found. They describe this as
"conduct likely to bring discredit on the office held; or fitness for the post".
Here I would submit that alcohol could play a big part. When a man gets the reputation of being a heavy drinker, it is not very long before it is widely known and before respect for him evaporates. A chief constable is locking up people every week for excessive drinking and he
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should not himself be exempt from an alchotest, however young the PC may be who finds him weaving on the road.
I also see in that Home Office memorandum that formal disciplinary proceedings have been brought only four times since 1964. That really is four times too many, but since human flesh has its weaknesses, should we say, "Three times too many"? I do not know how that figure would compare with those for generals or admirals, but I feel that it is disturbing.
Let us now look at chairmen of authorities. They are not elected: in practice they are appointed by a party caucus of the majority party in a county council—which I think is a pity—and in counties, rather more than in urban areas, the chairman can, or ought to be, a conspicuous figure prominent for public service in his area. However, I suspect that standards, taken over all England, are falling. A good chairman can be of immense help to a police force without intruding in any way on the chief constable's operational responsibilities. He is probably from a family that is well known in the county, whereas the chief constable can easily be a new boy. They should have complete confidence in one another, but, if too old for the job, if in poor health or if alcohol is playing a part, he should give way to others in the interests of the police and of the public he serves.
I think I have said enough to show that there are some grounds for misgivings, but I should like to end on this note. As many of you know, I have spent a lot of time with the police over recent years and the more time I have spent the greater my admiration has grown for them and their strong points—but also the more clearly one sees some of the weaknesses in the system. It is the duty of Parliament to use all influence possible to help repair their weaknesses and I shall listen with interest to the Minister's reply.
8.35 p.m.
Lord BOSTON of FAVERSHAM: My Lords, I am sure we are all grateful to the noble Lord, Lord Inglewood, for enabling us to discuss this subject tonight. He takes a close interest in police matters and has done so over a considerable period, not only in this country but also abroad.

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Indeed, it was the noble Lord who initiated what I believe was the last debate when Her Majesty's Inspectorate of Constabulary was discussed by your Lordships, although the debate itself was not about them specifically, on 26th July last year. The noble Lord, Lord Inglewood, has made one or two references to that debate tonight.
I intervene only very briefly and will detain your Lordships for only a few minutes. I would certainly agree with the noble Lord, Lord Inglewood, that in this sphere, as in others, the more it is possible to know, the better, and I look forward very much to hearing from the Minister the noble Lord, Lord Belstead, about the role of Her Majesty's Inspectors of Constabulary. But I would also emphasise—and I think this was implicit in what the noble Lord, Lord Inglewood, said—that there must be quite severe limits placed on what should be published about their work, for much of it must remain confidential by its very nature. Indeed, I believe it would be counterproductive and contrary to the public interest to go beyond such limits. As the Royal Commission on the Police said in its report—that is the Willinck Report of 1962—
… in general they"—
that is, the inspectors—
"achieve results by persuasion and goodwill rather than by making representations to the Secretaries of State—which is the only alternative means of inducing compliance with their recommendations".
I believe that if everything had to be strictly formalised, still less publicised, the changes they are able to bring about would be very much lessened. But, of course, where necessary, in cases of more serious shortcomings, representations do need to be made to the Secretary of State and sometimes more stringent steps still need to be taken, as we know. It is perhaps worth noting in passing here the very rigorous way in which the police have themselves rooted out those responsible within their own ranks on those rare occasions when serious shortcomings or corruption have come to light; and chief officers of police, such as the Commissioner of Police of the Metropolis, Sir David McNee, have been most outspoken about that.
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It is perhaps remarkable that as recently as 1962 that same report said:
"There has since 1945 been authority for the appointment of separate chief inspectors of constabulary for England and Wales and for Scotland, but no appointments have been made. We recommend that there be substituted a single post of Chief Inspector for Great Britain, and that this post be filled without delay".
It is really a reminder that the present system has not been with us for so long as we tend to think, although the office of inspector does date from 1856.
The system has, I believe, served us very well. Your Lordships have noted on other occasions the very high regard in which our police service is held abroad, and I think the same goes for our system of inspection too. No doubt it was partly a recognition of that that Her Majesty's Chief Inspector of Constabulary, Sir Colin Woods, a very distinguished officer, was appointed a couple of months ago to a new post in Australia. But it is essential to keep the system up-to-date, and that clearly is one of the prime purposes behind the Question put by the noble Lord, Lord Inglewood, tonight. In the last report of the chief inspector to be published—the one for 1977, which came out last July—Sir Colin referred to the Working Party on the Future and Structure of the Inspectorate, and gave an interim account of the consideration being given to it in the Home Office. I think that shows, in part at least, that the system is being kept under scrutiny. Perhaps we can look forward to a further account in the report for last year, which I think is due out quite soon.
There is one further point, when talking about that working party, which is sometimes made: that is that the Metropolitan Police, which of course does not come under inspections from the Inspectorate of Constabulary, should do so. It was, indeed, one of the recommendations of the working party that the Metropolitan Police should be formally inspected by the Inspectorate, along with the other police forces. In fact, the 1977 Report of Her Majesty's Chief Inspector of Constabulary contained the passage:
"The most significant of its recommendations"—
that is, the working party's recommendations"—
"was that the Metropolitan Police Force should be formally inspected by Her Majesty's Inspectorate of Constabulary. This matter arose with some regularity during my visits to forces. The

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report of my predecessor is of keen interest to provincial forces who strongly support the concept, as all are affected to some degree by events in the capital".
So that, certainly, was a matter which was considered by the working party.
But I feel, at the same time, that when one is considering a recommendation of that kind—and I believe that certain of your Lordships would go along with a recommendation like that—it is also important to bear in mind this reference in the report of the Commissioner of Police of the Metropolis for last year—his recent report—in which he said on page 4:
"On 12th December, I announced that a new Force Inspectorate had been established to begin its duties on 1st January, 1979. This was the culmination of discussions that I initiated with the Home Office, following my decision earlier in the year to increase the operational responsibility of the four area deputy Assistant Commissioners, who were at that time responsible for the inspection of the force. A deputy Assistant Commissioner, with supporting staff, was appointed as the new Inspector of the Metropolitan Police, under the direction of the Deputy Commissioner. The function of the Inspectorate is to provide a close and continuing assessment of the efficiency of all units of the force, including police branches at headquarters, in order to maintain the high standards required ".
It is important to bear in mind that observation, because it shows that the Metropolitan Police has given some evidence of its sensitivity on the question of the Inspectorate of the force, whether or not one goes along with the recommendation made by the working party.
These annual reports of Her Majesty's Chief Inspector of Constabulary are very useful and informative. I am sure that one big problem in compiling them is that there is far too much material, and that much has to be left out if they are to be kept to a reasonable size. So I hesitate to make any suggestion which would make them less manageable. However, I would not be averse, I must confess, to seeing certain sections in the report dealt with more fully than they are now and, indeed, in some cases, exhaustively.
In the last report, for instance, there was an interesting chapter, Chapter VII, on community relations and preventive policing. Only last Thursday we were debating in your Lordships' House aspects of that subject, arising from a Home Office circular on juveniles and the police and co-operation with other agencies.
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It might be useful if the Chief Inspector's report for this year contained an analysis of the response; and it will be interesting to see, too, whether the Inspectorate follows up any shortcomings in the response. There has been an enormous expansion in recent years of the work dealt with in that chapter on community relations and preventive policing; and it might be valuable, from time to time, to have an exhaustive analysis of an aspect like that, rather than just a very limited selective account of the highlights in particular force areas, useful though that is, so that we can see clearly which areas are taking action and which are not.
Again, at the end of 1976 the Home Office put out a circular on senior police appointments, stating criteria which the Home Secretary felt should be applied. It is a little early at present, perhaps, but a review of the way in which a new policy like that is working could be usefully included in a future report.
Her Majesty's Inspectorate of Constabulary is a sound instrument and there is certainly no sign of complacency within its ranks—quite the reverse; it demonstrates constantly that it wants to keep itself up to date. I believe it is part of our job to encourage it to do so, and that is one reason why a debate of this kind, initiated by the noble Lord, Lord Inglewood, is very welcome.
8.45 p.m.
Lord AVEBURY: My Lords, I too am very grateful to the noble Lord, Lord Inglewood, for having raised this matter and for having drawn my attention to the fact that it was to be discussed this evening. It is very opportune that we should have a debate on Her Majesty's Inspectorate at this moment, when the report for last year is about to be published, and when we can review some of the important matters which may be discussed in it, at a time when the Home Office is still considering the recommendations of the working party to which reference has been made.
The noble Lord said that Her Majesty's Inspectorate were the eyes and ears of the Secretary of State, but it has become clear, both from what he said and from what the noble Lord, Lord Boston, said, that they are not the eyes and ears of Parliament, because many of the matters

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that come within their ambit are not dealt with in the report, and there may be differences of opinion as to how far they can go in extending the information which they give to Parliament. I am not at all sure whether I agree with the tenor of the remark of the noble Lord, Lord Boston, that there should be severe limitations on what they can print, because I think that the limitations should be only those which are designed to secure that criminals are not given information which would facilitate their operations. Apart from that, the more information we can be given about the work of the Inspectors, the better, so that we can understand what it is that they are trying to do for the benefit of the police and for the community at large.
When one looks at the Police Act 1964, the functions of the Inspectorate are defined extremely vaguely. We see, not surprisingly, that their duty is to inspect, and to report on the efficiency of all police forces, except the Metropolitan Police. I suspect that this language is probably just a continuation of the wording that was used in the original County and Borough Police Act 1856, which initiated the Inspectorate, although I must confess that I did not look it up before coming to this debate. I would go so far as to say that many of the methods of operation of the Inspectorate may be hangovers from much earlier days. We have to begin by asking the blunt question: Why do we have an Inspectorate at all? I am not suggesting that there is anything positive to compel the opinion that they should be abolished, but merely that whenever we are discussing a body of this kind we should begin by seeing what their functions are, whether the arguments for carrying them out hold good from an earlier age, or whether there is some other way in which we could perform them better. That is one reason why an examination of this kind can be very useful.
The Inspectors report to the Secretary of State concerning forces which are nominally under the control of police committees. The Chief Inspector makes an annual report which could provide—and I think does provide—a very useful overview of police activity in their main concerns, if it was slightly fuller than it is
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and also did not appear so late, as the noble Lord, Lord Boston, remarked; and we still do not have the report for last year. It would have been helpful, perhaps, if we could have had it before this debate took place.
But the matters contained in it are entirely of a factual nature. It does not make any recommendations, and if there is anything which could be done to improve efficiency there does not seem to be a great deal of consciousness of it in the published report. That may be for the reasons which noble Lords have given, that some of these sensitive matters are properly dealt with in confidential reports to the Secretary of State, and that if they find any deficiencies, about which they must request the Secretary of State to take action, these are not matters of which we should like criminals to be made aware. That is the reason why most, if not all, of the recommendations have to be confidential.
I wonder, however, whether that is so in the case of some of the ways in which efficiency could be improved, apparently, and of which anybody who has looked at police work must be conscious. I am thinking of the enormous burden of clerical work on the police which occupies so much of their time and which might be made more efficient by the use of modern methods. I do not believe that the police forces of England and Wales have yet heard of word processers, yet one can think of many aspects of police operations which would be enormously facilitated by this new technology.
One would like to think that the Inspectors, if they are concerned with efficiency, had begun to suggest to police forces that they should examine the use of word processers, or that they themselves should conduct investigations into that subject. I am not quite sure whether they are intended to be management consultants who make recommendations on efficiency to individual police forces, or whether their role is of a much more general nature. Do they think of themselves as management services advisers, or is there an underlying idea that, although legally all of the police forces are autonomous, the Inspectors can exercise a kind of co-ordinatory function so that, unless there are very good reasons for doing

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otherwise, common practices are applied throughout the country? If the answer to that question is, yes, then, as both noble Lords have asked, why is it that the Chief Inspector is not also made responsible for the Metropolitan Police?
The noble Lord, Lord Boston of Faversham, has quoted the recommendation of the working party. I think it is time that we had a decision from the Home Office as to whether they will go ahead with that recommendation, or whether the announcement of 12th December of last year, to which the noble Lord, Lord Boston of Faversham, referred, means in effect that the Home Office have revised the arrangements for the inspection of the Metropolitan Police, although they intend to continue them as quite separate arrangements from those which are the responsibility of the Chief Inspector.
One notices that there are very considerable differences between the Metropolitan Police and other police forces. This is not the time to go into those differences in detail. However, to give one example, the basic recruits course in the Metropolitan Police is 15 weeks, while in the other forces there is mention of a 10 week initial training course. I do not know whether there is any solid reason for having a different period of initial training in the Metropolitan Police from that in the rest of England and Wales, but it is the kind of thing which the Chief Inspector could look at if he was covering both England and Wales and the Metropolitan Police.
In the case of the Metropolitan Police, there is the change, to which the noble Lord, Lord Boston of Faversham, referred relating to the strengthening of arrangements. It includes a provision for the Home Office to be consulted about the inspection programme and to call for particular matters to be examined. The Secretary of State is the person to whom the commissioner is responsible. In the exercise of his powers, he could, presumably, give to the Inspectors any terms of reference which he thought fit, whereas in the rest of England and Wales he is limited by the wording of the 1964 Act. However, Section 38(4) gives him the power to direct the form of a Chief Inspector's report. I should have thought that he could give directions under that
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section so as to bring the terms of reference of the Chief Inspector in England and Wales into conformity with the reply which he gave in another place on 12th December and which was repeated by the metropolitan commissioner, as quoted by the noble Lord, Lord Boston of Faversham.
I have mentioned training. With regard to this matter, the Chief Inspector emphasises the importance of developing an understanding of the attitudes and outlooks of the various groups which make up the community. The noble Lord, Lord Boston of Faversham, has referred to this matter and has said that he would have liked much more material on that subject. The commissioner does not specifically refer to it. In his report, under the heading of "Training", he devotes a chapter to the question of community relations. I know that in the discussions with the Metropolitan Police, reference to which is made in the commissioner's report, the Commission for Racial Equality had offered to help with training, and I have reason to believe that they would equally enthusiastically offer to help in the case of the police forces in the rest of England and Wales.
It must be apparent to all those who are concerned with these matters that relationships between black people and the police are not very good. This is not necessarily a function solely of training. However, I should have thought that if the Commission for Racial Equality is prepared to help, their offer should be wholeheartedly accepted, and that that should apply to the Metropolitan Police and to the other police forces in England and Wales as well.
One matter to which the commissioner devotes some attention but which is not mentioned in the Chief Inspector's report and which also has relevance to this subject is "sus"—Section 4 of the Vagrancy Act 1824. That may be because, in most cities other than London, the charge is practically unknown, whereas in Greater London it is very popular in certain divisions, although it is hardy used in others. If this offence ought to be repealed, as many black people's organisations have suggested, that would be a matter for the Secretary of State. In the meanwhile, however, if use of the offence affects police efficiency, then it would be a matter for the Chief Inspector. If large amounts of police time are taken up with,

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as I see it, harassing young blacks on the street, to say nothing of the effect on race relations, that is a matter which, I should have thought, ought to concern the Chief Inspector. At any rate, comparisons ought to be made between one police force and another to find out why the charge is so differentially used between different regions.
Finally, the noble Lord, Lord Boston of Faversham, said that he would have liked certain questions to be dealt with more fully; there was too much material to put it all into the report. I agree with the noble Lord that there are certain matters which warrant far more attention than they are given in the Chief Inspector's report. The one matter which I want to mention in particular is computing. It is quite extraordinary that the police national computer rates only a mention of five lines in a report extending to 109 pages. One can only hope that this is not a reflection of the importance which is attached to the subject by the Chief Inspector. I believe that computers could enormously facilitate the work of the police. They could help the police to detect crime and bring criminals to justice far more quickly, in many cases, than could be achieved by manual methods. I hope that in some future report the Chief Inspector will devote far more attention to the subject of computing than he has been able to do in the report which is under review.
I look forward to hearing what the Minister has to say. The principal point with which I should like him to deal is, as other noble Lords have said, whether or not, at the end of a period of 120-odd years since the Inspectors were first brought into existence, a unified system for the whole of England and Wales, including the metropolis, could at last be introduced.
8.59 p.m.
Lord MOTTISTONE: My Lords, I hope not to detain your Lordships for long. My noble friend Lord Inglewood, whom I thank for having put down this Unstarred Question, asked me to say a word or two about the Service aspect. If it is not out of order, it would have been very much better if Black Rod could have taken part in the debate, for not only did he leave the Services more recently than I but he is a general officer of dis-
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tinction, with particular knowledge of policing problems. Therefore, he would have been able to contribute to our debate in a very much better way than we can.
I should like to say that the two points which have been brought out, of reporting both on senior officers and on inspections, are very important indeed. In the Navy, just to make the comparison, these reports and the inspections are done by the immediate senior officer. I am happy to say that my last inspection and the last reports on me of any importance were made by the noble Lord, Lord Hill-Norton, who is not of course taking part in this debate. But the fact is that it is terribly important to have these inspections. The fact that they are done, as it were, locally, within the Navy rather spells out more the difference between that as a fighting force and the disciplined force of the police which is organised somewhat differently.
I should have thought that the concept of having an inspectorate is a good one for a force where people do not move about so much. In the Navy people tend to move from one appointment to another in a period of two years, or little more than two and a half years. Therefore, there is a permanent turn-round and one does not get a static situation over several years, as I suspect occurs in the police forces of the country. I am not criticising that, but it is because there is a different set-up that I think probably an inspectorate is a good thing.
I think that their reports should be on the same lines as Service reports. It would probably be insulting to the police to be told this, but it is quite a time now since we last had a conflict in which perhaps most of the senior police officers were involved and it could be that they could learn a great deal in the inspectorate from asking the Services what they do now, because life goes on and they might obtain several pieces of advice on the degree of inspection. The noble Lord, Lord Avebury, said that there were only five lines on computers. Perhaps that is ridiculous—I do not know—but the latest experience of the way in which inspections are conducted might be of value to the police, particularly with the rather horrifying information from the noble Lord, Lord Boston of Faversham, that between 1945 and 1962

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when there were powers to have an inspectorate, nobody did anything. That shows that there is a lack of enthusiasm for this process which is probably still reflected in us and I should suspect that the Inspectorate is having to fight a battle all the time. Did I misunderstand the noble Lord?
Lord BOSTON of FAVERSHAM: I think not, my Lords, but in case I did not put it clearly enough, what I was referring to during that period from 1945 to 1962 when the Willinck Report came out, as the noble Lord, Lord Mottistone, correctly said, was that, as the report indicated, there had not been any appointment of any chief inspectors of constabulary for England, or for Wales or for Scotland, but I think that is part of the point that the noble Lord was making.
Lord MOTTISTONE: My Lords, I think it is in line with what I am saying, if the detail is slightly off track. It is necessary to have this acceptance of the importance of an inspection system. That is the main point. I do not think there is a great deal to be said for having a United Kingdom-wide inspectorate. My thinking would be that it would be better to keep it more regionalised because of the differences that relate throughout the country. That is probably enough said about that.
As for the reports on senior officers, to take the particular point made by my noble friend as to whether admirals and generals were ever sacked for drinking too much, of course it would not be right for a retired naval captain to comment on his seniors directly in that respect, but on the whole I would say that it very rarely happens—if ever—in peacetime, although there is more likelihood of it happening in wartime, when perhaps one goes for somewhat different qualities. But the rigorousness with which people are selected for promotion to senior rank in all the three Services is such that, on the whole, it is unlikely that a heavy drinker would reach a senior rank and that is probably because of two other things. One is the faster turnover as between one rank and another. People spend less time in a rank compared with the police force, and it is partly because things are more likely to go wrong in that area when people are left in one place for too long.
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The great thing about the Services is that people are moved about a good deal more in them than they are in the police forces. I think it would be a good thing to move policemen about more, but then there would be great problems with their families not wanting to go, and houses not being available. It is an enormous administrative problem to have people thoroughly mobile, and therefore I should not think one could change that side of it very much, which lands one with people who are sitting around for too long. It is quite surprising that what must be a very active sort of job should permit people to serve on to such high ages as my noble friend was saying earlier. And I quite agree with him that medical inspections would be a good thing, and I am surprised also that they do not take place. It happens in industry to a large extent, quite apart from the Services, and I think that that point is something that is certainly worth looking at.
To return to the question of confidential reports on individuals, I am not frightfully enamoured of my noble friend's thought that somehow the confidential reports on individuals should be concurrent with the report on the particular section of the police force that is being—or did I get it wrong?
Lord INGLEWOOD: My Lords, it need not be concurrent provided that it happens, and happens fairly regularly.
Lord MOTTISTONE: Yes, my Lords, that is the point. In the Navy one is reported on every six months, and I think probably in a more static force once a year would do. It is not keyed to the inspection of one ship or unit, because of course time does not necessarily permit that. The reports on people are at stated intervals and the convenience of having a senior officer's inspection may not fit with that.
There is another point. It is quite a good plan to have these two separately because in one case you are giving your mind to a particular individual and in the other case you are giving your mind to the total unit for which he is responsible and those are best kept separate when making the report. So I think the recommendation would be that one should go out of one's way to keep them separate,

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and it would seem to me thoroughly right that there ought to be routine inspections on senior police officers to, perhaps, the Home Office; and on more junior ones to their own chief constables. It is a pity that that kind of system does not already exist. I shall be very interested to hear what my noble friend on the Front Bench has to say, and perhaps he can tell us a little about what is done on reporting of inspections and reporting on individuals.
9.9 p.m.
Lord BELSTEAD: My Lords, I am grateful to my noble friend Lord Inglewood for giving us an opportunity to discuss the role of Her Majesty's Inspectorate of Constabulary. It is timely because the report for last year comes out next Wednesday, and because the central task of the Inspectorate, that of promoting the efficiency of the Policy Service, has never been more relevant. Again I am particularly grateful to my noble friend for this short debate this evening. There has been a shortage in police establishment numbers for some years and the demands upon the police are such that, even with the encouraging improvement in recruitment which we are seeing, there are bound to be shortages for the foreseeable future. In addition, policing becomes an increasingly expensive operation and this must be so the more chief constables plan, as they are planning, for their police officers to concentrate closely upon community relations. Today the efficient use of resources, therefore, always important, assumes increasing significance.
The Inspectorate has two distinct but complementary functions. There is the traditional function of inspecting police forces, other than the Metropolitan Police, and reporting to the Home Secretary on their efficiency. The noble Lord, Lord Avebury, and the noble Lord, Lord Boston, and I think other noble Lords have referred to the Metropolitan Police. I think perhaps it is fair to remind the House that the original purpose for setting up the Inspectorate in the 19th century was to bring forces outside London up to the standard of the Metropolitan Police.
Of course, times have changed and high standards of professionalism are found
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in all parts of the country, but the geographical scope of the Inspectorate, it is perfectly true, has remained the same. However, I should like to confirm that this does not mean that the Metropolitan Police is not inspected. Arrangements have existed for many years, and at the end of last year the Commissioner introduced a new strengthened system of inspection, with a Deputy Assistant Commissioner designated Inspector of the Force and directly responsible to the Deputy Commissioner. I should also like to make it clear that the Home Office is consulted about the inspection programme and receives copies of inspection reports, and there is close co-operation between the new Inspectorate and Her Majesty's Inspectorate of Constabulary to enhance the development of common standards and procedures.
Your Lordships may say that this does not meet the points that have been made in the debates. The new arrangements have only been in force for about six months, but they seem to be working well. May I remind your Lordships that these new arrangements are designed to ensure that, as the police authority, my right honourable friend the Home Secretary is kept fully informed about the inspection of the force, because he is the police authority for the Metropolitan Police, and, of course, he in turn, and I on his behalf in this House, are answerable to Parliament.
The scope and nature of inspections have changed, but the notion of inspecting efficiency, if I may go back to that, has remained central to the process. Lord Avebury was absolutely right; the 1856 Act charged Inspectors to visit and inquire into the state and efficiency of the police. If I may say so, it is this function, the inspection for efficiency which, first of all, is particularly relevant to my noble friend Lord Inglewood's Question.
But the Inspectorate has a second and wider role, which was also mentioned by the noble Lord, Lord Avebury. That is to encourage the spread of new ideas and to seek to establish high standards throughout the country. The Inspectors are well placed, I would claim, to keep in touch with developments in policing through the office of the Chief Inspector and in other ways, and have the advantage

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of knowledge of the several forces which fall within their regions. My noble friend Lord Inglewood asked me a specific question: Are all the staff officers of the Inspectorate police officers? The answer to that is, Yes indeed they are, as are, of course, all the assistants to Her Majesty's Inspectors of Constabulary.
My noble friend asks in his Question for a summary of the Inspector's duties. The formal inspection of a police force takes place over a period of three to five days, but it really would be a mistake to assume that that is the whole story. The Inspector and his assistants will have kept in close touch with the force during the preceding year and will be aware, or they most certainly should be aware, of the matters which are giving rise to public comment locally in the Press and elsewhere. They will also have the chief constable's annual report to his police authority. They will have detailed inspection notes and returns prepared by the chief constable, giving essential statistics and a general account of the use of resources and of the activities of the force during the year. The inspector then endeavours to cover the whole range of police activities, and examines samples of the work of all branches to ensure that procedures are being properly followed and that resources are being sensibly used.
In the first place the Inspector will examine the work and functions of the headquarters departments, such as the CID, Traffic, Training and Communications Departments. He pays particular attention to the way in which complaints against the police are dealt with, and, as a matter of course, discusses this with the deputy chief constable. Then the Inspector will visit as many divisions as possible, and meet the representatives of the staff associations to discuss any matters of concern to them.
An important aspect of the inspection—certainly it is one about which my noble friend has expressed concern previously in your Lordships' House—is that any member of a force can, on request, have a special interview with the Inspector. That facility is used quite frequently, but normally to air views about such matters as promotion prospects and postings; but it also provides—let us make no mistake
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about it—an important channel by means of which an individual officer can draw attention to an unsatisfactory state of affairs within a force.
There is one further aspect of inspection which has grown in importance in recent years and has been encouraged by the present Chief Inspector of Constabulary. Responsibility for the efficiency of the police is shared between my right honourable friend and the local police authorities, and the Inspectorate has been and remains anxious to establish good working relations with authorities. In the course of his visit to the force the Inspector makes himself available for discussions with members of the police authority, and indeed is anxious that the chairman and members of the authority are present during his visit. This is a useful opportunity to exchange views about such matters as financial provision for the force and the general policing of the area, and is one which I know is welcomed by many police authorities.
At the conclusion of an inspection, the Inspector brings to the notice of the chief constable any points of an operational nature which need attention. He will make a full report in confidence to my right honourable friend the Home Secretary, and I am grateful to the noble Lord, Lord Boston of Faversham, for commending this confidentiality and to all your Lordships for understanding why that confidentiality is necessary at that step in the story. If the report revealed any major matter affecting the efficiency of the force—and this is really the last step in the story—a formal letter would be sent to the police authority drawing its attention to the matter. Obviously, such a letter could include points which have been raised by my noble friend in his speech—for example, physical fitness.
That, briefly, is the system. It concentrates, as I have tried to show, on the concept of efficiency. It cannot, by its very nature, be an exhaustive check of everything to do with police practice. But what it does do is to encourage good practice, to try to rectify bad practice where it comes to light and to provide my right honourable friend with an invaluable detailed account of the work of the Police Service, to enable him to discharge his statutory responsibilities.

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I have been impressed by the speeches which your Lordships have made this evening commending—I think that it was the noble Lord, Lord Boston, who did so first—the idea that Her Majesty's Inspectors' reports might concentrate on a particular subject in a particular report. I shall certainly draw my right honourable friend's attention to what has been said in this debate and, through him, to the Inspectorate who I know will read with interest what has been said.
Finally, I turn to the more specific part of my noble friend's Question, in which he asks whether the reports of the Inspectorate include confidential assessments of senior police officers and prominent members of police authorities. I shall deal first with senior police officers. As the House will be aware, my right honourable friend has certain statutory responsibilities in respect of appointments to posts at assistant chief constable level and above. Appointments are made by police authorities, subject to the approval of my right honourable friend—this was a matter which the noble Lord, Lord Boston, mentioned—and there is an informal arrangement under which my right honourable friend informs authorities, in confidence, and in advance of the short-listing and interviewing of candidates, whether there are any whose appointment to the most senior posts he would not be willing to approve. Advice is also given on the merits of the other candidates—in effect, whether any of them is particularly well qualified for appointment—and it is for the police authority then to follow the advice or not, as it thinks fit. The Secretary of State, incidentally, will not approve the appointment of a senior officer, who has served successively as assistant and then deputy chief constable, for the position of chief constable in the same force. That meets the point that was rightly made by my noble friend Lord Mottistone, about mobility within the Police Service.
In reaching a considered view on the merits of candidates for these most senior posts, my right honourable friend is able to draw on the professional advice of the Inspectorate, which has accumulated knowledge through the inspection process and through its other contacts with forces and senior officers. Her Majesty's Chief Inspector of Constabulary, as my right
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honourable friend's senior professional adviser on police matters, plays a major part in this process. Perhaps I can best meet my noble friend's point by assuring him that the Inspectorate is fully involved in consideration of the abilities and potential of senior officers, and that the inspection itself is only a part, albeit an important part, of that process.
I turn now to the point about the police authorities. I have mentioned the efforts which the Inspectorate makes to involve the members of authorities in the inspection process. The police authority and the Inspector have a common interest in the efficiency of the force, and the way in which the authority discharges its responsibility to provide an efficient force is obviously the very first concern of the Inspector. That is why I sought to place emphasis on the concept of efficiency at the beginning of this speech. The Inspector would be failing in his duty if he did not form a view on the authority's provision of resources and accommodation for the force, and on the state of relations between the authority and the senior officers of the force.
Equally, he is bound in his report to give the Home Secretary, in confidence, the benefit of any views he may have formed. That is not, however, to say that the inspector provides a systematic assessment of the personalities and capabilities of individual members of the police authorities, as my noble friend perhaps was possibly suggesting in his Question this evening. To do so would not be proper. The Inspector can, however, properly concern himself with anything that affects the efficiency of the force, and that includes the way in which the authority discharges its responsibility.
I am conscious of the fact that in replying to my noble friend's Question I have concentrated on the inspection process. But the duties of the Inspectorate are far wider than that. They have an important role to play in the fields of complaints and discipline. They are, as I have said, my right honourable friend's professional advisers—as my noble friend so graphically said, the eyes and ears of my right honourable friend—on a whole range of police matters, including the levels of establishments, appointments and the adequacy of buildings.

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The Royal Commission of 1962 recognised the advantages of the working partnership between local and central government in support of the work of the police. I believe that this partnership is a natural expression of so much that we have learned from our past in this country, and that police work draws strength from the relationship between each force and its police authority. But one only has to go into any police headquarter's control room to appreciate the tremendous advantages of the developments in science and technology, which nowadays make such a contribution to police work. Therefore, most of the Inspectorate's most valuable work is in promoting cooperation between forces, and ensuring that the results of research are properly distributed so that the forces can take full advantage of developments in science and technology. That, briefly, is a summary of the duties of Her Majesty's Inspectorate of Constabulary. Its work is indispensable to the modern police force. Its advice to my right honourable friend is valued greatly.

FELIXSTOWE DOCK AND RAILWAY BILL
Brought from the Commons; read 1a and referred to the Examiners.