Lords Sitting of 18 December 1979

Preamble
The House met at half past two of the clock: The LORD CHANCELLOR on the Woolsack.
Prayers—Read by the Lord Bishop of Saint Albans.
The Lord Delfont—Took the Oath.
The Viscount Bledisloe—Sat first in Parliament after the death of his father.

MINERALS: EXPLORATION AND SMELTING CAPACITY
Viscount HANWORTH: My Lords, I beg leave to ask the Question which stands in my name on the Order Paper.
The Question was as follows:
To ask Her Majesty's Government whether, hearing in mind the difficulties with the supply of minerals which are likely to arise in the future, they will pay for surveys of our own resources and promote increased smelting capacity of mineral ores in this country.
The MINISTER of STATE, DEPARTMENT of INDUSTRY (Viscount Trenchard): My Lords, the Department of Industry already funds a comprehensive programme of minerals investigation designed to promote the economic development of our indigenous resources. This includes mapping and reconnaissance programmes carried out by the Institute of Geological Sciences, which aim at providing necessary geological information on which subsequent minerals exploration by companies can be based; and there is also the Mineral Exploration and Investment Grants Act 1972, under which the Department is empowered to pay contributions of not more than 35 per cent. towards expenditure incurred on searching for and testing certain mineral deposits. Increases in smelting capacity are a matter for commercial judgment. Any application for Government assistance would he considered against normal criteria.
Viscount HANWORTH: My Lords, while thanking the noble Viscount for that reply, may I ask whether he would agree in the first place that the exploration grants are not very successful in encouraging firms to do the work, no doubt because they are afraid of not getting planning permission to exploit something that they have found? Would he, secondly, think that perhaps the right policy might be to tend to leave our resources in the ground until they are really needed because there is a world-wide shortage; and, if so, does he also agree that it is important to press ahead with exploration to a greater degree than we are doing today?
Viscount TRENCHARD: My Lords, I thank the noble Viscount for those supplementary questions. The planning position is one on which we are certainly interested to receive views, and have already received views, from all concerned. We believe that discouragement has not only centred around the planning situation. There is more than one opinion whether the planning stage in exploration should be treated on its own or as part of a possible final exploration. We are looking at this closely. As far as leaving the resources in the ground is concerned, I believe that we have enough resources to develop the minerals that we need in the shorter term. I believe that the balance of the programme is about right. If some of our mineral resources are to stay in the ground successors may be happy. We believe that the necessary degree of exploration will continue with the funds that we are supplying.
Lord BLYTON: My Lords, does the Minister think that that is necessary, seeing that the Government are bent on destroying the steel industry at the present time, and on doing the same thing to the steel industry as they did to the coal industry in the past 20 years?
Viscount TRENCHARD: My Lords, those are largely separate questions but, as to the fact that the steel industry has considerable problems, it could be, in your Lordships' opinion, that this is because the problems have not been adequately faced in the past.
The Earl of HALSBURY: My Lords, will the noble Viscount tell me when the

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primary plan to complete the palæozoic exploration of the sub-surface rocks in the South-East of England will be completed?
Viscount TRENCHARD: My Lords, I will look into that question and let the noble Earl know.
Viscount HANWORTH: My Lords, I should like to ask the noble Viscount a further question to do with smelting. Does he agree that if we can promote more smelting in this country it will be a safeguard against the time when supplies of smelted ores may not be available from abroad while the ores themselves might still be available? Therefore, does he regard it as a good insurance if it is possible to encourage more smelting here?
Viscount TRENCHARD: My Lords, as I have said, I think the decisions as to the installation of new smelting capacity must be mainly commercial. If installations were undertaken in our assisted areas at the moment, and if the criteria of additionality to GTP (which are the new criteria) were to apply—and I think they would—considerable assistance is available. I do not think that one can go further than that. One must recognise that smelting is usually done where the minerals are dug.

EXPORT MARKETS: RETAIL PRICE FORECASTS
2.44 p.m.
Lord AVEBURY: My Lords, I beg leave to ask the first Question which stands in my name on the Order Paper.
The Question was as follows:
To ask Her Majesty's Government whether they will publish estimates they have made of the change of average retail prices in the countries which provide our major export markets from the fourth quarter of 1979 to the fourth quarter of 1980.
The MINISTER of STATE, TREASURY (Lord Cockfield): No, my Lords, I do not think it appropriate for Her Majesty's Government to be publish-
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ing forecasts relating to the economic performance of other countries, who might well feel that this was intrusion in their domestic affairs. The OECD, which is an international body, does publish such forecasts every year, including forecasts of price movements. Their forecasts for 1980 are expected to be published in the next few days.
Lord AVEBURY: My Lords, is not such a forecast implied in the statement made by the Treasury in their document Economic Prospects for 1980 that the United Kingdom's costs and competitiveness have not greatly changed from their recent level, taking the fourth quarter of 1980 on the fourth quarter of 1979? Does the noble Lord still think that the assumption on which this calculation is based—that there will be a progressive reduction in the level of settlements over the coming year—is justified and that the rate of retail price inflation will come down over this period to only 14 per cent., bearing in mind the rapid acceleration in the rise of retail prices over recent months?
Lord COCKFIELD: My Lords, the noble Lord asks a number of questions. Inevitably—as was clearly stated in the document to which he refers—it was necessary to make certain assumptions. The assumptions were as stated. There is of course a difference between an assumption and a forecast. So far as the level of pay settlements is concerned, it is a matter of great importance that it should come down. We believe that the present level of inflation does impose very great difficulties for our exporters, and we think that the best way that these difficulties can be overcome is by reducing the level of inflation. It is to that end that Her Majesty's Government's policies are directed.
Lord AVEBURY: My Lords, may ask one further question? Even if we reduce the level of price settlements to the 14 per cent. assumed in the document, is the noble Lord really telling us that in the other OECD countries inflation will proceed at this rate of 14 per cent. year on year, the fourth quarter of 1979 on the fourth quarter of 1980? If it will be at some much lower rate than that, how can the document say that our price competitiveness will be maintained?
Lord COCKFIELD: My Lords, success in exports of course depends on a large number of factors other than price competitiveness. It depends on the quality of goods and on excellence of design. It depends on good delivery dates; it depends upon adhering to those delivery dates; it depends upon after-sales service and the availability of spares. Moreover, there is a difference between price competitiveness and the level of retail prices. The prices in an export market do not necessarily follow precisely the trend of retail prices in the country of origin.
Lord AVEBURY: I am sorry to pursue this matter. Is not the noble Lord trying to draw red herrings across this issue by referring to all these other features of success in export markets, which are not so much as mentioned in the economic prospects for 1980? I was asking whether the noble Lord was seriously telling the House that he can stand before us and say that the price competitiveness will be maintained, knowing perfectly well that inflation in the other OECD countries will not be proceeding at the same rate as it does in this country or anything like it.
Lord COCKFIELD: My Lords, I have already made the point that price competitiveness depends upon quite a number of factors other than the level of retail prices in the exporting country. The most important of these factors is the level of productivity. Many of our exporters—and it is greatly to their credit and we should pay them a tribute for this—have succeeded in obtaining substantial increases in the level of productivity. We hope that they will continue to do so with the co-operation of their work forces and this will maintain our position in the export market.
Lord MACKIE of BENSHIE: My Lords, would the noble Lord agree that it would be a reasonable assumption that the forecast of the White Paper is wrong?
Lord COCKFIELD: My Lords, I am not prepared to accept any such assumption on the noble Lord's part.
Viscount DAVIDSON: My Lords, would my noble friend agree that in any case most people use statistics in the same manner as a drunken man uses a lamppost: more for support than illumination?

ROAD INQUIRIES: APPOINTMENT OF INSPECTORS
2.49 p.m.
Lord AVEBURY: My Lords, I beg leave to ask the second Question which stands in my name on the Order Paper.
The Question was as follows:
To ask Her Majesty's Government by whom inspectors at motorway and trunk road inquiries are appointed.
Lord MOWBRAY and STOURTON: My Lords, in England an inspector is appointed to hold a particular inquiry by the Secretary of State for the Environment and the Minister of Transport, on the nomination of the noble and learned Lord the Lord Chancellor.
Lord AVEBURY: My Lords, was not the change in the procedure, bringing in the noble and learned Lord the Lord Chancellor as the person who nominates the inspector, designed to correct the impression in the minds of objectors that the inspectors were in fact creatures of the Department of Transport and the Department of the Environment? And does it not go a long way to destroy that attempted correction when an inspector refers to the Department of Transport, as he did at a recent inquiry, for an interpretation of his terms of reference and powers? Could not the noble Lord see that the Leitch Report is properly implemented and that the noble and learned Lord the Lord Chancellor has the sole responsibility for that matter?
Lord MOWBRAY and STOURTON: My Lords, as I said, there are three Ministers involved. Inspectors are eminent people from all walks of life. They are chosen for their proven abilities, their open-mindedness, perception and judgment, and also for their ability to assess reasoned argument and personal integrity. I should like also to point out that inspectors, like judges, do not have to be professional experts in order to be able to assess the evidence of those who are.
Lord DAVIES of PENRHYS: My Lords, does the noble Lord not agree that there are motorways in Scotland and in Wales: what happens there?
Lord MOWBRAY and STOURTON: My Lords, the Question referred only to England and I have no brief as to what would happen in Scotland. If the noble Lord cares to put a Question down on that subject, I will find out.
Lord AVEBURY: My Lords, among the many essential qualities of inspectors which the noble Lord did not mention was that of independence. Would he not agree that if the objectors at motorway inquiries are to believe that those inquiries are fairly and properly conducted, the independence of the inspectors from the Department of Transport and the Secretary of State for the Environment is essential? Would the noble Lord not agree that, for this reason, those two Ministers should play no part in the appointments and that that should be a matter entirely in the hands of the Lord Chancellor?
Lord MOWBRAY and STOURTON: My Lords, I do not think it is quite fair to say that they are not independent: they are appointed to be independent assessors. I cannot find it in my brief—I have so much—but I think I am right in saying that out of something like 120 inquiries, in some 21 cases the inspectors have differed from the Department's suggestions and in 18 of those cases the Ministers concerned have upheld the inspectors' objections.

BBC's FRENCH BROADCASTS TO AFRICA
2.57 p.m.
Lord MERRIVALE: My Lords, I beg leave to ask the Question which stands in my name on the Order Paper.
The Question was as follows:
To ask Her Majesty's Government whether, in view of the desire of Francophone Africa to increase its links with this country, it is intended to cut the French Service shortwave transmissions of the BBC; and whether, in view of the links these broadcasts provide with Anglophone Africa, they will increase this "projection" of this country over the air.
Lord TREFGARNE: No, my Lords. As my honourable friend Mr. Blaker
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said in another place on 13th November, at column 1252, in 1980–81 there will be no cuts in any of the vernacular transmissions of the BBC external services.
Lord MERRIVALE: My Lords, I thank the noble Lord for that reply, but I did ask him whether there would be an increase in the French short-wave broadcasts to West Africa, for the reasons given in the Question. May I ask whether he does not feel that in the context of the Economic Community of the West African States (ECOWAS) more should be done towards getting a better understanding and better relations between Francophone and Anglophone Africa? Furthermore, on the question of the development of that area on a regional basis and bearing in mind the cultural aspects, have not the BBC a very important role to play in bringing together the Anglophone and Francophone countries and helping them to co-operate to a greater extent?
Lord TREFGARNE: My Lords, I am afraid I cannot foresee any increase in the services broadcast to that part of the world. I must say that we believe that the present services are very satisfactory.
Lord GORONWY-ROBERTS: My Lords, may I ask the noble Lord whether he agrees that a number of Francophone countries in Africa are very anxious indeed to diversify their cultural and commercial connections, especially with the United Kingdom, and that there is a strong argument for not only maintaining the present level of external services to those countries, including Western Africa, as we have heard, but also, even in these difficult times, finding some resources to increase them?
Lord TREFGARNE: My Lords, certainly agree about the importance of these services but I am afraid that, with the present constraints upon our resources in that area, I cannot foresee any increase. However, I certainly agree about their importance.
Viscount ECCLES: My Lords, further to what the noble Lord, Lord Goronwy-Roberts, said, may I ask the Minister: is not the most interesting thing at the moment the way in which the inhabitants of the ex-French colonies now want to

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learn English? Would it not be worth while to see whether the British Council and the BBC could increase the possibilities for people of learning English in those parts of Africa?
Lord TREFGARNE: My Lords, my noble friend is quite right. As your Lordships will know, we are having a debate tomorrow evening about the British Council, and my noble friend might like to put his point during that debate.
Lord DONALDSON of KINGS-BRIDGE: My Lords, is the noble Lord aware that the House, in my opinion at any rate, would prefer to find these categories described as "English-speaking" and "French-speaking"?
Lord MERRIVALE: My Lords, may I ask one further question of my noble friend? He said that the external services were very satisfactory. They are indeed, but they do need extending. As Mr. Nicholas Ridley, the Minister of State, said in another place on 13th November (at col. 1286 of the Official Report) that the Government are greatly increasing the money provided for external services, would my noble friend not feel that in effect a certain priority should be given to increasing the money spent on services to that part of Africa?
Lord TREFGARNE: My Lords, the additional funds referred to by my noble friend and mentioned by my honourable friend Mr. Blaker in another place will be used to improve the audibility of the BBC external services. There is no plan to extend the vernacular services.
Baroness LLEWELYN-DAVIES of HASTOE: My Lords, further to what the noble Lord has said—this is a most important point—would he not agree that it is most important that the BBC should be heard in China? Is the noble Lord aware that it is inaudible in Peking and indeed anywhere North of Canton? Could he not arrange for the Singapore relay system to be stepped up?
Lord TREFGARNE: My Lords, I will take a careful note of what the noble Baroness has said, look into the matter and let her know what is being done.

GOVERNMENT STATEMENTS
Lord DENHAM: My Lords, with the leave of the House, at a convenient moment after 3.30 p.m. my noble friend Lord Gowrie will repeat a Statement being made in another place on the nuclear programme and the nuclear industry.
This will be followed by my noble friend Lord Trefgarne repeating a Statement on Rhodesia.

CRIMINAL JUSTICE (SCOTLAND) BILL [H.L.]
The MINISTER of STATE, SCOTTISH OFFICE (The Earl of Mansfield): My Lords, I beg to introduce a Bill to make further provision for criminal justice in Scotland and for connected purposes. I beg to move that this Bill be now read a first time.
Moved, that the Bill be now read 1a.—(The Earl of Mansfield.)
On Question, Bill read 1a, and to be printed.

EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES (GREEK ACCESSION) BILL
2.58 p.m.
Lord TREFGARNE: My Lords, I beg to move that this Bill be now read a third time. The support which Greek accession commands throughout the House has been very gratifying. During the earlier stages of the Bill a number of your Lordships underlined the basic political reason for welcoming Greece into the European Economic Community; namely the need to assist in consolidating the new democracy there. That is indeed the crux of the matter. Some of your Lordships have also quite properly pointed out the implications of widening the membership of the Community to include not just Greece but also two other Southern European economies, Portugal and Spain. The problems for the Community of having to adjust to the increase of the membership to Twelve, as with the earlier increase to Nine, will be considerable. To resolve them, the Community will need to display an effort of will and imagination similar to that shown by the founding fathers of the Community.

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Understandable concern has also been expressed by some of your Lordships about the implications of Greek accession for certain industries in this country, notably the textile and clothing industries. I wish to stress that the Government are not at all complacent about this problem. The need to give our textile industry time to adjust to the new world economic conditions is one of the Government's chief industrial priorities. But, as I explained during Committee stage, in Greece's case our negotiating hand was tied by the fact that there are no formal restrictions on Greek textiles under the current Association Agreement; and that in any case it is necessary to look at this question in the broader context of trade as a whole.
Finally, I should like to express pleasure at the relatively quick passage of this Bill—assuming that your Lordships agree to it this afternoon—which will, I hope, ensure that this country is the first of the present Member States to ratify the Greek Accession Treaty. To the best of our knowledge, no other Member State is as far advanced as we are in the ratification procedures. It is fitting that this country, which has throughout the accession negotiations been one of the chief supporters of Greek accession, should be about to become the first to ratify. My Lords, I beg to move.
Moved, That the Bill be now read 3a.—(Lord Trefgarne.)
3.1 p.m.
Lord CACCIA: My Lords, may I, from these Benches, also welcome the Third Reading of this Bill? In the previous stages, the noble Lord, Lord Goronwy-Roberts, the noble Lord, Lord Campbell of Croy and others, raised the various problems that may arise over Greek accession, and the Minister dealt with those fully. So I thought it as well not to take up the time of your Lordships' House on those occasions by going over again what was being so thoroughly debated.
But now I would ask for your Lordships' indulgence on a more general ground, arising from the facts of my personal involvement in the history of Greece over the last 40 years. This was first as a
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member, and indeed second-in-command, of our Legation, in peace and war, in Athens and then in Crete from 1939 to 1941; next it was as political adviser to our Commander-in-Chief and as Minister in our Embassy on the liberation of Greece from 1944 to 1945; and, since then, as a regular visitor and lately as instrumental in conveying to the Greek people the historic hospice in Rhodes of the English Knights of St. John.
These, your Lordships may think, are all ties so wrapped up in emotion and past history that my judgment must be suspect. I trust not. On the contrary, it has been an experience of mind as well as of heart to be a witness and, at times, a participant in the progress made by Greece. For progress, real progress, in her economy and now in politics it has been, from my first acquaintance with the country, then still struggling with few resources, except the liveliness of her people, from the debacle of Anatolia; through the unprovoked aggression on her from Albania and the subsequent German onslaught and the starvation and suffering during the occupation in the war; through brutal civil strife on regaining her freedom in 1944 to a position of increasing economic well being and restored constitutional Government.
The ineluctable law of Zeus, we are reminded by Aeschylus, is that the human race learns only through suffering. Greece having, like us, faced and survived many tribulations, sometimes through the slings of fortune, sometimes by self-inflicted wounds, we must hope—despite the gloomy forecasts now fashionable about the 1980s—that the accession to the Treaty of Rome will lead to further advance for Greece herself in which we and our partners in Europe may mutually share. Like others and the Minister himself, I trust that our ratification of this Bill will be the first.
3.4 p.m.
Baroness LLEWELYN-DAVIES of HASTOE: My Lords, because of the general desire of the House to pass this Bill as quickly as possible, we had not planned from these Benches to comment at this stage. But in view of the very moving speech made by the noble Lord, Lord Caccia, we should of course like to give our own very warm welcome to

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Greece on her accession to the European Communities. We have long years of friendship with the Greek nation, as we realise when we remember Lord Byron, a former Member of your Lordships' House, and his fight for their freedom. We warmly welcome them, we warmly welcome this Bill and we wish it good fortune.
Lord CAMPBELL of CROY: My Lords, may I simply say in a minute or two that I am very glad to follow the noble Lord, Lord Caccia, who has personally witnessed events in Greece before, during and after the war, and to hear his welcome to this Bill. I should like to thank my noble friend, because I raised a number of points concerning the effects on this country, for as we welcome Greece we must also recognise that there will be problems for some of our industries, particularly textiles and clothing. I confirm that my noble friend was able to answer all the main points which I raised during the two earlier stages. As I also on Second Reading expressed the hope that we would be the first to ratify, I am very glad to hear that news brought to us today by my noble friend.
On Question, Bill read 3a, and passed.

HYPNOTISM BILL [H.L.]
3.6 p.m.
The Earl of KINNOULL: My Lords, I beg to move that this Bill be now read a third time. Perhaps I may briefly explain that, following certain amendments during the passage of this Bill, it has been reduced considerably in size. There are, however, certain points that have been raised following the amendments by those concerned outside. These will be examined with care and taken up in another place, by my honourable friend Mr. David Crouch. I am grateful for the interest and attention which this House has given to the Bill. My Lords, I beg to move.
Moved, That the Bill be now read 3a.—(The Earl of Kinnoull.)
3.7 p.m.
Lord SANDYS: My Lords, I am sure that all noble Lords will join with me in paying tribute to my noble friend Lord Kinnoull, who has guided this Bill through
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all its stages in your Lordships' House. We are all indebted to him for focusing our attention on an area of human experience which raises important issues for us all. The Government find themselves somewhat at variance with the views of my noble friend Lord Kinnoull about the scale of the problems which are thought to stem from defects in existing controls over the use of hypnotism in places of public entertainment. The views which we have since received from the licensing authorities on this point are somewhat divided, and I have to tell the House that the Government remain unconvinced of the existence of serious abuse under the present law.
As I am sure the House is aware, the future of this Bill is somewhat uncertain. Pressure on parliamentary time is such that when the Bill reaches another place further progress will be very difficult indeed. But this is not to say that my noble friend and other noble Lords have wasted their time on the Bill. The discussion which has been provoked has served a very useful purpose, in that it has caused us to look again at the small but not unimportant piece of legislation which has stood for some 27 years, and has created in the minds of both the public and those more closely involved in the practice of this skill an awareness of the difficult questions to which it gives rise. For this we are indeed grateful to my noble friend.
3.9 p.m.
Lord BOSTON of FAVERSHAM: My Lords, the debates which your Lordships have had on this Bill have indeed been very valuable. On a previous occasion, my noble friend Lord Wells-Pestell had the opportunity from these Benches to express views about it. I have nothing further to add to that, and would only join the noble Lord, Lord Sandys, in congratulating the noble Earl, Lord Kinnoull, on his conduct of the Bill through this House.
On Question, Bill read 3a, and passed, and sent to the Commons.

POLICE NEGOTIATING BOARD BILL [H.L.]
3.10 p.m.
The PARLIAMENTARY UNDERSECRETARY of STATE, HOME OFFICE (Lord Belstead): My Lords, I beg to move that this Bill be now read a second time. The purpose of the Bill is to give effect to the recommendations of the Edmund-Davies Report on the police negotiating machinery (Cmnd. 7283) which was presented to Parliament in July, 1978. The committee, under the chairmanship of the noble and learned Lord, Lord Edmund-Davies, is well-known and rightly admired for its report on police pay. The committee in fact produced three reports. The report on negotiating machinery was in fulfilment of its first remit.
Perhaps I may remind your Lordships of the background to the report. Section 4 of the Police Act 1969 provided for the establishment of a Police Council for the United Kingdom, composed of representatives of the police authorities and the police staff associations. As at present constituted, the Police Council has dealt therefore with all negotiable matters affecting the police service for the last 10 years and has had a consultative role in matters relating to police pensions. Since 1964, there have been Police Advisory Boards for England and Wales, and for Scotland in addition, to advise the Secretaries of State on consultative matters affecting the police service.
Police pay is determined under the statutes by the Secretaries of State for the Home Office, for Scotland and for Northern Ireland. This is an essential part of the Secretary of State's power to ensure the efficiency of the police service. The Edmund-Davies Committee endorsed this principle. But before making pay regulations the Secretary of State has been required to take into account any recommendation made by the council.
In practice, changes in regulations have rarely been initiated by the Secretary of State. What has happened is that amendments have been produced in response to a recommendation made by the Police Council. The procedure has been for the two sides of the council to negotiate, with the object of reaching agreement. In the event of failure to reach agreement, the matter could be referred to the Police Arbitration Tribunal, a panel consisting of three independent members appointed by the Prime Minister, whose decisions have been binding on both sides.
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But in July 1976 the Police Federations for England and Wales and for Northern Ireland walked out of the Police Council and announced that they were no longer prepared to negotiate with the local authority representatives who formed the major part of the official side of the Police Council. The immediate issue was the question of the pay settlement under the pay policy then prevailing. The Police Federation, which, as your Lordships will be aware, represents police officers up to the rank of chief inspector, said that in future they were prepared to negotiate only with the Secretary of State. At the same time, the Police Federation made it known that they would no longer be prepared to take part in the work of other bodies like the Police Advisory Board. This decision would only be reconsidered by them after more acceptable negotiating machinery had been established.
It was in this atmosphere therefore that the Edmund-Davies Committee was appointed by the previous Home Secretary in August 1977 to review the police negotiating machinery and to make recommendations. Four months later, their terms of reference were extended to include the issue of police pay.
The appointment of the Edmund-Davies Committee did not of itself solve the problems besetting the police service. Experienced police officers were leaving the service prematurely in uncomfortably large numbers and recruitment was failing to keep pace with wastage. Between the end of 1976 and the publication of the committee's report in July 1978 the strength of the police service in England and Wales decreased by nearly 1,700. Most forces were under strength, some of them seriously so. But the appointment of the committee by the previous Home Secretary gave the police service hope, and that hope proved to be more than justified.
The committee's report on pay has completely reversed the trend during the two years preceding its publication. Recruitment has been stimulated and is now running at 40 per cent. above the rates for the 12 months ended 30th September 1978. Wastage has been curtailed and is now some 35 per cent. below the rate in the months preceding the publication of the report. Between July 1978 and the

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end of October of this year, the strength of the police service in England and Wales has increased by over 5,000 to a total of nearly 113,000, which is an all-time record.
But if the present high state of police morale is to be maintained it is essential that the police service should be provided with negotiating machinery in which it has confidence, and it is for this reason that the Edmund-Davies Report on the police negotiating machinery, a report which naturally attracted little attention when it was published simultaneously with the committee's report on pay, is so important.
The committee endorsed the general shape of the existing negotiating machinery. They recommended that the new negotiating body, like the Police Council, should comprise an official side and a staff side. They accepted that the official side should similarly comprise not only, as the Police Federation had recommended, representatives of the Home Departments but also of the local authority associations as the representatives of police authorities, reflecting the fact that police forces are maintained and financed locally as well as nationally.
The Edmund-Davies Committee did, however, recommend three important changes. First, that the new negotiating body should have an independent chairman and one or more deputy chairmen, appointed by the Prime Minister. This was designed to provide both continuity and a genuinely neutral voice in the to-and-fro of negotiation, which may help considerably in bringing the two sides to agreement. Secondly, that the new body should have an independent secretariat to be provided by central Government. Thirdly, that one-third of the English and Welsh local authority representatives on the official side should be magistrates. This was designed to ensure that the national negotiating body should reflect the composition of police authorities which, as your Lordships will know, are composed of two-thirds elected members and one-third magistrates.
The Edmund-Davies Report recommended that legislation should be introduced as soon as parliamentary time could be found to give statutory effect to the new body. Meanwhile, it should
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operate on a non-statutory basis. The new body, to be known as the Police Negotiating Board, was accordingly established in July of this year under the chairmanship of the noble Lord, Lord Plowden.
If I may briefly explain to your Lordships the terms of the Bill, Clause 1 provides for the establishment of the Police Negotiating Board. Subsection (1) provides that it is to be composed of representatives of the police authorities and the police staff associations and that it is to consider such matters as police pay, allowances, pensions and conditions of service. Subsections (2) and (3) leave the detailed arrangements for the establishment of the board to be made after consultations between the Secretary of State and the bodies represented on the board, but require the chairman and any deputy chairman to be appointed by the Prime Minister. Subsection (4) gives the Secretary of State power to defray any expenses incurred by the board and to pay fees to the chairman and deputy chairman, with the approval of the Minister for the Civil Service. Subsection (5) provides that, on the establishment of the board, the Police Council for the United Kingdom shall cease to exist.
Clause 2 confers certain statutory functions on the board. Subsection (1) requires the Secretary of State, before making regulations about matters with which the board is concerned, to have regard to any recommendation made by the board and to furnish the board with a draft of the regulations. As under existing legislation, this requirement does not apply to pension matters in respect of which the Secretary of State is only required to consult the board before making regulations. Subsection (2) of Clause 2 requires the board's constitution to include suitable arrangements for reaching agreement on recommendations to the Secretary of State and for the reference of any dispute to arbitration. Clause 3 deals with the short title and commencement.
This, then, is a small and, I hope, a non-controversial Bill. May I remind your Lordships that it arises because of action which was taken under the previous Government and which is now being put to Parliament for the first time under the present Government. It is, although a

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small Bill, none the less very important, because its effect will be to establish on a statutory basis the negotiating machinery which is essential to the long-term well-being of the police service. It is for this reason that I commend the Bill to your Lordships. I beg to move.
Moved, That the Bill be now read 2a.—(Lord Belstead).
3.20 p.m.
Lord BOSTON of FAVERSHAM: My Lords, as the noble Lord, Lord Belstead, has indicated, we all owe a great debt to the noble and learned Lord, Lord Edmund-Davies and his Committee of Inquiry on the Police for the immense amount of work they have put into their task, a very demanding one indeed, not only on this particular aspect of their inquiry but also on the others as well. Their first report on the negotiating machinery led directly to the Bill we are debating today. The House will also be grateful to the noble Lord, Lord Belstead, for his admirably clear and concise explanation. I fear that I shall not be able to be quite so concise, but I shall be as rapid as possible.
The Edmund-Davies Committee confronted all the most difficult issues, and that is no less than one would have expected with the chairman and membership it had. In considering this Bill, it is important to recall some of the background against which it is brought forward now. One of the basic facts the committee had to face at the outset was the special position of the police services, the problems that that creates and the need to solve them by having the right sort of machinery and conditions of service. As the report says, at paragraph 15 of the Introduction:
"The unique role of the police officer is reflected in the unique restrictions and limitations to which he is subjected, … the arduous and increasingly dangerous nature of his duties, a workload which involves night duties and often requires working over weekends and on rest days, and restrictions upon where he may live, even the work which members of his family may and may not do".
I think this is something which is generally not sufficiently recognised, still less acknowledged, outside. The report goes on to refer to what it describes as perhaps the most important statutory restriction,
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against membership of a trade union or association aiming at controlling or influencing pay or conditions of a police force, with criminal sanctions for anyone causing a police officer to withhold his services or commit breaches of discipline. To use the report's own words:
"There is no room to doubt that … such provisions sprang from the conviction that they are necessary to ensure and preserve the matchless role of the police".
Then, after considering whether those provisions may be repealed without imperilling the part played by the police in preserving law and order, and saying that that issue was one of the gravest by which the committee had been confronted, the committee concluded:
"Careful consideration has led us inexorably to the conclusion that the police should not have the right to strike".
The reference, particularly just now, to the increasingly dangerous nature of some police duties is perhaps especially noteworthy. We are not infrequently finding ourselves praising members of the police service for responding beyond the call of duty, but sometimes in praising them, quite rightly, for those actions we are in some danger of failing to acknowledge the extremely high standards of duty expected of them as a matter of routine, and it is right once in a while to give due praise for that and for the daily and often unnoticed acts of courage as well as for the more spectacular acts of heroism. I think it is true, too—and this is something which we should not omit to mention in the context of this Bill—that the police service is to some extent vulnerable and subject to undesirable pressures which occasionally lead to corruption. When that happens, they expect, and indeed we expect them, to be especially vigorous in rooting out the, happily, few bad elements in their midst.
In recalling the background, we should not minimise the importance of the immediate events which led to this inquiry and the need to review the negotiating machinery. It was a dispute over police pay in 1976 and early 1977 which played a crucial part in the breakdown of the negotiating machinery and which led directly to this review we are now considering. It was indeed differences over pay policy which were major factors leading to the loss of confidence of the Police Federations of England and Wales

1549
and Northern Ireland in the Police Council and subsequently to the withdrawal of the federations from the work of that council and other bodies.
Although this Bill is itself a small measure, and although moves towards it were already in hand before the present Government took office and before the last Government left office, we should not minimise the significance of the step now being taken if your Lordships pass this measure. If these proposals work as we on this side hope and believe they should, they will mark an important stage in the provision of a sound basis for the future negotiation on pay and conditions for the police service. The Bill itself follows closely some of the recommendations of the Edmund-Davies Committee and the committee did regard its proposals as radical, which indeed they are, if in a rather quiet and unobtrusive way.
One shortcoming of the Police Council, which this Bill replaces, was that it was little more than a formal body with chairmen who have been, essentially, figureheads. I do not say that with any disrespect to them personally; it was part of the system. The aim of the Committee of Inquiry seems to be to make the new board, with its committees, much more involved in all the negotiating work and not just with a role of overseeing the work of the committees. I feel sure that, with the noble Lord, Lord Plowden, as chairman, the new board will indeed be a real working body.
The committee's recommendation, embodied in this Bill, to have an independent chairman of the new board appointed by the Prime Minister, with a deputy chairman or additional deputy chairmen, similarly independent and similarly appointed, is a radical departure, aimed, I take it, at strengthening the body itself, its status and indeed confidence in it, and it is certainly to be welcomed.
It also seems right, as the committee recommend, to retain the existing collective bargaining system which the noble Lord, Lord Belstead, has explained, with the present police staff associations and the various Government Home Departments as before. The official side also had on it representatives of local authority associations and indeed, while the report was being prepared, while the Committee
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of Inquiry was actually sitting, there was considerable controversy over whether these bodies should continue to be represented, and over the proportion of local authority representatives who should be magistrates. I believe the committee was undoubtedly right to include the local authority representatives in its conclusions, but I think it would be useful to have it on record from the Minister whether that matter has now been satisfactorily resolved. The committee itself said:
"By far the chief problem we have had to consider was on local authority representation"
—that is to say, so far as membership was concerned.
I note that Clause 1 of the Bill provides that detailed arrangements for the establishment of the board are to be made after consultations between the Secretary of State and the bodies represented on it. I wonder whether the Minister can indicate any time-table for those consultations, or how plans for them are proceeding.
I have already referred in passing to the committees of the old Police Council. I say "old", but it will of course remain in existence unless and until this Bill is passed. The Edmund-Davis Committee recommended retaining the existing committee system. It also envisaged, I think, that the independent chairman would preside over the main committees of the new board as well as full meetings of the joint board itself. Again, there would clearly, I think, be greater working involvement of the independent chairman and deputies who would preside over some committees if the recommendations were followed. I should be pleased if the noble Lord, Lord Belstead, could tell us the Government's intentions or inclinations about the committee system.
I come to one other of the Edmund-Davies Committee's departures to a more radical approach—the recommendation for the appointment of an independent secretariat, a recommendation which was made, I think, partly to overcome the feeling within the staff side that the existing one appeared to be too closely associated with the official side; and the recommendation that the personnel for the independent secretariat should be drawn from the Office of Manpower Economies so that they would not have, as it were, an official side stamp upon them. That proposal is obviously accepted by the

1551
Government, as is clear from the Explanatory and Financial Memorandum to the Bill. However, if I may say so, the odd thing is that there is no mention of an independent secretariat in the Bill itself; there is no explicit provision for it in the Bill. Yet, it can be catered for, as the memorandum suggests, under the Bill's provisions.
I am bound to say that I find it strange that the independent secretariat is not provided for in the Bill itself and that the independence of the secretariat is not enshrined in the Bill. I am not at all convinced that that is satisfactory and certainly its omission stood out glaringly when I first looked at the Bill. The Edmund-Davies Committee made much of the need for an independent secretariat. Indeed, to quote one of the passages in its report on this matter, it said:
"We see the independent secretariat as the cornerstone of the new negotiating body".
One is bound to wonder why it has been left out and one perhaps almost fears that, if what is regarded by the committee as the cornerstone were to be left out, dangers would arise for the future of the whole edifice itself. Its absence from the Bill is something to which we may need to return in committee if the Bill receives a Second Reading and if we cannot be reassured.
As the committee said:
"The proposals we have made are radical, and we hope that in time they will produce that transformation in attitudes which we consider essential … The introduction of an independent chairman and secretariat provides a wholly new format, and fundamentally changes the existing framework which has led to the creation of what we think was avoidable suspicion and hostility".
The committee goes on to hope that the new machinery will protect the position of the police in what it calls the "pay league" and so obviate the need for major reviews of this kind, of which I believe the Minister himself said there have been four since 1949.
It is indeed the case that both sides of the new negotiating body will be jointly engaged in reaching agreements to ensure that in the United Kingdom we have efficient and contented police services. I would share the committee's view that:
"The attainment of that goal is vital to the well-being of our society",
as it mentions in paragraph 126.
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There have been some encouraging signs, as the noble Lord, Lord Belstead, has indicated—for example, on recruitment—since the first two Edmund-Davies Committee reports came out, in July last year and since the announcement of my right honourable friend the then Home Secretary, Mr. Merlyn Rees, on 17th July last year accepting, albeit in two stages, the recommendations of the Committee on Police Pay; and indeed since the present Government's own announcement. It is useful, I think, to be reminded and to have set out those recruiting details.
It is, in my submission, part of Parliament's job to provide the right basis on which police services can operate effectively and, indeed, enthusiastically. This Bill is a step in that direction and I would wish to give it a general welcome.
3.35 p.m.
Lord WIGODER: My Lords, with that lucidity which one is accustomed to expect of the noble and learned Lord, Lord Edmund-Davies, there are two propositions set out in paragraphs 6 and 7 of the joint introduction to the reports with which I know all your Lordships will entirely agree. Paragraph 6 simply reads in this way:
"We live in a parliamentary democracy. The concepts of law and its impartial enforcement are fundamental to it".
Paragraph 7 then adds:
"The instruments essential to the continued fulfilment of these concepts are an independent judiciary to interpret the law, the police to maintain and enforce it, and the armed forces to protect us from external aggression. These three groups of people are unique in our society and essential to its continuation".
It is because of that that this apparently modest Bill is, in fact, of considerable importance. It is of importance because it deals with the machinery for the negotiation of pay and conditions for this extremely important group in our community—the police. Therefore, it is right that the Bill should be given considerable attention in your Lordships' House.
Of the three principal recommendations in the Edmund-Davies Report, the Bill in fact deals specifically with only one: that is, the proposition that there should, in future, be an independent chairman of the negotiating board. That has, of course, been tried on previous occasions.

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Your Lordships may recall that after the Oaksey Report many years ago there was an independent chairman, the late Sir Eric Coates, and the system of having an independent chairman was tried. It did not at that time meet with complete success and in the result, after the 1960 Royal Commission, the present system was adopted, under which, instead of having an independent chairman, the chairman was provided by the official and the staff side in alternate years. That again, it is clear from recent history, has not been successful—largely, of course, for the obvious reason that such a chairman is not best suited to be able to exercise a conciliatory or arbitrating role as between the two sides when he is so clearly the representative of one of them.
Therefore, it is, I venture to think, right that the Edmund-Davies Committee on balance came down in favour of reverting to the former procedure and having an independent chairman, which is what this Bill provides. Where the Edmund-Davies Committee's Report goes further—and this is clearly envisaged by the Bill—is as regards the second recommendation, that for the first time this independent chairman will have an independent secretariat to support him. That, I believe, will make a great deal of difference to the prospects of success for the noble Lord, Lord Plowden, in his difficult task.
The position up to date, as your Lordships will know, is that the secretariat has, in fact, been provided by the Local Authorities Conditions of Service Advisory Board, known somewhat clumsily, I believe, as LACSAB to those who are devotees of naming people by the initials of a particular body. The position, in fact, was that the secretary of the official side on the police board was the chief official of LACSAB, and it was quite inevitable that in those circumstances he was thought to have a somewhat advantageous position over the secretary of the staff side with whom, nominally, he was intended to be on an equal footing.
It appears that the proposal to have a small independent secretariat will be of very great importance in the future in supporting the role of the independent chairman. I note what the noble Lord, Lord Boston of Faversham, said about the fact that this Bill does not specifically
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provide for an independent secretariat. I shall be interested to hear what the noble Lord, Lord Belstead, has to say about this, but it may be that one would hardly expect an Act of Parliament to provide for the formation of a secretariat perhaps in precisely those terms. But clearly it is envisaged by the Bill; as the noble Lord, Lord Boston, pointed out, the Explanatory and Financial Memorandum quite specifically refers to the fact that the board will have a small independent secretariat provided by the Office of Manpower Economics. It is clear from what the noble Lord, Lord Belstead, has said today that the Government entirely accept that obligation.
That is really the full extent of this Bill as it stands. There is, of course, the third important recommendation of the Edmund-Davies Committee—which has been referred to by the noble Lord, Lord Belstead—that there should be magistrate members of police authorities represented in force on the official side of the new negotiating board. That, again, is a proposal that we would very much welcome. It would appear to us that magistrate members of police authorities are perhaps a little less likely to be politically partisan on occasion than are the elected members of those local authorities and they might, therefore, help to add an independent and perhaps rather more stable element to the official side of this board. That, of course, is not specifically provided for in the Bill. As I understand it, the provisions for the constitution of the board remain to take effect after the Bill has passed into law. But it would no doubt be of assistance if the noble Lord, Lord Belstead, would indicate that the Government are committed to accepting that third recommendation of the Edmund-Davies Committee. With those few observations, we on these Benches welcome the Bill and wish it well.

NUCLEAR PROGRAMME AND NUCLEAR INDUSTRY
3.42 p.m.
The MINISTER of STATE, DEPARTMENT of EMPLOYMENT (The Earl of Gowrie): My Lords, if it would be for the convenience of the House, I should like to repeat a Statement being made in another place by my right honourable

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friend the Secretary of State for Energy on the nuclear programme and the nuclear industry. The Statement is as follows:
"With permission, Mr. Speaker, I wish to make a Statement.
"Safe nuclear power and a strong nuclear industry are essential to this country's energy policy. On present prospects, supplies of North Sea oil and gas will he declining in the 1990s. Even with full exploitation of coal and conservation, and with great efforts on renewable energy sources, it will be difficult, if not impossible, to meet this country's long-term energy needs without a sizeable contribution from nuclear power.
"The British nuclear power programme has been in decline over the last decade and the structure of the nuclear industry has been under review for nearly two years. If we are to reverse this trend and ensure that the industry is on a sound footing we must act now.
"The Government have therefore held urgent consultations with those most directly concerned.
"We believe that there must be continuing nuclear power station orders if our long-term energy supplies are to be secured and current industrial uncertainties are to be resolved.
"The last Government authorised the Central Electricity Generating Board and the South of Scotland Electricity Board to begin work at once with a view to ordering one Advanced Gas-cooled Reactor station each as soon as possible. This is in hand.
"The last Government also endorsed the intention of the CEGB to establish the Pressurised Water Reactor as a valid option by ordering a PWR station provided—and I quote,
'design work is satisfactorily completed and all necessary Government and other consents and safety clearances have been obtained'.
The present Government agree that the nuclear and electricity supply industries should now proceed along these lines, and we have made clear to them
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our wish that, subject to the necessary consents and safety clearances, the PWR should be the next nuclear power station order, with the aim of starting construction in 1982. With the approval of the Government, the CEGB have endorsed the National Nuclear Corporation's selection of Westinghouse as licensor for the PWR, and will shortly issue a letter of intent to NNC to authorise the design and, subject to the necessary approvals, manufacture of a PWR. In consultation with the CEGB, the NNC will prepare the safety case for the board to consider and submit to the Nuclear Installations Inspectorate. Statutory consent actually to build the station will also be needed and an inquiry will be held in due course.
"We attach overriding importance to the safety of nuclear power and will want to ensure that the lessons of events at the Three Mile Island station in the United States have been learnt. I am today publishing preliminary assessments of the Kemeny Report on this incident provided to me by the Nuclear Installations Inspectorate and other authorities in the United Kingdom.
"Looking ahead, the electricity supply industry have advised that even on cautious assumptions they would need to order at least one new nuclear power station a year in the decade from 1982, or a programme of the order of 15000 megawatts over 10 years. The precise level of future ordering will depend upon the development of electricity demand and the performance of the industry, but we consider this a reasonable prospect against which the nuclear and power plant industries can plan. Decisions about the choice of reactor for later orders will be taken in due course.
"The Government attach importance to the steady build-up of the NNC into a strong and independent design and construction company, fully able to supply nuclear power stations at home and abroad efficiently.
"The boards of NNC and of its operating subsidiary, the Nuclear Power Company, will be brought together into a single-tier structure with full responsibility for the affairs of the company. The supervisory manage-

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ment agreement between the NNC and the General Electric Company will be terminated. The management of the NNC will be built up to suit the needs of our nuclear programme.
"Lord Aldington, chairman of the NNC, has told me that he wishes to retire shortly. I would like to pay tribute to the valuable and unstinted service which he has devoted to the nuclear industry over the last six years. I will be arranging for a successor to take over the chairmanship in due course.
"The immediate task of the NNC is to carry forward their work on the AGR programme, including early commissioning of the remainder of the first AGRs, and to complete work on a PWR design, ready for safety scrutiny. In addition, it is the Government's wish that the company should take on total project management responsibility for the first PWR, drawing on whatever resources it may need to support it in this role. The company may also wish to consider moving into some areas of manufacturing in due course.
"The future success of our nuclear programme is of great importance to the prosperity of this country. I ask all concerned to give their active support to the decisions which I have announced."
My Lords, that concludes the Statement of my right honourable friend.
3.49 p.m.
Lord STRABOLGI: My Lords, we on this side of the House are grateful to the noble Earl, Lord Gowrie, for repeating that Statement. We agree with the general point made at the beginning of the Statement, that it will be difficult, if not impossible, to meet this country's long-term energy needs without a sizeable contribution from nuclear power. On the other hand, there is considerable public disquiet about nuclear installations, and I welcome the fact—as confirmed in the Statement—that the Government attach overriding importance to nuclear safety and that they want to ensure that the lessons of events at Three Mile Island have been learnt.
We accept the need for the AGR. Indeed, the last Government envisaged a
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steady ordering programme of AGRs. But we have reservations on the wisdom of a change to the PWR, and the onus of proof for this must surely rest with the CEGB, particularly since the Three Mile Island accident and the cracks reported to have appeared in the French PWR. I must ask the Government whether there will be a full-ranging inquiry, with terms of reference to discuss comparative safety, costs between the two types, suitable sites and other relevant factors. I must also ask the Government if they will publish all the documents provided by the nuclear inspectorate and other authorities in the United Kingdom, and not confine themselves to publishing only a preliminary assessment of the Kemeny Report, as the Statement implies.
Are the Government planning also to keep open the option for the fast-breeder reactor? They have committed themselves to setting up a full public inquiry. May I ask the noble Earl when this will take place and what kind of inquiry it will be? With regard to the proposed reorganisation of the nuclear power industry, we note that a single-tier structure is proposed, and there will no doubt be an opportunity for this to be debated in your Lordships' House in due course. I must associate my noble friends on this side of the House with the tribute to the noble Lord, Lord Aldington. I note that the name of his successor is to be announced in due course. Will the Government confirm that whoever is chosen as the new head will be acceptable generally to the shareholders of the various supplying companies involved?
3.52 p.m.
Lord TANLAW: My Lords, we too from these Benches wish to thank the noble Earl for giving us the Government's Statement on the nuclear programme and the nuclear industry for the next ten or twelve years. Our position is also quite clear. We believe it is necessary that a nuclear element does exist in the energy policy for this country. We are also pleased to recognise in the noble Earl's Statement that there are some issues here which will revitalise the nuclear industry in this country. There is one point on which I must disagree with the noble Earl, when he said: "The Government have therefore held urgent consultations with those most directly concerned." We accept that this

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may be the case with regard to the technical and commercial interests involved in this nuclear programme, but by far the largest interests concerned are those of the general public, and we believe that there has not been the fullest public discussion with regard to this programme.
It is pleasing to note that the noble Earl has said that there will be a public inquiry. We sincerely hope that during the course of that public inquiry a number of the outstanding issues of safety will be raised and some reassurances given to the public on the general disquiet that there has been over the safety record of the nuclear programme, especially in the United States. I see from this Statement, if my addition is correct, that it is the Government's intention to order 12 nuclear power stations between now and 1992. If the lessons have been learnt from the events that took place on Three Mile Island, will the Government first of all say today that the 100 safety issues that were unresolved at the time of licensing of the Three Mile Island station and which appear to be still unresolved will be clearly answered and clearly resolved before licensing is given to the new corporation for the manufacture of PWR reactors in this country?
While these technical issues remain to be discussed, and discussed publicly, we should like to support the Government, but we will give the Government our fullest support only when a public inquiry has resolved the issues so that my noble friends and I on these Benches and also any member of the general public can understand them.
The Earl of GOWRIE: My Lords, I am grateful for the general response of noble Lords for the official Opposition and for the Liberal Party. May I take first the broad issue of public confidence which the noble Lord, Lord Strabolgi, raised, and then the noble Lord, Lord Tanlaw, followed on? Obviously public confidence in nuclear power depends on a general sense that safety issues are being treated openly, so it is the policy of the Government and all concerned with the industry to make available as much information on nuclear safety as is reasonably possible. In that connection I have here an excellent brief on nuclear
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energy and the nuclear industry, issued by the Department of Energy, which does not duck these sensitive issues, and which I am arranging to have put in the Printed Paper Office for any noble Lords who may be interested.
The Health and Safety Executive published a summary of their assessment of the generic safety issues of pressurised water reactors in July 1977. A more detailed report of this work has recently been made available. A lengthy version of the Marshall Report on the integrity of PWR pressure vessels—one of the inputs into the Health and Safety Executive's exercise—has also been released. I understand that it is not possible to envisage the release of safety documentation prepared for existing stations, which was not written with a view to general release. However, the CEGB do intend to publish next year a substantial document on AGR safety, and that will cover administrative and procedural aspects of safety as well as safety analysis, and principles and emergency plans. In relation to subsequent stations, including the first pressurised water reactor, I have been assured that the appropriate safety documentation supporting the initial licensing will be published as well. I will keep the House informed about that.
The noble Lord, Lord Strabolgi, while broadly welcoming our Statement, said that he had some reservations about the PWR as against the AGR. I think it would be foolish for this country not to recognise that pressurised water reactors are now a considerable growth industry in the world's reactor technology, and it would be extremely difficult for us not to play our part, or participate, in a programme which is heading in this direction. The PWR is a well established and proven system with substantial operating experience behind it, and of course it is substantially cheaper than the AGR. But I did make clear our commitment to a mixed energy system; and indeed what we are talking about, even if this programme goes ahead or develops as fast as we should like, is about 30 per cent. or less of our total energy needs by the end of this century.
The noble Lord, Lord Strabolgi, asked me whether decisions had been reached on the fast reactor. The answer to that is, not yet. The United Kingdom Atomic

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Energy Authority, in consultation with the others mainly concerned, have been considering the option for developing the fast reactor in this country, including possibilities for international co-operation. I expect to receive their report soon. Future policy in this area will be considered early in the New Year, and the House will of course be informed. Finally, the noble Lord, Lord Strabolgi, asked me whether I would publish more information on PWR safety. As I think I indicated at the beginning of my remarks, a lot has been published already. The NII published a summary of their assessment in 1977, but we will see that continuing publications are made available.
3.59 p.m.
Lord WYNNE-JONES: My Lords, the noble Earl, in giving us the Government's Statement about their reactor policy, has answered only one question, and that is whether the Government have made up their mind. With regard to the rest, the whole position is left in very grave doubt. I should like to ask the noble Earl one or two questions on this matter. First, what is going to be the impact of the proposals of the Government upon the coal industry? It was previously stated that we would have a substantial need for coal throughout the 1980s. But the Statement of the Government implies that in effect there is to be a replacement of coal stations by nuclear stations, because there is no necessity for 12 15-gigawatt stations in addition to what is already being produced, and therefore some of these must be replacing coal stations. What will happen to declared Government policy on the coal industry? Does the noble Earl mean that in effect there will be a reduction in the development of the coal mining industry, which will have grave repercussions?
These stations are described as nuclear stations, but every station demands turbo generators. What will be the position with regard to the supply of turbo generators in this country when our capacity for supplying these has been run down over the years? Is the industry in a position to supply the necessary turbo generators for operating with these nuclear stations? Are the Government assured of an adequate supply of uranium? All the evidence is that there will be a shortage of uranium in the 1990s, and unless the
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Government have a guaranteed supply of uranium, it is madness to go in for a programme of this type, especially when we know perfectly well that the French have already embarked on what is, in my opinion, an over-ambitious programme, for the supply of nuclear stations. That leads inevitably to the question: why are the Government not giving high priority to the development of the fast reactor, which is the only one which can operate satisfactorily and safely when there is not a guaranteed supply of uranium?
The Earl of GOWRIE: My Lords, I think there is a general tendency, when Governments announce a programme in an area which affects every aspect of our daily and economic life, to assume that what they are talking about and what they are planning will in some way be at the expense of something else, and I would like to correct that impression. I hope I have made it clear in some of the supplementary remarks to the Statement as well as in some recent Unstarred Question debates in this House that the Government are committed to a mixed economy where energy is concerned.
The noble Lord, Lord Wynne-Jones, raised the question of coal. As he knows, coal is providing about 70 per cent. of current electricity generating needs. I would not imagine that that figure would necessarily alter very much, particularly in view of the fact that as North Sea gas tends to run out we will need more and more coal to provide sources of gas, which is a useful and fairly inexpensive fuel. So I do not think there are grave implications for the coal industry here; and the Government, as the noble Lord is aware, are committed to a programme of development in the coal industry, though we have always in connection with that industry offered the warning, as the last Government offered a warning, that of course if wage costs exceed the economic relevance of coal then obviously other or cheaper forms of energy could fill the gap.
I would also point out to the noble Lord that nuclear power stations now planned will be coming into operation only in the late 'eighties and 'nineties, and before the end of the century we will, as I said, be using coal to make substitute natural gas and we will be looking for nuclear power to fill the gap. The noble

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Lord also raised the issue of uranium. My information is that we have secure supplies of uranium until the end of the century, but it is exactly because of uncertainty about further supplies that my right honourable friend is investigating the fast breeder reactor, and I said that an announcement of the result of his investigations would be made early in the new year.
4.5 p.m.
Lord LEE of NEWTON: My Lords, while the Minister's reply to my noble friend Lord Wynne-Jones on the question of coal is satisfactory as far as it goes, may I ask him to accept that if we are now to see the closure of quite a number of pits in South Wales consequent on the run-down of the steel industry, there will be great resistance to the idea of more nuclear development because the miners will not believe that there will be the same demand for coal? In the Statement the noble Lord said the PWR was more economic than the AGR. My recollection is that when we agreed on the AGR we knew that it would be more expensive to install but that the economic performance would be cheaper. Was the noble Lord referring, then, to the installation when he said the PWR would be cheaper than the AGR, or was he saying that the economic performance would be cheaper?
The Earl of GOWRIE: My Lords, to take first the point about coal, South Wales and steel, I do not think, with respect to the noble Lord, Lord Lee of Newton, that that is really relevant to the case that we are discussing now about nuclear energy for electricity supply. The reason there is trouble in the South Wales pits is of course the failure of demand from the steel industry, but we do not expect there to be failure of demand generally for coal for electricity or power generation. He asked me about the AGR versus the PWR. As I said, at the moment our idea is to operate both; we are looking to a mixed economy here. There are advantages in both systems, but we do not feel that we can remain out on a limb, if I may put it that way, by restricting ourselves to the AGR, which is fundamentally a British device, when the world energy industry is moving towards PWR and where we would lose out in
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technical know-how as well as in cost considerations if we did not develop in this area as well. But we are not looking for areas of mutual exclusivity; we are trying to run a number of systems to make a sensible overall programme.
Lord NUGENT of GUILDFORD: My Lords, is my noble friend aware that he is much to be congratulated, as is my right honourable friend in another place, on taking this immensely difficult technical decision which other Governments have not found easy to take in the past, and we certainly wish him well with the outcome of it? However, is he aware how disappointing it is that after our very long experience in nuclear generation with the Magnox, where we were pioneers, which has been most satisfactory from the point of view of safety and the commercial factors involved, we should have had to turn to overseas technology for the solution of our next move? How does my noble friend see the capacity of our research facilities in this matter? Why is it that we have failed to build on the excellent experience we had in the past to find our own solution and continue to lead the field?
The Earl of GOWRIE: My Lords, I am grateful to my noble friend for those comments. He pointed out, and it is indeed ironic, that we have been developing gas-cooled reactors in this country for 25 years, starting, as he said, with the Magnox stations. I believe that all is not lost, because what we are doing under the terms of the Statement is effectively to buy the latest recipe, if I may put it that way, for development of the PWR. We would expect that that purchase and the development of that technology, allied with our own expertise, would mean that increasingly the PWRs that came out of that system would be developed and made here, with all the implications for our own research and development and for the employment that that would imply.
Lord WIGG: My Lords, I wonder whether I misheard the noble Lord, because I understood that his noble friend congratulated him and the Minister in another place for taking decisions that no other Government would take. It may be that I am a bit dense, but I understood that the Minister said that basically he

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had accepted the decisions of the previous Administration. So while in this season of the year I would not deprive him of the congratulations, at least let us get the matter clear.
The Earl of GOWRIE: My Lords, I think that there is a certain continuity of energy policy, and that is what we should have. However, I am not a politician for nothing, and I must point out to the noble Lord, Lord Wigg, that some of these rather tricky decisions were anyhow temporarily postponed by the last Ad ministration.
Lord WOLVERTON: My Lords, I am sure that the House is very grateful for the Statement by Her Majesty's Government on this very important matter of atomic energy, but I am very disappointed, and so is the noble Lord, Lord Wynne-Jones, that there is no statement about the fast breeder reactor, because nearly all countries in Western Europe are going in for the pressurised water system. I am quite certain that there will be a shortage of uranium before the end of the century, and in my humble opinion the fast breeder reactor is the answer. We were the pioneers of that system, as we were the pioneers of the Magnox system. I am disappointed that Her Majesty's Government have not made an announcement today that, subject to a proper inquiry, they are intending to build one experimental commercial station on the very successful Dounreay system, which has been going now for about 10 years.
On the AGR system, it is very disappointing that it has taken so long to develop. The Dungeness system, good as it may be, has taken 10 years and the first station is not in operation yet. So I think that there is a great deal to be said for the pressurised water system, provided, naturally, that it passes all its proper tests, and we are assured that it will not be embarked upon unless it passes the proper tests of the inspectorate. It is cheaper to construct and to run, and the main point is that much of the system can be manufactured in factories and sent to the site, while the AGR has to be built entirely on site; and there seems to be great difficulty with strikes, lock-outs and that kind of thing on the sites. I think that we ought to consider building one station if the inspectorate agree that it is safe.
The EARL of GOWRIE: My Lords, I am glad that towards the end of his remarks my noble friend welcomed what we said about the development of the pressurised water reactor. But I would reassure him, as I tried to reassure the noble Lord, Lord Wynne-Jones, that there is no question of the issue of the fast breeder reactor being shelved. No system which depends on uranium is anything other than finite in our view, and, as I said, we shall be coming to conclusions about that and we shall inform the House when we do so, which I understand will be early in the new year. However, while the shortages to which both noble Lords have drawn attention may indeed become acute, they are not acute at the moment. There is certainly a lot of life ahead for the pressure water reactor, and in our view there is no reason not to investigate the possibilities of developing it here.
The MINISTER of STATE, MINISTRY of AGRICULTURE, FISHERIES and FOOD (Earl Ferrers): My Lords, we have been dealing with this Statement for about 30 minutes and I wonder whether it is the feeling of the House that it is probably time for us to move to the next Statement.

POLICE NEGOTIATING BOARD BILL [H.L.]
Second Reading debate resumed.
4.14 p.m.
Lord INGLEWOOD: My Lords, we return now to the Police Bill and I rise not to make a debating speech, but simply to ask the noble Lord two or three questions, about which I spoke to him in the Lobby earlier. The Bill is drafted in very general terms, so I do not think it unreasonable to ask questions, as other noble Lords have done. I am glad to say that the noble Lord has cleared up the question of the status of the chairman and vice-chairman, but there is still the question of the size of the board and the balance between the different interests. On occasions like this there is a great temptation for all and sundry to claim representation on the board, which in the end has "Uncle Tom Cobbleigh and all" as members, and so becomes so large that it is very difficult to come to clear decisions; much

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of what it then decides is compromise. I hope that the noble Lord can say something about the size of the board that he has in mind.
Then we come to the question of regulations. What parliamentary control will there be over the regulations mentioned in the Bill? Can Parliament pray against them? I think that that is possible, but it is not clear in the Bill; and if it cannot, what else can Parliament do?—because Parliament must surely have some status in this matter. I ask this particularly because it seems to me that there is confusion in the police world between what are regulations and what are simply recommendations from the Home Office, which are sent as letters and addressed both to the chairman of the authority and to the chief constable. Those letters are not regulations, however great may be the respect paid to them.
Then we come to Clause 2 of the Bill where there are references to Sections 33 and 35 of the Police Act 1964, and where one notices that Section 34 has been left out. Section 33 concerns regular police. Section 35 concerns cadets. As I understand it, regulations made under the Bill would be laid only after consultation with representatives of staff associations. I may be very ignorant, but I did not know that cadets had a staff association. If that is so, I wonder who is going to represent the cadets before such regulations are made.
We ought to turn for a moment to the section which is left out, Section 34, which concerns special constables, of whom there are now 23,000 in this country, unpaid, and underrated by all of us and by the regular police. It is possible that in the foreseeable future they might be paid a bounty on the lines of the Territorial Army. If we come to that, is there power in the Bill to decide the rate of such bounty? Is there authority for any such decision to be made? If these steps are taken in the future, who will represent the special constables? They have no staff association, no national organisation, and no means of having their voice heard on a national issue.
Then we have what used to be called the first police reserve. I think I am right in saying it faded away at the end of the
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war, but still exists on paper. If that is so, how is their pay to be decided? How is their voice to be heard before such decisions are made?
This vague drafting gives the impression that the agreement with the federation is still very brittle. There has already been reference to the objections which the federation made to the representation of the staff associations on the board. We know that the federation upset the Police Council for about two years—the Minister told us this again this afternoon—and brought the Police Advisory Board to a complete standstill, as was shown in the Answer to a Parliamentary Question only last week. For over two years the Police Advisory Board simply did not function. Even the Patriotic Front, which recently held up the Rhodesian negotiations for three months, was not as successful as the Police Federation has been in delaying negotiations for about two years. I see the noble Lord, Lord Harris of Greenwich, who is sitting opposite, smiling. What signs can the Minister give us which will strengthen our confidence that these tactics will not be repeated the moment something comes to the fore which the federation does not wholly approve of?
My last point concerns numbers and quality. We have twice this afternoon been told to applaud the increase in the number of recruits to the police service, which we all welcome. Neither of the noble Lords who spoke from the Front Benches mentioned the question of quality.
In the police service it is not just numbers that count; it is the quality of those who join the service which is so important. We consider, rightly I think, that our police are leaders in the world in so many fields. But they are not leaders in the minimum educational attainment required of recruits; nor are they leaders in the pattern of training which we provide for them. The minimum educational standards required are revealed in a national examination set by the Home Office. I think it would shame many noble Lords if they saw some of the tick-in-the-box papers. I am going to ask the Minister now whether he would arrange for a set of these papers—say a year or two years old—to be put in the Library, so that we can in fact see what is required of recruits who have not the necessary four O-levels, of which English

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and elementary maths must be two, which is a low enough standard.
My Lords, I would submit that the important things in a police force are their standards and their relations with the public they serve; and public confidence depends on their being as open as possible. Of course, we must also ensure that the police forces of this country receive proper remuneration and can look forward with confidence, knowing that Parliament will see that this happens. I hope this Bill will contribute to this confidence over pay, and I hope, too, that it will contribute to happier relations between the police and the public whom they are paid to serve.
4.21 p.m.
Lord HARRIS of GREENWICH: My Lords, I propose to speak very briefly because I did not put my name on the list of speakers although I informed the Parliamentary Under-Secretary that I was going to say a few things this afternoon. First of all, it gives me great pleasure to follow the noble Lord, who always takes a very keen interest in matters concerning the police, although, as he will recognise, he has gone rather outside the precise terms of the Bill we have before us today. He referred to the question of special constables. Like him, I attach the greatest importance to them; but I think he is a little unfair in saying that their value is in some way underrated by the police force generally. Certainly chief constables I know attach the highest importance to them; and certainly anything that the present Government can do to stimulate recruitment would be very welcome to many of us, including the noble Lord. Secondly, the noble Lord referred to the question of police training, and perhaps we may come back to that on some occasion because, again, it is outside the terms of this particular Bill. Nevertheless, like the noble Lord, I attach the greatest importance to it.
As the noble Lord, Lord Belstead, said when he introduced the Bill, this measure has had to he presented to Parliament because of the breakdown in the Police Council; and think he sketched in the background to the dispute very fairly. There were obviously incomes policy reasons behind the dispute; of course there were. But there were other disagreements as well, and these were touched on by my
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noble friend Lord Boston of Faversham and the noble Lord, Lord Wigoder. One was the composition of the official side of the Police Council. The problem, undoubtedly—and the federation representatives at the time put it to me very firmly—was that they were extremely dissatisfied with what they regarded as the over-political attitude of the local authority representatives.
I think we have to recognise the fact that the police service is not like other services of local government. I think it does require special and very sensitive treatment; and I think there is a great deal to be said for bringing magistrates into these negotiations. I think it will solve quite a number of the problems which have arisen in the past. Speaking for myself, I welcome it, and I am sure the noble Lord, Lord Belstead, will come to this point when he winds up.
I should like to say only two other things. First, I very much welcome what my noble friend Lord Boston has said about the police service generally—about their courage in many intensely difficult situations and about their high standards of professionalism. I think it is necessary to say this, and to say it fairly regularly, because there unhappily appears to be something of an obsession in this country by way of denigrating the police service. One hears it all too often from some Members of another place and some sections of the media. I think it is right, when we are discussing a Bill of this sort, to express our admiration for the admirable job which the police service does and acknowledge the very heavy debt we all owe to them.
Secondly, I think it is only right to say a few words about the noble Lord, Lord Plowden, who has taken over the chairmanship of this important new body. The noble Lord, Lord Plowden, was in fact the deputy chairman of the committee of inquiry presided over by the noble and learned Lord, Lord Edmund-Davies, and I think we are very grateful to him that he has taken on this extremely important job in addition to his existing job as chairman of the Police Complaints Board. I do not think we could possibly have anybody of higher standard doing this important and sensitive job, and I am sure that I speak on behalf of the whole House in thanking him for doing it and in expressing our

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pleasure that the Government have thought it right to offer him this appointment.

RHODESIA: LANCASTER HOUSE FINAL AGREEMENT
4.26 p.m.
Lord TREFGARNE: My Lords, with your Lordships' permission, I will repeat a Statement about Rhodesia being made by my right honourable friend the Lord Privy Seal in another place.
"With permission, Mr. Speaker, I shall make a statement on Rhodesia.
"All parties at the constitutional conference have now initialled the final conference report. Formal signature of the report and of the cease-fire agreement is expected to take place within the next two days.
"The conference has thus reached final agreement. The Government welcome the spirit of compromise shown by all the parties and are grateful to the other Governments involved for their contribution towards a settlement.
"The House will wish to know that in the light of the requirement for a monitoring presence and its need for self-sufficiency of road and air transport within Rhodesia, the latest estimate for the cost of the pre-independence arrangements is £27 million.
"In the interests of reconciliation following a settlement, the Government intend to instruct the Governor to confer an amnesty in the law of Southern Rhodesia which will apply to acts committed in good faith by both sides.
"Many problems still lie ahead, but I am sure the House will agree that the successful conclusion of the Lancaster House Conference opens the prospect for peace and prosperity in Rhodesia."
My Lords, that concludes the Statement.
4.28 p.m.
Lord GORONWY-ROBERTS: My Lords, is the noble Lord aware that we are all delighted with the news that the final conference report has been initialled,
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and will be formally signed by all the parties concerned in the next day or two? Is he further aware that this will be immensely encouraging to the noble Lord, Lord Soames, and his staff, in their very difficult task of implementing the agreement which has now been reached by everybody concerned; and that we hope and, indeed, expect that all parties in Rhodesia will now co-operate fully with him as Governor in organising free and fair elections leading to an independent Zimbabwe, hopefully within the Commonwealth?
In conveying to the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary once more our warm congratulations on the success of his efforts, will the noble Lord also convey our confident hope that the constructive attitudes shown by the leaders of the Patriotic Front, by Bishop Muzorewa, by the Front Line leaders and by the Commonwealth Secretariat during the negotiations will now be repeated during the critical pre-independence period that lies ahead? Finally, will he again ask his noble friend to ensure the same consensus in the British Parliament as has been achieved in Lancaster House by agreeing to the Affirmative Resolution procedure in regard to the order we discussed last night; or, at least, to seek a report on the conduct and validity of the elections in Rhodesia which Parliament—the Parliament of the paramount country—may consider immediately before that order is implemented?
4.29 p.m.
Lord GLADWYN: My Lords, we, naturally, also greatly welcome this Statement, and regard it as a splendid step forward. We share the Government's hope that the conclusion of a cease-fire agreement will give us a prospect of what we all hope will be a lasting peace. We note, however, that we must still await formal signature, even though this appears, as I understand it, to be practically certain. My Lords, beyond once more congratulating the noble Lord, Lord Carrington, and all those associated with him, there is not much more that we can say now over and above the things which have already been said. The way is now practically clear for Lord Soames to be able to deploy all his great diplomatic skill and all his innate authority in order to get everybody into line.

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I have only two small questions. First, I note that a very considerable sum—I think, £27 million—is to be expended in order to make the monitoring force self-sufficient in road and air transport. Will this include a number of suitable mine detectors (in order to prevent members of the monitoring force being blown up on unfrequented roads) similar to those now being employed by General Walls and his army? Secondly, I note the proposed amnesty. Very welcome though this is in itself, it will apply to what are called "acts committed in good faith" by both sides. I am in some doubt as to how this provision can be interpreted legally. Perhaps the noble Lord will be able to tell us whether it would cover a murder committed in good faith.
Lord TREFGARNE: My Lords, I am much obliged to both noble Lords for what they have said in response to the Statement. Certainly, I shall convey all their good wishes to my noble friend the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary. I shall also convey to my noble friend what the noble Lord, Lord Goronwy-Roberts, has said about his desire for the order about the date of independence. I can give no undertaking, I am afraid, as to what my noble friend will decide on this matter, but I will bring the noble Lord's words to his attention.
The noble Lord, Lord Gladwyn, asked about mine detectors. I do not have to hand a precise list of stores and equipment available to the monitoring force, but it seems to me inconceivable that they do not have mine detectors. I will look into the matter and write to the noble Lord. I think that those were all the points that were raised.
Lord GLADWYN: My Lords, the point about "good faith"?
Lord TREFGARNE: Yes, my Lords. The point about the amnesty is an important one. The precise details of the amnesty will be published in the form of a Governor's ordinance within the next few days. The ordinance will set out the terms of the amnesty and I will arrange for a copy of the document to be placed in the Library of the House. It will apply to acts done in good faith by both sides since UDI. It will be those acts—all acts—done in good faith in the furtherance of
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the purpose of resisting and frustrating the illegal administration, for example. It will not apply to acts not done in good faith; for example, where the real motive was personal gain or private vengeance.
The Lord Bishop of LONDON: My Lords, may I from these Benches add our words of congratulation to all those who have been involved in these negotiations at their successful outcome? It has been a very long, anxious, worrying and wearying process. We have watched with the greatest possible admiration the way in which, with patience and understanding, the negotiations have been conducted. I think that the whole House must feel proud that the noble Lord, Lord Carrington, has brought this to a successful conclusion. I am sure that the noble Lord, Lord Soames, knows that he has our support and prayers in the very difficult task which he has ahead in implementing this very satisfactory outcome.
Lord HOME of the HIRSEL: My Lords, may I add my congratulations and echo the words of the two noble Lords opposite and of the right reverend Prelate. Since the Commonwealth Conference in Lusaka, this has been a most exemplary exercise in skilful diplomacy; and I hope that everything will be well in the end. May I ask a question on a matter which I do not think has been mentioned so far? How many places of assembly will be available to the Patriotic Front?
Lord TREFGARNE: My Lords, 16. We believe that these will provide fully adequate capacity for all the Patriotic Front forces.
Lord WIGG: My Lords, will the noble Lord be kind enough to turn his mind to the answer that he gave me yesterday when I asked whether he would give the House an assurance that all the operational aircraft, and particularly helicopters, supplied by the South African Government, and the officers of the South African Government, and the officers of the South African Air Force who have been flying them operationally, would be withdrawn? He said—and I can understand the reason—that it would be inadvisable to answer me but that he would write to me. Will he be good enough to address his mind to that problem with some sense of urgency? Sending a letter to me is not of much

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importance. I should be wholly satisfied if he gave an undertaking that, whatever his answer to me may be, he will make it available for public consumption—in other words, through the Press.
Lord TREFGARNE: My Lords, I shall have to consider that. I shall certainly be writing to the noble Lord as I promised, but I should wish to consider further whether the matter should be made public.
Lord HATCH of LUSBY: My Lords, may I add my congratulations to everyone concerned in the success of this conference? I am sure that the Minister and all his colleagues will agree that this is still only a first step and that we hope that we shall all be able to assist in its successful conclusion. May I ask two questions which arose out of the debate on the Bill yesterday? Can the noble Lord tell us who is actually responsible, once the cease-fire has been signed, for suppressing any incidents in which that cease-fire is broken? Will it be the Salisbury security forces' responsibility to suppress any incidents from their side and the Patriotic Front's those on their side, or is there any danger of either side being used against the other?
Secondly, as a supplement to the question asked by the noble Lord, Lord Home of the Hirsel, am I not correct in adding to the answer of the Minister that, although 16 assembly points have been agreed at present, the way has been left open, if there are more Patriotic Front guerrillas than has been estimated by the British and Salisbury Governments, for the Governor to increase the number of assembly points as those men are identified?
Lord TREFGARNE: My Lords, I can answer the second point readily. The question of additional places will arise only if the Patriotic Front forces assemble with their arms and equipment in numbers greater than can be dealt with at ail the assembly places designated in the cease-fire agreement. We do not expect that that situation will arise.
Lord HATCH of LUSBY: What about the responsibility for suppression of incidents?
Lord TREFGARNE: My Lords, we certainly do not foresee one side firing on the other. This is what I think seems to be in the noble Lord's mind. We think that the best way to contain any potential breach of the cease-fire is by self-discipline on both sides.

POLICE NEGOTIATING BOARD [H.L.]
Second Reading debate continued.
4.38 p.m.
Lord BELSTEAD: My Lords, I shall now reply to the speeches made on the Police Negotiating Board Bill. May I express my gratitude to noble Lords who have spoken on this Bill, thereby showing their interest in its importance, and particularly to the noble Lord, Lord Boston of Faversham, for reminding us of the responsible and often dangerous duties of the police. If I may say so, my noble friend Lord Inglewood was absolutely right to say that these duties require the police service to have officers of high quality; and it has been to the advantage of this debate that we have had the noble Lord, Lord Harris of Greenwich, with his experience of the police service, saying that he feels that the police service is finding these men and women to enter the service.
My noble friend Lord Inglewood asked me if I would reply to him on the question of whether this new body (to be called the Police Negotiating Board) is to be soundly based. I believe it is and for these reasons. First of all, the board is being set up as a result of recommendations of the Edmund-Davies Committee. It is fair to claim, on the evidence that we have of the Edmund-Davies recommendations, that the Committee was shrewd and indeed far-seeing with regard to the matters to do with the police service. Secondly the board is being set up as a result of consultations which are written into the Bill. These consultations have to be undertaken, and therefore when the board is set up it will be as a result of consultations with everybody connected with the police service.
At the same time—and this was a point that was put to me by the noble Lord, Lord Boston of Faversham—the

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Edmund-Davies Committee said that the committee structure was for the new board to decide. The Edmund-Davies Committee was very careful to say that it endorsed the same committee procedures which had proved that they worked under the Police Council. I have confidence in the future of this new board because it has a very able chairman in the noble Lord, Lord Plowden. I am grateful to noble Lords—not least the noble Lord, Lord Harris of Greenwich, with his knowledge of the police service—for welcoming the appointment of the noble Lord, Lord Plowden, whose services we have been most fortunate to secure.
My noble friend Lord Inglewood asked me about the composition of the board. The information that I can give my noble friend is that it is the intention that it should have 62 members: 33 on the official side and 29 on the staff side. If my noble friend thinks that this is a large body, may I remind him of what I have just said: the board will have a committee system, five committees. I think that the Police Council had five committees and the intention is that this board shall have the same number of committees. Therefore the real work of the Board will be undertaken in sensibly-sized committees.
Your Lordships have all asked me about representation of magistrates upon the board. It is the fact that the Edmund-Davies Committee recommended that the representatives of the local authority associations on the official side of the new negotiating body should reflect the composition of local police authorities by including one-third magistrate representatives. It is also the case (as your Lordships have made clear from your speeches that you realise) that there was disagreement between the local authority associations and the representative bodies over this recommendation. The recommendation has, however, now been accepted by both sides of the board. Therefore, when the board is set up on a statutory basis when this Bill becomes law, the composition of the new board will be determined as part of the arrangements made under Clause 1(3) of the Bill; and it is now agreed—may I make it quite clear to your Lordships' House—that this will accord with the recommendations on this particular subject of the Edmund-Davies Committee.
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The noble Lord, Lord Boston of Faversham, asked me about the bringing into effect of the Bill. Clause 3(2) provides that the Bill shall come into force two months after the Royal Assent, and before that time is up the consultations referred to in Clause 1(3) which refer to composition and procedure of the board must be completed. I hope that this debate has made clear that all the consultations conducted so far have reached agreement. I therefore believe that if both Houses of Parliament pass the Bill, the board will be ready to begin work on a statutory basis within two months of Royal Assent. The noble Lord also asked me about the independent secretariat—something in which the noble Lords, Lord Wigoder and Lord Boston, also expressed interest. May I make it crystal clear that the Government accept absolutely the Edmund-Davies recommendations for the independent secretariat. But the Government also took the view that this ought to be done only after consultations which are written into the Bill under Clause 1(3). That is why the secretariat is not provided in the Bill. I give the House an assurance that the Government accept that the independent secretariat is needed, and none of the police bodies concerned has commented adversely on this recommendation. The secretariat is therefore being provided for by the Office of Manpower Economics—as the noble Lord, Lord Wigoder reminded us, it is in the Explanatory Memorandum.
My noble friend Lord Inglewood asked me about the regulations in the Bill. They are subject to the Negative Resolution and therefore can be prayed against in both Houses of Parliament. My noble friend referred to the position of special constables and cadets He wondered whether they were—and, if not, why not?—provided for in the Bill. The cadets are represented by the Police Federation; that is why they are not provided for specifically in the Bill. The police advisory board working party in 1976 agreed that special constables ought not to receive payment and the question of their representation on the new Police Negotiating Board does not therefore arise. May I make it clear that I take very seriously what my noble friend says about the voluntary elements in this country and also in policing in this country. I should like to say on behalf

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of the Government that we believe that the voluntary contribution to policing is met, and should be met, through the special constabulary, which we all want to see as a vital and effective body.
May I reiterate my thanks to your Lordships for taking part in the Second Reading of what is a short Bill but none the less an important one. I hope that your Lordships will now agree to give this Bill a Second Reading.
On Question, Bill read 2a, and committed to a Committee of the Whole House.

HILL LIVESTOCK (COMPENSATORY ALLOWANCES) REGULATIONS 1979
4.47 p.m.
Earl FERRERS Earl FERRERS rose to move, That the draft regulations laid before the House on 29th November 1979 be approved. The noble Earl said: My Lords, these regulations, which apply throughout the United Kingdom, consolidate the Hill Livestock (Compensatory Allowances) Regulations 1975 and the three amending regulations and give effect to the higher rates of hill sheep and hill cow allowances which my right honourable friend announced on 22nd November.
Last July, draft regulations were laid before the House for the purpose of implementing a 50p increase, for 1979 only, in the higher rate of hill sheep compensatory allowance. When they came before the House, I said that the Government recognised that many hill farmers, and particularly sheep farmers, had experienced serious difficulties as a result of the prolonged bad weather of last winter. But we firmly believed that a judgment on the need for further increases in compensatory allowances should be deferred until we could take account of the prices which were obtained by hill farmers during this autumn's main period for the sale of store lambs and suckled calves. It is indicative of the present very serious state of the hill livestock sector and also of the correctness of our judgment in deciding to wait for the autumn sales before taking a decision that the House is being asked today to consider a
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more substantial increase in the rates of compensatory allowances than could have been foreseen in July.
Hill and upland farmers play a particularly important role in the livestock sector of our agriculture. They provide, in the United Kingdom as a whole, some 60 per cent. of the specialist beef cow herd and 20 per cent. of the total beef and dairy breeding herd, while the hill sheep account for some 57 per cent. of the total breeding flock. The role of the hills is therefore fundamental to the cycle of renewing the national breeding flock and the production of suckled calves and store lambs.
We have carried out a review of the economic conditions in the hill livestock sector in consultation with the farmers' unions which has provided clear evidence that the prolonged period of bad weather last winter led to an above average loss of animals in some areas and greatly increased feed costs, particularly for sheep. We have also had regard to the relatively depressed state of store market prices this autumn. These factors are expected to lead to a substantial fall in net farm incomes in the year 1979–80. Because of this, and bearing in mind that the hills are such an important sector of livestock farming, we have decided that there is a need for a sizeable increase in the rates of hill livestock compensatory allowances to be paid next year.
The regulations now before the House therefore provide that the rate for hill cows should be increased from £29 to £35, which is an extra £6; the higher rate for hill sheep, from £3·60 to £5·50, which is an extra £1·90; and the lower rate for hill sheep, from £2·85 to £4·25, an extra £1·40. The increase in the higher rate for sheep includes and consolidates the 50p increase announced in July. The differential between the higher and lower rates of hill sheep allowance has been maintained at the level existing since the July increase of the higher rate, which accords with the wishes of the farmers' unions. These increases, which will be paid with the allowances due at the beginning of 1980, will be worth £20·6 million.
The regulations additionally implement a change in the maximum rate of allowance payable under the Less-Favoured Areas Directive. In terms of sterling, the new

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maximum is £40·58, which represents an increase of £6·53 per hectare. The increase in the maximum amount payable per hectare will benefit a comparatively limited number of hill farmers—only those who stock their land at a rate which is somewhat greater than one livestock unit, which is the equivalent of one cow or six sheep.
The higher rates of allowances which we have proposed will increase the amount paid to hill farmers through these allowances by 37 per cent. They have been welcomed by the farmers' unions, who recognise them as a substantial demonstration of the importance that this Government attach to the hill areas and of our belief that hill and upland farmers should enjoy a reasonable standard of living. I therefore ask your Lordships to express your support for the Motion. I beg to move.
Moved, that the draft regulations laid before the House on 29th November 1979 be approved.—(Earl Ferrers.)
Lord PEART: My Lords, I am grateful to the noble Earl for having explained this very important award, if I may use that term, of £20.6 million. That is quite a considerable sum of money and I am glad that the money is to be injected in the hill and upland farm areas.
When the noble Earl talked about his Government doing this, I would support them. I only wish they had given me the support when I brought in the Pennine Rural Development Board, which I had hoped would improve the money-earning capacity of hill farmers. Unfortunately, one minister was very doctrinal and as soon as there was a Conservative Government he destroyed that system. I regret it, but I do not in any way blame the noble Earl! May I say that this instrument has gone through the necessary committee. There is no difficulty there, and I welcome it on behalf of the Opposition.
Lord MACKIE of BENSHIE: My Lords, I, too, should like to welcome the increases and to endorse what the noble Earl has said about the importance of the hill areas. They are the source from which the final production of beef, mutton and lamb reaches the consumer in this country.
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I do not wish to appear ungracious or to look a gift-horse in the mouth but, particularly with regard to cattle, the noble Earl will be aware that the value of the hill cow subsidy has depreciated enormously over the years. When the subsidy intitially came on, a hill farmer could purchase the whole of his winter feed—say a ton of hay per hill cow—with the subsidy. Now, with £36 and with the cost of transport to the hill areas, he cannot purchase half a ton of hay with the same money. While I do welcome this increase—and obviously £20 million is a lot of money—I think we perhaps might look at indexing the support for the hill cow in the same way as we index support for retired civil servants and others. Surely the hill cow needs it a great deal more than do some of the others in receipt of indexed pensions.
Baroness ELLIOT of HARWOOD: My Lords, speaking as a hill farmer and one of those who, I am glad to say, will have something coming to them out of this regulation, I should like to thank the noble Earl and the Government very much for having come forward now with an appreciable increase and with sympathy, which we all appreciate, for our plight.
It really has been the most disastrous year I can remember in 40 years of farming. While this is something which will help a great deal, I should like to point out that it will take certainly two or three years to make up for disasters that have resulted from the appalling weather and the desperate conditions. Nevertheless, this is Christmas-time and there is goodwill towards everybody ! I should particularly like to thank the Government for having now brought this out—a little later than I had hoped for, but anyway it is here—and I thank them very much indeed for their contribution.
Viscount BROOKEBOROUGH: My Lords, I should also like to welcome these regulations very much. Last week, I drew attention to the fact that the beef herds in Northern Ireland have gone down by 30 per cent. and an awful lot of beef conies to this country from Northern Ireland. There are a great many farmers in Northern Ireland who depend entirely on it.
As my noble friends have said, the past year has been disastrous as regards

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weather. With us, it has been the last 18 months, because since 12th July last year—I do not know whether or not that was a symbolic date—it has not stopped raining. Last year people fed expensive concentrates to their animals, hoping that prices would pay for them; but prices have been disastrously low and people are not prepared to do that now. I should like to ask my noble friend why, when the EEC, as I understand it, allowed a slightly higher subsidy to be paid in view of the disastrous situation that has arisen, they have not gone a bit further. I know that £20.6 million is a lot of money but to a farmer, certainly in my part of the world where hay is £2 a bale, what we have in fact got is the price of three bales.
Since I last spoke in this House there has been another review of the slaughterings of female animals, which are after all the absolute lifeblood of the herd. In the last six weeks, slaughterings of female animals are now 94 per cent, higher than they were in the same period last year. I do not know whether we have found this more disastrous in my part of the world than has been the case in other parts, because I do not know other parts of the world; but may I ask the Government very urgently to take another look at this, to receive representations from people and to see whether something cannot be done? What we are doing is not only crippling farmers as regards their expansion later but also crippling the future of our very important beef industry, together with the employment which goes with it. On these particular farms there is no alternative—you cannot go back to anything except milk and we do not want any more milk—so I feel that this is a very serious situation and I urgently ask the Government to take another look at it. At the same time, I welcome what they have produced.
Earl FERRERS: My Lords, I am very grateful to your Lordships for the welcome which has been given to this statement. The noble Lord, Lord Peart, had the advantage of being both succinct and brief. He simply said that he supported these regulations and I am grateful to him for that.
The noble Lord, Lord Mackie, tried to equate this allowance with the price of a bale of hay. I think it is always dangerous to start equating one thing with another.
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It may be that the price of hay is excessively high, but I thought he was really rather shooting off at a tangent when he suggested that we ought to index a cow instead of a civil servant. That was a fairly rash observation by any standards, and I think he might well regret having made it because the Directive sets out a maximum that is payable as well as a minimum, and we have to operate within the Directive. Even if we did not operate within it and even if there were no maximum there would still be the problem of public accountability and of persuading the Government of the day that, where public funds are concerned, it was correct to pay out more money on one item, which would inevitably mean less money on another. We think that we have got it about right—"generous" is not the right word—and we have tried to give the farmers almost the maximum, but not the total maximum, allowed within the EEC Directive.
My noble friend Lady Elliot said that, because of the disaster which they had last winter, it would take three years to get the situation right on the hills. I agree with her that it will take a long time. When disasters happen to animals and breeding stock, you do not get over them in the course of 12 months or by a form of immediate payment. All I would say to her is that we recognise the problem and hope that this payment will go some way—I put it no higher than that—towards helping hill farmers over the difficulties which they have encountered.
I take the point of my noble friend Lord Brookeborough about the situation in Northern Ireland and we will certainly be prepared to consider that problem. He asked why we did not pay more under the terms of the Directive when this allowed us to pay more. The answer to that is that one has to make a judgment as a Government as to what is the right thing to do, and, just because there is a maximum which may be paid, that does not mean to say that in the judgment of the Government it is the right amount. We consider that by these compensatory allowances we have made a fairly substantial payment. In reaching that conclusion, one has to judge the severity of the problem and to take into account, as I said earlier to the noble Lord, Lord Mackie, public accountability and the public availability of funds. At a time when, as everyone knows, the Government are under constraint in

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regard to funds, the hill farmers and those in Northern Ireland, too, have had a fair result. I hope my noble friend will agree with that, and I am grateful for the observations which your Lordships have made.
On Question, Motion agreed to.

SOCIAL SECURITY (CONTRIBUTIONS, RE-RATING) (NO. 2) ORDER 1979
5.3 p.m.
The Earl of GOWRIE: My Lords, I beg to move that the Social Security (Contributions, Re-rating) (No. 2) Order 1979, a draft of which was laid before this House on 28th November, 1979, be approved. This order has effects for both the employment protection and the social security legislation. So far as the employment protection legislation is concerned, I would start by explaining that the Redundancy and Maternity Pay Funds are both in a state of steadily growing surplus. The Redundancy Fund now stands at approximately £132 million and the Maternity Pay Fund is approaching £35 million. There are two ways of controlling the level of surplus; either by reducing income, increasing expenditure or some combination of both. It is with the first of these possibilities—namely, reducing income—that we are concerned today.
Both funds are wholly financed by an allocation from the secondary Class I earnings related contributions paid by employers in respect of employed earners. The present allocation, equivalent to a contribution rate of 0·25 per cent., is apportioned on receipt from the Department of Health and Social Security as to 0·2 per cent. and 0·05 per cent. into the Redundancy and Maternity Pay Funds respectively. The first effect of this order will be to reduce the allocation from 0·25 per cent. to 0·2 per cent. with effect from 6th April 1980. It is expected to cut the allocation income in respect of 1980–81 by £49 million and actual receipts during that period by £43 million. The difference in the two amounts is accounted for by the time lag involved in collecting social security contributions.
The Social Security Act 1975, under which this order is made, also provides
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that any change in the employment protection allocation rate must be matched by a corresponding change in the parent National Insurance rate from which it is financed; that is the secondary Class 1 contribution. The present contribution rate is 10 per cent. It is due to be increased by the Social Security (Contributions, Re-rating) Order 1979 to 10·25 per cent. on 6th April, 1980. The effect of this, the No. 2 Order, will be immediately to reduce that rate to 10·2 per cent. As far as employers are concerned, therefore, the practical effect of this order is that they will have to pay only a secondary Class 1 rate of 10·2 per cent. instead of 10·25 per cent. as from 6th April next year.
As regards the apportionment of the new allocation between the Redundancy and Maternity Pay Funds, it is proposed to apply the whole reduction to the Redundancy Fund income. As from 6th April next the allocation of 0·2 per cent. will be apportioned as to 0·15 per cent. and 0·05 per cent. between the Redundancy Pay Funds respectively. It may be that even this 25 per cent. reduction in Redundancy Fund income will not prevent the continued accumulation of surplus over a period of years. But it will certainly check the excessive growth rate which has persisted since the end of 1976.
It will do, of course, nothing to prevent the continued growth of the Maternity Pay Fund. It can be argued that the reduction should have been apportioned between the two funds, or that it is not enough. On the first point, we think it right to give priority to the fund with the greater surplus. On the second point, we have to recognise that these are public funds and reduction in income can be achieved only at the expense of the public sector borrowing requirement. The full year cost to this requirement of £49 million in respect of 1980–81 is already substantial. The alternative of a reduction by 0·1 per cent. so as to leave a reasonable tidy national insurance rate of 10·15 per cent. would have doubled the cost to the public sector borrowing requirement—and that would have been too much in present economic circumstances. I trust that I have made clear the need for this order and the effect it will have. It is an important step in the right direction and one

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which I am pleased to recommend for the approval of the House.
Moved, That the draft order laid before the House on 28th November, be approved.—(The Earl of Gowrie.)
5.8 p.m.
Lord WELLS-PESTELL: My Lords, I shall be as succinct and brief as my noble Leader was a moment or two ago. I want to thank the noble Earl, Lord Gowrie, for setting out this order so clearly and so precisely, and to say that we on this side of the House approve it. We recognise that it has been before the Joint Committee on Statutory Instruments and that in their Eleventh Report they have no comment to make on it. I also note, if have understood the position correctly, that it has been before another place without comment. Therefore, we approve the order.
The EARL of GOWRIE: My Lords, I am grateful for those words from the noble Lord speaking for the Opposition.
On Question, Motion agreed to.

PNEUMOCONIOSIS ETC. (WORKERS' COMPENSATION) (PAYMENT OF CLAIMS) REGULATIONS 1979
5.9 p.m.
The Earl of GOWRIE The Earl of GOWRIE rose to move, That the draft regulations laid before the House on 5th December 1979, be approved. The noble Earl said: My Lords, these regulations are to be made under the Pneumoconiosis etc. (Workers' Compensation) Act 1979, which was passed by the previous Parliament immediately before the dissolution in April this year, and came into force on 4th July. Regulations enabling claims to be made came into operation on the same day. The regulations which your Lordships are asked to approve tonight set out how the amounts to be paid to those who satisfy the entitlement conditions under the Act will be determined and, by means of the tables, enable the actual amounts payable in particular cases to be precisely calculated.
It had originally been hoped that these regulations might be approved before the
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Summer Recess and, when it became clear that this could not be done, that they would be laid as soon as Parliament reassembled after the summer. The preparation of the regulations has, however, proved a very much more complex task than had been envisaged. It is most unfortunate that this has inevitably delayed payments to those unlucky and, for the most part, elderly people.
The regulations take as their starting point the provisions of that part of the National Coal Board's pneumoconiosis compensation scheme, introduced in October 1974, which covered sufferers, and dependants of deceased sufferers, who had been diagnosed as suffering from pneumoconiosis prior to that date. This was foreshadowed when the Bill was introduced in April. There are, however, a number of variations from the details of the NCB scheme, and I will call attention to the most important of these.
Regulation 3, taken in conjunction with Table 1, is the key regulation, which sets out how payments to living sufferers from one of the diseases covered by the Act are to be determined. The amount of the payment is to be decided by reference to what is called the first determination that the sufferer was suffering from the disease—usually by a Pneumoconiosis Medical Board. The amount the sufferer receives will depend on his age at the time of that first determination, and the extent of his disability assessed at that time.
Those familiar with the NCB scheme will know that under that scheme, five year age bands were used whereas we have adopted single age bands. Single year bands seemed fairer to us; five year bands would have led to some people losing a great deal if their birthday fell just the wrong side of the dividing line. However, the major variation from the NCB scheme is in the actual amounts to be paid at corresponding points on the tables.
The NCB scheme was introduced in October 1974. Because of inflation, money is now worth only about half of what it was then. So it seemed right that an average payment under tile Act should be about twice what it would have been using the NCB tables. The obvious way to achieve this would have been simply to double all the NCB figures. However,

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there was a good reason for not doing this. If the amounts of the payments to be made in particular cases are to be determined by reference to the age and level of disability of a sufferer when he was first discovered to have the disease, then obviously the amounts should take into account the likelihood that the disability might become more severe as the sufferer gets older. This factor is most important in cases where, at the time of first diagnosis, the disease was not very severe—that is, where the assessment at that time was only 10 per cent. or 20 per cent.
It seemed clear, both from the Department of Health and Social Security statistics and other information, that the proportion of those first diagnosed as 10 per cent. and to a lesser extent 20 per cent. disabled, progressing to the more severe levels of disability, is considerably greater for the main groups who will benefit under the Act—slate, cotton and asbestos workers—than it is for coal miners. The most satisfactory way of reflecting this seemed to be to reduce the differential between the amounts payable for those first diagnosed at any given age at the lower levels of disability and the amounts payable for those diagnosed at the same age with higher disability levels. The amounts from the NCB tables were therefore increased for sufferers first diagnosed as 10 per cent. disabled by 50 per cent.; for sufferers first diagnosed 20 per cent. disabled by 25 per cent.; and for sufferers first diagnosed as 30 per cent. disabled by 10 per cent. All the figures in the resulting table were then increased by 60 per cent. This is estimated to produce average payments approximately the same as if there had been a straight 100 per cent. increase in the figures in the NCB tables.
Regulation 4 covers payments to the great majority of dependants of deceased sufferers. It follows very closely the pattern under the NCB scheme. If the sufferer was receiving disablement benefit for the disease, the dependant receives an amount arrived at by taking the amount which would have been payable to the sufferer if he were still alive, and then deducting from it the amount which would have been payable to him if his age when he was first diagnosed had been his age when he died. If the sufferer died as a result of the disease, an additional
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payment will be made in accordance with Table 2 of the Schedule. These amounts have been increased over the NCB equivalents in the same way as in Table 1. A dependant who is entitled to a payment but where disablement benefit was not payable to the sufferer in life will receive only the latter payment.
Regulation 5 deals with the special case of dependants of sufferers who died from diffuse mesothelioma—a cancer caused by sharp asbestos fibres piercing the wall of the pleural cavity, and medically distinct from asbestosis. These rather complicated provisions are needed, partly because this fatal disease almost always progresses within a year or two from first diagnosis to death, and partly because those who develop it may well also be sufferers from pneumoconiosis.
Regulation 6 contains special provisions covering those sufferers who were also suffering from tuberculosis when pneumoconiosis was first diagnosed. These are needed because if and when the tuberculosis becomes inactive, the assessed level of disability may actually go down—the only circumstances in which this happens.
Regulation 7 covers the minority of cases where it will be impossible to confirm from any available official records the information necessary to work out the right payment in accordance with the tables. These should be confined to a small group of dependants, unlikely to number more than a hundred altogether. The Joint Committee on Statutory Instruments has drawn special attention to these regulations on the grounds that the provision in this regulation for the Secretary of State to pay whatever amount appears in any particular case to be just and equitable in the circumstances is an unexpected use of the powers in the Act. The effect of the provisos to the regulation will however be to determine the precise amount payable in substantially all the cases concerned. We adopted the form of words which the Joint Committee has questioned because we are most anxious to avoid claimants being precluded from receiving a payment in accordance with the foregoing regulations because of some purely technical deficiency in the information available.
Regulation 8 sets a minimum amount of £725 to be paid to any dependant who is

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entitled to a payment. Table 1 sets the same minimum for sufferers, but without Regulation 8 the dependant of a sufferer who died shortly after the disease had been diagnosed, but not as a result of the disease, would otherwise receive nothing, or only a derisorily small sum.
In conclusion, may I apologise again for the complexity of these regulations. I could have wished they might be simpler, but I believe that in the circumstances these regulations are as fair as any that could have been devised, and I ask the House to give them their approval. I beg to move.
Moved, That the draft regulations laid before the House on 5th December 1979, be approved.—(The Earl of Gowrie.)
5.17 p.m.
Lord WELLS-PESTELL: My Lords, again we on this side of the House are grateful to the noble Earl for explaining, albeit in some detail, the purpose of this order. I noted that the noble Earl referred to the comments of the Joint Committee on Statutory Instruments in their Twelfth Report. However, I am not quite clear whether what the Government are doing is to the advantage or disadvantage of those who have some entitlement to an award.
As I understand the order—although I may be quite wrong about this—the amounts are fixed according to the age of the individual and the percentage arrived at in respect of disability. I am wondering whether it will be possible for that to fluctuate. If authority is given under the order to use discretion, presumably that discretion can go below or it can go above. In some respects, this seems to me, unless I have misunderstood it—and it is quite possible that I have misunderstood what the noble Earl has said—to act sometimes to the advantage of the individual and sometimes to his disadvantage. If it is possible for the noble Earl to clear up that point I shall be grateful.
I know that my noble friend Lord Hale, who has spent many years campaigning on behalf of people who are suffering from these various diseases, will, like me, be glad to see that the matter has at least
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been finalised. I am grateful to the noble Earl. We on this side of the House approve the order, but I should be grateful for any comment which the noble Earl may be able to make about what I have said.
5.20 p.m.
Lord HALE: My Lords, I think it would be appropriate if I were to say a few words now. I paused for a moment to enable the Liberal Party to avail themselves of their right to follow the noble Lord on the Front Bench; I gather that they do not intend to intervene. I am grateful to the noble Earl for the clarity of his exposition. Had I heard all he has said in the last few minutes I might have been able to give more attention in the early hours of the morning to what is happening in Western Australia. Indeed I have been spending a great many hours trying to find our precisely what the Act means. The noble Earl has explained it in a way that will commend itself to both sides of the House and which gives rise to no comment.
I raised the question of the position of asbestosis originally when we had about two-and-a-half minutes to discuss all the stages of the Bill in manuscript, on, I think, 2nd or 3rd April. There were some additional notes provided in writing. As mesothalioma undoubtedly has some connection with asbestosis it was said that asbestosis was included. I was wrong, of course, because it is already included in the Act of 1975 and is so catalogued in many of the tables recently published in relation to industrial diseases. Although I think that academically it is a little dubious, it is extremely advantageous to everybody, and therefore we are not worried about an academic point, which in any event has now been made clear.
My Lords, I have had, I suppose, nearly 60 years' experience in connection with industrial diseases in various forms, but I frankly had never heard of mesothelioma until I came into this House when these problems were being ventilated. There is provision, of course, in the Act for appeals on the lines set out in the Old Cases Act, the Social Security Act 1975. I cannot, frankly, see much possiblity of points of law arising. While paying great respect to the Select Committee on Statutory Instruments, which has

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obviously devoted some attention to this matter, I did in fact—and I am grateful to the noble Lord, Lord Wells-Pestell, for having called my attention to it—refer to their note which tells one where the evidence that they heard can be found. I went to consult that and I find that it has not been printed and is not available. I gather it is in this respect just the opinion of the Department, properly expressed, and I should not have thought, in view of the very wide powers given to the Secretary of State, that any court was likely to question any exercise of authority.
In any event, I cannot see that the Secretary of State would have much difficulty, if he does have to assess a figure, in assessing it on the basis of exact regard to one of those published in the appropriate table in the regulations. The noble Earl was good enough to answer to a Written Question—which was certainly not put down in any way to cause embarrassment but rather to satisfy the apprehensions about alleged delay, which I did not share. I thought it would be difficult to draft; it must have been very difficult to draft. I gather that over 2,000 claims have already been submitted. This is a new instrument for a very considerable and worthy purpose, the purpose of trying to make provision for those who have been deprived of compensation, mainly by the bankruptcy of employers. It also provides the possibility of the Secretary of State reconsidering cases within reasonable bounds. I am happy to be here to welcome this.
The long story of byssinosis is a bitter story, and the remedy is now coming at the time when the disease is, happily, disappearing. Any modern factory today is likely to be substantially free from byssinosis because the modern ventilating apparatus does not allow the lungs to become clogged with what is a vegetable, cotton dust and the associated muck in which the cotton frequently arrives in England. Although I doubt whether there will be a great many claims in respect of byssinosis, I do believe there are a substantial number of claims which are in difficulty in relation to mesothelioma.
I just wanted to ask the noble Earl one question: Whether, in view of the highly complex nature of the asbestos industry, in view of the fact that after a decision of the House of Lords largely in favour of
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workers about 10 years ago a factory closed down and in view of certain amalgamations, it will be easily possible for trade unions to be able to answer the vital question postulated in Section 2, the company having wholly ceased to carry on business. I should have thought that the Health and Safety Executive might be collecting a certain amount of information in relation to some of these matters which could be made available to bona fide inquirers. Subject to that, I thank the noble Earl very much for the courteous way this has been done, and for the considerate way in which the new Government has considered a measure first presented by the old one.
The Earl of GOWRIE: My Lords, I should like to thank both the noble Lord, Lord Wells-Pestell, and the noble Lord, Lord Hale, for their reception. Obviously in this sad area of industrial disability where people have worked hard and made their contribution and suffered accordingly, we are looking for the maximum continuity of policy possible. If I may give the pure point of information for which the noble Lord, Lord Hale, asked, it is in fact just under two-and-a-half thousand, 2,434, claims which have now been made under the Act, just under two thousand, 1,905, from sufferers, and 529 from dependants of deceased sufferers. I have a breakdown of information as to cotton industry, slate industry, pottery and the like which I can give to the noble Lord if he wishes.
In reference to the remarks made by the noble Lord, Lord Wells-Pestell, obviously the difficulty we have had with framing these regulations is trying to provide, within the limitations of a single payment to each individual, for a very wide variety of possible situations. Everyone's ailment has a different character and, of course, the individual conditions of those who suffer from the ailment may affect what is ultimately paid out. That is why the Secretary of State has perhaps rather peculiar and substantial powers to be just and equitable. The effect of the provisos in Regulation 7 will be that he will be enabled to determine the precise amount payable in substantially all the cases concerned. It seems to me that where there is the possibility of such individual variation, we must give some discretion to the Secretary of State; the

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object being to ensure that where certain information cannot be totally confirmed, but as to which there is no real doubt in common sense about the patient's case, the Secretary of State will not be precluded from making the payment in accordance with the tables; and that seems to us to be clearly right.
As in all questions where rather detailed payments are having to be tailored to individual cases, there are, as I have said, complexities involved. I should like to look at the points in detail made by the noble Lord, Lord Wells-Pestell, and the noble Lord, Lord Hale, in particular—who spoke at some length—and perhaps take them up with officials and see whether any modifications are necessary in the light of those remarks.
Lord WELLS-PESTELL: My Lords, I am obliged.
On Question, Motion agreed to.

HOSIERY AND KNITWEAR INDUSTRY (SCIENTIFIC RESEARCH LEVY) (AMENDMENT) ORDER 1979
5.33 p.m.
Viscount LONG: My Lords, I beg to move that the draft Hosiery and Knitwear Industry (Scientific Research Levy) (Amendment) Order 1979, which was laid before this House on 20th November, be approved. This order, if approved by Parliament, will be made under the authority of Section 9 of the Industrial Organisation and Development Act 1947. This short order makes provision for the amendment of Statutory Instrument 1969/882—the Hosiery and Knitwear Industry (Scientific Research Levy) Order 1969—so that the scientific research levies shall cease to be payable in the hosiery and knitwear industry after the levy period ending on 30th June 1982. It also provides that, from 1st January 1980, the level of exemption from liability to pay the levy will be increased from a chargeable turnover of £5,000 to £250,000 per levy period.
Your Lordships will remember that it was necessary to withdraw this draft order laid before the House on 23rd October so that the levy exemption limit could be amended to £250,000 per levy period—that is, £500,000 per annum. This was as a
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result of a misunderstanding between the Hosiery and Allied Trades Research Association and the Department when calculating the likely effect of the exemption level on HATRA's income. The Department's calculations were based on raising the limit from £5,000 to £500,000 turnover per levy period—that is, six months—whereas HATRA, and others, assumed £500,000 per annum. When it transpired that there had been a genuine misunderstanding my right honourable friend accepted that HATRA should not be obliged to live with a sudden loss of levy income of at least twice the level which the association, after careful consideration, had considered it could accommodate. My right honourable friend was reinforced in this view when further contact with the two trade associations primarily concerned revealed that the industry too had assumed that the agreement had been to exclude firms with a chargeable turnover of up to £500,000 per year, and not per levy period.
The new exemption limit of £250,000 per levy period—Article 2(b) of the draft order—properly reflects the understanding reached between HATRA and the industry and the Department and involves a loss of income tolerable to HATRA.
I think it would be helpful to the House if I explained, at this point, some of the background to the statutory levy. In the late 1960s the Hosiery and Allied Trades Research Association, known as HATRA, which was formed to carry out research on behalf of the United Kingdom hosiery and knitwear industry, requested the imposition of a levy, under the 1947 Act, so as to spread the cost of research, which benefited the industry as a whole through a gradual improvement in knitting techniques, on as equitable a basis as possible to all firms within the industry; and in so doing to augment its income to the extent necessary to carry out research on a scale suited to the needs of a highly competitive expanding industry, with considerable export potential. After consultations, the then Minister agreed the request and the order, which we are now seeking to amend, came into operation on 1st July 1969 to provide funds for HATRA which had been carrying out collective research for the industry since 1949. The proceeds of the levy are paid over gross to the research association.
The present proposal to discontinue the statutory levy stems from various criticisms

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made within the industry. In particular, some firms, many of them small, producing relatively low volume of high value knitwear—for example, cashmere and other fine animal hair knitwear—considered that they were bearing a disproportionate part of the cost of funding HATRA. It has also been argued that the present method of funding HATRA does not sufficiently encourage it to utilise its resources in the ways which the majority of the industry would like to see. Indeed, it has often been said that the research carried out by the research association is not directly applicable to many companies, particularly the many smaller firms who by their nature cannot benefit from, for example, developments in large-scale production techniques.
Having said that, I hasten to pay tribute to the much valued work which HATRA has, over the years, carried out to the benefit of the whole industry. Indeed, I should make it clear at this point that, having conducted full consultations with the industry, as required by the 1947 Act, it is the view of the industry as a whole that a research organisation with the standing and capability of HATRA will continue to be needed. However, a clear majority of the firms within the industry indicated in response to the department's inquiry that they considered that the present statutory system of funding HATRA was unsatisfactory and should be discontinued.
I am convinced that it would be quite wrong simply to discontinue the levy overnight. A period of adjustment to whatever new system of funding the industry and HATRA decide to introduce is obviously needed, and that is why my right honourable friend the Secretary of State for Industry has proposed to phase out the levy over a period of some two and a half years. The proposal does, however, contain a provision to assist at once the smaller firms in the industry by raising, with effect from 1st January 1980, the exemption level below which firms do not have to pay levy, from £5,000 to £250,000 chargeable turnover per levy period. In addition, I understand that it is the intention that smaller firms, thus exempted from levy payments, will still have access to the services and research results of HATRA, and that the association will undertake specific projects for those firms who are prepared to pay for them.
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At present the levy yields about £250,000 per year which represents about 50 per cent. of HATRA's total income. The remainder of its income comes from contributions to approved Textile Research Council Contracts from the Department of Industry, subscriptions, rent, royalties and the like. It is estimated that under the proposal which we are now considering HATRA's income from the levy will be reduced by approximately £20,000 in a full year. I should say that it is difficult to quantify precisely the effects that raising the exemption level would have on income since, as I mentioned earlier, the levy—0.033 per cent.—is calculated on turnover which, noble Lords will appreciate will, vary.
The industry will have between now and the end of June 1982, to decide what system of contribution should replace the statutory levy. Discussions with the industry have suggested that in future a much higher proportion of HATRA's income than hitherto would be related to the provision of specific services for the individual firms or groups of firms. It is not the intention that research for the industry carried out by HATRA should cease to exist, but rather that HATRA should become more commercially orientated and responsive to the needs of the industry which it serves. I believe that the alteration proposed from a statutory levy to voluntary support, combined with charges for specific services, will be the most effective way of bringing about this change in direction. I beg to move.
Moved, That the draft order laid before the House on 20th November be approved.—(Viscount Long.)
5.41 p.m.
Lord WALLACE of COSLANY: My Lords, first I should like to thank the noble Viscount, Lord Long, for the very detailed and lengthy explanation that he has given. May I also express gratification that the dropped stitches have been picked up and that at last we are able to deal with this order, only just in the nick of time, because I understand that the Recess starts on Thursday. Generally speaking, from the information that I have already gleaned from the noble Viscount, we have no objection to this order. I should like to ask him how the order originated. Did the initiative come

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from the industry? Furthermore, what organisations were consulted and, indeed, was the decision unanimous by both management and unions? Apart from that, it is obvious that there is no real objection to the order. Therefore, I wish it godspeed.
The Earl of SHANNON: My Lords, I, too, should like to thank the noble Viscount for explaining in such detail this order which is now in the correct amended form, as was agreed with the Hosiery and Allied Trades Research Association and the industry concerned. At this point I must declare my usual interest in matters of industrial research. I fully appreciate that the attitude of Her Majesty's Government is that they do not wish to continue indefinitely with compulsory payments by industry. Nobody likes paying statutory levies, even if they are for one's own benefit. However, I must ask Her Majesty's Government to bear in mind the vital necessity—and it really is a vital necessity—for British industry to keep very fully abreast of the modern technology available. It will be our only means of maintaining our industrial economy in the face of competition from developing nations, especially in the low labour-cost areas. The textile industry has produced some classic examples of where we have not kept abreast of the latest technology and of where, as a result, we have lost out.
The noble Viscount gave some figures of the percentage that was being spent on research. How pitifully low! Let us hope that when this statutory levy finally comes to an end, the industry will realise that it cannot possibly continue to meet world competition if that is the only sum of money which it and many other industries in this country are prepared to spend on the only means of keeping themselves abreast of modern technology and in the race at all. I hope that this observation will not be lost on Her Majesty's Government; that they will do everything they can to encourage industry, both large and small, to adopt new technology; and that they will also do everything they can to ensure the continued viability of all organisations which have a long record of transferring new technology to industry, with the all too obvious beneficial results to the nation and to our economy.
Lord WIGG: My Lords, before the Minister replies perhaps he would be good enough to answer one question. As I understand it, the Government object in principle to levies being imposed by statute, and the Government's attitude in relation to the order which is now before the House is conditioned by the fact that they object in principle but will allow two-and-a-half years to elapse. I am not interested in the two-and-a-half years, but I am interested in the Government's attitude to the principle of levies raised by statute.
Viscount LONG: My Lords, I am grateful to the noble Lord, Lord Wallace of Coslany, the noble Earl, Lord Shannon, and the noble Lord, Lord Wigg, for taking part in the debate on this very important order. Yes, we did manage to gather up the stitches. I have already said that we had to withdraw the order because it was not quite right. The noble Lord, Lord Wallace, asked me one or two questions, in particular where the views and ideas originated. The industry as a whole was informed about the changes. The order stems from a request made to the department by the Scottish Knitwear Council in mid-1977 for the revocation of the 1969 order owing to the high cost of their knitwear. They felt that they needed that revocation, As I understand it, in Scotland there are many more smaller firms than there are in England.
In October 1978 a referendum was held in which 61 per cent. of the firms on the department's levy list voted in favour of the abolition of a statutory levy—I think that this is the point raised by the noble Lord, Lord Wigg; 24 per cent. voted against, and 15 per cent. either held no view or did not reply. Therefore, it was not the Government which pushed this ahead; it was a referendum which produced the results.
Lord WIGG: My Lords, I take the point that the Minister is making, but I am not interested in the results of the referendum. I want to know what is the Government's attitude towards levies raised by statute.
Viscount LONG: My Lords, the Government are now very happy to allow the industry to adopt this voluntary method of raising the levy. That is what

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the industry wanted and the Government are in full agreement with them. I know that two-and-a-half years is a long time, but I think that the industry probably want to do it in a shorter period.
Lord WIGG: My Lords, I do not want to involve the Minister in an interrogation, but I wish that he would answer the point. The point is this. The industry wants to do something. Obviously the Government, who are sensible people, will want to go along with the industry. I want to know what is the Government's attitude towards levies raised by statute. Are the Government impartial or do they hold the view—which, after all, is in accordance with their general philosophy—of being opposed to levies imposed by statute and thus will sooner or later lift them?
Viscount LONG: My Lords, the Government are eventually looking towards lifting them.
Lord WIGG: My Lords, so the Government are opposed in principle?
Viscount LONG: My Lords, in his remarks the noble Earl, Lord Shannon, referred to the vital matter of money for research. Not only do I agree with him, but it is important that the whole of industry—not only knitwear and hosiery—receive money for research. It is vitally important at this stage because of the vast competition which this country faces with the rest of the world. I think that I have answered most of the questions.
On Question, Motion agreed to.

NUCLEAR DETERRENT: REPLACEMENT POLICY
5.50 p.m.
The Earl of KIMBERLEY The Earl of KIMBERLEY rose to ask Her Majesty's Government what plans they have to replace Britain's existing nuclear deterrent. The noble Earl said: My Lords, I raised this Question in May 1978 and I make no apologies for raising it again tonight. Last May—18 months ago—there were five or six speakers; tonight we have 12, and it is a very distinguished list because we have two noble and gallant Lords; the only one missing is a Marshal of the Royal Air
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Force. In the last 18 months the situation has, if anyting, deteriorated because of the increased strength of the Soviets in both numbers and technology. If we are going to have our nuclear deterrent in the 1990s we do not have many months left to decide what it is to be.
Let us look into a crystal ball at a few possible situations which may happen in the 1990s. NATO may not exist, or it may exist in a much changed state. It is not even impossible that we may have some form of federal European defence. On the other hand, the United States might have an isolationist policy in ten years' time. They have had one before. One thing is certain, and that is that France will still have its own nuclear deterrent. Maybe there is an opportunity to think about doing some collusion and having some entente cordiale with France over this if we cannot afford our own. I just put that out as a thought.
We have to be prepared for the worst possible situation, and I do not want us to be impotent either strategically or politically at any future summit meetings. Therefore, we must be in a position of strength whereby we can establish ourselves not only as the leader, perhaps, of defence in Europe but simultaneously as a voice which is heard and paid attention to; a voice which is now, and will be, capable of exerting both influence and power in international affairs.
I am given to understand that my noble friend Lord Strathcona will probably stick very closely to his brief tonight. But it is a comforting thought that one of the many subjects my right honourable friend the Prime Minister is discussing with President Carter is this very subject. She is a brilliant negotiator, and so I hope that perhaps my small feelings of optimism will not be unjustified. I am not an expert able to decide which form our nuclear deterrent, if we have it, should take—whether it be Cruise missiles, or Tridents, or a mixture of both—although personally I would prefer the Trident, which I believe my noble and gallant friend Lord Hill-Norton favours.
I am sure that the noble Lords, Lord Ritchie-Calder and Lord Noel-Baker, will attack me rather in the same way that they did 18 months ago. I most certainly respect their views, but they are

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views that fill me with great alarm because I think they are completely wrong. We all know the horror of the Bomb, and that is why it is a deterrent and why we have had peace for 30-odd years. Eight days ago "Panorama" did a programme on this subject which I watched with great interest. I believe that the noble and gallant Lord, Lord Carver, was taken somewhat out of context in it, but I am not going to speak for him tonight. I watched this programme with great interest. I thought it was biased and, in some parts, quite despicable, particularly the interview with the unfortunate Commander of "HMS Resolution". I believe that my noble friend Lord Orr-Ewing is going into this in greater detail later.
May I try to make myself perfectly clear: just because I maintain that we should have our independent nuclear deterrent in no way means that we should not also have comprehensive and strong conventional defence forces. I agree that all this costs money, but somehow we have to find the money, even if we have to tighten our belts. Even President Carter said the other day that he was going to increase his defence expenditure by 5 per cent.
To digress slightly, I can only approve wholeheartedly of the NATO decision to supplement our present defences with ground launched Cruise missiles and Pershings, because I personally do not put a great amount of faith in Mr. Brezhnev's propaganda in withdrawing tanks and troops. The balance in favour of the Warsaw Pact countries is still far too heavy. When he has removed his 1,000 tanks it will still leave him with 15,000, and NATO will have 6,500. The SS 20s and the Backfire bombers are what are needed to go. Let nobody be deluded, as some of the Dutch seem to have been, by the Soviets' pernicious and insidious propoganda. Let the Russians put their money where their mouth is. Let them start removing these implements of war which are not covered by the SALT 2 agreement.
Contrary to the belief that some noble Lords have about me, I assure them that I am not a warmonger. But I remember as a young man and as a young solider during the war what nearly happened to
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us in the 1930s. I do not want it to happen again. By all means let us have mutual and balanced force reductions, but in this instance "mutual" must be the operative word. Do not let us forget that SALT 2 does not cover the SS 20 and the Backfire. We in the West have the two most cherished possessions that the human race can have. We have freedom of thought and freedom of speech. They are sacred possessions, but they are not idly given to us. The powers of evil would dearly like to take them from us, and we shall keep them only by fighting unremittingly for them.
I appeal to my noble friend Lord Strathcona, when he answers tonight, to give our freedom-loving people the knowledge that the security of our country is uppermost in Her Majesty's Government's mind. I should dearly love to see a world free of military and police forces, but with our so-called civilisation of today that is not possible. Until such time as it one day becomes a reality, let us remain strong and retain our own independent nuclear deterrent.
5.58 p.m.
Lord GLADWYN: My Lords, it is good that the noble Earl, Lord Kimberley, should have succeeded in arranging for us to discuss what I believe to be the all important and even overriding question of our strategic nuclear deterrent, and that we should be concentrating this evening on that issue alone. Usually it gets mixed up with such things as pensions, the Territorial Army, the Highland Regiments, armoured personnel carriers, or even the uniform for the Brigade of Guards, in a debate on a general defence review, which is unsatisfactory. The real debate on nuclear weapons—of course outside closed Government circles—is conducted not here but in learned journals, in specialised groups and institutes, and even occasionally in the quality Press. The general public regard it as a sort of impenetrable mystery, unless of course they are pacifists in which case they are just against all nuclear weapons on ideological grounds.
The Liberal Party has for some time conducted its own inquiry with the advice of reasonably qualified persons, and has reached a conclusion from which I believe it will only be dislodged with difficulty. In its view the existing Polaris

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force, which may be supposed with luck to be to some extent effective until the early 1990s, should not be replaced, and the money which the Government seem bent on spending in order to replace it by Tridents—apparently about £6 billion, but in all probability much more—should be devoted for the most—
Lord WIGG: £6,000 million.
Lord GLADWYN: I said £6 billion, and in all probability much more—should be devoted for the most part to the improvement of our so-called conventional forces; that is to say, new tanks, new antitank and anti-aircraft weapons, adequate reserves of munitions, which is most important, new aircraft, new patrol vessels and new hunter killer submarines. The reasons for this conclusion—which must, given the time limits imposed on our debate tonight, be severely compressed—I will now give.
The existence of a British force of four submarines with nuclear weapons capable of reaching the Soviet Union, only one of which I believe is normally on duty at any one time, can in no way by itself deter the Russians from attacking the West if they are ever disposed to do so, for any threat to use it, unless the Russians halted their offensive would clearly be ignored, seeing that, if it were carred out, it would inflict only limited damage on the Soviet Union whereas the United Kingdom would cease to exist as a nation by reason of Soviet nuclear retaliation. The bluff, in other words, would be called.
The force can therefore deter the Russians only from themselves proceeding to bomb the United Kingdom directly, or to threaten to do so, on a first strike. But it is most unlikely that as things are the Russians in the event of war would do any such thing, preferring, after advancing to the Rhine, unless held up by "tactical nukes", to rely on a conventional sea and air blockade in order to bring NATO, or at least its European members, to the conference table. The existence of our strategic force might indeed deprive the Soviet Union of the possibility of then, in those circumstances, forcing the United Kingdom to surrender by the threat of nuclear action. It might deprive the Soviet Union of the opportunity of doing that, always supposing of course that
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surrender was not achieved by conventional means. But as I have said, conventional means would, always given the Soviet occupation of much of Western Europe, be only too likely to be effective.
It is true that in the terrible event of general nuclear war involving the two super-Powers, the British Polaris might be launched against the Soviet Union, but in that event they would add very little to the devastation presumably already created by the Americans which would no doubt also by that time have been extended to the United Kingdom. We can therefore conclude, I believe, that in practice the existing British nuclear deterrent is to a large extent merely a monument to Britain's departed imperial glory and great power status which includes a desire not to be thought inferior to the French who, whatever they may say, are in precisely the same boat as we are.
It might be added that, although the present Polaris force becomes obsolete, as I understand it, in the early 1990s—wear and tear, increasing noise and so on—it may well in practice become obsolete well before then, as might indeed any replacement, owing to some perfection of anti-submarine devices by the Russians who may eventually be able effectively to tail any British Polaris submarine as it emerges from the Holy Loch or even to interfere with its communications. Nor is there any reason to suppose that the replacement of the present Polaris force by Tridents would alter this situation very materially. Certainly a Trident force, more especially if it consisted of, say, five submarines, could do much more damage to the Soviet Union than our existing Polaris, but if it ever got as far as doing that we for our part would cease to exist. Knowing that we should know this, the Russians could still disregard any threat of the use of Tridents on a first strike.
The deterrent effect of its possible use on a second strike—always presuming it is not somehow taken out or immobilised by Soviet submarines before it could be operated—would admittedly be greater, but not significantly so in the general nuclear context if the Russians were to be in any way successful in advancing to the Rhine and thereafter organising a sea and air blockade of these islands. To spend £6 billion and, no doubt in the

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end, £10 billion in replacing the Polaris by Tridents would seem to me, for all these reasons, to be indefensible.
It would be far preferable to devote this large sum, or any portion of it, to increasing our conventional means of defence, preferably in common with our European allies, this in itself going a long way towards raising the famous nuclear threshold. And it would be all the more undesirable if, as no doubt we shall, we agree to the stationing of a certain number of mobile cruise missile launchers in this country as part of a NATO move to neutralise the Soviet SS20 missiles, if not, unfortunately I suppose, their Backfire bombers.
I know-because the noble Lord, Lord Strathcona and Mount Royal, explained this to us the other day—that under the present proposals the cruise missiles to be stationed in this country will be under the exclusive control of the United States. This, though it obviously increases the risk for us, is reasonable enough—though I believe it will not be regarded as reasonable by a good many people—seeing that, unless we do accept this additional risk, the Germans will no doubt not agree to the whole scheme coming into operation. We must assume, however—and this is something I would ask the Government in their reply to confirm or deny—that SACEUR would authorise the use of cruise missiles based in this country against the Soviet Union only in the event of the Soviet Union's making first use of its SS20s against targets in the NATO area. In other words, the use of tactical nukes by one side or the other in what is called the theatre of war would not in itself necessarily involve the operation from this country of what in effect would be strategic nuclear weapons. That is something on which I should like a reply.
The argument that ground-based missiles in this country would be sitting targets for a Soviet nuclear attack, though it must be taken seriously, is at least questionable. Theoretically it might, I suppose, be possible for the Soviet Union, entirely out of the blue and at one fell swoop, to take out all nuclear cruise missile launchers in Western Europe with its SS20 missiles. But that is surely
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quite improbable. How could the Russians be certain that at least some launchers would not already have been displaced, which could be done at very short notice? How could they be certain that there would not, in such circumstances, be some comeback? How could they be assured that the Americans would not make some riposte of some kind?
There remains the argument that the Russians might well after a few years be able to install an effective anti-cruise missile defence system. In the long run there is, I imagine, always a defence against anything. But a missile flying beneath radar screens in bad or foggy weather would, on the face of it, require a good deal of detection, and even if it was eventually shot down by a fighter it would presumably go off and kill many people somewhere on enemy territory, including the pilot of the aircraft, one would suppose.
Yet if all this is so, what exactly would be the deterrent role of any continuing exclusively British submarine-based nuclear force? Always supposing that in the last resort it would be the Americans and not ourselves who on some second strike would bombard the Russians from British bases, in what imaginable circumstances could we do the same on our own? Only, I suppose—this point was touched on by my noble friend Lord Kimberley—if the Americans had gone back to America and taken all their nuclear weapons with them. But in such distressing circumstances Western Europe would be indefensible. The Germans would have no option but to become neutral and do a deal with the Russians, and Western Europe, deprived of United States support, would then be at the mercy of a Soviet conventional blockade which neither we nor the French would be able to counter by the suicidal threat of nuclear action on a first strike. If this is not a logical deduction, then the noble Lord who is to reply for the Government will certainly tell me why.
Our conclusion, therefore, is that while there has up till now been at least some logical grounds for maintaining a so-called independent British strategic nuclear force, there is—always assuming that NATO is to continue in being and that strategic nuclear missiles of a "European" nature are going to be placed in these islands

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under the sole control of the Americans—no such impelling reason for renewing it at such vast expense. Moreover, if we decide not to do so, the chances of success in the SALT 3 talks are, I suppose, likely to be somewhat increased, while our abandonment of a bogus "Great Power" role, together with a great increase in our conventional strength, would surely result in our being a much more influential member of the North Atlantic Council. If the French want to persist with a policy of grandeur, that will be up to them, but there is no reason why it should hurt us very much if they do.
In taking this line I am well aware that there are some in my own party who will not share it, either because they are pacifist in inclination (and their views are to be respected) and thus against the possession by this country, or the stationing in it, of any nuclear weapons, or because they may still believe, as I think some do, that an independent British strategic nuclear force may have some validity, even if it is very small.
I suspect, however—perhaps the noble Lord, Lord Peart, will tell us—that the Labour Party is much more divided on this great issue than we are, and I even wonder whether all members of the Tory Party are convinced, for the reasons that I have been trying to develop, that we should be well advised to go in for replacing the Polaris by the Tridents in the years to come.
My Lords, I have not touched upon the possibility of replacing Polaris by submarine or air-launched cruise missiles—referred to by the noble Earl, Lord Kimberley—both of which are reasonable alternatives, if you accept the need for replacing our present strategic deterrent at all. It is even arguable that we might at small expense buy some of the Cruise missiles, if we wished from the Americans and place them, I suppose, in suitably camouflaged small surface ships which could then, in theory at least, provide us inexpensively with a small, "independent" stategic nuclear capability. But if the main body of Cruise missiles are in any case to he installed on land in the United Kingdom under United States command, what could be the point of that?
No, in all the circumstances, and certainly not for any sentimental reasons,
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but only those dictated by what I believe is commonsense, I conclude, my Lords, that we should be well advised not to take any steps towards replacing our present strategic nuclear deterrent.
6.12 p.m.
Lord RITCHIE-CALDER: My Lords, I take off exactly from where the noble Lord, Lord Gladwyn, left off. I adjure our friends—I hope that they are our friends—at least I adjure the Government to take this opportunity to get rid of something which is now becoming completely meaningless by any analysis, not just by sentiment. In this season of the year, if one goes around the toy shops one will be struck by the fact that all the toys now being produced for intelligent children are board games—Monopoly to train little capitalists, or war games to train militarists. But at least they are fun games. We are talking tonight about something that is not funny and is not a game, but you can do exactly what the children do: you can deploy, redeploy, you can toss dice, do this and that.
For 30 years now it has to me been competely meaningless that Britain should have an independent deterrent. It has no role. If, in wisdom, my own party in Government all those years ago had not decided to have the bomb at all, I should have been satisfied. In the 1950s it was manifestly plain that by no stretch of the imagination could Britain afford a meaningful deterrent. All we could do was what the French are doing—and I agree with the noble Lord, Lord Gladwyn: they have follie de grandeur; leave them with it. It was not evident then, as it is now, that in the grand strategy—I call it grand nonsense, by and large—of the whole nuclear game, we are going to be a minute part of a system in which all we are doing, by being that minute part, is attracting possible destruction.
But, apart from that, there is, I suggest, the humiliation of being the trigger-man in a situation in which, as in the case of the Cruise missile, we are not even the masters of the missile but are being asked to take the penalties, and, as in the case of involvement with a Polaris fleet in NATO, we ourselves have no ultimate initiative. What are we? We are the "hoods", hired by someone else, like the Hessians, in some sort of military situation in which

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we are acting as the instruments—and not only acting as the instruments but paying for the weapons which we are going to use. To me this is total nonsense. As the noble Earl, Lord Kimberley, has pointed out, I am basically a pacifist. I make no apology for that. It is a very sincerely held view. But, apart from that, I am also rather adept at looking at the facts both of the nuclear content and indeed of the numbers game that we are all playing.
We are playing a numbers game. Let me put it to your Lordships quite simply. If we have our so-called independent deterrent, if we move into a situation in which we are hiring American technique (as we are doing with the pressurised water reactor), we are in fact putting ourselves rather in the situation we are in at the moment, when I gather that the Prime Minister is not only negotiating for the new nuclear deterrent but is actually negotiating for ammunition for the Royal Ulster Constabulary. As I say, the Americans can withhold it. Let me be quite clear. We should be, we must be, aware that if we replace the Polaris by a Trident force, it would cost anything from £6,000 million to £10,000 million.
Lord ORR-EWING: £5,000 million.
Lord RITCHIE-CALDER: No, that has been recalculated. Inflation has taken place since last Sunday when that was published in the paper. We are talking of those orders of magnitude. Your Lordships realise that in that picture the component for which we are paying—four Polarises, possibly five Tridents—would mean that in terms of potential we should be about ·01 per cent. of the Russian retaliation potential. Work it out, my Lords. You can do the numbers game; we all play it. It means, however you act, that you are putting up a little Roman candle in a sort of ultimate defiance, and it will not be noticed anyway because by that time the world will have moved to its ultimate destruction.
We are doing this with the most incredible short-sightedness. It is not just a question of what it is costing. First, let us be quite clear. There is nothing in the moves that we are making, nothing in the defiance by the French or in this symbolic defiance by the British which will ulti-
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mately impress the Russians, or indeed our American allies. I suggest that we are now in a position to look again at this colossal waste. This is not a cowardly position that I am taking. This policy is ultimately invoking the take-out—and it will be the take-out. If there is to be a first strike, the first strike will take out that minute fleet. As we pointed out, they will be trailed anywhere by the Soviet, or whoever is our potential enemy, both by ground and by satellite devices. We shall be taken out, and at that moment the British Islands will be taken out, too.
The second matter I would come to is the question of the Cruise missiles. I think this policy is folly. We have tried to say this in this House before, and we have discussed it before. I think it is folly, exaggerated by the fact that we have no say in it; that we are just the "hoods", we are just the "trigger men". It means that we have provided targets for all that assemblage of potential destruction which we are always hearing about and which could be released by the Soviet Union, presumably, in some mad moment of first strike, plunging the world into a nuclear war and then inviting reprisals. The only thing I have to say to your Lordships is that at that moment Britain neither will have the potential to reply nor will it exist to reply. Therefore, if we are going to play the numbers game, let us look at it clearly and sensibly, at least to this extent: by realising that in eventually misdirecting this vast amount of money from all these other things, as our Government keep telling us we must do, we shall not only be worse off but shall actually be extending an invitation to total destruction.
6.21 p.m.
Lord HILL-NORTON: My Lords, it is obviously impossible in a discussion on an Unstarred Question to deal adequately with such a huge subject as that opened up by the Question so ably put by the noble Earl, Lord Kimberley, and I hope your Lordships will agree that a subject of such overriding national importance deserves at least a Short Debate early in the New Year. I hope, further, that when this occurs this particular issue will not be confused with the problem of long-range theatre nuclear forces, which is of a quite different nature. The barest bones of the subject we are discussing today are starkly simple, it

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seems to me; but so much misinformation about strategic nuclear weapons appears regularly in the Press and on television from alleged experts that it is as well to be clear what are the real issues that the Government are now facing, and what options are available to them.
In essence, the heart of the problem is whether we are to continue to be a strategic nuclear power or whether we are to get out of the business which all our Governments have supported for the last 15 years. Put another way, we are not deciding whether to go strategic nuclear, but whether to remain so. The noble Earl's Question does not precisely differentiate between strategic nuclear deterrents and other nuclear weapons which may be deployed as a deterrent themselves, either within the European theatre or on the battlefield, but I take it from what he has said that he inquires about the strategic weapons. Surely, my Lords, there can be no reasonable doubt (with respect to the noble Lords, Lord Gladwyn and Lord Ritchie-Calder, with whom I warmly disagree in this particular matter, both in general and in particular) that what has been, since its inception, a vital cornerstone of our defence policy must be maintained for as long ahead as anyone can foresee. I personally have no such doubts.
It is clearly necessary to review the ways of maintaining it, having regard, above all, to the overriding need for it to be convincing and for it to be capable of deterring attacks on our own vital interests, on the one hand, and of making an important contribution to the Western strategic nuclear forces, on the other. There is not time today, nor is your Lordships' House the place, to rehearse all the advantages and disadvantages of possible solutions, running, as they do, the gamut of technological, economic, industrial and practical options. May I simply state, as the noble Earl, Lord Kimberley, has suggested, that I have no personal doubt that a submarine-borne ballistic missile solution has no serious rival for this role on any of these grounds, although it would be wise not to repeat the cheeseparing which led to our Polaris fleet comprising only four submarines. Five are necessary, my Lords, on both political and military grounds. It is quite irrelevant what proportion four or five, or any other small number, is of the
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Russian force if we are talking about deterrence. We are not talking about a nuclear exchange.
From a technical and industrial point of view, and very likely from an economic and political point of view, too, there can be no doubt that collaboration with the United States over a new missile—but not over the warhead, nor the submarine—on the lines of the Nassau and Polaris sales agreements of 16 years ago must be the course most likely to meet the aim. I have read in the Press—indeed, the noble Earl, Lord Kimberley, has just said—that the Prime Minister may have discussed these matters in Washington this week, and if this is so I, for one, hope that she was successful. It has been said, and it has been closely argued, that there is no need to decide to replace the Polaris force for a long time yet. I hope the noble Lord the Minister shares my view that this is simply not true.
It has also been said that we cannot afford to spend the very large sums involved. According to the best unclassified sources, we are talking about £400 million a year over a ten-year period. But history has shown that our country always has spent what has had to be spent on its defence, and I devoutly hope that this is not going to become the exception to that rule. It is perhaps 4 or 5 per cent. of the present annual defence budget; and, to put that in some perspective for your Lordships, it is quite likely that the total expenditure just for the Tornado aircraft for the Royal Air Force will actually be more. It has been argued, too, my Lords—and the noble Lord, Lord Gladwyn, has just argued it again—that such money would be better spent on conventional weapons systems, but this does not seem to me, at least, to be an option now before the Government, if the arguments for maintaining our strategic nuclear deterrent force intact are as compelling as I believe them to be. I would warmly agree that the maintenance of this ultimate sanction should not be at the expense of our conventional arms, for I believe them to be inadequate now. May I repeat, my Lords, that if some new money has to be found, so be it. It is the height of folly to let your life assurance policy lapse and to spend the money saved on a shiny new motor car which you may never live to drive.

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I have said nothing about the very involved and subjective arguments about deterrence and how best it may be achieved; nor have I touched upon the great importance of another strategic nuclear deterrent centre; nor the host of interlocking situations, such as time-pressure for a decision, whether we want the French to be the only nuclear power in Europe and whether our allies do, which have led me to my own conclusions. Should your Lordships wish, as I hope, to return to this nuclear scene, and perhaps to discuss the quite different long-range theatre nuclear force problems, about which the Government have happily already taken the right decision, it may be more appropriate to say something on those occasions.
6.30 p.m.
The Earl of CORK and ORRERY: My Lords, it is a fearsome matter to have to follow a Chief of the Defence Staff on his own subject. It becomes positively nerve-racking when one knows that another is to follow immediately afterwards. It would be agreeable to the nerves to be able to agree with both; but I suspect that it may turn out that they do not agree with each other. Therefore, I find myself compelled to disagree with one or the other. A certain boldness is needed to take this course and, luckily, I am feeling slightly bold, I believe, this evening.
Familiarity with one's surroundings has the effect of blunting the perceptions so that after a time we no longer see them as they really are. If year by year, one lives in one's own household surrounded by one's own people and their belongings, gradually its components and its members will begin to appear not at all as they really are or as they seem to an outsider or an infrequent visitor. Everything is so familiar and so precisely to our own liking that it may come as a shock to learn that anybody might be upset by the wallpaper or by the oleograph of Great-Uncle Fred. One may be offended, incredulous even, to learn that, despite our own impeccable good taste and ready wit, there are some who find our surroundings tasteless and depressing and us a bore.
As in the home, so it may be in the wider world, in the world of NATO, for example.
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Is it possible that we have lived in it so long and grown so used to it that we no longer see the realities of it as they truly are? It is possible that our vision has become clouded? I am sure this is possible and think it has actually occurred. If it has, we are living in a deceptive world, and, possibly, a make-believe world, and I hope that nobody imagines that that can be safe. We might test the matter by stepping through the Iron Curtain and turning to see what meets our gaze as we look back from the point of view of the Russians.
Let us now forget the analogy, my Lords. It has, I hope, enabled me to make the point that, if we wish to forestall or prevent any kind of nuclear adventure from the Russian side in our direction, we must make an appreciation from the Russian point of view. This is not an original notion but it is one that is all too often forgotten or overlooked. It might be easier to do it if we could get rid of one or two illogical attitudes, and irrelevant arguments. I rate highly among irrelevant arguments the frequently expressed belief that the Russians do not want war—the conclusion being that if they do not want war it is much less likely to happen. Of course, they do not want war. Hitler did not want it and I dare say Ghengis Khan did not want it. What we may expect the Russians or any other aggressively-minded people or nation to want is that they should be able to get as much they want without fighting for it. The way to get it is to make it plain that they are prepared to fight for it, if absolutely necessary, in the end and as a last resort. Only when this process is exhausted does war actually begin.
Before it does so, there comes the critical moment when the apprehensive world holds it breath—and a long drawn-out breath at that—while the aggressor is forced to make his decision, when he is faced with a line of reasoning that goes like this. He says to himself: "I have all that these people are going to let me have. To get the rest, I shall have to fight for it. The question is, 'Do I want it badly enough to take the risk?'." Then comes the key question. "What exactly is the risk?" The moment when a potential aggressor finds himself faced with that inescapable question is the moment when the intended victims' power of deterrence takes or does not take effect.

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In assessing the likelihood of an attack against ourselves from whatever quarter, we thus have to evaluate and balance, one against the other, the answers to three questions. The first is, what does the other side want? the second, how badly does he want it? and the third, what do we have to dissuade him from trying to get it? To the first question we know the answer. It has been proclaimed throughout the whole world long ago: the universal success of the Revolution, which means world domination, no less.
There is no need for me to weary noble Lords with any assessment of how far the Russians have gone towards achieving this aim. They have gone a long way and, equally certainly, they mean to go a long way more. What they are doing, I have no doubt, is to build up so powerful a force by land, by sea and in the air that they could expect no one to dare to withstand them. Thus, by the sheer weight of the threat, they will eventually be able to achieve their heart's desire without fighting. They will supply weapons and arms and "advisers" to other people, of course, and will stamp ruthlessly on smaller nations such as Hungary; but never at any serious risk to themselves that they can possibly avoid. Therefore, they are unlikely to attack NATO which holds the nuclear deterrent, the American nuclear deterrent.
Now, my Lords, if you were engaged in strategic planning on behalf of the Warsaw Pact powers and in drawing up an appreciation, what would your thoughts be as you gazed across the wall westwards in the direction of the United Kingdom? You would be looking at it with, what to us would be, an outsider's eye. What you would see would be a spectacle not quite the same as the sights familiar to us. You would see, I think, the strategic key to the whole situation: a large offshore island protecting, commanding and served by the European ports and the North Sea oilfields. You would see it also as the home of various NATO air bases and of numerous nuclear missile sites. You would observe also that it was virtually without means of defence and without means of defending its own civil population. "What a plum!" you would say. "What a prize!"—and, you might calculate, close enough to be overrun quickly and without too much difficulty from the west, from the seaward side, without interfering with any
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other country at all. And you might calculate that when you had control of it, you would be able to pick off, isolate or subvert the other European countries one at a time and at your leisure.
Of course, you would be unlikely to recommend such a plan to be put into effect immediately in the face of the terrifying nuclear threat from the United States. So your next step, I fancy, would be to work away at the problem of isolating Great Britain, step by step. At about this point in the argument, we come upon an example of what I have described as illogical attitudes. To a proposal that we should have our own nuclear deterrent, someone is certain sooner or later to ask, "Do we not trust the Americans?" It is the wrong question. The right question would be, "Do you think that the Americans are certain to fire their rockets as a first strike"—for a second strike is no good to us—"if they see that we are in danger?" The answer is, No. It is not a question of trust and, in my view, it is dangerous, not to say mischievous, to use this highly emotive word.
It is not a question of trust because the Americans have never undertaken to do any such thing. And we cannot, and must not, count on them to invite the certain destruction of their own cities and millions of their own people, in the hope of averting a disaster to our own small country. The idea is simply not reasonable. Indeed, it is far less reasonable than it would have been to have expected them to come hurrying across the Atlantic in August 1914 or September 1939. Whether it will seem more or less reasonable in ten years' time, we cannot now know. In any case, it is now that the decision has to be made.
So we must leave the American deterrent out of our calculations altogether in making the decision that we have to make at the moment: that is to say, the decision whether or not we shall have our own independent nuclear deterrent. What we are visualising now is a situation in which the whole of the Russian threat is visibly directed against ourselves—and ourselves alone. This is a situation which, if I were on the other side, I should he keen to bring about. If I were on the other side I might also think that there was not much point in trying to bring it into being if I knew that Great Britain had her own

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independent nuclear deterrent, and if, furthermore, I were convinced that the tiresome Islanders would use it rather than submit.
The next step we have to consider then is the solving of a somewhat knotty problem. How are we to convince the other side that we really would use these rockets, whatever kind they and their means of delivery may be? In addressing ourselves to this problem we should be as clear as possible about the situation. We are under a recognisable threat which is a threat to ourselves alone. It may therefore be a threat of anything short of nuclear attack. Even if we cannot be totally certain that the Americans would respond to such an attack with intercontinental ballistic missiles, the Russians, for their side, could be even less certain that they would not. Moreover, it would be egregious folly to drop rockets on Great Britain without trying to knock out the missile bases in East Anglia. That might not be difficult to achieve, but the attempt would be in fact an attack on NATO and invite the full United States retaliation—and that is not what I am talking about.
So we must be prepared to fire our rockets into Russia, not in a retaliatory second strike—since there will be no first strike to which to retaliate—but in a pre-emptive first strike of our own. Could we actually do that and could we convince a potential enemy that we would? Well, my Lords, I think we might. I think we could make it convincingly plain that in certain circumstances we would fire our rockets without waiting for any to be fired at us: and I believe, furthermore, that if we succeeded in doing that the deterrent would in fact work and we should be safe. There are lots of "ifs" in this situation.
So that, as I see it, is the only true argument in favour of our maintaining our own independent nuclear deterrent. The question is, my Lords, do you find it convincing? Have I shown that we ought to maintain an independent nuclear deterrent in one form or another of our own? If you think I have, my Lords, then I am afraid I must disagree with you, because I do not. I have done my best in the past to convince myself that we ought to maintain our own deterrent,
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using arguments that I have thought—and I believe thought rightly—to be valid, and I have failed. I have failed because I have recognised a vital flaw in my own reasoning. I daresay that other noble Lords have also recognised it.
I continue to believe that an independent deterrent would be useful to us in the case—and only in the case—of a threat to us alone. But, try as I will, I have totally failed to see how such a threat could possibly arise. It cannot arise overnight at a moment's notice. It must occur gradually; there must be a gradual working away at the foundations of peace from the other side which will be perfectly perceptible to all our allies as well as to ourselves. I cannot imagine any means by which, say, the oil supplies round the Cape could be disrupted without other nations being affected; how an invasion against our Western seaboard could be mounted quietly in isolation. We cannot, I believe, be detached from our allies in such a way that an attack could be made against us without its being clearly made equally against them, in which case the whole of the American deterrent operates, and our own independent one is so small as to be relatively of no significance.
Therefore I do not think there is any point in having this independent deterrent, simply because the situation does not arise. I hope that I may invite you to notice, my Lords, that there are certain arguments that I have not used. I have not used the argument, and do not use the argument, that we cannot afford it. I believe, with my noble friend Lord Kimberley that there is nothing that we cannot afford when it comes to defence. I have not used the moral or pacifist argument, although I have respect for these and indeed I believe in them. They are for individuals and they are not ones that can be used by governments which are responsible for the safety of their country. Therefore I conclude that the independent deterrent is not for us and we should not, when the Polaris rockets come to an end and the hull life of the submarines comes to an end, replace them by Tridents or by anything else of a long-range nature. I have only to add that I heartily endorse the wish expressed by the noble and gallant Lord, Lord Hill-Norton, that early in the new year we may have a Short Debate on the whole subject.
Baroness GAITSKELL: My Lords, before the noble Lord sits down, may I ask him why he assumes that Russia will destroy us when in the last war she lost 20 million men fighting on our side? What makes him think that she now wants to destroy this island? It is ludicrous.
The Earl of CORK and ORRERY: My Lords, with respect to the noble Baroness, I think that I must wait until Hansard is published in the morning in order that I may read the report of my speech and discover the illusion to which she refers.
6.46 p.m.
Lord NOEL-BAKER: My Lords, I rise to oppose the arguments of noble Lords who have urged that our Polaris submarines should be replaced in the early future by Trident submarines with Poseidon missiles. I want to argue that the NATO deterrent, and our contribution to the NATO deterrent, are enormously greater than that which is required for deterrents; are enormously greater than are required for any conceivable military purpose. With respect to the noble Lord, Lord Gladwyn, and to my noble friend, Lord Ritchie-Calder, I think that they are very gravely underestimating the power of the submarine force which we now maintain. I state it as I understand it; if I go wrong the Government will correct me.
We have four submarines with 16 Polaris missiles each. The Polaris missiles are MIRVs. Each missile can deliver 10 weapons on 10 different targets with great accuracy. Each submarine has 160 weapons. Each weapon is four times as powerful as the bomb which destroyed the city of Hiroshima in 1945. Each weapon has 50 kilo tonnes in yield; the Hiroshima bomb was 12 kilo tonnes. Russia has fewer than 500 cities of 100,000 population.
In 1977—two years ago—I was at a conference in Hiroshima which considered a report by a commission of highly expert physicists, Japanese and others, on the effects of the first two nuclear bombs. The British member was Professor Joseph Rotblat, whose competence and authority are familiar to your Lordships. The commission found that the first atomic bomb which fell on Hiroshima did far greater damage and caused far greater loss of life than the governments
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had ever previously admitted. On the first day it killed no fewer than 140,000 people. Many, many perished in later years. Indeed, they are dying still. A committee of social scientists discovered that the life of the survivors was almost totally ruined: nearly all of them have declared that they have lived a living death. The bomb destroyed a city of 400,000 people—completely destroyed it—and Russia has fewer than 500 cities of 100,000 population. Six hundred and forty weapons, each four times as much in yield as the Hiroshima bomb—surely that would make even the Russians hesitate, if they thought of attacking us alone.
I venture to believe that so long as we rely on what we call "deterrents", our contribution is quite as great as it ought to be and that the NATO stock of deterrent weapons is overwhelmingly greater than is required. But I believe that the time has come not only to make that estimate, but to examine, to discredit and to discard the whole doctrine of deterrents.
What is the doctrine? It is that the nuclear war must never be fought. Noble Lords will have seen the marvellous documentary film prepared by Dr. Nigel Calder, the distinguished son of our distinguished colleague, the noble Lord, Lord Ritchie-Calder, entitled "Nuclear Nightmare"—a collection of statements by staff officers about the possible use of nuclear weapons. Throughout the film there came the theme: "The war must never he fought. We must build up the stocks but each weapon must be labelled with the warning sign, 'Never to be used'." To prevent its being used, both sides in the nuclear arms race must maintain a massive power to strike the other, a power completely to obliterate the other. The policy is called Mass Assured Destruction, MAD for short, an onomatopoeic acronym of singular felicity.
Each side retains the power completely to destroy the other, and therefore the other will never strike. Therefore deterrence makes us safe. It is, I would venture to submit with respect, the most glaring non sequitur in the whole history of human debate. If you intend that weapons shall never be used, abolish them all. Let both sides agree. Noble Lords on all sides of the House will

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accept that proposition and say: "Yes, we all want it but it does not happen".
British Governments of all complexions since 1945 have been bound by dozens of UN resolutions. From the first resolution adopted by the first General Assembly to the final document of the Special Session in May last year, all British Governments have been bound to the policy of total nuclear disarmament. The UN is now engaged on the basis of that final document with two bodies of able statesmen of great authority—the Committee on Disarmament in Geneva and the UN Disarmament Committee in New York—working out the plans by which that total nuclear disarmament can be brought about. But will anybody think that Her Majesty's Government are taking that work seriously or have any genuine belief that they can help to make it succeed if we now decide to adopt Poseidon weapons and Trident submarines in 1990?
I believe that the doctrine of deterrence is a dangerous fraud. Will it ensure that the other side will never strike? It was President John Kennedy who said in 1961 that the future of civilisation hung by the slenderest of threads, which could be cut at any moment by accident, madness or miscalculation. There have been a lot of accidents with nuclear weapons, many of them classed by the Government authorities as serious. We have had madmen in power since Hitler and Mussolini. They were mad and they were in power not so long ago. If you want miscalculations by the General Staff, look at the Vietnam war. President Kennedy was stating three very real dangers.
His authority does not stand alone. I do not need to commend to your Lordships the words of Captain Basil Lydell-Hart. I was privileged to know him, and in 1961 he wrote a book called Defence or Deterrence. It was written to prove that if the weapons existed in time of war they would be used, and would lead to utter disaster. Captain Lydell-Hart said that any man who talked of winning the war with nuclear weapons was a danger to his country and to the whole of humanity.
Then there is the speech of the late Lord Mountbatten, which was delivered
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in May to the Scientific Council of the Stockholm Peace Research Institute. Surely the Government and the British people will listen to Lord Mountbatten. His speech was delivered with passion and he told his friends that he wanted to be remembered by that speech. He was speaking as a military man who had given 50 years' service in peace and war to his country in the armed forces: at sea, at the battle of Cape Matapan, where he was picked up after his ship had been sunk—he swam about in the Mediterranean, a Mediterranean covered with oil, for more than an hour with a friend of mine before they were picked up—and in the great retreat through Burma, which saved India from the Japanese. Lord Mount-batten had an unqualified record in high command and in every other form of military service. Speaking as a man with that record, he said:
"The nuclear arms race has no military purpose. I cannot conceive any use of a nuclear weapon which will not lead to escalation and general nuclear war".
He quoted a Japanese journalist's description of what happened in Hiroshima, and followed it with his own terrible description of the collapse of civilisation when nuclear weapons were used. He then said:
"War cannot be fought with nuclear weapons. They only add to our perils".
Let us suppose that it happens that the weapons are used. I quote the noble and learned Lord the Lord Chancellor, who, talking of nuclear war, said in another place in 1965:
"Perhaps the Chinese will survive, perhaps Asia and Africa will survive, perhaps the United States and Russia, after suffering frightful damage, might survive. But this I know. We in this island will not survive".
I venture to say to the Government, with this new disarmament negotiation going on in the United Nations in Geneva and New York, that their first task, before they think of replacing our Polaris weapons, is to give their power and their influence to ensuring that the proposals for total nuclear disarmament, which were put forward by the Special Session last year, shall now, and quickly, succeed. The second Special Session is due in 1982. There is not too long to make a preparation.
I turn, briefly I hope, to the nuclear deterrent which we have deployed with

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our army on the Rhine. NATO has 7,000 nuclear weapons in Europe. Some of them, it is said, are very small, as small as one kiloton, even half a kiloton—a battlefield weapon, which Lord Mount-batten said does not exist. Half a kiloton is one-twenty fourth the size of the Hiroshima bomb. Let me try to bring home to noble Lords who have some experience of war what half a kiloton really means.
In the first world war, the most powerful weapon in common use was the 12 inch or 300 millimetre shell. A 12 inch shell was a very formidable affair. I was once present when one such shell killed 60 men and wounded 120. I was once camped in a narrow valley where we had good shelter, but when we went out to do our jobs we were under gunfire. We had a lot of small calibre stuff. But once in a major battle we were bombarded by 12 inch mortar shells, 50 in a week, seven a day—not a very intense bornbardment—at irregular intervals. But the roar of their descent, the convulsion of their explosion on the earth, was such that it broke the nerve of some of my best men and I had to send them down to base. A half a kiloton weapon is the equivalent of 1,000 12 inch shells exploding at the same point and at the same instant together. If they were used anywhere near the line, it would drive the troops clean round the bend. They would retaliate with the largest nuclear stuff that they possessed. That is how Lord Mountbatten's escalation would come about.
Let us imagine that we really used our weapons to repel a Russian invasion of West Germany. Let us imagine that NATO used 500 weapons of the Hiroshima yield—12 kilotons. They would be among the smaller ranges of our so-called tacticals. Lord Mountbatten said that no nuclear weapon should be called "tactical", and when you remember that two such bombs put the Japanese out of the world war it is indeed an extravagant misuse of language to call a nuclear weapon "tactical". It is only a way of covering up, of trying to make it seem small and acceptable.
Let us assume that 500 Hiroshima bombs are used against the Russians. They are directed with great accuracy at enemy command posts, at airfields and
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runways, at rail centres, at road junctions, at telephone exchanges, at communications in general, at depots of arms and at manpower in barracks. Inevitably, most of those targets will be in towns and the towns of West Germany will be bombarded by Hiroshima bombs. Between the towns, there are great forests. The towns will be utterly destroyed and the forests will be burned from end to end, in fire storms that no one can stop. What will remain of West Germany? The invading Russian army will, of course, be destroyed, but so will our German allies. German society will virtually cease to exist, and when that battle is over we shall have 6,500 of our NATO stock of nuclear weapons still remaining in our hands.
I venture to submit that our nuclear deterrent is incomparably greater than is required for any legitimate purpose of deterrence and its danger, of which I have spoken—I hope at not too great length—is compounded by the fact that NATO strategic thinking, like Russian strategic thinking, like Herman Kahn's strategic thinking, like everybody's strategic thinking about nuclear weapons is in utter chaos. It was a United States minister, a deputy secretary of defence, Mr. Morton Halperin, who said:
"The NATO doctrine is to fight with conventional arms until we are losing, then to fight with nuclear tacticals until we are losing and then to blow up the world".
That is the truth about the strategic thinking of the general staffs on nuclear weapons. The only answer is the total abolition of all nuclear stocks—and the time is very short.
7.10 p.m.
Lord CARVER: My Lords, when one faces up to this very difficult question of whether and, if so, in which way to replace what is called "the British nuclear deterrent", one must answer three questions. The first is whether we should continue to maintain the capability to design, produce and maintain our own nuclear warheads. The second is whether we should continue to man the delivery systems which, in the case of the Army and the Royal Navy, and, in some cases, the Royal Air Force, are not designed or produced by ourselves. The third is whether we should continue to try to

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maintain a so-called independent strategic nuclear weapon system.
It is as well at this stage to define what we mean by that. "Strategic" means that it is designed to do very great damage to targets within the Soviet Union which are considered by the Soviet Union to be of such great importance that they are protected by their anti-ballistic missile system. And "independent" means that it is intended to he used by us alone when the Americans are not using theirs and that it must be capable of both penetrating the anti-ballistic missile system and carrying out the designed damage when nobody else is attempting to do it at the same time.
The answers which I would give to those three questions are the following. There are military and even stronger political reasons why we should continue to design, produce and maintain our own warheads. It is of considerable interest that practically all the evidence, if not all, given to the Select Committee of another place which began to consider this matter, was in favour of that.
I give an absolutely unequivocal "Yes" to the question: should we continue to man the delivery systems? I believe it is of very great importance to the solidarity of NATO that all its members should share both the responsibility and the risk of manning nuclear delivery systems and having them based on their own territory, whether or not they themselves man them.
But it is when I come to the answer to the third question that I believe there are considerable disadvantages and little advantage in our struggling to maintain an independent strategic system which is capable of penetrating Soviet anti-ballistic missile defences and inflicting very great damage entirely on its own.
I should like at this stage to make it absolutely clear that I am not against nuclear weapons as such. I believe that they form an extremely important part of NATO's armoury. They keep the risks of war high. It is as well that we have been reminded in such dramatic terms by the noble Lord, Lord Noel-Baker, of what those risks are. But if we keep the risks of war high we keep the probability of war low. It is the great risk to both the Soviet Union and the United States of going to
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war which keeps the peace and which has kept the peace in Europe for so long—longer than in any other century.
My reasons for considering that there are disadvantages and little advantage in struggling to maintain an independent strategic system are these. First, whatever may be the sums, at 1979 prices, that have been bandied about today about the cost of such a system, I believe that it will inevitably have a serious effect on the equipment programmes, which I believe are of higher priority in the same time scale. I believe, secondly, that it fosters an undesirable concept that we can go it alone against the Soviet Union or against the Warsaw Pact. On military grounds alone I believe that this is very undesirable. Thirdly, in the circumstances in which the temptation to go it alone arose, I believe that it would produce very considerable pressure on the Prime Minister and Government of the day to employ that capability. And if that capability were employed, I believe that the retaliation would totally destroy this country and almost all the inhabitants in it.
For some 21 years I have been concerned with this subject—ever since I was Director of Army Plans just after Suez. In those days it was the Royal Air Force which manned the so-called independent strategic system. At that time the Royal Navy were quite critical of the arguments which the Royal Air Force produced to justify it. Now the boot is slightly on the other foot, although the Royal Air Force are inhibited to a certain extent in their criticism by themselves having previously used the same arguments. Over the years the arguments have shifted, and I have heard them all; but in that time I have never heard or read a scenario which I would consider to be realistic in which it could be considered to be right or reasonable for the Prime Minister or Government of this country to order the firing of our independent strategic force at a time when the Americans were not prepared to fire theirs—certainly not before Russian nuclear weapons had landed on this country. And, again, if they had already landed, would it be right or reasonable? All it would do would be to invite further retaliation.
Let me deal, if I may, with some of the arguments that are produced in favour of such a system. The first I hope we can

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dismiss quickly. It is called the trigger argument. It is one which has been put forward at times both by the French and by ourselves but which I regard as totally irresponsible. It is that by having our own independent strategic system, we could, in circumstances in which the United States were reluctant to employ theirs, fire ours off and the Russians would not know whose it was that had been fired. They would have to assume that it was American, so they would reply, and we should have triggered off the global strategic nuclear exchange. That argument has been seriously used at times both by this country and by the French, and I hope that your Lordships will regard it as totally irresponsible.
The second argument, which I also reject, is that there could be some vital interest of ours in the defence of which the United States and our allies were not prepared to support us when we were threatened by the Soviet Union and that, rather than lose that vital interest, we should be prepared to threaten to use, and then perhaps would finally use our own system. Like the noble Earl, Lord Cork and Orrery, I have been unable to envisage what on earth that vital interest could be, or what a realistic scenario could be which would bring that about. The risk to ourselves would be total, while the risk to the Soviet Union would be great but only partial.
A more valid argument, although I would prefer to say a less invalid one, is one in which war had started in Europe, NATO forces were engaged but the United States feared escalation to the stage of strategic nuclear exchange and refused to authorise the use of nuclear weapons at all, or refused to escalate beyond either the tactical or the theatre. In those circumstances, would it be right, would it be reasonable let alone would it be likely, that the United Kingdom should decide to go it alone? It is very doubtful that we should have the support of our allies in doing so. Indeed, in those circumstances do we think that it would stop the Russians in their tracks? I believe that the answer to all those questions is "No".
Finally, the argument which we have heard in the House this evening is that it is a form of insurance against the withdrawal by the United States of her support of the defence of Western Europe, that it is
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an insurance against the breakdown of NATO and that our allies recognise this and welcome it. Well, one must envisage what the situation in Europe and the world would be if for some reason or other the United States had decided to withdraw its support for European defence.
Do your Lordships suppose for one moment that any form of Western Alliance, let alone NATO, would survive such a political situation? You have only to cast your eyes around who the other members of the European Community and of NATO are. Would the Scandinavian members, would the Mediterranean members, would the Low Countries, and would that key country of all, the Federal Republic of Germany, decide to stand all together, relying on the support only of the independent strategic nuclear deterrent of ourselves and perhaps, but not necessarily, that of France also? I do not believe they would. I do not believe that they could welcome a threat by us under those circumstances to employ nuclear weapons against Russia. I believe that they would consider that the risks to them would be too great.
It is often said that our allies welcome the fact that we have such a force. I have never heard an authoritative military or political figure of any of our allies welcome the fact officially that we have an independent strategic force. I have indeed heard them welcome the fact that we are in the nuclear business, because, whether they are Americans or European, they believe that the fact that America is not alone in this is of great political value. But it is not necessarily of military value.
A further argument produced—and we heard reference to it from my noble and gallant friend earlier on—is about the second point of decision. I have never seen the point of this second point of decision. If the decision is the same as that of the United States it makes no difference. If the United States' decision is yes, they will employ theirs, and our decision is no, we will not, it makes no difference at all to what happens either to this country or to NATO. The Russians would not be the slightest bit impressed that we had decided that we were not going to use ours. If the United States' decision is that they were not going to use theirs and our decision was yes, that is a situation I have already dealt with.

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Your Lordships will, therefore, I hope, appreciate that I do not regard the replacement of this force as a matter of high priority. I believe the Government are heading for the same trouble they had when they were last in office, when the equipment programme became seriously overloaded. When that happens when the programme of future defence equipment gets beyond the resources of all kinds which are going to be devoted to it, the inevitable result is a series of cancellations of projects which have cost a great deal to develop over the years, and this is extremely wasteful. The £5,000 million at 1979 prices, or something of that order, if that is what it is, which this force is going to cost is going to clash with the Jaguar Harrier replacement programme for the Royal Air Force, with the Chieftain tank replacement programme for the Army and many other important projects, and also some very sensitive projects for the Royal Navy.
Having said what I think the Government should not do, it is incumbent upon me to say what I think they should do. I believe they should regard our nuclear force as a theatre force, as most of our allies in fact do, and that they should look at our longer-range theatre force—I am separating this from the purely tactical force—as one; they should look at the aircraft-delivered force and the submarine-delivered force in the light of its being a theatre nuclear force, and look at its modernisation as one problem, one force. The options open to them are several in that case. One of them may well be—and I think it is a perfectly reasonable one—that the platform from which they would decide to deliver these things would be a submarine, but I do not believe that it would necessarily demand five of them. Another option could possibly be that we should offer to man some of the cruise missiles to be based in this country, and if the Dutch will not have them in their country we should offer to man them in this country.
The Americans are always saying their allies should do more, and they ought to welcome such an offer, though 11 do not believe they will. What I am sure about in my own mind is that it would be wrong of the Government, and not in the interests of this country, to commit so large a slice of future defence equipment
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programmes to a weapon system for which the principal justification is political machismo.
7.27 p.m.
Lord KENNET: My Lords, it is very difficult indeed to follow not only the last speech by itself, of which I think much more will be heard in the ensuing weeks, but to follow both the last speech and Lord Hill-Norton's, because when a great sailor and a great soldier disagree so diametrically about what ought to be done the civilian has to stand back and leave the matter to be judged by the only authorities which can rightly judge it, that is the Government of the day and the people who put them in office. I do remark, however, that we are discussing mostly not how the Polaris force should be prolonged but whether it should be prolonged. I just want to make one point about that "whether".
It seems to me that all the old arguments of the late 1950s, when we first went thermo-nuclear, have changed very little, and it has been a surprise to me to hear not only Lord Cork and Orrery but also Lord Carver himself include among the arguments which they reject for maintaining our nuclear force the possibility of a first strike. Certainly I, and I think probably most of those in the Labour Party who have supported the existence of the British independent nuclear deterrent, have never done so on the basis of a possible British first strike. Such a thing does indeed seem very absurd in all lights. But we have done so, on the contrary, on the possibility of a British second strike; that is, the theory of posthumous or bee-sting deterrent; namely; that, irrespective of anything the Americans may be saying, we are able to say to the Russians, "We refuse to do this even though you should obliterate us, because you will not succeed in obliterating at least one of our submarines and with that we shall obliterate a highly civilised life in your country". This is the possibility which counts and this is the option the prolongation or otherwise of which should be discussed and decided, and will be.
Here I would like to add my voice very strongly to those who have called for an early full debate on the matter in the new year. In what follows I should like to sketch various points which I hope will

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be taken up in that debate. I think my old friend Lord Strathcona—we served together in the last war—is going to have enough to answer without going into the thick of the theory of deterrents.
It remains true that we have no right to call on the Americans to sacrifice New York and 40 other of their cities for something which may happen here in Europe. I prefer to look at it that way round. I do not like the arguments: Can we trust them to come in? The question to me is: Have we the right to demand that they come in? This question has been familiar to everybody who has been deeply into it for many years, and it has been decided by authorities as diverse as Mr. Macmillan, when he was Prime Minister, and Mr. Kissinger, speaking in Brussels just a week or two ago, that notwithstanding trust, whichever way you look at it, countries in Europe cannot be certain that the United States would incur the certain destruction of its own culture at the moment when the countries in Europe judged the best moment in their own interests during a war. That is the argument, and to my mind the only argument, for maintaining an independent nuclear deterrent.
In this respect I would point out, especially to Liberal colleagues, that the position of France is exactly the same as ours. I do not believe either the French or we do it for grandeur or gloire, which can be simply translated as grandeur and glory, and often are by the French. These are not our reasons. We do it for the same reasons that the Americans did it first and the Russians second. The Americans developed independent nuclear deterrents because they were afraid the Germans were doing so. The Russians developed them because they knew that the Americans had done so. Britain and France developed them because we knew that the Russians had done so and because we had not the right to pull in America. China developed them because they knew that the Russians had done so. So it goes down the line and independent nation States, without the discipline of disarmament, have done so and will do so. We are just the third.
I should like to make a few comments about language. In the major debate next time can we see whether we can get away from the words "tactical" and "theatre" in talking about weapons whose size has
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been terrifyingly evoked by my noble friend Lord Noel-Baker and the proximity of which to their targets is neither here nor there? It is surely not the nearness of a weapon to its target which makes it tactical or strategic but the effect that it has on the economy of a country when it goes off. There is no nuclear weapon in the world which is not grossly and a hundred times strategic. Let us not let the super-powers get away with the use of the word "tactical". Let us not use the polite word "theatre" which is used to describe the field of Waterloo, even the Battle of the Somme. Let us not use that polite word for an area stretching from the Atlantic to the Urals.
At this point I should like to take issue with the noble Lord, Lord Hill-Norton, who said that modernisation of the medium range nuclear weapons in Europe was a separate issue from the continuation of our SLBM force. May we raise in our debate that very relationship? I have in mind, in particular, the question of one key and two key. Mr Pym has said in the House of Commons, in so many words, that the Cruise missiles and Pershings are to be one key—that is, they are to be American owned and American controlled. He also implied in a discussion which took place in the House of Commons that there was nothing very new about that, that all the American nuclear weapons stationed in Europe in recent years have been one key—that is, under single American control—without anybody else's finger on the safety catch, without a British, German, Belgian or Italian finger on the safety catch. I should like to ask the Government whether, after consideration, they can give a fuller statement on that, perhaps in our debate or perhaps in some other forum.
In the old days we had the Thor missiles in this country which were withdrawn at the time of the Cuba crisis. They were dual key. I think that when the Pershing force was first set up on the Continent of Europe—Serjeants and Pershings—they were all dual key. When did the system become one key? Now we are told that the Cruise missiles and so on are to be one key—well and good—and we are also told that there is to be a consultation mechanism about whether they should be used or not. I think that there is also a consultation mechanism about whether the British Polaris force

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should be used. We know, of course, that it rests on American rockets. It is British housed, it has British warheads but American rockets. We know that the same formula is proposed for the Trident force: British housed, British warheads and American rockets. There is, therefore, an American interest if not hold, over the use of that British weapons system.
Will the Government after consideration again compare on the one hand, the degree of influence we shall have over the use of the American Cruise missiles stationed in this country, with the degree of influence that the Americans will have over the use of our Trident force when it is operational? Will they be equal? If not, will the degree of influence in the one case be greater than in the other and, if so, which way round? If they are not equal, will the British Parliament and people be content? If it is really true that the Cruise missiles are a complete one key force, are we not approaching George Orwell's famous era when Britain was "Airstrip I"? I shall not remind noble Lords of the context, but they will remember that it comes in 1984, which is about the year in question, is it not?
I should like briefly to take up the theme enunciated so eloquently by my noble friend Lord Noel-Baker—namely, disarmament and arms control. When the Ministers adopted the NATO modernisation programme in Brussels the other day they also launched a so-called arms control programme. This country is adopting a new, independent strategic missile system. We are, after all, still the third nuclear power in the world, both historically and in throw weight. We therefore have the third best right in the world to make disarmament proposals and we are in the third most hopeful position to do so.
The Ministers in Brussels the other day launched a package of arms control proposals which was very weak. It lay about all over the place. It was not co-ordinated, but simply said that we must try to do better than we ever have before in all the disconnected fora of discussion, ranging from the special sessions, referred to by my noble friend Lord Noel-Baker, through the Disarmament Conference itself, the permanent
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one, to SALT; to the MBFR discussions in Geneva; to the Review Conference of the Helsinki Act, with the next one in Madrid; to the Review Conference of the MPT. There are about eight or 12 of them and most of them have run right into the sand. There is no reason why they should do any better. They have run into the sand because they are insufficiently connected. What is needed is not merely a promise to do better in a series of disconnected talking shops, but a plan to connect them all. Why should this country not produce a plan?
I am sorry that he has left the Chamber, but until a moment ago the noble Lord, Lord Home of the Hirsel, was listening to the debate. I do not know how many people remember that, with the single exception of a praiseworthy, but very minor proposal about chemical disarmament made by Mr. Fred Mulley when he was Minister of Defence some 10 years ago, this country has proposed no disarmament in the international scene since the proposal of the noble Lord, Lord Home, in 1962. It is a matter that bears thinking about. By "disarmament" I mean the destruction of weapons; I do not mean the withdrawal of weapons, or the inspection of weapons or arrangements for keeping each other happy about what we are doing. I mean precisely what the word says—dis-armament. No British Government, whether Labour or Conservative, has proposed any disarmament since 1962. Is not this a good juncture to do so for both reasons—the NATO modernisation and the new generation of the British independent deterrent?
7.38 p.m.
Lord ORR-EWING: My Lords, I think that we all owe a debt of gratitude to my noble friend Lord Kimberley for having initiated this debate. It will clearly be one of the subjects which the Prime Minister will be discussing in Washington. I do not myself want to go deeply into the pros and cons, because I ought to make a short speech and this ought to be a short debate. Basically, I feel that we should not allow the United States of America to be the only free nation, totally isolated from the rest of us in having a strategic nuclear deterrent. On the other hand, I am attracted to the viewpoint put by the noble Lord, Lord

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Carver, that, in the next generation, it may be more economical, and therefore more cost-effective, to have a missile which can penetrate the defences; and to decide later whether it should be on a platform—a submarine platform, a merchant ship platform; possibly a platform from a V-bomber with an extended life; or even a large container lorry which might be the most effective and cheapest version of all, and could move about the country undetected and unidentified. I would agree with noble Lords that not enough discussion takes place on this extremely important issue. One must recognise the fact that today millions of people take their cue, their knowledge and their information not, regrettably, from this Chamber—because the high calibre of this debate reflects the expert opinion we have here—but from the television service.
In particular, I want to direct my short remarks to the "Panorama" programme broadcast on Monday, 3rd December, because I felt that that programme did not produce the balance which should be mandatory under the BBC Charter. In recent months Monday's fare has become more and more loaded. The Charter says that the BBC must produce balance. My friends who saw this programme were indignant and I was very surprised. Being unable to obtain a transcript of the programme, this afternoon I sat through a video tape on it and my surprise became even greater.
The programme was produced by Tom Mangold. I believe that it was slanted in the selection of subjects and personnel. I concede that much of the documentary was excellent, but between those excellent slices there was pure prejudice and slanted production. Mr. Pym did his best as the only man upholding the British and NATO viewpoint. In parenthesis I would say that he was exceptionally badly lit; he looked as though he was about to die. I also reflect that when the noble Lord, Lord Home of the Hirsel, was Prime Minister he was also badly lit as to appear like a death mask. One must recognise the fact that, if one wants to produce a result on television, one can do it by lighting as well as by cutting the tape to suit one's viewpoint. Curiously enough, the best picture of the Minister of Defence was when he was in an aeroplane flying to
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Brussels for the great debate on this nuclear deterrent. Then he appeared quite healthy and likely to live for many years, in contrast to the pictures of him in the studio which made him look very, very pale, if not green.
I found that the introduction was slanted and that some of the statements were totally untrue. In referring to Britain's nuclear deterrent, the programme said that the successor would cost about £5,000 million of expenditure, but, of course, it did not mention at that stage that that would be spread over 10 years. Then it went on to say that it was a deterrent "which NATO commanders think unnecessary". It did not tell us which NATO commanders, when they said it, or where. The programme then complained about lack of debate in both Houses of Parliament. Your Lordships' House is always in advance of the other place, as we were on advocating both radio and television, so at least we are trying to set some of that right.
Then a series of spokesmen were presented, and it is the choice of these spokesmen which I want to highlight. The programme started with Dr. Rotblat, a distinguished physicist. I have known of Dr. Rotblat and his writings for some 25 years and he has always been of the extreme Left or Marxist viewpoint. As long as that is known, that is all right. I felt that after him we would get a different viewpoint. He, of course, used all the emotional terms: vomiting blood, bowels exuding blood—every emotional term that could possibly be used. However, I accepted that as long as the other viewpoint might follow.
Next, we did not have anyone from West Germany or France, who might have been allowed to put a viewpoint on behalf of NATO, but we had someone from the Polish Foreign Ministry. That is another viewpoint. I wondered who would follow. The next spokesman was an East German. wondered who was to follow him.
Lord KALDOR: My Lords, I am grateful to the noble Lord for giving way, but does being an extreme opponent of nuclear weapons or nuclear warfare make one a Marxist? My noble friend Lord Noel-Baker made a very passionate speech against nuclear warfare. Does the noble Lord expect him to be classed as a Marxist?
Lord ORR-EWING: My Lords, no; I did not seek to say that everyone who preaches peace—and we have had two excellent and moving speeches today from pacifists—is a Marxist. I know them not to be. One of them, the noble Lord, Lord Ritchie-Calder, is a very good friend of mine. However, I am quoting people whom I believe to be of extreme Left-wing views. I do not mind a Left-wing view—that is liberty; it is what we fight for—provided the other side of the case is put. Therefore, after those spokesmen I expected a spokesman from a different viewpoint. But the next spokesman came from Isvestia. Is that political balance? Is that in accordance with the Charter?
Later we had Mr. Frank Barnaby. He was described as an ex-Aldermaston scientist. I do not know when he left Aldermaston, but I know that for some years he has been working in Stockholm at the International Peace Research Institute. That is not a government organisation; it is a private body which receives much financial help. It is anti-defence; it believes in unilateral nuclear disarmament; in fact, it believes in unilateral disarmament.
I have given a series of people. By no stretch of the imagination could anyone say that that is a balanced presentation of the case which we are now discussing. This list shows that "Panorama" has become biased, despicable and very heavily loaded. In these interviews none of the Marxist interviewees was interrogated by the BBC spokesman. That was done only in the case of the Minister of Defence, who put forward a very well-argued and balanced reply. The BBC commentator said that the Dutch Parliament has refused to allow the Cruise missile on its soil—
"This has shattered NATO's unity".
That is both incorrect and totally inaccurate. What the Dutch said was that they would reconsider this in 1981—and there is no need to make a decision before then—when they have seen the progress with the Soviet Union in talks towards disarmament.
The whole slant was that Britain's deterrent was insignificant. I think that many years ago before Sir Harold Wilson came to power he described it as a pea on a mountain. That was both before he and Mr. Callaghan had 11 years'
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responsibility for retaining and updating that nuclear deterrent. But it is not as described. Two or three, and perhaps very occasionally four, of our nuclear submarines will be at sea in a period of tension. Each one has 16 missiles; each missile has three separately targeted nuclear bombs. So each boat has 48 nuclear bombs; two boats have 96 and three have 144. Each bomb has more than 20 times the power of those delivered on Japan. Therefore, this is not to be lightly set aside, and the USSR would think many times before receiving that blow. The noble Lord, Lord Ritchie-Calder, mentioned that this was only one ten-thousandth ·01 per cent. of what the Soviet Union could deliver. I think that he has his figures wrong. Like myself, he is a physicist, but if he reflects and takes ten thousand times 144, he will come to 1·4 million nuclear weapons. I do not think that even the Soviet Union has that.
I would add that, throughout the whole of its 50 minutes, the programme made no reference to the French nuclear submarines, of which five are operational; they are-now building a sixth. Each has 16 missiles and each has three separate nuclear heads. Do we really—and this is the argument which the noble Lord, Lord Carver, advanced—want the French to have the only long-range independent nuclear deterrent in Western Europe? If you add the French and ours together you will get a total of nearly 400 nuclear bombs, each with 20 times the power of the Japanese bomb. I submit that that is a considerable deterrent to any group of people sitting in the Kremlin. I would contend that the anti-ballistic missile systems, some of which are deployed, would find it desperately difficult if it was decided to launch that number. That total would still be for many years an effective deterrent.
I generally watch "Panorama". It has been easier recently because the House of Lords has not been sitting on Mondays. I find it to be an excellent programme, but I have noticed in recent months that it has tended to become anti-American in concept and anti-NATO, and in fact anti-Shah, too. The hijackers in Teheran seem to get far more publicity, and the Americans very little support. It is not an American problem, as is sug-

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gested, it is a world problem and needs to be reflected as such.
I believe that at the moment Ian Trethowan, the Director-General, has suffered a heart attack, and I am sure that the BBC miss him as much as we do. We were going to have him at a meeting of the Conservative media committee tomorrow, and now he cannot come. I cannot help but feel that since he has been away there has been a drift away from the objectivity and balance which has been the BBC tradition. Perhaps it can be said that when the cat is away the moles will play. May I suggest that the BBC should regain their balance, should honour their Charter, and should strive to re-establish the balance which is their tradition and the nation's right.
Lord KENNET: My Lords, before the noble Lord sits down, as we say, may I ask him to accept that he is mistaken about three points? First, Professor Rotblat is not a Marxist. Secondly, the Swedish International Institute for Peace Research does not have a corporate view in favour of unilateral disarmament. Its director, by the way, is called "Barnaby", not "Burnaby". Thirdly, 144 times 10,000 is not 1·4 billion.
Lord ORR-EWING: My Lords, if Doctor Rotblat has switched away from the extreme Left I am delighted that he has seen the light. What was the second point?
Lord PEART: Please. This is tedious.
Lord ORR-EWING: If the noble Lord does not want an answer, my Lords, perhaps I could see him later. If I was wrong in saying that, I apologise.
Lord KENNET: May I—
7.53 p.m.
Lord PEART: My Lords, I think we ought to get on. I promise to be extremely brief, and I always keep my promise. I think it is good for the House, because I once moved a Motion that we should keep our speeches under 15 or under 10 minutes.
Lord KENNET: My Lords, would my noble friend—
Lord PEART: The noble Lord has made a very good speech and I think he might spoil it by wanting to speak again. If he was sensible, he would leave it as it is. He made a good speech, and I was going to refer to it. May I congratulate the noble Earl, Lord Kimberley, for introducing this debate. We are all indebted to him. It has been a good debate, conducted without any passion or ill feeling, and with analytical speeches. May I say how much I enjoyed our two distinguished servicemen, Lord Carver and Lord Hill-Norton. Both in their own way made tremendous contributions. I feel humble, as a very junior officer in the Army during the War, but I am glad to say that today we have heard two excellent speeches. I nearly converted to Lord Carver's point of view.
I have always believed in the nuclear deterrent. When we talk about the nuclear deterrent and NATO we are really talking about the American deterrent and strategy which we have accepted. I am glad that there has been no anti-American feeling in our debate—sometimes we get that from both Right and Left—because our American allies played their part in helping us to save Europe in the best sense. I think of General Marshall with Marshall Aid, and men like that. He was a military commander who had great responsibility, and who really rescued Europe in a very difficult period.
This debate has emerged because of the defence Statement we had the other day. Many noble Lords questioned the Minister on that. There were two major decisions: first, to participate with NATO allies in the stationing of 572 new American missiles in Europe, and secondly, a decision to acquire a successor to Polaris as Britain's independent deterrent. I understand from a reference sheet which has been obtained from the Library that it is expected that the Prime Minister will raise matters about the independent strategic nuclear deterrent, its effectiveness, its operational life and its cost. No doubt when the Prime Minister returns to this country there will be a major Statement in another place, but I hope there will be another debate in this House as well—I mean a much larger debate; a full day's debate, although this is no reflection on the debate we have just had.
We have been thinking in terms of a plan to modernise NATO's European

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missile force. This stems directly from Russia's deployment of the SS 20, which is the new rocket capable of striking targets throughout Western Europe from mobile bases in the Soviet Union. Here is a question of whether we have new NATO weapons; whether they be American owned and operated; whether they will have an equivalent capacity; whether they will help to prevent the creation of a military imbalance. The main importance from the point of view of NATO is that it strengthens America's commitment to defend Europe and is a warning to the Soviet Union not to attempt a military venture.
However, one must ask questions. I understand that it will be three years before the missiles approved at Brussels can be built and deployed. What is the cost going to be? After all, the present Government are seeking to curb unnecessary expenditure. Will a decision be taken on this matter because of that? Will there be diversion of funds to a new nuclear missile programme? This, after all, could seriously affect our resources for conventional defence. I think that was the main theme of Lord Carver's speech; that our effective conventional defence could be seriously damaged.
We are committed to a 3 per cent. increase in the year's defence budget. I understand that we are now just beginning to fill the gaps—according to reports in the Press and from elsewhere—which existed in the equipment and manning of our conventional forces. Will there be a diversion of funds to a new nuclear missile programme? Can it really mean only a reversal of the programme I have mentioned and which is emphasised in the Defence White Paper? Can we really afford an independent deterrent? Having listened to the arguments, I must say that I am beginning to think that we just cannot. I am prepared to look at it again in the light of this debate. I have wrestled with it in my mind. I have listened to the reasons.
The noble Lord, Lord Gladwyn, made a powerful opening speech. He asked me the views of the Labour Party. The views of individual members of the Labour Party on this subject are varied, as indeed they are with all parties. No
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one has a monopoly here. My party has always played its part. We have had a much better defence record than Conservative Administrations over the years, but that is not the argument. I believe that we are going through a period when we have to rethink and reconsider. That has really been the message today. We must try to achieve détente in the best sense. Both Conservative and Labour Governments have recognised the principle of détente; the need to have a reduction; the need to get the Soviet Union to the table; the need to discuss expenditure and the type of weaponry to be used. This is all known to noble Lords.
If one goes carefully through the White Paper on defence policy one finds that throughout it says that steady progress has been made in the negotiations between the United Kingdom and the United States on a comprehensive test ban in order to secure a properly verifiable multilateral treaty banning nuclear explosions in all environments. That is one example. Other arms control and disarmament measures are listed in the White Paper. The emphasis is spelt out, even though we agree with a nuclear deterrent, with that policy protected by the United States, and there is still a desire to have discussions with the Soviet Union.
The noble Lord, Lora Orr-Ewing, was critical because in a way I defended the Soviet Union in respect of SALT 2 and SALT 3. He said I was trusting people who could betray their position at a later stage. If one goes into negotiations in that spirit one will never achieve anything. I think it is right and proper that we should make more effort in relation to SALT 2 and SALT 3, along with our desire to have a larger conference which will enable us to try to achieve what has been suggested by many noble Lords today. I respect my noble friend Lord Ritchie-Calder and, after all, he may be right. Probably he is a pacifist; he may be a realist. But for the present I believe that we must have defence and therefore I take a different view. But I think that in the long term inevitably we shall have to come to terms with this matter and have agreement with the Soviet Union.
This debate will, I am sure, be read and studied by people who are interested in our policies and in the variety of emphases which noble Lords have placed. I hope

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too that many of our colleagues who are not here today will read Hansard and note carefully the speeches of all who have spoken. This has been a good debate and I hope it has revealed that the House of Lords is at its best when talking about defence and other matters of scientific impact.
8.2 p.m.
The MINISTER of STATE, MINISTRY of DEFENCE (Lord Strathcona and Mount Royal): My Lords, the noble Earl, Lord Kimberley, alluded to the delicate position in which I find myself owing to the timing of this debate when the Prime Minister is discussing this among other subjects during her visit to Washington. But the noble Earl can be proud that at the very least we have had this evening a series of well-informed and cogently argued speeches which have focused the arguments and have demonstrated that nuclear strategy is not only a very complex matter but a contentious area of policy involving a number of theoretical as well as practical considerations. Almost the only thing we can agree about is that there is no consensus on this matter as yet.
The hypotheses and analyses of nuclear deterrence involve the consideration of profoundly important matters touching the futures of citizens of this and other countries for many years ahead, beyond the lifespan of most of us here. The burden of these decisions is borne by this Government in full awareness of the responsibilities that we thereby assume, and I agree with the many noble Lords in expressing the hope that we can return to this in a full debate as the relevant decisive criteria emerge as the argument develops. Meantime, this debate provides me with the opportunity to set out briefly the rationale of the Government's belief in the need to maintain the independent strategic nuclear deterrent.
Throughout this discussion let us never lose sight of that last word. Our purpose is not to match a potential great Power adversary and to be able to win a slogging match, what the noble Lord, Lord Hill-Norton, called a "nuclear exchange". We seek above all to avoid a nuclear conflict by removing the temptation of trying to score an easy victory over us without fear of retaliatory damage. First
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let me once again reiterate our general policy. We aim above all else to ensure that the security of this country is never imperilled, but we urgently need to divert as few as possible of our national resources into channels which make little direct contribution to the national standard of living. Also, few noble Lords would disagree that the proliferation of armaments represents a danger in itself, and that is probably the only point on which I would agree with the noble Lord, Lord Noel-Baker. We do not want to engage in an arms race; I have said that before and I say it again. Indeed, we are seeking to achieve the greatest degree of security at the lowest possible level of armament compatible with that security.
We believe that a realist has to recognise that the search for security involves the maintenance of a balance of forces between East and West and the promotion of detente on the basis of that stable relationship. Our whole defence policy is designed to preserve peace and, if that fails, to prevent the use by any party of nuclear weapons of mass destruction. This implies that the level of armament that we must sustain must be directly related to the threat which we face, exactly opposite to the view expressed by Lord Noel-Baker. We need to maintain our capability to respond across the whole spectrum of deterrence—conventional, theatre nuclear (I apologise to the noble Lord, Lord Kennet, for that phrase) and strategic nuclear—and we need to preserve the close links between all the elements in the spectrum. In order to avoid the possibility of political blackmail, the Alliance must not allow itself to fall into a position where it would be unable to offer a credible response at any level of conflict.
It has often been claimed that the USSR military doctrine postulates that any conflict between the major powers will inevitably escalate to total nuclear war. I cannot believe that the Soviet Union would not go to great lengths to avoid conflict at that level and there is much evidence in the arms control field to support that view. We therefore believe that there is real value in continuing to try to contain a conflict at the lowest possible level.
Apart from conventional forces, the Alliance must maintain its ability to

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respond at the theatre nuclear level also, for, as many in this House will be aware, the Soviet Union has made major improvements to its long-range theatre nuclear forces with, as several noble Lords have mentioned, the introduction of new, highly accurate SS-20 missiles and the Backfire bomber which can strike targets throughout the whole of Europe. Furthermore, these new Soviet deployments are occurring just at a time when NATO's own long-range theatre nuclear forces are relatively small and are getting older. This was why, as I explained to the House on 13th December, the Alliance has decided to modernise NATO's long-range theatre nuclear forces by deploying new United States land-based systems in Europe. As I said then, the planned deployment will be comprised of 108 Pershing II launchers and 464 ground-launched cruise missiles.
The noble Lord, Lord Gladwyn, asked me about the nature of our influence of American control. This is one of the details that will need to be worked out in the agreement. That was a point also referred to by the noble Lord, Lord Kennet, and I think I shall have to write to him as to the exact nature of the single key or dual key control of the existing missile systems.
I now move to the strategic nuclear level. My right honourable friends the Prime Minister and the Secretary of State for Defence have made clear in another place that the Government intend to maintain the effectiveness of the United Kingdom's nuclear deterrent into the 1990s and for a long time thereafter. The United Kingdom's strategic deterrent, consisting of Polaris nuclear submarines, has fulfilled its assigned role with distinction for many years now, and we will ensure that it continues to do so into the 1990s. Ministers have made clear that as far as a successor system is concerned the Government are considering a number of options, but we are not yet in a position to come to a conclusion.
May I now take the opportunity which the noble Earl's Question provides to emphasise the value of our independent strategic deterrent to the United Kingdom and to the Alliance as a whole. The deterrent effect of NATO's forces is directly related to what we can term an
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uncertainty factor; that is to say, that their credibility, the extent to which they are seen to dissuade an aggressor, is reinforced if the number of risks that an aggressor must take into account is high. Any planning by such a potential aggressor is made considerably more complicated by the existence of a wide range of uncertainties.
It is a principal function of the United Kingdom's strategic deterrent to increase these uncertainties and thereby to reinforce the credibility of the Alliance's deterrent posture by providing a second, and independent, centre of decision-making within NATO. This enhancement of the deterrent is a vital ingredient in plans to maintain peace in Europe. The second major reason for the United Kingdom's possessing an independent strategic deterrent is that in doing so we can provide an ultimate guarantee of our own security now and in the years ahead. Although they do not participate in the integrated military structure of the Alliance, the French, with their own independent strategic nuclear deterrent, also provide a further decision-making centre in the political framework of NATO.
In conclusion, let me return to my opening remarks. The aim of all defence expenditure, and the reason for the retention of all armaments, is to enhance our security. We want to see greater stability in the military relationship between East and West, and thereby a greater sense of security for all nations. Certainly we want to see a lowering of the number of nuclear weapons possessed by both sides, and we want to see further progress on the long road to general and complete disarmament.

CITY OF LONDON (VARIOUS POWERS) BILL
Returned from the Commons with the amendments agreed to.