Lords Sitting of 17 December 1979

Preamble
The House met at half-past two of the clock: THE LORD CHANCELLOR on the Woolsack.
Prayers—Read by the Lord Bishop of Saint Albans

THE BINGHAM REPORT: CONSIDERATION BY DPP
Lord HATCH of LUSBY: My Lords, I beg leave to ask the Question which stands in my name on the Order Paper.
The Question was as follows:
To ask Her Majesty's Government whether the Director of Public Prosecutions has completed his consideration of the Papers connected with the Bingham Report and whether any further action is contemplated.
THE LORD CHANCELLOR (Lord Hailsham of Saint Marylebone): My Lords, the Attorney General will be making a Statement on this matter as soon as possible.
Lord HATCH of LUSBY: My Lords, may I ask the noble and learned Lord whether, bearing in mind the number of reports that have been made and the number of Answers which have been given to me about the Statement which will be forthcoming from the Attorney General, he can give us any clear idea as to when this Statement is coming? I ask this particularly in view of the fact that the other place has already expressed a view—it did so in the last Parliament—that there should be a public inquiry, and that one of the noble and learned Lord's own colleagues has stated that this is a matter which calls into question the whole integrity of Parliament.
THE LORD CHANCELLOR: My Lords, the noble Lord's Question relates to a report by the Director of Public Prosecutions, and I do not think it should be linked with the other matters to which he has referred.

LIQUID MILK IMPORTS
2.39 p.m.
Baroness SHARPLES: My Lords, I beg leave to ask the Question which stands in my name on the Order Paper.
The Question was as follows:
To ask Her Majesty's Government what will be the situation after 31st December as far as imports of liquid milk from the continent are concerned.
The MINISTER of STATE, MINISTRY of AGRICULTURE, FISHERIES and FOOD (Earl Ferrers): My Lords, after 31st December the sale of milk in metric containers will be permitted. In all other respects, including health and compositional requirements, the position will remain unchanged.
Baroness SHARPLES: My Lords, I thank my noble friend the acting Leader of the House for that reply. Is there a possibility that imported milk will undercut the price of our own milk?
Earl FERRERS: My Lords, the present position is that imported pre-packed milk cannot be sold here unless it is unpacked, heat-treated again and repacked on registered premises in this country. That expense will probably render the imported milk non-competitive.
Lord WALLACE of COSLANY: My Lords, can the noble Earl confirm that deliveries of milk to British households in the customary British manner will continue, as rumours are again prevalent that the good old system of milk deliveries to the doorstep is likely to be in jeopardy?
Earl FERRERS: My Lords, I think that the delivery of milk to the doorstep is one of the most important facets of our national life, and we wish to see this continued.
Lord SWAYTHLING: My Lords, can the noble Earl say what steps can be taken to ensure that proper health and hygiene regulations, such as ours, will be enforced? Because one has reports that the standard of health and hygiene of the milk-producing farmers on the continent, especially in France, is very much below that in this country.
Earl FERRERS: My Lords, our standards are extremely high. At the moment there is no common European Commission Directive on uniformity of standards, although one is lying on the table. We would not wish to see any agreement to a European standard being reached if it lowered in any way the standard which we have at the moment.
Lord LEATHERLAND: My Lords, following the noble Lord's supplementary question, may I ask the noble Earl—and I do so as one who very frequently slept in French cowsheds in 1915 and onwards—whether it is a fact that milk from French farms is likely to be contaminated because the cows are kept in most insanitary cowsheds?
Earl FERRERS: My Lords, the noble Lord, Lord Leatherland, has had the advantage of me if he has slept in a French cowshed. All I would tell him is that any milk which is sold in Great Britain must conform to the standards which Great Britain has. We make those standards operate by having premises which are registered and inspected by the local authorities. Therefore, any milk which comes from France, even if it is produced in the disagreeable situations which the noble Lord, Lord Leatherland, has suggested, would have to be treated in premises which are under the supervision of local authorities.

LEGISLATIVE CONGESTION
2.42 p.m.
Lord BALFOUR of INCHRYE: My Lords, I beg leave to ask the Question which stands in my name on the Order Paper.
The Question was as follows:
To ask Her Majesty's Government whether the legislative programme intended for the present Session, and to be taken before the Summer Recess, will avoid a repetition of certain past years when this House has been expected to deal with a congestion of legislation which could only be passed by unduly prolonged sittings, the House having to continue sitting into the Recess, or Bills having to be passed without time for adequate consideration and debate.
Earl FERRERS: My Lords, the Government recognise that Parliament will be under some pressure this Session. I can assure your Lordships that we will nevertheless do our best to see—with, I am sure, the help of the Opposition—that the arrangements which are made for the conduct of business are as acceptable to your Lordships as possible.
Lord BALFOUR of INCHRYE: My Lords, while thanking the Minister for that reply, may I ask whether he is aware of the appreciation felt, I believe, by Members of all sides of the House of the efforts which Ministers here—in particular the noble Lord, Lord Soames—have made to ensure that some major Bills are started in this House? Furthermore, will not the Government decision (which was insisted upon by the Opposition in another place) to take the Local Government Bill first in the Commons and then here seriously increase the risk of a July log-jam? In order to ease this possibility, will the Government consider a really formidable carrying-over of legislation after the House meets after the Summer Recess and before the winding up of the Session?—for only by such means do I believe that the log-jam is likely to be avoided.
Earl FERRERS: My Lords, I am grateful to my noble friend for the kind remarks that he has made about my noble friend Lord Soames. Anyone who has been Leader of this House will know (as the noble Lord, Lord Peart, does) that it is always difficult to get major legislation starting here. Clearly, the decision to take the Local Government Bill in another place will, in the words of my noble friend, risk the July log-jam becoming greater; but it is entirely up to this House to decide how we conduct our business to deal with that log-jam. I have no doubt that, as we have met the real points that the Opposition had, they, in turn, will make sure that they will help us to see that Government business is got through.
Baroness LLEWELYN-DAVIES of HASTOE: My Lords, is the noble Lord aware that it is quite out of the question for the Opposition in the other House to insist on anything about Government business? It is the Government who decide, and the Government did decide. Secondly, may I ask whether the noble

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Earl is aware that it does not depend upon this House, but entirely upon the Government, whether there is a log-jam in August or September?
Earl FERRERS: My Lords, of course it is the Government's decision as to the House in which a Bill should be taken, but being an accommodating kind of Government, we considered the view of the Opposition and tried to meet them over it. Having done so, we are in control of our business in this House and I am sure that we shall all do the best we can to ensure that the disagreeable thoughts that my noble friend has will not materialise.
Lord BYERS: My Lords, are there no major Bills that we could take in this House at an early stage instead of the Local Government Bill which we have now lost?
Earl FERRERS: Yes, my Lords, there are some new Bills which will be coming shortly after Christmas and in the New Year. Progress on the Competition Bill and the Industry Bill in the other place indicates that they will be with us fairly soon.
Lord MURRAY of GRAVESEND: My Lords, is the noble Lord aware that we shall be most helpful in getting legislation through, particularly if we drop something like the useless trades union legislation in order to make it easier?
Earl FERRERS: My Lords, I am sure the noble Lord will find many ways in which he can help us, even though that might not be one of them.

AIRPORTS POLICY
Lord DENHAM: My Lords, with the leave of the House, at a convenient moment after 3.30 this afternoon my noble friend Lord Trefgarne will repeat a Statement on airports policy.

BUSINESS OF THE HOUSE
Earl FERRERS: My Lords, I beg to move that the Motion standing in my name on the Order Paper be approved.
Moved, That Standing Order No. 43 (No two stages of a Bill to be taken on one day) be suspended until the Christmas Recess.—(Earl Ferrers.)
On Question, Motion agreed to.

BRITISH RAILWAYS (No. 2) BILL
Read 3a, with the amendments, and passed, and returned to the Commons.

ZIMBABWE BILL
2.48 p.m.
THE LORD CHANCELLOR: My Lords, I rise to move that this Bill be now read a second time. The first thing that I have to tell your Lordships is that I have it in command from Her Majesty the Queen to acquaint your Lordships that Her Majesty, having been informed of the purport of the Zimbabwe Bill, has consented to place Her Royal prerogative and interest, so far as they are affected by the Bill, at the disposal of Parliament.
The Bill itself contains a number of technically complicated provisions; but it is not for this reason that my noble friend the Foreign Secretary thought that, in the unavoidable absence of himself and of the Leader of the House, it was a courtesy to the House that the one remaining Member of the Cabinet should move the Second Reading of this piece of legislation which may be, indeed, an historic piece of legislation. I am sorry, and I think we are all sorry, that it has been necessary to compress the parliamentary timetable for its passage; but in another place the Opposition were good enough to understand the reasons for this and we were grateful to them there. I am given by noble friends to understand that in this House the Opposition intend to be equally accommodating. We acknowledge and are grateful for their public spirit in this matter.
The whole good faith of Her Majesty's Government, and therefore of Britain, depends upon placing this Bill speedily upon the statute book. It is essential that the independence Bill should pass before the actual occurrence of independence so that elections may be held before Independence Day and all affected by the granting

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of independence—particularly individuals—shall know in advance the arrangements to be made.
For 14 years now Rhodesia has been living in a state of illegality, of defiance of lawful authority. There is scarcely a person in any party in this country who did not deplore the unilateral declaration of independence when it was made; and certainly no one with any influence in my own party who did not use that influence against it being made. It was against the grain of history and contrary to the whole movement of British policy since the war. Worse than this, by defying lawful authority, the régime in Rhodesia made it difficult or impossible—and we do not yet quite know which; but difficult at least and possibly impossible—for Britain to help them and their country out of the impasse that they had created for themselves.
Since then, every party in every part of the House, has striven to the best of its ability to put an end to the state of illegality, and to create conditions in which Rhodesia could be brought to legal independence—its one chance, as all of us believe, of peaceful stability upon which the happiness and fortunes of all its inhabitants can be seen to depend. That has been the aim of us all throughout, although about the means we may have been in a state of difference with one another. The negotiations of the past 14 weeks have at last resolved the main political difficulties which stood in the way. This involved compromise between both sides in the negotiations. I know that my noble friend would wish me to pay tribute to both sides in those negotiations for their readiness to make the necessary compromises.
But an essential condition throughout has been a return to legality. It has been recognised throughout by the international community that it was the responsibility of Great Britain, it was the responsibility of Her Majesty's Government, to secure this return to legality. That was recognised by the Commonwealth at Lusaka, it has been accepted by Her Majesty's Government and by the parties to the negotiations. That is why the negotiations have taken place here at Lancaster House; that is why my noble friend has chaired the conference. The House will perhaps
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forgive me if I pay shortly my own tribute to my noble friend for the enormous public service that he has performed in doing so.
In addition to the immense burdens which inescapably attend the office of Foreign Secretary, he has risked his health and almost worn himself to a standstill in the cause of peace. He has been patient in the face of frustration; courteous in the face of discourtesy; helpful in the face of discouragement; firm without being precipitate in the face of vascillation. Now we hope that his efforts—all our efforts—are almost within sight of success. The main political issues have been resolved and only details remain to be settled. The first stage was of course to agree and then to enact the constitution. The summary was agreed between the parties in October. The full text (available to your Lordships) has been enacted by Order in Council. It achieves full majority rule, both in the administration and in the legislature. It provides safeguards, persuasive and entrenched, for the minority community: safeguards but not privileges; entrenched but not with blocking powers. Let us hope that they will prove sufficient for them to remain and to make their own distinctive and substantial contribution to the prosperity and security of the new State.
The next step was to secure the agreement of the parties to accept the authority of the Governor in the transitional period prior to independence. This was necessary in order to achieve a return to legality. That was no mean achievement. Your Lordships will remember that never had Rhodesia had a Governor with full powers such as my noble friend Lord Soames has. Your Lordships will remember the special position of Rhodesia ever since 1923. But the Governor's presence is essential in order to give confidence to both sides and to secure that there should be an impartial administration and an impartial organisation of elections. The House has already wished my noble friend and Lady Soames Godspeed and success in discharging their responsibilities.
As I have said, the task of my noble friend Lord Soames is to assume administrative power prior to the elections, and to organise and supervise the elections under the authority of Her Majesty's

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Government. That was agreed at Lancaster House, and it had previously been agreed at Lusaka. The elections will be held under British authority; all parties have agreed to campaign peacefully and all parties have agreed to accept the results. Independence will be conferred on whatever Government emerges as the result. The detailed arrangements for the elections have also been agreed at Lancaster House, and the legislative steps have been taken here by Order in Council and in Rhodesia by Governor's orders.
The dispatch of the Governor and the introduction of this Bill this afternoon are closely related to one another. Taken together, they enable us to do what the international community has constantly urged upon us as our responsibility. But of course there can no no question of our accepting an open-ended responsibility, an open-ended commitment. Our purpose is to organise elections in which all parties can participate equally. Our one remaining responsibility will end when that purpose is achieved and the constitutional formalities completed. In our view, that should not last more than three months. We are taking this action to discharge our remaining responsibility and to bring it to an end and not to prolong it.
This was well put by my noble friend Lord Soames in his inaugural address to the people of Rhodesia, when he said—and I quote him:
"My aim is to work with you for a better and more peaceful future for all the people of this country. My task is to hold the Government of the country in trust while the political leaders of all parties put their case to you. As soon as you have made your choice I shall hand over my powers to the Government which you elect and return to London. Your country will then become legally independent. This is an irreversible process".
With my noble friend's arrival as Governor, Rhodesia has been restored to legality. Our permanent representative at the United Nations has informed the President of the Security Council that the situation which led to the imposition of sanctions no longer exists. The United States and New Zealand have already followed our example in lifting sanctions. The Government hope and assume that others will do so very shortly.
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The third and final task of the conference was to secure agreement on a cease-fire. Agreement has been reached on the Government's proposals for a cease-fire. These offer security to the forces of both sides and enable them to be effectively monitored. The Salisbury delegation have subsequently accepted further proposals for the detailed implementation of the cease-fire. Discussions continue with the Patriotic Front. We have told the Patriotic Front that, if their forces assemble with their arms and equipment in numbers greater than can be dealt with at the assembly places designated in the cease-fire agreement, the Government will assess the need for additional sites in relation to the successful accomplishment of the assembly process by the Patriotic Front forces and in relation to the disposition of their forces. The Government also recognise that the Patriotic Front had a practical problem in one particular area, and have agreed to provide a further assembly point. We hope that, with these additional assurances, the Patriotic Front will now also initial the agreement.
The conference has now concluded its work and the final documents are now ready for signature. They have already been initialled by the Salisbury delegation and by Her Majesty's Government. The Patriotic Front must now take the crucial political decision whether to put its support to the test of elections rather than continue the war. When so much has been achieved and when the basic causes of the conflict in Rhodesia have been removed, it would indeed be a tragedy if the Patriotic Front were to refuse a peaceful settlement at this last moment. The Government hope profoundly that they will agree to participate in elections. I do not believe that a refusal to do so would have international support; nor can the Government keep open the date of elections indefinitely while the Patriotic Front make up their minds.
The Zimbabwe Bill now before your Lordships will enable the Government finally to discharge Britain's responsibility. As I have said, I regret the compression of the parliamentary timetable and am grateful to the Opposition for their understanding and consideration in this matter; but the passage of the Bill is for the parties to the conference a crucial test of the Government's good faith. We have been

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able to persuade them to make concessions—in many cases they have been very difficult concessions—by assuring them that the result will be independence for their country. We cannot hold a sword of Damocles over the country by leaving that issue in doubt. The parties have agreed to abide by the agreement and now we must show our good faith in return. It is also important that the arrangements to be made on independence should be made known well in advance, particularly to those individuals who may be affected by them.
I now turn to the legislative provisions of the Bill. Clause 1 establishes a new independent Republic of Zimbabwe, and, upon independence, terminates the responsibility of the Parliament and Government of the United Kingdom for Southern Rhodesia. In the Bill no date is set for independence. This will be determined by Order in Council. It may well not be possible to set the date until a late stage in the interim period: that will be for the Governor to decide in the form of a recommendation.
The Government do not propose that the order setting the date for independence be subject to further parliamentary procedure. There is nothing more that the Government intend to ask of the parties to the conference as a condition of independence. The certainty that independence will follow if the agreements reached at Lancaster House are honoured will be a strong incentive in the interim period for both parties to carry them out in full. So far as the parties to the conference are concerned, the final hurdle is the agreement of the conference. We cannot allow further obstacles now to be added.
The Government have undertaken to ensure that the coming elections are fair. Observers will be present from the Commonwealth and from other countries to see that they are fair, but it is the British Government's responsibility to bring Rhodesia to legal independence and the basis on which we shall do so is agreement reached at the conference.
Most of the remaining clauses are technical but they must be summarised, even though I shall attempt to do so briefly. First of all, there is the question of membership of the Commonwealth. In most, though not in all, previous case membership of the Commonwealth was
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discussed prior to independence. In this case the question must and will be decided by the newly-elected Government when it comes. Thus, since the processes of consultation will need time, the Bill assumes that independence will occur outside the Commonwealth and it contains provisions to deal with this, particularly in order to avoid an abrupt change of status for individuals. I need hardly add that if the future elected Government of Zimbabwe decide to seek Commonwealth membership, Her Majesty's Government will give the application their warm support.
The next question to be dealt with is citizenship and nationality. There are, we believe, some 80,000 people—I should say that I am now referring to Clause 2—who are also citizens of the United Kingdom and Colonies. They have this status quite independently of their relationship and connection with Rhodesia, usually because they were born in this country. The position of those 80,000 will not change on independence.
In addition to these, we estimate that there are some 70,000 citizens of Rhodesia who have a right of abode here under existing law because at present they are Commonwealth citizens. These would automatically lose their right of abode when Rhodesia came to independence outside the Commonwealth, unless some transitional provision were made. That is what we are doing. Since the Government believe that Zimbabwe may well join the Commonwealth within one year, it would not be fair to change abruptly the position of this second group of 70,000 persons. Schedule 1, paragraph 2, to the Bill therefore preserves their right of abode for one year. If, at the end of that period of a year, Zimbabwe has not joined the Commonwealth then that right of abode will be lost.
There are two further transitional provisions for citizenship. Rhodesians who are already in this country and who have an entitlement to registration as citizens of the United Kingdom and Colonies, will have a further 12 months after independence within which to apply. That is contained in Schedule 2, paragraph 2. It applies only to persons who have already been in this country for some years.

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Then, there is a very narrow category of Rhodesians who were British subjects before 1st January 1949, with a United Kingdom born ancestor in the male line and other close connections with the United Kingdom. These, too, will also have a further 12 months in which they will be eligible to apply for registration as citizens of the United Kingdom and Colonies, if they intend to take up residence here. But I should make it clear that in this case there is no automatic entitlement to registration. It will be at the discretion of the Home Secretary.
I can therefore give your Lordships two assurances. First, the Bill does not create any new citizens of the United Kingdom and colonies. Secondly, the Bill does not give rise to any significant new immigration commitment. The persons affected by the transitional registration provisions which I have described will amount, at most, to a few hundred.
Since we are moving from illegality to legality, and from a state of war to peace, it is clear that there must be an amnesty. "Amnesty" is a word of Greek derivation. It means that if you want peace you must learn to forget the past on both sides. So be it. Clause 3 deals with the amnesty according to the law of the United Kingdom. The details of the Acts covered, both in furtherance of the unilateral declaration of independence and in resistance to it, are set out in Clause 3(2). There will also be an amnesty under Rhodesian law—that is, an amnesty different from that which I have just described in Clause 3 of the Bill—and that will be made under Section 3 of the Southern Rhodesia Act 1979. In reply to a question from the noble and learned Lord, Lord Elwyn-Jones, on 29th November, my noble friend the Foreign Secretary promised to inform the House of the Government's intentions before any action was taken about Rhodesian law, and the Government hope to be in a position to make a Statement on that shortly.
It has long been recognised on both sides of your Lordships' House that an amnesty will be required to draw a line under the past in Rhodesia, and to allow a fresh start to be made. It is appropriate that the amnesty should extend to the law of the United Kingdom, too, so that those
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concerned with the unfortunate events of the past can travel here without fear of prosecution. If we can lift the burden of the past, the task of building a future Zimbabwe on a foundation of reconciliation and unity will be eased. We must use the opportunity, too, to wipe the slate clean in our own relations with Rhodesia, and try to pick up the threads of normal relations.
To leave the House in no doubt, I also confirm that the amnesty contained in Clause 3 of the Bill before the House does not apply to sanctions offences. Section 3(1)(b)(ii) of the Southern Rhodesia Act 1979 already confers on the Government the power to grant such an amnesty. My noble friend the Foreign Secretary informed the House of that during the debate on the Bill. The matter is one which the Government still have under consideration and a further Statement on that will be made in due course.
Clauses 4 and 6 of the Bill enable consequential changes to be made in the laws of the United Kingdom, as a result of Rhodesian independence. Most of the necessary changes are already identified and are found in Schedules 2 and 3 to the Bill, but of course there may be others which we have missed. Clause 4 would also enable the Government to ensure that when payments for interest on and redemption of Rhodesian stock, which have been in abeyance for 14 years, are resumed the interest of creditors will be satisfied in an equitable manner. Clause 5 enables the Government to deal with the situation should Rhodesia become a member of the Commonwealth after independence. Many of the changes in the laws of the United Kingdom made by this Bill and its schedules would then be reversed.
Schedule 2 deals more extensively with the consequences of Zimbabwe ceasing to be a part of Her Majesty's dominions, without being a member of the Commonwealth. A number of Acts require that the holders of certain offices, including, I am told, that of Lord Chancellor, should be British subjects. These restrictions will not apply to citizens of Zimbabwe for a period of one year after independence. They will also be allowed to remain members of local authorities until their term of office expires. They will remain eligible to vote at national and local

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government elections during the validity of any register on which they have been included while they were British subjects, and they will be exempt from the liability to deportation in certain cases for a period of one year, and any additional period during which their application for citizenship of the United Kingdom and colonies is under consideration.
The transitional period of 12 months from the date of independence, during which these savings, as well as those affecting citizenship, will have effect gives reasonable time for the new Government of Zimbabwe to reach a decision on Commonwealth membership, and for an application to be dealt with by the Commonwealth, as well as for individuals to make any necessary adjustments in their private affairs.
Schedule 2 also continues in force provisions for the registration of colonial probates and maintenance orders, and those relating to a dominion register of companies. Southern Rhodesians presently registered on a Commonwealth list under the Dentists Act and the Veterinary Surgeons Act will continue to be so registered. Schedule 3 provides for the repeal of a number of measures relating to Southern Rhodesia which will no longer apply after independence, and for the deletion from various measures of certain references to Southern Rhodesia and to matters and persons connected with Southern Rhodesia.
Though this Bill deals with Southern Rhodesia and its future as Zimbabwe, the House would not wish me to conclude my speech without referring to the immense benefits that a peaceful settlement will confer on the lives and fortunes of neighbouring peoples and neighbouring Governments. These Governments have played a vital and valuable part in making a settlement possible and we are deeply grateful to all of them. We have kept in close touch with them all, both in the preparation for the conference and throughout its course. There can be no doubt that their support and the support of the Commonwealth, the support of our partners in the EEC and the support of the United States and other Governments for a negotiated settlement has been a major factor in persuading the two delegations at Lancaster House to accept the proposals put before the conference,
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and to try to reconcile their differences. I do not need to remind the House of the effect that the Rhodesian dispute has had on relations between the countries of the region. I hope that even before Zimbabwe attains independence considerable progress can be made to normalise the country's relations with its neighbours.
The agreements reached at the conference and now awaiting signature are perfectly fair and widely recognised internationally to be so. They have been achieved because both sides have recognised that there is a more excellent way to a happy future than the continuation of a costly and tragic war. Can either side step back at this late stage and withhold its consent? I will not contemplate that possibility. In any event, nothing can obscure the fact that a constitution has been agreed, that elections have been agreed and that a return to legality has been achieved. There is now no longer any reason to withhold legal independence from Rhodesia, provided that, and as soon as, elections have been held.
It only remains for me to express the hope that the spirit of reason which has characterised the conference up to this point will be shown on all sides during the weeks leading up to independence. It is of crucial importance that the elections which are held should be, and should be seen to be, fair elections, if this beautiful country is to return speedily to a normal relationship with the rest of the world. From all parties this will demand restraint and it will demand goodwill. A settlement has been achieved honourably. We must now see that it is implemented and observed.
Perhaps I may finish on a personal note. My father died in 1950. With the exception of the seven years I spent in the Commons, I have been in your Lordships' House throughout the period since. I have been a Back-Bencher; I have been in Opposition; I have held office; I have led the House; and now I am for the second time the occupant of the Woolsack. Throughout that period of a quarter of a century the problems of Southern Africa have bedevilled the relationship between races and nations and have baffled the efforts of successive Governments to bring them to a peaceful settlement.

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Of those problems, the question of Southern Rhodesia has proved the most intractable to date. We remember the Federation; we remember Sir Roy Welensky; we have sent out, particularly from this House, some of the best and wisest of our number—judges and statesmen, diplomats, soldiers, politicians; we have met round the table; we have met aboard ship; we have conducted inquiries; we have held debates, sometimes embittered by controversy amongst ourselves.
But what Southern Africa needs most is peace. What the world needs is peace. What the world needs, what Rhodesia needs, what Zambia needs, what Tanzania needs, what all Southern Africa needs is a period of stability. And stability can only be obtained through justice, justice only by liberty under law, liberty for all under a law just to all. This time, we have within our grasp the chance of a major success. It is the first time we have come so close to one. It may be our last opportunity. This Bill is a necessary condition of our achieving it. My Lords, I beg to move.
Moved, That the Bill be now read 2a.—(The Lord Chancellor.)
3.24 p.m.
Lord GORONWY-ROBERTS: My Lords, the House will be very grateful to the noble and learned occupant of the Woolsack for the superb clarity with which he has explained the contents of this very complicated and, as he said, historic Bill. It comes to your Lordships after Second Reading in another place and it is not the normal practice of your Lordships' House to refuse a Second Reading to a Bill which has had that experience in the other place. Nor, indeed, do Her Majesty's Opposition seek to do that today. This, however, does not mean that the misgivings that we on this side of the House have expressed, especially in the last two or three weeks, about the timing and sequence of events and action by the Government, particularly in sending the Governor to Zimbabwe before a cease-fire had been agreed by all the parties, are without foundation. We have to repeat those reservations today, hoping profoundly that they will be proved to be unfounded as events develop in Zimbabwe in the next few days and weeks.
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The Foreign Secretary has indeed exercised considerable skill in bringing the matter to the point at which it now stands. But we all agree with the noble and learned Lord the Lord Chancellor, and welcome his references to the very considerable concessions made by other parties to the discussions at Lancaster House, including the Patriotic Front and the Muzorewa Government, and not forgetting the important role played by the Front Line Presidents. Equally, the Commonwealth Secretariat, so ably led by Sir Shridath Ramphal, its Secretary-General, has from time to time made crucial contributions to resolving very difficult situations.
I hope that on the basis of the agreements so far achieved the Governor in Zimbabwe will succeed in the very difficult tasks imposed upon him. We for our part fervently hope that he succeeds, and we shall certainly do everything we can to assist him in his work. I believe that the Opposition, both here and in another place—and, indeed, the country—have shown that they are keenly cognisant of the difficulties of this matter and have done or said nothing to hinder and everything to help the solution that may now be within sight. We particularly salute the courage of Lord and Lady Soames in going out to Rhodesia under the conditions imposed upon them. They are going out without the fundamental assurance behind them of an agreed cease-fire, and in that set of circumstances their courage is all the more remarkable.
So much for timing and sequence. The objectives of the Bill before us are of course acceptable to Her Majesty's Opposition, as they are, I believe, to the rest of Parliament and the people. In fact, the Bill generally expresses the policy which we in Government consistently pursued, not always at that time with the full-hearted support and encouragement of the party opposite. Nevertheless, we rejoice in their present sanctity, even if they are somewhat latter-day saints, and we look forward to many more agreeable U-turns of policy, both at home and abroad, by the present Government. The Bill therefore seeks to achieve what we all want: an orderly, peaceful transition by Zimbabwe-Rhodesia to independence, hopefully within the Commonwealth, through the democratic and elective process. The objectives are agreed.

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Now, how are they to be achieved through this Bill? The instrument, of course, is the Governor. Now, and until the day of independence, he is the government of Rhodesia, or we might say the United Kingdom is governing Rhodesia now, and will continue to do so until the day of independence, through a plenipotentiary who is the administrative executive and military head of the country. What is his central task, as described in this Bill and in the concomitant order? It is to organise free and fair elections, and that means that he has to make sure of a number of things. In particular, all the parties concerned must see that the arrangements for the elections and their conduct are fair and free.
At the top of the list of the things that he needs to ensure is equal access to the media for all parties taking part in the election. The results of the election will not otherwise be seen to be credible, and they will not be accepted. For years the Rhodesian broadcasting system has been the creature of the illegal régime, propagating the policies of the Smith party, and, latterly, in the last few months, that of the Smith-Muzorewa régime. The staff, technical and editorial, have operated in that groove of partiality. It is not the BBC World Service that has been put over the wires to the Rhodesian population; it is the news as prepared by the South African agency. Is that still the position? Is the Rhodesian radio still conducted by the same people and for the same purposes as has obtained in the last 14 years or so? Is not this one of the first things, if the election is to be seen to be fair and free, that should be put right? It is indeed essential that the position should be changed, and that it should be seen to be changed.
I understand that the Governor left for Rhodesia without experts drawn from our own media to accompany him. I believe one member of the COI went out with him. Perhaps the Minister, when he replies to the debate, will reassure us that the Governor has with him or will have sent out to him personnel from our own media, particularly from the BBC, which enjoys a deservedly high reputation in Africa and indeed throughout the world, so that this essential of a free and fair election is properly taken in hand.
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Secondly, what is being done about the political detainees? It is no good making elaborate preparations for an election when perhaps 18,000 people, who have very definite views about what kind of government should be elected as a result of that election, are not in the country to take part in the election. What steps are being taken to release the political detainees? I am not referring now to those who are in prison for criminal reasons. Are the political detainees being freed and enabled to vote and work for the kind of government they want? And what about the refugees, both inside and outside Rhodesia? There may be as many as a quarter of a million Rhodesians who are in fact refugees from their own homes. Will the electoral commissioner make arrangements for these people—they are a very substantial body indeed—to return to their districts to take part in the election and to vote on election day?
Of course, the release of detainees and the facilitating of the return of refugees to their homes applies equally to the Patriotic Front and to any irregular organisation which may be detaining anybody or preventing anybody from returning to his home. The message is mainly to the Governor of Rhodesia, that is to the United Kingdom Government operating in Rhodesia through the Governor, but equally to those who are in command of a great deal of territory and under whom a great many people are at present living. The electoral commission, coming as it does from personnel in this country, will make a very good job of the election. But that is not enough. Unless in fact everything possible has been done to enable the maximum possible number of the population to be registered and to take part in the election and to avail themselves of the free media, then even the most tightly organised election will not carry with it, either in Rhodesia or abroad, the credibility that it must have.
Thirdly, all sections of the people of Zimbabwe-Rhodesia must see for themselves that the United Kingdom, through the Governor, is already beginning on the task of reconstructing the economic life of the country and looking to a future of co-operation with and practical assistance for the new independent Zimbabwe, and indeed practical assistance to countries

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like Zambia which have suffered greatly as a result of UDI and as a result of the sanctions régime. In Rhodesia itself a great many schools, local clinics, hospitals and other facilities have been closed or destroyed in the past few years. In Rhodesia itself there are local scarcities of food, of medicaments, of essential provisions. It is mainly a matter of transport, of organisation. A cessation of the fighting and co-operation on all sides in order to get these facilities going again and the resources flowing more freely may very quickly solve the position. But I make the point that while we are organising the election there is also the need to proceed with the practical policy of reconstructing the life of the country, and certainly attending to the more immediate urgencies, such as those I have mentioned.
May I also ask, what is the position about the supply of maize, and indeed of food generally, to Zambia, and the restoration of communications with that country? There is an impression, I think, that maize and other foodstuffs have begun to flow freely again into Zambia. Some of us have been disturbed in the last day or so to be told by dependable sources that this is not so, that the food is not moving into Zambia yet. I think it is a matter of some priority that attention should be given to this matter and that Zambia should receive its customary supplies, especially of maize, and that we should do everything we can to rebuild the bridges in more senses than one, because Zambia, through its President, has made a vital contribution to the development of this agreement. I hope—indeed, I assume—that, while the work of negotiating the transition to independence has been proceeding, the Government have at the same time been thinking ahead about the problems of reconstruction. Once more one has to remind oneself that there may be a copybook election, but if the electors themselves do not find a comparable movement forward in reform and reconstruction in the economic reassurances which they seek, then a vacuum of loyalty may be created, despite the elections, into which undemocratic and wholly uncongenial forces may flow. Politics alone is never enough; it must be supported by constructive economic action.
The Bill, as we have heard, does not
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name a date for independence and the reason is that between the enactment of the Bill and the granting of independence there may be developments which affect the very date of independence. We do not disagree with that procedure, but we feel that the Government would have been well advised to make the order subject to an Affirmative Resolution in both Houses. The point was very ably argued by my right honourable friend Mr. Shore in the other place last week and he was strongly supported in the House. We regret that situation, but we hope that before the end of today's proceedings the Government may think again about this and decide that an order of this kind, naming the date of independence, could, without creating any kind of delay or breaking the momentum of events, be placed for affirmative approval before both Houses. As it is, whatever happens in Rhodesia, and however unsatisfactory the conduct of the elections may prove to be—we very much hope that they will prove to be totally satisfactory to all who take part—if a situation arises there which gives grounds for serious concern, the Government nevertheless under the Bill and the consequent provisions which flow from it, may designate a date for independence without putting the matter to Parliament for discussion and providing it with the opportunity of determining finally whether the true conditions of independence have, in fact, been fulfilled.
We have, as the noble Lord knows, been considering on this side of the House whether to put down a manuscript amendment today. We have finally decided against that course, but I make a last appeal to the Government to reconsider their position on this matter. At the very least, realising as they must the strong feelings of the Opposition on this point, will they not give the assurance that a report on the conduct of the elections will be made to Parliament and opportunity for discussing that report be provided, before the order is made? For our responsibility does not end with the Second Reading of this Bill. It will not even finally come to end when we are able to say in the British Parliament, "We are satisfied that the elections have been so held as to show conclusively the wishes of the Rhodesian people; and therefore the date for independence is hereby approved".

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I shall press on as quickly as possible as other noble Lords wish to speak. I am glad to see that Clause 2 deals fairly with the questions of nationality. There are some 150,000 Rhodesians whose position might be unfairly prejudiced if an abrupt change were made in their status. The provisions for the categories which we have heard described seem to us to be eminently fair.
The clause in the Bill which deals with amnesty is equally acceptable to us although we shall wish to study perhaps a little more closely the form of words used by the noble and learned Lord when introducing the Bill. Suffice it to say for the moment that the clause, in making provision for amnesty, is in a humane and constructive tradition. No reconciliation is possible in circumstances such as this if there is a backwash of revenge or of persecution after independence. We have many examples to draw on to show that amnesty is the best policy when independence has been achieved—I would not say through a process, but in an adversary atmosphere. Without amnesty in these terms reconciliation might be postponed or even made impossible.
We also very much welcome the opportunity provided for the new independent State to join the Commonwealth if it so wishes and of course if the Commonwealth agrees. Membership is by application. I hope that Zimbabwe will indeed decide to apply for membership, and I may be permitted to hope that another member of the Commonwealth, our own country, may be one of its sponsors on that happy day. I am sure that it would be to the benefit not only of Zimbabwe but of the Commonwealth.
The role of the Commonwealth and the Commonwealth secretariats in promoting a solution of this difficult problem, especially since the Lusaka Conference, has been considerable. Once more we have been reminded of the strength of the links between widely diverse countries that make up its membership. If Zimbabwe chooses to join, it will find itself among friends old and new—not least of whom will be the United Kingdom.
So, we extend to the Bill and its purposes a warm support. We regret that the order which is consequent upon it, in relation to the date of independence, is
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not made subject to Affirmative Resolution by both Houses. We ask the Government even at this late hour—it is perfectly possible—to look at the situation again. We agree with the purports. We are bound to repeat our misgivings about the handling of the timing in the last two or three weeks. It smacks a little of bouncing. Bouncing people into a position of agreement, when fundamentally they do not agree, may succeed at the time, but only for a time. Sooner or later the basic differences and resentments will surface. We very much hope that the methods which the Government have adopted for this purpose will succeed. It will be not the triumph of one party, but the victory of a whole nation which wishes for Zimbabwe, as it has for its previous dependencies, nothing but peace, stability and prosperity.

AIRPORTS POLICY
3.50 p.m.
Lord TREFGARNE: My Lords, with the leave of your Lordships, and particularly with that of the noble Lord, Lord Gladwyn, may I repeat a Statement being made by my right honourable friend the Secretary of State for Trade, Mr. Nott, in another place, on Airports Policy. The Statement is as follows:
"With permission, Mr. Speaker, I will now make a Statement about airports policy. I am publishing today the reports of the Study Group on South-East Airports and the Advisory Committee on Airports Policy. I recommend these reports to the House, and I should like to thank the members of these two bodies, which include representatives of local authorities, for their conscientious and painstaking work in preparing them.
"The Government have decided not to build a major new international airport of the kind considered by the Roskill Commission Report in 1971; nor do they intend to resurrect the Maplin project, even in a revised form. Instead the Government's policy is: first, to encourage the fullest use of regional airports; and, secondly, to provide additional airport capacity, as the traffic develops, based on the existing airports in the South-East, particularly Heathrow, Gatwick and

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Stansted. The Government's more detailed proposals are as follows.
"In the future we will adopt policies designed to maximise the potential of the English regional airports and those in Scotland and Wales and thus to shift the burden away from the London area airports.
"My Department will look with particular favour upon proposals for the expansion of capacity to meet demand at airports such as the East Midlands, Birmingham and Manchester.
"We propose, as opportunity arises, to negotiate new rights permitting services between overseas cities and British provincial towns. This is in accordance with the new policies contained in the Civil Aviation Bill which is now before Parliament. On the initiative of my Department the EEC Council of Ministers has recently invited the Commission, after consultation with Member States, to present specific proposals early next year for developing routes within the Community to serve the regions.
" However, even with a more effective use of regional airports the Advisory Committee makes clear that there is an urgent need for additional airport capacity in South-East England. On current forecasts, taking account of the uncertainty about future oil prices and world economic growth, it is estimated that there will be a demand of between 69 and 81 million passengers a year in London and the South-East by the late 1980s, against existing airport capacity of 50 million passengers. This leaves a large gap.
"We have considered whether it would be right to ignore the likely demand so that traffic became increasingly stifled or diverted to the Continent. Such a decision, or lack of a decision, would lead to developing chaos at our existing airports. A modern Western society heavily engaged in international trade and with a major stake in the airline business can hardly fail to provide for consumer demand, both for leisure and business. But given the inherent uncertainty of any forecast, the solution we need is one which meets the demand in London and the South-East only as it develops and which avoids the massive
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expenditure implications of developing a green field or coastal site.
"At Heathrow capacity is virtually exhausted, and that is why we must continue to divert traffic to Gatwick, as already announced in my Statement on 9th October. In order to provide additional capacity, the Government have decided to accept the Inspector's recommendation for a fourth terminal at Heathrow; the details of this decision are being announced separately today, and will include certain restrictions designed to mitigate the noise nuisance to local residents. We have also given careful consideration to the possibility of constructing a fifth terminal at Heath-row on the Perry Oaks site in order to increase yet further the capacity of that airport. However, we estimate that it would take at least 12 years to complete such a project, and it would impose added burdens on the surrounding area; these considerations have led us to the view that a fifth terminal should not be provided.
"At Gatwick a public inquiry is to be held next year into a proposal for a second terminal at the airport. The Government will reach their conclusions on this matter in the light of the Inspector's report. We have also considered whether further capacity should be created by constructing a second runway at Gatwick but have decided not to pursue this possibility.
"At Stansted the previous Government anticipated development of the existing airport to 4 million passengers a year by the late 1980s. Stansted airport already has a suitable runway which could carry, if necessary, many more passengers than this. There is good road access, and we believe that the addition of a new terminal building at Stansted, which could eventually handle up to 15 million passengers a year, together with appropriate access improvements, can be carried out by the purchase of under 1,500 acres of additional land and with the minimum commitment to public expenditure. The Government therefore believe that this expansion is the best way of providing extra capacity before the end of the next decade.
"However, we believe that the time is long overdue for a settlement of the

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airports question for a much longer period ahead so that the demand can be met if it develops into the next century. Years of indecision, decision and counter-decision reflect no credit on this country's capacity to make difficult but necessary choices. If air traffic continues to grow at anything like the rate forecast by the Advisory Committee additional capacity could be needed in the 1990s. For this reason, we have given careful consideration to each of the sites examined by the Study Group. Airports, road and rail access, the re-location of defence establishments all use up agricultural land, affect property and cause changes to the environment. The best solution must be one that avoids any premature expenditure and leaves future Governments with the maximum degree of flexibility—dependent on the growth of demand.
"Our view, on the evidence so far available, is that none of the green field sites meets these requirements. We recognise that Maplin has certain advantages, but the provision of additional road and rail links, the preparation of the site and the re-location of defence establishments, all of which would require a commitment of over £1 billion, involve very serious risks which are unjustified when we cannot be certain that an airport of such a size might be needed. Moreover, an airport at Maplin could not be ready to meet the expected shortfall in capacity in the late 1980s.
"The British Airports Authority will therefore be invited to bring forward proposals for the construction of a single terminal building at Stanstead based on the existing runway facilities, capable of handling about 15 million passengers a year. But it will also be invited to define and apply for the safeguarding of an additional area of up to 2,500 acres, sufficient to provide for a possible second runway and further terminal capacity should this be needed in the 1990s or beyond. Our aim would be that the owners of residential and agricultural property in this wider area should have the opportunity of either continuing to live or farm there, pending any possible requirement for this additional land; or
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of selling their property at an unblighted value to the BAA.
"These proposals will be examined under appropriate planning procedures which will include a wide-ranging public inquiry, and a final decision on them will then be taken. This will provide a full opportunity for all those concerned to express their views on these proposals, and for the wider social and environmental implications to be explored or assessed.
"I am making arrangements for the Vote Office to make available now to hon. Members full background information."
In parenthesis, I point out that the same information is being made available in our Printed Paper Office. The Statement continues:
"I am sure that the House will wish to debate these issues as soon as hon. Members have had a reasonable time to consider the reports and the Government's conclusions. I have therefore asked my right honourable friend the Leader of the House to make provision for a debate after the Christmas Recess".
My Lords, I say, again in parenthesis, that I imagine the usual channels will want to consider that in this House also.
That concludes the Statement.
3.59 p.m.
Lord PONSONBY of SHULBREDE: My Lords, I thank the noble Lord for repeating the Statement made by the Secretary of State in another place this afternoon. For almost 20 years we have had indecision on the question of future airports policy by various Governments. I cannot but agree with the Statement, that the time is long overdue for a settlement of the airports question. I only hope that the Government will be able to stick to their decision, and that their decision is the right one. The Statement says:
"In the future we will adopt policies designed to maximise the potential of the English regional airports and those in Scotland and Wales and thus to shift the burden away from the London area airports".
The Statement goes on to talk about the development of the East Midlands, Birmingham and Manchester airports.

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Later in the Statement reference is made to whether it would be right to ignore the likely demand so that traffic becomes increasingly stifled or diverted to the continent. The danger of the proposed policy is that insufficient capacity at London's airports can mean a diversion to continental airports, and already Amsterdam is being spoken of as London's third airport. However, it must be said that the proposed capacity envisaged and catered for in the Statement seems to about balance out. Whether it works or not would seem to depend heavily on an agreement to the proposed second terminal at Gatwick.
The Government, as they must in view of the inquiry, adopt a neutral position on this, but if it just was not possible, for one reason or another, for the second terminal at Gatwick to be built, then in fact one would face a real crisis situation. It would be necessary to expedite the plans proposed for Stansted referred to in the Statement and to proceed more quickly with the proposals for the second runway and the second terminal at Stansted. My view is that it is crucial for London, and therefore for Britain, that London should retain its premier position as a staging post for international airlines into Europe. Therefore, the Statement should be measured against that criterion.
Of course, none of us has had the opportunity of reading the two reports which are being published today, and we shall no doubt read them with great interest. Indeed, as one hears that they in fact show that any decision to base a third airport on a greenfield site would be prohibitively expensive, I am sure that in the present financial situation the decision proposed by the Government is the right one. But whether it would be the right one if our financial situation was different at the present time is another question, and a question to which only time will produce the answer. I welcome the fact that the Government have come to a decision on this matter.
4.2 p.m.
Earl AMHERST: My Lords, from these Benches we also thank the noble Lord for repeating this interesting Statement. I would also echo the remarks of the noble
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Lord, Lord Ponsonby, about a decision being taken at last after many years of decision, indecision, and what-have-you; and we now have a policy. We rather assumed here that the policy to restrict it to the three airports is based on the fact that there has been a reported diminution of traffic, and that the figures of traffic envisaged in the future may not be the astronomical figures we spoke about some months ago.
Presumably the addition of a fourth terminal at Heathrow, the additional facilities at Gatwick and the developments at Gatwick, will be sufficient to take care of the traffic so far as can be foreseen, and we welcome that. But there is the position that if we are going to get this relief of Heathrow we have to transfer—as the Government decided back in October—some services to Gatwick from Heathrow, but there will be further transfers to Stansted. Now Stansted is quite a long way from Heathrow, and this does not make it possible to carry out what is known as "interlining". Even when the M.4 and the M.25 are completed, there may be a better transfer service than at present but it would not permit of satisfactory interlining. Therefore, presumably it will be a particular sort of service that will be transferred to Stansted. Can the Government give any indication of what those services will be and which airlines will be involved, or is it going to be left to the Civil Aviation Authority to take the decisions, and possibly get into the same trouble as we got into with Iberia earlier in the year?
I would also ask one other thing of the Government. Can the noble Lord tell us what are the developments of British Rail in this connection? Are they going to back up that service? Will it come into Liverpool Street, or King's Cross, or where?
At the present moment it is not very satisfactory. I gather from the paper that there is going to be a public inquiry for the development of Stansted, and very full details of that will presumably be published in due course. We shall have opportunities to discuss this on the Civil Aviation Bill, which I gather will be in this House after Christmas. Therefore, I will reserve any further remarks for when that Bill comes up.
4.6 p.m.
Lord TREFGARNE: My Lords, I am obliged to both noble Lords for their reception of this Statement. May I take up the points made by the noble Earl, Lord Amherst, to start with. He asked me two specific questions to which I can respond now. First, the question of transfers to Stansted. We have reached no decision on any "encouraged" transfers—can I call them that?—to Stansted, although we would certainly like to see the development of charter services from that airport. With regard to the British Rail link between Stansted and London, there is presently a service between Bishop's Stortford and Liverpool Street, which as a matter of fact is pretty good. I have used it myself on several occasions. Certainly if we came to develop Stansted beyond what is immediately foreshadowed by the Statement—namely, the single terminal and single runway—we would have to think of improving that link and perhaps extending it into the airport itself. But that is certainly not part of the immediate plan.
The noble Lord, Lord Ponsonby, asked me about the second terminal at Gatwick, and what would happen if planning permission was refused for that terminal. Of course, the decision to grant, or refuse, planning permission will rest with the Secretary of State, but he will be guided by the report of the inspector, which will be forthcoming after the public inquiry. I think it is a bit early to say what would happen in a hypothetical situation such as that, but I suppose it is true to say that the Secretary of State will have to have regard to the public interest in this matter as well as the interests put forward at the inquiry.
Baroness BURTON of COVENTRY: My Lords, the noble Lord spoke of the many years it had taken to reach a decision on this matter. I take the view that if we had reached a decision a few years ago we should not have spent more money on having an airport at Maplin than we have on all the little bits and pieces that we have added since. Might I ask the noble Lord two questions? I am sure he will realise why I ask him the first one. How many passengers does he envisage would have to go through Stansted to make a second runway necessary? I do not know whether he can help the House on my second question. I do not know
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Sir John Howard and I know nothing about the Thames Estuary Development, but I have read in the paper that Sir John had put forward the proposition that Government and private enterprise should join together to develop Maplin. He said this could be done for a cost of £560 million and could be completed in seven years. I hold no brief for Sir John or his Development Corporation, but I should be glad to know, if the noble Lord could tell us, whether that has been considered by the Secretary of State or whether he has any information upon it.
Lord TREFGARNE: Yes, my Lords, I can answer both those questions. The maximum number of passengers that Stansted could carry with one runway would be of the order of 25 million passengers a year. That would probably need more terminals than we are presently anticipating, but that is certainly the maximum capacity of the single runway. As for the proposal to develop Maplin along the lines that have been canvassed in various quarters, we think that the sums of money which the promoters of these schemes have in mind are wildly optimistic. The sort of figure that we think would be the cost of developing Maplin now would be about £1,000 million— roughly double the sort of figure that we have seen canvassed in the Press. That was one of the main reasons that caused us to go for another solution.
Lord NUGENT of GUILDFORD: My Lords, is my noble friend aware—speaking as a member of the Airports Advisory Committee—that his right honourable friend's words of thanks are very much appreciated? Is he also aware that his acceptance so quickly of the main burden of the report will be a source of satisfaction to all members of those two very hard-working committees? His choice of one, Stansted, relieves the planning blight on the other five sites which we put up for his consideration, but may I ask my noble friend whether he is aware that, in effect, his Statement indicates that he has accepted our recommendation of the first phase of the major development—that is, the 15 million passengers per annum which he proposes for Stansted, later to go up to 50 million at the turn of the century—and that the first phase at Stansted will cost of the order of £300 million; that he will need an additional

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urban population for the workforce in that area, which is entirely rural—it is very good farm land—of the order of 45,000 and that that will mean a considerable urbanisation of this very high-grade farming area? Is my noble friend further aware that he will encounter massive opposition from the local people in that area, and that it will be supported by every local authority in the South-East, who have already sent advice to his right honourable friend that he should choose Maplin, and that the considerations on environmental grounds, which decided an earlier Government in 1971 to choose Maplin, still hold for the major development of any inland site?
Lord TREFGARNE: That is a very interesting point, my Lords; the environmental considerations were certainly well forward in my right honourable friend's consideration of this matter. They are not quite so simple as people make out. Although it is true that Maplin would be developed, if it were to be built, on reclaimed land, one must remember that we should also have to build a motorway and a railway, together with a great deal of other local infrastructure to support that new airport, if we were to go ahead, while the railway and road already exist to Stansted; indeed so does the nucleus of the airport itself. We do not necessarily accept that the enormous environmental advantages claimed for the Maplin idea are really as convincing as people would have us believe.
My noble friend also referred to the cost of the Stansted development; it is true, as he said, that the figure will be of the order of £300 million, but I can say that it is expected that the great bulk of this money will he found by the British Airports Authority without recourse to the public purse, and that of course was a major consideration. My noble friend also referred to the question of urban population. Certainly the new airport, when it comes to full fruition, or the enlarged airport when it comes to full development, at Stansted will employ a good number of people and certainly many more than at present, but I would remind your Lordships that there already is a modest working population there at Stansted, and we think the problems that have been foreshadowed—of a great urban sprawl developing in that area—are, again, much over-estimated.
The EARL of CORK and ORRERY: My Lords, may I ask my noble friend to say what degree of consideration has been given to the possibility of constructing a complete airport on the Severn-side site, linked as it is to London by the motorway and the high-speed railway?
Lord TREFGARNE: Yes, my Lords. That project was considered but did not really seem to be an effective solution to the problems of South-East England.
The Earl of SELKIRK: My Lords, may I tell the Minister that I think history will tell us that we have made a very big mistake in not developing Maplin? I appreciate the arguments that have been used and I will not press them. Heathrow today is overcrowded to an extent which positively repels passengers; experienced passengers coming to this country try their utmost to avoid going to Heathrow. I do not know whether this will be resolved by a fourth terminal—I rather doubt it.
I wish to take up a point made by the noble Lord, Lord Ponsonby of Shulbrede: I hope London will not be just a staging post for the rest of the country. Is the Minister aware that at present the congestion is caused to a great extent by the fact that everybody must to go London if they want to go anywhere else? I very much hope that will stop. The way to stop that is to have longer-range aviation provision—in other words, routes to the centres in the north (Birmingham, Manchester, Glasgow or wherever)—and it is only when one can have direct flights from those places to places abroad, be it America, Europe or Africa, that we will reduce the congestion in London.
Let us face it, Stansted is an unsatisfactory place to arrive at. If one wants to do business in this country where does one want to go? One wants to go to centres of industry, and this comes right into our regional policy—the development of the north part of this country to make access easier, so that people can get to business centres. That can come only by changing the traffic pattern, in other words by getting long-range aircraft from overseas to go to the north, and unless that is done the extreme numbers of people at London's airports will not be resolved.
Lord TREFGARNE: My Lords, my noble friend is quite right when he says

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we should be developing our services from aerodromes in the Midlands and the North of England. That was referred to directly in the Statement and is very much part of Government policy.
Lord LEATHERLAND: My Lords, would the Minister agree that this plan will alter the whole face of a very wide, picturesque and peaceful countryside? Would he also agree that accommodation, either in some kind of new town or otherwise, will be needed for at least 40,000 people? In view of the widespread objection there is in many parts of Essex to this proposal, may I ask the noble Lord whether he will arrange for a public inquiry to be held?
Lord TREFGARNE: My Lords, we would not agree that the disastrous results foreshadowed by many people as a result of this decision will take place; we think the difficulties have been greatly overestimated. As for a public inquiry, as the Statement says, there will be a public inquiry into the second phase of the development of Stanstead, and that will certainly give an opportunity for all local interests to say their piece.
Lord SEGAL: My Lords, may I ask the Minister to say whether Manston airfield in Kent has been used by civil aircraft, and whether it would not be possible to contemplate a complete change of policy between Government and the Service authorities so that wider use might be developed there, because it is very underdeveloped at the present time?
Lord TREFGARNE: My Lords, Manston aerodrome in Kent is used already to some extent by civil aircraft, but on a comparatively small scale. I cannot say that Manston formed part of our consideration as a solution to the problems of airport capacity in the South-East generally, but it certainly is used at present.
Lord LEATHERLAND: My Lords, may I ask the Minister to clarify one point he made? He said there would be a public inquiry when the second phase was under consideration. When will that be, what will it involve, and will there not be a public inquiry on the proposals that have been outlined to us today?
Lord TREFGARNE: My Lords, the Statement says:
"The British Airports Authority will therefore be invited to bring forward proposals for the construction of a single terminal building at Stansted based on the existing runway facilities, capable of handling about 15 million passengers a year. But"—
and this is the important part in this connection—
"it will also be invited to define and apply for the safeguarding of an additional area of up to 2,500 acres, sufficient to provide for a possible second runway and further terminal capacity should this be needed in the 1990s or beyond".
Later, the Statement says:
"These proposals will be examined under appropriate planning procedures which will include a wide-ranging public inquiry and a final decision on them will then be taken".
The public inquiry will specifically relate to the second phase of the development.
Lord LEATHERLAND: My Lords, does that mean there will not be a public inquiry prior to Stansted becoming a very much busier airport than it is today?
Lord TREFGARNE: The noble Lord is correct, my Lords.
Lord NUGENT of GUILDFORD: My Lords, am I right in understanding my noble friend to say that it will be necessary to acquire an additional 1,500 acres to enlarge the existing runway to carry this extra traffic? Does he really mean for this very major development of Stansted as of now, from a capacity of 4 million to 15 million per annum, he is not proposing to have any public inquiry at all?
Lord PONSONBY of SHULBREDE: May I press the noble Lord on this point, my Lords? My recollection was that there would have to be a public inquiry into the planning application by the British Airports Authority for their proposed development at Stansted.
Lord TREFGARNE: My Lords, I am sorry to say that I was wrong. The noble Lord is quite right, and I apologise to my noble friend Lord Nugent of Guildford and to the noble Lord, Lord Leatherland.

ZIMBABWE BILL
Second Reading debate resumed.
4.20 p.m.
Lord GLADWYN: My Lords, after that rather long interchange, we come back to the subject of Rhodesia. As I see it, it is a great pity that we cannot make our approval of this Bill the occasion for expressing our gratitude to the Government, and indeed to all those who have assisted them in the recent negotiations, including the Commonwealth Secretariat, for having achieved a very remarkable settlement, at least setting the stage for the possible emergence of a new and viable State out of the chaos and misery of a long civil war. For this settlement is, after all, not yet in the bag, though judging from the Press, the Government are clearly confident that it shortly will be.
Your Lordships will recall that the last time we discussed this matter both the noble Lord, Lord Goronwy-Roberts and I expressed some disquiet about the decision to send out the Governor before the cease-fire was actually in operation, and, as I think the noble Lord said, we can only hope that our apprehensions were unjustified. It was admittedly a great gamble—I think that this was admitted by everybody. But in any case I should like to associate myself with the noble Lord, Lord Goronwy-Roberts, in paying tribute to the great courage of the noble Lord, Lord Soames, in the mission that he is now undertaking.
Nobody can say that the elections which, if all still goes according to plan, will I understand, take place about three months from now, will necessarily result in the installation of a Government firmly based on a majority of the nation, or even that something like a conventional democratic system will necessarily follow. Nobody can deny that, on the contrary, there is a possibility that they will result in a bitter struggle for power that could in itself produce a further civil war of quite another character. But at least a régime may emerge now that will enable the white community to continue to take a useful part in the development of the country while ceasing to play any dominant political role. That is what the long negotiations in Lancaster House have at least made possible. If so, it is likely that the ravages of the war will fairly soon be made good—it is astonishing how soon the ravages of war can be made good—and Zimbabwe will then become, as is
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inevitable if racial and tribal tendencies can be overcome, one of the richest and most prosperous States in Africa. And not only that: the hope is that such a development would have a profound effect for good south of the border in the republic of South Africa itself, thus tending to reduce the intensity of the potential racial conflict that may then get out of hand in that part of the world, with appalling results for all of us.
On the other hand, if there is, after all, no agreement on a cease-fire in the next few days, what will happen then? Well, if that means that the elections will have to be conducted while a civil war is still raging, it is obvious that nothing like such a happy development will be possible. Even if the elections are held and do produce a majority in favour of some coalition, presided over, presumably, by Bishop Muzorewa—as would seem likely given the great support that I understand he is likely to have from many quarters—there is no guarantee, even then, that we should be able to achieve general recognition for it; worse still, we might as a Government be directly involved in a civil war. This of course would be even more likely—indeed it would be certain—in the event of no elections being possible after we had nevertheless resumed responsibility for actually governing the country. So it seems to me that it is essential for us to have a cease-fire in order to put the whole agreement into operation and if possible allow it to function as a great experiment in interracial co-operation.
Objectively considered, however, I should have thought that it might well be equally disastrous for the Patriotic Front to have to continue the war with evidently less sympathy and even support coming from the outside, and with some prospect of being defeated in the sense of not being able at least to impose themselves or play any part in the life of the new régime. It may indeed be that they will not obtain an actual majority in the elections, if they are held, but at least it would seem likely that they will achieve some kind of representation and, as powerful and responsible leaders, they would surely be able to exert great influence on the new Government in Salisbury in favour of their own political ideas, whatever they may be. Therefore, it would

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appear to be madness for them to decide in favour of a continuation of the war, and we can only hope, with some confidence, that the hold-up of the cease-fire will be temporary and that the difficulties will fairly soon be resolved.
I turn to the Bill itself. As your Lordships are perhaps aware, the Liberal spokesman in another place voted in favour of the amendment referred to by the noble Lord, Lord Goronwy-Roberts. This had been submitted by Mr. Peter Shore and provided that any Order in Council of the nature indicated in Clause 1(1) of the Bill should come into force only after a draft order had been approved by both Houses of Parliament. The purpose of this amendment was evident. Any decision to grant final independence would have to be dependent on elections having been held and found to be free and fair.
Here I should like to say that I agree very much with what the noble Lord, Lord Gorowny-Roberts, said. If the method of broadcasting news—indeed the whole broadcasting system in Salisbury—is now changed for the better and becomes more objective, it would be an excellent preface to the holding of free and fair elections in any consideration. In addition, if the Governor should now see fit to free a good many of the detainees, that again would create the right atmosphere in which free and fair elections were likely to be held.
Under the Bill as it stands, the decision to recognise independence would be left to the Government of the day, which might or might not reflect the mood of the nation. No doubt if the elections are held and are duly monitored and if Commonwealth observers pronounce them to be "free and fair", that will in practice be the end of the matter; of course it will be. But it is after all possible that there may be ambiguities, more especially if complete peace does not prevail during the elections, or, worse still, if the Commonwealth observers are by any chance divided. In such circumstances it might well be preferable for the vital decision to be left to both Houses of Parliament.
We on these Benches feel that since the other place has taken a decision in this matter, it is not for this House to attempt
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to overturn it. That would be irregular, and as the noble Lord, Lord Goronwy-Roberts, recognised, it would probably be inadvisable even to put down an amendment, as was done in the other place. But I wish to associate myself with the noble Lord in suggesting that, in view of what has been said, and of what other people may say, at this late hour the Government might have second thoughts, or at least in some way indicate their willingness in the last resort to leave this question open when the Bill goes through.
My Lords, I really have not anything else to say about the Bill, I think, except that it is technical but, as the noble and learned Lord who sits on the Woolsack explained so lucidly, it seems inherently reasonable; nobody wants to quarrel with it as such. Since there are 80,000 (is it?) British subjects who can claim British passports now resident in Rhodesia and another 70,000 who have the right of abode in this country—150,000 in all—I suppose it is possible (I do not know whether I am right in saying this) that, if the worst should happen and all the 150,000 wanted to come back to this country, they could. I should imagine that that is extremely unlikely, but one must remember what happened in Algeria. When General de Gaulle came to a certain conclusion about Algeria, no less than 700,000 French citizens came back to France.
It was quite possible for the French State to absorb that 700,000, and they did so very satisfactorily within a year or two; and it seems to me that, even if a certain number of these people who have a right to come back to this country want to do so, we should be perfectly well able to accommodate them here, and indeed should welcome them. For the most part, I think, their ancestors or they themselves went out to Rhodesia with the great approval of the Government, and often they were urged on by the Government to go there. Therefore—for it is not their fault, perhaps, if things have gone wrong against them—I believe we should be able to welcome them if they take it into their heads to come back here one day.
The only other point I should like to make (I do not think it comes into the Bill) is that I hope the Government will be very generous in granting aid to repair

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the ravages of war in Rhodesia when and if independence takes place. I cannot see why, if necessary, some of the money we presently vote in aid should not be deducted and deflected to Rhodesia. It seems to me that a good deal of that money might be much better spent repairing the ravages of war in Rhodesia than committed to the rather dubious purposes to which it is sometimes put under the Act.
All I can say, therefore, is that I wish the Bill well, and I only hope that the difficulty affecting the final agreement on the cease-fire will be overcome very shortly. If it is not, if there is no agreement on a cease-fire, we shall all obviously have to think again, and our thoughts may well not be very agreeable—nor possibly unanimous, for that matter. Indeed, as I see it myself we might even be not far short of a state of national emergency, and what the political implications of that might be is anybody's guess.
4.33 p.m.
Lord HATCH of LUSBY: My Lords, I cannot with sincerity join in the chorus of congratulations which have been expressed to the noble Lord the Foreign Secretary with regard to the conduct of this conference, and I am sure he is the last person who would want insincere compliments paid to him. I believe he has made mistakes; I believe he has aroused unnecessary frictions; and, as I shall try to show in my speech, I believe that the conference could have been concluded successfully much earlier. However, I should like to congratulate him, and very sincerely, on two points. The first is in cutting the talons of his own Prime Minister and those members of his own party who have been, traditionally, supporters of the Ian Smith, white-supremacy régime, and more lately of the Smith-Muzorewa régime, and in forcing a change in what was thought to be at the time of the election Conservative Party policy. Secondly, I should like particularly to congratulate him on his great courage in doing what no British Government has had the courage to do since 1965, and that is to involve the responsibility of the British Government and the British Parliament, which I believe has always been the crucial issue in the ending of UDI. That, I believe, has given Britain the opportunity, for the first time,
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to lead towards a possibly successful conclusion to this unhappy chapter in our colonial history.
My Lords, I do not believe that the noble Lord the Foreign Secretary was wise in his choice of the Governor for Rhodesia, and I will say why. We all admire the noble Lord, Lord Soames. We all enjoy his bluntness and good humour. But I believe that the Foreign Secretary has put him in an impossible position. I believe he has put him in that impossible position, first of all, because Lord Soames would be the first to agree that he is an unashamed member of the Conservative Party, and always has been; and that in itself is a political disadvantage in Rhodesia today. Secondly, he is a member of the Conservative Cabinet, and as a member of the Conservative Party and the Conservative Government he is bound to inherit the favour which has been shown towards the Muzorewa régime over the past nine months; he is bound to inherit at least a part of the opposition which was made by the Conservative Party to the attempts by my right honourable friend David Owen and the Secretary of State for the United States; and in inevitably taking with him this prejudice he has been put into a situation in which he cannot be seen to be as impartial as he himself would no doubt wish to be.
Nevertheless, like every other Member of this House, I wish him well; I wish him all the luck, and I wish him strength during the almost impossible task which he has been given by this Government. But I should like to remind the noble Lord, Lord Soames, that he is in Africa, not in Europe; and, because he has had no experience of Africa, he must find the conditions, he must find the spiritual atmosphere of Africa, so very different—and, as many Members of this House will agree, that atmosphere takes some time to learn.
We are talking this afternoon not about a Bill which is bringing to an end a period of 14 years; we are talking about a Bill which is bringing to an end a period, and a sad period, of 90 years. Let us remember that the people we are talking about, on whom the future of Zimbabwe depends, feel themselves to be coming to the end of that 90-year period, not a 14-year period. During that 90-year period, one major historical principle has been

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demonstrated time after time, which surely we have learned throughout the history of the British and other European empires. That principle is, quite simply, that if there are no constitutional channels open to reform—reform which enables every citizen to participate in the conduct of the society in which he lives—then violence and force is inevitable; and the history of the last 90 years in Rhodesia, now to be called Zimbabwe, bears out that principle to the very last syllable.
To the African, the men we see in London today, Joshua Nkomo and Robert Mugabe, are the inheritors, going right back to the days of Lobengula, who to the African had the land stolen from him and his people; to Chilembwe, in Nyasaland, who raised the spirit of revolt against white domination in the middle of the First World War; and to the Reverend Samkangi, who was one of the initiators of the African Congress in Southern Rhodesia itself. They are the inheritors, and they are the inheritors who continued that fight when Southern Rhodesia became a part of the Central African Federation, because that Federation, they believed, was still based on the essential principle that the man and woman with a white skin had a God-given right to rule—which they would not accept. They continued that fight through the Federation and through the Ian Smith régime; and they have won that fight. They won that fight because that fight was not for their individual power nor for the power of any individual party. That fight was for national self-determination; that fight was for the right of every individual in Rhodesia to participate in the government of the country. That fight is won.
So, my Lords, we are now talking about the details. I am not suggesting for a moment that it is impossible to reverse it. There have been many reversals of national self-determination, of universal suffrage, in the past. But the 90-year fight has been won this year, and won as a result of collective efforts going back to 1890. It was the break-up of that Federation, the break up caused by the efforts of those in Zambia and in Malawi who fought for national independence, that left us the residual problems that we have been discussing ever since 1964. We had to find some conditions
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under which Southern Rhodesia, like the other members of the Federation, could become independent. But those in power in Southern Rhodesia were not prepared to accept the same condition as had been applied in every other single British colony at the time of independence: namely, universal suffrage.
So we laid down that, first, the new constitution must depend on the will, and arise out of the will, of the people; that elections must be held with equal opportunity for all groups and all parties; that there should be universal suffrage and also that we should observe our international obligations.
I listened carefully to the noble and learned Lord who sits on the Woolsack when he introduced this Bill in his very lucid style. I remembered very well the speech that he made in the debate on sanctions 13 months ago and the stress that he laid upon our international obligations. I am wondering tonight whether our unilateral rescinding of sanctions is in conjunction with our international obligations. Should we not have gone first to the Security Council, where we had initially asked for sanctions to be imposed, rather than take that action ourselves? We could not fulfil any of these obligations until we had found a means of ending the civil war. In that respect, again, I pay tribute to the noble Lord the Foreign Secretary for holding back his own party, or a section of his party, until he could get to Lusaka and get the support of the Commonwealth to make it possible for the British Government to take action which could lead to the ending of the civil war.
And so we come to the period of the Lancaster House conference. I have not much to say about that conference; but we have passed rather quickly over its details. Some of us on this side of the House have deliberately avoided being provocative or asking awkward questions while the conference was taking place. Now the time has come to say that on the first issue, on the constitution, I am dubious about some of the clauses within that constitution and about some of the principles enshrined. It is much more in keeping with African tradition to have an executive president than it is to have an imitation of the Westminster system of a constitutional president and a Prime

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Minister. I believe that the Patriotic Front was right to oppose specific racial representation in separating Members of Parliament according to the colour of their skins. I believe that a mistake was made when certain vital sections of the Bill of Rights were made subject to a 100 per cent. vote—which I believe is unique anywhere in the world.
Secondly, on the interim period, I believe that the Foreign Secretary has always been wrong in resisting the clamant demands from a whole variety of sources to organise a peace-keeping force, based on the Commonwealth, large enough to keep the peace. I believe that the reason he did so was nothing more than his reaction to the Owen-Vance plan which had laid down a United Nations peace-keeping force which could have been of great value during this period. Furthermore, it is absolutely essential that during this interim period equality is applied, and seen to be applied, to the forces of the two sides. But let us remember, when we are saying that, that we are talking in equal terms about on the one hand, the Patriotic Front forces who have been fighting for self-determination, and, on the other hand, the Salisbury forces who have been fighting to maintain a rebellion and to maintain white control of that country. There is, at least, a strong argument for reverse discrimination to give extra opportunities to the Patriotic Front to catch up with their backlog in electoral organisation.
Then, my Lords, there is the sending of the Governor before the cease-fire. I understood that the Foreign Secretary had pledged in this House that the Governor would not be sent to that country until a cease-fire had been agreed. I think he has been put in an impossible position; because we want to know what has happened since the Governor arrived in Salisbury and what is going to happen. We want to know why it is that the Patriotic Front parties are still bound in Salisbury. I was satisfied with what the noble and learned Lord said about the amnesty. It does not apply to breaches of British law against sanctions and, therefore, does not apply to the Question that I asked this afternoon about the Bingham Report. But here we have a situation with a British Governor in charge who is still maintaining the ban on
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those parties that are to be allowed to take part in the elections and who obviously represent several hundred thousands or even millions of people in that country.
We see that on Saturday one of the leaders of that party, Mr. Msipa, was arrested and charged with conducting an illegal demonstration, although he is representing one of the parties at the Lancaster House Conference. How can one put a Governor in that kind of stupid position? We have seen no repeal of martial law; we have not seen any cancellation of executions. And let us remember that those executions were ordered under an illegal régime, and that many of them were carried out despite the personal plea of Her Majesty the Queen that they should not be carried out. We are still asking for an amnesty and reconciliation; but the people who are dead are not going to be very impressed by that kind of reconciliation.
I should like to ask the noble Lord who is going to wind up whether he will answer a specific question which arises from a Statement made by the Minister in another place. Is it the case, that since the Governor arrived, South African forces, South African personnel, and (as admitted by British military authorities) South African units, have been withdrawn from Zimbabwe?—because on 12th December, the Under-Secretary of State had this to say, that during the pre-independence period and after the presence, therefore, of the Governor in Salisbury, there can be and will be no foreign involvement. Has that foreign involvement ceased? I think that we are entitled to a specific answer.
We have heard this afternoon of the dangers that the cease-fire may not be signed. I think it will be signed; but I do not think it is the most important issue. Unfortunately, regarding the conduct of the cease-fire negotiations I differ with the noble and learned Lord who sits on the Woolsack; this is not a political decision. This is a decision which involves the safety of the people who have been fighting for self-determination. The fact that the arrangements for the locations in the cease-fire were made between the British Government and General Wall, representing the Salisbury forces, has inevitably and naturally angered the Patriotic Front. They remember that it is only a few months

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since the forces of the erstwhile colleague of Bishop Muzorewa, the Reverend Sithole, were massacred by those of the Bishop—by the security forces. One hundred and eighty-three of them were massacred this summer. Can one expect, with that very recent experience, that the Patriotic Front is going to put its forces in a position in which they can be massacred either by air or by land power?
Now we come to the real crunch of the present deadlock: the locations. This seems so stupid from the Government's point of view. There have been suspicions that the Patriotic Front will not send all their forces into the assembly points. But the Patriotic Front is being honest, they are saying when the British Government says to them each assembly point will have 1,000 men there, "We have 31,000 men, so we need 31 assembly points." The British Government says, "No, we will give you a great concession, we will raise the number from 15 to 16." And what happens? There are 1,000 men in each of the 15 or 16 assembly points and the rest are in the bush. That is the inevitable consequence of the British Government's policy. They are inviting the Patriotic Front to keep their armed people in the bush because they will not grant what seems to be obvious: the opportunity for the Patriotic Front to have all its forces in assembly points which are so located that they can he protected from attack by the security forces. Not only has one cast doubt on the good faith of the Patriotic Front, but when the Patriotic Front have shown good faith it has been thrown back in their teeth. They are invited by the British Government to stay in the bush to the danger of the future of the cease-fire.
Another point which I should like to ask the noble Lord to clear up arises out of paragraph 25 of the British Government's paper on the cease-fire submitted to the Lancaster House Conference of 5th December. Part of the paragraph reads:
"If, however, all Patriotic Front forces inside Rhodesia assemble with their arms, and where there is no further movement by externally-based Patriotic Front forces into Rhodesia, there would be no need in those circumstances for the Governor to ask the Rhodesian forces to deploy from their company bases".
What does that mean? Does that mean that the Governor is going to use the present Salisbury security forces to suppress any possible breaking of the cease-
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fire among the Patriotic Forces? There are bound to be incidents. Who is going to be told by the Governor to suppress any cease-fire violation? This is a specific question: is it going to be the responsibility of the security forces to suppress their own breaches of cease-fire or of the Patriotic Front to suppress their own, or is it, as this paragraph appears to make clear, that the Governor is going to use the present security forces in order to suppress breaches of the cease-fire by the Patriotic Front? We are entitled to an answer, and the Patriotic Front is entitled to an answer.
Finally on this point, may I ask the Minister to look again at the desperately important issue of the air force bases. As I understand it, only two air force bases are going to be monitored. The Minister and everyone know that there are far more than two air force bases controlled by the security forces in Rhodesia. I can mention two right now. My Lords, you have in your paper Salisbury; you have Gwelo. What about Hartley? What about Wankie?—and one could go on. I ask for a specific answer to the question about how many air force bases have been identified and who is going to monitor them. This is why the Patriotic Front, naturally, are very nervous that when their forces are deployed in these assembly points they will be open to attacks such as we have seen take place throughout Rhodesia and in neighbouring countries.
I am worried about one word regarding the future—and I shall raise this at the Committee stage. It is the word "irreversible". This was used in another place and it was used in a different way by the noble and learned Lord who sits on the Woolsack when he said that we cannot take on an open-ended commitment. We want to know whether in all circumstances this Bill is giving the Government the power to grant independence.
I remember particularly a statement made some years ago by my old friend Lee Kuan Yew, the Prime Minister of Singapore, when he was talking about the consequences of the end of the British Empire. He said—and said very boldly—to his fellow ex-colonials that the trouble was that the British had given responsibility without power; that they had given political responsibility but without the security and without the structure of defence to maintain that political settlement.

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I believe that that is a danger today; I believe again that the Foreign Secretary has made a mistake in turning down the proposals that were made by my right honourable friend in another place and the United States Secretary of State and, above all, by the noble Lord, Lord Carver, for an independent force there that could integrate the security forces during the interim period. The noble Lord, Lord Carver, had the skeleton of a plan that could begin to integrate those forces so that when the new Government was elected it would inherit the power to support its own political structure. This goes further because everybody is talking about the danger of a coup after the election. There inevitably comes up in regard to the location of the forces the danger of a military coup conducted by the military forces previously under Bishop Muzorewa and Ian Smith supported by the South Africans as a part of their policy of developing what they call their constellation of Southern African States. It would only be if, during the interim period, a force was gathered together and trained at least to the point at which there is a national force—a national army and a national police force—to be inherited by the new Government, that this danger could reasonably be expected to be avoided.
As we pass this Bill, let us express our thanks to the many non-governmental organisations involved, to the Commonwealth Secretariat under "Sonny" Ramphal; to the front-line Presidents; to the Nigerian Government; to the Patriotic Front and to the Muzorewa Government and the many others whom the noble Lord will know. Let us express the hope that in the coming months and years, which are going to be very, very delicate and very, very fraught, the hard and patient work that has been done behind the scenes by so many organisations is continued now—continued with the further responsibility that falls on us all, and I include myself here, to mediate, to reconcile and to help in development. But let us always remember that we are facing this prospect. We are facing the expectations of land reform, the redistribution of wealth, of employment where there is unemployment and, above all, of peace. We are facing that at the end of a period not of 14 years but of 90 years, during which time the vast majority of the inhabitants
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of Zimbabwe believe that they have been ruled by other people. They are determined now to rule themselves.
Viscount MASSEREENE and FERRARD: My Lords, before the noble Lord sits down, may I say that he appears to be worried about foreign intervention, but he does not appear to be at all worried about Soviet intervention. He does not appear to be worried about the hundreds of officers and advisers who are training the guerrilla armies in Mozambique and Zambia. He is not worried about the two Russian generals who have been based in Lusaka for some time. His argument really appears to be very one-sided and not at all impartial.
Lord HATCH of LUSBY: My Lords, I am glad the noble Viscount has raised that point, because it is one that has been raised by so many noble Lords on this side of the House and indeed a number of noble Lords on the other side. Of course there are Soviet advisers; of course there are Soviet weapons; of course there is a danger of the involvement of Cuban troops, just as there was the involvement of Cuban troops in Angola after the South African army, as attested by the Americans, invaded that country. The Africans want to exclude all foreign influence, but the influence of South Africa has been there for a very much longer time than that of the Soviet Union—long before the Soviet Union was ever heard of—and so long as there is the danger of intervention from South Africans and from mercenaries from other parts of the world, so long will the forces that have been fighting for self-determination inevitably turn to those who will help them. They are not turning to the Russians because they are Russians but because they cannot get help from Western Europe.
5.4 p.m.
Lord ALPORT: My Lords, if I may say so at the beginning of my speech, I think it is a pity that the noble Lord, Lord Hatch of Lusby, has given us the impression that he has spoken in this House this afternoon not in the independent stance which noble Lords should on all sides attain, but as a spokesman of the Patriotic Front. We in this House have different views about the past and I shall be referring to them shortly, but I am quite certain that all of us today—and I

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wish to take only a few minutes of your Lordships' time—agree that we wish my noble friend Lord Soames success in his sudden assignment and offer to my noble friend the Foreign Secretary our warmest congratulations on a major achievement in the field of British diplomacy and statesmanship—
Lord HATCH of LUSBY: My Lords—
Lord ALPORT: My Lords, perhaps I may go on: the noble Lord has had nearly half an hour. Some people have tended to criticise the length of the Lancaster House Conference. Negotiations about Africa with Africans are not amenable to the hectic time-scale of diplomacy in Europe and America. Your Lordships will perhaps recall that Rhodes' successful negotiations with the Matabele Indunas in 1896 lasted, on a daily basis, from August to October. That was to settle four months of violence and not seven years of escalating civil war. The Foreign Secretary, in handling these recent negotiations with Bishop Muzorewa, the Patriotic Front and the Rhodesian Front, has shown the same patience and decision that Rhodes showed on that occasion. In my view, that has been the basis of his success.
It gives me particular pleasure to be able to say this, because when in 1968 my noble friend Lord Carrington, as Leader of the Opposition, brought about in this House the defeat of the Southern Rhodesia Order in Council on sanctions, I led a handful of Conservative Peers in support of its continuance. I opposed the compact of my noble friend Lord Home of the Hirsel with Mr. Smith in 1972. I did not believe that it was a British solution to the problem of Rhodesia in accordance with the long-determined policies of the United Kingdom, and I think I can say that the Pearce Commission subsequently confirmed that that view was right.
Therefore, I am naturally glad that after so many years there is the hope that at last a British solution for the problems of Rhodesia may be on the threshold of agreement. That was, if I may say so, after all what I was sent out to bring about in 1961, and what as a servant of the British Government of a different political persuasion and as a private Member of your Lordships' House, I have tried to do ever since.
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Now, at the end of this tale of failure and frustration and 14 years of UDI, what is the balance sheet?—20,000 dead, a beautiful and happy country in the process of political and social disintegration, neighbours in Zambia and Botswana gravely affected, the intrusion of Communist influence over the whole of Africa facilitated. And why? Because the British solution for the future of that country of Rhodesia was cynically rejected in 1962 and that rejection was dramatically endorsed in 1965.
Now, with good fortune, under Providence, there may be a British solution—not as appropriate a solution as could have been achieved in 1962, not a solution as favourable to the Europeans or the Africans in Rhodesia, not a solution which can bring to life the dead, not a solution which can open up the certainty of creating in Rhodesia a multiracial state on the British model which was possible 20 years age, but nevertheless a British solution with, for a few weeks, a British Governor in Government House in Salisbury and a few hundred British servants and soldiers endeavouring to rescue black and white from the consequences of the stupidity, selfishness and malignity of those who over these last 14 years have derided this country, vilified its leaders and done untold damage to the real interests of Southern Africa and the Western world in general.
For some time past I have been of the opinion that it was too late for Britain to find a solution which would avoid ultimate disaster in Rhodesia. I think that the prospects today are pretty small. Nevertheless, I believe it would be wrong not to acknowledge the courage which Her Majesty's Government have shown in undertaking a commitment where the cards are so heavily stacked against success. I believe it is right now that everyone should give it wholehearted support. It is a gamble with the residual authority of this country, derived from its imperial era and with our credibility in international politics. If it succeeds, our action will have great advantages to Africa and to our own international standing. It may give fresh life to the Commonwealth, from which this initiative was derived. It is something which is expected of us by our friends all over the world. If we did not make this effort even at this thirteenth hour; if we were not prepared

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to take this gamble; if we were seen to shirk a responsibility which we acknowledge to be ours, then I think we would have felt an overwhelming sense of guilt as we stood by, as helpless spectators of the subsequent unfolding tragedy.
Therefore, if it fails I shall not be among those who seek to blame the Government or criticise the Foreign Secretary from the comfortable vantage point of hindsight. And if that does happen, I hope that those who do so will remember that the noble Lord, Lord Soames, will be the only British Governor of a dependency in history who has been commissioned to exercise direct personal rule without a single instrument of the authority of this country at his disposal, except the commission bearing Her Majesty's signature—no United Kingdom recruited Civil Service, no battalions and units of the British Army, no staff with experience of Rhodesia; nothing, except his own judgment and personality.
One cannot go on for ever sustaining old bitterness or grieving over the mistakes and lost opportunities of the past. One of the greatest of the virtues of the English is that they combine an enduring respect for history and precedent with an ability to consign to oblivion the events and bitterness of the more recent past. Our own civil war, three centuries ago, ended with an Act of Indemnity and Oblivion. The Bill before us, in Clause 3, contains much the same provision. It covers, as I understand it from the noble and learned Lord on the Woolsack, everything done in terms of the law of the United Kingdom by everyone—Rhodesian Front, Patriotic Front, security forces, guerrillas, the lot. It seeks, as he said, to wipe the slate clean.
I am sure that when independence comes to Rhodesia the slate will be clean, so far as we in this country are concerned. But whether such magnanimity is possible to black and white in Zimbabwe in the next few months, despite the hatreds and bitterness caused by these last many years; whether racial, economic and, above all, tribal differences will be submerged in the creation of a hopeful future for a Zimbabwe at peace, that I do not know.
There have been deplorable defects in the qualities of the leadership which the
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African peoples of Zimbabwe have produced from their own ranks during these last 20 years. Yet I know that there is a potential among the Africans in Zimbabwe, and among those who have been driven from it since 1965, which could make it the progressive, multiracial, prosperous country which it has always been British policy to create in that part of Africa. It is perhaps still possible that this may happen. It will require special qualities of tolerance, good sense and patriotism from both black and white which have seldom been evidenced elsewhere in history.
It could be that the men and women of Zimbabwe—Mashona, Matabele, European, Asian and Coloured—can, during the next few months, provide Africa and the rest of the world with an example of how to resolve a problem of human and political relationships of world-wide significance. And we here today in the Parliament at Westminster have, at any rate, the satisfaction of knowing that by passing this Bill we shall be giving them the chance.
Baroness GAITSKELL: My Lords, before the noble Lord sits down, may I put this to him? I have the most enormous respect and admiration for the noble Lord who has just spoken, but can he understand that, while many of us on this side of the House applaud to an enormous extent everything that the Foreign Secretary has done and think that he has made a great breakthrough, we may have reservations, without saying anything unkind and without criticising the Foreign Secretary?
Lord ALPORT: My Lords, the noble Baroness has never said anything unkind or ungracious about anyone, and I am quite certain that nothing like that would ever apply to her.
Lord HATCH of LUSBY: My Lords, before the noble Lord sits down for a second time, may I associate myself with everything that my noble friend Lady Gaitskell has said about the noble Lord, Lord Alport, for whom, as he knows, I have always had both a regard and an affection. But as he referred to me personally, would he just recognise that it is essential for some of us, with the kind of principles that we hold, to make a

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sharp differentiation between those who have been fighting in Rhodesia for self-determination, and those who have been fighting to maintain a rebellion against the Crown and the maintenance of white supremacy? Without taking any sides among the African parties, and without being accused of representing the Patriotic Front, this is the sharp and clear distinction which can and, to us, must be made.
Lord ALPORT: My Lords, I am very grateful for the noble Lord's views. My view was very clear. He gave the impression of it, and that was the impression which was in my mind. I shall read his speech tomorrow in Hansard and see whether that in any way changes the very clear impression that I have at the moment.
5.17 p.m.
Lord GARNER: My Lords, I do not want to intervene in this discussion, but I listened carefully to the words of the noble Lord and to those of my noble friend and previous colleague Lord Alport. I thought he put the matter so extremely well that there was very little else to say. With respect to the noble Baroness, Lady Gaitskell, I thought that he had his own reservations and doubts, as all of us had, because we are discussing this Bill at a moment of twilight when none of us quite knows what the dawn will bring. Each of us can have his hopes and his fears, and we have heard both expressed this evening. But it is futile at this stage to indulge our fancies, certainly dangerous to prophesy, and quite otiose, on my part, to attempt to offer any advice. So rather than deal with the present doubts and difficulties, I prefer to take a rather broader perspective.
I was adviser, for the last seven years of my Government service, to successive Governments and Ministers on the problem of Rhodesia, and I feel that I should be lacking in a sense of history and in the fitness of things if I did not, at least, add a brief comment this evening. From 1962 until my retirement we were striving, first, to avoid any declaration of independence and, secondly, to end it, but as everyone knows we failed. No doubt many mistakes were made during that time; perhaps, most of all, the over-emphasis laid on the effectiveness of
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sanctions. So that for 14 dreary years the struggle went on, with occasional gleams of light from time to time, but no solution in sight and certainly no prospect of Britain exercising responsibility.
I am sure the Foreign Secretary would be the first to admit that circumstances have changed this year and new situations have been opened up, particularly since the Smith régime first recognised the principle of majority rule, and then agreed to its being put into practice. Nevertheless, it is to the eternal credit of the Foreign Secretary, of his colleagues in the Government, and of the officials who advised him that this opportunity was seized and the initiative was taken, and that with a mixture of firmness, flexibility, patience and determination, and a careful selection of the risks but a readiness to run them, the Foreign Secretary did bring matters, if not to a total conclusion, at least very nearly there.
Of course, we are still in medias res, and all of us must accept that there are bound to be arguments and difficulties, and possibly conflicts on the spot. There may well be incidents. All this emphasises the challenge to the noble Lord, Lord Soames, underlines his courage in undertaking the job, and emphasises also the need for him to show the same degree of nerve and character that Lord Carrington has shown in the negotiations.
I think that this is a tremendous achievement by the Government. As the noble Lord, Lord Alport, said, the Government have achieved something which has eluded all their predecessors. They have established in Rhodesia the authority of the British Government. I use advisedly the word "established" because authority has never before been established in this form. After 1890 it was the British South African company. After 1923 it was the self-governing Colony of Rhodesia. After 1965, admittedly powers were taken in this House to assert the sovereignty of Britain but they were never properly exercised on the spot. Now, for the first time, we have the British Crown in control. This in itself is an historic moment.
Secondly, the Government have achieved the return to legality which is the essential condition for international recognition of independence. Rhodesia has therefore been set on a new path. It is

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now up to the Rhodesians themselves to settle what future they want to have. Only the Rhodesians can do it. We can provide the conditions, and we can advise. We can do a variety of things. But in the last resort it must be up to the Rhodesians themselves to decide. In this way we shall be fulfilling the vital Fifth Principle, which undertook that the form of government would be one that was acceptable to all Rhodesians.
After so many years of disappointment and frustration Britain can again hold her head high and feel that she can withdraw from what is now her last major colonial responsibility with dignity and with honour. But I say this with no sense of selfish self-satisfaction over the achievement of a moral principle. As the noble and learned Lord on the Woolsack has implied, other great consequences are at stake, too. It can bring peace and stability to Rhodesia, which has been so unhappy for so many years. It can end the bitterness and argument that there has been in this country and throughout the Commonwealth, with all the stirrings of racial confrontation which that has brought about. Above all, in my view, it can point the way to racial harmony in Central Africa, and lead to a relaxation of tension and a renewal of energy in countries like Tanzania, Zambia, Botswana and others. Finally—who knows?—it may drive home a lesson which may be heeded in South Africa in years to come, with tremendous consequences for the peace and stability of us all.
5.24 p.m.
Lord WIGG: My Lords, it is not my purpose to detain your Lordships for long. My task is made easier because I find myself in wholehearted agreement with the noble Lord, Lord Alport's description of the events of the last 14 years as tragic, unnecessary and potentially disastrous. The noble Lord did not, however, ask one question. I do not blame him for that, but I am going to provide my answer to the question which I think he should have asked: namely, why it was that in 1965 Mr. Ian Smith decided to embark upon this disastrous course of action, disastrous even for the interests which he represented.
To my mind, the reasons are twofold. The first reason is the action which was
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taken by a Conservative Administration before 1964–I do not know whether it was at the time when the noble Lord, Lord Alport, himself was a Minister—to supply Rhodesia with the Hunters, the Canberras and the Vampires which made it quite impossible for this country to take effective military action without clearly established air support. That opportunity to take the necessary action was denied to us by Mr. Nyerere, who refused to allow us to station the necessary air force squadrons in Tanzania. But there was a second reason: that Mr. Smith got a blank cheque from South Africa. He would never have proclaimed UDI without the certainty of the superiority of his air force, plus the support of South Africa underwriting the political and economic commitment into which he had entered.
My quarrel, if I may put it that way, or my difference with the Government, is that those two conditions still operate today. The first condition need not operate, because today Britain, now that there is a British Governor, has the capacity, if she so desires, to put effective air forces into Rhodesia which would take out the Rhodesian air force and which could, if necessary, take on South Africa.
I want to ask the Minister whether he would be kind enough to answer a question which was put to him by the noble Lord, Lord Hatch of Lusby, and which was put in another place to the Government but which was not answered. I wonder whether the Minister would tell the House whether the Government have made demands to South Africa that she should withdraw the forces which she has infiltrated into Mozambique, into Zambia and into Rhodesia itself. If a satisfactory answer is given, I believe that any opposition by the Patriotic Front to the cease-fire would then vanish.
I want to go a little further than that, and to particularise this. It is not merely knowledge of the ground forces that is required. I want to know whether the Pumas piloted by South African officers, and in particular the Bells which came originally from Israel, are still there, and whether they are going to remain there; because if they are there and the Patriotic Front gives the map references—which will be well known to everybody—then at any point, should negotiations break down,

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those concentration areas could be taken out in a matter of minutes. We have to remember that the Patriotic Front has no air cover—none at all—whereas the Rhodesian air force, based upon the South African commitment, can travel, in a matter of minutes, distances which would take days, if not weeks, to be covered in the height of the rainy season.
Without that condition, it seems to me that the Patriotic Front is putting itself in a position of extreme danger. Indeed, this country is putting itself in danger, too, for this reason. The outcome of Lord Soames' mission—and, goodness knows! I wish him well—depends not only on the elections but on what the rest of the world in general and what Africa think about them. Despite all the fine words in the great speech of the noble and learned Lord the Lord Chancellor, and also the sincere words of the noble Lord, Lord Alport, if at the end of the day it is demonstrated that South Africa has paid the piper and has also called the tune, it is not only South Africa and Rhodesia which will suffer. Our reputation will sink to rock bottom, and that is disastrous, because for Britain the days of power are over. I had always hoped that the days of influence would then begin, but there can be no influence if we have not played fair over this. I am not absolutely sure that we have played fair. I like to think that we have, but the proof of the pudding will be in the eating.
I will not detain your Lordships longer. This Bill is a blank cheque. The Government refuse to accept the Affirmative Order. I think they are unwise; I think it would be a gesture of goodwill and good intent that, for political reasons, they would do well to accept. If they refuse again, the responsibility rests firmly on their shoulders. But it is not only on their shoulders; it is the reputation of this country about which we all must be concerned.
5.32 p.m.
Lord GRIDLEY: My Lords, before I proceed to develop my speech this afternoon I should like to comment on some of the previous speeches. As I said in the debate on the Southern Rhodesia Bill, I was in Rhodesia during, the Lancaster House Conference. I met and
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talked with a number of black Africans in Victoria Falls, in Bulawayo and in Salisbury itself. I visited the security forces and members of the public service. In all the conversations I had with them there was one abiding desire which all of them seemed to want, and that was peace for the country. They seemed not to be unduly worried at what complexion might develop in respect of a Government elected to power after the election. I say that this evening because I wish to reduce the temperature raised in some of the speeches which have preceded mine.
The noble Lord, Lord Hatch of Lusby, in his comments on the appointment of my noble friend Lord Soames as Governor of Rhodesia, implied that because he was a Conservative he was incapable of exercising a dispassionate consideration of many of the tremendous problems with which he will be faced when he has been in office for a few months and before he hands over to an independent Government. I objected to that statement by the noble Lord. I felt that it was impugning the honour of the noble Lord, which stands particularly high in regard to the services he has rendered in a dispassionate sense in the interests of this country, in many of the great appointments he has held overseas and in Britain.
Another point I should like to make in respect of some of the comments of the noble Lord, Lord Hatch, is that he seems to me to impugn the whole of the past colonial policies of Britain in exercising its powers as a colonial empire. This rubs off on me particularly, because for the whole of my life I have given effect to those colonial policies overseas, as I have said on rather too many occasions in your Lordships' House. Many books which I deplore are written now. They are being circulated in the schools of Africa and give a quite similar account to that of the noble Lord, Lord Hatch, about our past policies, going back, as he seemed to indicate, over 90 years.
When I was at Victoria Falls in Rhodesia I was shown propaganda which was printed by the other side, or emanating from the Patriotic Front, which was captured by the security forces a week before my visit. It seemed to me that similar arguments to those which the noble Lord, Lord Hatch, deploys in your Lordships' House were used in this

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Communist propaganda by the forces which were then on the other side of the boundaries of Rhodesia. But this kind of argument deployed about our past policies is being used everywhere by every terrorist throughout the world who wishes us harm, and I deplore it. I feel it is about time that the true account was given of the honourable way in which we have acted over the years in many parts of the world.
Lord HATCH of LUSBY: My Lords, if the noble Lord would allow me to intervene, if he describes members of the Patriotic Front and similar people as Communists and terrorists, will he tell the House how he describes those who supported and fought for Ian Smith after he had broken his Oath of allegiance to the Queen?
Lord GRIDLEY: My Lords, I have discussed that very point with many of the civil servants of Rhodesia, and I would say this. Perhaps what is not known in this country, and it should be known a little more clearly, is that the public servants of a country or any administration are bound to give their loyalty and support to any Government in power. They do not strike and they never have struck in defence of any disagreement with that policy; they are not allowed to have a policy at all. They merely have to serve the Government in power. I am not defending UDI. Many of the public servants I spoke to disagreed with UDI; many of the people in Rhodesia disagreed with UDI. But they were faced with a fait accompli. They had no alternative but to go on and do their duty in support of somebody with whom they may have profoundly disagreed.
Lord HATCH of LUSBY: Like the Nazis.
Lord GRIDLEY: My Lords, this Bill and the Southern Rhodesia Constitution (Interim Provisions) Order 1979 give power to my noble friend Lord Soames, as the newly appointed Governor of Rhodesia, whom we all wish well, to act as Governor over various matters, one of which deals with the administration, and it is in respect of the administration that I now wish to make my comments. I shall be very brief, but I want
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to ask one question in regard to the public services of Rhodesia and their relationship with the Governor. I would ask this question of my noble friend Lord Trefgarne and I should like a considered answer.
At the present time in every respect the Zimbabwe Bill and these interim provisions give power to a Governor lawfully appointed by the British Government to govern. In every other territory in which Britain had a constitutionally appointed Governor hitherto, Britain, through her Governor and as soon as independence was finalised, entered into a public officers' agreement signed between Her Majesty's Government and the incoming independent Government. The object of this was to safeguard the terms of service and pensions of public servants. I should like to be assured that this procedure is being followed, or will be followed in due course, in the case of Rhodesia.
In that connection I would emphasise that there are many black and white public servants who would be involved. I would also emphasise to my noble friend Lord Trefgarne, that the public officers' agreement lays at the door of the independent Government full responsibility for pensions. If the public officers' agreement was omitted in the Rhodesian context—and I cannot see any reference to this in any of the documents we are considering this afternoon—then it would be the one exception to all other colonies granted independence by Her Majesty's Government.
The other point that I should like to make is largely a request to the Press and commentators outside your Lordships' House who by what they write and say—probably unwittingly, and only on some occasions—in the Rhodesian context, seem to give succour to those who would seek to make difficulties for my noble friend the Foreign Secretary and my noble friend Lord Soames in the peace which they both desire for Rhodesia. In that connection I should like to refer to a leader in The Times of 6th December on the difficulties that would face the Governor when he assumed duty in Salisbury. In reference to the Civil Service The Times wrote that the Governor would be facing the:
"administrative apparatus of a state which for 14 years has been in rebellion against the Crown and inspired by hatred and contempt for the British Government".

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That is simply not true. Note the date 6th December when The Times published this article. On the 13th November, in a debate on the Southern Rhodesia Bill, I spoke about my travels in Rhodesia where I found nothing but the highest traditions of public service anywhere and where I was to discover—and this is important—that in September 1978, over a year before my visit, a resolution was passed by civil servants who pledged to serve any Government elected to power. In the interim period they have pledged to serve my noble friend Lord Soames as loyally as they have served other governments in former days. I said a great deal of that in your Lordships' House, but even so The Times referred to the hatred and contempt of the:
"administrative apparatus of a State … inspired by hatred and contempt for the British Government."
It is absolute nonsense.
It would be better for all concerned if the Press in general took a little more notice of what was said in your Lordships' House as regards what they publish as their opinions, and what commentators say in this connection, for the difficulties which lie ahead, even after a cease-fire has been achieved, may be extremely formidable. It is only too easy for those who on occasions seek no other interests but their own, to seize on any criticisms for their own ends in order to detract from the devoted courage, ability and character of my noble friend the Foreign Secretary in his efforts to secure peace for Rhodesia.
Lord MORRIS: My Lords, with the leave of your Lordships' House I wish to support most warmly, if shortly, a most important point made by the noble Lord, Lord Goronwy-Roberts—namely, that it is of vital importance that broadcasting in Zimbabwe, particularly during the interregnum, be both fair and seen to be fair. That, other than Rhodesia, only Russia, Ethiopia and Radio Cairo broadcast in the two major vernacular languages of Shona and Matabele is not only sad but dangerous. The BBC Overseas Services, among others of course, broadcast in English to Africa as a whole. However, in Rhodesia only two people out of seven, at most, speak English. Arising out of that, may I ask the noble Lord whether Her Majesty's Government have any plans for using the unique
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experience of the BBC's African Services to assist the Rhodesian Broadcasting Service to maintain and even strengthen the impartiality of broadcasting, particularly in the tongues of Shona and Matabele and especially during the interregnum?
5.45 p.m.
Lord TREFGARNE: My Lords, the Bill which the Government submit for your Lordships' approval tonight is the last major legislative step we have to take before we lay down our final direct responsibility in Africa. Our withdrawal from that continent has on the whole, I think, been achieved with dignity and justice.
The efforts which successive British Governments have made to solve this most intractable of problems by persuasion and negotiation, are perhaps best illustrated if I recall that your Lordships have held no less than 49 major debates and listened to 61 statements on the subject since UDI. Indeed, I venture to suggest that in terms of ministerial effort this problem has taken more time to resolve than the independence of Australia, Canada, India and New Zealand taken together.
The lengths to which this Administration have gone and the Herculian labours of my noble friend the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary are a matter of public record. Now, after three and a half months, the Conference at Lancaster House has concluded its work. The Salisbury delegation have accepted and initialled the documents, the contents of which are seen by world opinion to be entirely reasonable. All the main concerns of the Patriotic Front have been met. With the Governor in Salisbury all the agreements reached can be implemented without delay. We very much hope that the Patriotic Front will participate in the forthcoming election. My noble and learned friend the Lord Chancellor has described the final efforts which the Government have made to deal with their concerns. There is now no genuine obstacle to prevent them from initialling the agreements. But we cannot hold up Rhodesia's progress indefinitely. The Government have always made it clear, and I repeat tonight, that no party can have a veto.

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My noble and learned friend described the achievements of the Conference, and the reasons behind the main thrust of our policy, with his usual clarity when he opened this debate, but perhaps your Lordships will allow me to deal with some of the narrower points which have been raised.
I understand the concern of many noble Lords about the decision to take direct responsibility for Rhodesia in the pre-independence period. There is no doubt that it will be a difficult time, and I believe we are fortunate to be able to call upon the services of my noble friend Lord Soames for this demanding task. May I say at this point that I quite reject the suggestions and criticisms put by the noble Lord, Lord Hatch of Lusby, when he suggested that my noble friend was less than suitable for the task.
It is important to emphasise the precise nature of that task. The Governor has full powers. But they are for a specific purpose and a short time. His main duty is to organise and conduct fair elections and provide an impartial administration of the country in the meantime. His responsibility does not extend further.
Several of your Lordships have asked how we will ensure that the elections are free and fair and, by implication, what we will do if the Commonwealth observers report unfavourably. My Lords, the world has long recognised that the resolution of this matter is a British responsibility and that, of course, includes ensuring that the elections are properly conducted. In the discharge of that responsibility we have appointed the Governor, together with a substantial staff, specifically to supervise the elections. We greatly welcome the expected presence of the Commonwealth observers and we shall do what we can to facilitate their task. But Rhodesia's prospects of international recognition and acceptance depend very much on the elections being seen to be fair. This will be an important incentive. But at the end of the day the final decision will be ours.
The noble Lord, Lord Goronwy-Roberts, asked whether the Government were considering the problems of reconstruction in Rhodesia. I can assure him that the Government will be ready to make development aid and technical
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assistance available to an independent Zimbabwe within the limits of our resources. In particular, as we have said at the Conference, we shall be prepared to provide assistance for agricultural development and land resettlement schemes. We shall also do all we can to support the independent Government in obtaining assistance from other donors. We are considering urgently what possibility there might be of obtaining for Rhodesia some preferential access to EEC markets during the interim.
We are also conscious of the heavy toll that continuing Rhodesian conflict has exacted on all the neighbouring States, particularly Zambia. We have made it clear that once the cease-fire has been agreed we shall wish to play our part in assisting Zambia to restore her infrastructure. I see that the noble Lord, Lord Goronwy-Roberts, is not in his place, but none the less it may be convenient for your Lordships if I deal with some of the points he raised, because they are of interest to several noble Lords.
Baroness LLEWELYN-DAVIES of HASTOE: My Lords, I am sure that my noble friend did not intend any discourtesy, but as the House will realise, we are two speakers short and I hope that he will be here any moment.
Lord TREFGARNE: My Lords, I quite accept that, but it would probably be convenient if I deal with the points raised by the noble Lord as they are of interest to several other noble Lords. Indeed, I see the noble Lord now taking his seat. The noble Lord raised several points about the administration of Rhodesia under the Governor. However, I think that his expectations may be a little too great. My noble friend has been in Rhodesia for only five days. Although he is certainly giving urgent attention to the issues raised by the noble Lord, I am afraid that they cannot all be resolved immediately.
The noble Lord also raised the question of access to the media, which was echoed by my noble friend Lord Morris. The document on pre-independence arrangements agreed at the Constitutional Conference establishes the right of all parties to have free access to the media, as well as the freedom to publish and advertise political views. It will be important to

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ensure that the Zimbabwe-Rhodesia Broadcasting Corporation is genuinely impartial in its coverage of political activities, and the Governor's instructions specifically cover this point. I understand that those members of the corporation who are standing for political office have agreed to vacate their posts. I can also inform your Lordships that the ZRBC has agreed to take the BBC Overseas Service for its first news broadcast every morning.
The noble Lord, Lord Goronwy-Roberts, also inquired about detainees. If I heard him correctly, he suggested that there were 18,000 detainees. I know of no basis for that figure, which I must say is very much in excess of the figure available to us. Documents agreed at the Conference call on all parties to release persons detained arbitrarily and on political grounds, and the Governor will take steps to ensure that that happens. I hope that persons detained outside Rhodesia by or at the request of the Patriotic Front will also be released. The Governor will also be ordering a review of the cases of all persons detained. The noble Lord also asked me about refugees. A start will be made during the period of the Governor's rule on the resettlement of refugees.
Lord PAGET of NORTHAMPTON: My Lords, before the noble Lord deals with that point, it is not suggested, is it, that prisoners of war should be released before the war is over?
Lord TREFGARNE: My Lords, neither side claims to hold any prisoners of war at present; but, as I have said, the Governor will certainly be reviewing the cases of those detained—at least those cases to which he has access.
To continue on the question of the refugees, it is a sizeable problem, and I can only say to your Lordships that I am confident that the Governor will use his very best efforts to deal with it. On the question of the shipments of maize, we are taking the necessary steps to lift the ban on maize shipments, but there are a number of administrative arrangements that have to be made, and these may take a few days.
The other important issue which the noble Lord, Lord Goronwy-Roberts,
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raised, was the question of the parliamentary procedure on the order setting out the day of independence. All the major issues of the Constitutional Conference have been resolved, and we think that the House and your Lordships should form a judgment now on whether the conditions for independence have been established. In the Government's view they have. The issue of majority rule, which has been at the root of the conflict in Rhodesia, has been settled by the independence constitution. With the appointment of a British Governor the territory has returned to legal status. It has been agreed that elections should be held, supervised under the British Government's authority. We have achieved agreement on these points at the Constitutional Conference, and there is nothing further which the Government intend to ask of the parties to the Conference. Therefore, we believe that we are fully justified in asking the House to decide upon the issue of independence now.
Perhaps I could now turn to some of the points raised by the noble Lord, Lord Hatch of Lusby. The noble Lord repeated a number of issues which were agreed by all the parties at the Conference. I do not think that tonight I shall re-open the discussion that took place at Lancaster House. However, the noble Lord also asked why the ban on political parties was being maintained. It has been made clear to the parties concerned that the ban will be lifted as soon as the cease-fire agreement is signed. Thereafter all parties will be able to take part in the election campaign, provided, of course, that they campaign peacefully. The noble Lord, Lord Hatch, also asked why martial law had not been lifted. The document on the pre-independence arrangements agreed by all the parties at the Conference says that in the event of an effective cease-fire the need for martial law will disappear. That is certainly our position.
The noble Lord asked about the South African forces, a point which I think was also raised by the noble Lord, Lord Goronwy-Roberts. My noble friend the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary has told your Lordships that we envisage no external military intervention in Rhodesia under a British Governor. The Governments concerned are aware of our views and we are quite sure that they will comply.
Lord WIGG: My Lords, I asked the same question in more specific terms. I asked the noble Lord whether the Government have made specific requests to the South African Government to withdraw the forces that they have infiltrated into Mozambique and into Zambia, and whether they have withdrawn in particular the Pumas and the South African pilots who have been operating them.
Lord TREFGARNE: My Lords, I think that I would be wise to consider the implications of that question before I answer, certainly before I answer in public. I shall consider it and write to the noble Lord. All the major issues of the constitutional conference are now resolved.
Lord HATCH of LUSBY: My Lords, I thought that the noble Lord was going to continue on the same point, because he has not answered the question which I asked nor that which my noble friend Lord Wigg asked. I quoted specifically from the Under-Secretary, who, in the debate in another place last week, said:
"During the pre-independence period and after the presence, therefore, of the Governor in Salisbury, there can be and will be no foreign involvement".—[Official Report, Commons, 12/12/79; col. 1413.]
The Governor is in Salisbury. Are the South African forces still within the frontiers of Rhodesia?
Lord TREFGARNE: My Lords, there are certainly no units of the South African forces in Rhodesia, but there are individuals of various nationalities serving in the Rhodesian armed forces. However, the only forces in Rhodesia in this period will be the Rhodesian armed forces and the Patriotic Front forces. We have made it clear at the conference and elsewhere that we do not contemplate any kind of purge of the personnel of the forces of either side.
As I was saying, all the major issues of the constitutional conference are now resolved. We have gone to the limits to reach agreement, and we sincerely believe that the documents now awaiting signature constitute a settlement which is fair to all parties. As my noble and learned friend has said, the achievements of the conference have been remarkable. It remains only to put a settlement into effect, and
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that we are poised to do. The Government hope that the Patriotic Front will sign the agreements very shortly and thus put the final seal on all that has been achieved at this conference.
The Government have now embarked upon an irreversible process to bring Rhodesia to independence. The first step of this last phase was to install the Governor in Salisbury. We cannot and will not impose new conditions. The conditions for independence have been fulfilled in the agreements reached at Lancaster House. They will now be carried out. We can no longer deny to the people of Rhodesia their right to take their place in the world as a free and independent Zimbabwe.
The choice now facing the Patriotic Front is a simple one. On the one hand, they can sign the agreements now on the table. They will have a fair chance to put their support to the test in elections held under our authority. These agreements, in the Government's considered opinion, constitute a settlement fair and reasonable to all the parties and give to the Patriotic Front a splendid opportunity to submit themselves and their policies to the approval of the Rhodesian people. If they take that course—and we do not underestimate the political courage required of them to do so—then Rhodesia can move swiftly to independence in a spirit of reconciliation and national unity. The people of Zimbabwe will then have the chance they surely deserve to live in peace and increasing prosperity surrounded by friends and allies. Alternatively, if they allow the negotiations to founder after all that has been achieved they will bear a heavy responsibility. I repeat that it is our hope and our expectation that they will agree; and it is the clear duty of Her Majesty's Government to keep Rhodesia moving ahead and on course for independence in the near future. That duty is wholly binding upon us and will be discharged within a matter of weeks. This Bill enables us to do just that.
Baroness LLEWELYN-DAVIES of HASTOE: My Lords, before the noble Lord sits down, there is one point which my noble friend Lord Goronwy-Roberts raised to which I think the whole House would like an answer, and that is about Zambia. It is difficult to get information from that part of the world. My noble

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friend asked whether it was true that traffic has now been normalised between Rhodesia and Zambia as we thought it would be as soon as the Governor got there. Zambia is in fact starving. They have no maize. They are desperately in need of salt. So far as we know those goods are being held up in Rhodesia, and we should like to know whether the Governor is taking prompt action to deal with this matter.
Lord TREFGARNE: My Lords, I can assure the noble Baroness and the House that the Governor is taking steps to get maize moving into Zambia as quickly as possible. The noble Baroness may also recall that I answered a Question in the House a week or so ago about maize being provided by the British Government from another source, and that is also moving into Zambia.
Lord GRIDLEY: My Lords, if my noble friend cannot give me the answer about the public officers agreement, would he write to me?
Lord TREFGARNE: Yes, my Lords, my noble friend asked for a considered reply. I will do just that, consider the matter and write to him.
On Question, Bill read 2a, and committed to a Committee of the Whole House.
Then, Standing Order No. 43 having been suspended (pursuant to Resolution):
6.2 p.m.
Lord TREFGARNE: My Lords, I beg to move that the House do now resolve itself into Committee on this Bill.
Moved, That the House do now resolve itself into Committee.—(Lord Trefgarne.)
On Question, Motion agreed to.
House in Committee accordingly.
[The LORD NUGENT OF GUILDFORD in the Chair.]
Clause 1 [Independence for Zimbabwe]:
On Question, Whether Clause 1 shall stand part of the Bill?
Baroness LLEWELYN-DAVIES of HASTOE: We on this side have tried throughout these complicated debates
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and discussions always to be constructive and not obstructive. We have warned the Government when we felt that they were taking risks that perhaps could not be justified. We have always been clear about that. But we have tried to be constructive—I am sure noble Lords opposite will agree—and we did not put down an amendment at this stage, although we were tempted to do so because there is no question that feeling in another place, and in this House, is very strong about the whole question of the Order in Council about the date of independence merely being laid before Parliament but not being given an Affirmative Resolution by both Houses.
I must say that on this side we were profoundly disappointed by Lord Trefgarne's reply. He himself said that it was a British responsibility; that the whole world recognised it as such. We feel that under those conditions it ought to be seen to he approved by both Houses of the British Parliament. We cannot indeed form a view about whether the conditions for independence are fulfilled until after the elections have taken place.
My noble friend Lord Goronwy-Roberts pleaded with the noble Lord that if he could not give way completely on the Affirmative Orders, he should agree that there should be a report to Parliament after the elections and before the date for the independence order is laid. I know that it is the thirteenth hour, as the noble Lord, Lord Alport, said, but we feel deeply about this. We are profoundly disappointed that the Government could not respond in another place, and we ask the noble Lord even now to say that he will consider if not the complete Affirmative Resolution at least a report.
Lord GLADWYN: I should like to associate my noble friends on these Benches wholeheartedly with what the noble Baroness has said. We voted for this amendment in another place. We should like very much that the Government should to some extent, anyhow, revise their view.
6.6 p.m.
Lord HATCH of LUSBY: In full support of my noble friend Lady Llewelyn-Davies I draw the attention of the Committee to the issues involved in this question

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of whether or not the Order in Council will be subject to debate by Parliament before it is carried into effect. That is the nub of the question. I believe that we have a parliamentary responsibility in this matter to ensure that the conditions have been fulfilled in which Parliament would wish to grant independence.
I do not accept the argument of the noble Lord the Minister when he said that all the conditions have been fulfilled for the granting of independence. They have not. They cannot have been, otherwise why are we inviting Commonwealth observers, probably international observers, certainly observers from this country to go and see whether the elections are held in a free and fair manner? What is the point of doing that if, in fact, they report that they have not been held in a free and fair manner and there is nothing we can do about it?
What we are being asked to do by the Government is to give them a blank cheque. This has never been done before in these circumstances. There has never been an occasion on which independence has been granted to a colony when a civil war was taking place; and that civil war is taking place right now. It has not come to an end. Never before in the history of British decolonisation has independence been granted without there being both stability and peace.
I believe that the noble and learned Lord now sitting on the Front Bench will understand the point when I say that to some extent this agreement has had to be reached by balancing justice and peace, and we have had to diminish to a slight extent the justice that is meted out in order to obtain peace. But what we cannot do is simply to say to the Government that, whatever happens between now and some time in March, they have the right to grant independence to Rhodesia. What is more, is this not unfair to the Governor, Lord Soames?
Lord TREFGARNE: I do not think we are questioning the right of the Government to grant independence. Surely this Bill gives the Government the right to grant independence. We are simply talking about the day on which we do it.
Lord HATCH of LUSBY: I very much regret that there is not the same amendment
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down in this House as there was in the other place. That would then perhaps have made it clear to the noble Lord the Minister that what we are challenging is not the right of the Government to grant independence but the right of the Government to grant independence without coming back to both Houses of this Parliament with the reports of the Commonwealth observers, with the observations of the Governor himself, instead of putting all the intolerable onus on the Governor who may very well be in an extremely difficult situation after the election in deciding whom he should call upon to be Prime Minister.
Surely is is a parliamentary responsibility. Surely it means something that this Parliament is granting independence. This Government, all Governments, have always said that only the British Parliament can grant independence. Then the British Government have the responsibility before they grant independence of ensuring that circumstances commensurate with independence have been fulfilled. But they have not. They cannot have been fulfilled yet, and the Minister cannot get away with it. They can have been fulfilled only after the elections have taken place, after they have been seen to be free and fair, and after there is a situation when a government can take over all the responsibilities of independence.
There is no amendment down on this matter, so we cannot divide the Committee. We are simply asking the Government to say, "When we table the Order in Council we will return to Parliament and report to Parliament the circumstances existing between now and that date", and that would mean virtually no delay whatever. If, as we all hope, things have gone well, it will be only a matter of days because the matter will go straight through Parliament. But that right should remain with Parliament until Parliament is satisfied that circumstances have been created when it is right, fair and just to grant independence, rather than putting the onus on the Governor. It is here, in Parliament, where the responsibility should lie and I beg the Minister to promise that when the Order in Council is tabled it will be brought before both Houses of Parliament so that it may be debated before it is carried into effect.
6.12 p.m.
Lord HARMAR-NICHOLLS: We have just listened to what I would call a quibbling argument, and a dangerously quibbling one at that. It is Parliament which is granting independence and that is what the Bill is all about; nobody but the two Houses of Parliament has given authority for independence to be granted under terms with which Parliament has shown itself to be satisfied. The actual date on which the formalities are completed is a matter that must be at the judgment of the Government of the day, and the reason why I say the argument to which we have just listened is dangerously quibbling is that it reflects a lack of confidence in your Lordships' House as to the good intentions and the good sense of the Government when they come to whatever decision as regards the date that they will eventually have to reach. If we here in Parliament reflect such a lack of confidence, are we not adding fuel to the arguments of people who, for reasons quite different from whatever reasons may be expressed here, have also shown a lack of confidence in what will eventually be the decision?
If on this matter we cannot be unanimous in allowing the Government of the day, with the special knowledge that only the Government of the day can have, as to the date, time and hour when the final move should be made, I believe we shall be creating an atmosphere which could be dangerous. If in some special circumstances the conditions were completely changed or something unforeseen were to happen, we know that we have a Government who would take that circumstance into account and who would wish to share with Parliament any new facts which may arise. If that is not the sort of confidence which your Lordships' House can reflect, we should not be surprised if it undermines the advance that has been made in other quarters.
Lord GLADWYN: Would the noble Lord not agree that it is not just a question of having confidence in this Government; that possibly one may need to have confidence in another Government?
Lord HARMAR-NICHOLLS: What the noble Lord, Lord Hatch of Lusby, was asking was that this Government should not he allowed, if the circum-
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stances are in their judgment the right circumstances, to make the final decision. Let us not quibble and let us not, especially at this stage, be dangerously quibbling as we approach this great move forward.
Lord GORONWY-ROBERTS: We have heard repeatedly from the Government Front Bench that the process to which your Lordships' House is asked to agree is irreversible. In the light of that definition of what they are doing now in the name of this country, and for Rhodesia, we have suggested that the mechanism of the Affirmative Resolution be adopted—that would not delay the order by more than a couple of days—or, failing that (and this is a great concession from us) that a report either from the Commonwealth monitoring force or some other impartial source as to how the elections have gone, showing, we very much hope, and I very much expect, that the pre-requisite condition for independence, namely, properly conducted free and fair elections, have in fact taken place. I cannot understand why the Government first refuse the Affirmative Resolution procedure and, secondly, seem unwilling to present a report to your Lordships' House which we could then look at and say, "This is all excellent. Let the date be announced today and we shall all agree to it".
6.15 p.m.
Lord TREFGARNE: I am afraid I cannot agree to either of the proposals put to me by the noble Lord.
Lord GORONWY-ROBERTS: The noble Lord will rue this day; it is a great mistake.
Lord TREFGARNE: As my noble and learned friend stressed in his Second Reading speech, the Government have asked both sides of the constitutional conference to make concessions. They have agreed to our proposals on the understanding that, provided they fulfil the agreed conditions, independence will he forthcoming. The Rhodesian Parliament has been dissolved and Bishop Muzorewa and his colleagues are standing aside in the belief that an irreversible process is being engaged leading to independence.
Secondly, if a further parliamentary stage were added, it could—I emphasise

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"could"—mean that the Government were taking on an open-ended commitment in Rhodesia. The purpose of assuming legislative and executive authority in Rhodesia is to allow elections to be held in which all parties can participate and independence be granted to whatever Government emerges. This is a finite process and the Government cannot accept the possibility that it could be extended. If we allow the Affirmative Resolution procedure, of course Parliament might produce a Negative Resolution and that, we think, would be against the undertakings we have given.
The Government recognise that the majority of independence Bills set a date for independence, but that is by no means always so; it was not done, for instance, in the case of independence for Ceylon, Cyprus, Malaya or Malta. In none of those cases was it judged appropriate to provide any parliamentary procedure for the orders setting the date of independence. I have already explained to the Committee the uncertainty over the precise date of elections and the exact length of time which it will take to complete the various stages after them.
Lord DAVIES of LEEK: Would the noble Lord give way?
Lord TREFGARNE: No, not at the moment. There will need to be consultation with the Governor and with the parties, and it may be that the final date for independence is not set till a later stage in the process which I have described. The Government must have reasonable flexibility in this matter.
Lord DAVIES of LEEK: I simply wanted to ask the Minister, while sincerely taking in all he has said, if he was aware that none of the Governments he cited had the problem of UDI. We were confronted with a completely different case. We are not attacking the Government; we are simply saying it is Parliament which should make the decision.
Lord PEART: May I make an appeal to the Government Front Bench to concede our request? I think my colleagues have been extremely reasonable and I urge the noble Lord to accept that an Opposition has its rights; we believe that what we are suggesting is positive and constructive.
Lord TREFGARNE: The noble Lord, Lord Davies of Leek, said the position in Rhodesia was unique because of UDI. But UDI is at an end—legality has returned to Rhodesia—and I am afraid I cannot accept the proposals which have been put to us.
Lord HATCH of LUSBY: The Minister has not answered the simple question involved here or made any response to the appeal made by noble Lords on this side of the Committee. I quote to him paragraph 26 of a paper which the Government submitted to the Lancaster House Conference:
"Finally, I am conscious of the concern on both sides about the situation which might arise after the elections. I have made it clear that if there is a general wish, the monitoring force would stay in Rhodesia until the independence government are formed and independence is granted".
So the British Government themselves recognise that there is a danger of a situation arising after the elections in which the new régime might need to call upon the monitoring force. Now surely it is only common sense, it is only reasonable and it is only good parliamentary practice that, if the British Government recognise that that may be the situation, they should say that they will come back and report to this House before they make the final decision on independence which is now being taken. I say to noble Lords opposite, you are asking us to make that decision tonight in a vacuum. You have no idea what is going to happen in the next three months, nor have we. You are asking us to give you a blank cheque, to say that at the end of three months whatever happens, independence is going to be granted because we have started an irreversible process. I suggest to the Government that what I propose might in the future very well be extremely helpful to themselves, as well as to the Rhodesians and to parliamentary practice.
Clause 1 agreed to.
Clause 2 agreed to.
Clause 3 [Amnesty in respect of certain acts]:
On Question, Whether Clause 3 shall stand part of the Bill?
Lord STEWART of FULHAM: I want to say a few words about Clause 3 because it seems that, quite apart from the Rhodesian issue, it is a matter of such constitutional importance. Without this clause Ian Smith and some of his associates would be in danger of prosecution for treason and murder. This clause is exempting them from that. It is the use of the legislative power to override the ordinary rule of law. For my part, I believe that it is sensible and right to have the clause in the Bill, and I think that most of my noble friends would agree with me.
What surprises me a little is that members of the Conservative Party, with their intense, at times almost fanatical, devotion to the rule of law, are so ready to see it set aside in this instance. I am reminded of an episode in the last Parliament, in the time of the last Government, when a very modest measure was put forward to relieve certain councillors at Clay Cross from legal penalties that they would otherwise have suffered for being over-generous with ratepayers' money and not showing a strict regard for the law. When that measure was put through, language was used suggesting that we were tearing up civilisation by the roots. At the time I wondered whether Conservative members who spoke in those terms had foreseen that the day would come when they would want a clause of this kind in this Bill.
I am a little surprised, too, that certain members of the judiciary who expressed opinions about the handling of the Clay Cross case have not had a word to say about this clause. Do we really take the view that overspending the ratepayers' money is unpardonable, but that treason and murder can be set aside so light-heartedly, as we appear to be doing? I believe that this is one of the occasions when it is right that of the two great principles of our Constitution, the sovereignty of Parliament and the rule of law, the sovereignty of Parliament should be allowed to override the rule of law and set aside normal legal consequences. It merely seems to me, however, that this is an unusual thing to do, at the very least, and that we ought not to let it pass entirely without comment.
Lord PAGET of NORTHAMPTON: I should like to make a very short observation to my noble friend. There is this
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difference between Rhodesia and Clay Cross: one is within the jurisdiction of our Government and within the realm of British law; the other is neither.
THE LORD CHANCELLOR: I think I ought to say that there is another distinction. I have known the noble Lord, Lord Stewart of Fulham, for a very long time, if he will forgive me saying so; I think for probably more than 50 years. There is this further distinction, which he appears to overlook. In Clay Cross we were not endeavouring to put an end to a civil war; in this case we are.
Clause 3 agreed to.
Remaining clauses and the schedules agreed to.
House resumed: Bill reported without amendment.
Report received.
Bill read 3a, and passed.

SOUTHERN RHODESIA CONSTITUTION (INTERIM PROVISIONS) ORDER 1979
6.27 p.m.
Lord TREFGARNE: Me again, I am afraid, my Lords! I beg to move, that the Southern Rhodesia Constitution (Interim Provisions) Order 1979, a copy of which was laid before this House on 4th December, be approved. The order was made on 3rd December under powers contained in Section 3 of the Southern Rhodesia Act 1979. It is subject to Affirmative Resolution of both Houses within 28 days. Sections 1 and 3 of the order came into operation on 4th December. The remainder of the order was brought into effect on 12th December by a notice signed by my noble friend the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary.
The purpose of the order, as its title indicates, is to make temporary provision for the Government of Southern Rhodesia for the period between the Governor's arrival and the grant of independence, to which your Lordships have just agreed. It sets no time limit for this period, but as my noble and learned friend the Lord Chancellor said, we expect it to be in the order of three months. The terms in which it provides for the government of Rhodesia implement the agreement reached

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at the Constitutional Conference on the pre-independence arrangements.
The order establishes the offices of Governor and Deputy Governor of Southern Rhodesia, which have been filled respectively by my noble friend Lord Soames, and Sir Antony Duff, Deputy to the Permanent Under-Secretary in the Foreign and Commonwealth Office, who has played a leading part in the negotiations at the Lancaster House Conference.
The order confers full legislative powers in Southern Rhodesia on the Governor. He will be able to make laws by ordinance. He will also have the power to continue existing laws with such modifications as he thinks fit, and to validate transactions entered into during the period since 11th November, 1965. The Governor's first ordinance, published on the day of his arrival, set out in greater detail how he will exercise his powers. His second ordinance has been published, which deals with the functions of the Election Commissioner and his staff and establishes the Election Council, in accordance with the arrangements agreed at the conference for the pre-independence elections. Copies of these ordinances have been placed in the Library of the House.
While the legislative power conferred upon the Governor is very extensive, my noble friend Lord Carrington made clear at the constitutional conference that the power will not be used to make changes in Rhodesia which are properly the business of an elected Government. This re-assurance was repeated by the Governor in his first broadcast to the people of Rhodesia. The Governor's role will be to organise elections and maintain the administration of the country on a caretaker basis.
The order also confers upon the Governor full executive authority in Southern Rhodesia, and requires all officers and authorities in Rhodesia to obey his instructions. Bishop Muzorewa and his colleagues will not exercise ministerial powers during the Governor's period of office. This provision is crucial to the implementation of the pre-independence arrangements agreed at the constitutional conference. It will give the Governor the authority with which to ensure the impartial administration of the
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country during the elections and the implementation of the cease-fire. At the same time, it recognises that he will work through the existing administration and police. As your Lordships know, the Government have taken the view—and this has been accepted by the parties at Lancaster House—that there is no practical alternative in this brief period to using the existing services. It will be for the Government of independent Zimbabwe to decide on the future structure of the services of the State.
The order also vests in the Governor the prerogative of mercy. During the pre-independence period no sentence of death can be carried out unless it be confirmed by the Governor. It would not be in accord with the policy of Her Majesty's Government that executions should take place. Finally, the order makes provision that the rights and liabilities of the Government of Southern Rhodesia including the debts and liabilities incurred before UDI remain enforceable.
The reasons for appointing a Governor have been explained fully to your Lordships, and I shall not repeat them now. The constitutional responsibility for bringing Rhodesia to independence rests with Britain, and this order confers the powers which enable the Governor to carry out the responsibilities laid upon him under the agreements reached at the constitutional conference. I beg to move that the order be approved.
Moved, That the order laid before the House on 4th December 1979, be approved.—(Lord Trefgarne.)
6.33 p.m.
Lord BOSTON of FAVERSHAM: My Lords, when the noble Lord, Lord Trefgarne, began his speech on this order and used (if I heard him correctly) the words "the Bill", I thought for a moment that at last, after a splendid revelation on his part, he was going to make the concession which has been so vigorously sought on this side of this House and in another place as well. But, my Lords, as we have heard, that is, alas!, not so. I do not propose to detain the House long on this particular order. As we have heard from the noble Lord, Lord Trefgarne—and the House will be grateful to him for his explanation of the order—it gives extensive powers to the Governor

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in Salisbury, and in our view it is right that he should be given all the powers necessary to govern the country; for, after all, the Salisbury Parliament has already dissolved itself—it did so last week—and, also last week, Rhodesia returned to the status of a colony.
So in our view it is essential that the Governor should be given these powers: not only legislative powers but also, as the Minister has explained, executive powers as well. These latter powers are indeed very wide in scale, and include control over the Armed Forces as well as—a further point which the noble Lord mentioned in the course of his remarks—the Governor's assumption of powers connected with the prerogative of mercy. I am sure that everyone—certainly my noble friends on these Benches—will be pleased to hear the observation that he made concerning the question of the possibility of executions during this particular period.
So all those powers are very necessary; but, at the same time, it is also necessary to make the point that still, as yet, there is no cease-fire in that country. We all hope fervently that that will come, and will come soon. But, if I may say so, I do not think that the House can escape the implications of any clash (we all hope it will not take place, but any clash which could take place) between the Rhodesian armed forces and the guerrilla forces, because there is no doubt at all that Britain itself would be directly involved; for, after all, the Governor, as part of his functions as explained by the noble Lord, Lord Trefgarne, tonight, is the commander-in-chief of the armed forces exercising responsibilities of this country.
My Lords, I do not want to go over the implications of this again—they have been discussed extensively on other occasions—but I nevertheless feel that it is right that Her Majesty's Opposition should have pressed, as they did, for agreement on a cease-fire before the Governor went. As the noble Lord the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary, Lord Carrington, said to your Lordships on 7th November and again on the Second Reading of the Southern Rhodesia Bill, as it was then, on 13th November, the plan was for a cease-fire to be agreed before the Governor was actually sent. On that second occasion, on
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13th November, he added a reservation which will be familiar to the House.
We have made full and well-deserved comments about the success which the noble Lord the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary has so far achieved, and I have no wish to be critical of him on this or, indeed, on any other point, but, with respect, I feel it is right that the House must face the possible consequences of the sequence of events that was chosen. I would add only that we also quite understand all the reasons and all the circumstances which led the Government to decide to send the Governor there last week.
My Lords, the only other point I would make is that this particular example is not the first which has confronted the House tonight, in the course of our deliberations, of where, in our view, the cart has been placed before the horse. I hope there will be no difficulties arising as a result of the Government's refusal—and this is the other instance we have had tonight—to accept the Affirmative Resolution procedure for an Order in Council on the date of independence following elections. It would be wrong of me—and, indeed, I would be out of order in doing so—were I to pursue that further tonight; but I say that because it is not the only occasion on which in these matters we have experienced the cart being placed before the horse tonight.
It has been said already in the course of our debates on the Bill itself that this exercise is something of a gamble. We all hope—on these Benches as well as on the Government Benches and, indeed, elsewhere—that there will be a complete agreement soon; that there will be a swift cease-fire; and that Rhodesia will proceed to the remaining stages of independence with the minimum of trouble and, we hope, complete success. This is what I believe all of us desire with all our hearts for the sake of all the people of Rhodesia.
6.39 p.m.
Lord HATCH of LUSBY: My Lords, may I ask the noble Lord the Minister one brief question in two parts? As I understand it—perhaps he will correct me if I am wrong—this order gives power to the Governor, both to command the armed forces and to order the police

1519
force. Can the noble Lord tell me whether the police force is now going to be separated from the combined operations; in other words, separated from the armed forces? That is the first part of the question. Secondly, will it be the police force or will it be the armed forces who will be responsible and given command by the Governor in the event of any cease-fire? I will understand if the noble Lord has not got the answer ready, but, if not, perhaps he will write to me about it.
Lord TREFGARNE: My Lords, those are perfectly proper questions to which, I confess, I do not have the answer at this moment, but I will find out the answer and write to the noble Lord. I do not think your Lordships would wish me to rehearse again all the arguments that we have been through this evening. I hope your Lordships will now agree to pass this order.
On Question, Motion agreed to.