HL Deb 13 December 1979 vol 403 cc1383-90

4.3 p.m.

The MINISTER of STATE, MINISTRY of DEFENCE (Lord Strathcona and Mount Royal)

My Lords, with the leave of the House, I shall now repeat a Statement which is being made in another place by my right honourable friend the Secretary of State for Defence. The Statement is as follows:

" With your permission, Mr. Speaker, and that of the House, I should like to make a statement about the NATO Foreign and Defence Ministers' meeting in Brussels yesterday to consider proposals for modernisation of the Alliance's long-range theatre nuclear forces, and a parallel arms control offer. A copy of the communiqué issued at the end of the meeting is being placed in the Library.

" Faced with the rapid growth in Soviet long-range theatre nuclear capability, notably the deployment of large numbers of modern SS-20 missiles and Backfire bombers, at a time when the Alliance's own equivalent forces are increasing in age and vulnerability, we concluded that some modernisation of NATO's theatre nuclear capability is essential.

" The modernisation programme will involve the deployment in Europe of United States owned and operated systems comprising 108 Pershing II ballistic missile launchers, which will replace the same number of the existing Pershing IA, and 464 ground-launched Cruise missiles. All 14 NATO countries concerned have agreed to support the programme, and certain infrastructure costs will be met through NATO's existing common funding arrangements. As far as basing is concerned, Germany, Italy and Belgium, in addition to ourselves, have agreed to stationing, subject in the Belgian case to a six-month deferment of implementation while arms control developments are monitored. The Netherlands will take a decision in 1981 on deployment in their territory. The first deployments should take place in about three years' time.

" We will discuss with the United States where the 160 Cruise missiles to be deployed in the United Kingdom should be stationed; I will make a Statement about this as soon as practicable.

" As an integral part of the programme, we also agreed that the United States should withdraw 1,000 of their nuclear warheads from Europe as soon as possible, and that the remaining stockpile will not be increased as the 572 warheads associated with the modernisation programme are introduced.

" In parallel with this modernisation programme the United States will make an offer to the Soviet Union to begin negotiations on the limitation of both Soviet and United States land-based long-range theatre nuclear systems. The intention is that their bilateral negotiations should begin as soon as possible. They will be based on the principle of equality between both sides; any limitations will have to be adequately verifiable. The aim will be to contribute to a more stable military relationship in Europe, and hence a more predictable and manageable situation at a lower level of armaments. Because of the particular importance of these negotiations for the European members of the Alliance a special consultative body is to be set up within NATO to follow the negotiations on a continuous basis.

" Her Majesty's Government have, as I have earlier made clear, fully supported the Alliance effort to reach agreement on this programme, which I believe is essential if we are to avoid a dangerous gap emerging in NATO's theatre nuclear capability. Such a gap would weaken the Alliance's strategy of flexible response and so cast doubt on the credibility of our deterrent. The decision reached yesterday is a dramatic reaffirmation of the American commitment to the defence of Europe. This decision is also a demonstration of the cohesion and political will of the Alliance to respond to a growing Soviet threat and to resist a massive Soviet propaganda campaign. My right honourable and noble friend the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary and I therefore regard the outcome of the Alliance's lengthy and careful deliberations as highly satisfactory. We must now hope that the Soviet Union are now willing to negotiate seriously on the limitation of theatre nuclear systems ".

My Lords, that is the end of my right honourable friend's Statement.

4.8 p.m.

Lord PEART

My Lords, may I thank the noble Lord for repeating the Statement. It is a very important Statement and I am sorry that Her Majesty's Government have been deficient in providing parliamentary time to discuss it. No doubt noble Lords will have seen some of the very effective television programmes on this matter, but other countries in Europe have been debating it in their Chambers. Therefore, I should like to chide the Government for not offering time for the matter to be debated in Parliament. It is so important. We should have had discussions well before a Statement was presented to this House. As I have already said, other NATO countries have had parliamentary debates on this issue.

While there is consensus in the United Kingdom on the need for adequate defence and strong support for NATO, nevertheless there is a clear need for new initiatives on arms control, disarmament and détente, and I am glad that this formed a small part of the Statement which has been made today.

We on this side of the House strongly support pressing forward with SALT II and wish SALT III discussions to be started now. The House will recall that some time ago we had a debate on this matter. In that debate I stressed the importance of negotiations which would lead to détente. Our allies, the United States of America, are having important discussions and wish to continue the dialogue.

We must do all that we can to reactivate the talks on mutual and balanced force reductions, and we must be positive about this. We want to avoid a widening of differences. We want the two large Powers to get together and to have fruitful discussions. I hope that we can achieve this.

Lord GLADWYN

My Lords, the Government will certainly not be surprised to learn that we on these Benches warmly welcome this NATO decision, since the Parliamentary Liberal Party has already expressed its approval, while accompany- ing it with the demand that the whole scheme should be linked with proposals for negotiations with the Soviet Union on arms limitation. With the noble Lord, Lord Peart, we are happy to note that the United States will now take the initiative in this direction—an initiative with which, as we understand it, the European members of NATO will to some extent be associated.

We would however welcome a little explanation on how this method of negotiation will actually work. Will it in effect be the equivalent of SALT III? It is, after all, a decision of the first importance and I agree with the noble Lord, Lord Peart, that it should have been discussed in this House before Christmas. In any case, will it now be embodied in a White Paper which we could have an opportunity of discussing immediately after the Recess? I see that the noble Lord, Lord Peart, is nodding his head. I also suppose that in such a debate the attitude of the Government will be clarified, if it has not been made clear already, on such important matters as whether the missiles stationed in this country will be operated under the so-called double key system and whether it will be possible or desirable—as some suggest—to lessen the vulnerability of missiles stationed here by placing at least some of them in small camouflaged merchant vessels?

Lord STRATHCONA and MOUNT ROYAL

My Lords, may I respond to those two comments first. My right honourable friend has, on a number of occasions in the last six weeks, said that he would welcome a debate, and I think we can take some credit in this House for having discussed this matter; indeed, we are going to have a further opportunity of discussing it next week. I admit that it is not a major debate such as we would wish. So far as the White Paper is concerned, I will draw the noble Lord's comments to the attention of my right honourable friend.

The noble Lord, Lord Peart, mentioned the mutual and balanced force reduction negotiations, which, of course, run continuously. But we hope and confidently predict that the result of this offer will galvanise those talks into slightly greater progress than they have been making recently. I think the implications of the Statement are that the SALT III negotiations would take place in a rather similar manner to the SALT II negotiations, but there has been this consultative body which would give some formality to our relationships with the United States, who will be negotiating, as it were, on behalf of the West. That is my understanding of the situation.

The noble Lord asked me one other specific question which I can answer. At the present time it is not envisaged that these missiles would be under a double-key arrangement. It would be a wholly American operated system, and of course it is mobile.

Lord GLADWYN

My Lords, would the possibility of stationing them on camouflaged merchant ships be discussed?

Lord STRATHCONA and MOUNT ROYAL

My Lords, so far as I know it is sites in this country which are being discussed at the present time.

4.13 p.m.

Lord WIGG

My Lords, the Minister has confirmed the question that I was going to put to him, that all these missiles, be they cruise or ballistic missiles, will be under American control so that they add nothing whatever to the Government's vaunted defence policy of having an independent deterrent, but in fact by being stationed here they add to the dangers to this country and indeed it increases the possibility that, should the Soviet Union react actively, we should be a "target for tonight "—we are that already, but it would be even more so. In which case, does it not become imperative to accede to the obviously reasonable request made by the noble Lord, Lord Peart—provided the Government have nothing to hide—to have an early debate so that these matters may be threshed out, not in the form of questions and answers, which is not satisfactory, but so that we may know the whole truth? In my submission, this policy is part of a smokescreen in order to placate Senate objections to getting SALT II. Militarily it is just a load of nonsense and just as much a load of nonsense as Polaris was as a successor to Blue Streak or to Skybolt; and as the penalty if things go wrong has to be paid by the British public is it not imperative that the British public should be informed in the first instance through a debate in this House or in another place?

Lord STRATHCONA and MOUNT ROYAL

My Lords, I do not think the noble Lord and I are likely to agree about the military assessment, so I will not attempt to convince him on that point. We believe that this agreement asserts the solidarity and the unity of NATO and that is really the easiest way to answer his misgivings about the increased risk to this country. So far as a debate is concerned, this is something which I think we should best take up through the usual channels.

Lord PEART

My Lords, I accept that and I hope there will be a positive response. I know that the noble Earl, Lord Kimberley, is raising the matter at some time, but I think that the Government should provide time.

Lord ORR-EWING

My Lords, is the noble Lord aware that this Statement will be very warmly welcomed on these Benches? It underlines the fact that this is a NATO decision and the Americans are not imposing these missiles on an unwilling Europe. They are being warmly welcomed by all the NATO allies as a modernisation of the existing force. And is he aware that his Statement will do something to counter the propaganda in the media and other places—particularly on television—which is suggesting that the American President is somehow imposing this on Europe against our will? Is he aware that many of us have been alarmed by the success of the Soviet massive propaganda campaign which persuaded the United States and other NATO allies not to deploy the neutron bomb, and on these Benches we are delighted that the Government have taken no notice of that success but have gone ahead to make a modern nuclear deterrent in Western Europe?

Lord STRATHCONA and MOUNT ROYAL

My Lords, I am grateful to my noble friend. It is, of course, the importance of the reiteration of the American identification with the defence of Europe which pleases us in this Statement.

Lord SHINWELL

My Lords, I join with the noble Lord, Lord Orr-Ewing, in extending a welcome to the proposition, but there is a great deal to discuss before we come to a definite decision. One accepts the principle but—and I say this with respect—rejects the statement made by the Minister about this being an expression of unity in Europe, because obviously that cannot be said so long as France contracts out. Nothing has been said about that. There has been a great deal of talk in the Press about unity in the countries of the Nine and setting aside the reservations of the Dutch and the Belgians, but France—a nuclear power itself—has contracted out of NATO, so where does unity come in? I should like the Minister to express an opinion on that.

I want now to come to the question of negotiation. Let it be clearly understood that the primary purpose is not to provoke war or to engage in a conflict. The primary purpose is to create a deterrent; to say in effect to the Soviet Union: "You are strong—stronger than you require to be. You are forcing us also to become strong and therefore we must negotiate ". Will the negotiations always take place in private? Are the public, who are primarily concerned, to be excluded—particularly on issues such as verification, which is a very substantial element in these discussions?

There is a great deal more to be said about this and I hope we shall have a debate, but my final question is this. On the subject of infrastructure, are we to understand that the process of infrastructure will begin before there is a definite decision, say in 1983, because that would mean vast expenditure for communications and similar purposes that may have nothing to do with a future conflict at all? I ask that part of my question because, following the last war, some of the countries of the Nine were able to create communications of various kinds which have been used for the purpose of industrial development, to the detriment of the United Kingdom, when they were only intended for the purposes of conflict.

4.20 p.m.

Lord STRATHCONA and MOUNT ROYAL

My Lords, I have quite a number of questions from the noble Lord, Lord Shinwell, which I will endeavour to deal with. Naturally, we regret the situation which has grown up over the years in NATO'S relationship with France. Conceivably this might be an opportunity for them to rejoin the alliance in full. This has not been mentioned; the noble Lord is quite right. The nature of the negotiations is something that is not yet settled; it is very early days.

So far as verification is concerned, I agree completely with the noble Lord about the need to convince the public of the credibility of verification. The great problem is that verification is in iteslf an extrenely sensitive area about which it is rather difficult to be entirely forthcoming. On the matter of infrastructure, my understanding is that the basic decisions to station these missiles are now taken in principle and will have to be taken in detail in the coming months. It is axiomatic, I would have thought, that if the missiles are gonig to be deployed in 1983, obviously it will be necessary to make certain infrastructure provisions to accommodate them when they finally arrive.

Lord BALOGH

My Lords, would not the noble Lord agree that American internal politics have played too large a part in this decision? Would he further agree that to re-arm and at the same time cut steel production capacity by 40 per cent, is folly?

Lord STRATHCONA and MOUNT ROYAL

My Lords, I do not think that American internal politics have had anything to do with this. This has been a European matter largely led by this country.

Earl FERRERS

My Lords, I hesitate to interrupt something which is of very great concern, but in view of the fact that we are slightly up against time and that the questions on this Statement have gone on for about 19 minutes, I wonder whether it would meet with the approval of the House if we were to move on, bearing in mind that my noble friend has said that he would be quite happy, through the usual channels, to consider a debate.