THE RESERVE FORCES

HL Deb 12 December 1979 vol 403 cc1143-58

2.48 p.m.

Lord GLENARTHUR rose to call attention to the need to maintain effective Reserve Forces; and to move for Papers.

The noble Lord said: My Lords, I must first declare an interest. I left the Regular Army just over four years ago and since then have been a member of the Territorial Army as an individual reserve for my regiment, and I train with them for 19 days every year. I can find no record of a full debate on the Reserves in this House in recent years, but since the mid-'sixties the role of the Reserves has become an increasingly important one.

The complete organisation of our defence effort has been adapted in line with what we can afford, what is appropriate in the context of our commitment to NATO, and the threat which we perceive. Each of the three Services depends to a greater or lesser extent not only on individual reinforcements which bring them up to strength on mobilisation, but also on units of trained volunteers who complete the order of battle. I am therefore encouraged by the number of noble Lords who have put their names down to speak on this important subject. Many have considerable experience of the Reserves, some from the highest military offices in the land. By my calculations, my Lords, with so many to speak it gives us about 10 minutes each.

The main purpose of the Reserves, as I have said, is to complete our commitment to our allies in NATO and to assist in maintaining a secure United Kingdom base. Broadly speaking, there are two types of Reserve: first, the Regular Reserve, which consists of men and women who have completed a period of regular service and who have to undergo a compulsory period of reserve commitment; and, second, what I shall call the trained Reserve. The trained Reserve is composed of both ex-regular Servicemen and civilians of no previous military background who have volunteered to train regularly in a particular Service, and who generally make up complete Reserve units or ships' companies, but who may in certain circumstances be an individual Reserve, such as I am myself.

The threat against which both Regular and Reserve forces are available to be deployed has changed considerably over the years. I suppose it is just conceivable that 15 years ago it could possibly have been argued by the Soviets that their military effort was defensive. My Lords, their ability now ranges from the defensive to what, in an ever-increasing way, is patently and overtly offensive in character and capability. The huge superiority of Soviet and Warsaw Pact forces, of tanks, missiles, aircraft, warships and the men to deploy them, has received considerable publicity lately. Those of your Lordships who listened to the retired Chief of Defence Staff addressing the All-Party Defence Study Group last July will be only too well aware of the considerable strength and capabilities ranged against us. So it came as a real encouragement, certainly to those on this side of the House, and particularly to both the Regular and the Reserve Forces, to hear that one of the first pledges of the new Government on taking office was to increase defence expenditure by 3 per cent. in real terms until 1986, and to award the Services the full pay rise recommended by the Armed Forces Pay Review Body, bringing Servicemen into line realistically with their civilian counterparts and promising to maintain this comparability in future, which to some extent should stop the outflow of people from the Services.

It is of course argued at a time of national penury that any increase in the defence budget is not so much in the interests of the nation as improvements in the social services or other areas of the Welfare State might be. But I submit that expense is one thing: value for money is another. For example, the total cost of the Territorial Army to the nation is just over 3 per cent. of the Army's share of the Defence Vote, which in turn works out at just over 1 per cent. of the total defence budget. Yet the Territorial Army provides 28 per cent. of our mobilised Army in Germany. That represents considerable cost-effectiveness, and the value that it provides as part of our overall defence effort is in the very deepest interests of the country. In Britain we are almost unique among our European NATO allies in that we have no conscription, National Service or anything like that. While it existed, there were considerable numbers of individuals who had some military background and who in many cases had an obligatory period of Reserve service to undertake when their full-time National Service expired. At the same time, however, our Regular Forces were considerably larger than they are today, and the same reliance was not placed upon the Reserves as is the case now. They were not as well equipped and in some cases, perhaps, not as professional as they needed to be and as trained Reserves are today.

Today's trained Reserves for all three Services are, as I have said, volunteers. They take part in it because they see a sense of purpose in it, and because they enjoy it. Indeed, I think it is no exaggeration to say that volunteers must regard their Reserve training as their main hobby. Perhaps I can give your Lordships an example from the Territorial Army. Imagine what it is like for a person to walk, or get home somehow, from his place of work on a Friday evening; to go straight to his TA headquarters, there to change into uniform, prepare his vehicles and his equipment and attend briefings; and eventually deploy overnight to an area perhaps 100 miles or so away to be ready to commence an exercise starting at first light on Saturday. He exercises throughout Saturday, throughout Saturday night, and perhaps until midday on Sunday, before being faced with the tedious journey back after no sleep, de-kitting, the cleaning up of vehicles, debriefing and learning all he may from the exercise. Eventually, perhaps, he gets home for supper on the Sunday. My Lords, efforts of that sort require not only a great deal of hard work but dedication, loyalty and the achievement of a considerable amount of personal satisfaction and enjoyment, as well as much understanding on the part of the individual's family.

Of course, the Reservist is paid regular rates for the time that he is undergoing his training; and, furthermore, he now receives an enhanced bounty after three years, which amounts to some £300 per year if he completes his annual quota of training. No one would dream of suggesting that the volunteer does it for the money. He could probably earn far more by doing overtime at his normal place of work. During my last two years with the Regular Army I had the privilege of working very closely with the two armoured reconnaissance regiments of the Territorial Army, the Royal Yeomanry and the Queen's Own Yeomanry. If any of us Regulars were a little sceptical to begin with about the ability we might find, those thoughts were very swiftly dispelled and we soon came to respect the enormous enthusiasm and professionalism of those we supported. If in any way there were gaps in their military ability—and there were very few—they were admirably filled by the good humour, zeal and energy which they displayed.

My Lords, it seems to me that in order to maintain the effectiveness of our Reserves, and indeed to improve them, we must concentrate on three areas: manpower, the provision of equipment and, to a considerable extent, public relations. So far as the trained Reserves are concerned, each of the Services is below strength. Perhaps I may run through each of the Services in turn. The Royal Naval Reserve has about 6,500 members; yet it has a major and increasing sea-going role, chiefly in mine counter-measures. It will, as I understand it, operate the new Hunt Class mine counter-measures vessels, of which the first, HMS "Brecon", was launched very recently. Additionally, the Royal Naval Reserve is to operate the 12 extra-deep Armed Team Sweep vessels, based on trawler design, which are currently under development. Therefore, although the equipment side is encouraging, there are definite gaps on the manpower side, and a sustained effort is required to put this to rights.

Recently, the formation of a new Naval Reserve of helicopter pilots was announced. This Reserve will, we are told, augment front-line helicopter squadrons and introduce a pool of expertise for communications flying. Although it intends to recruit only 40 aircrew initially, rising to 60 in the early 'eighties, I suspect that it will be well subscribed. Certainly many of my professional pilot colleagues with a naval background have indicated a desire to use their flying skills in a Reserve role. So it makes a great deal of sense to direct back to the Navy many of the skills acquired there at colossal expense in the first place, and which have since played such an important role in the development of North Sea oil, for example.

Turning to the Army, this possesses the greatest number of trained Reservists. There are about 60,000 members of the Territorial Army at the moment. But, again, the Territorial Army is some 20 per cent. under strength. Additionally, there are over 7,500 members of the Ulster Defence Regiment. Without wishing to show any disrespect to the Ulster Defence Regiment, for which I have boundless admiration, I shall not talk about their particular role at length today, as I should rather concentrate on the NATO aspect. However, I am certain that I speak for noble Lords on both sides and in all corners of the House when I say that we all have immense admiration for them in the difficult job that they have to do and for the courage and devotion to duty which they show in difficult circumstances.

The Shapland Committee report on the study of manpower wastage in the Territorial Army has been published and certain of the key recommendations have been adopted, a fact which I know has been greatly appreciated by the Territorial Army. I was encouraged to hear from the noble Lord the Minister in answer to my Starred Question last week that other recommendations are being studied. I was heartened also to hear in answer to my supplementary question that the Government are taking steps to promote throughout the Government agencies, nationalised industries and industry as a whole the importance of allowing reservists time off to train. There is no doubt that employers and the country at large are far from enlightened as to the relevance today of any of the Reserves and I feel that it is important that efforts be made to promote this understanding.

It is interesting to note that in the year ending March, 1977, which, I know, is a little out of date, out of 54,000 Territorial Army soldiers eligible for a bounty, only 26,600 did the minimum training necessary to qualify for a bounty. I do not support legislation in this area but those who take part in Reserve training should not be required to make undue personal sacrifice in the light of the importance of the Territorial Army over holidays and the like.

So far as the Army's Regular Reserves of some 121,500 are concerned, it makes a great deal of sense to have improved the mobilisation plans, albeit for only 50,000 of them, by intending to issue them with equipment and asking them to report once a year to ensure that they and their equipment are in good order. It eases mobilisation plans considerably and one hopes that, in addition to those who are compelled to take part under the training obligation which they have and which hitherto has not been invoked, volunteers will also come forward. I look forward to the scheme being extended to include the Royal Navy. One aspect which concerns me is the strength of the Army Reserves left in the United Kingdom on mobilisation. I understand that almost 80 per cent. of the Territorial Army will be deployed in mainland Europe. This leaves home defence desperately weak. This is about only 15,000 or 20,000 trained Army reservists in the United Kingdom—which has been described as the equivalent of a rather thin crowd at Twickenham. I fear that our preoccupation with the deployment of our trained Army Reserves in Europe has left a serious gap here. I suggest that a reappraisal of our home defence (and civil defence, which is another subject) is required.

The Royal Air Force has the fewest trained Reserves, at present about 300 in all. But this has been expanded to provide three squadrons of airfield defence volunteers for which, I understand, recruiting is going well and is approaching half the establishment required. There is no reserve flying role for aircrew. As far as high performance aircraft are concerned, I think that this is quite understandable. I have some little practical experience of it. Last February the noble Lord, Lord Trefgarne, and I flew in a Jaguar at Lossiemouth and I saw at first hand that the skills and practice required not only to fly the aircraft but to deliver weapons from them and to keep pace with a technologically complex subject are so enormous that to attempt to do it part-time is unrealistic.

However, the training of any pilot is very expensive. Apparently, it approaches half a million pounds and rises to over £l million for a fully-trained fighter pilot. It is expensive, but it seems to me that there is scope for using the ex-RAF helicopter pilots who are in current flying practice, in a similar way to that being planned for the Navy. That is something which I hope the Government will consider.

Having discussed manpower, I should like to talk about making the best use of our resources when it comes to equipment in industrial or commercial use. I hope that I may he forgiven for producing yet another helicopter example, because I am involved in it. There are over 450 civilian-registered helicopters in this country and about 70 of them are large machines ideally suited to increasing the efficiency of the support helicopter role of the RAF or the Royal Navy. So far as I know, no reserve role exists for any of them; nor, indeed, for the 380 smaller machines. If you connect this with the availability of manpower, there are over a thousand pilots flying them and 98 per cent. are Service-trained. I should be interested to know whether the noble Lord, Lord Strathcona and Mount Royal, can confirm that his Ministry are aware of this apparently untapped resource.

My Lords, I have spoken for long enough. The subject is a large one and covers much more ground than I can hope to discuss by myself this afternoon. Suffice it to say that the Reserves are a fully-integrated and essential part of our national defence effort, both on the Continent of Europe, at sea and in the United Kingdom. Money is always scarce; so let us make the best use of those Reserves which offer real cost-effectiveness in defence terms. Public goodwill towards the Reserves abounds, and the ability and enthusiasm of those who volunteer is considerable. I trust that the Government will continue to develop the existing Reserves and, where necessary, expand them to fill the gaps which obviously exist. My Lords, I beg to move for Papers.

3.6 p.m.

Lord SHINWELL

My Lords, the noble Lord justifiably deserves congratulations on his speech and also on the subject he has chosen for debate. As he rightly said, we have not had, at any rate for a long time, a full debate concerning our Reserve Forces. But I can inform him that seldom have we had a debate on defence and the Estimates and matters concerning the national security without substantial reference being made to the need for Reserve Forces. Perhaps many noble Lords present will recall that I have repeatedly advocated the need for strengthening our Reserve Forces. I have not only ventured to offer opinions on the subject in this House, but I did so in another place, sometimes without evoking much enthusiasm—that I readily admit—and also when I was associated with the Labour Government as Secretary for War and Minister for Defence, There ought not to be any partisanship on a subject of this character. I mean by that that there ought not to be acute divisions of opinion on a subject which concerns our security. It should be wholehearted and universal. After all, it concerns every person in the land irrespective of his political partisanship. There is no use in accusing the Labour Party or previous Labour Governments for their lack of enthusiasm in building up our Reserve Forces or in matters concerning defence. After all, following the decision of the electors and the formation of a majority Labour Government in 1945, we had to face the legacy of National Service and, in particular, international tension which could not he shrugged aside. Then, despite financial difficulties which were extremely acute at the time, and despite the lack of enthusiasm, and despite our suffering grievous loss of manpower and dissipation of our financial resources, we continued with National Service for several years despite some opposition from the ranks of the party to which I belong, and indeed a lack of enthusiasm in the country. One could hardly expect much enthusiasm following a great war.

Moreover, this subject of Reserve Forces, which of course relates primarily to manpower—of course, we cannot ignore equipment, finance and ancillary matters—was very largely subordinated in the public mind and in the political spheres in the country because of the White Paper of 1957. The noble Lord, Lord Duncan-Sandys, is not present; but I would hardly expect him to come along for a debate of this kind, and he might be busy elsewhere. He conceived the notion that the future had very little relation to manpower but to nuclear strength. Ever since then there has been a division of opinion as between the military experts and those who are less expert, who are amateurs in this "game ", as between the need for nuclear strength and conventional power.

So we are faced with a situation at the present time when we have to deal with the controversy which concerns the whole of Europe and NATO in particular and has its repercussions throughout the world. We are dealing with whether we should use our resources, such as they are or what they are likely to be in the future. Even in the most optimistic vein we do not expect too much. Also we are dealing with whether we should focus attention on nuclear weapons, missiles capable of causing devastation if unfortunately a conflict occurred, but primarily for the purposes of a deterrent. In other words, to put it bluntly—and not being afraid to put it bluntly—to say to a possible aggressor: "If you start any nonsense you will have to deal with a situation which probably you did not contemplate because of our alleged weakness. We are not as weak as you suspect ".

What is to be done about the situation? When I saw on the Order Paper the Motion for which the noble Lord is responsible I put my name down with no intention of making a long speech—I give your Lordships that assurance, if it provides any consolation—and certainly without wishing to make any attempt at oratory on a subject of this kind. One has to be realistic. On this subject of realism I must digress for a moment. What has concerned me frequently in your Lordships' House is this. We have the most remarkable debates on a variety of topics, mostly of an academic and intellectual character. Reference was made yesterday to the presence in your Lordships' House of 13 Fellows of the Royal Society and a host of others who exude expertise. I sometimes wonder how it is that, with all the intelligence and all the academic and scientific knowledge that we possess, the country is in such a mess. There must be something wrong. I know it is easy enough to find a scapegoat, say a trade union leader or the people on the shop floor. But that will not do. It is a remarkable fact which we have to face that, despite our high intelligence—about that there can be no question—our scientific and technical knowledge, and technological know-how, we are in a frightful industrial, economic and financial mess.

I venture a reason for it. The other day we had a debate in this House on shipbuilding. I spoke for only a few minutes, and I am afraid that I worried quite a number of noble Lords who expected a long discourse on the shipbuilding situation. I gave nothing of the sort. I simply asked: What is the cause of the trouble? Why are we weak? I ask that question now. Why are we weak?

I have the highest regard and respect for the noble Lord, Lord Strathcona and Mount Royal. I wish him well now that he has been elevated, rightly, to the Front Bench. If he replies to this debate he might say: "What is the use of talking about weakness? In the TAVR we have 60,000 people. We have a Regular Reserve of 130,000 people, and we can call upon a large number of others in the event of conflict. We have a potential, and therefore we are not as weak as is supposed ". If he says that, I will not argue any further. If, on the other hand, he accepts what the noble Lord, Lord Glenarthur, has said: manpower 3 per cent., helicopters not properly equipped or used, what are we going to do about that? We have in your Lordships' House some remarkable military experts. One is to follow me. I hesitate to think what he will say about this speech of mine. He will probably say: "He knows nothing about it. He was just a Minister and probably did as he was told ". He had better look up Lord Montgomery's memoirs in order to correct that impression.

We have other Members, Admirals of the Fleet, Field Marshals, a whole collection of military experts. What are they going to do about it? Something has to be done about. it If anybody supposes that, as a result of this debate and eloquent speeches such as we have just heard, and amateur speeches, such as your Lordships are listening to now, there is going to be a change in the situation which is going to lead to the build-up of effective Reserve Forces, they are mistaken. It requires organisation; it requires will; it requires enthusiasm on the part of the general public; it requires an understanding of the insecurity in which we find ourselves, which may be more intense in the future. It requires all that.

I should like, as a result of this debate, those military experts to make up their minds, shrugging aside all the trifling issues that might be raised, that they are going to play a part in this, that there should be a campaign in the country. That is to say—and I emphasise this—if we believe that we ought to increase our security by building up Reserve Forces. If we do not, then that is the end of the matter. However, if we do, if we regard it as essential, then they will have to help us to put things right. I hope that the noble Lord, Lord Strathcona, when he replies to the debate, will give some attention to the realistic aspects of what should be done about it, if anything should be done.

It is easy enough to say: "It is not so bad after all. International tension exists. We know all about it, but we do not expect a war the day after next or even in a month or two. I understand that the ideas will take another six years before they decide to have a conflict, and they are not quite sure whether it will be with nuclear weapons or with conventional weapons ". We can say that, but it will not do. Either we believe that we are too weak on the Reserve side in connection with the Army, the Navy and the Air Force, and in particular as regards civil defence—and nothing has been said about that—and something has to be done about it, and immediately, or else we just have a nice academic debate and (apart from the speech to which your Lordships are now listening) there will be wonderful speeches from the experts who know much more about the subject than I do, but at the end of the day there will be no implementation and nothing will be done. We will go on talking and talking, and pelading and pleading, until some fine day we "catch it in the neck" and we have to return to conscription—a subject about which my noble friend Lord Wigg knows more than any other person present, even the military experts. That will not do. So let us be realistic about this issue. If we are not, I say to the noble Lord, enthusiastic as he may be and expert as he may be, that his speech will be a thing of shreds and patches.

3.22 p.m.

Lord CARVER

My Lords, I am extremely pleased to be able to support the Motion of the noble Lord, Lord Glenarthur, in particular because he uses the word "effective ". I think it is to the effectiveness or lack of effectiveness of our Reserves that we should draw attention. I shall attempt to meet the challenge put by the noble Lord, Lord Shinwell, of being realistic, and also to meet the challenge of keeping within 10 minutes.

Fifteen years ago I myself was very closely concerned in the reorganisation of both the Territorial Army and the Army Emergency Reserve into the Terri- torial and Army Volunteer Reserve. That reorganisation was absolutely necessary because at that time both were largely, if not totally, ineffective. Together, they were far too large, so that they could not possibly be recruited to anything like their potential establishment. They were too large to be properly trained; they were too large to be clothed properly or to be equipped; they were still living on what was left over the from Second World War. What is more, they were far too large to meet any real requirement, given the limitations of a voluntary force and what the NATO strategy was, and still is.

The situation today as I see it—and I will speak only of the Army Reserves—is a great deal better. Of the combat units of the Territorial Army, practically all are recruited at 80 per cent. or over. The overall total of 60 per cent. of the TA allows for under-recruitment in certain specific areas. They are well equipped, well trained and most of them have realistic tasks which they themselves can feel are really needed. But of course the Regular Reserve is now a great deal smaller than it was then, and that rather bogus reserve of all, the ex-National Serviceman, has disappeared. However, the dilemma remains which faced us then, which is that the Territorial Army does not always exactly like meeting what is the real need of the Army for Reserve Forces.

What is that need? The first need in support of NATO—the overall need to provide individuals and units to complete the wartime order of battle of NATO—consists of three main parts. The first and perhaps the most important is primarily logistic, to replace largely the civilians employed in peacetime. Secondly, the need is to find some extra combat units, given the limitations of training of a volunteer force which the Shapland Report fully realised. They must have simple tasks and they are largely tasks of a defensive nature, such as demolition and bridge guards. Finally, they need individuals to bring Regular units up to war establishment and to replace casualties.

That is the primary function of the Regular Reserve and, as I see it, these tasks are fairly satisfactorily met today, though there are certain weaknesses. The first is a lack of volunteer reservists for logistic reinforcement, particularly among the important specialists, who are largely founded by what are called "sponsored units" or "sponsored individuals "—largely those who, in the old days, were in the Army Emergency Reserve.

Secondly, as is pointed out in paragraph 207 of this year's Defence White Paper produced by the previous Government, there are some unsatisfactory aspects of the procedures for the recall of Regular reservists. I should like to ask the noble Lord the Minister whether he can tell us the result of the study of those procedures which was referred to in that paragraph.

It is to the second main task, of home defence, that I should like to draw attention. It is a very vague term and covers a host of things. Only too often an out-of-date concept is retained, in which people think that what home defence consists of is trying to repel invaders who either land on the beaches or drop from the air. That is not a realistic scenario now. The two threats are, first, threats of bombs or explosive warheads landing on this country, whether they land on cities or on targets such as nuclear delivery systems or any other military target. The second is that of sabotage of military installations or essential services. Nothing really in our defence or Government plans is done about either of those to any realistic degree. Regular and general reserve battalions of the Territorial Army allotted to home defence are ineffective to meet either of those threats; and it is an unsatisfactory role for them because they know they are ineffective.

What is the need here? The first need, of course, is a combination of air defence and civil defence. Air defence is thought of by most people today as shooting down aeroplanes, but it meets only to a very small degree the attempt to stop these things landing on this country. I do not for one moment suggest that we should invest in an anti-ballistic missile defence. Civil defence is non-existent and the fact that it is so when there are so many potential targets in this country, is to my mind little less than a scandal.

As regards the second threat to internal security, it is quite unrealistic to think that infantry battalions, whether Regular or Territorial Army, standing round the sort of targets one is thinking of really provide any serious deterrent to or protection against that sort of threat. The saboteur will already have established himself inside the organisation and the answer to this, whether it is a military or civil target, must be that all establishments of this nature must have, and must be forced by the Government to have, a really effective internal security service of their own, which could be reinforced in emergency by specialist volunteers. I think it is admirable that the Royal Air Force have got round to this in the air defence volunteers for their airfields. That is the sort of pattern that is needed to meet the sabotage threat, whether the target is military or civilian.

I suggest to the Government that they really need to take a radical new look at home defence, at both the need and the most effective way to meet it. I do not believe that the general reserve battalions of the Territorial Army are in any way needed for this, or suited to it. Therefore, 1 think that the Government have to look again at a further task for the Territorial Army and, although I do not suppose it will be popular with the Ministry of Defence or the TA, I suggest that they might see whether they could provide individuals and sub-units to reinforce Regular combat units and Regular logistic units in wartime, on the kind of pattern that the German army does today. I believe that that would not only help to meet some of the Regular manpower shortfall, but would also be a satisfactory form of service for a volunteer reservist. Of course some of them do this already, but not a great many.

There is a further need, which really need cost no money at all, but which is totally lacking in our national plans. On the threat of war or emergency, there will be a very considerable need for general guard and security forces, and for drivers for all kinds of things. But there exists a ridiculous situation, in which the Royal Corps of Transport pools of drivers in the Territorial Army are either very short of men or consist largely of people who cannot drive, the reason why they have joined being that they want to learn to drive. But there is an enormous number of drivers in this country, even in this House, and when an emergency exists there should be provision to meet that kind of need by volunteers, who probably need little or no training on call-up and who, I suggest, are mostly time-expired reservists.

Finally, if I may make one further suggestion to the Minister, the split in responsibility between the Director of Volunteers, Territorials and Cadets in the Army Department of the Ministry of Defence and the Commander-in-Chief United Kingdom Land Forces should be done away with. There is absolutely no reason why all matters connected with the Territorial Army should not be dealt with by the headquarters of United Kingdom Land Forces at Wilton. I cannot conceive any objection from the point of view of the Ministry of Defence. I suggest that objection is likely to come from the TA Council, who might feel that they were not able to lobby at the very top. But those—and I hope that the noble Lord, Lord Shinwell, will agree—are perhaps some realistic suggestions for maintaining the effectiveness of the Reserve Forces.