§ 2.42 p.m.
§ Lord BROCKWAYMy Lords, I beg leave to ask the first Question which stands in my name on the Order Paper.
§ The Question was as follows:
§ To ask Her Majesty's Government whether they will raise at the appropriate international level the need to verify, by requiring accountability to the International Atomic Energy Authority, that States do not direct nuclear materials from power plants into weapons.
§ The MINISTER of STATE, FOREIGN and COMMONWEALTH OFFICE (Lord Goronwy-Roberts)My Lords, the International Atomic Energy Agency's existing safeguards system has as its aim the detection of any diversion of fissile material from peaceful nuclear programmes. We contribute substantially to the Agency's budget for this purpose, and we have taken an active part in international discussions about ways of improving the system.
§ Lord BROCKWAYYes, my Lords, but is it not the case that the recent report of the Agency showed that the present system is inadequate to detect elicit production of nuclear bombs by the diversion of material from foreign power plants? Does it not say that of 41 States inspected, 12 had deficiencies in accounting?
§ Lord GORONWY-ROBERTSMy Lords, the Agency report, to which my noble friend refers, indicates that it is satisfied that the safeguarding of the facilities with which it has so far been concerned—namely, research reactors and light-water power reactors—is adequate and has not resulted in the diversion of nuclear material. The Agency has recently undertaken the safeguarding of some fabrication and reprocessing plants on which the report admits that new techniques may be required, much as improved containment and surveillance measures should be developed further. In a letter to a newspaper the Agency has said that many of the inadequacies shown up in the 1977 report have been dealt with.
§ Lord BROCKWAYMy Lords, may I ask the Minister whether there is a developing danger? Is it not the case that recently there has been detailed evidence of massive material sent to Israel—I am not implying doubts about the Israeli Government—by methods which were fraudulent and deceptive by the companies concerned? Are not the possibilities now of West German supplies to Brazil, and of American recycling of nuclear waste to South Africa, illustrations of this danger?
§ Lord GORONWY-ROBERTSMy Lords, at the time when this incident allegedly took place in 1968, the then Member States of EURATOM had not ratified the non-proliferation treaty and no agreement existed whereby the EURATOM States accepted IAEA safeguards. The current safeguards applied by both EURATOM and IAEA to all EURATOM countries would make a repitition of this alleged incident of 1968 impossible to keep quiet. It would be reported to the agencies and subsequently to the Secretary-General of the United Nations.