Lords Sitting of 21 February 1978

Preamble
The House met at half-past two of the clock: The LORD CHANCELLOR on the Woolsack.
Prayers—Read by the Lord Bishop of Derby.

BRITAIN AND WEST GERMANY: INVESTMENT
Lord SHINWELL: My Lords, I beg leave to ask the Question which stands in my name on the Order Paper.
The Question was as follows:
To ask Her Majesty's Government to state the total amount of British investments in West Germany since the date of accession to the EEC and the total amount of West German investment in Britain during the same period.
Lord ORAM: My Lords, the information available relates to overseas direct investment up to 1975. In the three years 1973 to 1975 the direct investment by United Kingdom companies, other than oil companies, in the Federal Republic of Germany was £311 million, and the direct investment by the Federal Republic of Germany in the United Kingdom, other than in oil and insurance, was £61 million.
Lord SHINWELL: My Lords, I put down this Question because of the information conveyed to me from a certain source. Apparently my suspicions have been confirmed that during the years mentioned we have actually been investing more in Germany than Germany has been investing in our country, and yet there has been a clamour in the United Kingdom—and quite rightly—that we should have more investment in our industry. Why is it that we have invested so much in Germany and there has been much less investment in the United Kingdom?
Lord ORAM: My Lords, it is true, as my original Answer indicated, that investment in Germany by United Kingdom companies exceeds that coming from the opposite direction, but there is no particular reason why inward and outward investment should balance in relation to any particular country. However, I would inform my noble friend that the total figures which he asked for in his Question, and which I gave, conceal the fact that the gap has been narrowing. Investment by United Kingdom companies in the Federal Republic of Germany has fallen from £149 million in 1973 to £108 million in 1974, and £53 million in 1975. Investment by West German companies in the United Kingdom has fluctuated. It was £17 million in 1973, £33 million in 1974, and £11 million in 1975. I assure my noble friend that we are taking steps to encourage more German companies to invest here.
Lord SHINWELL: My Lords, I am at a loss to understand why, in his supplementary answer, my noble friend speaks about the margin being narrowed when he did not mention that in the first Answer. Are we to understand that there are institutions in this country, and private investors, who prefer to make a higher profit by investing in Germany than they can make in the United Kingdom? Is that the motivation?
Lord ORAM: My Lords, my original Answer answered my noble friend's original Question. The fact that I did not go further was because I knew he would ask supplementary questions which would enable me to give him further information. As to the motives for investment in Germany, I think these would vary considerably. Possibly the factor that my noble friend has mentioned is one factor, but there are others. The factors which influence companies making investment decisions are many. For example, they may wish to penetrate overseas markets for United Kingdom exports; they may wish to improve distribution facilities, or to support a larger research and development base here than might otherwise be possible. All these factors contribute to maintaining employment in the United Kingdom. May I suggest to my noble friend that it is not quite a black and white situation. There is a great variety of factors that need to be taken into account.
Lord HALE: My Lords, could the noble Lord say what steps are being taken to encourage German investment in this country? Could he also say what, at the moment, appears to be the potential result of the steps that are being taken?
Lord ORAM: My Lords, the Department of Industry has a continuous programme of promotional activity both in the Federal Republic of Germany and in other EEC countries, and commercial staff at the embassy and the consulates general in the Federal Republic of Germany are also in contact with potential investors every day. I assure my noble friend that there is considerable activity of this kind.
Lord WIGG: My Lords, would not the Minister agree that one of the fairy stories conveyed to the British public
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was that if we joined the Common Market there would be a tremendous flow of investment into this country, whereas in actual fact the reverse is the truth?
Lord ORAM: My Lords, there again I think my noble friend has oversimplified the matter. The figures fluctuate considerably from year to year and there is not a simple pattern such as he indicates.
Lord GLENKINGLAS: My Lords, may I ask the Minister to study the question of German investment in Southern Ireland, which seems to have been on a very much greater scale than in Britain, to see whether there are perhaps some ways in which we could make investment from Germany more attractive in this country?
Lord ORAM: My Lords, that goes somewhat wider than the original Question, but I take note of what the noble Lord said and I will certainly look into it.
Baroness GAITSKELL: My Lords, why should there be any special ways of investing in Germany now? Do we not have many other countries in which we might do better to invest?
Lord ORAM: My Lords, there are no special activities in relation to Germany other than those which apply to other countries. We encourage inward investment from countries other than Germany. I was just answering the Question, which happened to refer to Germany, but the activities which I indicated in relation to the Federal Republic could be repeated elsewhere.
Lord BLYTON: My Lords, may I ask my noble friend to accept that part of the disastrous result of joining the Common Market has been our acceptance of the export of capital?—something we were dead against before we joined.
Lord ORAM: No, my Lords. "The export of capital" phrase which my noble friend uses is, if I may say so, a little misleading. Investment in other EEC countries is, with minor exceptions, financed by earnings from previous investments in those countries or by foreign currency borrowing.

POLISH SHIPBUILDING CONTRACT
2.45 p.m.
Lord CAMPBELL of CROY: My Lords, I beg leave to ask the Question which stands in my name on the Order Paper.
The Question was as follows:
To ask Her Majesty's Government whether they will make a further Statement about the arrangements agreed with Poland for the building and operating of ships.
Lord WINTERBOTTOM: My Lords, I am pleased to confirm that on 26th January British Shipbuilders and the Anglo-Polish Shipping Venture Ltd., Szczecin, signed contracts for the construction in United Kingdom shipyards of 22 ships and two crane barges which will be chartered to the Polish Steamship Company.
Lord CAMPBELL of CROY: My Lords, I thank the noble Lord for that Answer; extra work for British shipbuilding yards is welcome. However, is the noble Lord aware that much is still unknown and not announced about this deal; for example, the terms of the bare-boat charter between the British-Polish company and the Polish shipping line and even what flag the ships are to fly? There is understandable anxiety about unfair competition with British shipping, which still ranks third in the world league and makes an important contribution to our balance of payments.
Lord WINTERBOTTOM: My Lords, I had hoped to implement today something I said in November, but perhaps I can first say what I was going to say and then say that unfortunately I cannot answer the other two points. The Shipbuilding Intervention Fund provided a grant of up to £28 million; ECGD are guaranteeing credit of not more than 70 per cent. of the export price; and British Shipbuilders have raised from a consortium of banks and without Government guarantees a loan of 65 million dollars to finance the joint venture company. All this is within the framework of our international commitments and, as I said earlier, any British company wishing to buy the same ship on the same terms is able to do so.
Lord BOYD-CARPENTER: My Lords, may I ask the noble Lord at least to tell the House what measures Her Majesty's Government have taken in the course of this transaction to make sure that ships acquired with the aid of help from the British taxpayer are not used unfairly to compete with the British Merchant Navy?
Lord WINTERBOTTOM: My Lords, one cannot give a categorical undertaking on this matter.
Lord BOYD-CARPENTER: Of course not.
Lord WINTERBOTTOM: However, these ships are proposed to be used principally in the Baltic and that, I presume, is not an area where we have the same interest as we have elsewhere in the world.
Lord CAMPBELL of CROY: My Lords, British ships do and can ply in the Baltic. Furthermore, is the noble Lord aware that a categorical assurance was given about this when the Aircraft and Shipbuilding Industries Act was passing through this House, by the noble Lord, Lord Melchett, when he said that there would not be unfair trading with British shipping? Is the noble Lord further aware that an advantage of £1 million for a foreign competitor in the cost of a ship enables him to undercut British companies by £400 a day during the whole life of that ship?
Lord WINTERBOTTOM: These are interesting figures, my Lords, but the hard fact of life is that, if we had not built these ships, somebody else would.
Baroness WARD of NORTH TYNESIDE: My Lords, does the Minister remember that quite a long time ago, when I raised this matter of Polish shipbuilding, he gave me an undertaking so far as the Tyne is concerned? He said then that it was a very difficult question to answer and that he wanted some time to consider it. Since then we have not been given the answer. Can the noble Lord add to what he said to my noble friend and tell us what in fact was spent on the Tyne on Polish shipbuilding and whether the shipping interests on the Tyne are being adequately protected, as they are very important to my part of the world?
Lord WINTERBOTTOM: My Lords, as the noble Baroness will know, a substantial element of this contract was offered to the Tyne and the shipyard concerned was unable to give an undertaking that it would carry out the contract as agreed, and therefore the contract went elsewhere, mainly to Scotland.
Lord LEATHERLAND: My Lords, may I ask my noble friend a question dealing with another aspect of this matter? Is it not a fact that one of the leading British ship-owning firms has placed an order with Polish shipbuilders for the building of ships for its British fleet? If that is so—and I know it is—is it not a good thing that we in return should be building some ships for Poland?
Lord WINTERBOTTOM: I am grateful to my noble friend for that observation, my Lords. Everybody seems to think that we are a completely contained economy, whereas in fact we are an international trading community, and for this reason we must trade in all directions.
Lord CAMPBELL of CROY: My Lords, does the noble Lord agree that, very recently, a Government spokesman congratulated the British shipping industry on having placed so many of its orders with the British shipbuilding industry in the last year or two?
Lord WINTERBOTTOM: And I am certain that your Lordships' House would support the Government in this matter.
Lord SEGAL: My Lords, as the balance of trade with Poland will be strongly in our favour after completion of this order, can my noble friend say whether it would be desirable, in order to promote good relations with Poland, if some reciprocal arrangement were made for increasing the amount of our own imports from that country?
Lord WINTERBOTTOM: Yes, my Lords; I think it is very important, because of the interesting political situation in Poland, that close economic relationships should be maintained with that country.
Lord ORR-EWING: My Lords, does the noble Lord not agree that the anxieties from all parts of the House about the terms
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of this agreement suggest that it would I have been wiser to have built naval ships or naval auxiliaries in our shipbuilding yards, which, if we were not able to use them ourselves, would be readily available to sell to our allies and others who admire British warships and who would be very glad to have them?
Lord WINTERBOTTOM: My Lords, perhaps I may say that I sympathise with the noble Lord's views, as I have said previously from this Box. However, he knows that there are more factors involved than just building warships "on spec".
Baroness WARD of NORTH TYNESIDE: But, my Lords, whatever the situation is now, is the noble Lord aware that he gave an undertaking to me, when I raised the same Question a long time ago, that he would give the details about the ships for Tyneside? Why does the noble Lord not answer that question, which he promised me he would answer?
Lord WINTERBOTTOM: My Lords, the final answer is "Nil". They have nothing because they would not agree to the terms that were offered to them.

NAMIBIA: INDEPENDENCE NEGOTIATIONS
2.52 p.m.
Lord BOSTON of FAVERSHAM: My Lords, I beg leave to ask the Question which stands in my name on the Order Paper.
The Question was as follows:
To ask Her Majesty's Government whether they will make a Statement about the talks in New York on Namibia on 11th and 12th February.
The MINISTER of STATE, FOREIGN and COMMONWEALTH OFFICE (Lord Goronwy-Roberts): My Lords, in New York we made further progress towards narrowing the gap between the parties. Many difficult problems remain, but we are determined to maintain the momentum to achieve the peaceful settlement of this problem which is now very nearly within our grasp.
Lord BOSTON of FAVERSHAM: My Lords, having thanked my noble friend for the somewhat encouraging tone of

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the final words of that Answer, may I ask him whether there is any plan or date for a resumption of these talks; whether, during the recent talks, any progress was made as regards the size and disposition of the South African and the proposed United Nations forces; and whether any progress was made on the release of detainees and Walvis Bay?
Lord GORONWY-ROBERTS: My Lords, these talks will be resumed as soon as possible. Work is continuing on a consideration of the issues that were raised during the recent talks in New York. As to the points my noble friend has raised with regard to the future conditions of settlement, it would be a tragedy if disagreement about Walvis Bay prevented a settlement now on the central issue of independence. We are examining various possibilities whereby the main question can be proceeded with, possibly leaving other questions, such as Walvis Bay, for negotiation after independence. On the question of the continuing presence of South African troops, clearly this must be related to whatever the United Nations, under the direction of the Secretary-General, decide to do under Resolution 385, but one would expect that the transition stage will be marked by a presence by the United Nations and a residual and diminishing presence by South African troops. I think there was a third point which my noble friend raised. No doubt he will repeat it for my benefit.
Lord BOSTON of FAVERSHAM: The release of detainees, my Lords.
Lord GORONWY-ROBERTS: Yes, my Lords. I refer my noble friend to the terms of Resolution 385, which in turn formed the basis of the Five-Power talks in New York and included the return of all detainees to Namibia in good time to prepare for, and to take full part in, the free elections which are proposed in the settlement.
Lord BROCKWAY: My Lords, is the Minister aware that many of us are surprised and delighted by the optimistic tone of his reply? Is he aware that many of us had feared, because of the withdrawal of the South African Foreign
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Secretary, that these discussions might now be ended? In view of that fact, is it not desirable that we should not be putting down Questions which might create difficulties; but can the Minister give us some indication as to the likelihood of a renewal of these discussions, which seem to have broken down?
Lord GORONWY-ROBERTS: My Lords, as I said, we shall seek to resume these Five-Power talks with all the parties concerned as soon as ever possible, and work is continuing on this basis for resumed discussions. As to my optimism, it must always be qualified, of course, by the fact that there are a number of conflicting interests involved here. Happily, progress has been made to the point where I felt justified in saying that, given reasonable goodwill by everybody, a settlement was now within our grasp. As to raising these matters, I know that my noble friend in particular will always refrain from asking Questions which may upset the delicate balance of negotiations.

EUROPEAN ASSEMBLY ELECTIONS BILL
Brough from the Commons on Friday last, and printed pursuant to Standing Order No. 47; read 1a.

EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT
The LORD PRIVY SEAL (Lord Peart): My Lord, I beg to move the Motion standing in my name on the Order Paper.
Moved, That, with effect from 28th February 1978, the Lord Kennet be designated a member of the European Parliament in the place of the Lord Murray of Gravesend.—(Lord Peart.)
On Question, Motion agreed to.

PARTICIPATION AGREEMENTS BILL
Read 3a, and passed.
2.58 p.m.

SUPPRESSION OF TERRORISM BILL [H.L.]
The MINISTER of STATE, HOME OFFICE (Lord Harris of Greenwich): My Lords, I beg to move that the House do now resolve itself into Committee on this Bill.
Moved, That the House do now resolve itself into Committee.—(Lord Harris of Greenwich.)
On Question, Motion agreed to.
House in Committee accordingly.
[The LORD ABERDARE in the Chair.]
Clause 1 agreed to.
Clause 2 [Restrictions on return of criminal under Extradition Act 1870, or to Republic of Ireland, in certain cases]:
Baroness ELLES Baroness ELLES moved Amendment No. 1:
Page 3, line 23, at end insert—
("( ) In relation to any requisition for the surrender of a fugitive criminal by a Convention country, the Secretary of State may refuse the request where, in all the circumstances, there are substantial grounds for doubting the bona fides of the requesting State.").
The noble Baroness said: I should like to preface my remarks on this Amendment and future Amendments by stating that I do not hold to the exact wording of the Amendment; nor, may I say—and I say this straightaway—do we intend to press any of the Amendments which are down in the names of my noble friend Lord Belstead and myself. But the Bill and the determination of the United Kingdom, including the Opposition, to fight terrorism in every way is of such importance that I think certain aspects of the Bill should be raised at this stage. I also believe that this is probably as good a stage as any for these matters to be raised.
The Amendment I have put down under Clause 2 is based on the tacit understanding of the operation of this Bill that all ratified States are democratic; or, at any rate, have a fair judicial process and are not oppressive. The Judicial Committee of your Lordships' House has held that the courts cannot refuse extradition on the grounds that surrender
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would be oppressive. So it is within this context that I should like to speak to this Amendment. The purpose is to draw attention to the particular aspect of asylum and restriction on extradition of a fugitive offender which has so far not been touched upon.
The basis of the Bill is that only Member States of the Council of Europe will be parties to the Convention and therefore—and it is this "therefore" that must be queried—it has been assumed that all States' parties will be "civilised" States and will institute the necessary proceedings and inflict punishment in the tradition of Western States. It is also assumed that the restrictions on extradition introduced in Clause 2(1) and (2) will therefore probably not be used at all, or very seldom indeed.
There are two reasons for suggesting that, regardless of the quality of the offence or indeed of the offender as now inserted under Clause 2(1) and (2), the Government themselves may be of such an oppressive nature that it will be inconceivable in the eyes of a democratic country to return an offender to the State of that Government. This would of course be true of any totalitarian régime, and it is not beyond the bounds of possibility that a Member State of the Council of Europe may be suspended, as indeed has already happened. In fact, this was a technical matter, but they were no longer regarded as an active member of the Council of Europe. It may be that a Member State no longer conforms to the principles of democracy enshrined and envisaged by the Statute of the Council of Europe. However, regardless of being suspended from the Council of Europe, such a State would still be a Convention country under this Bill, should it have ratified. In any case, even if by some means it was possible to bring to an end its ratification—which I do not think is possible—there would certainly be a time lag.
It is not only the question of the Council of Europe Member States, but by extension under Clause 5 the same considerations may arise in other countries and, in particular, Commonwealth countries. There may be a rapid change in Government—indeed, overnight; and a fugitive offender from such a country could be extremely badly treated, tortured and so

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on, as we have seen from certain countries. This must at least give one grounds for doubting whether the kind of restriction in Clause 2 as it stands is adequate protection for any individual. Such an individual's race, creed or political opinion would be totally irrelevant in such a situation. As I read the Bill, the Secretary of State would have no recourse but to make an order for extradition, assuming of course that all the other necessary conditions were fulfilled.
The intensification of the fight against terrorism and the terrorist would not be diminished because of the extension of jurisdiction to the United Kingdom to prosecute in this country for a crime which, under the Bill, would otherwise be extraditable. This is not a granting of freedom to a terrorist, because he or she would be held and punished in this country. Some consideration must be given by the Government to the threat of the existence of a totalitarian or oppressive régime with the rapidity with which such régimes can be installed, bearing in mind the long time it would take to amend this Bill, if it were considered necessary. I beg to move.
Lord HARRIS of GREENWICH: I am grateful to the noble Baroness for what she has said in moving this Amendment and in giving me an opportunity to talk for a few moments about the safeguards provided in this Bill. This also gives me the opportunity, a little belatedly, of joining in the interesting discussion and exchange of views which have taken place in the columns of The Times, in which the noble Lord, Lord Wigoder, has taken a part.
The Committee may recall that I stated during the debate on the Second Reading of this Bill at column 931 of Hansard of 7th February that it:
"… in no way derogates from our right to grant political asylum".
The Committee may recall that this statement was challenged by the author of the leading article in The Times to which the noble Lord, Lord Wigoder, responded. The author of that editorial will find that closer examination of extradition law and the principles of political asylum lead to the conclusion that the genuine political refugee has nothing whatever to fear from this Bill.
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The United Nations Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees defines a political refugee as one who has a:
"well founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion"
and is therefore unwilling to return to his country of origin. Article 5 of the European Convention on the Suppression of Terrorism precisely reflects the principle that such persons should not be returned to their country of origin by providing that a request for extradition may be refused if the requested State:
"has substantial grounds for believing that the request for extradition … has been made for the purpose of prosecuting or punishing a person on account of his race, religion, nationality or political opinion, or that that person's position may be prejudiced for any of these reasons".
It follows that the Bill, which incorporates the safeguard in Article 5, confers no obligation on the United Kingdom to surrender a political refugee to his country of origin by way of extradition. That also deals with a point which was raised perfectly properly by the noble Baroness, because an adequate safeguard is provided against the very disagreeable situation that she outlined, that one of the signatories would become a totalitarian régime. The safeguard provided in the Bill meets the point which caused the noble Baroness such concern.
If I may deal with the slightly wider question, rather outside the terms of what the noble Baroness has said, should like to refer to the editorial in The Times. The editorial writer raised the question of the offender from a third State who commits in a contracting State an offence directed at his country of origin (for example the assassination of its ambassador or visiting Head of State) and pointed out that he would not, under the Bill, be able to avoid extradition to that contracting State because he could not plead that he would be prosecuted or punished there on account of his political opinions. I must say at the outset that I am not sure whether in these circumstances such a plea would succeed even under existing law because in the case of Cheng in 1973 it was held that an offence committed in one State, but aimed at the Government of another State, was not an offence of a political character.

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However, leaving that aside for a moment, the implication seems to be that the contracting State, although a fellow member of the Council of Europe, might punish such an offender more severely than we would. That possibility, of course, exists, but I do not see that it is a threat to the genuine political refugee—the person about whom we are all concerned—as distinct from the terrorist; and, given that we have sufficient confidence in the standards of justice in the countries concerned to have extradition arrangements with them, I do not see it as a legitimate ground for withholding extradition. We have suffered just such an incident when last year a former Minister of the Yemen Arab Republic and his wife were assassinated here in London. So this is by no means a farfetched eventuality.
I do not think that anybody would wish to see the perpetrators of such acts avoid the proper processes of law simply because they might be punished more severely in the United Kingdom than in some other country. For these reasons, I believe that the Bill, as at present drafted, provides adequate safeguards. I hope that, in the light of what I have said, the noble Baroness will decide not to press the Amendment.
Baroness ELLES: I am grateful to the noble Lord for his reply. It will be helpful to those who were concerned about the status of the political refugee, and the possibilities of asylum in this country. I beg leave to withdraw my Amendment.
Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.
Clause 2 agreed to.
Clause 3 [Extraditable offences]:
3.10 p.m.
Lord BELSTEAD Lord BELSTEAD moved Amendment No. 2:
Page 3, line 27, leave out paragraph (a) and insert—
"(a) an offence under section 2 of the Explosive Substances Act 1883
( ) an offence under section 3 of the Explosive Substances Act 1883".
The noble Lord said: I beg to move Amendment No. 2 and would ask the leave of the Committee to speak also to Amendments Nos. 3, 4, 5 and 6. Clause 1
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provides that, for the purposes of the United Kingdom's extradition arrangements, the offences listed in Schedule 1 are no longer to carry with them the defence against extradition as being offences of a political character. The United Kingdom's extradition arrangements listed in Clause 1(3) are the Extradition Acts 1870 and 1873, the Fugitive Offenders Act 1967, and the Backing of Warrants (Republic of Ireland) Act 1965. The offences which are listed in Schedule 1 are the equivalents in United Kingdom law to the offences which are to be found in Articles 1 and 2 of the Convention.
In Schedule 1, offences against the person, offences involving explosives and offences using firearms are covered by paragraphs 8, 10, 12, 13 and 14, which specify particular sections of the Offences Against the Person Act 1861, of the Explosive Substances Act 1883 and the Firearms Act 1968. These coincide with Articles 1 and 2 of the Convention.
I think that all that is to be expected. What, to me, is unexpected is that Clause 3—which we have now come to—deems to be included in the list of extraditable offences in the Extradition Act 1870 and the Fugitive Offenders Act 1967 any offence under the Explosive Substances Act 1883 and any indictable offence under the Firearms Act 1968; and, in addition, any indictable offence under the Offences against the Person Act 1861 is also to be included in the 1967 Act.
It is in order to probe this apparent contradiction between the drafting of Schedule I and the drafting of Clause 3 that these Amendments have been put down. It was not apparent from the speech on Second Reading of the noble Lord, Lord Harris, which dealt with broader issues, as to why the scope of our two main international extradition treaties is to be widened with respect to all indictable crimes under these particular Acts in these ways in Clause 3.
Presumably, these new arrangements in Clause 3 will have to be negotiated on a bilateral basis with all the foreign States with which we are bound by the 1970 Act and with all the Commonwealth countries with which we have agreements through the Fugitive Offenders Act 1967. Neither I nor my noble friend is concerned

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in any way with criticising Clause 3, but may I ask whether any negotiations have been already carried out about these matters? Do we expect that other countries will be welcoming Clause 3, and are these new offences of such a nature that the Home Office has been persuaded by past experience that they should now be made extraditable? I deliberately have not mentioned the Backing of Warrants (Republic of Ireland) Act. That already covers all indictable offences. I beg to move.
Lord HARRIS of GREENWICH: I am grateful to the noble Lord who has moved this Amendment because this gives me the opportunity to deal with some of the wider issues involved in Clause 3. I suspect that that is his intention and I will endeavour to do so. The effect of the five Amendments which he has moved would be to make extraditable under the Extradition Act 1870 and the Fugitive Offenders Act 1967 only those offences which are in Schedule 1 to the Bill and which are not already extraditable. Certainly, this is all that we are required to do under Article 4 of the Convention. We considered, however, that there were good reasons for going beyond the Convention in this particular matter and making extraditable all indictable offences under these Acts and all attempts to commit extraditable offences.
All the offences which are made extraditable in Clause 3 are serious offences. I do not think anybody would challenge that. There is the offence of carrying firearms with intent to commit an indictable offence, contrary to Section 18(1) of the Firearms Act 1968, which is punishable by up to 10 years' imprisonment; there is the offence of making or possessing explosives under suspicious circumstances, contrary to Section 4 of the Explosive Substances Act 1883; that is punishable by up to 14 years' imprisonment. All indictable offences under the Offences against the Person Act 1861 are already extraditable under the Extradition Act 1870 so that in subsection (2) of Clause 3 we are simply bringing the Fugitive Offenders Act 1967 into line with the 1870 Act.
We consider that all these are offences for which extradition should be available generally. We have in the past experienced difficulty because these offences have not been extraditable. For example, we have
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been unable to consider requests in recent years from Italy, the Netherlands and Switzerland in respect of offences under the Firearms Act and the Explosive Substances Act, and we have been prevented from seeking the return of offenders for these offences from other countries. This Bill seemed to us a good opportunity for plugging those particular gaps in our extradition arrangements. I suspect that that view will be widely shared in the country. Once this measure is brought into force, subsection (1) of Clause 3 will have immediate effect on extradition to and from foreign States under the Extradition Act 1870 where our extradition treaties contain a "catch all" provision allowing extradition for any extraditable offence. Twenty-four of our treaties have such a provision. Other treaties will be amended in due course. Subsection (2) of Clause 3 will have immediate effect on extradition to and from Commonwealth countries under the Fugitive Offenders Act 1967 where these offences are also extraditable under the laws of other Commonwealth countries.
Clause 3, as it stands, will facilitate extradition generally. It will also avoid doubt and confusion about which offences are, in fact, extraditable. Such doubt might arise if only a selection of offences under an Act or one offence under one subsection of an Act, are made extraditable. Having given that explanation, I hope that it will be satisfactory to the noble Lord. If there are any other points that he wishes to raise, I will do my best to deal with them.
Lord BELSTEAD: I am grateful to the noble Lord for the reply that he has given. It is the fact that the noble Lord has given me, certainly, some information about Clause 3 which is useful and which I did not know before. I am bound to agree with the noble Lord that the offences which, under this provision in Clause 3 are now to be made extraditable, are very serious offences. The noble Lord in his reply mentioned two groups of offences. I also noted, when glancing at the Firearms Act 1968, the illegal possession and the illegal selling and that most cruel of offences, the conversion of firearms, are now to be brought within the list of extraditable offences by virtue of Clause 3. I therefore go along with the spirit of the reply which the noble Lord has given.

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I imagine that I am right in assuming from my reading of the Bill that these offences will still retain the protection of the political character defence because they do not come into Schedule 1. None the less, as the noble Lord has made clear, when one has had in recent years requests from such countries as Italy, the Netherlands and Switzerland for extradition under the offences which will now be brought within Clause 3, it is obviously valuable that the Government are taking the opportunity of drafting Clause 3 as they have done.
Therefore, in just a moment I shall be withdrawing my Amendment. However, before doing so I should like to ask one question. The noble Lord made it clear that the drafting of Clause 3 goes even wider than one might think, because it affects the "catch all" offences which can be written into other treaties. Looking ahead in the Bill, we see in Clause 9(3) the following words:
"This Act shall come into force on such day as the Secretary of State may by order appoint, and different days may be so appointed for different purposes".
I wonder whether the noble Lord would like, either now or later, to give an indication as to what intention the Government have with regard to bringing the Bill into effect.
Lord HARRIS of GREENWICH: Given the fact that my noble and learned friend Lord Gardiner always takes a keen interest in these matters, I am sure he will be grateful to the noble Lord for having asked this particular question. I can certainly assure him that we wish this to be brought into effect as quickly as possible and certainly well within a period of 12 months.
The Earl of SELKIRK: We are passing domestic law in order to ratify these provisions. That means that all the other 16 or 17 members will have to do the same, and I take it that by ratifying they will have indicated that their domestic laws are in line with Article 1 of the Convention. Is that correct?
Lord HARRIS of GREENWICH: I understand that is the situation, broadly speaking. We are moving into a position where a number of our colleagues in the Council of Europe are making progress,
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as we are, in this matter. Unfortunately I cannot give an indication of the number of countries which have reached the present situation. At the moment we are certainly in the vanguard and, given our experience in these matters, I think that is desirable.
Lord BELSTEAD: I beg leave to withdraw the Amendment.
Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.
[Amendments Nos. 3 to 6 not moved].
Clause 3 agreed to.
Clause 4 [Jurisdiction in respect of offences committed outside United Kingdom]:
Lord HARRIS of GREENWICH Lord HARRIS of GREENWICH moved Amendment No. 7:
Page 4, line 32, leave out ("subsection (1), (2) or (3) above") and insert ("this section").
The noble Lord said: In moving this Amendment, I suggest that we should take Amendment No. 10 at the same time. These are drafting Amendments. I beg to move.
On Question, Amendment agreed to.
3.23 p.m.
Baroness ELLES Baroness ELLES moved Amendment No. 8:
Page 4, line 34, leave out ("Attorney-General for Northern Ireland") and insert ("Secretary of State").
The noble Baroness said: This Amendment is in line with extradition proceedings which are governed by the Extradition Act, 1970. It is the Secretary of State who is responsible for the proceedings relating to extradition of a fugitive offender, and it is for the Secretary of State to decide whether the extradition order should be enforced once the court proceedings relating to extradition are completed. In normal extradition proceedings where such extradition is not granted, the fugitive, as I understand it, will be released. But the provisions of this Bill create a different situation and I think that that fact should be taken on board.
The amendment to the Extradition Act of 1870, Section 3, which is made by Clause 2(1) affects the powers of the Secretary of State. It is for him to decide whether the fugitive terrorist is to be extradited. If

21
he should decide, because of the provisions of Clause 2, that the fugitive should not be extradited, the immediate consequence must surely be that prosecution should be initiated in the United Kingdom.
The decision under Clause 4 presupposes that action under Clause 4 will in fact be initiated: that is surely one of the main intentions of the Convention. Therefore, it is my view that because of the powers residing in the Secretary of State relating to Clause 2, it must be his responsibility, and not that of another member of the Executive, to order a prosecution under Clause 4. To my mind—and I think it is clear from the Convention—the two decisions should be made simultaneously. There should not be delay and there should not therefore be a shifting of responsibility from one part of the Executive to another—which would entail, needless to say, a vast amount of documentation. I should like to hear from the Minister the Government's reasoning as to why such powers should be removed from the Secretary of State and given to the Attorney-General when it comes to prosecuting under this part of the Bill. I beg to move.
Lord HARRIS of GREENWICH: I am obliged to the noble Baroness for having explained the intention behind this Amendment. I think it might be helpful to the Committee if I show how a prosecution under Clause 4(4) might arise. Although Clause 4 confers jurisdiction on United Kingdom courts in respect of offences in Article 1 committed outside the United Kingdom, there is no obligation on the United Kingdom under the Convention to consider prosecuting anyone for those offences unless a request for the person's extradition has been refused in the circumstances set out in Article 6. The obligation arises on whatever ground a refusal to extradite is based. In practice, criminal proceedings are likely to be instituted here only after consultation with the Government of the contracting State primarily concerned—that is, the State where the offence was committed or whose national has committed it. We could expect the fullest co-operation from that State, because Article 8 of the Convention obliges contracting States to,
"afford one another the widest measure of mutual assistance in criminal matters in connection with
22
proceedings brought in respect of the offences mentioned in Article 1 or 2".
The decision whether to institute proceedings in a particular case would have to be taken in the light of all the circumstances, including the evidence available to a United Kingdom court. The Secretary of State is not the appropriate person to take such a decision. It is true that there are some Statutes which provide that prosecutions may be brought only by or with the consent of the Secretary of State, but these consent provisions apply only to specialist offences of a regulatory nature. Where more serious offences are concerned, it is accepted that control should rest in the hands of the Attorney-General or the Director of Public Prosecutions. Furthermore, where important political or international considerations may be involved, the Attorney-General, who is directly answerable to Parliament for his decisions and is in a position to consult Ministerial colleagues direct if need be, is regarded as the proper person to carry the responsibility. There are likely to be both political and international considerations involved in prosecutions under Clause 4 of the Bill, and, in our view, it is right that responsibility should rest with the Attorney-General. I hope that that explanation will satisfy the noble Baroness.
Lord HARMAR-NICHOLLS: I do not think that one can easily accept the distinction just drawn by the noble Lord between the types of offences. I should have thought that on purely practical grounds my noble friend's Amendment ought to be accepted. On these grounds, if the ultimate decision is left entirely with the Attorney-General, we know from practical experience that this officer is a purist in terms of adhering closely to the strict legal situation. The Attorney-General makes decisions with no consideration in mind other than the strict interpretation of the law.
If the power provided by this section is left with the Secretary of State, as it is in other parts of the Bill, the Secretary of State always has the advantage of being able to call on the Law Officer: he can always call on the Attorney-General for any legal interpretations or any detailed explanations that may be required. But that does not apply the other way round. It is not likely that the Attorney-General

23
would call upon the Secretary of State in order to take into account the general knowledge which would be known to the Department of the Secretary of State but would not be known to the Attorney-General. Therefore, I should have thought that, on purely practical grounds, one would have the benefit of the Attorney-General's legal position. If you left to the Secretary of State the decision as to what should be done, this Amendment would seem to have the best of all worlds. You have the legal advice which the Secretary of State can call upon from the Law Officer, coupled with the special knowledge that is known to the Secretary of State and would not be known to the Law Officer. I should have thought if we want to implement in the spirit the words that are here, it could well be that that is more likely to be done if the ultimate decision is left to the Secretary of State with the Attorney-General behind him rather than to the Attorney-General standing alone.
3.30 p.m.
Lord HARRIS of GREENWICH: May I respond very briefly. I was interested to hear the noble Lord put that particular point, but I am bound to say that the more he went on the more concerned I became about what he was suggesting. He said that the Attorney-General would take his decision on grounds whereby he would adhere to the strict legal situation. I very much hope he will. I find it very difficult to believe that anybody, be he the Secretary of State or the Attorney-General, would base his judgment in a matter of this sort on anything other than strictly defined legal criteria. This is an interesting matter which has been raised by the noble Baroness, but I must point out that in matters of this sort it is normal for the Attorney-General to make decisions of this sort and not the Secretary of State. I know of very few precedents, except of the kind I mentioned earlier, where the Secretary of State has a power in cases involving certain regulatory questions. Other than that, it is a matter for the Attorney-General, and I think it should remain so.
Lord HARMAR-NICHOLLS: If I may come back on this point, I think that this House and also the other place must
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take into account recent happenings. We have had a very recent happening where the Attorney-General, who had power similar to this, gave a decision concerning the Grunwick stand-out; and when he gave his decision he virtually had to say that on strict legal grounds he ought not to have taken the step he did: "But", he said, "I thought it right to take into account the general circumstances surrounding it". I felt that that was a weakening, where the Attorney-General had to move out of the strict legal interpretation, and I should like to protect the Attorney-General of Northern Ireland from having to face that same dilemma. I believe that the Secretary of State can take into account the general circumstances surrounding a case while also adhering, so far as he can, to the strict legal situation. There have been happenings so recent in our minds, where the impartiality and objectivity of the Attorney-General in the United Kingdom was called into question because he went beyond the strict legal interpretation. I should like to try to avoid that in this instance, particularly when so many unusual things are happening. I believe that conflict of view may well come again. It would be overcome if the final decision was left to the Secretary of State, backed by the Attorney, and not left to the Attorney alone.
Lord HARRIS of GREENWICH: I do not wish to detain the Committee further, but before the noble Baroness replies perhaps I could deal with that point. As I understood the noble Lord when speaking on the first occasion, he was concerned that the Attorney-General—and I am freewheeling a little but trying to explain the position as clearly as I can—might be involved in rather an arid exercise involving the legal technicalities of the situation. He now seems to be suggesting exactly the reverse—that the Attorney-General would not in fact worry about the law but would make a decision on other grounds. I very much enjoy debating with the noble Lord, but I think he must make up his mind which of the two arguments he wishes to adopt; he cannot adopt both at the same time.
The second point I should like to make is this: Decisions of this sort will

25
always be difficult, but it seems to me that one does not get over this difficulty by saying that it should be the Secretary of State. It will still be a politician who is going to make the decision; the question is which particular Minister should do it. In the light of precedent, it seems to me sensible to have the Attorney-General.
Baroness ELLES: First, I should like to thank my noble friend for his nimbleness of mind in taking part in discussing this Amendment, and to apologise to the Minister, who understood that I was moving Amendments Nos. 8 and 9 together and that it was a matter for general discussion. The noble Lord the Minister mentioned two points which would confirm me in my contention that it should be the Secretary of State rather than the Attorney-General. If I understood him correctly when he explained the procedure, if a refusal for a request came from the Secretary of State there would be long discussions with the requesting State. In those discussions there must, presumably, at some stage be an undertaking that proceedings will be taken in this country if they are not going to be taken abroad. I maintain that this is the purpose of the Bill.
I accept that in hijacking and certain other acts these considerations do not arise. The terms of the Convention are that if you are not going to release somebody or surrender a terrorist to a requesting country you undertake at the same time to prosecute them in your own country. Therefore it would seem very much more logical—though perhaps that is not necessarily something that everybody would follow—that the person dealing with the request, the decision under Clause 2, is the person who should say, "Very well, we cannot release X but we will undertake to prosecute", and therefore the political decision must lie in the hands of the Secretary of State.
Secondly, if I understood the noble Lord aright—and I will of course read very carefully his reply—mentioned that there were international and political decisions to be taken. The last person to take these decisions must be the Attorney-General because his decisions must be strictly in accordance with the law. He should not be guided by whether there is any international concern or whether there is some political element in his
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decision. It is surely for the Secretary of State to make those decisions. It was with this worry in mind that I introduced this Amendment. I shall read very carefully the reply which the Minister has been good enough to give your Lordships and, if necessary, ask leave of the House to raise the matter again at the next stage. In the meantime, I beg leave to withdraw my Amendment.
Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.
[Amendment No. 9 not moved.]
3.38 p.m.
Lord HARRIS of GREENWICH Lord HARRIS of GREENWICH moved Amendment No. 10:
Page 4, line 44, leave out ("subsection (1), (2) or (3) above") and insert ("this section").
The noble Lord said: I beg to move this Amendment. I referred to this matter when moving Amendment No. 7.
On Question, Amendment agreed to.
Lord HARRIS of GREENWICH Lord HARRIS of GREENWICH moved Amendment Nos. 11 and 12:
Page 5, line 13, leave out ("and")
line 15, at end insert ("and does not fall within the preceding paragraph").
The noble Lord said: I beg to move Amendments Nos 11 and 12 together. They are drafting Amendments.
Baroness ELLES: I should like to make one suggestion, which of course may not be accepted by the Minister, in regard to line 10. Instead of the words—
"a person who at the time of the act is a representative …"
it seems to me that it should read "being a representative". Perhaps the noble Lord would like to look at that and possibly accept it.
On Question, Amendments agreed to.
On Question, Whether Clause 4 shall stand part of the Bill?
3.39 p.m.
Lord BELSTEAD: May I ask the noble Lord a point about Clause 4? As I understand it, unlike Clause 4(1) and (2) jurisdiction is not to be extended in subsection (3) over attempts to commit the offences mentioned in subsection (3). I understand that the reason for that is because such attempts taking place outside the United Kingdom are not thought

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to be offences under United Kingdom law. It would appear that the defect in subsection (3) is not consistent with Article 6 which lays a duty on a contracting State,
"To take such measures as may be necessary to establish its jurisdiction over an offence mentioned in Article 1 in the case where the suspected offender is present in its territory and it does not extradite him".
As Article 1(f) includes an attempt to commit any of the Article 1 offences, it seems to me that Clause 4(3) is not taking the measures necessary to establish extra-territorial jurisdiction over Article 1 offences.
I ask this because Clause 3 is altering our law by including all indictable offences under the Explosive Substances Act, the Firearms Act and the Offences against the Person Act. We discussed this on a previous Amendment when the noble Lord gave his reply, which was certainly acceptable to us on these Benches. But I am prompted to ask: Why is it not possible also to include in this Bill a provision to bring within our law attempts to commit murder or manslaughter, or to contravene Sections 2 or 3 of the Explosive Substances Act, when committed outside the United Kingdom, so that such attempts could then be brought within the scope of subsection (3) of Clause 4? I should be grateful for some guidance from the noble Lord on this point.
Lord BOYD-CARPENTER: On consideration of whether the clause shall stand part, perhaps the noble Lord would also say a word about subsection (7). It appears to be a very sensible and practical provision which, as I read it, means that if an attempted hijacking takes place on board a British registered aircraft anywhere in the world, whether over Libya, the South Yemen Republic or any other salubrious district of that kind, it shall be treated as having been committed in this country. The question which I should like to ask the noble Lord is this. There is no limitation in the subsection in respect of an aircraft which might be on the ground somewhere, or, for that matter, a ship which might be in port. Is it the intended effect of the subsection that if a hijacking attempt is made on a British aircraft at some foreign airport, perhaps in a non-Convention country, the offence shall none the less be treated as if it were in this country?
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As the noble Lord will be aware, the point is far from academic. If, indeed, the aircraft involved at Larnaca a couple of days ago had been a British registered aircraft, and not an aircraft belonging to an associated company of British Airways, the point would have been wholly relevant. I should not necessarily object if this is the effect of the clause, but it is a somewhat striking one, that, if someone engages himself in a shooting match on an airport in the middle of some wholly foreign non-Convention country, our courts should be able to try him for it. It would be an interesting development, and I should like very much to hear the noble Lord's explanation.
Lord HARRIS of GREENWICH: Two points have been raised and, if I may, before the next stage of the Bill I will look into the one made by the noble Lord, Lord Belstead, and will communicate with him. The noble Lord, Lord Boyd-Carpenter, raised a question about subsection (7), and I entirely agree with him that this is very far from being an academic question. Subsection (7), in fact, provides that acts done on board ships, aircraft or hovercraft of a Convention country, as defined in Clause 8(1), shall be treated as if they were done in the territory of that country. The subsection applies to offences over which jurisdiction is taken in subsections (1), (2) and (3) of the clause, and the effect of the subsection is to treat ships, aircraft and hovercraft registered in a Convention country as comprising part of the territory of that country. This reflects the jurisdiction which United Kingdom courts have over offences committed in United Kingdom registered ships, aircraft and hovercraft, and accords with international law under which such craft registered in a country are treated as part of the territory of that country.
Lord BOYD-CARPENTER: I am most indebted to the noble Lord for that answer, but I wonder whether he would carry it a little further. How important is the expression "on board"? Taking the Larnaca incident, I understand that, had that been a British registered aircraft which of course it was not, any act committed by someone in the cabin or on the flight deck would have been within the purview of the British courts. What about someone who, from the tarmac

29
outside, fires on the aircraft or hurls a grenade at it? If the aircraft is British territory, is it not arguable, whether or not the criminal act is committed on board, that if it is committed against the body of the aircraft, or the body of those on board, it should be similarly dealt with? It is important that we should be clear as to the position. Does it all depend on whether one attacks a British aircraft from inside or outside?
Lord HARRIS of GREENWICH: Being, I hope, a man of some wisdom, I propose to look into the point which has just been raised and I will communicate with the noble Lord.
Clause 4, as amended, agreed to.
Clause 5 [Power to apply provisions of Act to non-convention countries]:
3.45 p.m.
Lord AVEBURY Lord AVEBURY moved Amendment No. 13:
Page 5, line 30, after ("which") insert ("having adhered to the United Nations Convention on Civil and Political Rights and having submitted a statement as provided by Article 40 of that Convention and without having been the subject of any adverse report by the Human Rights Committee, but").
The noble Lord said: This Amendment is concerned with the countries to which the Bill applies, apart from the Convention countries which the noble Lord has explained are defined in Clause 8(1). At this stage, may I just say, apart from the anxieties which some of us may have about the mechanism of extending the provisions of the Bill to non-Convention countries, that there is also a point which I see no other opportunity of raising during the Committee stage. What happens if one of the Convention countries ceases to be democratic? This, also, is not an academic question, because, in the case of Greece, there was the takeover by the colonels. So one hopes that there is scope somewhere in the Bill for deleting from the list of Convention countries to which the provisions apply, any nations which cease to be democratic. Obviously, the same point was in my mind when I put down this Amendment with regard to the possible extension of the Bill beyond the Convention countries to, first, designated Commonwealth countries, which are mentioned in paragraph (a) of sub-section
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(1), and foreign States with which we have arrangements under Section 2 of the Extradition Act 1870, which are mentioned in paragraph (b).
During the Second Reading, some very alarming remarks were made by the noble Lord, Lord Hankey, about the question of human rights in some Latin American countries. He suggested that people who were raising human rights questions in relation to those countries were feebleminded, and he said that it was not sensible to grumble because human rights in countries like Brazil and Uruguay are being destroyed and offended against. I do not think that many of your Lordships would sympathise with him in that point of view. But as a result of his remarks having been reported on, I think, BBC Radio, a number of people concerned with the rights of Latin American refugees expressed grave anxieties to me about the position of those people when this Bill comes into force. Indeed, it was the subject of an article in The Times, and I hope that my noble friend Lord Wigoder may have reassured some readers by his letter which subsequently appeared in that newspaper.
My noble friend said that it is the intention to apply this Bill only to countries which are democracies, signatories of the Convention and Commonwealth countries. Although he did not go on to say this, the implication is that we would not extend it to Commonwealth countries or foreign States which are not themselves fully subscribing to the principles that should have respect as regards human rights. I do not know what are the designated Commonwealth countries under the Fugitive Offenders Act, or what are the foreign States to which paragraph (b) applies, and I should be grateful if the Minister could enlighten us on this.
First, are they, in fact, all democratic? Secondly, what would be the mechanism for extending the Bill? I know that there is provision for any new countries, which are to be added, to be brought forward under the Affirmative Resolution procedure, and the Minister will probably say that that gives both Houses of Parliament every opportunity for arguing against the inclusion of States which we do not think ought properly to be included. But why do we not strengthen the safeguards against some future Minister, who

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has less liberal inclinations than the noble Lord, Lord Harris, or the present Secretary of State, trying to include States which not everybody would agree should be allowed to take extradition proceedings in our courts? So, I thought, why not, at least, provide that the States to which this clause applies should be signatories of the UN Convention on Civil and Political Rights, and that they should have submitted the statement which is required of them under Article 40 of that Convention, which asks the States parties to explain what they are doing to fulfil the other terms of the Convention. The statements go to the United Nations Committee on Human Rights, and there they may be the subject of observations of one kind and another.
I am suggesting in my Amendment that, if they have been the subject of any adverse objections by the United Nations Committee, the Government should not have the power to bring forward an order such as is described in the clause. This may not be an altogether cast iron safeguard, for when one looks at the States which have signed the United Nations Convention on Civil and Political Rights, not all of them are entirely admirable. Indeed, many of the States which have submitted the statements required under Article 40 would not meet the kind of criteria that we ourselves would think suitable. Also we know that the United Nations Committee may be reluctant to make the kind of adverse comments on breaches of human rights which they detect, despite the submission of these statements which would more properly come from the non-Governmental organisations that are concerned with these matters.
I believe that somehow we need to strengthen this part of the Bill. Having drafted the Amendment, I thought it might have been better to suggest that only States that had signed the optional Protocol to the United Nations Convention should be included. That provides for some rights of direct access of individuals in the States concerned to an international tribunal which can have jurisdiction on human rights restrictions, just as we already have that right in the European Convention on Human Rights. This is why we ourselves did not adhere to the optional Protocol. Already we have a perfectly satisfactory
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international machinery for somebody to appeal through the Commission to the European Court.
I hope that the Minister will have something to tell us which will reassure not only your Lordships but also those who have expressed perhaps not justifiable but nevertheless some real anxieties as a result of the proceedings on the Second Reading of the Bill and the article which appeared in The Times. I beg to move.
3.53 p.m.
Lord HARRIS of GREENWICH: The noble Lord, Lord Avebury, began by raising a question regarding what would happen if overnight a member of the Council of Europe became totalitarian. This was a point which we discussed on the first Amendment. I do not think that at that stage the noble Lord was in the Committee, so I hope he will look at Hansard and at what I said and that it will meet the point which he raised.
As I understand the noble Lord's view, it is that although the United Nations Covenant rather than Convention has a number of problems associated with it, it would be an improvement to the Bill if this addition were made. Before dealing with it, perhaps I should make one point in answer to a question which was raised on an earlier Amendment. At the moment the Government have no plans for entering in the near future into arrangements with non-Convention countries; that is, countries which are not a party to the European Convention on the Suppression of Terrorism. Such arrangements would have to be mutually agreed. We have made no approaches, and none have been made to us. I do not think that we shall rush into such arrangements, but in my view it is right that they should be there so that if the United Kingdom Government come to the conclusion that it is desirable to have something negotiated along these lines there is statutory cover for it.
In extending the Convention's arrangements to a non-Convention country, I entirely agree with the noble Lord that we should ensure that that country is one in whose political and judicial system we have confidence. However, it does not necessarily follow that we should restrict ourselves in the way that this

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Amendment proposes. If this Amendment were made to the Bill, there are a number of friendly States which would be quite unnecessarily excluded. We should have a fairly unusual situation in which we should be unable to include the United States of America or Australia. People would find that mildly surprising, given the fact that among the countries which have signed the United Nations Covenant are the Soviet Union and Mongolia.
In that situation, we would legally be in a position to negotiate some kind of arrangement with them, but I shall probably carry the Committee with me when I say that I do not believe that any of us would regard this as particularly desirable. I am quite sure that the noble Lord, Lord Avebury, would not urge it upon us. As the noble Lord has said, there are many countries which have become parties to the United Nations Covenant. I have mentioned two—the Soviet Union and Mongolia. There are also Bulgaria, Chile, Czechoslovakia, the German Democratic Republic and so on, but not, I repeat, Australia and the United States of America. On that ground alone it seems to me that we should not add this Amendment to the Bill.
Furthermore, I believe that the safeguards incorporated in the Bill are wide enough to meet the points which the noble Lord made in his speech. We have already extensively discussed the safeguards provided in the Bill, and rightly so, for political refugees. We have an honourable tradition and I do not think that any of us would wish to undermine it. May I remind the Committee that this safeguard is already incorporated in our extradition arrangements with Commonwealth countries under the Fugitive Offenders Act 1967, and any arrangements made under Clause 5 of this Bill with a Commonwealth country will automatically include that safeguard. The safeguard has already been incorporated in some of our more recent extradition treaties under the Extradition Act 1870. If an arrangement under Clause 5 with a foreign State is contemplated but the extradition treaty with that State does not contain this political asylum safeguard, the Bill provides a way for it to be included. The order made under subsection (1) of Clause 5 would direct that subsection (1)
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of Clause 2, which sets out the safeguard, would apply in relation to that State.
That covers very substantially the grounds which the noble Lord has raised in moving this Amendment, but perhaps I should make one final point. May I draw the Committee's attention to subsection (5) of Clause 8. This subsection provides that any order made under Clause 5—that includes an order made under subsection (1) of Clause 5, and this is the point precisely raised by the noble Lord, Lord Avebury—requires Affirmative Resolutions of both Houses of Parliament. I believe that this will enable the content of each proposed arrangement with a non-Convention country to be subject to full Parliamentary debate. The noble Lord, Lord Avebury, anticipated that I would make this point. Nevertheless it is a very real safeguard. There is no question of using the Negative Resolution procedure. Full public debate would be required on Affirmative Resolutions of both Houses.
It is almost inconceivable that in a matter of sensitivity of this kind any British Government would behave in an irresponsible fashion. Therefore the safeguards which I have outlined are, I believe, adequate. In the light of what I have said, I hope that the noble Lord will not press his Amendment.
Lord AVEBURY: As the Minister appreciated, I did not think that the Amendment was perfectly worded. If I were to start all over again I should suggest as an alternative that only nations that had signed the optional Protocol should be eligible for the extension provided under Clause 5. However, the noble Lord has reassured me to a very great extent by saying that it is not contemplated for the time being that there should be any extension of the provisions in the Bill to non-Convention countries.
I very much hope that those who expressed anxieties, and who quite genuinely feel them, will have the opportunity to study the remarks made by the noble Lord and that they will appreciate that there is no question whatsoever of applying this Bill to dictatorships such as Argentina or Uruguay, as was suggested by the noble Lord, Lord Hankey, at Second Reading.

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I agree that the Affirmative Resolution procedures provide as good a safeguard as we are likely to get. I hope that no future Parliament will extend such provisions as are contained in this Bill to a country which does not enjoy the same standards of human rights and democracy as we in this country enjoy. I beg leave to withdraw the Amendment.
Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.
4 p.m.
Baroness ELLES Baroness ELLES moved Amendment No. 14:
Page 5, line 33, after "(1967)" insert—
("( ) a United Kingdom dependency within the meaning of section 2(2) of the Fugitive Offenders Act 1967.")
The noble Baroness said: Assuming that the purpose of the Bill is to extend its effects as widely as possible throughout the world, and believing, as we all do, that international terrrorism can be combated only by international consensus, I put this Amendment forward. I may be technically out of order, and I would be grateful for a comment by the Minister on that in his reply. In Clause 5 (1)(a) reference is made to "designated Commonwealth country", but in the Fugitive Offenders Act that does not actually cover a United Kingdom dependency. There would therefore be dependencies which would not be covered by this Bill, so far as I can see, unless another clause were inserted. I recognise, of course, that in the drafting I should have put the word "or" somewhere else, but that is a technicality which I know the Minister will overlook when replying.
So far as I know, the Fugitive Offenders Act now includes all the Commonwealth countries, including the Seychelles and Papua New Guinea, but the Fugitive Offenders Act, Section 2, which deals with the United Kingdom dependencies, I believe covers only certain of the dependencies. As I understand it, it only applies at the moment to the British Solomon Islands, Protected Brunei and the New Hebrides. Therefore, a considerable number of dependencies are left out. I think it would be tragic if, when this Bill is extended to other parts of the world, some of the dependencies should become havens of refuge for terrorists because they are the only part of the Commonwealth
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left which are not covered by the provisions of this Bill. I should be grateful for comments from the Minister on this particular paragraph, which I beg to move.
Lord HARRIS of GREENWICH: I am grateful to the noble Baroness for explaining the terms of this particular Amendment. It has drawn our attention to a difficulty which could arise if arrangements between the United Kingdom and the dependencies under the Bill were not adequately spelled out. Under subsection (3) of Clause 7 the provisions of the Bill may be extended by Order in Council to a dependency, subject to any modifications and adaptations which may be necessary. Once they are so extended the dependency will be able to surrender fugitives to Convention countries and to the United Kingdom, and to prosecute where they do not extradite, on the basis which is provided for in the Convention. On the face of it, therefore, a separate provision under Clause 5 should not be necessary.
But such an Order in Council would not confer jurisdiction on the United Kingdom courts over offences committed in a dependency; nor could a dependency be designated as a Convention country under subsection (1) of Clause 8. It is unlikely in practice that a fugitive would not be returned from the United Kingdom to a dependency, because the arrangements for extradition between the United Kingdom and its dependencies which are set out in the Fugitive Offenders Act are a simplified version of the arrangement we have with Commonwealth countries. There is, for example, no prohibition on the surrender of a fugitive for a political offence, although the Home Secretary has a discretion to refuse to return an offender to a dependency for such an offence.
It is, however, possible that a request from a dependency may be refused on some other ground. It we did decide to refuse to extradite a fugitive to a dependency to which the Bill had been extended, we should not be able to prosecute him. It would clearly be undesirable to leave such a gap, but I think there is probably more than one way of closing it. Therefore, if the noble Baroness will withdraw this Amendment, we will consider the matter further and decide what is the best way of remedying this difficult situation to which she has drawn our attention.
Baroness ELLES: I am very grateful to the Minister for his reply and for his assurance. In this context—and, of course, I do not expect a reply immediately—obviously the position of Rhodesia should be considered in relation to how the Bill will apply. I should be very grateful if the Minister could perhaps give me some indication of his thinking on this matter before the next stage of the Bill. I beg leave to withdraw the Amendment.
Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.
Lord BELSTEAD Lord BELSTEAD moved Amendment No. 15:
Line 45, leave out ("may") and insert ("shall")
The noble Lord said: I beg to move Amendment No. 15. At the present time, the Republic of Ireland and Malta are alone among the Council of Europe States in refusing to sign the Convention; this despite the pressing need to take concerted measures against international terrorism, which is the whole reason why we are debating this Bill in Committee today.
This Amendment does not provide the opportunity for me to speculate as to why the Republic is unwilling to sign or ratify the Convention. We know that the Republic has always set its face against extradition for crimes of violence committed in Northern Ireland and Great Britain in the belief that such crimes are bound to have a political motive. However, in this Bill, Clause 2, which gives effect to Article V, provides the safeguard of protecting the fugitive offender if he can prove that he would suffer, if returned, on account of his race, religion, nationality or political opinions. But this safeguard against extradition, which we have already discussed, is linked with Clause 4, which gives effect to Article VI, providing for extra-territorial jurisdiction by the United Kingdom for offences committed abroad, offences which I understand are already triable if committed within the United Kingdom.
I do think that Clause 4 marks a significant step forward in combating international terrorism. Whereas I have resisted the temptation to question at any length why the Republic is unwilling to sign and ratify the Convention, this Amendment would lay a duty upon the
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United Kingdom to apply Clause 4, and Clause 4 alone, to the Republic, in the hope that an order under this subsection would be reciprocated by the Irish Government. I should like to examine that for a moment or two. Clause 4 does not involve extradition. That is the whole point of putting down this Amendment. To that extent, I hope that it would be acceptable to the policy of an Trish Government. If Clause 4 is not to be put into effect among all the States of the Council of Europe, the inevitable consequence will be that terrorists will continue to be able to commit crimes in any country of their choosing and then claim political protection for their crimes in other countries, including Council of Europe States. It is for that reason that we have Clause 4 in the Bill, and we would hope that the other Council of Europe States would be doing the same thing.
I should like to examine what the effect would be if the Secretary of State were to make an order under Clause 5 (2). I hope that the noble Lord will correct me if I have got it wrong, but it seems to me that it would apply Clause 4 (1) to the Republic; thus it would mean that, if a citizen—of the United Kingdom or not—were to commit within the Republic of Ireland any of the offences mentioned which coincide with Article I(d), (e) and (f), and include murder, kidnapping and various explosives offences, and if that offender were to seek refuge in the United Kingdom, he could then be tried here for any of those offences: that would be one effect of this Amendment.
The Amendment would also apply Clause 4(2) to the Republic of Ireland: that would mean that a citizen—of the United Kingdom or not—could be tried, if he were to seek refuge here, if he had committed in the Republic an offence against a protected person. Thirdly, the Amendment would apply Clause 4(3), and that would mean that if, outside the Republic or the United Kingdom, an Irishman were to commit the extraditable offences of murder or manslaughter, and offences connected with explosives, and were to seek refuge here, again he could be brought to trial here.
If those examples are correct, it seems highly important that the Republic should be brought within the scope of Clause 4,

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and that is the effect of the Amendment. In that event, of course, I should hope—and this was inherent in some words spoken by the noble Lord, Lord Harris of Greenwich, as regards a previous Amendment—that the Republic would feel able to reciprocate on a bilateral basis. I beg to move.
Viscount BROOKEBOROUGH: I should like to support my noble friend Lord Belstead who has so eloquently proposed the Amendment. By leave of the Committee, I should like to extend my remarks to Clause 6, because I should have thought that the Government, through this Bill, which extends the suppression of terrorism, would have taken every opportunity to strengthen the suppression of terrorism within the British Isles, recognising as we must that regrettably, at present, extradition is not possible within the Irish Constitution, although many of us feel that that is not necessarily the case.
On 29th November 1974 Mr. Cooney said:
"If it helps in the fight against terrorism we will be only too glad to extend the bill "—
he was referring to the Criminal Jurisdiction Bill. I wonder what efforts the Government have made to ensure that the Irish Republican Government would, in fact, accept the implementation of the Amendment of my noble friend? If we could count the number of criminals that we cannot deal with, we would realise the importance of making sure that everything possible is done under this legislation to combat terrorism. I support the Amendment of my noble friend.
Lord HARMAR-NICHOLLS: I believe that this Amendment could be accepted. Under the present drafting,
"The Secretary of State may, at any time when the Republic of Ireland is not a Convention country, by order direct".
That means that a discretion is left to the Secretary of State. We know that discretion in this sort of area is not a very pleasant thing to have. There are all sorts of extraneous circumstances and side shoots which make it an extremely difficult decision to make, because other matters have to be taken into account if one has a discretion.
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I believe that Parliament should take full responsibility. Parliament ought to say that,
"The Secretary of State shall, at any time".
That would mean that the full responsibility and all that flows from it is taken on board by Parliament itself, and in that way we remove the discretion, which is dangerous and in many instances unsatisfactory, from the Home Secretary, whoever he may be. In view of all the other responsibilities in this area and the risks that the Secretary of State has to run, the least Parliament can do—if it wants to do anything at all—is to accept the full responsibility which will flow from its Statutes; and to say "shall" rather than "may" in this instance would do just that.
Lord HARRIS of GREENWICH: I dealt with the general situation of the Republic of Ireland during the Second Reading of the Bill, and the Committee may recall that I did so on that occasion because the issue was very properly raised, as it has been today. Indeed, it is most understandable that points have been raised in the way that they have.
I should like to say something about the effect of this Amendment which goes rather further than the noble Lord, Lord Harmar-Nicholls, seems to imagine. The effect would be to confer jurisdiction on United Kingdom courts over the offences mentioned in Clause 4(1) and (2) when committed in the Republic of Ireland—that is, the offence being committed in the Republic of Ireland—and over the offences mentioned in Clause 4(3) when committed by a citizen of the Republic of Ireland, regardless of the fact that the Republic would not have entered into any arrangement to do likewise. That is the point which is now before the Committee. It goes rather beyond the point of whether the word "may" or "shall" should appear on the face of the Bill as, I am sure, the noble Lord, Lord Harmar-Nicholls, will recognise.
The situation is that Clause 5(2) empowers the Secretary of State to order that Clause 4 of the Bill applies in relation to the Republic of Ireland as a non-Convention country. Similarly, Clause 1(4) empowers the Secretary of State to order that the relevant parts of Clause 1 (and, by extension, Clause 2 as well) apply in relation to the Republic of Ireland. Those

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two powers are together equivalent, for the Republic of Ireland, to the power in Clause 5(1) which enables the Secretary of State to apply all or any of the provisions of the Bill to a State with which the United Kingdom has an extradition arrangement, but which is not a Convention country.
I should like to follow this particular point through, because it is important to have the facts clearly before us. The purpose of these order-making powers is to enable the United Kingdom to enter into an arrangement with a State which is not a Convention country, and such an arrangement will be based on the European Convention on the Suppression of Terrorism. These arrangements would not be unilateral, and would have to be mutually agreed. It would be wholly contrary to international law unilaterally to take jurisdiction over offences committed abroad by a citizen of another State. Yet this Amendment would require us to do just that in relation to the Republic of Ireland, without its agreement and without any corresponding commitment on its part.
We certainly hope, as I indicated when I spoke on Second Reading, that the Republic of Ireland will become a party to the Convention. Even if it does not—this was a point made, I think, by the noble Baroness during the discussions we had on Second Reading—become a party to the Convention, we hope that some other arrangements can be made with the Republic, possibly within the framework of the European Community. But, it would be wrong in our judgment to pre-empt any such agreement, and I very much hope, therefore, that this Amendment is not pressed because—I want to emphasise this once again—it would be wholly contrary to international law.
Certainly there is no disposition on our part to underestimate the importance of getting satisfactory arrangements with the Republic of Ireland. As I have indicated today and on the previous occasion, it is possible that this will be able to be done within the framework of the European Community. If that were possible it would be widely welcomed, and certainly we should very much welcome it.
Baroness ELLES: Before the noble Lord, Lord Harris of Greenwich, sits down, I intervene solely to ask him to look very carefully at what he said earlier because when he referred to subsection (2) he said that it shall apply in relation to the Republic as if it were, and then I think he said "a non-Convention country". I know that slips of the tongue occur, but as this is of legal significance perhaps he would look back and make sure that what he said was not in the text and rectify it with Hansard, because the matter is of importance.
Lord HARRIS of GREENWICH: Yes, I shall do so.
Lord BELSTEAD: I am grateful to the noble Lord, Lord Harris of Greenwich, for his reply, in the sense that once again he has given us information, about some of which I was not aware, and he has underlined a point of which I was aware and to which he has given expression before. Indeed, he was quite right to repeat it in relation to the moving of this Amendment which would, after all, lay a duty, because by changing "may" to "shall" Clause 4 shall be applied to the Republic. The noble Lord made the point that it would be questionable, to say the very least, and, if I understood him aright, probably contrary to international law, to do such a thing unilaterally, and it would need to be done on a bilateral basis.
I should like to raise just one other matter, because I believe that it is possible that the Home Office may write to noble Lords who have spoken during this Committee stage, and Government Departments are habitually helpful and very often include some extra information for our benefit. I should like to make the point—and I should like to be told whether the noble Lord thinks that I am wrong—that I do not think it would be contrary to the signatory, the Government of Ireland, of the 1957 European Convention on Extradition if a bilateral agreement were to be concluded in line with Clause 4 of the Bill. I particularly go out of my way to probe whether or not the Home Office thinks that that is a correct view.
I base this not on my view, because I have no legal training whatsoever, but on a dissenting opinion in the report of the Law Enforcement Commission which, in

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fact, preceded the Criminal Jurisdiction Act 1975 which relates to Northern Ireland and to the Republic. Certain members of the Law Enforcement Commission held the view that Article 28(3) of the 1957 Convention permits two or more contracting parties to that Convention to regulate their mutual arrangements for extradition exclusively in accordance with a system of uniform law, notwithstanding the Convention. Of course, as regards extradition we have a uniform system of law with the Republic of Ireland, based on reciprocal backing of warrants procedure.
I go out of my way to say that because I should like to know, either now or in the future, whether or not the Home Office thinks that that view is wrong. I shall certainly withdraw the Amendment. However, before doing so, I should like to make two remarks.
Lord HARMAR-NICHOLLS: Before my noble friend withdraws the Amendment, perhaps I could submit to the noble Lord, Lord Harris of Greenwich, that if the words, "The Secretary of State shall" are in conflict with international law, then the words, "The Secretary of State may" must also as regards intention, be in conflict with international law. If the Bill is to read that the Secretary of State "may", one presumes that in certain circumstances he "will", otherwise why give him the power involved in "may"? I submit that if the word "shall" will be in conflict with international law, certainly in the spirit of international law it is very wrong to include this sentence at all. If it is to be included, let us have something which has some weight behind it rather than something which is a contradiction within itself in terms of being legal or illegal.
Lord BELSTEAD: I am grateful to my noble friend for speaking on this Amendment because I believe that it helps to probe the Government's view on this matter. In conclusion, I should like to make two points. First, with respect to my noble friend, unlike him, I should prefer to see the Bill remain at least as it is drafted because it leaves the door open, and I believe that that is right. Secondly, the noble Lord, Lord Harris of Greenwich, said that it may be possible, in the context of the EEC, for some understanding to be
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reached with the Irish Government. It seems to me that that offers very much narrower scope than what is offered by the signatories to, and the potential ratifiers of, the Convention.
In withdrawing the Amendment I express the hope that it may still be possible to pursue negotiations with the Irish Government—I am sure Her Majesty's Government will do so if at all possible—to see whether, at least on a bilateral basis, the terms of Clause 4 can possibly be agreed with the Irish Government. I beg leave to withdraw the Amendment.
Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.
Clause 5 agreed to.
Clause 6 [Amendment of Criminal Jurisdiction Act 1975, Sch. 3. 1975 c. 59.]:
On Question, Whether Clause 6 shall stand part of the Bill?
4.25 p.m.
Viscount BROOKEBOROUGH: This clause is a substitution of Schedule 3 to the Criminal Jurisdiction Act 1975, and weakens that Act. The particular subsection which is involved states:
"If the accused is serving a sentence imposed by any other offence, …"
The new subsection which we seek to substitute involves not only serving a sentence but all the paraphenalia of the courts before that. It seems to me that when we were passing the Criminal Jurisdiction Bill, which is now the Criminal Jurisdiction Act, we recognised the fact that the Irish Republic could not have extradition and, sadly, that we were trying to substitute something else. I have always maintained that it is a very poor substitute, but it was a substitute and a little progress was made.
However, I had understood, almost as a principle of that Act, that in point of fact we were saying that should someone commit a crime within the British Isles outside that jurisdiction and then become a fugitive into one of the other jurisdictions, that accused would be treated totally as though the crime had been committed within the jurisdiction. If that is so, the normal conventions of civilisation should apply; that is, the most

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serious crime should take precedence over a less serious crime. Under this new subsection which we seek to insert in the Bill, we shall enable a fugitive, if he believes that he is liable to be picked up under the Criminal Jurisdiction Act, to commit some minor crime and thereby delay his trial on the major crime until he has not only been convicted but carried out his sentence.
It is peculiar that we have to modify the Criminal Jurisdiction Act with a Bill to suppress terrorists and strengthen the action against terrorists. When the Irish Government passed their Criminal Law Jurisdiction Act I was told many times by the noble and learned Lord on the Woolsack that we could not modify it because it was a treaty Act and had to be agreed by both parties. But the moment the Irish Republic modified it and weakened it, then we, in this country, had two options. We had either to acquiesce to the Irish Government, which is what we have done, or else we should have made the Irish Republic change their Act. I feel that it is a weakening of the case and at a time like this, especially after last weekend, any weakening of any Act between the United Kingdom and the Irish Republic should be avoided. I should like to know what the noble Lord thinks the effect of this Amendment will be.
Lord HARRIS of GREENWICH: Indeed, if there were any weakening of the Statute in this particular respect, of course the noble Viscount would be absolutely right. But I do not accept for a moment that what he has said is, in fact, in accordance with the true facts of the situation. I should like to say a few words on Clause 6 of the Bill. Clause 6 amends the Criminal Jurisdiction Act 1975 so as to extend the circumstances in which the operation of an order for the return to the Republic of Ireland for trial of a person accused of an extra-territorial offences is postponed. This brings the relevant provision exactly into line with the Republic of Ireland's Criminal Law Jurisdiction Act 1976. This Amendment arises out of the difference between the relevant provision of the Criminal Jurisdiction Act 1975 and the corresponding position in the legislation of the Republic of Ireland.
The effect of paragraph 2 of Schedule 3 to the 1975 Act appears to be that if a person is charged in Northern Ireland with
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an extra-territorial offence—that is, one committed in the Republic—and also with an offence committed in Northern Ireland and he has not yet pleaded to the arraignment for the latter offence, the Northern Ireland court would be obliged, at the request of the accused, to hand him over to the Irish police for trial in the Republic without first trying him for the offence committed in Northern Ireland. This could be done provided that a warrant for his arrest for the extra-territorial offence has been issued in the Republic.
The purpose of this particular amendment contained in this particular clause, Clause 6, is to ensure that the accused's right to opt for trial in the Republic of Ireland is suspended if he has been charged with an offence other than the extraterritorial offence. I hope, in the light of what I have said, that the noble Viscount will recognise that there is no weakening of the Statute so far as this particular amendment is concerned.
Lord BELSTEAD: Does not this lead to a delay in bringing proceedings for an extra-territorial offence?
Lord HARRIS of GREENWICH: No, I do not think that delay is involved. I think it brings our legislation into line with the legislation of the Republic of Ireland and that of Northern Ireland, It will lead to an improvement in the situation rather than any deterioration in the situation. I do not think that any substantial delay is involved. There could be, in some cases, delay, but it seems to me to be in the public interest that we effect an amendment of this sort. It seems to me to improve the situation rather than lead to any deterioration.
Lord BELSTEAD: I have not, in fact found Clause 6 as easy to follow as I thought when I first read it. When the noble Lord says that it leads to an improvement rather than to a deterioration, just to get it absolutely clear may I ask what the noble Lord is referring to? An improvement in what way?
Lord HARRIS of GREENWICH: What I was responding to was the suggestion of the noble Viscount that we are weakening the law in this particular matter. What I am saying is that there is no weakening of the law at all.
Clause 6 agreed to.
4.32 p.m.
The Earl of SELKIRK The Earl of SELKIRK moved Amendment No. 16.
After Clause 6, insert the following new clause:
Right to suspend air services
(" . Nothing in this Act shall in any way derogate from the right of Her Majesty's Government to suspend all direct and indirect air services between the United Kingdom and any country which gives asylum to hi-jackers, and to deny landing-rights in the United Kingdom to the aircraft of any such country".).
The noble Earl said: This new clause arises very nearly spontaneously from the discussions which were held on Second Reading. Not only noble Lords whose names appear on the Amendment but two or three others—in fact, almost all the speakers—referred to this: they included the noble Lords, Lord Gridley, Lord Hylton, and Lord Duncan-Sandys. The noble Lord, Lord Harris, said in his winding-up speech on 7th February, at column 957:
"We recognise that, until we obtain some degree of international agreement in this important area, there will be a very substantial gap in our defences".
It we want it confirmed, we have the tragic events that took place in the course of last week.
I suppose that it is possible for the Government to get some satisfaction from the difficulties that the aircraft had in finding a landing place. However, it brings out clearly the extremely dangerous spread of reactions to any form of hijacking which takes place. If we look back on what has been happening, we may say on the whole, that we have been rather lucky in these events. We have been fortunate that some much greater catastrophe has not taken place. But it has shown beyond doubt the extreme vulnerability of aircraft to certain forms of attack.
We have ourselves passed the Aircraft Protection Act. I do not know whether the noble Lord can be tempted to say anything about the great powers which have been handed to the Government in that Act. I do not expect him to say much because I know these remain secret, but I should like him to say that these powers have remained absolutely up to date, and that those carrying responsibility for them are fully alert to the problems and difficulties with which they may one day be confronted. Not only that, but
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we know, particularly from what the noble Lord, Lord Wigoder, said to us, that there are men at large at the present time who have carried out hijackings, who know the techniques, and who, for all we know, are perfectly ready to do it again. We know that they have money, and that they are probably affiliated to some kind of world organisation.
This is, in a sense, a mild clause. It does not do very much. It seeks to deny aircraft communication with any State which is prepared to give hijackers asylum. If we show that we have those powers and that we are prepared to do this. I would hope that this would eventually come in as an extension to the Convention. If all the European States were to agree that anyone giving asylum to hijackers will in fact have no air communication with Europe, that would be a formidable power.
It is not all that much, but the problem is really that we have the somewhat sacred doctrine of sovereignty, which is intended to protect citizens, but which is now being used to protect criminals, and it is very difficult to find a way round this without taking some outside action. We have had certain examples in which the sovereignty of certain countries has been infringed in the case of hijackers, and some have been very successful, but it is an extremely dangerous activity to undertake. These particular powers would not involve any infringement of sovereignty, and would be a useful and considerable danger to countries that are prepared to run that peril.
I want to say one word about the pilots. Flying one of these great aeroplanes with passengers is the acme of modern technology. It is no mean task. It demands the highest qualities of those who have to fly them. It is asking an awful lot of pilots to have to fly them under threat of assassination. The miracle is that they have behaved—and I think they deserve every possible congratulation and support—in the way that they have. It is an intolerable burden to expose them to. It is all very well for passengers. They go on aeroplanes occasionally. But flying is the profession of these people. They go daily in aeroplanes, and of course hijacking remains possible for them.
What I am asking is that we should declare quite clearly that we are willing to impose this ourselves, and that we

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should thereafter seek to gain the accession of other countries in the Convention. I believe that, if we do this, it will be a mild but important step, and one which will show our determination to put an end to these dastardly practices. I beg to move.
Lord WIGODER: May I strongly support this Amendment, although I appreciate that it goes very much beyond the present scope of the Bill which your Lordships are considering. The Bill in its present form is concerned with the relationships between countries that are parties to this Convention. The Amendment deals with the relationships between civilised countries, if I may so describe them, and those countries which habitually offer asylum to hijackers, and it raises a series of different issues.
The extent of the problem needs no underlining. We have reached a situation in which, in any one terrorist incident, hundreds of completely innocent civilians—men, women and children—may face an agonisingly slow death, and may do so when they do not even come from a country which is a party to the political grievance which is alleged to be the subject of the terrorist attack. That is the situation as it exists at present. How it may develop, one does not know; but with technological advance it is by no means impossible that before very long there will be a major disaster, and it will then be a little late to start debating in your Lordships' House what steps might have been taken to prevent it. Already there have been at least two incidents where terrorists have been arrested in the vicinity of airports with the latest heat seeking missiles at their disposal which could, if they had been fired, have brought down the largest airliner in the middle of a crowded capital city. It is perhaps reflections of that sort that lead one to underline the urgency of the situation which is now facing the civilised world.
The figures speak for themselves. The CIA examined terrorist incidents over a period of some six years. They discovered that of those incidents in which hostages had been sought 87 per cent. had been successful. Of those 87 per cent. in which hostages had in fact been seized, in no fewer than 79 per cent. of the incidents the whole of the team of terrorists escaped. They escaped with their lives and without any punishment
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whatsoever. If one looks at the specific incidents of the hijacking of aeroplanes, one finds from the same source that, over those six years, there were 127 terrorist attacks on aircraft, 115 of which were successful, and that, of those 115, less than 10 ended up with any harm coming to the hijackers by way of death, bodily injury, trial or imprisonment. This is an indication of the extent of the problem.
As to what can be done about it, I suggest that there are several courses which we could pursue. First—and I believe that we are already doing this to some extent—there should be the maximum possible international co-operation in the exchange of intelligence and the exchange of technical information as to how terrorist acts can be dealt with. Secondly, there is the maintenance of the maximum security at airports. I believe that security is very good at our airports. Again, the problem can be appreciated from the figures showing that, in the United States, where security at airports is rigorous, no less than 1,054 firearms were impounded in one six-month period as a result of airport security searches, and, in a 12-month period, just under 1,500 explosive devices were discovered in the possession of people about to board aircraft.
That our airport security is rigorous is not in doubt. I believe that what may have to be considered is the question of what should be done in relation to foreign countries where airport security is manifestly inadequate; not by way of applying sanctions to such countries, but perhaps we should consider whether, in self-protection for our own citizens, we can allow aircraft to come to this country when they have been through a foreign airport whose security is known to be lax.
The third way to deal with the problem is that specifically indicated in the Amendment; that direct action by way of sanctions should be taken against countries which habitually harbour terrorists. For my part, I would not want to suggest that unilateral action by this country would in itself be very effective. What I would hope to see is that this country should take the lead in international negotiations at the European Parliament or the Council of Europe to persuade other countries of like mind—and there must be

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many of them—that effective sanctions of this nature could be applied against such countries. That, I believe, is the only way of protecting pilots and passengers that would be effective in the short run.
It may be that the noble Earl will feel in due course that it is not practicable to write his Amendment into the Bill. Nevertheless, this discussion would have served a useful purpose if it became clear that, in all parts of your Lordships' House, there was a recognition of the nature of the problem and if it also became clear from what the noble Lord, Lord Harris of Greenwich, might say in the reply that the Government would certainly support any international initiative that was taken along these lines and perhaps might even take the lead in beginning to make proposals of this nature. I therefore support the Amendment.
Lord HANKEY: I, too, support what has been said on this issue. The frightening thing about the statistics which the noble Lord, Lord Wigoder, quoted, is the number of successful hijackings which have occurred in spite of the security measures which have been taken to protect aircraft. This really is an international problem which ought to be and must be dealt with for the protection of the international community and of an essential means of communication in the world in which we live.
I can see the difficulty about the particular suggestion in the Amendment; it raises problems such as how other States will discriminate and so on, and I can quite see that, but I hope noble Lords will not be put off by the fact that various States which habitually accept hijacked aircraft did not agree to accept the aircraft which was hijacked at Larnaca. I think the reason for that was that the hijackers were Arabs and they did not want to have them on their territory at a time when the whole of the Arab community had revolted against that disgusting crime. The fact remains that something should be done about it and I hope that Her Majesty's Government will really give thought to this matter to see how they can help to work out some system which could be applied. I hope, anyway, that the suggestion made in the Amendment will give a lead for thought on this subject in a very practical manner.
Baroness ELLES: From these Benches I wish to support the principle and thinking behind the Amendment which was moved by my noble friend and supported by noble Lords in all parts of the House. Obviously, the intention of the Amendment is that there should be no haven for hijackers, a principle which we would all agree is an objective we should seek to obtain. Nevertheless, we must be clear on one point and I am not sure that noble Lords have touched on this, and I mention it because it could be open to a certain misunderstanding. It does not mean that there is to be no haven for the airborne aircraft. In the recent hijacking to which many noble Lords have rightly referred, one country did not give landing rights to the plane which was in a very difficult situation with hijackers on board and with the pilot having to fly with decreasing supplies of fuel. It is an important point, when we are considering measures designed to safeguard the lives of the pilots and to enable them to fly planes without the constant threat and fear of having a hijacking attempt on board, that they should in all circumstances when demanding landing rights anywhere be given them where it is convenient for them to land. I simply wanted to make that particular point.
Obviously, a number of measures can be suggested for dealing with hijackers, apart from extradition. I believe there should be some movement towards an international consensus that wherever a hijacker is apprehended and where a country refuses to extradite such a hijacker, every civilised State or every State which wishes to be called civilised should undertake in treaty from to impose a minimum penalty below which no nation should go in giving punishment to hijackers caught on its territories.
As to the sanctions proposed in the Amendment, I think they are extremely moderate considering the acts they are seeking to remove. We must also consider that, if some serious action is not taken by this country, by the Council of Europe and, indeed, by the United Nations—we remember the threats of the International Air Line Pilots' Association last year during the course of the General Assembly—we might have the threat of strikes by airline pilots if they are not to be adequately protected. This is an action which I think would receive considerable

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sympathy from many people representing all shades of political opinion in this country. I therefore support the thinking behind the Amendment.
We should at the same time give serious consideration to other measures which could be taken in parallel to the effects of this Bill. Personally, I believe that we should have some kind of trained force, perhaps on a regional basis, to deal with such emergencies. After all, the Germans have a special unit and, as we know, they called on Great Britain to contribute in the Mogadishu action. I think we would all agree that it was a wise decision on the part of the Prime Ministers and it showed co-operation among nations in endeavouring to deal with an intractable and intolerable problem. A force which was already internationally trained within a regional context in Europe would, in my view, be a valid contribution in dealing with this matter. We have seen this kind of action with, for example, earthquakes, where a force has gone from one country to another to deal with a specific disaster. This is something that the Government should consider in discussion with other ratifying States. I had thought originally that it might have been possible to do it under NATO, but, of course, we have only to think of Sweden or Austria. Sweden being a ratifying State but not being a member of NATO, that may not be the right answer; but I do think some international force should be considered.
Secondly, I think this country should take very seriously the practice which has been started in the United States of having on aeroplanes guards who are trained specifically to deal with hijacking problems on aircraft. Again, it is obviously a very expensive and difficult thing to do, but I think the circumstances demand that serious and difficult action should be taken and that expense is secondary. Thirdly, I would suggest that a very serious look should be taken at the inadequacies of The Hague Convention; and I pay tribute to the article by Mr. Bin Cheng in the Aeronautical Journal of 1972, in which he analysed the effects of The Hague Convention. Whereas many people think they are now protected under this particular international Convention, there are three very serious lacunae which perhaps I may, without taking up too much of the time of the Committee, very briefly outline.
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One was touched on by my noble friend Lord Boyd-Carpenter, and it is that it applies only when the crime takes place on board the plane, and does not apply to pre-flight or post-flight situations, as my noble friend rightly said.
Lord BOYD-CARPENTER: Would my noble friend allow me to interrupt her? I understood the noble Lord, Lord Harris, to say that he was not clear on the point and was going to take advice.
Baroness ELLES: I am very thankful that the noble Lord the Minister will take advice, and perhaps he will able be to prove me wrong; but according to the article by Mr. Bin Cheng in 1972 and his analysis of the Convention, this is in fact how it took effect. Secondly, it applies only where an aircraft takes off and lands in the same place. Supposing the other day the plane had not landed at Djibouti but had gone straight back, then there again that would have been outside the terms of the Convention. Thirdly, of course, there is no uniform duty on States to extradite.
I apologise to your Lordships for taking up time, but I think it is a very important point. I think these are matters which have to be discussed and aired. The Government should be given every encouragement to look at all the loopholes which exist in relation to this particular form of terrorism, and I therefore very warmly support my noble friend and thank him for having raised this matter today.
Lord BOYD-CARPENTER: Having, until quite recently, been responsible for the regulation of civil aviation in the United Kingdom, I should like to add my support to this Amendment and, in particular, to put two points to your Lordships and to the noble Lord the Minister. The first point is that I think we ought to emphasise with all the clarity of which we are capable the fact that the offence of hijacking an aircraft full of innocent people is unpardonable in any circumstances whatsoever, and that political motives even of the highest—even by people representing terribly persecuted sections of the human race—do not justify this offence. I would hope that we will have no feeling that any political motive can conceivably justify this act; for, as the noble Earl said from his very great

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experience as a pilot, the strain on the pilots involved in these episodes is appalling.
It is not just a case of whether the bomb will go off or whether these criminals will deliberately destroy an aircraft. In the interests of safety all civil aviation authorities in the world lay down very strict rules as to the number of hours a pilot may fly. This is not done out of any woolly-minded social motives; it is done because expert opinion is clear in saying that it is dangerous for a man to fly an aircraft more than a certain number of hours, particularly if he is liable to have a tricky landing at the end of a long stint. Yet, in these hijacking episodes, not only do these pilots fly with a pistol at the back of their neck, as my noble friend said; they fly, very often, for intolerably long hours. Therefore, quite apart from any deliberate act of destruction by hijackers, sooner or later, if hijacking goes on, a hijacking attempt will produce, accidentally, a major catastrophe to a large airliner full of passengers. I therefore hope we are prepared as a country, and I hope the Government are prepared, to treat hijacking as a specially serious offence for which there really can be no excuse whatever.
That would be an argument for putting this new clause into the Bill, and I was rather sorry to hear the noble Lord, Lord Wigoder, suggesting that perhaps these words should not go into the Bill. I think there would be advantages if this Committee were to insist on this, and I hope my noble friend will consider this. But, in any event, there is a further and related point. It may, indeed, not be necessary—and, in the presence of the noble Lord, Lord Wigoder, I put this point with a certain diffidence—but I believe it may be desirable from a legal point of view to insert this or some such provision. The power to prevent aircraft of a particular State from using British airports is a very important one, not least because, as noble Lords know, Heathrow has the largest number of international movements of any airport in the world, and, therefore, to be banned from Heathrow is an immensely damaging thing for the aircraft of any State. But, as I understand it, the power to inhibit foreign aircraft from coming here is exercised under the prerogative.
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There is authority in the courts. Going back to my student days, I remember, as will the noble Lord, Lord Wigoder, the case of Attorney-General v. The Keyser's Royal Hotel, and there is the much more recent case, which will be in the minds of some noble Lords, of Laker v. The Secretary of State for Trade, both of which seem to support the thesis that, where something which has been dealt with by the prerogative is the subject-matter of legislation, the power under the prerogative lapses and the Executive is confined to only the statutory powers. Now we are legislating in this area. We legislated in this area quite recently in the Protection of Aircraft Bill. Before the noble Lord the Minister rejects this Amendment on the grounds that I guess he is going to seek to put forward, that it is unnecessary, I wonder whether he would reflect for a moment and take advice as to whether the undoubted existing power of the Government, of the Executive—of the Crown, if you like—to exercise a ban of this kind might not be narrowed or inhibited a little once legislation of this kind is on the Statute Book.
If there be anything in this point—as I say, I put it with immense diffidence, but it may be that those interested in constitutional matters may think there is something in it—I am sure the noble Lord himself would be the last man to wish to restrict the powers of the Government. There may well come an occasion when the course of action laid down in this Amendment will be precisely what we want to do, and it would be a tragedy if we allowed our power, the power of our Government, to be restricted by accident, and so be prevented from doing it. I hope, therefore, that the noble Lord will not brush this aside but will give some further thought to it. Whether the noble Earl will press this Amendment at this or at another stage I do not know; but I think there may be a point here—I put it no higher than this—which the Government ought seriously to consider.
Lord HYLTON: Having spoken at Second Reading on behalf of and from the point of view of innocent passengers, I should very much like to support this Amendment moved by my noble friend. The text of the Amendment mentions only the giving of asylum to hijackers. I should like to suggest to your Lordships

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that allowing the training of terrorists in the territory of a State, the failure to enforce adequate security precautions and the paying of ransoms—all three of these things—are just as important as the giving of asylum.
In fact, in the interval between Second Reading and today I asked a Written Question of Her Majesty's Government to try to discover which foreign States, during the last few years, have harboured fugitive terrorists, have allowed other terrorists to be trained on their territory or have failed to arrange for adequate security precautions at their airports. My purpose in asking this Written Question was to try to discover—and this was incorporated in the text—which States have improved their practices, which States have ceased to be backsliders. Once one knows that, then it may be possible to pursuade those who continue to default to improve their ways.
However, the noble Lord, Lord Goronwy-Roberts, replying for the Government said that comprehensive and detailed information of this kind is impossible to obtain. That seemed to me to be a remarkable statement. Surely, the British Airline Pilots' Association could have been consulted and would have had most of the answers. Even a reading of the newspapers, one would have thought, would have disclosed a great deal of this information. Why do we have a Diplomatic Service and a Secret Service if we cannot have at our disposal the kind of information I was asking for? Again, surely, it must have been available during the very long negotiations which preceded the drawing up of the three international Conventions which have been mentioned—The Hague, Tokyo and Montreal.
The question of sanctions to be applied to the defaulting States has been raised already today. I hope that the Government will consider very seriously some of the suggestions that have been made by my noble friend Lady Elles and the noble Lord, Lord Wigoder. One would feel that a Government capable of devising sanctions for the enforcement of their non-statutory incomes policy would also be capable of thinking up some effective non-legislative sanctions against international terrorism. I think that we would all agree that the sanctions that are needed would far best be applied internationally
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and by agreement among a large number of nations; but, as my noble friend Lord Boyd-Carpenter has mentioned, Heathrow Airport has by far the largest number of aircraft movements, and one could say—
Lord BOYD-CARPENTER: Would my noble friend allow me to intervene? Heathrow Airport has not got the largest number of aircraft movements, but the largest number of international aircraft movements. O'Hare, Chicago has more actual movements.
Lord HYLTON: I am sorry. I accept what my noble friend has said. Looking at this country, slightly wider than Heathrow itself, we surely can be considered to be at the hub of international air traffic and this, to my mind, gives us a very much greater leverage than we would otherwise be able to bring to bear. If we cannot get widespread international agreement and co-operation, then surely it is up to us, given this leverage, to exercise it unilaterally if we have to.
5.4 p.m.
Lord HARRIS of GREENWICH: I think that all who have been present during this last hour or so will agree with me that this has been a particularly useful debate on an issue where there is widespread public anxiety for the reasons given by all who have spoken and, particularly, by the noble Lord, Lord Boyd-Carpenter, with his substantial experience of this particular area. He stated one or two propositions with which I think we will all agree—I would, certainly—namely, that hijacking is an unpardonable offence in any circumstances. With respect, I agree with that view. Inevitably one can think of circumstances where people are fleeing from some despotic régime where it is natural that there should be a very substantial amount of sympathy with the people concerned. Nevertheless, as the noble Lord, Lord Boyd-Carpenter, rightly said, there is no doubt that this puts at risk the lives of a very large number of innocent people and if practices of this sort go on it is certain that many innocent people will lose their lives.
I agree with him also on the second point he made; namely, the strain on the pilots because of the fact that their lives

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are threatened as are the lives of passengers on the plane, and that they are having to fly for very long periods of hours, which in itself is a factor affecting the safety of the passengers on the particular aircraft.
My own experience is infinitely more limited than that of the noble Lord, Lord Boyd-Carpenter, but I was involved to some degree in one of our own experiences of this when an aircraft was hijacked on its journey between Manchester and London. The noble Lord, Lord Boyd-Carpenter, will probably recall that there were various episodes at London Airport and the plane eventually flew on to Stansted. I can recall the serious problems so far as the strain on the pilot on that occasion was concerned. Fortunately, the person concerned had only an imitation firearm. Nobody was to know that and there could have been catastrophic consequences for the people on the plane.
Obviously, there is no real issue between us in our attitude towards this particular problem. There have been some indications in recent months that there have been some improvements in the attitude of some Governments towards hijackers. There have been the recent events referred to by the noble Lord, Lord Hankey. I do not think he brushed aside this evidence that there had been some improvement in the attitude of some Governments. He gave particular reason why he thought that certain Governments on this occasion had behaved differently compared to other occasions; but it is fair to say that over Mogadishu as well the same situation was made clear: that many Governments who in the past had had an ambiguous attitude to this problem took a much firmer line than on any previous occasion.
Therefore, having said all this, it is obvious that we all wish to apply our minds to the question of how we can take action to eradicate this menace of hijacking. Certainly I will take note of the point raised by the noble Lord, Lord Boyd-Carpenter, on this particular Amendment because I am bound to say—and I think that he predicted fairly accurately the line one is likely to take—that there is a difficulty about including in an Act of Parliament a statement about the Government's rights. It is not appropriate to state in legislation that Her Majesty's Government specifically reserve the right
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to take action which, in any case, they are empowered to take. Therefore, on that point alone I should be extremely doubtful about the widsom of adding this Amendment to the Bill.
The noble Lord, Lord Boyd-Carpenter, asked whether I would take advice on this question. Obviously, I will do so, but at the moment I am advised—and the noble Lord will recognise that this is a matter which falls outside the confines of the Home Office, although I will take account of the points he made—we are highly sceptical about the wisdom of adding this new clause to the Bill.
Secondly, there is no action which Her Majesty's Government would be precluded from taking in this struggle against this problem of hijacking and international terrorism generally. Our ratification of The Hague, Tokyo and Montreal Conventions is evidence of that determination. So also is the help which we gave last October in Mogadishu to the German Government—and this particular point was also made by the noble Baroness, Lady Elles. This was an important occasion in collaboration between two Members of the European Community.
We certainly have consistently urged other Governments to ratify these particular international Conventions. We lent our support to the United Nations' General Assembly resolution passed unanimously on November 2nd last year, which called on all States which had not already done so to give urgent consideration to becoming parties to the Conventions. There are encouraging signs—and I think that the noble Earl, Lord Selkirk, referred to this, and I have just done so—that the number of Governments prepared to give a haven to hijackers is dwindling. There have been these two occasions. There is also some change of attitude on behalf of some of these Governments.
Let me give some indication of what we have been doing. First, on the important issue of prevention, we have been working closely with our partners in the European Community under the programme established by the Ministers of the Interior, to which I referred during the debate we had on the gracious Speech, to improve aviation security standards and facilitate co-operation during an incident. One important issue, as I indicated on the last occasion when we

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debated this matter, is that a number of working groups have been established from the Ministers of the Interior Conference to go into some of these matters in much more detail. That will continue.
Secondly, British missions abroad have instructions to concert with local British airline representatives and, where this is necessary—and this is a point raised by the noble Lord, Lord Wigoder—to seek specific improvements in airport security which is obviously a matter of the greatest importance. The noble Lord referred to the number of firearms which had been detected at American airports. It is only fair to say that the number of people in the United States who have a habit of carrying firearms is, I am delighted to say, rather larger than it is in this country. Nevertheless, it is perfectly true that people have been found carrying devices on to aircraft in this country, or attempting to do so, which could have been used in certain circumstances in a terrorist incident, though it is obvious in most cases that people had no ill intent whatever.
The Department of Trade are certainly willing to provide advice on airport security to foreign Governments who ask for it, given the fact that we have undoubtedly a fairly substantial amount of expertise in this particular area. Certainly here in the United Kingdom there is no ground at all for complacency. We must make sure that our own airport security measures are up-to-date and effective. All this is evidence that the Government do not in any way take this problem lightly.
So far as sanctions are concerned, if they are to be effective, it is our clear view that they must be agreed internationally. We are deeply sceptical of the wisdom of unilateral action in this particular matter. It is sad to recall that a special international civil aviation organisation conference in Rome totally failed to reach agreement on sanctions. Unfortunately, notwithstanding what I said a few moments ago about the attitude of Governments towards hijackers, there is no evidence at the moment that a similar effort now would lead to a more happy result. I wish it were otherwise. It is our view that the international community must be ready to agree to joint measures of this character. Without them, we cannot possibly ensure an adequate degree of safety to people who
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use the airlines. I want to assure the Committee that the Government wish to play a leading part in bringing about any such understanding when, in our view, it is a moment when such an approach is likely to lead to a satisfactory conclusion.
It is our view that the widespread denial of overflying rights, which might well follow an imperfectly concerted attempt to apply sanctions, is something which could lead to the disruption of the international aviation system. I repeat, it is our clear view that there has to be international agreement in this area if any form of sanctions is to be satisfactorily applied.
I should like to say this in conclusion to the noble Baroness, Lady Elles. The noble Baroness referred to an article, I think it was, which was casting some doubt as to the effectiveness of the Hague Convention and the Montreal Convention. It is undoubtedly the case that as hijackings are continuing it would be foolish to pretend that the Conventions had been wholly successful. They have not. Nevertheless, it is only right to recall the number of hijack incidents throughout the world which took place before these Conventions had been agreed, and the situation now. The peak figure was achieved before these particular Conventions were concluded.
In 1969 there were 87 such hijacking episodes. The year following, 1970, it was down to 82. As a result of some of the international activities that have been taking place, the figures came down to 59 in 1971 and far lower in following years. Last year the figure was 34, despite the fact that there were far more aircraft at that stage flying because of the growth of international civil aviation traffic. I repeat that I say this in no way whatever to suggest that we can afford to take this matter lightly. I have indicated that we regard it as a matter of the greatest importance. We determined with our friends and allies in the European Community to take all possible action against this menace of international terrorism, of which hijacking is an important part.
I will undertake, as I have already indicated, to look again at the point made by the noble Lord, Lord Boyd-Carpenter, so far as this particular Amendment is concerned; but I must say at the moment that it is our view that adding this clause

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to the Bill would not in fact in any way increase the powers of Her Majesty's Government to deal with this particular problem.
The Earl of SELKIRK: I had no intention to start a debate on anti-hijacking measures. I was dealing with an extremely narrow and brief point: the sanctions of aircraft flying. We have had a broad debate on it. I do not think the noble Lord used very strong words. He said that he does not take it lightly. I hope he does not, for this is an enormous field.
Lord HARRIS of GREENWICH: I hope the noble Earl, in the light of what I have said, will not take one phrase wholly out of context. That is all right for an ordinary debating practice; but it is inappropriate in a debate of this kind where I have indicated the serious measures which the Government have taken to deal with this problem.
The Earl of SELKIRK: I accept readily what the noble Lord says. He says he has the power; I am perfectly satisfied that that is so. If I may say so to the noble Baroness, there is a great difference between asylum to a hijacker and emergency landings. Those things are entirely different. I understand that the noble Lord will look at these points and I certainly will not press the Amendment. I beg leave to withdraw my Amendment.
Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.
Clause 7 agreed to.
5.18 p.m.
Baroness ELLES Baroness ELLES moved Amendment No. 17:
After Clause 7, insert the following new clause:
Information to Council of Europe
(( . The Secretary of State shall, at least once each year, inform the European Committee on Crime Problems of the Council of Europe regarding the implementation of the provisions of this Act."
The noble Baroness said: This Amendment draws attention to Article 9 of the Convention which imposes a duty on Convention countries to keep the European Committee on Crime Problems of the Council of Europe informed of the application of the Convention or, in this context,
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the provisions of this Bill. The reported procedures, I believe, should not be considered or dismissed merely as a formality as something which the Secretary of State will do. It is something to which we should draw attention. If this Bill is to be effective in contributing to the suppression of terrorism, it has to be seen to be effective. If action taken by the United Kingdom Government is to be seen to be effective, it must be seen to be so in relation to and in co-operation with the other Convention States.
This Article, which is very modest in its wording, should not be disregarded, because it will be able to perform the role of a forum, provide a forum, in which the success or failure of Convention countries to deal with the situation of terrorism will be measured. I realise it is probably not correct drafting to put this Amendment into the Bill, but I should like an assurance that this obligation resides in the Secretary of State and will be faithfully recognised. Also, that every effort will be made in giving this information to the European Committee and that there will be full co-operation, which we hope we will get from the other Member States who will be signing this Convention. I beg to move.
Lord HARRIS of GREENWICH: This Amendment would oblige the Secretary of State to inform the European Committee on Crime Problems about the working of the Act at least once a year. I do not think that the Amendment is necessary and I hope I shall be able to persuade the noble Baroness that that is indeed so.
First, this requirement goes beyond the obligations which are imposed by the Convention. Article 9 merely states that the European Committee on Crime Problems.
"shall be kept informed regarding the application of this Convention".
The Explanatory Report to the Convention states that this is intended to keep the Committee informed about possible difficulties in interpreting and applying the Convention. That is sensible, and United Kingdom ratification of the Convention will oblige us to do it. The Committee is the guardian of the Convention and should know if problems arise, but this proposed new clause would oblige the Secretary of State to inform the Committee about the implementation of the

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provisions of the Bill, whether any problems have arisen or not. That seems to be an unnecessary burden of communication to impose on the Secretary of State. We are all looking for ways—and I know the noble Baroness is doing this with vigour—of avoiding unnecessary work in the public sector. I hope that she will find that particular part of the argument, if no other, attractive.
Secondly, some of the provisions of the Bill are not related to the Convention. For example, it would not be appropriate for the Secretary of State to inform the Committee about the workings of Clause 6, which we were discussing a few moments ago. In the light of that explanation, I hope that the noble Baroness will agree not to press this Amendment.
Baroness ELLES: I am very grateful to the noble Lord the Minister for that explanation and beg leave to withdraw the Amendment.
Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.
Baroness ELLES Baroness ELLES moved Amendment No. 18:
After Clause 7, insert the following new clause:
Reference of disputes to arbitration
(" . Any dispute concerning the interpretation or application of the provisions of this Act shall, at the representation either of the Secretary of State or of a Convention Country, be referred to arbitration.")
The noble Baroness said: This Amendment, again, merely draws attention to the provision in Article 10 of the Convention for the setting up of a system of arbitration where there is a dispute between contracting States. I think it is again important to draw attention to this article because there may well be disputes, for example, as regards the interpretation of Clause 2(1) and Clause 2(2) of the Bill as to the way particular States will apply their particular modification of extradition provisions. I think it is important that the Committee should be aware that there is such an arbitration clause.
I rather regret that the Convention itself allows three months for a party to nominate an arbitrator, and I very much hope that, if it falls to the lot of the United Kingdom to have to do so, they will do it very much more quickly than that, because one of the best ways of dealing with terrorism is to deal with it as quickly
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and as effectively as possible. I beg to move.
Lord HARRIS of GREENWICH: Article 10 of the Convention provides that:
"Any dispute between contracting States concerning the interpretation or application of this Convention, which has not been settled in the framework of Article 9, paragraph 2, shall, at the request of any Party to the dispute, he referred to arbitration".
That, of course, is the issue to which the noble Baroness is directing our attention.
The article then describes how the arbitration tribunal is to be composed and set up. The intention is that disputes will, so far as possible, be settled not by arbitration but under the procedures provided in Article 9, paragraph 2: namely, by the intervention of the European Committee on Crime Problems, which is required to do whatever is needful to facilitate a friendly settlement of any difficulty which may arise out of the execution of the Convention. It is right that the Committee, as the guardian of the Convention, should be the first body to which disputes are referred.
The proposed new clause seeks to apply to the provisions of the Bill the second half of the procedure envisaged in the Convention, presumably with the intention of adopting the method of arbitration which the Convention provides. But by no means all the difficulties that could arise for us in operating the provisions of the Convention will necessarily concern the interpretation or the application of the Act. What is at issue is essentially a matter of the relations between two contracting States; and a point of dispute could equally arise over the terms of the Convention itself, the relevant law of the other contracting State or the provision of our bilateral extradition treaty with that State. Since both parties to the dispute will have ratified the Convention, both will be bound, at international law, by the provisions of Articles 9 and 10; and since those provisions require no amendment to United Kingdom law it is not necessary to seek to give effect to them in this Bill. With that explanation, therefore, I hope that the noble Baroness will agree not to press this Amendment.
Baroness ELLES: Once again I am grateful to the noble Lord for the explanation and for clarifying the position over

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the setting up of arbitration measures. I should like to ask one question, and I must apologise for not having given notice of it; I shall therefore not expect an immediate reply. The noble Lord referred to the relationship between Convention States. I understand that we do not in fact have an extradition treaty with Turkey, and Turkey is one of the possible Convention States. Could the noble Lord perhaps at a later date tell me how this matter will be dealt with and whether any extradition treaty is being envisaged?—because all these are on bilateral, and not multilateral, treaty arrangements. Perhaps the noble Lord the Minister could let me have a reply between now and the next stage of the Bill: I should be grateful to him. I beg leave to withdraw the Amendment.
Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.
Clause 8 [Provisions as to interpretation and orders]:
5.28 p.m.
Lord HARRIS of GREENWICH Lord HARRIS of GREENWICH moved Amendment No. 19:
Page 7, line 8, at end insert—
(""enactment" includes an enactment of the Parliament of Northern Ireland, a Measure of the Northern Ireland Assembly, and an Order in Council under the Northern Ireland (Temporary Provisions) Act 1972 or the Northern Ireland Act 1974.")
The noble Lord said: I beg to move. This is a drafting Amendment.
On Question, Amendment agreed to.
Clause 8, as amended, agreed to.
Clause 9 agreed to.
Schedule 1 [List of offences]:
Lord HARRIS of GREENWICH Lord HARRIS of GREENWICH moved Amendments No. 20 and 21:
Page 8, line 8, leave out ("or abduction") and insert (", abduction or plagium")
line 10, at end insert ("or causing injury").
The noble Lord said: Perhaps I might move Amendments 20 and 21 together. These are drafting Amendments, and I beg to move.
On Question, Amendments agreed to.
On Question, Whether Schedule 1, as amended, shall stand part of the Bill?
Lord BELSTEAD: Paragraph 20 says:
"An offence of attempting to commit any offence mentioned in the preceding paragraphs of this Schedule".
Does that cover all conspiring to attempt? I am afraid I have not given the noble Lord notice of this question and he may prefer to let me have the information by letter. Article 1 says:
"an attempt to commit any of the foregoing offences or participation as an accomplice".
If the noble Lord were to say to me that "conspiring to commit" goes further than participation "as an accomplice", then I will accept what he says. In that case the words that I am suggesting should be added are not necessary. On the other hand, I was slightly perplexed when I glanced at the Criminal Jurisdiction Act 1975, which relates in its substantive clauses to Northern Ireland. There I noticed that Section 6(2)(b) refers to:
"attempting or conspiring to commit a substantive offence".
I am not aware that the law as it relates to Northern Ireland with regard to attempting to commit offences is any different from the law with regard to attempting to commit offences in England and Scotland. Therefore, I would ask, should paragraph 20 include the words:
"or conspiring to commit any offence"?
Lord HARRIS of GREENWICH: I shall gladly look into this point.
Schedule 1, as amended, agreed to.
Remaining Schedule agreed to.
House resumed: Bill reported with the Amendments.

SHIPBUILDING (REDUNDANCY PAYMENTS) BILL
5.31 p.m.
The SOLICITOR-GENERAL for SCOTLAND (Lord McCluskey): My Lords, I beg to move that the Bill now be read a second time. The Government announced a year ago their intention to bring forward to Parliament proposals for special redundancy payments schemes, in order to assist British Shipbuilders and Harland and Wolff to alleviate the human

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problems resulting from contraction of the shipbuilding industry brought about by the great slump in world demand for ships.
This Bill now before the House is the means through which my right honourable friend the Secretary of State can achieve that objective. It is an enabling measure, which empowers the Secretary of State to make schemes for providing financial assistance to employees of British Shipbuilders and Harland and Wolff, or their subsidiaries, who become unemployed, or take less well-paid work; either because a company closes or reduces its activities or reduces the numbers employed. It is my firm hope that this Bill will have as speedy a passage through this House as it had through another place. It is a humanitarian measure. It is designed to cope with the consequences of a unique, worldwide situation which is affecting shipbuilders in every part of the world in the same way. Shipyards everywhere are faced with falling production because of the huge drop in demand. This is not simply a trough in a normally cyclical demand cycle; it is a massive change, and a structural change, in the whole of world supply and demand.
I spoke just now of the speedy passage this Bill had in another place. This, I think, reflects the support this Bill has on all sides and the urgency with which it is needed. It is not a welcome Bill, but it is a necessary Bill; and I trust this House will deal with it in the same spirit and with the same despatch as in another place.
Before I go on to deal with the content of the Bill, I should like to say a little about why there is this urgency, and what has led the Government to take this step. In 1973, orders for new ships placed throughout the world amounted to over 70 million gross registered tons. World production capacity was about half that. In 1974, the net figure for orders fell to 24 million tons. When I say, "net figures", I am talking about the total tonnage ordered less cancellations in the same period. In 1975, a great flood of cancellations of tanker orders meant that instead of a net addition to the world order book, there was a net loss of nearly 19 million gross registered tons. Even ignoring cancellations, the new orders placed in 1975 and 1976
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have been no more than about 13 million gross registered tons, and in 1977, they look more likely to be nearer 11 million tons. This, my Lords, to serve a world industry with a capacity of well over 35 million tons.
A direct comparison of these tonnage figures may exaggerate the extent of the employment crisis, because the lost orders are nearly all tanker orders; and tankers do not need as many men to build, for each gross ton, as other kinds of ships. But in real terms, it still represents a loss of output amounting to about 40 per cent. in employment terms; and by any standards this is a grave blow to world shipbuilding. Moreover, all those in a position to make an informed judgment are agreed that the level of demand is unlikely to begin to rise significantly until the early 1980s; and then only relatively slowly. This is not therefore a short-term crisis; it is a situation which is likely to be with us for some years.
It is a sad fact that people must sometimes pay for the foolishness of others. Employment in shipbuilding has been declining steadily in this country, for very many years. In other countries, notably Japan, it has expanded grossly over the same period—indeed, out of all proportion to the likely growth of demand. We, and our European partners, warned the world, and the Japanese in particular, that serious over-capacity would result if the rapid and unjustified expansion of world shipbuilding capacity were to continue. There was the oil crisis but, even without it, there would have been serious over-capacity today.
So it is distressing for us to have to face the consequences of a situation as serious as this when we have had no hand in its making. And it is for that reason that this Government are determined to do their utmost to keep contraction of the shipbuilding industry here to a minimum. But shipbuilding is an international market, and neither this nor any other country can isolate itself from the effects of a world slump of this magnitude. Some redundancies are inevitable. That has to be faced. People inevitably ask, "How many?" But it is not possible to make a forecast with an acceptable degree of accuracy. Many different factors will affect the numbers. Thus, while world demand will never reach the peaks of 1973, so far as can be foreseen, there could

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well be some modest increase by 1981. And this, I should add, is the time limit for the duration of the schemes we propose under the Bill. On the other hand, there could conceivably be no increase in demand at all. In any event, precisely how much of the reduced world market can be won by British Shipbuilders and Harland and Wolff in the future remains to be seen.
I said a moment ago that the Government intended to do their best to keep contraction to the minimum. Their actions in this regard will obviously have an effect on the costs of the proposed redundancy schemes. So it is right for me to refer to what is clearly a most material step; namely, the introduction by the Government last year of the Shipbuilding Intervention Fund.
For the fact of the matter is that there is now a wild scramble for orders throughout the world, which has led to fierce, and sometimes even unfair, price and credit competition. And without assistance of the kind provided by the Intervention Fund, orders would well be impossible to achieve. This situation was not of our making. For two years, we and our European partners have urged the Japanese Government in our discussions in the OECD to take some action to stern the disproportionate flow of orders to Japanese yards, whose capacity is still so large that it could not be satisfied even if they won every order placed throughout the world. At a time when Japanese yards were capturing, each month, up to 80 per cent. of the orders won by the OECD shipbuilding nations—as compared with half during more normal times—the Government could not stand by and see our own shipyards starved of orders. We pressed, unsuccessfully, for a Community policy which would enable this country, and our European partners, to secure at least their fair share of the world market, but there has been no agreement so far—only proposals from the Commission for massive cutbacks in employment, with which we do not agree.
We were, therefore, forced to introduce our own proposals, and this is why the Intervention Fund was introduced. It received the backing of the Commisson and our Community partners, and was
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agreed to conform to OECD rules. It helped to complement the modest price increase imposed by the Japanese Government on its own industry, after many months of pressure from ourselves and our partners. It is a fair scheme and it is successful.
Last year, with its help, British Shipbuilders won orders amounting to 540,000 compensated gross registered tons, worth nearly £400 million. This is a substantial achievement, especially given the higher labour content of these orders as compared with previous production, which included many tankers. The total for the country as a whole is over 730,000 compensated gross registered toils. It is a performance which, in relation to output in recent years, is better than that of our major competitors, including Japan, who appear to have secured little more than half a year's full output last year.
But even the Intervention Fund is not enough, by itself, to win orders in today's market. It is not enough simply to be able to match prices; one must be able to offer reliable, prompt delivery, a good specification and a sound ship; and the success of our shipbuilding industry this year is not merely a reflection of the value and effectiveness of the Intervention Fund. It is also a tribute to the agressive and co-ordinated marketing of British Shipbuilders, which has been made possible by nationalisation.
It is also right for me to commend the loyalty and good sense of many British shipowners, who placed a very large proportion of their orders in United Kingdom yards last year. I hope very much that they will be able to continue and perhaps improve on that record this year; I am sure that most of them accept that it is as much in their interests as anyone else's that there should continue to be a sound, viable United Kingdom shipbuilding industry.
In spite of these successes, we must not lose sight of stark realities, for our achievements last year in winning new orders for this country did not provide a full year's work for the industry. Indeed, the figures I have given—especially about the performance of Japan—serve to illustrate that it is impossible, even by quoting the lowest prices, to secure enough work to maintain full output from existing

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capacity. The plain fact is that shipbuilding industries all over the world are facing the inevitability of contraction; and we must do likewise.
May I now turn to the Bill itself. The first clause, after describing the circumstances under which financial assistance to employees of British Shipbuilders, Harland and Wolff and their subsidiaries, is to become payable, enables the Secretary of State to make schemes for this purpose. The reason for proceeding in this way will, I hope, be fairly clear. Schemes of this kind are inevitably lengthy and complex—as anyone who has studied the scheme for the iron and steel industry will be aware. This scheme could prove to be even more complex, because of the greater variety of individual circumstances that it may have to deal with. One is aware of the dislike of the continuing growth of subordinate legislation, but I suggest that in the circumstances that prevail here the making of schemes in this way is entirely appropriate. And your Lordships will observe that we have provided in Clause 2 for the schemes to be approved by Parliament by the Affirmative Resolution procedure, so that each House will have full opportunity to discuss and comment on the schemes.
I should also mention at this point that the schemes will simply set out the many and varied conditions attaching to eligibility for, and level of, benefit. They will not lay down any policy for British Shipbuilders or Harland and Wolff to follow in implementing the schemes. Nor will they propose any "targets" for the number of redundancies—I have already explained how inappropriate any such exercise would be. This is not a Bill for redundancy; it is a Bill for redundancy payments. Implementation is, in fact, a matter for British Shipbuilders and Harland and Wolff, in consultation with the trade unions, and we have therefore tried in this Bill to provide for the maximum flexibility in order to meet all possible circumstances.
For example, it may be that, in the light of the uncertain future of the world shipbuilding market, some workpeople—perhaps those nearing retirement age—would feel it preferable to leave at a time of their own choosing, if given a suitable cash inducement to do so, rather than risk being forced to leave if no work can be secured. There may be others
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who would like to take up employment in another industry, in another part of the country, but who would need the special help to move their households which a scheme might provide. If, therefore, a need arose to reduce the numbers employed in a particular company, the intention would be to effect redundancies by calling for volunteers in the first instance. For this reason, the Bill does not limit payment under a scheme to those affected by a closure—a scheme can also cover those left without work by the contraction of a particular yard; or allow payments to those who are transferred to less well-paid work as an alternative to losing their jobs altogether.
Flexibility must, however, have its limits, and one such limit, imposed by Clause 2, is that the schemes will operate only for a limited time; two years in the first instance, which may be extended to four years by means of an order by the Secretary of State, subject again to an Affirmative Resolution of both Houses. There is a very good reason for this limitation. As I said earlier, the Bill seeks to deal with a special situation, which has arisen as a result of a sudden once-for-all structural change in the world balance of supply and demand for oceangoing merchant ships. But we expect that the large disparity between supply and demand which now exists will greatly diminish within the relatively short time-scale envisaged by the Bill, simply because shipyards throughout the world which have no ships, or fewer ships, to build will be forced to cut back or close, thus bringing supply into line with demand. The purpose of the Bill is to alleviate the social effects of that part of this relatively rapid worldwide process, which this country is unable to avoid. It is not to put shipyard workers in a privileged position in the ups and downs that are part of ordinary commercial and industrial life.
Before I leave the subject of timing, I draw your Lordships' attention to the fact that under Clause2 the prescribed date in relation to a scheme may be earlier than the date of the order making the scheme, or indeed, earlier than the date on which the Bill becomes—as we hope it will—an Act. This does not, of course, mean that any payments can be made before the necessary statutory authority is given.

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The purpose is simply to allow payments to be made retrospectively to those who have already been affected by the slump. Retrospection is itself not unlimited. In the case of the scheme for Great Britain, the Bill provides that the date prescribed by order cannot be earlier than 1st July 1977, the shipbuilding industry vesting date for the purposes of the Aircraft and Shipbuilding Industry Act 1977. It is our intention that the same date should apply to a scheme for Northern Ireland.
Clause 3 contains the financial provisions. I can, perhaps, say just one word about that. It provides for the Secretary of State to reimburse British Shipbuilders in respect of payments and expenses—all out of money provided by Parliament. It also provides for the Department of Manpower Services to do the same for Harland and Wolff, but in this case the money would come from the Northern Ireland Consolidated Fund.
There is very little more to be said about the contents of the Bill at this stage. But your Lordships will expect me to say something about the schemes, and about their likely costs. There will be two schemes, one each for Great Britain and for Northern Ireland, but we intend that the detailed provisions of each shall be, to all intents and purposes, identical. Some of your Lordships may have seen the outline of what is proposed for the schemes, which was recently announced elsewhere—in fact, in the Hansard of another place, in the Written Answers at column 475 of 7th February 1978—but it may be convenient if I summarise the main points here very briefly.
First, it is proposed that there should be redundancy payments for workers aged between 40 and 65, with a minimum of one year's qualifying service, the payments being graduated according to age, length of service, and earnings before redundancy. The payments will comprise three parts; a flat rate lump sum determined according to age, up to a maximum of £750; a lump sum related to earnings and increasing by an even progression, according to completed years of total continuous service; and, thirdly, income support payments calculated on the same basis and payable over a maximum of two years. A ceiling is proposed for the aggregate total payment under this
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scheme and under the Redundancy Payments Act 1965, equivalent to two years' previous normal earnings of the individual concerned. This would have the effect of limiting the maximum payment under the scheme in lump sum and weekly payments, to £7,400. There would also be some tapering of payments to those nearing normal retirement age, to ensure that no one would receive more on redundancy than he would have earned by remaining at work.
The minimum payment will be £300 for those with at least one year's service, and this will also apply to those of 40 or under who do not qualify for the age and length of service payments. Other important proposals include provision for some income support during re-training; and for mobility payments in certain circumstances. I must emphasise that a good deal of detailed work remains to be done to produce a detailed scheme suitable for incorporating in a Statutory Instrument, and some further consultation with the industry will be necessary on a number of points. It has taken a long time to reach even this point, but the time spent has been worthwhile, since the outcome has been an outline scheme which has many advantages over existing special schemes in other industries. Moreover, the painstaking effort and goodwill which have gone into it reflect great credit on those in the Confederation of Shipbuilding and Engineering Unions, British Shipbuilders and Harland and Wolff who undertook this task.
Before I turn to the overall cost of the schemes, I want to reply to those who have suggested outside this House, both generally and with particular reference to recent events at Swan Hunter—and I put the suggestion in its simplest and most direct form—that "redundancy payments should not be made to those who lose their jobs as a result of their own industrial action." I believe that proposition in this context to be quite misconceived. To attempt to put such a principle into effect would be unjust and quite impractical.
The Swan Hunter case is a perfect illustration of why this should be so. The workers who have recently received notices of redundancy are boilermakers—that is, steelworkers engaged largely in the earlier processes of building a ship. It is true, however, that although the underlying dispute was one of very long standing

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the particular sequence of events which led to Swan Hunters losing a share in the Polish order began with industrial action taken by outfitting workers—that is, those engaged in later processes. In such circumstances, can it fairly be argued that these redundancies were caused by those workers on whom they have now fallen? I say this not to attempt to apportion blame in this particular case but to illustrate that it is unduly simple to suppose that some sort of justice can be done by attempting to make a crude link between redundancies and industrial action.
I hope that I may be allowed briefly to develop these points. All experience suggests that it is impossible to apportion blame beyond argument in industrial disputes. Can it ever be said of any dispute that blame lies entirely with one party? How can one justify singling out for further penalty one particular group of workers, and still more one individual worker, who happens to become redundant in circumstances which have included industrial action? The loss of the job itself is surely enough of a personal disaster. And how can justice be served in denying payment to a redundant worker when his colleagues—perhaps just as much involved as he is in industrial action—keep their jobs? How, also, could one allow for the case of a worker who was absent for some reason—sickness perhaps—while industrial action was taking place, industrial action in which he had no active part? More difficult still, how could one distinguish an individual who had dissented from a group decision to take industrial action but had felt obliged to accept a majority view?
Industrial practices and relations are far too complex a field to permit such a punitive system as has been suggested to be applied with any equity. If in a measure such as this we sought to impose on unemployed workers—and, I may add, their families—harsh financial penalties just because one of the last and immediate causes of their misfortune was a deep and intractable industrial dispute which may have had its origins before they entered the industry and in which they may have played little or no part, then I believe we should do immense damage to industrial relations, not just in the shipbuilding industry, not just in the North-East, but throughout the entire United Kingdom. In simple terms, the suggestion is, in my
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view, neither practical nor fair. I ask noble Lords to bear that in mind before they think of supporting the unsophisticated slogans with which some commentators have sought to attack the men made redundant.
The object of this Bill is to cope with one of the consequences of worldwide contraction of the industry. It is not an exercise in industrial relations policy. Of course, irresponsible action by any part of the workforce is to be discouraged, whatever the circumstances, let alone in the present particularly difficult situation. But that is not a job for this Bill. I acknowledge, of course, that it may well be that industrial action could precipitate part of the inevitable contraction of the industry as a whole in one yard rather than another. That in itself may, one hopes, be a sufficient deterrent to irresponsibility.
Regarding payments, some commentators have sought to link events at Swan Hunter with the levels of benefit proposed, putting the emphasis on the maximum figure of £10,400, of which £7,400 would be payable under the scheme and £3,000 under the Redundancy Payments Act 1965. With respect to all those commentators, I should like to point out that the sort of employee to whom this level of benefit will be payable will be the man of 55 who is earning over £100 a week and who has been with one company for his entire working life. That does not seem to me to be an excessive payment for such a man on being left without work in an area where unemployment is already a very difficult problem. As must be perfectly obvious and as the Explanatory and Financial Memorandum to the Bill seeks to make clear, the payment to the average worker would be far less and there would be no one under the age of 41 who would receive more than £300. There will be many who will not regard those as particularly generous payments in all the circumstances. So I hope your Lordships will agree that the Government cannot be charged with reckless extravagance in what they are proposing.
I come to the last matter, the cost of the schemes. I have already mentioned that the overriding factor will be the number of those benefiting: but since our aim is to keep contraction to the minimum, it follows that we shall keep the costs of the scheme to the minimum. It might be

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helpful, however, if I were to point out that, even if one assumes a fixed number of redundancies and a certain level of average pay, there are still many other variables which can affect the cost.
For example, payments increase with increasing age and length of service, so that if the take-up is weighted in favour of the higher age groups, as might happen if there were a call for volunteers in order to reduce capacity in a particular yard, then the average payment would obviously be higher. If, on the other hand, a yard were to close, the age and length of service profile of those receiving benefit might well reflect that of the industry as a whole, and the average cost would consequently be lower. We have thought it right to give, as an illustrative example, the effect of an age and length of service profile matching that of the industry as a whole. That produces an average payment of £1,500 per head at an average pay of £65 per week. The eventual average could be higher, simply because more long-serving or higher-paid employees qualify for benefit; but it is the overall cost that is important, and as I have already said, this must depend almost wholly on the number of employees who benefit from the scheme.
I hope I have given your Lordships sufficient explanation of the background to this Bill and of its purpose and intentions. The principle of the Bill is not controversial; the Bill has been welcomed, albeit with much sadness, on all sides. It is a social measure, and it is an urgent social measure. It is designed to mitigate the consequences of a unique problem faced by shipbuilding workers throughout the world, and I therefore ask your Lordships to give it a speedy passage. I commend the Bill to your Lordships. I beg to move.
Moved, That the Bill he now read 2a.—(Lord McCluskey.)
5.58 p.m.
Lord CAMPBELL of CROY: My Lords, we thank the noble and learned Lord, Lord McCluskey, for his explanation of the Bill and also for his attempt to give an indication of the Government's thinking about the kind of schemes which are likely to arise under it. A Bill for this purpose is now necessary. It is a
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matter for great regret, I am sure, in all parts of the House that we in the United Kingdom must prepare for redundancies in this industry.
As the noble and learned Lord has said, this is an enabling Bill allowing for special schemes devised for redundancies to come forward in orders presented to Parliament by the Government of the day. These schemes are additional to the statutory redundancy scheme which applies to industry as a whole. Because of the world-wide crisis in shipbuilding I doubt whether there will be any serious complaints from other industries, provided that the schemes are fair and equitable. There have been precedents. I give the example of the scheme some years ago for the textile industry when it became clear that industry would have to contract and rationalise.
Nor should there be objections from other countries to sound and just schemes to ameliorate redundancies in the ship-building industry. Other countries with shipbuilding industries are also having to take action. Britain was not responsible for the oil crisis in 1973 and the subsequent collapse of the tanker market and the market for large ships; nor has Britain contributed to the over-capacity which now exists in the shipbuilding yards of the world. We have not expanded in Britain as other countries have—for example, Japan. So I would say to my noble friends that we should support the principle of providing the Government with powers to lay such schemes before Parliament.
It is the nature of the schemes themselves which is still very vague. Some of what is known is, I must say, ill-considered and objectionable. Our aim from this Bench is to help the Government to put on to the Statute Book a measure adopting the principle, to which we agree, but we will wish to examine carefully the way in which the Government are setting about this business. In the course of this speech I must be critical of some of what has so far emerged, though I start by exempting all the noble Lords now sitting on the Front Bench opposite, who are not themselves in the Department and have not been involved. I hope they will use their undoubted influence with their colleagues to secure improvements in the Bill.

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Throughout the story so far the Government have been left behind events. This enabling Bill should, in my opinion, have appeared last summer. Even now, late in the day, the Government are unable to give anything but a sketchy outline of the schemes they have in mind. The noble and learned Lord referred to the first outline that was produced, and of course it came a day too late. It appeared as an Answer to a Written Question in Hansard in another place the day after the Bill had left the other place. I can inform the noble and learned Lord of this. At eleven o'clock that night, when the Third Reading was taking place, the Minister had to hand out photostat copies, some of which had pages missing to anybody who was there. That was the first chance they had of considering the outline scheme, on the day the Bill was leaving them. Of course, it appeared in Hansard on the following day, and so we in your Lordships' House have had the benefit of a few days of study of that scheme—and it is only an outline.
Then, on that last day, as a result of that outline scheme the finances were completely changed, the quantities of money were changed. Indeed, the Financial Memorandum in the Bill which we have before us now is different from the one which was in the Bill in the Commons, because as it left the Commons they had to take account of that Written Answer and write a new figure into the Financial Memorandum we have before us; that is, that the scheme is estimated as costing £1·5 million per one thousand men, whereas three months ago in another place it was down as £0·9 million. So in three months the figure has been upped by two-fifths. I give that as an illustration, because it is disquieting that the Government seemed to have so little idea of what these schemes were to cost.
One reason the Government have given for this vagueness, and then changes in the estimates, is that discussions have been going on with the unions. But they have been going on for a year. One of the Ministers, Mr. Les Huckfield, said during the debates that the discussions had started in February 1977. They have, of course, been taking place with the Confederation of Shipbuilding and Engineering Unions. I understand—this is the information from the debates in another place—that that
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confederation of unions will contemplate only voluntary redundancies. So the first question I put to the Government is this, and I hope there will be an answer today: has there been any progress with those talks with the confederation since 7th February? The second question is: if there has been no progress to speak of, what is the Government's attitude on this? Today I was glad to hear the noble and learned Lord indicate that voluntary schemes were only a part of what the Government had in mind. But if the confederation are still not thinking beyond voluntary schemes, after a year's discussion, there is still a lot of ground to be covered.
Of course, voluntary redundancies are satisfactory in some ways. It means there is little argument about who is to leave. But they do have disadvantages. It does lead to unpredictability concerning numbers and also the areas in which people are to become redundant and leave. That means that it is difficult, if not impossible, for British Shipbuilders to work out manpower strategy. It could also lead to losses in vital skills and in certain age groups, while leaving those in the industry who are unskilled or may be in age groups for which there is not enough work.
Hitherto, the Government have said very little about this question of where the redundancies were going to fall, or indeed about redundancies at all. During the passage of the Aircraft and Shipbuilding Industries Bill, in which I took a certain part, whenever the question of redundancy came up the Government were very silent: they said they were leaving the organisation of the nationalised part of the industry to the new nationalised corporation; namely, British Shipbuilders. That is why, accordingly, we have been waiting for the first report of British Shipbuilders. Under Section 5 of the Act that was due to reach the Secretary of State by the end of last year. It was not issued by him until last week. It was published in the latter half of last week. It has not been printed, but I have managed to obtain a copy. Of course I was looking to see whether the new nationalised corporation had in their first report said anything about redundancies; I can tell your Lordships' House that the answer is that they have said virtually nothing.

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It is, of course, a very difficult problem. They speak about "manpower development"; that is the only reference to it. They say that any arrangements or proposals for this are to appear in their first corporate plan, and that they do not expect to produce that corporate plan until the end of 1978; that is almost another year. So there is no light to be shed there about where these redundancies are likely to fall or how they are to be treated. So I ask the Government: have they any idea yet how and where the enabling powers which they seek in this Bill are to be used?
The only publicised case we know of so far is Swan Hunter, where over 1,100 redundancies have been announced. If the Government are in a hurry to get this Bill through, as we understand they are, is it for that case that they need it? I heard the noble and learned Lord pointing out the difficulties concerning allocating the blame for an inter-union dispute, and I do sympathise with that. But some of us have grave doubts whether taxpayers' money should be used for special additional redundancy schemes, over and above the statutory schemes, for men who have put themselves out of work by inter-union disputes. If blame can clearly be allocated—and I realise there may well be great difficulties—I do think there are great doubts about whether these schemes should apply in those cases. Is that the only shipbuilding redundancy situation in prospect at present for treatment under this Bill?
Then we come to the whole question of eligibility and qualifying for particular sums. This needs clarification. Of course, the details will come later in the particular orders in relation to schemes put before Parliament. But those orders cannot be amended; at that stage they can only be approved or thrown out by the House. So some of the points which the Government should deal with while the Bill is still before Parliament are these, and we shall raise them at later stages. First, are there any restrictions on men returning to the industry if employment picks up, perhaps unexpectedly well as some of up hope it will, in five or 10 years' time. There is something about this in the outline scheme in the Hansard of another place of 7th February, but it is
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not clear. Then there is the question of casual workers. Will casual workers in the industry be eligible for payments? This is something which I know the confederation of unions has been talking about.
Will the workers in subsidiaries which are in no way connected with shipbuilding be eligible? There are subsidiaries of British Shipbuilders which, as a result of historical accidents, are trading companies or are concerned with such matters as housebuilding, motorcycles and concrete. As the Bill stands, workers made redundant in those subsidiary companies appear to be eligible. According to my count no fewer than 61 of the 140 subsidiaries are companies of that kind not connected with shipbuilding.
Next we come to the approximate cost of the scheme. The Government have so far given no indication whether they expect 200 redundancies or 20,000. There has been absolutely no indication and therefore, I believe that both Houses must recognise that, to a great extent, the Bill is a blank cheque. I think that on those points the House would be glad of more information. Indeed, it ought to have more information before the Bill leaves us.
I turn to the serious defect in the Bill, which does not need clarification as it is unfortunately, all too clear and I ask the Government to look at it again. The Bill does not apply to all shipbuilding firms: it applies only to those which are, under British Shipbuilders and Harland and Wolff. When the Government produced their nationalisation Bill three years ago, they did not aim to take over all the shipbuilding companies. Rather like nationalising the steel industry, they deliberately left a private sector. As a result, there are a number of independent shipbuilding firms which the Government never set out to nationalise and which were not covered by the Aircraft and Shipbuilding Industries Bill which is now an Act. They are as hard hit by the present recession as any of the other shipbuilding companies. Indeed, the Government have already recognised that, because the assistance under the Intervention Fund, to which the noble and learned Lord, Lord McCluskey, referred, does not exclude them. It extends to the independent shipbuilding companies—why on earth have they been omitted from the Bill?

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I should point out that somewhere between 5 and 10 per cent. of employees in the British shipbuilding industry are working in these independent companies. They are smaller companies; they are not the largest companies, but they are just the kind of small businesses of whom the Government, in an excess of pre-Election zeal have declared themselves to be the special new found protectors. The Prime Minister himself has announced this and, I understand, has appointed his right honourable friend Mr. Harold Lever as their champion. If there is no reasonable response to this point, I hope this evening, I shall be in touch immediately with both of those right honourable gentlemen.
The independent shipbuilding companies' employees are members of the same unions as the employees in the nationalised sector. If the unions are still only willing to talk of voluntary redundancies, then I recognise that there is no need for them to have considered this matter yet. However, if and when it becomes necessary, and probably compulsory, to have schemes for redundancy, then the unions are most unlikely to ignore complaints from their members who are being discriminated against because they happen to be in the independent companies. It is no fault of theirs and it is no fault of the companies for whom they work. It was the Government of the day who decided not to select those companies for nationalisation and left them independent.
Therefore, I ask the noble and learned Lord whether he will tell us the latest position as regards the Confederation of Shipbuilding and Engineering Unions. Has he consulted them about this matter? Are they thinking in terms of redundancies for the whole industry or only for the nationalised part of the industry? I should be very surprised if they are not concerned with the interests of all their members, for whatever shipbuilding companies they work.
The reasons offered by the Government so far have been pathetic. Again, I exclude the noble Lords opposite who have not been involved. However, in another place the excuse has been given that these companies build only small ships. Apparently they have not noticed that other countries are now building small
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ships, including countries like Japan. Japan has recently concluded an order with Germany for building small ships. Shipbuilders in the present world crisis are having to build the kinds of ships which they hope they can sell, whether they be small, large or whatever, in face of the fierce competition which the noble and learned Lord mentioned. The smaller independent companies, if they have to spend their working capital on additional redundancy schemes in order to be fair, will of course suffer and be at a disadvantage compared with their rivals. Alternatively, they may simply not be able to provide the extra money for the additional redundancy scheme. That would be inequitable and inexcusable under this Bill.
Another reason that has been given is that it is difficult to draw the line and that if one goes beyond the nationalised part of the industry one would be getting down to the builders of small fishing boats, rowing boats—indeed the Skylark. A ship can be defined and it has been defined in previous legislation. Ships have to be registered and the companies that build them can be identified without too much difficulty.
I should like to illustrate the gross anomalies which can arise on this part of the Bill. If a man working in house-building or concrete production somewhere in the centre of England, who may never have seen the sea or a ship in his life and who has never been employed on any work connected with a ship, is made redundant, he appears to be eligible, if he is working for one of the subsidiary companies covered by the Bill. Another man who has worked all his life in shipbuilding will not, as it stands, be eligible, because his company was not selected three years ago by this Government for nationalisation and it is now in the independent sector. That is monstrously unjust and it is penalising the smaller businesses and their employees.
Therefore, I ask the Government to think again about this matter and I offer our help to correct it. There can be no difficulty about delay. I assure noble Lords that from this Bench we shall agree to the Committee stage which is, at present, well over two weeks ahead—indeed, the Committee stage and the Report stage can be brought forward if necessary if

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there is any question of an Amendment putting this matter right being thought to cause delay. It need not cause delay. As regards an Amendment going to another place, it can be taken there on the same day as it leaves us. I am sure that an Amendment of this kind would receive general agreement and would not meet with any opposition in either House. As regards the question of privilege, of course it would be amending the Bill in a financial scheme; it is not a question of this House suggesting that more money should be spent, but simply a question of how it is shared out. Of course, there is no difficulty about another place waiving its privilege in order to accept such an Amendment if it is generally agreed. Therefore, we shall help the Government as much as we can to put right what is a glaring anomaly.
To sum up: we support the principle of the Bill. Flow it is to be applied, however, is still vague and the Government have been unable to make proposals or assess the cost, and they have given no indication of the numbers involved. I conclude with one interesting observation. Although the Government have made no attempt to estimate the numbers who are likely to be redundant, they have, in the manpower memorandum, said that 30 to 40 extra staff would be required for the National Coal Board computer agency work arising from the schemes. It seems very strange that it is possible to make an estimate of as many as 30 or 40, which is a very large number considering the amount of computer work that would be involved. Is that really correct or is that a mistake? The schemes may be complicated, but they certainly should not require permanent extra staff of that order for the computer belonging to the National Coal Board.
6.20 p.m.
Viscount SIMON: My Lords, from these Benches I should like to assure the noble and learned Lord, Lord McCluskey, that he will have the support he asks for in getting this Bill through as quickly as possible. That does not mean that we also, like the noble Lord, Lord Campbell of Croy, do not see some difficulties in it. I should like to call attention to some of those difficulties and to ask some questions.
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The first question that has worried me ever since I started trying to understand this proposition is: What are the considerations which persuaded the Government that very much higher sums should be paid to people who are made redundant in the shipbuilding industry compared to those who are made redundant in any other industry? Of course, I recognise—as we all do—with the greatest of regret, that the probability is that there will be a large number of people in this industry who will become redundant. But it is not obvious to me—and it does not seem to follow naturally—that because a large number of people are being made redundant, their individual needs should be very much greater than those of people being made redundant elsewhere. I, personally, have not managed to find any explanation for that.
I should like to make it clear that we do not disagree with the sort of figures suggested in the preliminary outline of the scheme. My question is simply this: If those figures are right for shipyard workers, why are they or something like them not right for workers in other industries? In the course of the debate on Second Reading in another place the Minister in charge of the Bill said:
"The purpose of the Bill is … not to put shipyard workers in a privileged position".—[Official Report, Commons, 16/1/78; col. 176.]
But surely, rightly or wrongly, that is exactly w hat the Bill does. When the noble and learned Lord winds up this debate perhaps he could give us some more information on the Government's thinking about this matter and tell us the criteria which were applied and which persuaded the Government to single out shipbuilding as an industry which ought to have higher payments for redundancy. Perhaps he could tell us whether they agree that workers in other industries face just the same difficulties if they are made redundant and will need the same measure of support.
I know that the noble and learned Lord referred to the special situation which has arisen as a result of a sudden, once-for-all structural change in the balance of supply and demand, and this, again, was referred to in another place. But to my mind that does not meet the point why, because the number of people involved is greater, one has to consider much larger sums per individual to be disbursed. I wonder

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whether the noble and learned Lord is right to describe it as "sudden" when, as he himself said, we were warning the world in 1972 that this situation would arise. As regards "once-for-all", that is a very bold statement to make about any development in industry. However, that is by the way. My point still is that I do not understand why, because more people are involved, they should necessarily expect or deserve more compensation for redundancy than others.
That brings me naturally to the point which has already been touched upon by the noble Lord, Lord Campbell of Croy, about the employees of shipbuilders in the private sector. I am sure that the noble and learned Lord cannot dispute the fact that, if they are made redundant, their needs would be just the same as those of employees in the public sector. The Government's resistance in another place was, as the noble Lord, Lord Campbell of Croy, said, really very thin. There is a difficulty about definition, but with goodwill I am sure that that difficulty can be overcome.
As to causing delay, I believe that in another place the Minister suggested that he would have to go hunting all round the country for those who would be eligible to come into the scheme. Would it not be perfectly satisfactory to legislate for any private employer who satisfies the definition himself to make an agreement with his employees identical to the agreement made between British Shipbuilders and the unions? He could then say to the Government, "I have an identical agreement and this is where you ought to make the same contribution to my payments as you do to the payments of British Shipbuilders".
I was going to say a few words about what have been called self-inflicted wounds, but much has been said already and I would simply say that I agree with what the noble and learned Lord said about this. I do not believe that it is a practicable or a fair proposition that people should be penalised because of industrial trouble with which they may or may not have had anything to do.
As has already been said, the nub of this problem will be in the schemes that are produced, and those we can discuss later when they are brought before us in
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the form of a draft order. However, as has already been said, this is a very unsatisfactory way in which to discuss matters of this kind, and I should like to make three points about the draft schemes in the hope that they may influence the thoughts of those who are negotiating. In the first place, I suggest that it is very important that the Government should be active parties to the negotiation. Of course, I agree that the details have to be worked out between British Shipbuilders and Harland and Wolff on the one side and the unions on the other. However, I think noble Lords will agree that if two parties are negotiating in effect to agree on sums of money that will be paid by a third party, the negotiation may not be very realistic unless the third party is closely involved in it.
In this context I wonder whether—and it is probably too late—consideration could not be given to the help offered by the Government being offered in the form of a loan to British Shipbuilders and to Harland and Wolff, to be repaid over, perhaps, a long period out of the profits which we all hope they will make in due course. It may be that noble Lords will think that this is putting an impossible millstone around the neck of the nationalised shipbuilding companies. I should have thought that it was not necessary to suggest that the loan must be repaid at any given time. I should not even mind if it was a loan free of interest. What I think is important is that when British Shipbuilders and Harland and Wolff produce their accounts from time to time, the fact that they borrowed this amount of money from the Government should be shown on the face of their accounts. If it is not done in that way, I can quite understand that once these companies are—as we hope they will be—successful, they will produce results which everyone will think very good and people will forget the amount of money given to them under the bill in order to help them in their early stages.
The second point that I want to make is that in the outline scheme presented to us there is a reference—as indeed there is in the Bill—to "prescribed employees". It is said that "prescribed employees" means employees prescribed in the scheme. I hope there is no question but that the prescribed employees must be all the employees, not only the members of the

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unions which are members of the Confederation. I do not think that there are many non-union people in the shipyards, but there are a number of people—particularly managerial staffs and such people—who may not be members of unions within the Confederation. I hope it can be laid down in the Bill that all employees of the companies are eligible for treatment in tile same way.
I was disturbed to hear what the noble Lord, Lord Campbell, was saying about the attitude of the Confederation of Unions on the 'subject of voluntary severance. I hope it may be found that that is unduly pessimistic. It seems to me that the third important thing, is that management must have the last word on who is made redundant. They must of course have the fullest discussions with the unions, but management has the responsibility to ensure that the reduced labour force is adequately balanced both in age and in skills.
In this connection I was going to refer—but I think that perhaps the noble and learned Lord has helped me out of this—to the average of £1,500 per man, which seemed to me very low and suggested to my mind that possibly the old and well established rule of "last in, first out" was having an undue influence on the thinking of people. It seems to me a very low figure, and the result of it might well be to leave an ageing labour force. I think that the noble and learned Lord referred to this. He said that it was based on the industry profile by age, and perhaps therefore my criticism is not sound.
Finally on the scheme, it is essential to stiffen up the reference to retraining and to put more emphasis on it. That is surely absolutely necessary. If it involves, as I think it may, a substantial expansion of facilities for training this should be undertaken. Above all, let all those concerned with the working of the schemes never forget that they are dealing with people, and not numbers or statistics. I should like to think that in each shipyard a special unit could be established to advise and assist individuals in the problems which they individually will have to face. This will be a whole-time task. Perhaps I might suggest that these units could be staffed by employees who might otherwise be added to the list of
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redundancies. The cost need not be large. There are one or two specialist professionals who may be required in the units. If those working in these units are dedicated to helping their fellow workers—and, I repeat, helping them individually and not treating them as though all their worries and problems are the same—how much could be achieved both in alleviating the social effects of that part of the worldwide process which this country is unable to avoid (those are words from the Minister in another place) but also in cementing good industrial relations within the yard!
6.33 p.m.
Lord BOYD-CARPENTERMy Lords, the state of the British shipbuilding industry can give no joy to any noble Lord or anybody outside. It is one of the tragedies of these last 20 or 30 years that an industry which was, at one time, our pride, and which built some of the finest ships in the world from the old "Mauretania" down to the "Queen Elizabeth", should have reached the state it is now in. But I felt that the noble and learned Lord the Minister was a little ingenuous when he first of all suggested that this development was unexpected and, secondly, added, "no fault of ours". If he will allow me to say so without disrespect, the attitude that these developments were unforeseeable and "no fault of ours" is precisely the attitude which has done most damage to British industry right across the map. I was indeed sorry to hear a Minister from that Bench adopting that attitude.
With the greatest respect, he is wrong in fact. I recall in the middle 1950s, 23 years ago, when I was Minister of Transport and, as such, in close touch with the shipyards because we dealt with merchant shipping, going round the yards, and in private pointing out to management and union leaders that the delays in delivery, the hold-ups due to demarcation disputes, all the silly nonsense of who does what, was going to do long-term damage to the industry. I got absolutely no response. They all pointed to their long order books for four or five years ahead, and appeared to disregard the fact that the length of those order books could be more than matched in foreign yards, because the source of it all was the world shortage of shipping following the massive destruction of shipping during the war.

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I think we can do nothing but harm to our own economic recovery if we suggest that this decline is no fault of ours—using "ours" in the broadest sense of all concerned, Governments, employers, workers, the lot. Be that as it may, we have to deal with the situation which has in fact arisen. The noble and learned Lord said that this was a humanitarian measure Maybe it is. But if it be humanitarianism it is humanitarianism with blinkers on. Rather the sort of humanitarianism of the 19th century mill owners—most of them, I am glad to recall, Liberals—who subscribed generously to charities abroad out of the proceeds of oppressing their workers at home.
What can be the justification for the discrimination which this Bill seeks to exercise between worker and worker? During the noble and learned Lord's speech I waited for him to deal with the question which the noble Viscount, Lord Simon, put directly to him as to why, while the great majority of workers in this country made redundant have to be content with payments made under the Redundancy Payments Act 1965, special and additional provision had to be made for redundant shipbuilders. There may be a good reason for this. The noble and learned Lord will recall that he did not tell us so, and, with great respect to him, it is not self-evident.
With a million and a half people unemployed in this country today—a factor which disturbs everyone in this House as much as Her Majesty's Government—an enormous number of people have been made redundant. It is the greater part of that one and a half million, apart from the unhappy school-leavers who never had a job from which to be made redundant. What is the argument for special and particular provision for redundant shipbuilders? If there is such an argument, what is the answer to the question of my noble friend Lord Campbell as to why this higher and better provision should be made only for shipbuilders made redundant from companies owned by British Shipbuilders? What is the justification for discriminating within the shipbuilding industry and, as my noble friend pointed out, giving the benefit of the scheme to people who have never seen a ship or the sea at all?—because, if one looks at the Memorandum
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of the Bill, one sees that all the ordinary capital of a company they are in is held by British Shipbuilders.
This humanitarian measure can depend in an individual case, for the man who has never built a ship in his life, on whether all the ordinary capital of the company in which he works, or only part of the ordinary capital, is held by British Shipbuilders. The ordinary employer in those terms is not necessarily wholly responsible for the capital structure of his employees. This is a series of proposals that calls for explanation. It cannot be presented to this House and the country as a display of the Government's warm and admirable humanitarianism. It is discriminatory and arbitrary and, so far, the arbitrariness has not been explained. This is made all the more difficult by the form of this measure. We are simply presented with an enabling Bill and are told that a scheme will come along. The noble and learned Lord told us, as Ministers for generations have told both Houses of Parliament, "It does not matter; you can pass the enabling Bill because you will have the right to deal with the Statutory Instrument to authorise the schemes when they come along". But as my noble friend pointed out, when the Statutory Instrument to authorise the schemes comes up, all that this House or another place will be able to do will be to say "Yes" or "No"; we are left in the silly position that if, for example, we think the scheme is insufficiently generous we are compelled to reject it and provide, for the time being at any rate, that nothing will be paid. Or, if we think it marginally too generous, we are quite unable to amend it.
It would have been so much better in a matter of this sort if the Government had brought forward a Bill with the schemes—and the noble and learned Lord said that only two were contemplated—scheduled to it, so that either House of Parliament could have scrutinised the details of the schemes and amended them in the ordinary Parliamentary process. Perhaps we are entitled to some explanation as to why that proper Parliamentary procedure was not followed in this case and why we are simply presented with an enabling Bill to authorise the making of schemes.
That method of proceeding makes it necessary at this stage, as both the noble

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Lords who preceded me have done, to ask a number of questions because otherwise we shall not know until we are plunged into the Committee stage what are the difficult matters with which we ought to deal. The first of my questions relate to discrimination. My second question is this: Will the benefits provided under the schemes be taxable in the hands of the recipients or not? We are dealing with potentially substantial sums, rising, as the noble and learned Lord told us, when payments under the Redundancy Payments Act are taken into account, to 10,500, these to be paid over a year or two.
If they are not taxable, it would be a very well-paid man indeed who would not be much better off with the benefit of that sort of pay tax free than by earning a large salary or wage subject to taxation. The House will remember that in private industry, when a comparable situation arises and compensation is paid to a departing officer or director of a company, any payment of over £5,000 is subject to tax and is treated as income of the year. Will that apply in this case? What is the taxation position in respect of payments which are, from a tax point of view, substantial, and which, from the point of view of the value in the hands of the recipients, might well produce a situation which could be extremely anomalous?
I come to what is, I know, the difficult and delicate point which was described well by the noble Viscount, Lord Simon, as that of the self-inflicted wound. I fully take the noble and learned Lord's point about the practical difficulties of discrimination in the Swan Hunter case, but I hope the noble and learned Lord will take it from me that, on the other hand, many people outside find it a little difficult to swallow the idea that they should be taxed at the present levels of taxation to provide, over and above what at any rate the people concerned would have got under the Redundancy Payments Act, additional payments to people who in a very direct sense have been the authors of their own injury.
I hope the noble and learned Lord will not let himself be so blinded by the practical and technical difficulties that he will ignore the very real feeling that an anomaly of this sort can cause. And when he says eloquently that, because
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someone had acted in the course of an industrial dispute, it would be wrong to impose harsh penalties—"harsh penalties" was the phrase he used—does he recall that what he described as harsh penalties are what the Government are meting out to every other person who is redundant in this country, even though they be people who in the overwhelming majority of cases have not contributed in any degree whatsoever to their own redundancy? Thus, "harsh penalties" does not seem to be a phrase that, on reflection, the noble and learned Lord will feel that he can justify.
There are many other questions that I hope will be asked in Committee. I hope that what the two noble Lords who preceded me said and what I have tried to add will indicate to the noble and learned Lord that there are many people who regard this measure, however compassionate the circumstances which have given rise to it, as a very curious series of transactions which require to be very fully explained and justified to a critical and perhaps somewhat cynical public.
6.48 p.m.
Lord LEE of NEWTON: My Lords, the main question, a fair one, that has been asked is: Why shipbuilding? I can only go from my own experience. I am not in the confidence of the Government. I live in an area where there is heavy unemployment among shipbuilders and I had the job for two years of trying to look after the problems of the Northern Region, where the Swan Hunter yards presented quite a headache.
I suggest that the combination of events in shipbuilding—that is, the need for swift modernisation as the only way we could hope to keep any orders at all from abroad, with, at the same time, the terrible decline in orders for shipping—has brought about an agonising situation for the shipbuilding industry, and one which it will probably face for a number of years ahead. The third issue to be taken into account is the fact that most of the large shipbuilding yards are in development areas.
Thus, we have a most unholy trinity. I rather agreed with what the noble Lord, Lord Boyd-Carpenter, was saying, in that we have known of this for a great many years, and certainly things should

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have happened systematically over that period, but they did not. We are now, therefore, in the awful position of having the need for modernisation if we are to get any orders at all and the fact that most of these great yards are in development areas, and this seems to me to justify rather exceptional treatment so far as the shipbuilding industry is concerned.
Speaking of Swan Hunter, while I was there I had the good luck to be able to keep open Furness, a yard employing 3,000 to 4,000 people, by bringing it into the Swan Hunter firm. Therefore, to people like myself it is terribly annoying—one feels a little bitter—when one looks at the dispute which resulted in the Polish ships being taken away. But of course it would be quite wrong to believe that that meant the difference between permanent employment and massive unemployment. The Swan Hunter yards themselves have for long been in grave difficulties. Sir John Hunter told me on many occasions how near they were to massive redundancies years ago. It is not the case that had they got those orders they would have been assured for years ahead. Indeed, had they got the orders it is more than probable that there would have been unemployment more immediately on the Clyde, where those ships have now gone.
I completely agreed with the noble Viscount, Lord Simon, when he talked about the need for greater emphasis on retraining. I know for a fact that, in the period I was up there, when I managed to keep that yard open, even though there was massive unemployment in the North-East there was the terrible problem of there not being sufficient skilled labour. Indeed, they were transferring skilled men almost on a shuttle system from the Tyne to the Weir, back again and so on. So in the midst of the heaviest unemployment in Britain, probably, there was a terrible famine of the very skills which, had they been available, could have employed many of the unskilled people. I have always believed that we in this country have never got right the problem of retraining. We skimp the thing. We are short-sighted. We believe we are doing a great job of work if we increase the amount of money we give to retraining. In this day and age, with the coming of the technological revolution, the position will be reached—indeed, it is coming now—in which there
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will be massive unemployment among unskilled people and an equally large demand for non-existent skilled people. That is the position we are now facing.
So I would suggest to the Government, although I know there is now a great deal of work being done on this, that they really must not skimp the idea of retraining, especially in industries like shipbuilding. The noble Lord, Lord Boyd-Carpenter, was telling us about his period as Minister of Transport, when demarcation disputes were the order of the day. He is quite right. They were stupid disputes. There was a change in material, perhaps, from copper to aluminium or to timber, and who drilled the holes immediately became an argument. But that problem has almost disappeared from the shipbuilding industry because of the amalgamation of two of the principal trade unions; and, although we have had disputes of other types, it is not easy—and I keep quite close to industry—for me to remember when the last demarcation dispute took place in the shipbuilding industry. That shows that, by sensible amalgamations, you can obviate the kind of problems which I remember so well by way of demarcation disputes.
Unfortunately, in this country it is not open to us to get the ideal of industrial trade unionism—that is, one union one industry—which I, for my part, would love to see. It is not possible because two great general workers' unions are spread throughout the whole of our industries. We were the first in the field—I see a member of the Transport Workers' Union looking at me down his nose at the moment—but it is not now possible for us to say that we are going to insist upon industrial trade unionism when there are 2 million (I think it is) in the T & GWU at the moment a large number in the Municipal and General Workers, and so on. So we are suffering from the fact that we were first in the field in our methods of organising workpeople. I hope that my noble friend can go a little further on the question of how wide the redundancy scheme goes. Is it the case that people making components, people who are not really employed in the shipbuilding industry itself, will be able to benefit from this scheme? I hope the Government do not take it too wide, because I can think of a dozen industries in which components are made by people

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who, although they are in no way connected with that industry, play a vital part. Take the car industry, for example.
On the question whether you should exclude the Swan Hunter people because of what happened, quite frankly you cannot do it. As I was trying to say a minute or two ago, no person who knows that industry can say that, had they had those Polish orders, there would have been no redundancies. In fact, we all know there would have been redundancies. Let me give your Lordships a comparable case. In the area of Merseyside where I live we have the problem of British Leyland, where 3,000 jobs will now disappear, I suppose. Was that caused by a long strike, or was it caused by inefficiencies, it may be, in the line layout? It may be there was not the same effort; I do not know. But once you begin to say of an industry which is already in decline, that you can attribute the cause either to a strike or to action of that type, you are facing issues which no legislation can possibly safeguard. I hope that noble Lords, especially those from the Party opposite, will not pursue that kind of line. Otherwise, I am afraid they will entangle themselves in issues which go far beyond that which is happening in relation to this redundancy scheme. At one time I thought the noble Lord, Lord Campbell, was complaining that the Government had not gone wide enough in their nationalisation measure. He seemed to be saying, "If only you had nationalised the lot, there would have been no problems".
Lord CAMPBELL of CROY: My Lords, would the noble Lord give way? He must have misheard me. What I said was that it was a decision by the Government to select certain companies, and now they appeared to be ignoring them.
Lord LEE of NEWTON: My Lords, I can recall the noise that was created from the other side about the repair yards. If the repair yards had not listened to the Party opposite, they would not be arguing now about redundancy payments. You cannot play this both ways.
Lord CAMPBELL of CROY: My Lords, I am sorry to interrupt the noble Lord again, but I did not mention the
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words "ship repair" in the whole of my speech.
Lord LEE of NEWTON: My Lords, I thought the noble Lord avoided it, just, on a number of occasions. But, again—I am jumping about a bit because of interruptions—on the issue of whether the Government are treating shipbuilders in an isolated way which has never been enjoyed by other workers, this again is not true. The coal industry—deservedly, in my opinion—had even better conditions for redundancy than the shipbuilders are now getting. In the North-East, in Wales and in areas where there were enormous pit-closure programmes, there was the opportunity for people to retire early and to get 90 or 95 per cent. of the money they had been earning in wages, which was a far better scheme than this one—far and away better. So I put it to noble Lords opposite that where you have conditions of that type—and the noble Lord, Lord Campbell, knows parts of Scotland to which this applies—the Government are faced with the issue that, if you do not do something exceptional, the whole economy of the region will collapse. Then how much is it going to cost, not only in the loss of manpower, which is vital, but also in terms of finance?
So, for the reasons I have tried to explain—and, as I say, I am not in the confidence of the Government—I can see from my own experience why they feel that, in areas where there is a great dependence on mining, shipbuilding and that kind of thing—on steel, indeed—there is the need for some kind of exceptional treatment. I put it to noble Lords opposite that we really must not now hold up the passage of a Bill which can be of enormous importance, certainly in the humanitarian sense but also in the economic sense, in regions where it is badly needed.
6.59 p.m.
Viscount ROCHDALE: My Lords, I must apologise to your Lordships for intervening in this debate when I had not put my name down to speak, but I will be very brief. There are two points I should very much like to make, having listened carefully to the whole of the debate and, in particular, to the noble and learned Lord who moved the Second

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Reading of the Bill. My first point deals with the time factor. I can remember very clearly that, during the Second Reading of the Aircraft and Shipbuilding Industries Bill, I asked the Government spokesmen what they were doing by way of giving thought to the question of redundancy; because even then, and long since, it had been obvious that something in the way of redundancy measures was becoming very necessary. It was also obvious that our competitors in other countries were at that time actively engaged in thinking what was the best thing to do. I got no response at all during the Second Reading of that Bill, even though it appeared to me that the longer something was left the more expensive (whatever the scheme was) it might be. However, today, at long last we have got a scheme embodied in this enabling Bill.
I agree with my noble friends Lord Campbell of Croy and Lord Boyd-Carpenter that this is something we must not interfere with, in time, too much; but I agree with them very much in the various reservations they have put down by way of question to amplify many of the points that seem peculiarly vague. I agree with my noble friend Lord Campbell very much when he said there are instances, special instances, in some industries where something very special and unusual has to be done. My noble friend quoted one case which was the textile redundancy scheme of about 1960 or 1961, in which, as it happens, I was very closely implicated. In fact, I was chairman of the committee that had to administer the scheme from the Cotton Board in Manchester and I am well aware that there are special cases at times when special considerations have to be given. But, on the other hand, the longer special consideration is deferred, the more expensive very often it becomes.
My second point is a less critical one. The noble and learned Lord during his speech was at pains to associate the company of which I was previously chairman, Harland and Wolff, with the companies in British Shipbuilders. I was particularly glad to hear that, because during the Committee stage of the Aircraft and Shipbuilding Industries Bill I put down a series of Amendments the purpose of which was to attempt to see that that company should not be left out in the
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cold, squeezed out, by British Shipbuilders on many important issues which would put them at a disadvantage.
I think that one or two of my Amendments were accepted but, for the most part, they were not. But I was given an assurance then by the noble Lord, Lord Melchett, that, although the Amendments were not going to be embodied in the Bill, there was every intention of co-operation between British Shipbuilders and Harland and Wolff on these great issues so that they should not be at a disadvantage. My information is that in the interim period those assurances were well justified and I am glad to be able to say that I think that this Bill is a further bit of justification for those assurances. I should not like to let the occasion pass without saying, Thank you.
7.4 p.m.
Lord McCLUSKEY: My Lords, may I begin by saying that I am happy to acknowledge the positive and constructive responses that have been made to my introduction of this Bill on Second Reading. I think I can say that everyone in the House has acknowledged the necessity and, to that extent, has welcomed it. From what noble Lords have said, I accept that the points made are serious and deserving of answers, if not today then later. I will try to answer them the best I can today, but I am sure that the noble Lord will appreciate that some of them may be better dealt with at greater length at Committee when that stage is reached—and not today. I have already made one long speech and there is an important debate to follow.
My Lords, since November, and the Explanatory Memorandum of the Bill that went to another place and the Explanatory Memorandum today before us, costs have risen. I acknowledge that and I acknowledge that the order of change is as the noble Lord, Lord Campbell, has stated it. Of course, in November when the Bill was presented to another place, no outline scheme had been agreed between the parties to the negotiations. There were certain parameters for these parties in the discussions and these were based on the Iron and Steel scheme. The scheme which eventually emerged from the discussions was of a somewhat different character, particularly in relation to those

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below the age of 55. For that reason, the whole financial picture has changed.
I hope that that is sufficient explanation at the moment. No doubt that can be gone into further, but that, added to what I have already said in opening the debate, will explain it fully. I cannot say anything more at this stage about progress since 7th February with the CSEU. I do not think that I should do so at the moment. There is to be a meeting to which I shall refer, later, and perhaps I can confine myself to that observation.
The noble Lord, Lord Campbell of Croy, asked for clarification in relation to a person who returns to industry. I think that he will see from paragraph 11 of the outline scheme which was printed in the Hansard of 7th February that, in fact, there is provision that if a person returns to his employment within the period of time, then there may be a deduction from the redundancy payment made to him. If he is paid on a basis of 38 weeks' wages, then if he returns within the period of 38 weeks, there will be some deduction. It is an artificial relationship between the qualifying number of weeks for payments and the number of weeks during which he may not return without making some contribution. It is explained in paragraph 11 of the draft outline scheme.
My Lords, the noble Lord, Lord Campbell of Croy, also made a point, which was repeated by my noble friend Lord Lee of Newton, about the payment of redundancy payments to those who have had no real connection with shipbuilding and allied industries but who happened to be employed by subsidiary companies of British Shipbuilders. Some of these companies have no obvious connection with the main activities of British Shipbuilders, but they are very few. Some of the companies, although they have been referred to in another place and by reference here, are dormant and have no employees. Others, although not directly linked with shipbuilding, have some connection, sometimes a very strong one. For example, a company may be a training company, and as training is an integral part of the industry, one would tend to include such a company. But there is a possibility for excluding from the schemes the employees of those few
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subsidiaries whose trading connection with the main activities of British Shipbuilders is, at best, tenuous.
I refer to the point made by the noble Viscount, Lord Simon, when he asked about "prescribed". Of course, one may use the term "prescribed" in the Bill to select those employees whom it would be inappropriate to include because they have no real connection with shipbuilding but who happen by an accident of history to come under those who might benefit under the Bill itself.
A considerable point was made here, as was made in another place—a serious point—about the fact that the Bill discriminates between those employed in the public sector and those who are not. I acknowledge that that is a serious point. I acknowledge that there is discrimination. There has been a considerable and elaborate defence of the Government's position in another place. I can go into that at some length today, but I should prefer not to do so for a number of reasons. First, this matter can be gone into more fully at Committee stage; and I think the noble Lord, Lord Campbell, will accept that. Secondly, the explanations have already been given; but, thirdly, those who have read the proceedings in another place will note that the Minister, Mr. Kaufman, offered to meet the representative body concerned. I think that the noble Lord, Lord Campbell of Croy, may know that there is to be a meeting very shortly. I am not suggesting that at that meeting the Government will change their mind. I do not know; but I do not want to say anything now which may seem to prejudice the holding of that meeting. I prefer that that meeting should take place without anything further being added to what the Government have said on that matter. If the House will allow me, I will leave it at that.
The noble Lord, Lord Campbell of Croy, made a point about the extra computer staff. That figure is not a hard one; it is a guess and I will say no more about it. The noble Viscount, Lord Simon, was concerned about the fact that here we are discriminating in a different sense; we are giving higher payments to those made redundant here. He asks: are their needs greater than those made redundant in other industries? There have been a number of schemes—the noble Lord, Lord

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Campbell of Croy, referred to one and my noble friend Lord Lee of Newton referred to others—which have been designed to allow for inevitable redundancy and inevitable shrinkage in various industries. I can mention them briefly: the iron and steel industry has already been mentioned; the docks industry has not been mentioned but is well known to your Lordships. The mining industry as well.
Viscount SIMON: My Lords, if the noble and learned Lord will permit me, the position in the docks industry, with which I was very familiar, was different. In the docks industry the registered dockers could not be made redundant, therefore it had to be a voluntary scheme. Under the dock labour scheme it was impossible to make a dock labourer redundant. When it was necessary to reduce the labour force, it was necessary to offer inducements to people to seek voluntary severance.
Lord McCLUSKEY: Yes, my Lords, I acknowledge that. That was the only case of its kind in that respect. I can still point to the docks scheme, because in the event the payments were substantially larger than those people might have received had they been receiving redundancy under the Redundancy Payments Act 1965; so to that extent one could point to that scheme as well. The mining industry is another example.
So I refer first to these precedents; I refer also to the fact that when there is a crisis of this kind, there tend to be great numbers made unemployed in one particular area at the same time. That area may well be, as has already been said, an area of considerable unemployment. Furthermore, when people leave in a situation like this because of redundancy, the prospect of their returning to work is a very remote one indeed. These matters, and those I mentioned in opening, are the proper answer to the question asked by the noble Viscount, Lord Simon.
Lord BOYD-CARPENTER: My Lords would the noble and learned Lord allow me? Will he say how many of these precedents involve payment, as in this case, direct from the taxpayer as opposed to those from the industry concerned?
Lord McCLUSKEY: My Lords, before I attempt to reply to that, I am not certain that I would acknowledge the validity of this distinction. At the end of the day someone has to pay; and the public has to pay whether it is paid through extra charges in the docks or paid directly in the form of taxation.
Lord BOYD-CARPENTER: It is a pure question of fact.
Lord McCLUSKEY: It is a twisted question of fact. It may be pure but it is slightly twisted. It carries an assumption which I am not prepared to accept.
Lord BOYD-CARPENTER: My Lords, the noble and learned Lord says it is twisted. It is a perfectly plain question of fact. What he means is he does not like having to answer it.
Lord McCLUSKEY: My Lords, I will withdraw the word "twisted" and insert the word "loaded", if I may. It is a loaded question. The noble Lord asks first about support direct from the tax-payer. First, the general notion of the redundancy payment under the 1965 Act. There is support from the taxpayer and some contribution from the employer. The iron and steel industry scheme, which was introduced on the model of a scheme which the Europe of Six had before we joined the EEC, was introduced in 1974. Financing is by Her Majesty's Government direct with part recovery of costs from the EEC. In the docks industry, as the noble Viscount, Lord Simon, can confirm, that is financed by a levy raised on the employers by the National Dock Labour Board, and payment is then made to the dockers. That, of course, is a case where the employers will have to pass the payment on to those who use the docks. Regarding the mining industry, I cannot give details at the moment of who pays in respect of the scheme; but I can inform the noble Lord by letter if he would like me to do so.
Lord BOYD-CARPENTER: My Lords, I am much obliged.
Lord McCLUSKEY: My Lords, may I turn to the next point that the noble Viscount, Lord Simon, made. It was echoing a point made by the noble Lord,

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Lord Campbell of Croy, that it may be possible, in relation to the private sector, for the Opposition and others to give the Government some assistance. That is a matter which we will look for if we are able to make any progress on the matter of principle here. I cannot hold out any immediate hope of that; it is not for me to do so. I have taken note of what both the noble Viscount and my noble friend Lord Lee of Newton said about retraining and the importance of that. That will be taken into account when we come to deal with the details of the scheme to go into the order.
Viscount SIMON: M y Lords, I apologise. If the noble and learned Lord will allow me, I raised the question about the prescribed employees. The noble and learned Lord answered it with a point that was quite different from the one that I had raised and said that it may be used to exclude manufacturers of cement. My point was that it should include everybody in the shipyard whether or not a member of the union.
Lord McCLUSKEY: My Lords, I should have replied to both aspects of it. As regards that aspect, the noble Viscount sought assurance that the power to prescribe would not be used to confer benefit on members of unions and exclude others. I can give him that assurance without qualification.
The noble Lord, Lord Boyd-Carpenter, raised a number of points. He suggested that I had said that the crisis was unforeseeable and was no fault of ours. I used neither form of words. What I said was that we warned the world that there would be such a crisis. That of course was in 1972. I do not think that I used the word "unforeseeable" at that point. Secondly, I did not say that it was no fault of ours, I said that we had no hand in its making. In respect of that observation, I had the support of the noble Lord, Lord Campbell of Croy. He agreed with me that over the years there was a decline in British shipbuilding employment but suddenly in the early 1970s there was a massive and excessive growth of shipbuilding capacity in Japan and other Asian countries. We did not cause that and we did not cause
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the oil crisis. To that extent, I can properly say that we had no hand in making this particular crisis.
I have already referred to the other schemes and need add nothing to that. The noble Lord, Lord Boyd-Carpenter, also asked me: Why not follow the ordinary Parliamentary practice and, instead of introducing an order which cannot be amended, put the schemes into the Schedule to the Bill? I know of no scheme for special redundancy payments which has gone into the Schedule to any Bill so far. If the noble Lord considers that there has been one, perhaps he could let me know.
Lord BOYD-CARPENTER: If the noble and learned Lord is relying on that, he has already indicated that he knows of no scheme where the whole cost has been imposed on the taxpayer of whom Parliament is supposed to be the guardian. Parliament should therefore see that he has a scheme in the Bill.
Lord McCLUSKEY: My Lords, I was responding to what the noble Lord suggested was the ordinary practice. I know of no such practice. He asks whether or not the benefits will be taxable. I can give the exact position in relation to that: lump sums up to £5,000 in any one year are tax free. Over that amount, they are subject to income tax. The income support payments spread over a two-year period are aggregated with any other income and liable to income tax at whatever rate may be appropriate to the individual concerned. In other words, as the noble Lord surmised, normal tax rules apply.
Reference has been made by the noble Viscount, Lord Simon, and others, to the self-inflicted wound. I sought to anticipate this criticism. I chose my words as carefully as I could. I am indebted to the noble Viscount for his support and also to my noble friend Lord Lee of Newton. I do not think that I should add anything further. I look forward to giving the House further explanations when we come to consider this matter in Committee and I therefore commend the Bill again to your Lordships.
On Question, Bill read 2a, and committed to a Committee of the Whole House.

DISARMAMENT: UN SPECIAL ASSEMBLY
7.20 p.m.
Lord BROCKWAY Lord BROCKWAY rose to ask Her Majesty's Government what proposals they plan to put forward at the forthcoming United Nations Special Assembly on Disarmament. The noble Lord said: My Lords, I beg leave to ask the Unstarred Question standing in my name on the Order Paper. I will begin by way of what may be called "a commercial", but I hope that a wider significance will soon be recognised.
A few weeks ago I published a booklet The Hope for Peace, to which my noble friend Lord Noel-Baker contributed an important foreword. In that booklet I urged that partial disarmament had failed to reduce the extent of weapons, their destructive power and the danger of war; and therefore that we ought to make a radical advance to end all weapons of massive destruction and to take steps towards total disarmament. I urged that the United Nations Special Assembly on Disarmament to be held in May should provide the opportunity to realise these aims in view of the declarations on disarmament made by the Heads of State of the two great armament Powers, the United States of America and the Soviet Union.
I sent a copy of that booklet to the Foreign Secretary, and I will say at once that I was astonished by the reply. As I have indicated, I put forward views which may be regarded as extreme by Members of this House. The Foreign Secretary has given me permission to publish his replies. I will refrain from repeating the whole of his letters, because I do not want this to be made too much of an occasion for "a commercial". However, I am conscious that all Members of the House will appreciate the significance of the passages from his replies to me which he has given me permission to repeat. In a letter dated 19th December, the Foreign Secretary wrote:
"You are absolutely right in saying that there is now a chance of real progress on disarmament. I believe that President Carter and President Brezhnev are sincere in their expressed wish to move ahead in this field. For me, as I said in a meeting of NGOs yesterday, arms control is the barometer of détente. That is where the key lies, although, as you know, we are interested in détente in all its aspects, including human rights".
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In a letter to me dated 19th January, giving me permission to publish those statements, he adds:
"I share your hope that the world will turn towards peace this year. I shall certainly do all in my power to see that it does, and I am not unhopeful that we can achieve a breakthrough in the field of arms control".
My Lords, what were the proposals of President Carter and President Brezhnev, to which Dr. Owen has referred and the sincerity of which he recognises? President Carter of the United States has made the following proposals: first, the abolition of all nuclear tests; secondly, no distribution of nuclear weapons; thirdly, reciprocal reduction of stocks of such weapons by 50 per cent.—I repeat, 50 per cent.; fourthly, a ban on all chemical and radiological weapons; and, fifthly, the neutralisation of the Indian Ocean. At Des Moines, on 23rd October, President Carter said that after a SALT agreement:
"We will proceed towards my ultimate goal of reducing nuclear weapons to zero".
Those are radical proposals, of good hope, from the head of the most powerful armaments nation in the whole world.
I turn to President Brezhnev of the Soviet Union. He has, first, endorsed all the proposals made by President Carter and has added that these measures should serve as a preliminary to a staged process to complete disarmament, to be realised over a stated period of years. I want to submit that when the heads of the two super-Powers of the world—those most involved, not merely in the largest armaments expenditure but in the production of the most destructive weapons—speak in those terms, surely there is hope that 1978 can be made a great year of decision for peace.
I shall be asking how far the British proposals further these aims, but before doing so I wish to ask a few preliminary questions, of which I have given the Minister notice. The document prepared by Her Majesty's Government, Draft Programme of Action on Disarmament for the United Nations Special Session on Disarmament, states that it is put forward at the United Nations on 1st February 1978 by the United Kingdom and other Western Powers. I want to ask the Minister which were the other Western Powers. Did they include all the members of NATO? Did they include France, or is France putting forward separate proposals? Is it

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true that the United States of America will not put forward its own proposals but will accept those put forward by the United Kingdom? May I ask him who will lead the British delegation and whether it is possible to state its size and the names of its members?
I want to congratulate the United Kingdom on taking the lead in this matter. It is exhilarating that Her Majesty's Government, after a period of acting as second and third to others, should now be accepting the position of priority on this great issue. But I do not want to hide the fact that in my view we shall have to go much further if Dr. Owen's hope of a breakthrough for peace is to be reached this year.
In the Preamble, the ultimate goal of general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control is accepted, but nowhere in the document which the British Government have presented is there a strategy to progress towards the end of complete disarmament. There are important single measures, as I shall indicate, but no co-ordinated plan with that aim in view. There is no indication of an acceptance of the Soviet proposal for a phased advance to total disarmament. I should be answering my own Question if I detailed the British proposals—my Question was formulated before they were available—but I will comment on some.
There is the splendid declaration in favour of halting and reversing the nuclear arms race with the objective of reducing and eventually eliminating nuclear weapons. It is suggested that this should be done by the SALT discussions and by follow-up negotiations. I suggest that this is tragically inadequate. The SALT talks have proposed the limitation of the number of missiles while allowing those which remain to become more and more destructive; fewer launchers, more warheads. The International Institute for Strategic Studies estimates that by the early 1980s the number of warheads in the Soviet Union will increase from 3,600 to 7,500, and in the United States of America from 11,600 to 14,000, despite the limitation on the number of launchers in the SALT talks.
I welcome the British proposition which extends to the qualitative character of
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weapons, but I submit that experience demonstrates that restricted negotiations on nuclear weapons are not now enough. The United Nations Assembly should, first, demand the ending of all nuclear weapons and the destruction of all stock-piles. Secondly, the world disarmament conference should implement this demand in detail. In view of the statements of President Carter and President Brezhnev, the United States of America and the Soviet Union could not logically refuse to participate in such discussions and to participate towards this objective.
I welcome many recommendations in the British proposals: a comprehensive test banning treaty, the establishment of nuclear weapon free zones, the prohibition of chemical and radiological weapons and the destruction of stockpiles, the restriction of conventional weapons—though this is dealt with rather superficially—the publication of information about (1) the strength of armed forces, (2) the transfer of arms to other countries and (3) military budgets. These represent great advances which one hopes the United Nations Assembly will accept in principle, but they will demand detailed implementation.
The proposal will be made to the Assembly that it should be followed by a world disarmament conference to apply to them specifically. I want to ask the British Government if they will support that proposal. But I have to acknowledge this. When all that has been said, and notwithstanding all the hope that is promised, one must recognise the scepticism and the doubt which is in the world today. There is disbelief that the ideals of disarmament and peace can be realised. The Foreign Secretary has recognised the sincerity of the Presidents of the United States of America and the Soviet Union in their proposals—and who, with greater influence, could possibly have made such proposals? I am asking our Foreign Secretary, our Government and the leader of our delegation to the United Nations Assembly to go there not only with sincerity, about which I have no doubt at all, but with a determination that these great hopes may be realised in practical politics.
I believe that the time will come when mankind will look back on our generation with disbelief. They will think that we

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were all mad, that we should have permitted to be built up in the world armaments which could destroy the whole of humanity, and to accept this so quietly and without making demands. Think, my Lords, of today, with the Cruise missile able to destroy 200 times the population that was destroyed at Hiroshima. Think, my Lords, of the neutron bomb, able to destroy all life but allowing material things still to remain. The policy for the neutron bomb is that it will be localised on one battlefield. I hope that members not only of the Foreign and Commonwealth Office, but of the Ministry of Defence, read the article contributed by the defence correspondent of the Sunday Times on 14th August. That article described the whole technical research process by which the neutron bomb was formalised:
"The practical problem was to scale the neutron bomb to a size suitable for the battlefield".
In its production, the technical problem was to prevent the neutron bomb from extending far from the battlefield to great areas, where it might destroy, over days and weeks and in painful agony, men, women and children whom it approached
Yet I conclude by saying this. I remain optimistic. This world of ours has existed for millions of years. The human race has existed for only some thousands of years. It is still in its childhood, perhaps adolescence. But the time will come when the human race has grown to adulthood, when war will be an unthinkable atrocity to those future generations. My appeal tonight, while welcoming the proposals which they have made, is that Her Majesty's Government will at the United Nations conference, where, undoubtedly, the majority of the delegates will urge it to go much further than the Government's proposals, contribute to the time when mankind will feel that war is an obscenity which a civilised world should not tolerate.
7.45 p.m.
Lord O'HAGAN: My Lords, the noble Lord, Lord Brockway, has made an eloquent and, indeed, moving plea in the course of putting his Unstarred Question to Her Majesty's Government. I hope that he will understand, or, at least, extend to me the indulgence due to a former constituent of his, when I say that, as well as the deep passion and shining
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idealism with which he always arms himself, if I may use the term, when dealing with these great international and supranational questions, cool and calm negotiation between the great Powers who decide these matters is, in the end, essential if real progress is to be made. I say that because with the warm heart, which I hope beats as strongly and firmly in my case as it does in his, it is necessary to bring the cold head and the cool mind, when these matters are to be decided between those whose fingers are on the buttons which would unleash nuclear war.
In supporting the noble Lord's inquiry of the Government and of the noble Lord, Lord Goronwy-Roberts, about the nature of the proposals that they plan to put forward at the United Nations' Special Assembly, I should like to add to what the noble Lord, Lord Brockway, has already asked by putting this Question. What status have the proposals that have so far been published? We have heard about them from the noble Lord, Lord Brockway. Are they the basis of Her Majesty's Government's position, or will they be negotiated on later? I ask these questions not out of a desire to pick minor points and to be pernickety about details, but because I hope that the noble Lord who is to reply for the Government will be able to explain to your Lordships how the Government see these discussions at the United Nations' Special Assembly, in relation to all the other talks, negotiations and discussions. What relationship have Her Majesty's Government's plans for the United Nations' Special Assembly to the Mutual and Balanced Force Reductions and to the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks? Surely it is important that what goes on in New York should not impede progress in Belgrade and Helsinki; and is it really a good idea to have a proliferation of discussions about the non-proliferation of weapons? Is this a propaganda gesture or is it, as one hopes, a serious plan of a co-ordinated nature, as the noble Lord, Lord Brockway, was inquiring?
Idealism is essential if negotitions are to succeed, but on the day upon which the latest White Paper on the Defenec Estimates is published it is hard to refrain from commenting that the record of Her Majesty's Government and the quintupling of their cuts in the Defence Estimates does not lead one to be optimistic that the

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voice of Her Majesty's Government will be listened to with respect throughout the world, especially when we read of what is going on in the Horn of Africa, or when we look at the figures relating to the build-up of the maritime forces of the Soviet Navy throughout the world. The noble Lord, Lord Brockway, spoke about President Carter's proposal for the neutralisation of the Indian Ocean. Let us have a call for that delightful objective from the admirals of the Soviet Navy!
There is another query which comes to my mind, and noble Lords opposite will understand why I am thinking in these terms. It seems to me that there is a basic contradiction in their attitude to international matters on the part of not only the Labour Government but the Labour movement and the Labour Party. When it is a question of general and vague declarations, everybody agrees that they are worth aiming for. However, when it is a question of making an international or supranational organisation work by giving it authority, then a curious schizophrenia seems to occur in Labour minds and hearts.
We are pursuing a wrecking policy, if you like, within the European Economic Community which has real authority, which protects directly our interests, which speaks with the voice of 250 million people and which is the largest trading bloc in the world. Under this Government we do not seek to make that Community work, although it is a Community with real power and authority and with genuine force throughout the world, in particular—and I stress this to the noble Lord, Lord Brockway—among the Afro-Asian countries which have signed the Lomé Convention and brought to themselves enormous benefits from their relationships with the European Economic Community.
Therefore the contradiction that I see, and which I suggest to your Lordships leads one to be a little sceptical about the nature of the proposal put forward by Her Majesty's Government for the Special Assembly, is that while the EEC is a world force, although the Government do not seem to enjoy making it work on behalf of us all, there is a proposal to look at disarmament in the context of the United Nations whose record of
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productivity is not all that high, and there the Government proceed with alacrity.
I should like to ask the noble Lord who is to reply for the Government this question: What efforts have Her Majesty's Government made to co-ordinate the policy of Member States of the European Economic Community? I know that the European Defence Community is a creature of the history books and not a real fact, and I understand the difficulties that might flow from it. However, I should be delighted to be proved wrong by the noble Lord if he could tell me that there is, and has been, full co-operation with our European Economic Community partners in preparing the position of Her Majesty's Government. In particular, I should like to know what the French have decided about their proposals, and whether those proposals are to be withdrawn. Also, could the noble Lord give us an indication of any major differences that remain between this country and France?
I do not want to detain the House for very long, but may I ask a question which was not touched on by the noble Lord, Lord Brockway. The noble Lord did not mention China. I should like to ask the noble Lord about the attitude of Her Majesty's Government towards China. How do the Government view the role of the Chinese in relation to this particular and very difficult problem, and what future have all the non-nuclear and nearly nuclear Powers to look for in the way of permanent negotiation?
I do not think that there is any difference of opinion between one side of the House and the other about the objectives that we should seek when disarmament is being discussed. There is no real clash about what we all want. We want an end to war. But there is a difference, as I see it, as to methods and how one should achieve that wonderful goal, if ever it can be achieved.
Like the noble Lord, Lord Brockway, I believe that there is a real place for idealism and declarations of intent in negotiations of the kind which are the subject of discussion tonight in your Lordships' House. My family's motto is: "Victory or Death". In a nuclear war, victory may well be death because there will be nothing left to be victorious over and the old alternatives will be outdated.

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However, it is no use thinking that while the daily encroachment of the Soviet Union throughout Africa increases and grows, pious aspirations are enough.
If the Unstarred Question of the noble Lord, Lord Brockway, has served no other purpose than this, it will have been very useful. The purpose that I hope it will have served could be summed up in this way: Will Her Majesty's Government go into the discussions at the United Nations Special Assembly anxious to negotiate a workable solution to this awful and awe-inspiring problem, or will this he one more session of prolonged aspirations and very little achievement? If these hopes are to be dashed, it would have been better that they should never have been raised. If the noble Lord, Lord Goronwy-Roberts, can give us a clear understanding of the nature of the hopes of Her Majesty's Government with which they are going to that Special Assembly, then this Unstarred Question will have served a very useful purpose.
7.58 p.m.
Lord BANKS: My Lords, I am grateful to the noble Lord, Lord Brockway, for providing us with the opportunity this evening to discuss the forthcoming United Nations Special Assembly on Disarmament and the world disarmament scene which will confront it. I am sure that we all appreciated the eloquent sincerity with which the noble Lord made his appeal.
When we debated defence in this House on 7th December last, I said that the alternatives open to NATO countries, as it seemed to me, were either to abandon any attempt to defend ourselves, and thus place our freedom and independence in jeopardy, or to provide ourselves with adequate arms to maintain a credible balance while vigorously seeking détente and disarmament. I made it clear that my noble friends and I supported the second alternative. I added that the mistake would be to opt for that second alternative while failing to provide sufficient strength to make it credible.
That remains our position and, indeed, it is reinforced by the publication today of the White Paper on Defence, showing, as it does, a two and a half to one ratio superiority in tanks, artillery and fixed-wing tactical aircraft for the Warsaw Pact countries over the NATO countries. So
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I repeat that we have to provide ourselves with adequate arms to maintain a credible balance while vigorously seeking détente and disarmament. It is in that context that we express our support for sincere attempts to bring about disarmament and wish them well. It is in that context that we view this special session of the United Nations Assembly.
For Britain and our NATO allies the core of the disarmament problem is to be found in the negotiations between the United States and the Soviet Union and between the NATO countries and the Warsaw Pact countries, and there are perhaps three main aspects of these. First, there are the SALT talks about strategic weapons, weapons possessed by the super powers, capable of striking at each other's heartlands. Secondly, there are the mutual and balanced force reduction talks in Vienna, basically about ground forces. And, thirdly, there is the confidence-building section of the Helsinki Agreement, the notification of military manoeuvres, the appointment of observers and matters of that kind.
So far as the SALT talks are concerned, we have been told for some time that we should expect an agreement in the near future on SALT II. But now there appear to be some doubts; we understand that there are some reservations within the United States Administration. There is the question as to whether Congress will agree to the proposed terms of the agreement, and there has been expressed in Pravda very recently some Russian irritation with the possibility that the United States might be seeking some further concessions in the proposals so far agreed. But there are, in addition, misgivings among some of the European partners of the United States in NATO, particularly on the part of the West Germans. There is a feeling that there is an area not covered by either SALT or the Mutual and Balanced Force Reduction talks. A whole range of weapons are being deployed by the Soviet Union which are not classified as strategic but which are targeted on Western Europe. There are the Backfire and Fencer aircraft; there is the recently deployed SS 20 ballistic missile. These are Euro-strategic or Continental weapons, and the Soviet Union is seen as extending its strategic capacity in an area not covered by any form of arms control,

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something that falls between the existing attempts to secure a measure of disarmament.
It is argued by some that the Cruise missile, which is subject to SALT, could provide a counter to these Euro-strategic weapons, and there is a fear that the United States will agree in SALT II to limitations on the Cruise missile which will leave the European members of NATO at a disadvantage. I am wondering whether, when he comes to reply, the noble Lord, Lord Goronwy-Roberts, can give us any reassurance on the validity or otherwise of these misgivings, which do exist and cannot be ignored.
Turning to the Mutual and Balanced Force Reduction talks, these, of course, have been bogged down for some time on the Warsaw demand for a percentage reduction and on the NATO demand for a reduction to an equal level on both sides. Recently the Warsaw countries appear to have argued that there is no disparity, that there is in fact parity. Although this is an obstacle to agreement, it may contain within it the seed of hope, because if there is agreement that there ought to be parity that at least is a commencing point for discussion; it may be that the noble Lord who is to reply is in a position to tell us a little more about the possibility of any development from that starting point.
So far as the confidence-building is concerned, that appears to be making some progress, although, of course, there are doubts about the possibility of an overall agreement being reached by the conference in Belgrade which is monitoring the achievements so far under the Helsinki Agreement. I wonder how far the Government are hopeful that the United Nations Assembly will be able to help matters forward in any of these three areas.
I warmly welcome the fact, as did the noble Lord, Lord Brockway, that the United Kingdom Government have put forward a detailed plan for consideration by the Assembly, a plan which commands general Western support, and I look forward to hearing more about it when the noble Lord comes to reply. Perhaps I could refer to one or two of the points which I understand are contained in that document. It is proposed that there should be assurances by the nuclear Powers that
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non-nuclear States will not be subjected to nuclear attack. That, of course, is welcome as far as it goes. It is suggested that there should be the creation of regional nuclear-free zones. I am not quite clear exactly where it is proposed these should be. If it is possible to have further information on that, I should welcome it. It is proposed that conventions should be signed banning chemical and radiological weapons, and that we would all applaud.
There are proposals to restrict the conventional arms race, particularly in developing countries. I am not quite clear exactly how that is to be done, but if it could involve some control of the trade in arms then we on these Benches would greatly welcome it. I am well aware of the economic argument of the importance of arms contracts to industrial countries. I am well aware of the arguments which say that developing countries and countries which have no large industrial base are entitled to have their armed forces and to have them adequately provided for. But, even so, I am convinced that we shall never have any kind of a peaceful world unless there is some form of control of the trade in arms, and the sooner that can begin the better.
Lord BROCKWAY: My Lords, would not the noble Lord take some encouragement from the fact that this special assembly of the United Nations on Disarmament is being called on the initiative of the developing countries, the unaligned Governments of the world?
Lord BANKS: Yes, my Lords, I certainly would take some encouragement from that fact. I understand, too, that the document says that the rôle of the United Nations in the disarmament field should be stepped up, and I am wondering just in what way that would be done. There is also a proposal that there should be much greater use made of peace-keeping forces. That again we on these Benches would greatly welcome. I understand, too, that it is suggested that the confidence-building measures in the Helsinki Agreement should be more widely accepted. I am wondering whether it is thought that these could be used beyond Europe in other parts of the world. I very much hope that a great deal of attention will be focussed on the need to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons.

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I think it is clear from the number of points I and other speakers have mentioned that much valuable work can be done by this assembly. It may prove to be entirely peripheral to what I have described as the core of the disarmament problem, the problem in Europe itself. But success in these important matters would be no less welcome for that. With the success in these peripheral matters, we should have to return doggedly and determinedly to dealing with the difficult and dangerous problems of United States-Soviet negotiation and NATO-Warsaw Pact negotiation. For that we need neither a starry-eyed optimism nor a defeatist pessimism, but rather a sober appraisal of the threat to our security and to the security of the world and a determination to work vigorously and urgently for agreed disarmament while, with our allies, maintaining our defences in good order.
8.10 p.m.
Lord NOEL-BAKER: My Lords, I wish to begin by thanking my noble friend Lord Brockway for initiating this debate and for his very powerful speech. He has added one more to his long record of services to the cause of peace and harmony among the nations and races of the world. I remember a party given for him by our friends of the new countries of the Commonwealth on, I think, his 70th birthday in gratitude for his valiant struggle for their dignity and rights. If the Government will do what he has asked of them tonight we shall give him an even better party.
I wish to follow my noble friend in urging the Government to view the forthcoming proceedings in New York in a bold, constructive spirit. I should like them to ponder a saying by a great British philosopher whose works many of us studied when we were undergraduates long ago. I am referring to John Stuart Mill, who once said in a pregnant aphorism:
"Against a great evil, a small remedy does not produce a small result; it produces no result at all".
He might have had the modern arms race in mind when he wrote those words. The modern arms race is the greatest evil which the human race has ever known. It began with the Franco-Prussian war in 1870. The quick victory
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of Bismarck's conscripts and Krupp's steel guns made Government after Government decide that they must adopt compulsory military service and must arm their troops with the latest weapons, however costly they might be.
Year by year as engineers invented new weapons and new kinds of war, the manpower in the standing forces of the world and the expenditure on armaments increased at an astronomical rate. Vast vested interests were built up. There came the military industrial complexes against whose immense and dangerous influence President Eisenhower warned us. There came the acceptance of war as a frequent and necessary fact in international life. Finally, there has come in the last stages of the arms race the commitment of Governments to the total indiscriminate violence of the "A" and "H" bombs.
Let me give two figures that illustrate the sweep and magnitude of the arms race of recent years. In 1913, at the peak of the arms race, which Lord Grey, our then Foreign Secretary, said had been the true cause of the First World War, there were 5 million men in the standing peacetime forces of the world. Today in 1978 there are 35 million men in the standing peacetime forces of the world. In 1913 the world expenditure on armaments was £500 million: today it is about £240,000 million—about £600 million a day or 1,000 million dollars a day.
The armaments have produced wars. Never was there a more striking confirmation of what Shakespeare said in King John:
"How oft the sight of means to do ill deeds makes ill deeds done".
As the armaments have increased so have the armed conflicts. In the second 40 years of this century there have probably been something like 10 times as many wars as there were in the first 40 years. The armaments have not produced the stability which they were supposed to produce. They have not produced international order. They have not made nations safer. There is greater insecurity in the world today than there has ever been.
Indeed, wars have become so frequent that the Press hardly bothers to report them at all and the Security Council of the United Nations simply pretends that they have not happened. The present

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example is the ghastly conflict between Somalia and Ethiopia in which two nations are destroying their hope of social progress for a century to come.
I want to suggest that the Government might study with greater care than perhaps they have done so far some documents that date from 17 years ago, documents that were the result of 40 years of international discussion, of careful international work by the League of Nations and the United Nations, sometimes at the very highest level, as in the nearly successful disarmament conference of 1932. Men like Robert Cecil, of the highest standing, made a great contribution to this work. The documents to which I wish to draw attention are, first, a statement made by a conference of Commonwealth Prime Ministers which met in London in March 1961. At that time there were 12 Prime Ministers of self-governing countries. As it chanced, the Prime Ministers of the old Commonwealth—Britain, Canada, Australia, New Zealand and South Africa—were all Conservatives in politics and spoke for Conservative Parliaments which had sent them here. The Prime Ministers of the new Commonwealth included such men as Pundit Nehru of India, Field-Marshal Ayub of Pakistan and Mr. Nyerere of Tanzania. Between them they spoke for a quarter of the human race. Their final communiqué recorded that they had held a full discussion of the problems of disarmament. It was a full discussion; there were 12 of them and the discussion lasted several days.
The communiqué recorded that they had unanimously adopted a Statement on the problems of disarmament—a Statement from which I hope to read, if my defective eyesight allows it, some brief paragraphs. The Statement says:

"1. The aim must be to achieve total worldwide disarmament, subject to effective inspection and control.

2. In view of the slaughter and destruction experienced in so-called conventional wars, and of the difficulty of preventing a conventional war, once started, from becoming a nuclear war, our aim must be nothing less than the complete abolition of the means of waging war of any kind.

3. An agreement for this purpose should be negotiated as soon as possible "—

several times in their declaration and in their communiqué the Prime Ministers of the Commonwealth emphasised the need for speed—
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"on the basis of the following principles:
(a) All national armed forces and armaments must be reduced to the levels agreed to be necessary for internal security".
There was nothing for aggressive war. They were very conscious of the difference between aggressive and defensive weapons. They demanded the abolition of everything that was not needed for internal security and, in fact, in a later clause, a contribution to a UN peace-keeping force. That reduction to the level needed for internal security, with an addition for a contribution to a UN peace-keeping force, is still a vital principle which the Government should bear in mind. The Statement continues:
"(b) Once started the process of disarmament should be continued without interruption until it is completed, subject to verification at each stage that all parties are carrying out their undertakings".
The Prime Ministers went on to emphasise again the need for speed; to say that the agreement must be negotiated in the United Nations and that all nations must take part.
I venture to believe that that document is of great value today. It was followed shortly by the Zorin-McCloy principles, unanimously endorsed by the General Assembly of the United Nations in September 1961, six months later. That was followed by the two draft treaties presented to the UN Committee of Eighteen in Geneva in March 1962— Khrushchev's draft treaty of general and complete disarmament under effective international inspection and control, and President John Kennedy's draft treaty of complete and general disarmament in a peaceful world. I hope that the Government will put these three documents into the proceedings of the preparatory commission. I hope that they will consider that the assembly of the United Nations and the possible world conference are far more likely to produce practical results than partial negotiations by a small number of nations sending junior officials or military men to discuss in private, without any properly thought out plan before them. I am saying that I do not attach great importance either to SALT or to the MBFR talks in Vienna. They have gone on for so many years; they have not reduced armaments by a single rifle. They have been a cloak for the vast increase of armaments which has happened during these long years. They have made

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many people—perhaps some noble Lords—believe that something was being done when in fact there was no hope whatever of a practical result.
I have lived in this work since 1920. I have been in very many Government negotiations. I was assistant to the President of the Disarmament Conference of 1932 which, as I have said, came so near to full success but which was defeated by the hawks and militarists of Britain, France and Germany. As a result of my experience, I believe that if disarmament ever comes it will be as the result of public debates by top rank statesmen in the organs of the United Nations or in a world conference, if one be called.
I hope that the Government will take the line in New York which my noble friend Lord Brockway and I have urged. I hope that they will bring the nations back from the world of illusion, in which Governments have been living, to the realities of what government is for. People have talked; some noble Lords have talked. I say with respect that I have a feeling of gratitude for the temperate and constructive tone of the two speeches made by the noble Lords who followed my noble friend Lord Brockway. However, I believe that the Governments have been living in a world of illusion. The Romans said: "Si vis pacem para bellum"—more armaments will prevent the war. Militarists have gone on repeating that false old slogan for decade after decade, and always it has led to more andmoreand more ferocious conflicts like the Second World War, like this ghastly war in Ethiopia today. I hope that the Government will go to the assembly in New York with the resolution to act on John Stuart Mill's principle that only a great remedy can bring a result against this greatest of all evils that mankind has ever known.
If, as the noble Lord, Lord Brockway, proposed, they can bring about a 50 per cent. reduction in nuclear weapons in this year, as President Carter has proposed and President Brezhnev has accepted, and if they can follow that by total abolition of nuclear weapons by 1980, I believe they will make a revolution in the temper of international affairs. I believe they will strike a decisive blow against the surging violence that is spreading around the world today. The Mafias and gangsterism; the hijacking of aircraft; the political
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terrorism of Western Germany; the kidnapping of Italy and France; I believe that all these things stem from the Governments' acceptance of a commitment to the total, indiscriminate violence of nuclear weapons. If that total, indiscriminate violence is permissible to the public authorities of the civilised nations of the world, then to sick minds any form of violence will seem permissible in protest against an unjust society or, more simply, for personal or commercial gain.
If the Governments of the Commonwealth could act together, if the Government could bring India and Canada to share the lead, I believe they would exercise an enormous influence in New York. We sometimes say that without our great navies and armies of the past Britain has less power that it used to have; but Britain has a great deal more influence because it transformed the greatest Empire in world history into a Commonwealth of equal, self-governing nations who retain their links with us today. The Commonwealth could be the greatest force in international affairs. If the Commonwealth will stand for the proposals made by President Carter and President Brezhnev, and will use the great influence of their many delegations to sec them through, I believe that they will lead New York to the breakthrough of which the Foreign Secretary has spoken; to the beginning of the general and complete disarmament which alone can save mankind. If the Government do this they will earn the gratitude of every nation, and they will go down to history with the glory which they will deserve.
8.35 p.m.
Lord MACLEOD of FUINARY: My Lords, may I first add my sincere gratitude to the noble Lord, Lord Brockway, for instituting this debate in order that we may hear what the Government are thinking of putting forward when we come to this May assembly. May I also express, I am sure on behalf of the entire House, our appreciation to the noble Lord, Lord Noel-Baker, who has done day-to-day probably more in working out things of peace than any other man in London. How glad we are that he is a Member of this House, and how happy we are in what he has said and what it may lead to.

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It might well be said that all I can do is to second—or third—the proposition put forward by the two noble Lords who have spoken in this way, but in point of fact I should like to declare an interest. I happen to be one of those people who, while his pre-eminent interest is in the things of peace, has gradually become convinced—because I was a combatant in the First World War—that, despite all the sincerity in approaching the matter in another way (I agree about the sincerity), for 31 years the situation has got worse and worse. What I am emphasising, and the only reason I am saying it instead of just repeating what has been so truly said, is that I do not believe anything will happen until some nation or some group of people really decides that they are going to be the proponents of nonviolence as of now, regardless of the consequences. Otherwise we will go on for another 31 years of sincere effort and sincere failure.
I am perfectly well aware that to speak in that way is to raise in certain noble Lords' minds the thought, "Well, now we are just going to hear some pacifist claptrap". Let me just say that, except for the fact of the centrality of Christ himself when he spoke about loving your enemies and doing good to them that despitefully use you, and when he on the Cross said, "You are forgiven because you do not know what you are doing", I am one of these people who believe that it is entirely through military issues that this thing can be argued and not through pacifist issues and pacifist arguments, and I am not quoting another pacifist. My quotations are entirely military.
As your Lordships are aware, the first three centuries of Christianity and the Church were pacifist. Then there came the time when Constantine in the 4th century made the Christian religion not something to be persecuted but promoted. As a result of that, there was a Church which was right in the middle of the State, and they had to get round the dilemma, which they did by saying that Christians could now take part in what was called a "just war". They defined a just war as a war in which the end justifies the means.
Even in our own lifetime we have known what we mean by just wars. Through the
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centuries I think you could argue the case that there have been just wars, controlled wars, and thereby things that happened for the better by reason of slaughter. Perhaps it is best described, and at least most shortly described, by Mafeking, which is in the memory of a few people still in this House. Mafeking, where the town was occupied by the British and the attack was from the Boers. They were both law-abiding Sabbatarian people, strictly expressing Sabbatarian views. For instance, they never fought on a Sunday. War stopped on Saturday at midnight and it did not start again until Monday because you must not break the Sabbath day by fighting with each other.
The Household Cavalry, who were inside Mafeking, got so bored with the proceedings when nothing was going on, that they started playing polo. The Boers came in with a white flag to BadenPowell—later of the Scouts—who was in command, and said how grieved the enemy were that the Sabbath was being broken by the Household Cavalry playing polo on a Sunday. The letter is still extant from Baden-Powell to the Boers assuring them that there would never be any more polo played on a Sunday. Can we have a better description than that of what was a just war, a controlled kind of a war?
To jump the decades and come to our present situation, what about this at the other extreme, which is our real situation? Two Congressmen in 1974 asked the President of the United States what he would do with the Russians, and was America ready to meet the Russians. The President then said, "I have only to pick up that telephone and say the code word and 70 million Russians, men, women and children, will be dead in half an hour". He was not just being ridiculous. He knew that they had 8,000 nuclear weapons, 5,000 of them in submarines which are at present facing round outside Norway, outside in the Mediterranean, facing to the South, outside in the Indian Ocean and outside in Siberia—5,000 nuclear weapons waiting for the word. All they have to do is to fire them together—and they are ready to fire at this very moment—and he was therefore quite justified in saying that he only had to say a word down the telephone and 70 million Russians would be dead within half an hour.

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It is against that background that I think all noble Lords would agree with the late Eminence Pope John when he said, "It is impossible to conceive of a just war in a nuclear age". It is indeed impossible to conceive of a just war in this nuclear age, and that washes out that whole approach. Nor, I would say, is it claptrap to talk in pacifist terms, and again I am not quoting from a pacifist. I quote from Sir Basil Liddel-Hart, the best known defence correspondent in journalism who died about four years ago. Sir Basil, who was the defence correspondent of The Times, in a book which he wrote shortly before his death spoke about the situation:
"Anyone who talks of winning a nuclear war is a menace to his country and to all humanity. To make non-violent resistance a national affair would be an extremely difficult task. The most important thing is to educate people and convince them that it is a workable policy. The more Governments realise their incapacity for military defence, the more they will begin to take nonviolent military defence seriously".
Here we have a situation where we go on and on; it might come to a crisis and then we should have to win, yet that great military correspondent was saying that nobody can win. At present we are spending £6,000 million a year preparing for a war which nobody can win, and here is a famous war correspondent recommending the way of the Cross. This is the test of the situation. Here is Saint Paul, whose poetic prohecy at the time of the Bible has turned into prosaic possibility, for Saint Paul declared
"We preach Christ crucified. To the legalists a stumbling block; to the philosophers sheer folly; but to them that believe, whether legalist or philosopher, a Christ who is the wisdom and the power of God. For the foolishness of God is wiser than men, and the weakness of God is stronger than men".
We have arrived in an outside world, something completely different; we have gone back to that particular moment where the weakness of God and the weakness of this approach is more satisfactory then spending £6,000 million a year preparing for a war we might have to fight but which anyway we would lose.
Everybody knows that the situation is getting worse, all despite the very sincere things that are being said. Things have been said about Helsinki, but what happened there? That was supposed to be the solution, but since then there has been one meeting after another about
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what they meant at Helsinki. The SALT talks have been referred to and of course the two middle letters of SALT mean "arms limitation"; and one of the SALT decisions, after infinite labour, was that there would be no more nuclear bases, since when the number of nuclear bases in the world has quadrupled.
Now we are to have this Assembly and I, like everybody else, wish it all the best, but I hope that possibly the comments of the noble Lord, Lord Goronwy-Roberts, may contain a passing sentence about what the Government intend to do. Of course, the Government will do their very best, but at the same time they are advertising that when the May Assembly is over there will be an exhibition to sell more armaments here in this country. There have been enormous Press and media references to the wonderful things that will come out of it, but almost no reference at all to the fact that as soon as it is over we shall have an exhibition designed to sell more armaments.
Do we yet realise—yes, with our minds we realise; but do we with our guts realise—the situation? For example, what about the over-kill that is going on? The figures are quite well known. The United States now has 30,000 nuclear weapons, the total combined yield of which is 600,000 times the power of the bomb dropped on Hiroshima. The United States could destroy the whole of Russia 30 times over and Russia has enough bombs to destroy the whole of the United States 20 times over. Why this over-kill capacity? The answer is the military industrial complex. In other words, it is money and not the appalling nature of the enemy that is causing the enormous build-up. It is money.
The three biggest armament firms in America are Rockwell, Monsanto and Lockheed. In 1948, Rockwell's annual turnover was 95 million dollars and in 1975 it was 4,943 million dollars, well over £2 billion a year. That is one firm. Mr. C. A. Thomas, head of Monsanto, was himself appointed adviser to the National Security Council, which determines the foreign and military policy of the United States, and since then Monsanto has a turnover of 2,700 million dollars, more than £1,000 million. That is one armament firm. Mr. Louis Ridenour, vice president

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of Lockheed, gave the game away when he said:
"We dump our motor-cars long before they are out of order and our economy would have collapsed if we had not done so".
He went on:
"Out rocketry programme is doing fine fulfilling a similar function. We send up rockets and they never come back, and that is why we should build new rockets all the time".
It is money, money, money—not fear of Russia. It was no mere cynic who made the following remark; it was no less a person than a deputy assistant at the Defence Ministry in the United States:
"The NATO doctrine is that we will fight with conventional weapons till we are losing, then we will fight with tactical nuclear weapons till we are losing, and then we will blow up the world".
That was said by a man who at the time was Minister of Defence, and it is perfectly possible that we all know him. We mumble about deterrents, but is it really any deterrent? Eight years ago China was spending £6 million on the discovery of how to turn nuclear power into war-like purposes. Last year China spend £600 million on the same exercise. No sooner did China do that, India, on the edge of China, had to stop spending whatever amount was being spent on the people dying of starvation in the streets and began spending tens of thousands of millions of pounds to come level with China. Then there is Pakistan, which is even more impoverished than India, but because India now has nuclear weapons, Pakistan has to get them, and so it goes on and on.
We say we will never use nuclear weapons first. How many people know that shortly before he resigned as President, General Ford said they would use them first and were retaining their right to use them first Indeed, it was the Warsaw Pact who tried to bring in a Bill by which everybody would sign a document saying they would never use them first, yet it was our side who refused to sign the Bill. That came from Russia, but we would not do it. Why? The answer is money.
We comfort ourselves with the fact that it is mainly between Russia and the United States of America. Eight nations now have nuclear power. Palestine has nuclear power; Egypt has nuclear power; and, last week, the Americans sold millions of pounds worth, both to Palestine and to Egypt. Money, my Lords! Ronald
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Ellis, our own representative for arms export, said on the 20th August last year:
"We will sell to anyone who wants to buy".
Amin, I suppose, would be one good man. It is the military-industrial complex that is the issue. This is the real enemy. It was no less a person than General Eisenhower, President of the United States, who was so horrified by the military/industrial complex that he declared:
"I think people want peace so much that, one of these days, Governments will have to get out of their way and let them have it".
I am here to suggest that it is never going to be done by Governments, because Governments are being controlled by the money power; and, having been controlled by the money power, the situation goes from bad to worse. It is about time the people stepped in and did something about it.
It is only when you speak in those terms that you find things are even worse than that. A year or two ago a professor of economics of the State University in California wrote a three-volume book pointing out in infinite detail the extent to which America and NATO had rearmed Russia; that over 60 per cent. of their capability in war has been inspired or interpreted or built up by what America has done and what NATO countries have done, for money. This is the situation. He produced it in a book. He reduced it to a small book to make it more popular, and, having done that, that book is called National Suicide. For the sake of Hansard I am going to repeat that you can get National Suicide from KRP Publications, 254 Cann Hall, Leytonstone, E.11, and can read page after page proving absolutely and for ever that we have rebuilt the military power of Russia.
Or, if you want to come down to cases before going away from that point, what about one of our own? I was so horrified by that book that I repeated what I have just said to a man who is in business and asked him, "Is this possibly true?" He said, "After all, Rolls-Royce are making aeroplanes". I wrote to Rolls-Royce in November of last year, and Rolls-Royce replied—and I am quoting from a director of that company:
"Rolls-Royce does not manufacture aircraft but it does produce gas turbine engines for civil and military aircraft. … One of these engines, the Viper, has been installed in two different types

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of Yugoslav military training and light combat aircraft for many years … the same type of engine is to be used in a combat aircraft being developed jointly in Yugoslavia and Rumania".
His letter went on:
"The company more recently received a contract from the People's Republic of China under which the Chinese have a licence to build a Rolls-Royce Spey engine with technical assistance from Rolls-Royce. This will also he used in a combat aircraft by the Chinese armed services".
There you are, my Lords—right down to cases; miles short of nuclear warfare.
If there is going to be a fuss about Hong Kong and the Chinese attack, our young soldiers are going to be killed by Spey engines which have been introduced, and Rolls-Royce have people in China at the present moment helping them to produce them more successfully. Or, miles short of nuclear warfare, if there is a limited kind of warfare between Russia and its satellites and our country, our young people are going to be killed by Viper engines which have been produced for them by Rolls-Royce. When you come to that point, I say "I'm not going to play"; and an increasing number of people are saying, "I'm not going to play". I am not going to have my young sons going into the Army to be killed by Rolls-Royce Viper engines and Spey engines. This should be known. That book by the famous Anthony Sutton mysteriously disappeared from the bookshops of America, and yet somebody said it was the most concealed piece of terrifying truth that had ever happened. How many people in our country are aware that it is Rolls-Royce which are providing the implements of warfare, in and through all the sincerity, which I do not doubt, of other people? It is just part of it; it is just part of our life.
I have quoted in this House before the Caborro Basse Dam, Mozambique. One of our big banks was putting out millions of pounds to build the Caborro Basse Dam, and the water from this dam was going to flow into South Africa, thereby keeping apartheid going. Three rather idealistic young men, not churchmen, said, "We will go and buy a share in the bank and that will allow us to go and protest about the business being done". When they got up and protested on their one share each, they were told that they could not bring it up at the annual general meeting; but the chairman of the international
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section of this bank took the three young men into a room and said, "You young men must understand that international trade is now so intertwined that if you bring principle into it there will be no international trade". This was not a backroom boy of the Stock Exchange; this was one of the directors and one of the sub-chairmen of one of our largest banks saying, "Where profit is concerned, to hell with principle!" When we talk about the vandalism in our world, I will tell your Lordships where it comes from: it comes from the top of the tree, and not from the bottom of the tree—"The trade of this world is now so intertwined that if you bring principle into it there will be no international trade".
Remember, we will never declare war. Remember that the thing is now so precipitate that you cannot get Parliament together to decide whether to go to war. The result is that they have handed it over to NATO; NATO have handed it over to the President of the United States of America; and, well, we know what he is going to do. He is going to kill 70 million people in half an hour without consulting us at all. If this should ever happen, if we in this country should wake up one morning (that is, if we did wake up at all) to find that, because America had acted with nuclear power without consultation, we, representing the West, the Church consenting, had killed 70 million Russians, 95 per cent. of whom would not know what the war was about, to prove the superiority of Christianity over Communism—if that should ever happen—I hope to God that no young man dares to join the Established Church, or is such a fool as to join the Established Church! Where principle is concerned, well, let them become Quakers or let us pray for another Pentecost. We have come to the end of the thing; and I also to the end of my words—and the end of my words are not finally negative. But it is against that terrifying background that I must say this word.
There is a movement starting. Some people are saying: "Not yet one more movement!" But yes, one more movement. It is called Mobilisation for Survival. Your Lordships may be a little more interested when I tell you that it has on its staff in America and various places the

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President of the Fellowship for Reconciliation, the President of the World Council of Churches, the representatives of Pax Christi, which is the Roman Catholic Church, the Episcopal Bishop of New York; and I will tell you that they started on Hiroshima Day last year and that they are now growing very rapidly in Australia, in Chile, in Finland, in Great Britain, in Greece, in Germany, in Holland, in India, in Italy, in Kenya, in Mexico, in Norway, in Switzerland, in Tanzania and in Zimbabwe. I repeat all that in order to let your Lordships know that it is not a tiny little society. In Japan they are hoping to get 1 million signatures before the May conference, to say essentially that none of these people is going to have anything to do with a war, if and when it comes off.
I am proud to say that in my own Church in the North, in the middle of August, 280 ministers signed a document to say that they will have nothing to do with the next war, against the background of these remarks, if it comes off. We are hoping by May, which is our small Church Assembly, to have 500 ministers who are just not going to play at all. This is happening through Mobilisation for Survival in these places.
I would end by reminding your Lordships of the remark of Victor Hugo when he said that there is one thing mightier than armies: an idea whose hour is come. This is the idea whose hour is come; and it is slap in the middle of the Bible and right in the very centre of the Cross. Here we are a religious establishment which opens every time with Christian worship. Another man has said that wars will only cease when men refuse to fight. That is not a passing remark. There was the Vietnam war; and 95,000 young men, Americans, refused to fight and Kissinger was out. In terms of Eisenhower's remark, the Government had to stop because the people would not listen to them any longer. These were 95,000 young men. If you can get a million Japanese and 95,000 young men in all countries saying that they are not going to play, then there might be a new situation.
My Lords, the request, therefore, is whether the Government will investigate Mobilisation for Survival and see whether
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there is not a new initiative and a new way through, and not just (however sincere) another conference.
9.2 p.m.
Lord RITCHIE-CALDER: My Lords, I join with others in thanking my noble friend Lord Brockway, for giving us this opportunity and for opening up this discussion on what we, the British or British Government and, indeed, this House should be contributing as input into the special assembly. It is a great privilege for me—and it is the first time it has happened in this House—to follow the noble Lord, Lord Noel-Baker. I may say that it was a great privilege for me to follow George Macleod. I followed him often enough in the Aldermaston marches.
Having spent half my life opposing nuclear armaments, as such, I must on this occasion restrain myself on that subject. I do not criticise the rhetoric of nuclear disarmament in the United Kingdom draft programme. We have been refining the rhetoric—as somebody else has remarked, a great deal of it is extraordinarily familiar—for the past 32 years, ever since Bernard Baruch, when the U.S.A. had the monopoly of the bomb, offered the United Nations the choice between the "quick and the dead". I ought to say of this rhetoric how much more convincing it would be if Britain, having demonstrated the capacity to make the bomb, had announced it when our moral gesture would have been meaningful and as an example in nonproliferation.
Some of it, I must say, does not sound too convincing in this week when the Minister of Defence in a war game—and it is a war game; the children play it on boards on the kitchen table—deploys the comparative strengths of the NATO and the Warsaw Pact countries without emphasising the fact that Europe is a nuclear minefield. There are 7,000 tactical nuclear bombs on the NATO side and about 3,500 on the Warsaw Pact side. The US-supplied tactical nuclear weapons in Europe have a combined explosive capacity of 460 million tons of TNT—35,000 times greater than the Hiroshima bomb. That is in Europe alone.
Throughout the world the United States has 22,000 tactical nuclear weapons and probably 9,000 stragetical nuclear weapons; and the Soviet Union, in the

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horsetrading which we call the SALT talks, are negotiating on the same orders of magnitude; and while they drag their feet, they go on increasing their capacity. I would remind your Lordships that "tactical" in this connection with nuclear weapons means that in a Third Phase Alert, like the one with which Nixon terrified his allies, operational decisions are left in that case to junior commanders, right down to battery level. That is to say, this is not a question of that gentleman who could destroy 70 million people from the White House. This is, by this stage, getting down to operational level, even to the point of whimsical decisions.
Now we are faced with neutron bombs and Cruise missiles and, no doubt, now or presently, Soviet variations of the same devilry. The neutron bomb, which that unlikely Dr. Strangelove, my noble friend Lord Shinwell, has learned to love, is designed to destroy all life and, as my noble friend Lord Brockway has pointed out, to leave all property intact. I remember the proper derision with which the UN "Atoms for Peace" Conference 20 years ago greeted the cynical talk of "clean bombs" and "humanitarian bombs". Now we have the neutron bomb, which of course is the cleanest and kindliest.
I hope that the British proposals for conventions on weapons of mass destruction means by "radiological weapons" the neutron bomb—because that is what it is—a radiological bomb. I put this to my noble friend the Minister: I hope the proposals will be more specific about biological weapons. Although we are supposed to have outlawed them, and we have signed all kinds of conventions, I should like to see it repeated that these conventions will outlaw for ever biological weapons. I would remind your Lordships that these can be easily reactivated. In the last War the Allies had—and I know this as a positive fact because I was involved in discussions—among other things an extremely virulent form of botulin to serve the same purpose as the neutron bomb, to kill off all life so that the attackers could advance into a graveyard.
But I want to deal particularly with what the noble Lord, Lord Macleod of Fuinary, referred to. I want to deal with the horrendous traffic in conventional weapons now running at 18,000 million dollars a year in sales. In the 1930s we used to
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write about the merchants of death, the private arms traders. They even had faces, like Sir Basil Zaharov. Today these arms traders are the middlemen or are in the black market arming the IRA and the hijacker. The trade is now in the hands of Governments. Goverments are the merchants of death. The largest is the US Government authorising over 10,000 million dollars a year in the sales of weapons of death. I still shudder when I recall that my own Party in Government in 1964 simultaneously appointed a Minister for Disarmament and a Government arms salesman.
Now, as the noble Lord, Lord Macleod of Fuinary, has pointed out, we have great arms fairs in this country to which the buyers come to buy our "super-duper" weapons of destruction. How cynical can we get? We are gunrunners. I draw your attention to the Statement on the Defence Estimates. We actually boasted in that that overseas sales of defence equipment and associate services covered a wide range:
"These sales continue to make a substantial contribution to the country's balance of payments. The equipment sales in 1978–79 are expected"—
this is a boast—
"—to reach £900 million".
For the past few weeks we have seen what this indiscriminate arming means in the Horn of Africa, where American and Soviet arms—and I am sure some of ours—are being used by both sides. One thing you can never guarantee is whether countries will switch their alignments. We have seen that Egypt is to receive offensive aircraft and weapons; but of course Israel will have to get more sophisticated weapons as well. Vice-President Mondale in the United States, in deploring the arms trade, said:
"If we sell half a billion dollars in arms to Saudi Arabia, including 1,000 Sidewinders and over 1,000 of our most sophisticated weapons like the Maverick bomb and the precision-guided anti-tank weapons, we then have to give economic and military aid to Israel to preserve that balance".
What absolute nonsense! No child at the kitchen table playing at war would ever think of that nonsense.
Iran is now a great military Power, no longer just arming to offset the Soviet arms delivery to Iraq, which was the original excuse for supplying them. When OPEC increased the oil prices, Iran bought weaponry—2½ thousand million dollars of

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weapons including 1,200 British Chieftain tanks. That is a pretty grim adjustment of the balance of payments. Sales to Kuwait in that same year, sanctioned by the US Government, rose in that one year from 18 million dollars to 366 million dollars. In the same year, Saudi Arabia tripled its arms purchases to 1½ thousand million dollars of imported hardware in a military budget of 6 billion dollars. Of that trade Britain has got a substantial share.
A friend of mine who was a "big shot" in the United States military-industrial complex is alarmed by one aspect of the trade. He does not frighten easily but he is frightened by this point. He says that his customers are now getting sophisticated weapons which the United States Services themselves have not got in use. It is no longer military surpluses or "discontinued lines" that are being sold. Foreign customers on the level of Iran and Saudi Arabia, with all their wealth, are now subsidising the research and development of the arms companies, with the Pentagon eventually getting the spin-off. An interesting aspect of cost-benefit in the arms trade I should have thought, but have the Americans forgotten what happened when the gun-runners sold the latest Winchester rifles to the Red Indians? Perhaps they do not watch late-night movies.
The military budget for the world today now totals three hundred thousand million dollars a year, with the poorer countries who can least afford it paying the most per capita for defence. There is another consideration which I ask your Lordships to listen to, because it is far too serious to be ignored: that is the growth of armed para-military forces and, as we know to our dismay, the growth of guerrilla forces. "Para-military", in the context I am using it, implies allegiance to and dependence on the Government in power. The obverse is represented by the guerrillas dedicated to the overthrow of whatever régime—they can be substantial, often foreign-based, "liberation armies", they can be the Maquis, they can be the urban guerrillas or a multiplicity of armed factions, often—as in Ireland and the Lebanon—in conflict with each other. This kind of violent activity is now global and is often a form of interventionist policies, delivered and augmented in many
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cases, with arms provided. The resistance movements of war situations with patriotic intentions, as in occupied Europe during the War, have now become a means of organised subversion, with the planting of mercenaries and so-called "experts", often with supplies of arms from Governments deliberately unfriendly and providing of course the richest market for private gun-running. This is the fact of the situation which the noble Lord, Lord Noel-Baker, referred to as "indiscriminate violence". This indiscriminate violence is due to the fact (he said this and I repeat it) that we are now in a world where the cynicism of Governments—of our directors, our rulers and people who are supposed to be our "wise men" has in fact betrayed the younger generation.
I want to point out that this question of "para-military" is becoming a very serious matter. Professor Maurice Janowitz, a friend of mine at Chicago University, has been quantifying the paramilitary forces, with particular reference to the developing countries. He has found a remarkable increase in the past decade. Excluding the armies of Nigeria and Egypt, which expanded and have remained on a wartime footing, the regular armies of the nations of Africa increased from 313,000 in 1965 to 463,000 in 1975, an increase of 48 per cent. The para-military forces of those nations increased from 134,000 to 327,000144 per cent. In Asia, the figures for the regular military show an expansion from 7,397,000 to 9,729,000, or 30 per cent.
Those figures take account of the South-East Asia war and the India-Pakistan war. The increase of para-military forces was from 3,770,000 to 5,904,000 or 74 per cent. The Latin-American figures, for regular military forces increased from 605,000 to 639,000, or 6 per cent. The para-military figures increased from 232,300, or 32 per cent. The reason I am stressing the para-military question is because the para-military are in fact people who either carry arms legitimately—that is, they have authorised arms—or they have access to them; so we then have vast internal forces increased in many cases, in some places even by the security guards of firms and so forth.
I suggest that this is releasing into the system of every country the most fantastic

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availability of arms. If we look at what the noble Lord, Lord Noel-Baker, was saying about the "indiscriminate violence" we realise that here we have all sorts of possibilities which, to me, are quite terrible. What I am really saying is that there should be, and must be support of the high purposes that David Owen has expressed to my noble friend Lord Brockway. In addition to these high purposes, in addition to any purposes, we want to work out the military aspect.
I think that at this on-coming conference we have to get to grips with this widespread availability of arms, this traffic, this trade in arms. We shall never be able to achieve anything in this world until we stop this arms race. The United Nations Committee for Development Planning, with the support of the Economic and Social Council in 1976, said that the greatest single obstacle preventing the achievement of the goals and targets of the international development strategy was defence spending, and called for an unflagging emphasis on the need for reallocation of resources from defence to development. In 1980 when the United Nations declares a new international strategy for the third development, an international disarmament strategy should also be declared, making specific provision for the linking of those two strategies. I share with my noble friends Lord Brockway and Lord Noel-Baker an optimism about what is going to happen in the next few months, but you will only make that meaningful for us and for the people of the world if you persuade the misled, misdirected, wrongly inspired developing countries, who in imitation of all we are doing have seen the need for vast expenditure on arms, that this new economic order to which they are so strongly committed can only be achieved by an end to the arms race.
9.24 p.m.
Lord GORONWY-ROBERTSMy Lords, this noble House would be very grateful once more to my noble friend Lord Brockway for raising this matter of the utmost importance, and also for the opportunity of listening to my noble friend Lord Noel-Baker, holder of the Nobel Peace Prize and one who has for so many years at such high levels exerted himself in the cause of peace and disarmament. To hear both my noble friends Lord Brockway and Lord Noel-
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Baker speak tonight brought forcefully to me how much I and an entire generation owe to these two truly noble Lords for the action and the doctrine which they propounded in the crucial years of the 'twenties and' thirties.
The Government warmly welcome the United Nations special session on disarmament, which will take place from the 23rd May to the 28th June this year. Like all meetings of the General Assembly, the special session will not be empowered to take decisions binding upon Governments. But it will be the largest ever international gathering on disarmament and it can focus world attention, stimulate Governments to rethink their policies and give a new impetus to progress in arms control and disarmament. The possibilities of this special session are immense and many of us feel an optimism that at long last at least a beginning on significant disarmament and arms control may commend itself to the nations of the world.
The United Kingdom has played a vigorous part in the work of the preparatory committee for the special session. We joined with other Western States in putting forward on 13th December 1977 a draft for the Declaration on Disarmament, which will be a part of the final document of the special session. Of course, there is a copy in the Library of the House. This Declaration on Disarmament states the principles which we consider should govern disarmament negotiations, so as to give the nations of the world a clear commitment to this most vital work. The preparatory committee now in session in New York has begun the drafting of this declaration using as their basis the various texts put forward, including our own.
We have also, with other Western States, made suggestions in the preparatory committee on ways in which the international machinery for the discussion and negotiation of disarmament agreements can be improved. The conference of the Committee on Disarmament in Geneva is the principal multilateral organisation for such negotiations, and it has done useful work. But we favour certain changes to increase its effectiveness and to bring it into the United Nations family.
In particular, we want to see China and France involved in disarmament negotiations.

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There is also a need for arrangements to enable States which are not members of the conference to participate in its work. Other improvements are also for consideration. In addition, we favour increasing the role of the United Nations in disarmament and propose to make appropriate suggestions at the right time. Of course, the conference is not an agency of the United Nations, and I am not suggesting that the change which some people have in mind should proceed in quite that direction. Nevertheless, I repeat—and the noble Lord, Lord Banks, made a valid point on this—that we favour increasing the role of the United Nations in disarmament, and propose to make appropriate suggestions at the right time.
However, perhaps the most important document to be adopted by the special session will be a Programme of Action on Disarmament, setting out the measures which are needed in the next few years. This programme can be a valuable catalyst to progress. It should be ambitious and comprehensive, but, at the same time, coherent, clear and, above all, practical. The record of the 'twenties and 'thirties, and of the early decades after the Second World War, is strewn with emotional slogans and adjurations, when in fact what has been necessary is two things; first, hard work by experts to make these ideals practical, and, secondly, goodwill, not by one Government or one country only but across the board and across the world. When I sometimes hear my own country pilloried, although I know that it has set an example of willingness not only to proclaim these principles, but to work hard at the expert level to make them practical, I must confess to a certain impatience.
This Programme of Action on Disarmament is a most important document. Of course we are committed to the cause of general and complete disarmament; it is our policy. In the meantime, we must mobilise as much agreement as we can, on the widest possible front, and try to achieve a breakthrough—I believe that that was said by my noble friend—at those points where it is possible to make progress. I believe that there are a number of points where meaningful progress can be made.
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That programme should, above all, be practical. It should call for the negotiation of specific, verifiable agreements. We have had too many suggestions from various quarters which have made an impact on the public mind, but when we have come down to the close negotiation and said, "That is fine, but of course it must be seen to be verified in practice", somehow the whole propaganda has dissolved in mist. There should therefore be negotiation of specific, verifiable agreements, whether bilateral, regional or multilateral. There should not be unilateral gestures or grandiose ideas that are unrealisable in these or any other circumstances.
The United Kingdom has prepared a draft for this programme of action. It is not a programme for the promulgation of disarmament at a stroke—overnight. It is a practical policy and a practical programme which, if we can get sufficient agreement behind it, will indeed transform the prospects of the world. We began by conducting a review of our own policies and those of the West. Then we discussed our ideas with a wide range of non-Government organisations and with distinguished personalities, many of them world experts in these fields and interested in disarmament, who make up my advisory panel on this subject.
The plan we have drawn up incorporates some of the useful ideas which have emerged from these discussions. We further discussed it with our allies in the Atlantic Alliance, our partners in the Nine and other Western States. We then put it forward in the United Nations on 1st February, with the support of a number of Western States as co-sponsors. A copy of this declaration also is in the Library of the House, but it has been very fairly discussed and quoted from by more than one speaker this evening. As for the declaration on disarmament, this is now being considered in the preparatory committee, together with drafts put forward by other countries. Our programme of action starts with a statement of the immediate measures for disarmament which are needed in the years following the special session.
We seek to tackle the problem of nuclear weapons from two directions. First, there is the co-called vertical proliferation aspect and the attempt to

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move towards a reduction in existing and nuclear arsenals. My noble friend Lord Ritchie-Calder, who boasts an expertise of uniqueness in this field, has reminded us of the many possibilities of explosion by accident, let alone by design, that exist in the nuclear age. We are attempting to move towards a reduction in the existing nuclear arsenals—to thin out the minefield my noble friend so graphically described. This is a practical step. I believe that it will make sense to other countries—to the super-Powers and others—and encourage them to tackle the existing dangers in the nuclear field.
The main steps are a comprehensive test ban, in which we are engaged with the Russians and the Americans, and further agreements on strategic arms limitation. But it is also of vital importance to strengthen the curbs on the horizontal proliferation of nuclear weapons to other countries, and our plans set out a range of ideas for this purpose. In this context we have suggested that powers possessing nuclear weapons should reassure others and encourage non-proliferation by giving assurances, to increase the confidence of the States that have renounced nuclear weapons in their security nuclear attack.
In the conventional field we stress, among other things, the need for early progress in mutual and balanced force reductions and we call for a ban on chemical weapons, on which the United Kingdom put forward a draft treaty in 1976 which was very well received indeed by the international community. Here again, we see the evidence of sheer hard work. Our plan goes on to set out the preparations needed for the next generation of major disarmament talks, on subjects which at present may be too controversial or not well enough understood for successful negotiations. First, we propose steps to strengthen international security and build confidence between States, without which progress in disarmament will always be very difficult. I want to repeat that: to strengthen the feeling of international security, without which progress in disarmament will always be very difficult—I would say practically impossible. So long as people are afraid they are not going to disarm. The key to disarmament, as I have repeatedly urged from this Box, is confidence and security.
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We urge the adoption in other areas of the world of confidence building measures—we have heard about these tonight—on the lines already in being in Europe flowing from the Helsinki Final Act. We believe that States in other continents might also find it reassuring to have advance notification of military movements and manoeuvres taking place in their regions and to exchange observers at manoeuvres—the strength of security and confidence arising from being shown what the other man is doing. This is a very sound principle of co-operation.
We call for more facts. Governments should publish detailed information about their armed forces and their military expenditure, and also the total annual value of their arms production and exports. Britain is calling for that. We have heard about British arms exports. They are minuscule compared with the massive operations of other countries; let us really keep this in perspective. They are also licensed and managed so as to achieve the greatest possible end result of a feeling of confidence and security in the regions to which they are sent. I could give many examples of this. I agree strongly with everything that has been said in favour of the abolition of the arms trade. It is not just in Britain that it must start. In fact the really practical significant proposals for starting to end this trade come from Britain and form part of the proposals we are putting forward at this special session this year.
We also suggest that preparations for future disarmament negotiations might be taken by a series of United Nations examinations, studies on key subjects, where more needs to be known and more widely known if progress is to be made. Once again it is this need for the data, the understanding, the expert grasp of what lies at the heart of this problem, so that having solved the theology of it you proceed to try to solve the scientific practicality of it. I agree with my noble and reverend friend that once we have the theology right we are more than halfway towards achieving the practical end. Indeed, I would say that we would not get to the practical end unless we were spurred on by the kind of conviction that he exemplified in his speech tonight. In particular, we favour a study of the world-wide build-up of conventional arms and how to reduce it.

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Worldwide military expenditure in 1976 reached 350 billion dollars (350 thousand million dollars). It is a grim and important fact that the share of the arms of the developing countries whom we all want to help, has increased from 6 per cent. in 1966 to 15 per cent. in 1976. Their total expenditure of 51 billion dollars is almost three times what they received in development aid. It is estimated that they spent eight billion dollars in 1976 on importing conventional weapons. I say that not to denigrate those countries but to point out an operative fact with which somebody has to grapple. It is no good going to them and lecturing them about what they ought to do. They have a firm feeling that their security depends on arms. Indeed, many of them feel that the attempts to impose non-proliferation of nuclear weapons or nuclear knowledge on them is some kind of conspiracy by the developed countries to keep this new knowledge from them.
All of these matters need very close study. We must go into the heart of the motivation of insisting on weapons at all. Developing countries understandably distrust the idea that importers of arms—they do not make them themselves—should be subject to special restrictions. The right approach to arms control—the control of the arms trade and its eventual abolition—must involve both suppliers and importers. A start can be made by deepening and disseminating the world's knowledge of the subject. That is the purpose of the examination, or the in-depth study, that we are proposing among other things in the programme.
Another study we suggest is on the strengthening of the security rôle of the United Nations in peacekeeping and the peaceful settlement of disputes, to enable it to anticipate and resolve international crises. I was much impressed by a number of speeches which drew our attention to the sheer violence that characterises our society these days. Can we perhaps, through the internationalisation of force, prevent the proliferation of violence by appointing the policeman to hold the baton and depriving everybody else of any weapon? That must be the aim. There must be a use of force which countervails violence. In that sense pacificist and patriot—not that pacifists are not patriots
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—can unite on a policy where the natural energies of men and the world are diverted to constructive uses.
The Organisation of the United Nations has not fulfilled the role in maintaining international peace and security which the Charter envisaged. As progress is made in disarmament—and it may well be made in certain areas on disarmament this year—the role of the United Nations in the peaceful settlement of disputes will obviously become increasingly important. Another new idea is for a study into the latest technology available for confidence building and the verification of arms control agreements. The United Nations, indeed the United States, have successfully used modern surveillance techniques in the Sinai Peninsula. We think that such techniques might be applied elsewhere in increasing confidence and in verifying arms control agreements.
This year of 1978 may, indeed, be a successful one in the history of arms control. We hope for agreement within a matter of months in our tripartite negotiations with the United States and the Soviet Union on a properly verified comprehensive test ban of unlimited duration. We applaud the efforts of President Carter's Administration to achieve a second Strategic Arms Limitation agreement with the Soviet Union, which could open the way to reductions in nuclear arsenals; and we are convinced that the United Nations Special Session can give a new momentum to arms control negotiations generally. A Programme of Action on the lines we are advocating, if adopted by the Special Session, would be a catalyst to action and achievement—a signpost of the way ahead towards a safer world.
Lord BROCKWAY: My Lords, before the Minister resumes his seat, may I say that I put a whole series of questions to him which I shall not press at this stage. I can put them down as Questions for Written Answer. However, I should like him to answer one in particular because it is important. At the United Nations Assembly will Her Majesty's Government support the proposal that it should be followed by a world disarmament conference to carry out the recommendations in detail?
Lord GORONWY-ROBERTS: My Lords, indeed my noble friend might table a series of Questions for Written Answer, but perhaps the House will bear with me if I answer his question. Which Western nations supported the United Kingdom's Programme of Action? Australia, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, the Federal Republic of Germany, Italy, Japan, the Netherlands and Norway co-sponsored the Programme of Action. That links with a question put to me by the noble Lord, Lord O'Hagan, as to whether the EEC countries have supported us in this. He will find that with the exception of France, Eire and Luxembourg, they have.
Will France and the United States be supporting our programme or be putting forward their own proposals? The answer is that we consulted France and the United States in the preparation of the programme. So far as we know, they have no plans to put forward drafts of their own for the Programme of Action. But, of course, France has made proposals on individual aspects of arms control and disarmament and I daresay that the United States might do likewise. At the moment the only Programme of Action is that of the United Kingdom supported, as I have said, by those co-sponsors.
The noble Lord also asked who will lead the British delegation. I am glad to say that my right honourable friend the Prime Minister, as well as the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary, plans to attend. I shall lead the delegation for part of the time. Our Ambassador at the United Nations, Mr. Richard, and our Ambassador to the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament, Mr. Ashe, will lead for the remainder of the time. He also asked about the size of membership of the British delegation. It is a little early to be precise about this, but our delegation will probably contain about 10 officials from the Foreign and Commonwealth Office, and our delegation to the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament.
Finally, my noble friend was anxious to know whether we would favour the idea of a follow-up world disarmament conference. Many delegations in the preparatory committee support the idea of a second special session in the early 1980s which would adopt a programme of action for the following years. This
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seems to be the most likely form of follow-up. Let us not disregard this possibility. If this process this year is effective in achieving what has been described by some Members this evening as a breakthrough, may it not be that the right follow-up is to have a repeat performance after a period of implementation, of verification, in say two or three years' time? It is worth considering.
My noble friend is always in favour of a world disarmament conference. By all means, it might be appropriate in due course after a series of progressive achievements by everybody implementing what has been agreed at successive special sessions. There are a number of other points put to me and no one, so far, has pressed me to reply to them with quite the friendly enthusiasm of my noble friend. I shall be glad to do so, though not necessarily this evening.