§ 4.2 p.m.
§ Lord WINTERBOTTOMMy Lords, with the leave of the House, I shall now repeat a Statement being made in another place by my right honourable friend the Secretary of State for Defence. The Statement is as follows:
§ "Following the NATO Ministerial meeting on 25th March, the Government have given further consideration to their position on the provision of these aircraft to meet the requirements of the Alliance. As I made clear at the meeting, we have already agreed to two postponements of the NATO decision which is urgently required if timely provision of airborne early warning cover for the NATO area is to be achieved.
§ "As the House knows, we have maintained an alternative national development based on the Nimrod aircraft as a fall-back option in case of failure by NATO to agree on a system for the whole Alliance. This development has so far been funded at a low level, but if it is not to be delayed further a substantial increase in the rate of expenditure on it is now necessary. In the light of the continued uncertainty about the procurement of the AWACS system by NATO, we have decided that we must now go ahead with the Nimrod system, which, subject to the successful conclusion of the necessary contract negotiations, will now proceed to full development.
§ "In taking this decision the Government have taken full account of the arguments put forward in NATO for further delay to enable outstanding questions on the procurement of the Boeing E3A AWACS aircraft to be further studied. Our decision to go ahead with Nimrod, however, will give the Alliance an urgently needed and modern airborne early warning capability to replace the Shackletons now operating in the United Kingdom Air Defence Region and in the Eastern Atlantic and Channel areas. Our decision does not exclude the possibility of a collective NATO solution to the requirement. In developing the Nimrod system we shall aim to secure the maximum inter-operability and compatibility 1066 between Nimrod and whatever additional airborne early warning aircraft the Alliance may eventually decide to procure. I suggested to my NATO colleagues that a single NATO airborne early warning force, though it would be an ideal solution, is not the only way in which the airborne early warning requirement could be met. We shall continue to work for arrangements which will secure maximum military effectiveness from the resources which the Alliance eventually decides to devote to the airborne early warning task".
§ My Lords, that concludes the Statement.
§ 4.5 p.m.
§ Lord STRATHCONA and MOUNT ROYALMy Lords, the House is grateful to the noble Lord for repeating that Statement. First, I should like to express regret that NATO has again demonstrated its inability to agree on a common policy. I believe that all sides of this House remain dedicated to the notion of standardisation of equipment. Is it true that it is principally the Germans who have reservations about committing themselves to the AWACS system, and, if so, can the noble Lord tell us what their reservations are?
We can express considerable satisfaction about the employment implications in this decision. I believe that it gives employment to about 1,500 people for a matter of five years. Can the noble Lord tell us how this would compare with the part of the AWACS contract that this country would receive, because I do not think it is inconsiderable? We must accept that in pursuing the course that is suggested here we are laying ourselves open to being accused of parochialism and jingoism, whereas I would hope that we could demonstrate our readiness to submerge our national interests in the wider interests of the Alliance as a whole. Therefore, is there any chance of Britain persuading her allies to join her in the course that she will pursue? Also, can the noble Lord expand a little on what is meant by the sentence in the Statement:
Our decision does not exclude the possibility of a collective NATO solution to the requirement"?1067 Can the noble Lord tell us the relative technical merits of the two systems? For example, does the Nimrod system operate overland and does the Boeing system operate over water, or is it the specialised nature of the two systems which is referred to in the Statement where it says:… that a single NATO airborne early warning force … is not the only way in which the airborne early warning requirement could be met"?Can the noble Lord tell us how the timings of these two developments compare? For example, when will the Nimrod system be ready? I believe that so far it has only been tested on the ground.Clearly, we are glad to hear that there is to be inter-operability and compatibility, however much we may dislike those rather ponderous words. However, does that mean that we could envisage the possibility of Nimrod and AWACS aircraft operating side by side in a complementary role? Can the noble Lord tell us what compromises are envisaged in the development when the Statement says:
In developing the Nimrod system we shall aim to secure the maximum inter-operability and compatibility between Nimrod and whatever additional airborne early warning aircraft the Alliance may eventually decide to procure"?I apologise for firing so many questions at the noble Lord but they are relevant to the Statement. Finally, can he tell us to what rate of expenditure we are committing ourselves by taking this decision? I am certain that we have to take this step, but we should like to know how deeply committed we are and what, for example, would happen if, in a few months' time, it was decided, after all, to reach agreement on ordering the AWACS system. When is the next decision point and when will the next discussion of this matter take place?
§ The Earl of KIMBERLEYMy Lords, we on these Benches should also like to thank the noble Lord for repeating the Statement, and congratulate his right honourable friend the Secretary of State on making this decision. It may well turn out to be a very good decision. We should congratulate British Aerospace on concluding their first contract since they have been nationalised—it may be a good omen.
I should like to ask the noble Lord one or two questions. The present system 1068 is installed only in a Comet airframe. When it is due to fly? Secondly, when will the system be installed in the first Nimrod airframe and when will that fly? In view of what the noble Lord, Lord Strathcona and Mount Royal, said, as we have now made a stand on using our own aircraft, will the Government be able to bring even stronger pressure to bear on the remaining NATO countries to purchase Nimrod themselves? Also is there any chance of exporting it to other countries not in NATO, such as France and Australia? I should also like to repeat something that the noble Lord, Lord Strathcona, mentioned. Can the noble Lord, Lord Winterbottom, enlarge on what he meant by "the possibility of a collective NATO solution"? Lastly, can the noble Lord tell us, now that the decision has been taken to go ahead, how long it will take to equip the United Kingdom defence system?
§ Lord WINTERBOTTOMMy Lords, I hope that both noble Lords who have questioned me on my Statement will accept that fact that I should very much like to answer them in detail if I could, but the timing of the Statement has been such that I could grasp only the main outlines of the decisions. I should be grateful if perhaps another opportunity might be taken, by way of an Unstarred Question, to enable me to answer in detail the points made to me be the two noble Lords who have questioned me.
However, may I say that we have made it clear all along that a single NATO force would, if it could be established, be the best solution. We believe that. Unfortunately exercises have shown that the Shackleton force, which is now the only element we have for policing the United Kingdom air defence region, is inadequate. A recent exercise has shown that 70 per cent. of aircraft got through undetected. It was because our national need was so great that my right honourable friend insisted on his colleagues in NATO reaching a decision by, originally, I think it was the 25th of March; now it could not be reached until 1st July. That is why I am making the Statement today: because we believe that this particular decision cannot be allowed to drag on.
The noble Lord, Lord Strathcona, mentioned German reservations. Of course I cannot speak for the German 1069 Government, but the point is that, whereas on this matter I think in many ways they share our view, the actual reapportionment of resources that would have been demanded of them made it necessary for them to think a little further. For this reason we have decided to go ahead and buy the Nimrod variant. There is one point I can perhaps make. The two aircraft, the Boeing and the Nimrod, were designed for rather differing roles. The Boeing was designed mainly for over land operation, and the Nimrod for over sea operation. Their radars, as a result, have different capabilities which could be harmonised but which at the moment are not totally in harmony. The Nimrod is the better aircraft for sea work, and AWACS is the better for over land work. That is what I think my right honourable friend meant when he said a combined Nimrod/AWACS solution might possibly he the best that the Alliance could get.
§ Lord CARRINGTONMy Lords, would not the noble Lord agree that, regardless of whether or not the Government were right about this decision, it is yet another indication of the lack of political will on the part of NATO to come to a decision themselves and to equip and standardise their equipment? When the Statement says that the Government intend to secure the maximum inter-operability and compatibility between any two systems which develop as a result of this, does it mean that there is a possibility that they will not be inter-operable?
§ Lord WINTERBOTTOMMy Lords, I am speaking without exact knowledge in this highly technical field. I presume it means that what we have to achieve is the maximum degree possible of overlap between the two systems. If the noble Lord wants a more detailed answer, perhaps he could use a different situation. I am perfectly willing to give it, but these are highly technical matters on which I am not at this moment properly briefed.
§ Lord BEAUMONT of WHITLEYMy Lords, the noble Lord said that maybe we could put down an Unstarred Question, or that another opportunity might be found. In a situation like this, where a tremendous number of highly pertinent questions have had to be asked on a very 1070 skimpy Statement, is it not the Government's duty to expand in some kind of a much more detailed statement exactly what they are going to do, and exactly what are the implications of this decision? Will the noble Lord please say what the Government's intentions are about producing a detailed statement about this matter in some way?
§ Lord WINTERBOTTOMMy Lords, I would welcome the opportunity to inform the House in greater detail about the exact technical implications of this decision. I am certain that the usual channels will note what your Lordships have said and will make the necessary arrangements. But it is not simple. I am afraid that these things are not simple, and for this reason I think we should hope that the usual channels will arrange for perhaps a deeper discussion than I can answer today.
§ Lord ORR-EWINGMy Lords, would the noble Lord bear in mind that the vulnerability of this country and Western Europe to low level attack is considerable? The figure he gave us of 70 per cent. getting through was truly alarming. Therefore, any delays are not welcome. Moreover, delays inevitably add to the cost of anything, and therefore it is important that we should get on with the job, and the provision. I understand that it is envisaged that this Nimrod force should eventually be built up to II aircraft. May we be assured that these Nimrods will not be taken from the anti-submarine maritime Nimrod force but will be additional to that? The cuts which the Labour Government have already made are desperately dangerous at a time when the USSR is launching a new nuclear submarine every four weeks, and we should not weaken our maritime surveillance capability by one single aircraft. Can we be assured that that will not suffer as a result of this decision?
§ Lord WINTERBOTTOMMy Lords, I am grateful to the noble Lord, Lord Orr-Ewing, for supporting in the first part of his question the point of view that I took in my statement in answer to questioning. Without a brief in front of me, but from knowledge, I am reasonably certain that I can assure the noble Lord that the maritime Nimrods will not be affected. We have some airframes 1071 available for immediate conversion. I imagine for that we have to thank the noble Lord, Lord Carrington, for a decision he reached while he was Secretary of State for Defence. If I am wrong, I will inform the noble Lord and the House.
§ Lord GLADWYNMy Lords, I would not want to turn this in any way into a debate. However, may I ask one question? As I understand it, the Government still think that a collective early warning system in NATO would be the best. As I also understand, they still wish to tend in that direction: they want to achieve that if they can. If it is achievable, is it compatible with the maintenance of the Nimrod system or would it inevitably imply the suppression of Nimrod and the substitution of AWACS? Is it hence to be concluded that when they talk of a collective early warning defence that can only mean AWACS?
§ Lord WINTERBOTTOMMy Lords, obviously what is meant is that the two radars are compatible. The airframes are really secondary to the transport of radar.
§ Lord WIGGMy Lords, would the Minister not agree that there can be no question of transferring the maritime Nimrods to the role of early warning because, although they have the same name, they are really different kinds of animal?
§ Lord WINTERBOTTOMMy Lords, the noble Lord is quite correct, except that they would have a common airframe.
§ Lord SEGALMy Lords, while fully endorsing the action of Her Majesty's Government in this matter, may I ask whether my noble friend can say if any others of our NATO allies have supported us over the Nimrod issue, or whether this is a totally unilateral action on our part?
§ Lord WINTERBOTTOMMy Lords, I cannot give that answer because I do not know the whole course of the discussion.
§ Lord STRABOLGIMy Lords, we have now spent 17 minutes on this Statement. May I remind the House 1072 that ministerial Statements are made for information, and brief comments and questions are of course allowed but Statements should not be made an occasion for debate. I suggest that we move on with the original Motion.