HL Deb 27 July 1977 vol 386 cc1094-112

7.32 p.m.

Lord GLADWYN rose to ask Her Majesty's Government whether it is their opinion that the stretagy of "flexible response" is becoming increasingly inoperative and that it should be replaced by the gradual building-up of a forward defence based on conventional forces adequate to hold any conventional assault and backed up by "tactical" nuclear weapons for use only, and if necessary, as a second strike. The noble Lord said: My Lords, I feel that I owe your Lordships an explanation—or such of your Lordships as are now present, which number does not include very many—for raising this vast and immensely important matter on an Unstarred Question. The reason is simple. There was virtually no other way of raising it. If, as in the past, it comes up as it has done occasionally on the Defence Estimates, it is drowned in a discussion of the state of the TAVR; the desirability of going ahead with some particular weapon; the necessity or otherwise of cuts in defence expenditure; the protection of oil rigs; the conditions of service in the BAOR; pension matters; regimental reorganistaions, or I know not what.

The Government spokesman may, indeed, say that remarks on strategy are interesting and deserve study, but that is as far as one gets. An actual debate on strategy can, indeed, take place only on Government initiative, on a Party day (and the Liberals have only two days), or as a result of a ballot. So the chances of getting any profitable discussion going, other than by means of a Parliamentary Unstarred Question or as a result of a Government initiative, are slender.

No doubt in the recesses of the Ministry of Defence or in NATO there is intelligent talk about whether our whole present scheme of defence is sound or unsound; echoes of those talks are quite often heard in American technical journals and, indeed, in Survival, an excellent magazine published by the Institute of Strategic Studies. But the results are never made known in the Palace of Westminster and I doubt whether even the Cabinet has either the time or the inclination—and more especially the inclination—to consider a rather distasteful subject (and how distasteful it is may be seen by the comparative absence of Government supporters from tonight's debate) which may be considered by many to be a matter for military experts only and one on which even military experts may be divided. And yet there are now, apart from general strategy, some rather ugly features as regards which the ordinary citizen of this country has surely a right to know the Government's attitude. I refer to the Cruise Missile, the MX or Mobile Intercontinental Ballistic Missile and the so-called neutron bomb. I shall deal with those in a moment.

First, however, let us consider the whole concept of what is called "flexible response", on which our whole defensive posture still seemingly rests. As we all know, that is based on the idea that any aggressive action on the part of the adversary—and of course, there is now only one possible adversary; namely, the Soviet Union and its satellite forces—must be countered by an appropriate reaction. Perhaps it would be more correct to call it a policy of "graduated" response and as such it is no doubt acceptable theoretically in a general way.

Thus, if the adversary's move should prove to be not an all-out offensive but a simple probing operation, with limited political objectives, then it should be possible to check it with our available conventional forces, as they are called. Meanwhile, our Reserves would be mobilised and rushed to the front, their object being, if possible, to check the adversary if the push should prove to be more than a probing operation, or at least to hold him so as to facilitate negotiations.

But if all that is not enough and the adversary still advances, then an initial nuclear shot will presumably be necessary, and even if that should not be heeded our available tactical nuclear weapons will, so I understand, probably be directed against the adversary's front-line troops, who by that time presumably are well inside the Federal Republic, but in any case, against his lines of communication. I think that I am right in saying that that is the present theory.

This general strategy has unfortunately become less "credible" of recent years because of two developments. The first is the build-up of the Warsaw Pact forces in Europe, and notably in the German Democratic Republic, to an extent which largely vitiates any balance between these forces and those in Europe of the North Atlantic Alliance. The point has been made again and again in debates in this House and I shall not weary your Lordships with a description of the details of this imbalance as it exists in most fields, but chiefly in tanks, aircraft and armoured fighting vehicles.

It is not I think denied—and if it is the Government will no doubt reassure us—that the Soviet superiority in these weapons, some of which are at least equal in quality to the corresponding NATO weapons, is so marked that there would be no prospect of preventing an armoured thrust from penetrating a long way into the Federal Republic unless the allocated Reserves had already arrived and had been deployed, or unless recourse had been had from the outset to the use of the nuclear bomb.

But would it be possible for the Reserves to be deployed in time? As to that, there is increasing doubt. For the second major development has been the immense improvement in the state of readiness of the Soviet Armed Forces and in their lines of communication which would enable them, so we are given to believe by all the experts, even now to launch an offensive of great power on a small front with little warning, and quite possibly in a year or two's time with no warning at all.

So, in all probability, not only would the Reserves not be available in time to affect the issue of the battle, but the bulk of our forces in Germany, situated as they now are at a considerable distance from the frontier, would hardly be out of their barracks and into their transporting vehicles before a large part of the Federal Republic was in the hands of the adversary, who had crashed through the rather thin line of conventional forces on the frontier zone, unless—and I repeat unless—from the very outset the NATO forces had had resort to the so-called tactical nuclear weapons. It is, I know, suggested by some that the necessity of getting the Soviet Fleet out into the oceans would always provide some warning, but I doubt whether we should rely on that. After all, there could always be world-wide Soviet naval "manoeuvres" which could hardly trigger off any mobilisation on the Western side.

This brings us to the heart of the matter. It may still be said, I suppose, that if the Russians believe that the American President will not hesitate to authorise the use of nuclear weapons, if necessary within a few hours of the launching of any offensive, such an offensive will never be launched. Maybe. But the fact remains that in the future it will probably be less certain than it now is that such a decision will be taken. That is the probability. For if it were taken there is no serious doubt on the part of anybody that the Soviet forces would reply in kind, and that their reply would be unlikely to be limited to the "tactical nukes", though they have these too, of course. Some at least of the MRBMs (medium range ballistic missiles) now trained on all the major cities of Western Europe—and no doubt and more especially, I should think in the circumstances, those trained on certain Western German towns—would probably be let off.

Nor is it at all likely, I am afraid, that such second strike action on the Soviet side would be precluded by a perhaps rather improbable announcement from Washington that, if taken, it would result in a full-scale nuclear assault on the Soviet Union itself, still less such a declaration issuing from Paris or London. First use by NATO of nuclear weapons might indeed result in the halting of a Soviet armoured thrust, but only in return for quite unacceptable retaliation in Europe. The operation, in other words, might well be successful, but the patient would die.

All this does not mean, of course, that the Soviet Government are at all likely to bank on the likelihood that the United States Government will not, in the event of their attempting some coup in Europe, or even in the event of some clash in some other part of the world, authorise the first use of nuclear weapons. For if Europe died the Soviet Union would certainly not be better off. But it does mean that unless the situation changes, the Soviet political position, and hence their ability to drive hard bargains in negotiation, will get stronger and stronger. There is no doubt about that.

How, therefore, can we best prevent the position of the West from getting weaker and weaker? Well, clearly the most logical, and indeed the most desirable, way would be so to strengthen the forward positions of the allied forces on the Eastern border of the Federal Republic, and more especially of course in the North German plain, as to have a prospect of holding any conventional armoured thrust, at least for a considerable period, by employing sufficient conventional weapons of the very latest type. It would naturally also involve a transformation of the present NATO armoured divisions into smaller and more mobile forward-based units.

The general way in which this might be done has been often described in this House, and I need not repeat it. Most experts seem to think that such an effective defensive screen could be installed without any enormous extra expense and within a reasonable period of time. But most would also agree, I feel, that it could not even be attempted without a serious and successful effort, if not to produce all the necessary new weapons in common in Europe, at least to achieve what is called "interoperability": for this purpose to pool, in many respects, though not totally, the R and D programme of the European members of the Alliance, including France; and in any case to redeploy all the available ground forces of NATO so as to constitute a forward defence with a corresponding abandonment of the whole concept of a "second battle" after the presumed arrival of reserves.

For a time it looked as if this sort of concept was making some progress. Two years ago a speech by the French Chief of Staff, General Méry, followed by a pronouncement of the Head of State himself, suggested that the old—and logically indefensible—strategic theories based on total French independence were about to be revised. After all, it is undeniable that the existing French—and indeed, I would say, British—nuclear arsenal could only act, and can only act, as a deterrent against direct Soviet nuclear action against our own countries, and can never be used on a first nuclear strike.

Eighteen months ago, too, a body known as the European Programme Group, whose declared object was the harmonising of the production of advanced conventional weapons, was actually established with French participation. But such tendencies seem recently to have rather faded out as the French election approaches and the Gaullists' hope of overcoming the Left lies in an increasing beating of the national drum. True, there has been some successful effort, whether in the Eurogroup or, so to speak, alongside it, to produce certain modern weapons in common, notably the Tornado—or MRCA—fighter bomber, the FH medium gun, the Milan anti-tank guided weapon, the Roland ground-to-air missile, the Alpha-Jet fighter and the Anglo-French Jaguar aircraft, but so far as I know there has been no real attempt to reorganise our present defensive posture, which means that we must rely on a very early use, or threatened use, of nuclear weapons of some sort; in other words, as Soviet strength increases, in a steady lowering of the so-called "nuclear threshold".

The first question I would therefore ask the Government is simply whether they agree generally with my argument so far and with its conclusions, and if not, why they do not. If they do, however, the situation is grave, and it is here that we come up against the tiny neutron bomb (I believe it can be fired from the "Lance" missile launcher or even from a gun) which is supposed to have a lethal effect on concentrations of men, its damage to buildings and installations being more or less insignificant.

Great efforts have been made over many years now by the prospective manufacturers and promoters of this weapon to have it adopted by NATO. On the face of it, as I remember pointing out some years ago, it seems to be chiefly designed to make the possibility of the employment of tactical nuclear weapons less unpalatable to the Germans, who would not wish large areas of their own territory under (it would be hoped) temporary Russian occupation to be devastated, and hence to make it easier for the President of the United States to authorise a nuclear "first strike", if he has to do so, directed rather against invading Russians than Germans, and of course sparing all German constructions and buildings.

Of course its actual first use would not prevent appalling retaliation, although that would presumably follow the first use of any kind of nuclear weapon. Would it, however, if installed, have any real use as a deterrent? That is really the question before us. Personally I think this doubtful, and the violent Russian reaction against it is not particularly reassuring. The chances are indeed, as I believe, that it would make arms control more difficult. On the other hand, the more likely its use the greater the deterrent—or so it could be argued.

It has been attacked understandably on humanitarian grounds, notably this afternoon by the noble Lord, Lord Brockway, but I am not sure that it is more frightful than a "normal" small size nuclear bomb which would kill masses of people anyhow in horrible circumstances, and in just as frightful a way. All nuclear weapons are appalling, but I think that, whatever views we have on this, whether we think it has any use as a deterrent or not, we should surely know on which side of the controversy the Government stand. So my second question is: Do the Government approve of the acquisition by NATO and the deployment in Germany of the neutron bomb? The Government must have had ample time, many years now, to consider their attitude, and it really is rather intolerable that they should apparently, as I noticed from Lord Winterbottom's reply earlier this afternoon, seek to avoid this issue altogether by saying, as I understand it, that it is only a matter for the Americans, and that this weapon in any case has not yet been fully deployed. I therefore repeat my second question: Do the Government approve of the acquisition by NATO and the deployment in Germany of the so-called neutron bomb?

We are excluded from the SALT talks, but I understand that they are now unfortunately stalled because, apart from the neutron bomb, the Russians accuse the Americans of contemplating going ahead, first, with the production of the so-called Cruise missile, which, by following the contours at low altitude and at subsonic speeds, and guided by satellite or otherwise, in theory, and at the moment I think largely in practice, could destroy, by nuclear or other means (it could have a conventional or a nuclear warhead) any target with perfect accuracy at thousands of miles range without at the moment much possibility of interception; and, secondly, with the possible installation in the United States of mobile ICBMs, perhaps also fired from 20-mile long tunnels, which could not be eliminated on a first nuclear strike.

This last one, the mobile ICBM, is something which we can clearly do nothing about. I believe—at least I am told—that the Americans do not really want to develop this weapon but are using its possible existence for bargaining purposes. Giving them public advice on this matter might perhaps best be left to the President of the French Republic, but presumably we could give our private advice on how its adoption would be likely to affect the policy of détente, on which we have built such hopes in the past, and perhaps we have already done so in conversation with Mr. Carter; who knows? Perhaps I should not ask that question at the moment.

The Cruise missile, on the other hand, is something which, like the neutron bomb, if deployed, would affect us very directly. This weapon, which already exists in an imperfect form, can be employed, as I say, either for strategic purposes or in what is called the theatre of war. At present there is little defence against it, though no doubt, more especially over the longer ranges, it could be installed without great difficulty, if at great expense. But in the theatre of war it could be deadly and might well take the place of aircraft and of the present so-called tactical nuclear weapons. It would also, as weapons go, be very cheap to produce. Consequently, if deployed in sufficient numbers, it could do a great deal to redress the present imbalance, and it is this that no doubt worries the Soviet Government. My third question, therefore, is whether the Government feel that the Cruise missile could with advantage be deployed in Europe and, if so, should we consider acquiring and manufacturing a number of these for our own individual use?

I confess that I doubt whether I shall receive any very straight answers to these questions this evening. However, I hope that, by merely posing them, I may somehow provoke or instigate a full-blown debate before the end of the year, in which noble Lords who have already reflected on these grave matters may be persuaded to give their valuable advice. Though I do not think it sould necessarily be limited to members of the Services, past and present, I should in particular hope that, by that time, the noble and gallant Field Marshal, Lord Carver, who has now taken his seat, will feel able to take part in such a debate.

In any case, the nuclear issue hangs over all of us like a cloud which, like death, most of us prefer not to think about. But the American Senate and its powerful committees do discuss this fearful subject, so why should not we? Surely this House is well equipped to consider it and might even be thought to be failing in its duty if it did not. It is really this thought that I wish to leave with your Lordships in asking the Question which is now before the House.

Baroness GAITSKELL

My Lords, may I ask the noble Lord, Lord Gladwyn, a question about the neutron bomb, arising out of his most interesting speech? Is not the reason why we have such feelings of revulsion against the neutron bomb because it puts property much higher than the consecration of human life?

Lord GLADWYN

I am not sure the noble Baroness is right, my Lords. It would destroy human beings just as effectively as any nuclear weapon would. It is true that it would not affect buildings, but if one looks at it from the German point of view, which the noble Baroness might not wish to do, it might be thought of advantage that a great many Russians would be killed yet buildings in the Federal Republic would not be destroyed. They might consider that of advantage. I am not saying they would, but I think it likely.

Baroness GAITSKELL

I would take a lot of convincing about that, my Lords.

Lord GLADWYN

My Lords, the noble Baroness might care to reflect on that possibility.

7.56 p.m.

Lord STRATHCONA and MOUNT ROYAL

My Lords, perhaps I should interrupt the dialogue between the noble Baroness, Lady Gaitskell, and the noble Lord, Lord Gladwyn. I intend to be brief, though judging from the number of questions he has had thrown at him, the noble Lord, Lord Winterbottom, might welcome a brief interlude before he gives the answers.

There is no doubt that the issues raised by Lord Gladwyn are at the very heart of defence thinking and we cannot exaggerate their importance. However, it is perhaps a pity that the noble Lord's expertise and eloquence are possibly being wasted on an Unstarred Question of this nature, although I sympathise with his reasons. He is possibly underrating the effectiveness of our usual channels, which I am aware want to have some kind of defence debate.

Lord GLADWYN

When?

Lord STRATHCONA and MOUNT ROYAL

In the autumn, my Lords, and an issue of this sort, which I completely agree can become submerged in all the other issues with which we try to deal in defence debates, is something to which we should return in due time.

It seems to me that the nuclear umbrella has served us well since the end of Hitler's war by the sheer magnitude and awesome nature of its threat. It is certainly right to say that the mini-nukes or tac-nukes, or whatever jargon one uses to talk about them, and other similar developments, such as the proposed neutron bomb, are in danger of eroding the clear-cut nuclear threshold to which we have been accustomed and which was so clearly defined. That point was ably made by the noble Lord, Lord Chalfont, in an article in The Times earlier this week in which he said that there was a danger inherent in anything nuclear which tended to blur the distinction between nuclear and nonnuclear.

I am in no doubt whatever that the noble Lord, Lord Gladwyn, will be performing a valuable service if this debate serves once again to reiterate the danger of the disparity which is gradually appearing in conventional forces. There is no doubt that NATO is increasingly falling behind the Warsaw Pact in this respect. Consider one example which has been quoted in this House before. The Warsaw Pact countries now possess the classic three-to-one preponderance in tanks which Liddell Hart deemed to be the margin needed to launch an attack. I saw an article in Newsweek earlier this year by Arnaud de Borchgrave in which he said very neatly: Conventional muscle and the will to use it in what the United States or Russia perceive to be their vital interests are the real keys to the balance of power. On that front NATO has never been more vulnerable". The point in this connection is that disparities of this kind tend to lower the nuclear threshold to a point at which we may find our vital interests so threatened that we would have to contemplate the awesome possibility, the unthinkable possibility, of resort to the nuclear armoury to redress the balance; and, of course, this becomes increasingly tempting if this is the area in which one has a technical lead—

Lord WYNNE-JONES

My Lords, I thank the noble Lord for giving way. I wonder whether he has taken into consideration the enormous significance of the Tornado? From all that I can understand, the Tornado is really far superior to anything that can be posed on the other side. Surely the noble Lord will agree that the forward defence, to which the noble Lord, Lord Gladwyn, has referred, is largely an outdated mode of thinking, and that today we are thinking much more in terms of what happens 200 miles behind the border, rather than at the border. Surely the Tornado is extremely important in this respect.

Lord STRATHCONA and MOUNT ROYAL

My Lords, I am delighted to hear from such an expert as the noble Lord, Lord Wynne-Jones, such an encouraging report of the Tornado, which is entirely in line with everything that one hears. I recognise the danger of posing as an armchair strategist, but I should not have thought that, however excellent one particular aeroplane, it was likely to compensate for the conventional disparity in other kinds of arms, which are increasingly appearing in the NATO forces. I simply would not set myself up as an expert; but this is a very fair point.

I should like to revert to one of the conclusions which I think one should draw in passing. The disarmers must face the danger that they increase the risk of war and that they increase the risk of the subsequent escalation into nuclear conflict, with the terrible consequences of which we are all aware. When we talk of flexible responses, I do not see how it is possible to establish recognised steps on the stairway from conventional to all-out nuclear war, however desirable that may be. It is also worth saying that uncertainty is an element of great value, and here we ought to appreciate that, however limited it may be, the nuclear capabilities possessed by the United Kingdom and France have a considerable contribution to make here, in that they are another complicating factor to be considered by any potential adversary who engages in warlike manoeuvres.

I was rather relieved that the noble Lord, Lord Gladwyn, did not go too far down the road in advancing what we might call the Euro defence policy as a panacea for our problems, because I believe we must understand that NATO continues to be our linchpin, and NATO includes the United States. Therefore, we should welcome President Carter's recent reassertion of his commitment to Europe, and his intention to have a 3 per cent. increase in the American defence budget. In passing, it is worth asking why a nation like the United States feels it necessary to commit itself to such an increase. It does not do this kind of thing lightly. I do not believe that the noble Lord will be wholly angry with me if I say that I contrast this with the 28 per cent. cut which has been advocated by some members of his Party in another place, and—

Lord WINTERBOTTOM

It is just a discussion document.

Lord STRATHCONA and MOUNT ROYAL

My Lords, I am very relieved that the noble Lord treats it so lightly. However, I believe that my honourable friend in another place was right when he said the other day that our defence posture was something of a façade and something to worry about. I should like to end by saying that I hope that the debate will serve to underline the perilous course which we are following, and the need to reassert the national will to reverse the drift into disaster which I believe we are embarked upon.

8.5 p.m.

Lord WINTERBOTTOM

My Lords, when we debated the Statement on the Defence Estimates on 12th May, I said that the noble Lord, Lord Gladwyn, had raised a most interesting question when he suggested that NATO's basic strategy of flexible response and nuclear doctrines were outdated and needed revision. I said at the time that this was an issue that could not be ducked, since it lay at the heart of our entire defence policy. To try to do so would be to lapse into a "Maginot" mentality. I am, therefore, grateful to the noble Lord for giving us this opportunity to discuss the subject. I hope that the noble Lord is grateful to me for having suggested to him the way that we might do it. I hope that he will also realise that it is a sensitive subject, and I am certain that he will understand if I adhere closely to the carefully chosen form of words that I am to use. I hope he will also understand that this excludes a number of questions which he put to me, because my reply to his Question is based upon the question, and not upon the subsequent interesting tactical and strategic elements that have raised their heads within the past week or so.

I have listened carefully, and with great interest, to the points made in this debate.

But I conclude that there is no viable alternative to the current NATO strategy of deterrence by flexible response and forward defence, and that, so far from being outdated, it continues to offer the best means of securing the safety of the West. Let us consider what alternative strategies NATO might adopt. At one extreme, the Alliance could go back to its "tripwire" strategy of the '50s and early '60s, adopting a clearly declared policy that the first Russian foot on Western soil would be met by instant and massive nuclear retaliation. I need hardly point out to your Lordships the inflexibility of such a policy in dealing with minor acts of aggression, and the risks of unleashing nuclear war by accident. No, my Lords, a return to a "tripwire" strategy is untenable, particularly with the advent of broad strategic equivalence between the nuclear arsenals of the two sides.

Could we then go to the opposite extreme—that proposed by the noble Lord—and put virtually everything into conventional defence, keeping both our theatre and our strategic nuclear weapons for use only to deter or retaliate against use of nuclear weapons by the other side? Such a course would, in the first place, demand a massive increase in resources for defence. The Western nations would have to go a long way towards eliminating the numerical advantage which the Soviet Union has always enjoyed in conventional forces. In order to provide their massive conventional capability, in addition to nuclear forces, the Soviets have to subordinate much of their industrial and economic capacity to defence; and the cream of their scientists and engineers have to work on defence projects. May I ask the noble Lord: would he like to see the same situation here, and within the Alliance as a whole? Would he like to see spending on social programmes, the health service, pensions, and other items drastically decreased? They would have to be decreased because a massive increase of conventional defence is an expensive option—

Lord GLADWYN

My Lords, for many years my thesis has been that it would not necessarily be very much more expensive, if more expensive at all, to constitute this new defensive screen. I said this afternoon that if one contemplates perhaps the employment of Cruise missiles, instead of aeroplanes and technical nuclear weapons, one might save a vast amount of money. One would also save a vast amount of money if one managed to some extent to pool one's R and D with one's neighbour.

Lord WINTERBOTTOM

My Lords, I have had the pleasure of listening to the views of the noble Lord in a number of defence debates, and perhaps come autumn, when we really get down to discussing the White Paper, we might anatomise this point with care. By implication, I think, the noble Lord suggests that NATO should pledge itself not to be the first to use nuclear weapons. He forgets that NATO is already a defensive alliance, designed to deter aggression and defend NATO territory should aggression occur. I must ask the noble Lord, question for question: Does he really believe that we should renounce in advance one of the means of defending ourselves?

Lord GLADWYN

No, my Lords; I never said that. I said that whether we used tactical nuclear weapons on a first strike depended, in practice, not on us but on the decision of the President of the United States. I also said that at the moment it is quite possible to believe that the Russians think he would authorise such action, and it is on that that our whole strategy now rests. I would not dispute that for a moment. All I said was that in the future it might become increasingly doubtful whether the American President would authorise such action. That is all I said.

Lord WINTERBOTTOM

My Lords, I do not think the noble Lord said it tonight, but at any rate he has said it in the past, and I agree with him. This is a complex subject, and I cannot give him the whole truth on a plate. Nor can I speak for President Carter, who is probably feeling his way through a minefield at the moment. May I go back to the point. Does the noble Lord really believe that we, the British, should renounce in advance one of the means of defending ourselves?

Lord GLADWYN

No, my Lords.

Lord WINTERBOTTOM

I thank the noble Lord. Even if we were to bankrupt our societies and build a massive conventional defence, we would still be weakening our security if we denied ourselves the option to be first to use nuclear weapons in the face of an overwhelming attack. NATO's strategy depends on providing a range of options to meet aggression with a defence tailored to the situation but which cannot be predicted in advance by the enemy. Remove one of those options, and the risks involved in aggression become more precisely quantifiable, military adventures become more attractive and deterrence is weakened. The noble Lord has not said it, but does he believe that NATO can do without its strategic nuclear forces?

Lord GLADWYN

No, my Lords.

Lord WINTERBOTTOM

I thank the noble Lord. While strategic nuclear parity means that we can no longer rely on strategic nuclear forces to deter against all forms of aggression, it certainly does not mean that we can discard these weapons completely. Vitally important as is the maintenance of an adequate conventional and theatre nuclear posture, this is insufficient in itself when we are dealing with a strategic nuclear Power. Unless the West maintains a strategic nuclear capacity of its own, it would have no credible answer to Soviet use of their own strategic nuclear forces as an instrument of blackmail.

Other students of the subject have argued that NATO strategy and the role of nuclear weapons within it should be altered in a very different way. They foresee a bigger role for theatre nuclear weapons as a result of the possibilities afforded by new technology. Adherents of the so-called "Mini-nuke" school claim that intense battlefield use of these low-yield, short range, precisely targetable weapons would enable NATO to terminate a major conflict in Europe, possibly without needing to maintain strong conventional forces, and without needing to threaten to escalate to the strategic level.

Lord GLADWYN

It is nonsense, my Lords.

Lord WINTERBOTTOM

I was just about to say that. Noble Lords will appreciate, I hope, the potentially disastrous implications of NATO ever regarding her nuclear weapons in such a way. I agree with the noble Lord: it is nonsense. First, it could have the effect of lowering or blurring the nuclear threshold. The otherwise laudable aims of reducing and confining the collateral damage caused by nuclear weapons could lead to a situation where nuclear warfare became more acceptable, and thus more likely. Consider also the Warsaw Pact's reaction—possibly with "dirtier" and less discriminate weapons—and the results of an intensified nuclear battle in Europe. Clearly this is no acceptable or desirable alternative to our present arrangements. Quite apart from the question of which side would actually win the military conflict (if either side would win it in the strict sense of the word), such a policy would be tantamount to inviting our European allies to countenance wholesale the nuclear destruction of their territory.

Such is the situation we get into if we start to regard tactical nuclear weapons purely as a mainstay of NATO's battlefield defences, detaching them from other elements in the NATO Triad and altering their role. This is not their key function. They are there, essentially as part of a deterrent, supporting conventional forces, on the one hand, and linked to strategic forces, on the other. This deterrent function is vital, but is often misunderstood, especially by those who criticise the present theatre nuclear doctrines. Let me try to explain it more precisely. Should deterrence fail to prevent an attack, the conventional resistance that the West can put up should be sufficient of itself to convince an aggressor that no easy victory was open to him, and that we were determined to resist at whatever level was necessary. If the aggressor persisted, some limited use of nuclear weapons might he necessary to supplement our conventional forces in achieving this end. While also being militarily effective, the basic purpose of a theatre nuclear strike would be to convince an aggressor of the continuing reality of the deterrent threat, of the risk of escalation to the strategic level if he persisted, and the certainty that he could never gain his objectives. Thus, the coupling of the tactical use of nuclear weapons to the strategic deterrent remains vital to NATO's nuclear doctrine.

In emphasising this deterrent function, I am not suggesting that the potential developments in theatre nuclear forces, to which noble Lords have alluded, should be rejected outright: only that they should be exploited in a way which will enable the alliance to implement its present strategy better, rather than to move to a new strategy. We must continue to rely on all three elements—the strategic nuclear deterrent, theatre nuclear weapons and conventional forces—for our security. These elements support one another, and all are necessary if the West is to present a credible deterrent posture. Of course, to say that the basic strategy is right is not to say that we can sit back and relax in the face of the build-up of Warsaw Pact forces, particularly conventional forces. While maintaining the search for genuine and enforceable measures for arms control and for nuclear disarmament through multilateral negotiations and agreements, we must also, within our economic capabilities, maintain our collective defence efforts.

I would agree with the Question we are debating to the extent that, in meeting the present challenge, particular emphasis must be placed on conventional improvements—and I think the noble Lord would agree with that. In addition to redressing any potentially dangerous trends in the balance of these forces, it would also have the effect of keeping the nuclear threshold high—something which I know noble Lords will agree is of the greatest importance. I do not need to go into details about the re-equipment and modernisation programmes which NATO currently has in hand, but I would stress that our own record on this is rather good. We spend a higher proportion of our defence budget on equipment than virtually any other alliance member, notwithstanding the recent necessary reduction in planned defence expenditure. NATO Defence Ministers have recently decided to develop a programme of measures to meet the changing defence needs of the 1980s. Thus, there is no tendency towards complacency: the alliance's forces are being modernised and improved to enable NATO to carry out the strategy of deterrence and flexible response.

One of the areas in which improvements are planned is readiness, and I know that there have been many expressions of anxiety, both in this House and elsewhere, about the possibility of a surprise attack by the Warsaw Pact. The first point that must be made is that there is no evidence that the Soviet Union contemplates an attack on Western Europe; and, so long as NATO maintains vigilant and effective deterrent forces, there is no likelihood of an attack developing. None the less, credibility of NATO's deterrent posture requires that the alliance be able to meet any eventuality, and I can assure the House that forward defence is an integral part of alliance strategy. NATO will continue to plan and provide forces adequate to display the alliance's determination to resist in all parts of the NATO area, including the most forward areas, whether the period of warning is long or short. I do not know whether I have satisfied the noble Lord, but at least the material is there to indicate to him what is the Government's thinking on the subject.