§ 3.44 p.m.
§ Lord GORONWY-ROBERTSMy Lords, with permission, I shall repeat a Statement on Rhodesia now being made by my right honourable friend the Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs in another place. The Statement is as follows: 350 "With your permission, Mr. Speaker, I wish to make a Statement about Rhodesia.
"As I told the House on the 14th December, I authorised Mr. Richard to adjourn the Geneva Conference and to undertake intensive consultations in Southern Africa with a view to laying the foundations for an agreement on an interim Government. In particular, I asked him to develop with the parties some new and positive ideas, including our ideas on the direct role which Britain would be ready to p ay in the transitional period.
"Following Mr. Richard's first round of consultations, we set out what we had in mind in a document, copies of which have been placed in the Library. This document was given to each of the Geneva delegations, the four African Front Line Presidents and Mr. Vorster.
"The suggestions in the paper did not constitute a cut and dried British plan. Nor were they presented on a ' take it or leave it' basis. They were intended to provide a serious and detailed basis for negotiations, and were open to amendment and modification in the light of those negotiations.
"But in our view these proposals represented a reasonable way forward. They were designed to meet the concern of the Nationalists that the transfer to majority rule should be rapid and irreversible, and of the white Rhodesians that it should be peaceful and orderly. They would have led to the ending of the war, and the lifting of economic sanctions. They were supported by the American Government, and would have set the stage for an international trust fund to help develop the Rhodesian economy and give financial reassurance to Rhodesian Europeans. They would have provided a basis for a prosperous, independent and non-racial Rhodesia.
"It was therefore with a deep sense of disappointment that we learnt yesterday that Mr. Smith, alone of the parties, had rejected the ideas which we had put to him, even as a basis for further negotiation. Mr. Smith claims to have left the door open for further negotiations by expressing his readiness to implement the 'Five Points' put to him by Dr. Kissinger in September last year. But it was clear from an early stage of the Geneva Conference that the Nationalist 351 delegations could not agree to accept these proposals as a basis for negotiation. That was why we put forward our own ideas which we believed offered a reasonable way of bridging the gap between the parties.
"Mr. Smith has claimed that our proposals would have led to chaos and Marxist rule. But if there is such a risk, it is much more likely to be created by his rejection of these proposals. He has once more shown his inability to face reality.
"We have to accept that this present round of discussions is at an end. We now need—all of us—to take stock and to make a cool appraisal of the new situation. I have instructed Mr. Richard to remain in Southern Africa for a few more days to discuss these latest developments with some of the parties. He will then return and report to me with a full assessment of the attitudes and expectations of those concerned.
"Mr. Speaker, yesterday's events represent a serious setback to all our hopes for peace in Rhodesia. We must now give intensive study to any options which may still be open to us in this new situation. For our goal remains a peaceful and orderly transfer to majority rule in Rhodesia."
My Lords, that is the end of the Statement.
§ 3.49 p.m.
§ Lord CARRINGTONMy Lords, the House will be grateful to the noble Lord, Lord Goronwy-Roberts, for repeating that Statement, which I think will be received in all quarters of the House with disappointment and a good deal of foreboding. I must say that I think this has been a lost and wasted opportunity. If one considers the enormous stride forward that was made by Mr. Smith's acceptance of the five Kissinger points and compares that agreement with his statement not so very long ago that he would not accept majority rule in a thousand years, it seems to me that there has been a really wasted opportunity. I must also say that I think it a very great pity that the Geneva Conference was not based on what had seemed to be the general acceptance by all parties of the Kissinger proposals. It should be noted that Mr. Smith—and he has been greatly criticised—has never deviated from those five points.
352 I do not understand the phrase in the Statement that it was clear from an early stage of the Geneva Conference that the nationalist delegations could not agree to accept these proposals as a basis for negotiation. I had thought that that was exactly what they had done; and that it was exactly on that basis that the Geneva Conference was called. I must also say that I think it a very great pity that the Africans did not accept what was in essence an enormous step forward, with only a short interim period before majority rule, and refused to negotiate on the basis of the Kissinger proposals. Certainly if a genuine settlement was wanted without bloodshed, a great opportunity was missed.
My Lords, I also think—and I must say this frankly—that it was a very great pity that the Front Line Presidents insisted on Mr. Nkomo and Mr. Mugabe as, it seems, the sole representatives of the Rhodesian Africans. That made it very much more difficult for the negotiations to be successful. I think that one must be very careful about criticising negotiations when one is obviously not in possession of all the facts; but I must also say that I do not think that these negotiations were carried out with the sense of urgency that one would have expected; and I am afraid—and this is no reflection on Mr. Ivor Richard—that I do not think he carried the authority that was necessary in a negotiation of this kind.
It is very difficult now to see what is going to happen. I agree with the noble Lord that we must sit down and take a look at it. It may be that the only possible step forward is an initiative by the American Government. But it is a new American Government and we shall have to wait to see what happens. In the meantime, perhaps I might ask the noble Lord whether the Foreign Secretary, who at one stage, I think, said that he was prepared to visit Africa if he thought it useful, intends to do so in the near future.
§ Lord BANKSMy Lords, we on these Benches are grateful also to the noble Lord, Lord Goronwy-Roberts, for repeating the Statement made in another place. We very much regret the breakdown of these negotiations. We think it is much to be deplored that Mr. Smith should have refused to negotiate on the basis of the British proposals. He was not asked 353 to accept them as they stood; they were put forward as a basis for negotiation, as the Statement made clear. Indeed, Mr. Smith has been fortunate as a rebel Prime Minister—which is what he is—to have had the opportunity to negotiate at all.
We should certainly welcome more information about the precise nature of the proposed British proposals. We must admit that the outlook for Rhodesia today seems bleak, but we can only hope that a return to negotiation will be possible before long. In the meantime I should like to express appreciation of Mr. Ivor Richard's very considerable efforts.
§ 3.54 p.m.
§ Lord GORONWY-ROBERTSMy Lords, may I thank both noble Lords for the restrained character of their contributions this afternoon and express thanks particularly for the agreement of the noble Lord, Lord Carrington, that we should give ourselves a period of time for a cool appraisal of what is bound to be a difficult and dangerous situation? He referred to lost and wasted opportunities. Indeed, there have been five such in the last eleven years. It depends upon what point of view one takes towards the reasons for the breakdowns of the five attempts to reach a reasonable solution. He said that Mr. Smith's statement on 24th September last was a step forward. It was. He accepted majority rule within a short time. But I must take momentary issue with the noble Lord when he says that the so-called five points, Five Principles, which have been fathered on Dr. Kissinger, were greatly different from our own new proposals. I appreciate that it is only now that the full statement of our new proposals is available generally in the Library of the House.
I should like to assure him—and he can test this from his own reading of the proposals—that they are not fundamentally at variance with the content and spirit of the so-called Five Principles. I agree with the noble Lord, Lord Banks, on this point. Mr. Smith might well have consented at least to negotiate on that basis if he was genuine about negotiating the Five Principles. I think that on examination the House will agree he could easily have negotiated on the basis of the 354 new proposals put to him and to the African leaders by Mr. Richard. Mr. Smith is the only one of the Parry to have refused to negotiate on these new proposals.
Naturally, a question arises whether in fact he genuinely wishes to negotiate. I very much hope that he does. I know that Her Majesty's Government, and certainly the Secretary of State, are most anxious that he should reconsider the position, and I do not think I am going beyond the bounds of propriety when I say that we understand that the South African Prime Minister also takes this view. As I have said, the American Government supported the proposals which we put forward. My Lords, as to the intentions of the Secretary of State, naturally he will want very carefully to consider the situation, but, as he said in his statement of 14th December, if it seems necessary and advisable that he should visit Africa, he holds himself in immediate readiness to do just that.
Lord PAGET of NORTHAMPTONMy Lords, the noble Lord might well recollect that when this caper to Geneva was first proposed I warned him that it had no chance of success and would only bring discredit upon Her Majesty's Government. I take no pleasure in having been right. We backed the Kissinger proposals; we committed ourselves to them and we have now reneged on them. Mr. Smith has stood by them. We now propose that Smith should negotiate to hand over immediate power to guerrilla forces who are committing gross atrocities in his country and should ask his defence forces opposing those guerrillas to put themselves under the command of the guerrilla leaders. What seriously does he expect Mr. Smith to say to such proposals? I take little pleasure in finding my Government and my country disgracing them selves in this manner.
§ Lord GORONWY-ROBERTSMy Lords, may I commend to the noble Lord, Lord Paget, a cool appraisal of the Statement of the Secretary of State which I have repeated in this House together with a study of the document that I have put into the Library this afternoon before he launches himself once more on his own kind of tremendous philippic on Southern Africa.
§ Baroness GAITSKELLMy Lords, despite the Minister's very kind words to the noble Lord the Leader of the Opposition, for whom I have the greatest respect, may I say that I do think that the words of the noble Lord the Leader of the Opposition showed a great ignorance of the situation in Southern Africa, of the United Nations and of everything concerned with the situation in Rhodesia? The statement of the noble Lord the Leader of the Liberals was far nearer the facts of the situation. May I further ask, because there have been criticisms of Mr. Ivor Richard, whether it would not be true to say that he was the best man to take on the chairmanship of the Geneva Conference because of his great experience of the law, of the United Nations and of the Africans in the United Nations with whom he has dealt for quite a long time?
§ Lord GORONWY-ROBERTSMy Lords, I would not wish to set up a kind of transitional Government between my noble friend and the noble Lord, Lord Carrington. I join very much with my noble friend in the tribute she has paid to Mr. Ivor Richard's attempts to seek to obtain a solution to this extremely difficult problem. No one in this House will minimise the difficulties and dangers of this problem, and we have among us some of the best minds of the country who have experience of these difficulties. I am very grateful to my noble friend for giving voice to the general appreciation of the efforts of Mr. Richard.
§ 4 p.m.
Lord HOME of the HIRSELMy Lords, I am sure everybody will feel that it is extremely disappointing that the Geneva Conference has failed. It is not surprising from the way the events unfolded. I want to ask the noble Lord one question about the Statement. What basis is there for the sentence in the Statement that says that, with the acceptance of the British proposals, the war would have ended? It was my impression that Mr. Nkomo and Mr. Mugabe made it clear that the war would go on. In those circumstances, it is not surprising that Mr. Smith refused the present proposals, ft is" however" difficult to get a complete picture in a short time, and the exchange of question and answer is rather unsatisfactory. I wonder whether 356 the noble Lord the Leader of the House and my noble friend would consider, when the Government have carried out their re-assessment, holding a short debate on the Rhodesian question?
§ Lord GORONWY-ROBERTSMy Lords, I have no doubt that if the noble Lord and others engage in discussions through the usual channels a suitable opportunity for an exchange of views on these matters can be arranged, and the opportunity to clarify some of the points, such as the question put to me by the noble Lord, will then be more available. I will only say at this point on that question that we have always said that the end of the war and of sanctions would inevitably follow the setting up of a transitional and interim Government.
Lord HOME of the HIRSELMy Lords, if the noble Lord will forgive me for one second, we could guarantee the end of the sanctions; but the Africans have not guaranteed, as I understand it, the end of the war.
§ Lord GORONWY-ROBERTSMy Lords, I agree that it is a matter for argument. I should have thought that the two would go together because of the fact of the setting up of a transitional Government. Such an act would be an historic and impactive new event, a fact of life, in Rhodesia. I would not underestimate its effect upon all parties concerned. No doubt in debate we can discuss and argue about these matters.
§ Lord NORTHFIELDMy Lords, may I ask my noble friend whether he appreciates that noble Lords on this side and in all parts of the House understand that Her Majesty's Government have been engaged in a thoroughly thankless task in Rhodesia? They will get no joy and no credit in the world for trying to bale out a rebellious régime and a most unhappy historic situation. Despite the grave disappointment in the outcome so far, will my noble friend confirm that Her Majesty's Government will not abdicate, will remain ready to intervene again as soon as the situation indicates that such intervention will be helpful and that we will, as a Government and as a country, continue to contribute positively and openly to finding a solution to the Rhodesian problem rather than deserting the scene?
§ Lord GORONWY-ROBERTSMy Lords, the Statement that I have repeated explicitly gives an affirmative to the question put by my noble friend towards the end of his supplementary question. I gladly repeat it now. I should also like to say that I am sure that my right honourable friend will appreciate what my noble friend said at the beginning of his interjection; namely, that he appreciates—as we all do—the peculiarly difficult and dangerous character of the situation and the difficulty of the negotiations.
§ The EARL of ONSLOWMy Lords, as what we are all striving for in Rhodesia is to make sure that the European contribution to African civilisation is preserved, but with access for all races under a free régime, would the noble Lord comment on the following three points: First, we over-indulged the African susceptibilities and did not give due credit to Mr. Smith's susceptibilities. I am sure that it is perfectly reasonable to argue that the susceptibilities are intrinsically unimportant, but in negotiations this is how human beings work. Also Mr. Smith, with his essentially suburban mind and with his back totally against the wall because he is frightened, is more likely to be over-sensitive of his personal and the Rhodesian Fronts' point of view. Thirdly, on the point which my noble friend Lord Carrington raised, the fact that the so-called Front Line Presidents recognise the Nkomo/Mugabe faction, did this not further push Mr. Smith into a corner?
I am sure that the noble Lord is aware that I have no sympathy with Mr. Smith. I regard him as a rebel against the Crown. Is the noble Lord aware that if one is to keep the one object in one's mind, which is to maintain the best civilisation which Europeans brought to Rhodesia, together with wealth and employment, somehow we have to get round these problems in a free society?
§ Lord GORONWY-ROBERTSMy Lords, on the matter of Mr. Smith's personal feelings, he is not, of course, the only person in Rhodesia in a leading position who has personal feelings about what has been happening there for so many years. So far as I know, he has not been imprisoned; others have. But I take the point that in these negotiations 358 it is always important not to affront people's personal susceptibilities, especially when they are in a leading position. I believe that Mr. Ivor Richard in his broadcast a few days ago in Rhodesia made it clear that he, on the spot, did not believe that there was any real reason for Mr. Smith to feel affronted in a personal sense.
The second point which the noble Earl raised referred to the action of the so-called Front Line Presidents in endorsing the patriotic front; and this indeed they did. We understand however that, having done so, they in no way ruled out the possibility of other delegations attending a resumed conference or a future conference. So while there was a necessary gesture, as they saw it, it did not prejudice the all-embracing nature of a resumed conference or a new conference. I have not a note of the third point the noble Earl mentioned; perhaps he will help me.
§ The Earl of ONSLOWMy Lords, the third point was the over-indulgence of African susceptibilities as opposed to the under-indulgence of Mr. Smith's susceptibilities.
§ Lord GORONWY-ROBERTSMy Lords, perhaps I answered that in my reply to the first point, and the noble Earl will no doubt do me his usual courtesy of examining what I said in cold print tomorrow morning.
§ Lord GORE-BOOTHMy Lords, I have one precise question to ask May I first associate myself with those noble Lords who have the impression which I have, that Mr. Richard has handled this almost impossible negotiation with considerable spirit and authority. One should not underestimate the position in the world held by the British Representative at the United Nations. The noble Lord used the word "alone" applying to Mr. Smith. Does that imply something in regard to the all important attitude of South Africa? If I may give the Minister an escape route, if he felt that question was prejudicial at this moment, if there is a debate he will possibly then be able to tell us more about that matter as it is so important.
§ Lord GORONWY-ROBERTSMy Lords, I am most grateful to my noble 359 friend. As to attitudes, I am not entitled to speak explicitly about the attitude of any other Government, but I think it is clear to all that the South African Prime Minister, Mr. Vorster, has made it perfectly clear that he is most anxious, and responsibly anxious, that there should be an early opportunity to resume the quest for a settlement of this matter. We very much welcome his attitude. As to the attitudes of the black Africans, the black Rhodesians, it is perhaps encouraging to note that Mr. Nkomo has referred to the new British proposals (the document I have put in the Library) as being objective and valid.
§ 4.11 p.m.
§ Lord HANKEYMy Lords, with the advantage of hindsight, does it not appear that perhaps Her Majesty's Government and Mr. Richard have not been closely enough informed during these negotiations about the attitudes of the African nationalists in Rhodesia and, for that matter, of Mr. Smith and his Party? May I make a constructive suggestion to the Government? If there is the further chance of any kind of negotiation or settlement, the chances of success would be very much better if, despite everything that has happened, they could bring themselves to send a first-class diplomat—under any title one liked to give, such as, for example, diplomatic agent—to Salisbury, in order to keep in touch with the development of Mr. Smith's thoughts and of white and black opinion in Rhodesia. This would also keep Mr. Richard, if he continues the job, or certainly our own Secretary of State and Government, closely informed about developments—because without it one might reasonably doubt whether we could create opportunities or take advantage of them when they arise.
§ Lord GORONWY-ROBERTSMy Lords, I will certainly take note of the suggestions made by the noble Lord, Lord Hankey, and so will my right honourable friend.
§ The Marquess of SALISBURYMy Lords, may I ask whether it is true that Her Majesty's Government's proposals for the interim council which is to take control of Rhodesia are not very similar to those 360 put forward by Mr. Mugabe and his faction? If that is so, it would appear that Her Majesty's Government are adopting his proposals and asking Mr. Smith to accept them or negotiate on something very close to them. In view of what Mr. Mugabe has said he will do in Rhodesia, surely it is not unreasonable for Mr. Smith to turn them down?
§ Lord GORONWY-ROBERTSMy Lords, I do not think I can be very helpful in discussing the details of a paper which perforce I have not been able to put to public use before today, and that includes the role of the council which has been raised by the noble Marquess. As to the motives and policy of Mr. Mugabe, he is one among a number who have a policy for Rhodesia. He is entitled to express his thoughts and to join in general discussion in conference. Beyond that, I would not describe Mr. Mugabe's rights or future actions.
§ Lord BROCKWAYMy Lords, all of us must deeply deplore the breakdown of these negotiations. I think we must be terribly fearful of what is going to happen in Southern Africa, which includes not merely Rhodesia but Namibia and the Republic itself, with the appalling prospect of violent struggle hanging over the whole area. I want to express my agreement with the noble Lord, Lord Carrington, when he said that the statement made by Mr. Ian Smith, accepting majority rule in two years, was quite momentous. The difficulty is this: in previous negotiations Mr. Smith has made statements which have been subsequently disavowed in later negotiations. I should like to make a particular appeal to my African friends. They may react violently in this situation: I hope they will not do so. I hope they will take the view, with Her Majesty's Government, that one has to sit back and consider.
May I also make this constructive proposal: that Her Majesty's Government should immediately ask the Security Council of the United Nations to discuss this situation as being one which carries a danger of war, and to seek to bring together all the elements involved with a view to reaching a solution.
§ Lord GORONWY-ROBERTSMy Lords, on the second point raised by my 361 noble friend, I think it would be premature to consider steps of that kind; but I welcome very much what he has said about the need for his African friends—and they are friends of all of us—to cool it and to look to the future of their country in a rational spirit of co-operation, looking to an early resumption of conference. My noble friend has referred to his African friends. I hope his appeal reaches them and is listened to by them, because my noble friend is one of the very best friends they have had for many years.
§ Lord COLERAINEMy Lords, may I ask the noble Lord whether his attention has been drawn to an article in The Times newspaper today by Mr. David Spanier, the diplomatic correspondent at Geneva, in which he states quite categorically that it was not so much Mr. Smith who insisted that the Kissinger proposals were a package, but Dr. Kissinger himself, who made it a condition that they were not negotiable and that the whole package had to be either taken or left? I do not know whether the noble Lord can categorically deny what The Times correspondent said; but in any case would it not be more useful, if we really desire a settlement with the Rhodesian people rather than with the so-called Front Line Presidents, to take up the Kissinger proposals again and start off from there?
Perhaps that would be unacceptable to the Front Line Presidents, but may I ask the noble Lord what exactly is their locus standi in this affair? Why should they have more influence on what goes on in Rhodesia than, say, Her Majesty's Government should have in what goes on in France or Germany? Surely the people we have to negotiate with are the Rhode-sians, black and white, and not with these so-called Front Line Presidents, some of whom we know to be Marxist-directed and Marxist-oriented.
§ Lord GORONWY-ROBERTSMy Lords, the people we have to consider and principally negotiate with are the people of Rhodesia, and I gladly join in describing them as black and white Rhodesians, and indeed Rhodesians of other colours as well. However, Rhodesia is surrounded by other countries which have a natural interest in its future. My noble friend Lord Brockway pointed to the appalling 362 consequences of failure to achieve a settlement in Rhodesia for the whole of Southern and Central Africa. Therefore, the South African Prime Minister and the so-called Front Line Presidents have a natural interest in what happens, so it is right that we should consult and even negotiate with them. As to his reference to The Times—I always read Mr. Spanier's contributions, with great respect—I have not had time to evaluate his article of today, although I have had time to evaluate the leading article which I found very fair to the role of Her Majesty's Government in all this.
§ Lord PEARTMy Lords, I think that we have had a good innings on this, but I will allow one noble Lord to ask the last question.
§ Lord DOUGLASS of CLEVELANDMy Lords, I thank my noble friend the Leader of the House for this opportunity. As an old negotiator, may I ask whether we can escape the conclusion that we have sent Mr. Richard naked into the negotiating chamber? The strength of Dr. Kissinger was his military and commercial power arising from the strength of the USA itself. If this is the case, can we not, with all our experience of the Colonies and the Commonwealth, and with all the trust which they have in us, approach Mr. Carter, who is as yet undeclared on this problem, and get a collaboration with the USA that will put behind Mr. Richard the strength that Dr. Kissinger had? In this way, we would get a common sense solution of this problem, based on the experience of this country in dealing with these other countries, on the trust that they have in us and on the strength of the United States?
§ Lord GORONWY-ROBERTSMy Lords, I have referred to the very helpful and constructive attitude of the Government of the United States—that of the Administration of President Ford, and I have absolutely no doubt of that of President Carter—and I welcome my noble friend's reference to that. In support of everybody's attempt to keep this matter cool, may I say that my noble friend's reference to sending Mr. Richard naked into the conference chamber summons up visions of quite extraordinary vividness, knowing him as well 363 as I do. May I close on this note? Like those who preceded Mr. Richard in the search for a solution of this problem, he has aplied himself, his considerable intellect and his complete integrity, in an admirable way and I am sure it is right that the whole House, whatever one thinks of the course of the negotiations, should express its appreciation of his efforts to achieve a solution.