COMMUNITY RELATIONS BILL

HL Deb 12 October 1976 vol 375 cc208-26

(formerly the Race Relations Bill)

2.50 p.m.

The MINISTER of STATE, HOME OFFICE (Lord Harris of Greenwich)

My Lords, I beg to move that the Report be now received.

Moved, That the Report be now received—(Lord Harris of Greenwich.)

On Question, Motion agreed to.

Clause 3 [Interpretation.]:

Lord HARRIS of GREENWICH moved Amendment No. 1:

Page 2, leave out line 35.

The noble Lord said: My Lords, we had some discussions of the structure of the interpretation provisions of the Bill in Committee, and I have since been in correspondence with those noble Lords who took part in the debate. As they will know, I have reached the conclusion that it may be confusing to have two interpretation clauses by that name, both applying to the whole Bill, especially when the second provision defines one of the three terms "nationality" in the first in exactly the same terms as the first, while it defines the other two, "racial grounds" and "racial group", by reference to the first.

This Amendment will ensure consistency: it will leave Clause 3 defining two terms, "racial grounds" and "racial group", of which the meaning is essential to the understanding of Part I; and it will leave "nationality" to be defined only in Clause 74. We shall also be making what I hope your Lordships will agree is a helpful change to the side note to Clause 3, which will read: "Meaning of 'racial grounds', 'racial group' etc." I would add that these changes will ensure that the relationship between Clauses 3 and 74 corresponds more closely with the formula approved by the Renton Committee.

Lord HAILSHAM of SAINT MARYLEBONE

My Lords, this is an improvement and a sign of grace. I am grateful to the noble Lord for having paid attention to some of the criticisms. I am sure that the noble and learned Lord on the Cross-Benches who joined with some of us in making them, will be grateful too. I wish that the Government would consider actually putting the interpretation clause at the beginning of the Bill, when these problems would not arise.

On Question, Amendment agreed to.

Clause 5 [Exceptions for genuine occupational qualifications]:

2.53 p.m.

Lord JACQUES moved Amendment No. 2: Page 4, line 25, leave out ("style or").

The noble Lord said: My Lords, we are back to the subject of special ambience. At the Committee stage the noble Lord, Lord O'Hagan, moved an Amendment to substitute "particular style or setting" for "special ambience". We want to simplify it further by omitting "style or" and merely leaving it as "particular setting". Apart from the simplification, it would get rid of the possibility that "style" could mean the style in which the food was eaten and would have to be taken into account in deciding whether or not the exception applied. To avoid this we propose this Amendment which I beg to move.

Lord HAILSHAM of SAINT MARYLEBONE

My Lords, I think that this is another improvement. We are getting on.

On Question, Amendment agreed to.

Clause 23 [Further exceptions from ss. 20(1) and 21]:

Lord JACQUES moved Amendment No. 3: Page 16, line 10, after ("6") insert ("7(4),").

The noble Lord said: My Lords, I wish to speak to Amendments Nos. 3, 5, 8 and 26. At the Committee stage I moved a technical Amendment which was accepted by the Committee and I spoke in these terms: This is a technical Amendment to ensure that principals of contract workers are in the event of a complaint of unlawful discrimination afforded the same defences as are available to employers under Clause 6 of the Bill. This was accepted by the Committee without debate. Amendments Nos. 3, 5, 8 and 26 are merely consequential Amendments. I beg to move.

On Question, Amendment agreed to.

2.55 p.m.

Lord MONSON moved Amendment No. 4:

Page 16, line 15, at end insert— ("(3) Section 20(1) does not apply to the provision of facilities or services by a person in his home, not being a place open (for payment or not) to members of the public generally.").

The noble Lord said: My Lords, at the Committee stage I drew attention to the apparent paradox whereby the Government had excepted from the scope of the Bill certain types of semi-private behaviour embracing clubs with 24 or fewer members, partnerships with six or fewer partners, domestic servants (even those employed outside the house), boarding houses with accommodation for fewer than six persons other than the owner and his family, and so on. I asked why, in view of this, the Government had not exempted services and facilities provided by a person in his own private dwelling-house.

I moved a similar, although not identical, Amendment to the Amendment I move today to rectify this anomaly. The Government reply was twofold. First, they said that under Section 2 of the 1968 Race Relations Act there was no exception similar to that which I was proposing. They then went on to say that in any case in their view there was no material difference between somebody offering facilities and services in a public place like a shop or in the street and providing them from the privacy of his own home.

So far as the first reply is concerned, I find this hard to accept. The 1968 Act is only eight years old. It is too short a time to establish whether the implied inclusion of private homes is a good thing or not; furthermore, the 1968 Act provides that a person who feels that he is discriminated against must take the initiative and go to make a complaint to the Race Relations Board. In contrast, the present Bill sets up a Board with wide ranging powers of investigation. Parkinson's Law seems to dictate that the Commission will proliferate and that people will be going all out to seek discrimination in every nook and cranny. As to the extraordinary assertion that there was no material difference between providing facilities or services in public or in a private house, if the Government really believe that, there is no meeting of minds on this.

My Lords, let me try to convince the House. Let us consider the people who might call at the door of the average housewife one morning: a Jehovah's Witness dishing out Biblical tracts, an Encyclopaedia Britannica salesman, canvassers from the Conservative, Labour and Liberal Parties, the man who comes to mend or service the television and a market researcher who calls to carry out a survey on the use of soapflakes or detergents. The point is that the housewife has the absolute right to choose whom she admits into her house. She can decide to admit one or another and, even if she has made an appointment beforehand, she might say that she has changed her mind or has a headache, or she can admit and later say that she is sorry but she is busy and, "I am afraid that you must leave".

The point is that a woman is mistress in her own home. Within the four walls of a person's house there is no obligation to behave in a socially acceptable way, and still less to conform with the officially approved attitudes of the moment. A person's right is to be eccentric, inconsistent and even bloody-minded if he or she so wishes. Behaviour which may seem eccentric to an outsider may make sense to the individual because of that individual's past experience.

My Lords, in Committee I spoke of a lady who ran a boarding house. She had no racial prejudice as such, she admitted people of every race and nationality; but she had a phobia about turbans and would not admit Sikhs and got into trouble. This may seem funny. Phobias often seem funny to people who are not suffering from them. But let me put a hypothetical, but understandable case. Let us assume that a lady called Miss Greenberg living in North West London wishes to give piano lessons which she advertises in the local Press or by means of a card in the local newsagent's window. She gets a telephone call asking if she is free to give lessons during the next few weeks. She says, "I believe so. Certainly. Could I have your name?" The man says, "My name is Adolf Schmidt", let us say. Miss Greenberg is a lady of 50 years or more and she hesitates a moment and then says, "I am terribly sorry, Herr Schmidt, but I have just checked my diary and have suddenly realised that I am booked solidly for the next three months". It is not difficult to understand the reasons why.

How on earth can the Community Relations Commission investigate such a case and take action against Miss Greenberg in such circumstances? Do they call upon a neighbour and ask whether they can put their ear against a party wall to see if indeed the sounds of a piano being played can be heard through the wall? Do they send somebody in disguised as a gas meter reader? Do they have a van parked across the street with spyholes bored in it so that people can observe the comings and goings at Miss Greenberg's front door? If that were to happen, I suggest that the furore over VAT inspectors raiding people's houses in the small hours of the morning and the powers given to the Inland Revenue recently would fade into insignificance by comparison. The Relf case would be like a storm in an egg cup. I think that this would be handing propaganda to the National Front on a plate.

It is not as if the Government were determined to revoke what the noble Lord, Lord Houghton of Sowerby, described the other day as the right of a citizen to retain some semblance of what he has fought to gain throughout our history, to subordinate or to sweep away all considerations of freedom of choice, freedom of association, freedom of the Press, in favour of some distant Utopia in which every aspect of racial consciousness was swept from the face of Britain. Not at all; common sense has in many parts of the Bill, although not in nearly enough, triumphed over dogma. That is the reason why the Government's attitude in this is all the more inexplicable.

It is not as if this Amendment were in any way biased against the immigrant population, because I can assure noble Lords that the average Jamaican whom I know regards his home as his castle just as much as does the average Englishman; the same is true of the average Asian. Indeed, I think that, in a devout Pakistani or Bangladeshi family, the sanctity of the home is even more highly prized than it is in this country. I have redrafted the Amendment to exclude the limitation of six because the more one thinks about it the more one realises that monitoring the movements of people to see whether somebody is taking more than six people into his or her home would be even more reminiscent of 1984 than the possible procedures I described earlier. I have deliberately excluded stately homes and gardens that are open to the public on either a permanent or an occasional basis, because they are of course mainly public rather than mainly private places. I have demonstrated, I hope, that the Bill as it stands in this respect is counter-productive; I also believe that it is purely and simply wrong. I beg to move.

3.5 p.m.

Lord HOUGHTON of SOWERBY

I will support this Amendment. I think that Clause 23(2) does not go far enough. As your Lordships know, I believe that much of this Bill is unenforceable, anyway. I also think that it tends to erode the freedom of some people in order to establish the freedom of others. One has to keep that exercise very much in balance to avoid leaning too far in one direction. There are some things that the citizen should be permitted to decide for himself. However wrong he may be, unless he is doing wrong to others, unless his behaviour is harmful to relationships or community harmony or social peace, there are some things that must be reserved to the individual, and the closer one gets to a person's home, the nearer one gets to that reserved position. It seems to me that the noble Lord, Lord Monson, has made out a case for extending slightly the range of exceptions which is already provided for in Clause 23.

In all these measures to do with discrimination the temptation is to overkill all the time, to provide for every conceivable eventuality. How well we remember some of these things in the recent discussion on the Sex Discrimination Act when we had a long debate on whether it was reasonable to exclude women from the galley of a ship on the ground that there was not really a loo there for a woman. One wondered how many women were clamouring to serve on the galleys of ships and how many might even think that they should be excluded merely because there was not separate toilet accommodation. We went on in that discussion to try to establish rights and to narrow down the possibility of avoiding action and evasion. Is it worth it?

Are not the main issues with which we should deal the major and broad questions of discrimination, the elimination of them from the public life of the country without pursuing every minute detail in an effort to enforce a law which would be extremely difficult to enforce and which could, in certain circumstances, bring the law into ridicule—it has done that already—or set up reactions which did the cause of racial equality positive harm? Those are the broad considerations that influence me in connection not only with this Amendment but with others that come later. So, unless the Minister has some very convincing reason indeed for not pursuing this Amendment, I hope that your Lordships will give it favourable consideration.

Lord AVEBURY

I am very sad that the noble Lord, Lord Houghton, has taken this attitude, because I know that he is a great defender of civil liberties and I should have thought that he would be even more concerned about the civil liberties of people who are discriminated against, and who have been suffering grave injustices throughout the years, than about the rights of a person to carry on a discriminatory business within his own home, because that is what we are talking about. If he discusses the matter with community relations officers and those who are advising members of ethnic minorities, I do not think that the noble Lord will find there that is a threat to overkill at all. I think that the very reverse has been true and that is one of the reasons that we have this Rill in front of us now, because it is so very difficult for persons to make a complaint, have it upheld and get any sort of redress.

If we are talking about the provision of goods, facilities and services by an individual and it happens that these things are done within his own home, what is the difference from the recipient's point of view whether it is somebody's home or his office?

If we take the example that the noble Lord, Lord Monson, gave, of the piano lessons provided by Miss Greenberg, it so happens that she is giving the piano lessons from her own home, but it might just as well be that she was Greenberg and Partners and providing piano lessons from a business address somewhere adjacent to her own home. What the noble Lord, Lord Monson, was saying was that she is perfectly entitled to discriminate against Herr Schmidt so long as she does this within her own home. As soon as she has an office from which she conducts the business of piano teaching, then she is not entitled to discriminate. By doing that the noble Lord is introducing grave anomalies into the Bill.

No one is saying that a person should not be, as he put it, "eccentric, inconsistent and bloody-minded" so far as their own domestic affairs are concerned. I defend that exception from the general provisions of the Bill; but we are not talking about his internal domestic affairs, we are talking about something which he, as a householder or a member of his family, does for the general public at large. One can think of many other examples besides the one that the noble Lord gave, of the piano lessons; not the ones he quoted, incidentally, because those were not the provision of facilities or services by a person in his home. The examples which the noble Lord, Lord Monson, talked about were the provision of services by someone outside the home to the person who was in it. They were not all services or facilities. I do not think it will be right, to pursue this matter, to say that the Jehovah's Witness or the canvasser is providing goods, facilities or services. The encyclopaedia salesmen or TV maintenance men—two other examples that he quoted—would be providing a service, but they would not be covered by the Amendment in any case because they are not the person in his home, they are a person outside the home providing services to someone in it.

I do not wish to prolong this discussion. I was only moved to speak by the remarks of the noble Lord, Lord Houghton of Sowerby. If one is considering this, as one should, from the civil liberties point of view, to make them subject to the general provisions of the Bill would be a greater breach of the civil liberties of the person who is likely to be discriminated against if we accept this Amendment, than of the persons who conduct businesses from their own homes.

3.12 p.m.

Lord WELLS-PESTELL

My Lords, I fear I am not going to satisfy the noble Lord, Lord Monson, because correspondence has passed between us and it it quite clear that the letter I sent to him on advice has not satisfied him. We have given a great deal of consideration to this matter. I do not think any Government takes lightly a matter raised by a Member of your Lordships' House. We have gone into this matter carefully between Committee and Report stage. to see whether it is reasonable to meet this Amendment or, for that matter, to do something in the direction that the noble Lord, Lord Monson, requested the Government to take.

The Government take the view that the need to keep essentially personal and intimate relationships outside the scope of Clause 20 is adequately provided for by the words … concerned with the provision (for payment or not) to the public or a section of the public in subsection (1) of Clause 20. These words are of course the same as those in Section 2 of the 1968 Act, and the only criticism to which those words have been subjected is that they go much too wide. I am of course referring here to the interpretation placed on them in the two club cases which came before your Lordships' House in its Judicial capacity. The point here is, to take the music teacher example, that if the music teacher provides his services only to those whom he knows well and whom he selects on the basis of personal acceptability to him, he will be in any case outside Clause 20 because he will not be providing to the public or a section of the public. If, however, he holds himself out to provide his services to the public or a section of the public—if, for example, he puts his card up on a notice board somewhere or other where those likely to be interested in taking piano lessons will see it—then, even though he may conduct his business in his own home, we see no justification at all for removing him from the scope of Clause 20. We see no reason at all why he should he permitted to discriminate on the ground of colour, race, nationality or ethnic or national origins.

The noble Lord has sought to persuade your Lordships that there is something special about a person's home. So far as the Bill is concerned the answer is that there may or may not be. It is not good enough just to look at where facilities or services are provided. The question is whether they are provided to the general public or to a section of the general public. This is the acid test. The exception proposed by the noble Lord would be limited to situations in which the provider's house was not open to the general public. The provider would therefore be within the exception if his home was open only to a section of the public. This does not seem to us to be a very satisfactory distinction: there would be many ways in which a person could place himself outside the scope of the exception merely by excluding from his home some limited class of person whom he knew would never want to enter his home in any event, thereby ensuring that his home was not open to the general public. In conclusion, I would only say that we see no reason to change from Section 2 of the 1968 Act, and that the limitation in Section 2 and in Clause 20 to which I have referred seems to us to be quite adequate to ensure that the Bill's provision does not apply to exclusively private and personal relationships.

The noble Lord referred to the example of the housewife. This is irrelevant. The housewife to whom he referred would not be providing facilities or services in her home. If she does—for example, in taking pupils for piano lessons, or coaching and offers her services to the public at large—the principle of the Bill should apply. He mentioned the example of Mrs. Greenberg. I am fully aware that there are difficulties and they were emphasised by the noble Lord, Lord Houghton of Sowerby. We have to trust the Commission not to act oppressively in this type of personal circumstance envisaged by both noble Lords. I am sorry that I cannot take the matter any further other than to say we have given it a good deal of consideration, but we are not able to accept the noble Lord's Amendment.

3.19 p.m.

Lord HAILSHAM of SAINT MARYLEBONE

My Lords, this seems to be a matter of absolutely minute importance, I am sorry to say. This would have been an opportunity for the Government to show a certain degree of flexibility instead of providing us with a long exposition of how right they are. It can only conceivably apply, I suppose, to a case of somebody who, for instance, provides piano lessons, language lessons, dress-making facilities or takes in a lodger or two in her own home.

With respect to the noble Lord, Lord Avebury, if I were a Jewish lady—which I am not—and I was approached by a very keen Palestinian or Arab, I should probably prefer not to have them in my own home. I do not really see why one should not. The idea that Parliament should waste its time for hour after hour arguing about such matters of minute importance does not appeal to me. I cannot turn this into a matter of Party difference, but I can only say that, so far as the Conservative Party are concerned, they can vote as they like, if the noble Lord pushes this minute matter to a Division. If the Government are beaten, it will be only because of their intransigence and stupidity.

Lord MONSON

My Lords, I am profoundly disappointed at the attitude of the noble Lord, Lord Wells-Pestell. I thought I might be able to get across this point of view to them, and also to the noble Lord, Lord Avebury, who stood the whole concept of civil liberties on its head by implying that other people had the right to enter people's homes even when they were not wanted there. The Government have made exceptions throughout the Bill. The door is the point at which a person can say, " Thus far and no further." It is really no different from the case of somebody ringing the doorbell and saying, "Have you got a room to spare?" and a landlady with fewer than six rooms to let saying" I am afraid not." It is the same as a club with 24 people where the same thing can apply perfectly legitimately. It is the same as someone applying for the post of cook or gardener. An employer is perfectly entitled, under the Bill as drafted, to say: I am afraid I do not want a Pakistani gardener." That is perfectly legitimate.

Noble Lords on the Government Benches are concerned, I know, that people may be offended, but in most cases that is not going to happen. People are going to be tactful when they turn other people away. That is the British way of doing things, and I think that is a totally

irrelevant consideration. The Government have not explained why it is all right to turn people away from your front door in some cases but not in others, where a far more intimate relationship is involved—because I am sure they would agree that sitting beside someone on a piano stool is far more intimate than giving orders to a gardener who may not even come into the house. I have had support from every quarter of the House because, after all, this is not a Party political matter. Therefore I am afraid I must divide the House.

3.22 p.m.

On Question, Whether the said Amendment (No. 4) shall be agreed to?

Their Lordships divided: Contents, 111; Not-Contents, 67.

CONTENTS
Alport, L.	Exeter, M.	Mowbray and Stourton, L.
Amory, V.	Fraser of Kilmorack, L.	Munster, E.
Ampthill, L.	Gisborough, L.	Newall, L.
Arbuthnott, V.	Glasgow, E.	Northchurch, B.
Arran, E.	Gore-Booth, L.	Onslow, E.
Ashbourne, L.	Gray, L.	Orr-Ewing, L.
Balerno, L.	Greenway, L.	Platt, L.
Barnby, L.	Gridley, L.	Porritt, L.
Belstead, L.	Grimston of Westbury, L.	Powis, E.
Berkeley, B.	Hankey, L.	Rathcreedan, L.
Braye, L.	Harmar-Nicholls, L.	Redesdale, L.
Brock, L.	Hatherton, L.	Reigate, L.
Caccia, L.	Hawke, L.	Rochdale, V.
Campbell of Croy, L.	Hives, L.	Ruthven of Freeland, Ly.
Carr of Hadley, L.	Home of the Hirsel, L.	Sackville, L.
Carrington, L.	Hornsby-Smith, B.	St. Davids, V.
Clancarty, E.	Houghton of Sowerby, L.	Sandys, L.
Clifford of Chudleigh, L. [Teller.]	Hunt, L.	Selwyn-Lloyd, L.
Clitheroe, L.	Hylton-Foster, B.	Sempill, Ly.
Clwyd, L.	Ilchester, E.	Shannon, E.
Cole, L.	Ironside, L.	Sharples, B.
Cottesloe, L.	Kimberley, E.	Sligo, M.
Craigavon, V.	Kinloss, Ly.	Spens, L.
Cromartie, E.	Kinnaird, L.	Stamp, L.
Cullen of Ashbourne, L.	Lauderdale, E.	Strang, L.
Daventry, V.	Long, V.	Strathcarron, L.
Davidson, V.	Loudoun, C.	Strathclyde, L.
de Clifford, L.	Lucas of Chilworth, L.	Strathspey, L.
Denham, L.	Lyell, L.	Terrington, L.
Deramore, L.	Mancroft, L.	Thomas, L.
Derwent, L.	Marley, L.	Tranmire, L.
Drumalbyn, L.	Melville, V.	Trefgarne, L.
Dundee, E.	Merrivale, L.	Vernon, L.
Eccles, V.	Monck, V.	Vickers, B.
Effingham, E.	Monson, L. [Teller.]	Vivian, L.
Elliot of Harwood, B.	Morris, L.	Ward of North Tyneside, B.
Emmet of Amberley, B.	Mottistone, L.	Wellington, D.
NOT-CONTENTS
Airedale, L.	Energlyn, L.	Pargiter, L.
Amherst, E.	Evans of Hungershall, L.	Parry, L.
Avebury, L.	Gardiner, L.	Peart, L. (L. Privy Seal)
Aylestone, L.	Gladwyn, L.	Phillips, B.
Banks, L.	Grey, L.	Raglan, L.
Beaumont of Whitley, L.	Harris of Greenwich, L.	Ritchie-Calder, L.
Blyton, L.	Henderson, L.	Rusholme, L.
Brockway, L.	Jacobson, L.	Sainsbury, L.
Buckinghamshire, E.	Jacques, L. [Teller.]	Seear, B.
Burntwood, L.	Kaldor, L.	Segal, L.
Burton of Coventry, B.	Kirkhill, L.	Shinwell, L.
Byers, L.	Leatherland, L.	Simon, V.
Champion, L.	Lee of Asheridge, B.	Slater, L.
Chorley, L.	Llewelyn-Davies of Hastoe, B.	Southwark, Bp.
Collison, L.	Lovell-Davis, L.	Stedman, B. [Teller.]
Cooper of Stockton Heath, L.	Lyons of Brighton, L.	Stone, L.
Darling of Hillsborough, L.	McCluskey, L.	Strabolgi, L,
Davies of Leek, L.	Melchett, L.	Wells-Pestell, L.
Davies of Penrhys, L.	Murray of Gravesend, L.	White, B.
Delacourt-Smith of Alteryn, B.	Oram, L.	Wigoder, L.
Donaldson of Kingsbridge, L.	Paget of Northampton, L.	Wilson of High Wray, L.
Douglass of Cleveland, L.	Pannell, L.	Winterbottom, L.
Elwyn-Jones, L. (L. Chancellor.)

On Question, Amendment agreed to.

Resolved in the affirmative, and Amendment agreed to accordingly.

Clause 27 [Discriminatory advertisements]:

3.31 p.m.

Lord JACQUES moved Amendment No. 5: Page 18, line 17, after ("7(3)") insert ("and (4)").

The noble Lord said: My Lords, in moving Amendment No. 3, I spoke to Amendment No. 5. I beg to move.

Lord HAILSHAM of SAINT MARYLEBONE move Amendment No. 6: Page 18, line 17, leave out ("26,").

The noble and learned Lord said: My Lords, I beg to move this Amendment. It is a purely technical one necessitated by previous Amendments made at Committee stage.

Lord MONSON moved Amendment No. 7: Page 18, line 18, after ("or") insert ("because it involves private relationships exclusively; or").

The noble Lord said: My Lords, this Amendment is not an issue of principle in the same way that my previous Amendment was. There is, of course, a principle involved, because any diminution in the right to free speech must be watched closely and guarded against if possible. The purpose of the Amendment is to exclude advertising which relates to purely, solely, private person relationships. For the reasons I gave in speaking to the last Amendment, I do not believe that if this Amendment were agreed to there would be any rash of offensive advertisements, which the Government Front Bench felt might happen when we discussed Clause 29, as it then was, at Committee stage. I do not think you are going to get people putting up advertisements saying "No blacks wanted". That is not what would happen in the present climate at all. Newspapers will not accept such advertisements, neither will newsagents, for the most part. I can well understand the fear of the Government in this matter but I think it is totally unfounded.

The purpose of the Amendment is to permit people to advertise mainly on grounds of nationality, because, for the first time, nationality, although not citizenship, is included within the scope of the Bill and it would, for instance, almost certainly make it illegal for a Frenchman to advertise for another Frenchman to share a flat with him, or a Brazilian for another Brazilian, or a Canadian for another Canadian, or some other nationality, whatever it might be. There is such a shortage of accommodation in London that demand exceeds supply; therefore such an advertisement would be caught by subsection (1)(b) of Clause 1. It is not a matter of tremendous importance, but the liberty of the individual would be enlarged if this Amendment were to be carried, and a lot of nonsensical cases, such as that of the Scottish cook, which tend to bring laws such as this into total disrepute, would be avoided.

3.35 p.m.

Lord JACQUES

My Lords, this clause was fully discussed at Committee stage and there will inevitably be some repetition in my remarks, for which I apologise. We are at one with the noble Lord, Lord Monson, when he says that the Bill should not apply to personal and intimate relations and it is for that reason that we have made exceptions, such as employment in private households, small partnerships and the letting of small dwellings. We have made those exceptions. But what we are talking about here is not personal and intimate relations but advertising, which is something different. The present law—that is to say, the 1968 Act—forbids discriminatory advertising, whether the intended act is lawful or not. We had a good look at this matter to see whether there could be some easement, so we are thinking along very similar lines, at least in principle, to those of the noble lord. We came to the conclusion that there were some exceptions that were possible, in particular where the intended act was accepted because it was a genuine occupational qualification. For example, if someone was wanted for a theatrical part and for that part it was essential to have somebody of a particular race, then we saw no reason why there should not be an advertisement inviting applications from people of that race. We felt that in such cases the terms of the advertisement itself would show the good reason for discrimination.

However, we could not find similar reasons when it came to exceptions on grounds of personal and intimate relations. We felt that if we made exceptions here we should be opening the door very wide for discriminatory advertisements which could have a great effect upon race relations in this country. I would emphasise, as I have done at earlier stages in this Bill, that the professionals who are appointed for the purposes of keeping observation on things that happen from day to day to see how far the Act is effective have reported to us that one of the most successful parts of the 1968 Act, so far as race relations are concerned, is the banning of discriminatory advertisements. They believe that that has been fairly successful, that it has been one of the success points in the Act. We do not want to throw away that success.

Furthermore, it would, for example in the case of partnerships, undermine the compromise that has already been reached. There is a difference of opinion as to whether or not partnerships should come within the scope of the Bill. We have reached a compromise of six. Where the partnership is fewer than six, it does not come within the scope of the Bill. Where it is six or more than six, it does come within the scope of the Bill. But those who have agreed to the smaller partnerships not coming within the scope of the Bill have done so in some cases because in the case of advertising there would be no discriminatory advertising. We would adhere to the law as it is now. We would not give way on advertising. We believe that if you allowed discriminatory advertising for the small partnerships it would certainly undermine the spirit of the compromise which has been reached on partnerships.

Finally, there is the question of small dwellings. I should have thought, as I said in Committee, that nobody in this House would look with favour upon the possibility of the kind of advertisements which you could get if this Amendment were carried—for example, "One room available. No blacks". That is the kind of advertisement which would be permitted. I should have thought nobody wanted that. We feel we have reached a very fair and reasonable compromise. We have said that in the letting of small dwellings there is personal and intimate relations. The intended act will be accepted but not the advertising, which could be discriminatory and which could disturb race relations. We believe that this Amendment, if carried, would do infinite harm to race relations. I hope that with that explanation the noble Lord will see his way clear to withdraw his Amendment.

3.40 p.m.

Lord HAILSHAM of SAINT MARYLEBONE

My Lords, I must say that if the speech against the Amendment were the only reason for opposing it I should remain wholly unconvinced. I cannot believe that the matter will do infinite harm to anything, whether it is carried or rejected, and it is precisely this solemn-faced approach to rather small points which, in itself is doing a great deal of harm to race relations. However, I cannot advise my noble friends to support this Amendment because I simply cannot define the words "private relationships". I have racked my brains as to what it means in this connection and I think it would cover the kind of advertisement you see in Private Eye—" Good looking male wishes to meet blond female under 25. Photograph supplied". But I cannot think of any other relationship which could properly be described as a "private relationship" which could also be advertised.

So, being on my crusade against the unenforceable in both directions—the unenforceable by the Government and the unenforceable by the enthusiasts for privacy—I cannot really advise my noble friends to support this Amendment, and I think it could have been said even more shortly than I have done.

Lord MONSON

If I could explain to the noble and learned Lord, Lord Hailsham of Saint Marylebone, and indeed to the noble Lord, Lord Jacques, my Amendment is not meant to include partnerships or small dwellings or any of the other things, which he mentions, but concerns purely private relationships—in other words, those not involving a business transaction and, quite possibly the Private Eye advertisements. But, after all, why not?

Supposing a New Zealander puts an advertisement in an Earls' Court window seeking a fellow antipodean to travel across Afghanistan and India and to share expenses, that is not a business relationship but a personal one, but it would be illegal. I referred in Committee to the matrimonial columns in Indian newspapers which, as every noble Lord who has travelled on that sub-continent knows, do, more often than not, state that the advertisers are seeking a relatively fair-complexioned bride or groom. Again, if anybody were to act upon that or to make a complaint about it, it would have to be taken up. It is not discrimination that is illegal in itself under the Bill, but the advertising would be discriminatory.

The noble Lord, Lord Jacques, talked about offensive advertisements, but I specifically said that I did not think there was the remotest possibility of such advertisements being published nowadays, because very few newsagents would accept them and certainly no newspaper would publish them. I do not think that is at all likely. He overlooks the fact that nationality has been included for the first time, and there are all sorts of reasons why persons should meet or wish to do things with people of a certain nationality. That is the main motive behind the Amendment.

Reverting again to the question of offensive advertisements, the noble and learned Lord, Lord Hailsham of Saint Marylebone, I think I am right in saying, said on Second Reading that such advertisements were almost certainly covered by common law anyway. This is not a matter on which it is worth dividing the House. The Government will find themselves in hot water at some future date over this. If the experience of recent years is anything to go by, the improbable always happens and the unthinkable very frequently does. With that, I beg leave to withdraw the Amendment.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.