§ 26 Leave out Clause 65.
§ The Commons disagreed to this Amendment for the following Reason:
§ 27 Because the Commons consider that it is appropriate to make special provisions to enable persons who suspect that they have been discriminated against to obtain relevant information.
§ Lord HARRIS of GREENWICHMy Lords, I beg to move that this House doth not insist on its Amendment No. 26 to which the Commons have disagreed for the Reason numbered 27. When we debated this question in Committee, I explained in some detail the considerations which had led us in the Sex Discrimination Act, but more particularly in relation to this Bill, to put forward the "questions procedure". I certainly do not propose to go over that ground again. I shall confine myself to replying to the main criticisms which have been levelled at this clause.
1090 The main criticism to which the noble and learned Lord, Lord Hailsham directed attention is that the kind of innovation which the "questions procedure" embodies should apply either to all litigation or to none at all. The Government do not agree that this "all or nothing" argument is valid. I was about to say that in my view there was a clear justification for the provision before remembering that the noble and learned Lord had expressed himself as having strong feelings about the use of the words "clear" or "obvious". I think he said that he would pull out his six-shooter if the words were used again, so I shall certainly not use either. I shall therefore use the more neutral term and say that I think there is a justification for our position.
The principal factors are these. First, the complexity of the concept of discrimination; I do not think that anybody who has heard our debates would disagree with that. Secondly, the difficulty of knowing and of proving that character of discrimination. And, thirdly, the fact that we are in this Bill transferring the responsibility of enforcement by legal powers from a statutory agency to the individual victim. I think it is right to mention a fourth consideration, and this is that we are doing away with the statutory conciliation procedure which is incorporated in the 1968 Act, because we are restructuring and improving the enforcement provisions of the legislation, but there is an important place for conciliation. The industrial tribunal system incorporates conciliation machinery, and there are usually informal attempts at conciliation and settlement before ordinary county court litigation commences. We believe that the questions procedure will go some way towards filling the gap which will inevitably be left when the statutory conciliation machinery of the 1968 Act ends, for it will afford an opportunity to both parties to identify and reflect upon the issues between them, and we think that this will be valuable. I beg to move.
§ Moved, That this House doth not insist on their Amendment No. 26, to which the Commons have disagreed for the Reason numbered 27.—(Lord Harris of Greenwich.)
§ Lord HAILSHAM of SAINT MARYLEBONEMy Lords, I do not want to say very much about this. It is, I think, 1091 an abominable but relatively unimportant procedure upon which the Government insists. It is just another example of the way in which race relations will be damaged as a result of this foolish piece of legislation. In every other kind of wrongdoing, in the criminal courts and in the civil courts, you cannot do this kind of thing to your opponent; you cannot interrogate him; you cannot draw inferences from his silence. But this time you can do it. It is aimed at the majority of the inhabitants of this island to assist minorities, but in fact it will operate in reverse, as the Government found under their Race Relations Act 1965. The only valid prosecutions that were ever taken were taken against black men for abusing whites, and this is the way it will work this time in relation to this interrogation procedure. I will not take up the time of the House. This is another example of the folly of this type of legislation.