DEFENCE OF NATO

HL Deb 30 March 1976 vol 369 cc1049-63

5.17 p.m.

Lord PAGET of NORTHAMPTON rose to ask Her Majesty's Government whether they have any statement to make on NATO's vulnerability to surprise attack. The noble Lord said: My Lords, I beg to ask the Question which stands in my name. It is concerned with the article which appeared in The Times disclosing a NATO leak as to the vulnerability of the forces in Germany to surprise attack. In the same edition of The Times the noble Lord, Lord Chalfont, put in a scenario of how that surprise attack might operate. Both the article and the scenario considered the difficulties that might arise from the fact that the consent of the President of the United States is necessary before any tactical nuclear weapon can be used. They considered the question that he might be in bed and asleep, and not be able to be wakened until the invading divisions were well committed. I think there is a difficulty greater than that. One would not merely have to find him and wake him up: one would have to find that he had also gone quite mad if one wished to obtain his consent to throwing nuclears about in Germany in the first hours of an invasion—nuclears which would not only kill literally millions of civilian Germans but would incinerate the entire NATO forces, which would be "sitting ducks" in their barracks, from which they had not had time to deploy themselves. Really, the idea that you could use tactical nuclears in these circumstances is absurd.

There was a correspondence which followed and which seemed, in the main, to say that this NATO report was "old hat". Of course it is. This vulnerability has been known for many years. When I was the spokesman for my Party on military matters—I am not certain which year it was, about ten years ago—I was present with the late Sir Basil Liddell Hart when we worked out how a surprise attack would be likely to develop. The idea was rather different from Lord Chalfont's. Sir Basil visualised a Soviet commander probably choosing a winter's night when the North German plain was frozen, and calculated that if he started at last light he could have three divisions on the Rhine by first light next morning. If they turned up the Rhine they could be on the Swiss frontier by the third day and completely across the whole NATO communications; and with nine airborne divisions there would be little difficulty in moving in troops to line that corridor. The fact that it is "old hat" is perfectly true; but it seems surprising to advance it as an argument. It is an argument which would only be relevant if it were to be said that this is a danger which has passed and we are now prepared to meet it. Obviously, that is not true.

Every year the forces of the Warsaw Pact have become stronger and the forces of NATO have become weaker. It derives from the Lisbon Conference of 1952 when the Chiefs of Staff of NATO met to advise their Governments on what was necessary to defend the Western position. The answer came out: 50 divisions at the ready, 4,000 front-line aircraft, another 120 divisions at so many days and, most important of all, the main striking force to be held behind the Rhine because if it were put forward it could certainly be surprised.

This was back in 1952. We had not the will to provide the divisions and the Germans certainly had not the will to provide the battleground. Instead, all that we did was to find 22 divisions, a very scratch force, to be placed on the German frontier—not really even on the German frontier but on convenient barracks—convenient for housing troops, but not for deploying them. It was said that they would be a tripwire; that they might not be able to do much in the way of fighting; but that if they were attacked, the nuclear blast would leave America and descend on Russia. This was to be the deterrent. Now the bomb has gone! The tripwire is disconnected. The SALT agreements, in substance, amount to this: that neither the Russians nor the American will guard themselves against the other's attack; in other words, each party will expose his naked breast. That means very simply that the Americans have said in the SALT agreement: "We are not going to accept the incineration of our country for anything that happens in Europe." There is no nuclear deterrent left.

The Warsaw capacity in these years has much enlarged, and so far as NATO is concerned, what morale it ever had has disappeared. I think that it is time to say that. Britain has a small, professional, highly-efficient Army. It is loyal to its task. It would fight if it could; but it is stationed at least nine hours further from its deployment position than the Russians whom it proposes to meet, so that its chances of ever being able to fight would be remote. Behind that highly professional Army we have a generation that has never pulled a trigger. France has retired. Italy is not there.

Germany has become democratised, and very successfully democratised. She has been demilitarised and successfully demilitarised. Her Army is highly democratic. It is no danger to her civil Government and no danger to the Russians either because it is universally agred that it is heavily infiltrated at all levels from the East. Apart from that, we have established in Germany the civil right over the military right. There is no power by which one could mine the advance route of the enemy; no power to mine the bridges or even to remove petrol from the stations in the line of the enemy advance. Such are the entrenched rights of the individual against the military requirements, rights which we imposed in Germany in our enthusiasm when we created that Republic.

The American troops—well, American battle-worthy troops have been great fighting men; but she has never produced a peace-time Army which was interested in training; and she has not one in Germany, either. The defence of NATO is not a question of a surprise, it is not a question of "old hat". I have been trying to hammer this home for ten years. It just does not exist. We do not have to think in terms of attack. All that the Russians have to do is to sound their trumpets and the walls will come tumbling down.

The article says that there were 16,000 Soviet agents in Western Germany, at whatever date the NATO report was made. I do not know how they counted the numbers; but I suspect that it was quite simple. Those agents are perfectly well-known and nearly every German businessman has got his arrangements with them. The Germans are not Communists, they do not want to be Communists. They vastly prefer to go on as they are. But they are realistic people; they have suffered before—and there are very few German businessmen who have not made their private arrangements as to what they are going to do and how they are going to be accepted when the East moves in. There is going to be no resistance there.

In France, the working class movement is controlled by the Communists; and the Communist-Socialist alliance looks very likely to provide the next President—though that is looking a little far forward. So far as Italy is concerned, the Communists look to be on the point of joining the Government. They tell us they are independent and not under Russian control. Those who like comforting beliefs can believe that, if it amuses them. They also say that they will remain in the NATO Alliance. That, at any rate, I should think would have the approval of the Russians. It is hard to think of anything which could suit the Russians better. It would not have the approval of Dr. Kissinger, who has indicated that if communism goes on in this way then the NATO Alliance will have to be reconsidered.

For my part, I hope profoundly that it is. I should like to see it wound up as quickly as possible, because I believe that it is an untenable military posture, an obviously untenable military posture. It is not a deterrent but an incitement. We are not defended by NATO. We are not defended by any American threat of nuclear retaliation, because there is none. We are defended by the fact that a highly conservative gerontocracy in the Kremlin have the feeling that they have as many people as they can manage and do not want any more. They have a very strong feeling indeed they have as many Germans as they can manage and if they had more they might have the Germans running them. They have the feeling that they are old men and they hope and expect the present dispensation will see them out.

How long can we entrust our security to that chance arrangement in Russia? All through Russian history there have been periods of lassitude, and then comes a new young Tsar. Perhaps the new young Tsar will be a Communist who really believes in world revolution. Then we can look to the end of this European civilisation so far as the Continent is concerned. But I am convinced that if we look to ourselves we can defend ourselves. We do not have a Communist Party or anything that counts as a Communist Party. We have no Communist Party which could provide the Russians with a credible Government. Russia is not interested in governing countries where she cannot use a local Communist Party for that purpose. That is why the smaller States—Switzerland, Turkey, Finland and Sweden—seem reasonably secure and stable. There are not Communist Parties there, but there is resolve and determination to defend their liberties. Where there is a will to defend, those countries can look to a future.

I do not believe that the Russians, even with a young new Tsar, even with the determination of world revolution, would wish to interfere with resolute people who are prepared to defend themselves and who are not needlessly provocative. This country should recognise, in view of this report and everything which has been said, that NATO has ceased to be a viable alliance; it has ceased to be a source of security. We should get out of these dangerous entanglements. We should get rid of nuclear weapons which are a danger to us and nobody else because we cannot conceivably use them. We should train our people to defend themselves.

The idea that one can have a whole generation that has never pulled a trigger cannot go on. It is not merely a question of physical ability but morale. If a nation is to live it must have the will; it must have the feeling of being together, of being part of a unit, a determination to be a nation and defend itself. This is absolutely essential. A long period of military training is not necessary. It should be on a local basis. The battalions ought to be brought into being, roughly at school leaving ages, and should have a ten-year life. They should be based upon their local area with fairly simple weapons. They should be designed to go underground if necessary, to be guerrillas if necessary, to defend their locality, to become a community imbued with defending the idea of independence. I believe that would be a deterrent to any invader, for no invader wants to take on Ulsters voluntarily, let alone trained, determined guerrillas who would be far more effective than any Ulster terrorists. There lies the deterrent, and there is the direction in which our defence policy should go.

Lord BOOTHBY

My Lords, before the noble Lord sits down, may I ask one question? Is not the logical conclusion of his argument that we should restore National Service in this country?

Lord PAGET of NORTHAMPTON

Certainly, my Lords; I thought I had made that clear.

5.34 p.m.

Lord STRATHCONA and MOUNT ROYAL

My Lords, one cannot but fail to be impressed by the sincerity and authority of Lord Paget's analysis, however depressing one might find it. I cannot follow his conclusion in suggesting that we should wind up NATO. It is still the best we have, and we would be in danger of falling into the old pitfall of the best being the enemy of the good. Furthermore, he talks of Soviet agents infiltrating the West. In my more depressed moments I sometimes acquire some solace from thinking that Czechoslovakia, for instance, is held down by force of Soviet arms, and while one tends to think of the monolithic nature of the Warsaw Pact countries, I am not so certain that I would want to go to war with the Ukraine, Czechoslovakia and Roumania at my back. We do not know the extent of their total identity with the present Soviet régime.

Briefly, I want to support the noble Lord in having asked this Question; but I want to be careful not to pre-empt the full defence debate we shall be having in about a month's time. I am not qualified to follow the noble Lord's penetrating analysis on the strategic balance. The publicity we have recently had on defence issues is wholly desirable. It is dangerous for these issues to be swept under the carpet, for we would be in danger of tripping down the stairs. The particular study which triggered off this Question has probably been slightly overblown in that it was more or less a routine staff study, and these things go on continuously all the time. It is reassuring that these staff studies are being carried out. Perhaps some of the conclusions they come to are worrying.

It has unquestionably highlighted the situation which has been worrying many of us for a number of years. It has proved particularly timely in view of the startling Russian reaction to the speech from the Leader of my Party. This in turn has triggered off a series of useful and informative articles by the noble Lord, Lord Chalfont. Predictably, it has either been followed or initiatives have been taken by that reliable old friend of defence, the noble Lord, Lord Shinwell, who has taken certain initiatives about information being made available to this House.

It is important we should retain a balance in studying these reports. If we overdo decrying our weaknesses, we may be in danger of provoking precisely the response we are anxious to avoid. A potential aggressor may be tempted in thinking he could attack the West with impunity. As the noble Lord said, this is certainly one of the psychological reasons why it is of great importance for the West to retain a credible defence posture. Equally, it would be dangerous for this country to become as paranoid as the Russians are—and indeed historically have been over very many years—harbouring unfounded suspicions that neighbours have the desire or intention of dominating by force.

The difficulty in which we find ourselves is that the Russians feed such fears in the West. We look across the Iron Curtain and see a country which has a long way to go in raising the standard of living of its people in the production of consumer goods and, indeed, in food. Yet they choose, as a land-locked and land-based Power, to create in the space of ten short years the most powerful navy in the world, with a massive spearhead force of attack submarines—which of all the weapons in the armoury is the one which cannot be said to be a defensive weapon. By definition, the attack submarine is not a defensive weapon. Furthermore, in recent weeks the Soviets have demonstrated quite clearly that they are not afraid to deploy this machine in support of their political aspirations. It is therefore wholly understandable that Mr. Solzhenitsyn should be saying that they are on a treadmill and possibly in danger of being unable to control the machine they have created. Nevertheless, I continue to be a believer in the rather overworked word "détente", provided we are clear what we mean by it. We would support frank discussion of our fears and differences in the hope of being able to identify where the conflicting interests lie, with a view perhaps to reconciling some of the differences and expanding those areas of mutual trust and understanding which exist.

I think we must be opposed to détente if by this we mean being lulled into a false sense of security by an over-facile acceptance of palpably false assurances which are not backed up by deeds and performance, and which are simply designed to weaken the will to defend what we believe in. This, again, was eloquently expounded by Mr. Solzhenitsyn the other day. We must oppose détente. If we then progressed even further and, in our weak and troubled financial and industrial situation, used it as a pretext for the unilateral dropping of our guard, we should be setting an example which inevitably would be followed by our NATO allies. In many cases they are only looking for a pretext to do this. This country is still looked to for leadership in these matters and, if we start, the dominoes will fall fast indeed.

I should like to finish by reminding the Government of an old adage: that the ostrich, with its head in the sand, is indeed in a posture which invites a kick up the behind. I know this is not something which applies to the noble Lord who is to reply to the debate, and I know that he personally is aware of how close to the bone we have come in cutting the forces in NATO. I shall be very interested this evening to hear whether his brief allows him to admit how close we have come.

5.44 p.m.

Lord HALE

My Lords, the whole House will have listened with attention to the noble Lord who has just sat down, who has made an absolutely charming, friendly and certainly non-controversial speech. I think, with all humility as a pacifist, I might venture to put one point to him, because he has asked my noble friend the reason for his destructive views about NATO. I would ask him to recall the fate of SEATO, because it was only last September that the final meeting of the South-East Asia Treaty Organisation took place in New York. This was rather surprising, but the meeting was held there because it was not safe for many of the representatives concerned to go to Bangkok—Thailand having decided to expel the whole of the American citizens who were there. Of the eight Members, France had not paid a subscription and two or three had evolved a new, anti-American foreign policy. The resolution was passed last September that while they would not abrogate the Treaty—a most charming conception, this—they would abolish the Organisation.

That is the end of one Organisation. Can it happen here? I beg your Lordships to believe this personal statement: I have had no discussion whatever, except for the exchange of a couple of words, with the noble Lord, Lord Paget of Northampton. I did not intend to listen very carefully to his speech, because I was convinced I should disagree with every word—and I have known him for 50 years or more and am rather an expert on the noble Lord, Lord Paget. But he is surprising. There was indeed quite a long period when Lieutenant Paget of the Royal Navy was writing the most indiscreet letters to Sergeant Hale of the Royal Regiment of Artillery. We exchanged letters and we expressed during that time, with the utmost freedom, our views on the powers-that-be and thanked whatever Gods might be that we had an Air Force! When I wanted to be rude to the noble Lord, Lord Paget, which I was on occasion, I said unkindly that he had brains and no common sense; and when I wanted to flatter myself I claimed that I had common sense and no brains. Then today up gets the noble Lord, Lord Paget of Northampton, and in a very brilliant, admirably-reasoned and plausible speech he comes to precisely the same conclusion as I have reached. His views on NATO are my views; his views of the future are my views. I listened to him with almost astonished agreement. He has taken the high road and I, of course, always take the low road; but we have arrived together at our separate conclusions.

I shall content myself with merely reciting a few events of yesterday. Yesterday The Times reported that the opinion was being widely reported from America and the words were believed to be those of Dr. Kissinger—that if Italy had a Communist-participating Government then it was not worth continuing NATO at all and it might as well be wound up. The Times pointed out that this would mean the withdrawal of 3 million American troops from Western Europe. Italy will almost certainly have a Communist-participating Government. On all the informed predictions of the pollsters, France will also have a Communist-participating Government. M. Francois Mitterand is at the moment enjoying a popularity which the Left have not been able to register since the return and subsequent demise of General de Gaulle. France, with her own position in NATO always equivocal, and, indeed, precarious, has in these circumstances to rely on Germany to provide a very substantial measure of support.

But it was announced yesterday, again in The Times—not a paper on which I normally rely, but on matters of this kind one can at least regard a statement as a provisional hypothesis—that the leader of the Social Democrat Party in the Federal Republic of Germany, speaking in this country, said: For long we have been an economy looking for a nation. For a time we looked to Europe to provide it, but we have concluded that this is nonsense. It is impracticable. It is not even visionary. So, he said: I do not rule out for a moment the reunion of Germany". And let us not forget, my Lords, that Herr Schmidt himself has been negotiating treaties for the repatriation to Western Germany of some of the East Germans. He is very sensible, and I am not criticising the Germans. I am merely saying that steps are being taken, day by day, for the reunion of Germany.

I am far from wanting to criticise the Americans. I think that their foreign policies have been very good, but I thought that President Nixon's discovery of China was perhaps a little belated. I had done it beforehand, though I naturally accepted the assurance of the CIA that it was the Gobi desert populated with supers.

However, we are the area for battle in the event of nuclear war, in the event of the full use of nuclear weapons. There is a temptation to say that Great Britain is an admirable target. You can wipe out Great Britain, without wiping out anybody else. If we have reached that point of no possible return, where someone has to push a button, Russia might well think that if they destroyed Britain it would convince the Americans that they were serious, and an interchange of flashes might avert the final combat. I do not think our American friends have ever pretended that they would sacrifice the whole of their Atlantic seaboard in defence of Britain. It would be unfair to ask them to do so. They have been very generous, and I am certainly in no sense anti-American. So that, precisely as the noble Lord, Lord Paget of Northampton, said, there is a situation in which, if we had not spent £40,000 million on armaments since 1945—a vastly increased sum in 1975 terms—we should not now be enduring our present economic depression. We should not now be facing as near certain economic extinction as we may be facing nuclear extinction.

The other thing that happened last night—and I tore myself away from a fascinating debate for it—was a programme on the ITV; one of those terriers in the rat pit political discussions which so delight the audiences of the BBC. There was half an hour of bland statements of opinion and of facts, uninterrupted, by five of the most distinguished nuclear scientists in the whole United States—four of them were present, and one was speaking from hospital—speaking with ail the authority and dignity of judges of the Supreme Court pronouncing a decision on law, but in this case pronouncing a decision on science. What they said was that we have gone too far. We have nearly reached the point of no return.

We have a situation in which France is supplying nuclear energy to Libya. Yet only a month or two ago, President Sadat explained that the eccentricities of Colonel Gaddafi were due to falling on his head from a very tall camel when he was 12 years old. It is a somewhat new but rather frightening version of Lady Caroline Norton's most famous poem. Field Marshal Amin VC was also mentioned. President Kaunda might usefully consider whether he would like, on behalf of the coloured races of Africa, to undertake against Field Marshal Amin the same measures that he advocates our taking against the white population of Rhodesia. It is not an easy matter.

However, the professors in America said that there will soon be 300 tons of plutonium floating about. Canada is supplying the stuff to Pakistan, the United States are supplying it to Iran and, I think, Brazil, and so on. They said that if Israel does not have nuclear weapons now, it can make them within a few weeks—of that there is no doubt—and it can use them. If Israel is beleaguered by the Arab nations and fighting for its existence against overwhelmingly superior forces, whatever be the rights and wrongs, who can expect it not to use them?

I know that since 1950 we have had the arguments about strategic and tactical weapons. I never quite know what they are, and they vary from time to time. But the placidity of the last North Atlantic Treaty Organisation Report was so astonishing as to be almost unbelievable. They took note of the fact that the United Kingdom and Iceland are playing musical chairs, put and take, in the Icelandic seas to no sensible purpose. They did not comment on the fact that war is becoming an instrument throughout the world. Nearly all of them are religious wan, too. Christians are slaughtering Moslems. Moslems are slaughtering Christians, Protestants are fighting Catholics. I have yet to record the first Agnostic war. It may be that there is something to be said for holding moderate and understanding views, but that is the position. My Lords, I am grateful to my noble friend Lord Paget of Northampton for initiating this discussion. I am also grateful for the privilege of taking part in it. After a very brief personal absence from the Chamber, I shall listen to the noble Lord on the Front Bench with the greatest possible interest.

6.1 p.m.

Lord WINTERBOTTOM

My Lords, the issue raised by my noble friend is very important and deserves careful consideration. I am sure that noble Lords will understand, therefore, why I shall confine myself to the Question and not be diverted into other interesting topics that would fall more appropriately within the ambit of our forthcoming debate on the Statement on the Defence Estimates 1976. It is then that I shall reply fully to my noble friend's arguments and to the points made by other noble Lords.

I think I should begin by referring to the way in which this subject first came to public prominence. Just over a fortnight ago The Times featured two articles—my noble friend has obviously read them—one of them written by the noble Lord, Lord Chalfont, based on a report prepared by a senior officer of NATO's armed forces…now circulating within the Alliance and forecasting all sorts of alarming consequences in the event of a surprise attack on NATO. In fact, the articles, with their references to a report circulating in NATO, came as a far greater surprise to NATO than any military attack is likely to be. After some investigation, however, the report was tracked down. It turned out to have been written for private purposes by a military officer employed in a NATO agency outside NATO Headquarters. It was not prepared by, nor is it being studied in, the civil and military components of the various NATO headquarters.

After what I have been saying, I doubt whether noble Lords will be very surprised to hear that neither Her Majesty's Government nor NATO accept all that was alleged in The Times articles. Of course, some of what the noble Lord, Lord Chalfont, wrote is true, given his assumptions. Any attacker who can achieve complete surprise must gain an advantage from doing so and is likely to be able to make inroads upon the territory of his opponent. This would be equally true on the totally incredible hypothesis of a surprise attack by NATO upon the Warsaw Pact. But the articles assumed, in effect, that NATO's forces are totally inadequate to offer any resistance to the kind of attack that would be delivered without any build-up. The fact is that NATO recognises the possibility of a surprise attack and deploys at all times forces which are ready to counter such an attack. It is part of NATO's strategy that it should do so.

Another assumption was that the Warsaw Pact would have available in a "surprise" situation forces which would not, in fact, be employable without some preparation. Some preparation would be necessary. This would of itself alert NATO and thus reduce the element of surprise. NATO is of course aware of the danger that such preparations might be undertaken in the guise of preparing for a large-scale exercise. There were also the assumptions of the absence of any political indicators of the imminence of an attack, and the inability of Western leaders to interpret and act upon what warnings there may be; and the implicit assumption of complete Soviet confidence that Western leaders, and the United States President in particular, would be unable to take speedy decisions after the attack had begun.

We do not accept these assumptions—nor, indeed, did The Times in its own leading article the day after the original articles appeared. We have confidence in NATO's flexible response strategy and in the triad of forces which support it. So that it could make an effective and appropriate response to any Warsaw Pact attack, NATO deploys conventional forces, theatre nuclear forces and strategic nuclear forces. Each of these three elements of NATO's forces has a specific role in countering particular types of aggression, but each depends on the other two to constitute overall a credible deterrent. For example, in the circumstances postulated in The Times articles which we have been considering today, NATO would, if necessary, be prepared to use its theatre nuclear weapons. We say something about this on page 10 of the Defence White Paper, which I know noble Lords who are interested in these matters will be studying. I can assure noble Lords that it would be wrong to suppose that NATO would be unable to do so, simply because the attack had come with little warning, or at an inconvenient time of day, or at an equally inconvenient time of the year.

This is a short reply to an important subject, but in the course of the next month we shall have the opportunity of going much more deeply into the total problem of Western defence.