Lords Sitting of 25 March 1976

Preamble
The House met at three of the clock: The LORD CHANCELLOR on the Woolsack.
Prayers—Read by the Lord Bishop of Wakefield.

TRAFFIC FORECASTING
Lord AVEBURY: My Lords, I beg leave to ask the Question which stands in my name on the Order Paper.
The Question was as follows:
To ask Her Majesty's Government in what form they propose that the national debate about traffic forecasting should take place.
The PARLIAMENTARY UNDER-SECRETARY of STATE, DEPARTMENT of the ENVIRONMENT (Baroness BIRK): My Lords, traffic forecasting will be covered in the Consultative Paper on transport policy which my right honourable friend the Secretary of State is publishing shortly. The Paper should stimulate debate both in Parliament and outside.
Lord AVEBURY: My Lords, why is the transport Consultative Paper being delayed? Can the noble Baroness, Lady Birk, say whether she agrees with her noble friend Lady Stedman, who on the last occasion when we debated traffic forecasting said that she could not understand the mathematical formulæ involved and that the matter was far too complicated to be dealt with on the Floor of the House? In that event would the noble Baroness agree that other opportunities must be provided for those interested parties outside to make their views known to the Department, and would the noble Baroness consider the possibility of a Select Committee of this House being convened to examine the White Paper?
Baroness BIRK: My Lords, the opportunities for it to be debated in this House and in another place will be discussed with everyone with any interest in the transport field—unions, management, local authorities, transport users—and we shall also be asking people to write to us
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with their views. In addition, we shall be discussing it with any bodies who have already intimated any likely criticisms they may have, even of a paper they have not yet seen.
Lord POPPLEWELL: My Lords, is my noble friend aware that her original reply was almost like a gramophone record? The noble Baroness used the word "shortly": we have been getting this reply each time a Question has been asked since last December. Instead of giving the same type of reply, can the noble Baroness not be a little more forthright? Are we going to get this Paper next month?
Baroness BIRK: My Lords, the Paper certainly should be out next month, which is "shortly".
Baroness YOUNG: My Lords, can the noble Baroness tell us what steps the Government intend to take to consult the users of public transport in regard to the Paper?
Baroness BIRK: My Lords, both through the organisations which I have already mentioned, and also publicly, people will be asked to write giving their ideas, so they may make representations either through organisations or as individuals.
Lord AVEBURY: My Lords, I should like to press the noble Baroness once again on the technicalities of traffic forecasting and the question of how she sees these being debated. Does she not agree that if people are left to write letters to the Department this will not promote a public debate because no one else will see them? Will she find some means whereby the methodology of the traffic forecast can be thoroughly examined with all those interested parties having the opportunity of making their views known, not only to the Department but to a wider circle of people who might be in a position to comment on them?
Baroness BIRK: My Lords, in view of the problems in regard to traffic forecasting, my right honourable friend will issue an annex to the Paper. I am sure the noble Lord will agree that the technical side is the way it is arrived at but the basis on which it is made is part of policy, which can quite easily be discussed.

COHABITATION AND PERSONAL INCOME
3.11 p.m.
Baroness WOOTTON of ABINGER: My Lords, I beg leave to ask the Question which stands in my name on the Order Paper.
The Question was as follows:
To ask Her Majesty's Government:

(1) whether a couple who live together "as man and wife" without being married, are liable to be treated as a married couple under the Supplementary Benefit cohabitation rule, with the result that the woman loses her entitlement to benefit;

(2) whether a man and woman, each with a substantial investment income, who cohabit without being married, continue to enjoy the financial advantage of being taxed as separate individuals, since their incomes are not aggregated for income tax purposes as in the case of a married couple.

Lord WELLS-PESTELL: My Lords, the answer to the first part of the Question is, "Yes". With regard to the second part, for tax purposes the incomes of a man and woman who are not married to each other but who are living together are not aggregated; each is taxed separately.
Lord GARDINER: My Lords, may I ask my noble friend whether the Government think the time has come when supplementary benefits should be administered according to personal needs regardless of the sex life of the person concerned?
Lord WELLS-PESTELL: My Lords, my noble and learned friend will have seen the recent report of the Supplementary Benefits Commission which recommends that the matter which underlies his question should remain as before.
Baroness WOOTTON of ABINGER: My Lords, I thank my noble friend for his Answer and for the clarity and precision of his unqualified affirmative to both parts of my Question. May I ask him further whether this is an outrageous example of one law for the poor and another for the rich? May I also ask
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him whether he can give an estimate of how the amount of public money which is saved under the first rule in this Question compares with the amount of money which is lost under the second?
Lord WELLS-PESTELL: My Lords, in reply to the second part of my noble friend's question, I cannot give any figures or information. If there are any available, I shall make it my business to find out and let my noble friend know. With regard to the first part of her question, it has been customary in this country to deal differently as between married couples and unmarried people who are living together.
Baroness WOOTTON of ABINGER: My Lords, that is not an answer. My question was this: was this not an outrageous example of one law for the poor and one for the rich? Would the noble Lord answer that?
Lord WELLS-PESTELL: My Lords, at first glance, I would say, No.
Lord HAILSHAM of SAINT MARYLEBONE: My Lords, is it not time that a Government of some political persuasion—I recognise no Party can claim to be innocent in this respect—did long-felt justice to married couples by giving a separate assessment for man and wife, as well as those who choose, for one reason or another, to cohabit without the preliminary ritual?

SOCIAL SECURITY BENEFIT FRAUDS
Viscount MASSEREENE and FERRARD: My Lords, I beg leave to ask the Question which stands in my name on the Order Paper.
The Question was as follows:
To ask Her Majesty's Government whether they will take stronger powers against those who receive unemployment and national assistance benefits without declaring upon what work or employment they are engaged.
Lord WELLS-PESTELL: My Lords, persons convicted of benefit fraud are already liable to a fine or to imprisonment for not more than three months, or to both. The maximum fine for insurance benefit franc was increased from

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£100 to £400 under the Social Security Act 1975, and we shall seek an opportunity for bringing into line the maximum fine, at present £100, for offences involving supplementary benefit, which the noble Viscount referred to as national assistance.
Viscount MASSEREENE and FERRARD: My Lords, while thanking the noble Lord, Lord Wells-Pestell, for that reply, may I ask whether he is aware that many thousands of honest working people—in fact, the majority—are disgusted at the manner in which certain members of the public engage in fraud on social security? May I further ask the noble Lord whether he is aware that if there could be—I quite appreciate the difficulties—more stringent enforcement of the regulations, it would benefit the Government by bringing down their published unemployment figures, and would help in regard to public expenditure?
Lord WELLS-PESTELL: My Lords, the noble Viscount in his Question refers specifically to supplementary benefits and unemployment benefits. Taking those two particular benefits, in 1975 13,500 cases of concealment of earnings, including those of adult dependants, were actually considered for proceedings, and there were prosecutions in 7,100 cases. No stone is left unturned in trying to bring this matter before the courts, but, in the interests of the community and everyone concerned, one has to be satisfied that there is sufficient evidence which can be established in a court to bring about a conviction. That is not always easy. In other cases, the amounts are so small that, if I have not misunderstood the matter, they would not really warrant proceedings being brought. But the people who are not proceeded against are dealt with in no uncertain manner by the Department of Health and Social Security. I could go on, but I will not, to show the noble Viscount that in other benefits where there has been fraud the number of prosecutions is twice the number that I have given him.
Lord GARDINER: My Lords, may I ask my noble friend Lord Wells-Pestell how the number of prosecutions referred to compares with the number of prosecutions for income tax fraud known to the Revenue?
Lord WELLS-PESTELL: My Lords, I have not come prepared to answer that question.
Viscount MASSEREENE and FERRARD: My Lords, is the noble Lord, Lord Wells-Pestell, aware that income tax fraud is quite another matter?
Several Noble Lords: Oh!
Viscount MASSEREENE and FERRARD: My Lords, is he further aware that people who perpetrate an income tax fraud have at least helped the economy by producing wealth? They must have the money to indulge in an income tax fraud, whereas people receiving social security benefit fraudulently have not produced anything.
Lord WELLS-PESTELL: My Lords, I would call in aid the noble and learned Lord, who would say that fraud is fraud.
Lord COLLISON: My Lords, is the noble Lord the Minister aware that in some quarters public opinion as to what is a fraud is greatly exaggerated? Even if we take the total figures which the noble Lord has been given, in relation to the total number of people on supplementary benefit the number who are trying to behave fraudulently is very small.
Baroness GAITSKELL: My Lords, in order to establish the facts, may I ask that whenever a noble Lord in this House uses the term "many thousands of people" he ought to give the precise figure?
Viscount MASSEREENE and FERRARD: My Lords, is the noble Lord aware that I can give—
The LORD PRIVY SEAL (Lord Shepherd): Order, order!

RHODESIAN PASSPORTS AND TRAVEL PERMITS
3.19 p.m.
Lord BARNBY: My Lords, I beg leave to ask the Question which stands in my name on the Order Paper.
The Question was as follows:
To ask Her Majesty's Government whether they will indicate what criteria are used to define "urgent compassionate grounds" with regard

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to the issue to holders of Rhodesian passports of travel permits to this country.
The MINISTER of STATE, FOREIGN and COMMONWEALTH OFFICE (Lord Goronwy-Roberts): My Lords, each application is considered on its individual merits.
Lord BARNBY: My Lords, arising from that not very exhaustive reply, may I ask the noble Lord the Minister whether in the very ample regulations which I received late last evening from the Minister of State on this subject—and in his letter the Minister refers to them he could define "urgent compassionate grounds"? Could he give any help on a case which has gone through his hands to the Minister of State, urging that on urgent compassionate grounds—and in the presence of the right reverend Prelate one might think on humanitarian grounds—the individual referred to in the application should come to this country for the briefest time for the marriage of his daughter to someone in this country, and one employed in this country? It would seem, when permission has been given for the wife to come here, that the application from the father should surely come under "urgent compassionate grounds". The refusal seems to smack of vicious implementation of bureaucracy which is not dissimilar from that in Russia, where the exit of people is not permitted.
Lord GORONWY-ROBERTS: My Lords, most of us would not so resent being accused of occasional lies, but all would resent being accused of being vicious in this particular kind of situation. The noble Lord said that it was late before he received copies, and I imagine he is referring to the rather lengthy statements on guidelines made by the then Attorney General on 17th June 1968, and the then Secretary of State for Commonwealth Affairs on 27th June of that year. He was even later in putting down this Question, which raises very complicated matters on which a Minister would not wish to pronounce on the day after it was tabled. If the noble Lord is still dissatisfied in regard to the case he has raised, he has only to come and see me, or indeed prolong the correspondence he has been engaged in, and we shall see
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what is possible to be done. I hold out no hopes of a reversal of the decision, but I think it would be inutilitas for me to engage in detailed discussion of criteria or of an individual case at Question Time.
Lord BARNBY: My Lords, may I thank the noble Lord, whom one always regards as the most considerate and compassionate of individuals, certainly in interpreting any phrase. But would he not categorise the desire to attend this marriage of a daughter as entitled to be considered on compassionate or humanitarian grounds?
Lord GORONWY-ROBERTS: My Lords, the noble Lord puts it in a loaded way. These matters are considered individually, and I would say with a very great degree of compassionate consideration.
Lord HAILSHAM of SAINT MARYLEBONE: My Lords, I realise, of course, that this Question may have reference to an individual case, and in any event that its ambit is limited to a trickle of individual applications; but I wonder whether the noble Lord is in a position to answer this. If the situation in Rhodesia is anything like as serious as we are led to believe, will there not be a very large number of applications to come to this country from that country, and is it not absolutely essential that there should be widespread contingency planning as to the way in which they should be dealt with? If the noble Lord would prefer not to answer that question without notice, I will, of course, fully understand, and so will the House, but I would be obliged if he can give me some sort of indication.
Lord GORONWY-ROBERTS: My Lords, I can certainly give the assurance that any contingency planning found to be necessary will be engaged in.

CONSOLIDATED FUND (No. 2) BILL
Read 3a, and passed.
POST OFFICE (BANKING SERVICES) BILL
Read 3a, and passed.

BILL OF RIGHTS BILL [H.L.]
3.26 p.m.
Lord WADE: My Lords, I beg to move that this Bill be read a second time. The purpose of the Bill is to provide that the principles set out in the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights shall have the force of law and shall be enforceable by action in the courts of the United Kingdom; that is to say, shall be part of our domestic law. As your Lordships are aware, the Convention was approved by the Council of Europe in 1950. It came into force in 1953 and was ratified by 10 countries. It was ratified by the United Kingdom in 1951. Since 1966 individual complainants in this country have had the right, subject to rules about admissibility, to petition to the European Commission and ultimately to the Human Rights Court in Strasbourg. Eight countries have gone further and have incorporated the Convention into their domestic law. The United Kingdom has not yet done so. It has been argued by some jurists that the ratifying of the Convention and the incorporation into domestic law should be regarded as an obligation in the light of the wording of Article 1, which reads:
"The High Contracting Parties shall secure to everyone within their jurisdiction the rights and freedoms defined in Section 1 of the Convention".
This Bill aims to give effect to that obligation.
If I might turn for a short while to the broader issue of this great human rights debate, I must first acknowledge that this is not the first time this subject has been discussed in this House. There have been a number of such debates in both Houses of Parliament; so far as this House is concerned, from the late Lord Reading's Preservation of the Rights of the Subject Bill 1947, and the late Lord Samuel's Liberties of the Subject Bill 1950, up to the present day. The only reason for not attempting to review the past history of our debates on this subject is that I do not wish to trespass unduly on your Lordships' time. But I must make it clear that I am indebted to members of all Parties and to both Houses for the contribution that has been made to the subject, and I must also acknowledge that Mr. Alan Beith, in the House of Commons, introduced, under
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the Ten-Minute Rule, on 15th July 1975, a Bill in similar form to the one which I am now putting before your Lordships. In that case Parliamentary time did not permit the Bill to proceed.
In recent years there has been growing interest in the whole subject of a Bill of Rights, much discussion in legal and political circles, and some very important observations on this issue, notably from Lord Justice Scarman in the Hamlyn Lecture in 1974. There is general or at least widespread agreement about the need for something more to be done in regard to the protection of human rights and fundamental freedoms, to use the words of the European Convention. There is, however, some difference of view as to the next most practicable steps to take. I do not propose to go over all the arguments that have been put forward and deal with them point by point, because obviously that would take up too much time. Moreover, in opening this debate it would be presumptuous of me to do so. However, I have a few general observations to offer.
I was brought up to assume that the absence of a written Constitution was a great asset to this country; that it was far better to rely on case law supplemented by Statute Law providing specific safeguards for specific abuses. But there has been a change of attitude in recent years. It may be said that since joining the European Community we are already half way, or at any rate a quarter the way, to a written Constitution. In any case, we shall have to face up to this when devolution for Scotland and Wales is introduced. I am not, however, raising this whole subject of a written Constitution this afternoon for I think it would be wiser to deal with that in the context of devolution. Then there is the closely related subject of entrenched clauses. Again, we shall have to face up to this when we embark on the subject of devolution. However, I do not think that that is an adequate reason for delaying the passing of this Bill. I am very conscious of the difficulties involved in introducing legislation which attempts to bind future Parliaments and—to express my personal view—I prefer what I call the psychological safeguard whereby certain principles, such as those contained in a Bill of Rights, would be deemed to prevail over all future legislation unless

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specifically stated to the contrary, and I will return to that point later.
The next general proposition I put forward relates to the wording of the European Convention. It has been said that the clauses were drafted in the immediate post-war period, in a different climate, and that in some respects the wording has become dated. It must be remembered, however, that these are principles. The circumstances may change but the general principles remain valid, and in adopting the wording of the European Convention there is the further advantage that the wording has been widely accepted. Incidentally, the basic human rights that have been spelled out in the European Convention are derived from principles laid down in British courts; British lawyers had a very large part to play in drawing up the European Convention. I should make a general point relating to Northern Ireland. I do not wish to prejudge the debate on the Bill of the noble Lord, Lord Brockway, which is to follow, but I think it preferable that a Bill of this nature should apply equally to all parts of the United Kingdom. It is very difficult to provide separate rules for different parts of the United Kingdom, but of course I will listen to what Lord Brockway has to say.
I come to the details of my Bill, which is very short and the major part of which is the Schedule setting out the provisions of the European Convention and Protocols. There are four clauses. The first provides that the Convention:
"…shall without any reservation immediately upon the passing of this Act have the force of law, and shall be enforceable by action in the Courts of the United Kingdom."
Clause 2 provides that in the
"…case of conflict between any enactment prior to the passing of this Act and the provisions of the…Convention and Protocols, the…Convention and Protocols shall prevail."
Clause 3 provides that in the
"…case of conflict between any enactment subsequent to the passing of this Act and the provisions of the…Convention and Protocols, the…Convention and Protocols shall prevail unless subsequent enactment shall explicitly state otherwise."
Clause 4 provides that the Bill extends to Northern Ireland. I have certain observations to make about the wording of the Bill. I am assuming that the word "enactment" in Clauses 2 and 3 will
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cover delegated legislation derived from an Act of Parliament and Resolutions of both Houses derived from an Act of Parliament and requiring interpretation in the courts. If the word "enactment" is not sufficiently wide, this could be dealt with in Committee and, if necessary, a definition clause inserted.
Another point regarding the wording. I have used the words:
"…unless subsequent enactment shall explicitly state otherwise"
That is in the case of future legislation. I do not believe that Members of Parliament of either House would be so cynical as to allow some phrase to be inserted in a large number of measures which would exclude the terms of this Bill and the effect of the Convention on Human Rights being treated as part of our law. If words were inserted to exclude the application of the Convention, this would be taken as a warning and I think that Members of Parliament would be very reluctant to pass a number of measures with such exclusion; I think it would put Members of Parliament on their guard. Therefore I believe that the use of this expression in my Bill would—at any rate, I hope it would—be effective.
I recognise that the Bill, if passed, might reduce the opportunities for appealing to Strasbourg, but in this regard one must consider the delays and expense involved in taking a case to the Commission and the European Court and the embarrassments that are caused to the United Kingdom when it is criticised in Europe for having broken the spirit or the words of the Convention of Human Rights. I should like to quote from a letter to The Times of May 22nd 1975 from a relative of mine, Professor H. W. R. Wade, of St. John's College, Oxford. The letter reads:
"Sir,
Lord Hailsham's stimulating articles of May 12th, 16th and 20th will have strengthened the case for a British Bill of Rights, which already has Lord Salmon and Lord Justice Scarman among its eminent advocates. One measure, surely overdue, is to incorporate into our domestic law the European Convention on Human Rights, by which we have long been bound internationally. If, like other countries, we had done this, we would probably have been snared the humiliating proceedings against this country in Strasbourg in recent years, since the cases would have come first into our own courts and their decisions would in all likelihood have given satisfaction"

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Professor Wade goes on to discuss the subject of entrenched law, but I quote only the first paragraph of his letter because it states so succinctly the point which I am endeavouring to make and because it strengthens my case for asking for this Bill to be read a second time.
I am aware of the Motion that has been tabled by the noble and learned Lord, Lord Hailsham, and I shall listen very attentively to whatever he has to say. It would probably be best if I were to defer any comments on that Motion until I have heard what the noble and learned Lord has to say. To sum up, there are at least five possible courses of action. They are not all incompatible with each other. One is to draw up a written Constitution incorporating a Bill of Rights. That would be a formidable task. Secondly, we might attempt to achieve agreement on a newly drafted Bill of Rights for the United Kingdom. Some favour this course, but it would require a great deal of careful consideration. I have no objection to that course on principle, but I would point out that if this Bill is passed there will be nothing to inhibit the introduction of further legislation to expand and supplement the principles of the European Convention so far as the United Kingdom is concerned. Furthermore, it might be worth while considering whether such supplemental legislation could usefully incorporate some of the decisions already made by the Human Rights Court.
To return to the possible courses of action, we could establish a United Kingdom Commission of Human Rights, as suggested by Mr. Sam Silkin in the House of Commons on 2nd April. 1971, to investigate, report and recommend but not to enforce. Then again, as a fourth possible course, we could do nothing at all and leave things as they are. Fifthly, we could incorporate the European Convention into our own domestic law as proposed in this Bill.
The main considerations which affect my mind are that we should not do anything less than other ratifying countries and also that the delays and expense in bringing a case to the Commission and ultimately to the European Court are very serious. While they may be inevitable, they are regrettable. In the Golder case, which was concerned with the right
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of a prisoner to have access to his solicitor and to correspond with a solicitor, the proceedings lasted five years. Surely, if it is right for this country to ratify the Convention as, indeed, it has done, and if it is right that an individual complainant should have the opportunity of taking a case to the European Court, or at any rate of having his case heard and decided, it cannot be right that he should have to wait five years before obtaining a decision.
There is one other relevant consideration. It is this. It used to be assumed that adequate protection for human rights and the preservation of individual liberty against the abuse of power could and would be provided by the development of case law, coupled with Statute Law. But there is a growing consensus of opinion that the individual citizen today lacks the protection which, in a modern, civilised community, he needs. Some further safeguards are required. The development of the Common Law is too slow and the mass of modern legislation is so overwhelming that that in itself may be a danger against which the individual needs protection. Hence, the growing interest in the subject of a Bill of Rights.
Mr. Michael Zander, in his admirable litttle book, A Bill of Rights, published in 1975, sets out the pros and cons. He comes down broadly in favour of the view which I have been expressing this afternoon. In his conclusion, he writes, with commendable moderation, as follows:
"A Bill of Rights is desirable not because human rights are grossly abused in Britain, nor to provide against the danger of future tyranny. The former is untrue; the latter unlikely"
Here, may I insert my own comment? I do not feel that we should regard the possibility of future tyranny with too much complacency. Mr. Zander goes on to say:
"The case for a Bill of Rights rests rather on the belief that it would make a distinct and valuable contribution to the better protection of human rights"
I trust that, in the desire for a better protection of human rights, both now and in the future, your Lordships will see fit to give this Bill a Second Reading. I beg to move.
Moved, That the Bill be now read 2a—(Lord Wade.)
3.49 p.m.
Lord HAILSHAM of SAINT MARYLEBONE: My Lords, I am sure that the House is indebted to the noble Lord, Lord Wade, for introducing this important proposal and for doing so in the form of a Bill which gives us at any rate terms of reference of fairly precise boundaries. The particular form which the Bill takes has been recommended in a serious way by a number of reputable authorities. I can remember the last time when I had to discuss this subject. Again, we were discussing a Bill called a Bill of Rights but of a very different type. It was proposed by the noble Earl, Lord Arran, again from the Liberal Benches, and I was then sitting on the Woolsack. I have been trying to find the debate in question in Hansard but have failed to do so. During the course of the debate the noble Baroness, Lady Gaitskell, intervened to ask why we could not have the European Convention embodied in our domestic law. Since then it has been, I think, the preferred solution in Mr. Zander's pamphlet. It has been produced out of Transport House in a little document called, A Charter of Human Rights, which I have here, and the proposal is that we should embody the European Convention, by which we are already bound in international law, in our domestic law.
For various reasons I do not think that, in this form, it will quite do. That does not mean that I qualify in any way my sense of gratitude to the noble Lord, Lord Wade, for putting it forward. The House will see that there stands in my name a Motion to refer this Bill to a Select Committee. Whether I move that Motion will depend on the reply of the Government. We are looking forward to hearing the noble Lord, Lord Harris of Greenwich, but I am sorry that the noble and learned Lord the Lord Chancellor is not also taking part in the debate. The reason I tabled the Motion—and this is closely connected with some of the observations I wish to make about the Bill—is that I do not believe that a Private Member's Bill, altering the British Constitution, is really on.
I think that it is a much more tricky task than the noble Lord, Lord Wade, has given the House any idea of. It will alter, among other things, the whole relationship between the Judiciary, the
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Executive and the Legislature. Before I would legislate a proposal of this kind—there are other reasons why I might be reluctant to do so—I should like to have evidence from the Judiciary, the Parliamentary draftsmen, the civil servants, the trade unions and other bodies, as to how they think that this proposal would operate in practice. It was for that reason that I put down a Motion proposing that instead of pursuing the Bill to the ordinary Committee stage on the Floor of the House, we should have a Select Committee to take evidence and to report to this House. I still think that if we are to go on with the Bill in this form this would be the way to handle the matter.
The noble Lord referred, rightly, to the delays of going to the European Court. It is a slow business, and he will find that in every European system of law the legal process is rather slower than ours. Sometimes people complain of the law's delays in this country. Broadly speaking, the law's delays in this country are very much less than in any other country in the world; that is, if both parties want to get to the seat of judgment. They are not always so keen to get to the seat of judgment as they ought to be. What I believe the noble Lord has not quite taken on board is that the process provided by this particular formula will take longer, and not less long, than the existing process of going straight to the European Court. If the noble Lord will, for instance, look at Article 26 of the European Convention, which he has conveniently placed as a Schedule to his Bill, he will see that one cannot go to the European Court. There is an absolute bar until one has exhausted all the remedies in this country.
Let us take a concrete case. This week we were dealing with a conscience clause in the Trade Union and Labour Relations (Amendment) Bill. I claimed, rightly or wrongly—noble Lords opposite said wrongly; I still think rightly—that that was an open breach of the European Convention which we are discussing today. Let us say that a trade unionist is sacked, in the context of a closed shop, for refusing to join a trade union on what he claims are grounds of conscience other than religion. If this Bill becomes law he cannot go to Brussels. That is one thing which is quite certain.

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He must bring an action for unfair dismissal before the Industrial Tribunal. The Industrial Tribunal will say, "No, look at this Act which you passed in 1976."—it will, I believe, receive Royal Assent very shortly—"It says that conscientious grounds for not joining a trade union are no good" The man will reply, "Oh, but look at Lord Wade's Bill of Rights. He has passed it. It says that previous Acts of Parliament, if they break the Bill of Rights, are void to that extent."
So there will be an issue in the English courts as to whether I am right or whether noble Lords opposite are right. Without doubt on a matter of this importance it will go to the House of Lords. For the first time a subject will have challenged the validity of an Act of Parliament under the new Bill of Rights. It will take months: or will it, perhaps, take years? Whether or not the subject involved will be legally aided I am not sure, but during the whole of that time he will be denied the seat of justice in Brussels, which is the only place where he can ultimately get relief. I do not believe that that will do. I think it is a great mistake—but this is a pure Committee point—to incorporate into this Bill at all Article 19 and those following in the Convention but it will not alter the validity of the point I am making about Article 26, because Article 26 is part of the European Convention, whether or not it stands as part of this Bill.
So there are very considerable doubts, at least in my mind, about the wisdom of this formula. Furthermore, it is true, as the noble Lord, Lord Wade, properly pointed out to the House, that a number of countries—I think he said eight—adherent to the Convention have done the very thing which he proposes to do this afternoon. Well, why not let us do it, too? That is a very powerful sounding argument. The answer is not an easy one to put forward, but I believe that it is a serious one. Given the kind of legislative and judicial tradition of Continental countries, it is very easy to do this kind of thing, because those countries have a long tradition of importing general principles into the detailed articulation of their legislation. It is sometimes very difficult for English lawyers to understand the effect of it.
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I remember in the Appellant Committee, just after I ceased to be Lord Chancellor, we were hearing an appeal on double nationality which depended upon the interpretation of the law of Germany in relation to the status of an individual citizen. It was extremely difficult to translate what was being done in various courts in Germany into terms of what an English judge would do in relation to our own law. I am perfectly certain that both Professor Wade—no relation, I believe to the noble Lord—
Lord WADE: A cousin.
Lord HAILSHAM of SAINT MARYLEBONE: A distant cousin. Both Professor Wade and Mr. Zander have gravely underestimated the technical difficulties of taking—I forget how many volumes there are just beneath this Table—say, 20 or 30 volumes of Statutes, each more than 1,000 pages long, and saying in relation to any given section, which may come at any given time, that it is Inconsistent with the Bill of Rights. It has to be interpreted again by the court in relation to this particular section, because the whole of our tradition of judicial interpretation of Statutes, and the whole of our legislative tradition of passing them, proceeds on different assumptions from this kind of thing.
I should not like to pass this formula until the Judiciary and the Parliamentary draftsmen had given evidence to a Committee of some kind. That is not said for the purpose of delay. It is said because I am genuinely apprehensive of the dangers of applying this kind of formula to the English legislative and constitutional position. So those are two important grounds upon which I think we should hesitate before trying to push this Bill on to the Statute Book.
Now I should like to say one or two other things about Bills of Rights generally in relation to this proposal, because I think that these are never fully appreciated by enthusiasts for Bills of Rights. Show me a Bill of Rights and I will show you escape clauses in it. There must be. There are questions of public security; there are reservations relating to public health; there are all kinds of reservations dealing with almost every field of public policy. Show me a nation with a Bill of Rights and I will show you a nation which has fewer

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actual human rights than England or Britain because the escape clauses are used, often quite ruthlessly, by the Executive of the time. It is therefore to some extent a bogus protection. I want to come to a conclusion about this in a moment, but one must not exaggerate the value of the protection given by any document of this kind.
In the main, speaking in relation to English constitutional law, the kind of general assertion of rights which is contained in our own Bill of Rights 1688 and in our Magna Carta, which is still on the Statute Book in the 1297 recension, and in the Act of Settlement, is asserted in such general terms that in practice it cannot be relied upon in relation to any given Statute. It belongs to an earlier and less sophisticated tradition than we now move into. I made this point in November 1970, and I reiterate it today. I believe we need entrenched clauses in our Constitution. I believe we need a written Constitution. I should like to see a written Constitution in which there were devolved Assemblies, in which there were certain kinds of rights entrenched and in which the Judiciary had the powers to strike down legislation (as I believe the American phrase is) which offended against certain prescribed prohibitions. I should like to sec the Constitution itself have provisions for its own amendment, so that it was not absolutely rigid and from time to time, as experience went on, you could improve it. But I do not believe that it is in fact possible to deal with these things piecemeal.
This particular formula applies what the noble Lord has described as a psychological sanction; in other words, it does not have a sanction at all except that of being slightly unpopular if you put at the end of a Bill:
"This Act is intended to operate notwithstanding the Bill of Rights".
But is he justified in thinking that either a Government of the Liberal Party, if that were possible, or a Government composed of the Party opposite, or perhaps a Government composed of the Party of which I am a member, would hesitate, as one of its main programme Bills, to do this very thing? It so happens that I can give the noble Lord some evidence to the contrary. I did not expect to be able to, but I can. It is the Labour Party
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official document, published by, I think, Transport House, but certainly published by the Labour Party, London, called A Charter of Human Rights. It in point of fact proposes the exact formula contained in the noble Lord's Bill, and they were facing the very problem which the noble Lord was discussing when he spoke of the psychological deterrent. They say that perhaps some wicked Tory would seek to strike down their proposed legislation, which was the noble Lord's Bill, on the grounds that, for instance, legislation on comprehensive education was contrary to the article in the Convention which gives parents a certain right to control their own children's education.
I am very grateful for the suggestion from the Labour Party; it had not previously occurred to me. But whether it is right or wrong, I do not propose to argue this afternoon; I merely draw attention to the sentence in the pamphlet in which the possibility is dealt with. They say:
"Finally, in the unlikely event that any United Kingdom judge ruled against comprehensive education, the Government would be able to reverse the decision by legislation".
So how far on would you be with your psychological deterrent? Of course, it would not make any difference to our international obligations. We are still bound by the European Convention, which the authors of the pamphlet do not seem to care about and do not seem to understand, so we could be taken to Brussels if we did it; but the immediate reaction of one of the principal supporters of this formulation, representing one of the two great Parties in the State, is, "If we do not like what the Bill says, we will reverse it by legislation when the judge has pronounced upon it".
So we really deceive ourselves if we think we can tackle the problem of human rights without tackling the second rule of our Constitution, and the second rule of our Constitution is the omnipotence of Parliament. It is called the sovereignty of Parliament, but it means the legislative omnicompetence and omnipotence of Parliament. I do not believe that you can do this piecemeal. It is undermining one of the two pillars upon which the Constitution is based. They are the rule of law and the omnicompetence and omnipotence of Parliament, and it is undermining the second pillar. It so happens that I want to undermine that second pillar. I want

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to do it by devolved Assemblies, I want to do it by putting the Judiciary in a different position and I want to see entrenchment; but if you do not do that, you do nothing. Having in rather a prissy way condemned and rejected the proposal, if it was ever made—and I am now quoting—
"accepted by, amongst others, Lord Hailsham and Sir Keith Joseph, which envisages",
so they say,
"a Bill of Rights entrenched in the Constitution by a requirement that it be amended or repealed only by a stated majority. This would indeed limit Parliament's freedom of action especially now that small Parliamentary majorities are more common than in the past"—
we are told that, under this formula, Parliament would remain "top dog".
My Lords, I do not want there to be any "top dogs" in this country, and that is where I differ from the proponents of formulae like this. This is where I differ from the Labour Party's pamphlet, and this, I am afraid, is where I must say that I differ from the Bill of the noble Lord, Lord Wade. I want this country to be governed by the people for the people, and it should be government of the people; and putting "top dogs", especially when they happen to be elected by rather a small minority, in charge of the people is not government of the people by the people for the people—it is an elective dictatorship. Until you get rid of our over-centralised bureaucracy; until you get rid of our over-centralised nationalised industries; until you get rid of our totally ineffective Second Chamber and substitute something better; until you insist that no Legislature, however elected, has the right to breach the fundamental rules of justice and decency, and put the thing, as every other civilised country has done, under the rule of law, you are simply toying with this problem.
I know, of course—and Mr. Zander refers to it at the end of his pamphlet—that these things can be overruled by force, by actual tyranny. I agree with the noble Lord, Lord Wade, that one should never be complacent about the possibility of actual tyranny in one's own country; but I do not think that comes into the argument at all this afternoon. Any Constitution can be overthrown by force and the right of preserving it
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depends, in the end, upon the bravery and independence of individual citizens acting individually and collectively. I do not think we need worry about that. But I believe that this formula will not do; it is a delusive protection, and I should want to see something far more comprehensive than this before accepting it. Until that time, I believe that the protection afforded by the European Convention itself, preserving direct access to the Convention when it is breached, instead of imposing a bar between it and ourselves—a bar consisting of the English or Scottish courts, going up to the House of Lords—is more effective protection than would be given by this Bill.
For these reasons, I hope that this Bill will be given a Second Reading. I shall be very interested to hear what the Government may say. I hold my fire about my Motion. If the Government give good reason for not moving it and have alternative proposals, I shall listen very carefully. In the meantime, I thank the noble Lord, Lord Wade. I am afraid that I may have sounded a little ungracious but I did not mean to be. I regard the Liberal Party as my allies in this matter. They are deeply concerned about matters which concern me as deeply. If their formula and mine differ it is a matter of discussion between us and not of hostility. I am grateful to the House, and will not say any more.
4.12 p.m.
Lord GARDINER: My Lords, I, too, hope that this Bill will obtain a Second Reading. I should first declare an interest in that, with the noble and learned Lord, Lord Kilbrandon, and the noble Lord, Lord Foot, I am a governor of the British Institute of Human Rights. My Lords, this is a subject on which I have changed my mind. I used to think, as I think many, if not most, lawyers thought, that a Bill of Rights was something outside our legal traditions. Our traditions in law have been that if we find an anomaly we introduce legislation ad hoc to cure that anomaly. We do not ordinarily go in for legislation containing lofty sentiments, very often couched in woolly terms. But, in the course of time and changes of events, I have changed my mind for the following reasons. First, I think that, certainly for the last 30 years, the Executive and, to some extent, the bureaucracy, have gained in

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power at the expense of Parliament and the people; and I think that we must do what we can to improve the powers of both Parliament and people rather than of the Executive.
Secondly, there is a strong and growing international movement for human rights, and it would be sad to me if our country did not play its full part in it. Thirdly, I think that devolution will probably, in any case, require it before long. In his very interesting articles in The Times the noble and learned Lord, Lord Hailsham, said:
"If the powers of the devolved Assemblies for Scotland and Wales are to be adequately controlled and policed, on the one hand, and protected from the central Government and Legislature on the other, some measure of judicial control seems to be inevitable, and if this is right, some definition of the rights of individuals and minorities against both central and local authority would seem to be desirable and perhaps essential."
Fourthly, my Lords, the European Convention is extremely slow. It has also had the undesirable result, I should have thought, that, of all the parties to the Convention, there have been more complaints to the Commission of infringements of human rights in the United Kingdom than in any other country. This is not, I hope to think, because we in fact infringe human rights more than others: it is because nearly all the other countries have incorporated it into their domestic law, and therefore their own judges deal with it. I should have thought that was very much the better plan. It has always seemed to me that we are backward in two things: first, in signing documents and international treaties but not ratifying them. For years now the two United Nations Conventions on Human Rights remain signed by us but unratified. Secondly, when we do ratify them we do not make them part of our domestic law, as most other countries do.
Fifthly, I think it would enable the judges to develop the law and practice quicker than leaving it to the Executive and the Legislature. I do not want to go back to my old friend of 1958, the Blagden Committee on Bankruptcy Law, and its 60 recommendations for the improvement of our bankruptcy law, or the more recent Justice recommendation of the same kind. It is not a matter for the Lord Chancellor's Department; but here getting on for 20 years have passed
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during which time Governments have said, "We accept the recommendations, and we will legislate as soon as legislative time permits." We are always in this difficulty about time. I think that the proposed incorporation into our domestic law of the European Convention would enable our Judiciary to develop the law and practice quicker. Lastly, a Bill of Rights in itself would have a major educational effect.
My Lords, if it is right that we should have a Bill of Rights, there is a serious question as to what form it should take. From the practical point of view, if we do something, there are two main alternatives. One is to take a piece of paper and a pen and to start writing our own Bill of Rights. I shudder to think what the length of the Committee stage in each House would be if we were to do that. I think that most people who have experience of a good many different forms of Bills of Right have come to the conclusion that, on the whole, the European Convention is the best one. One starts with the advantage that we have, after all, accepted it. It is not only Article 1, to which the noble Lord, Lord Wade, referred; there is also Article 13, which provides:
"Everyone whose rights and freedoms as set forth in the Convention are violated shall have an effective remedy before a national authority notwithstanding that the violation has been committed by persons acting in an official capacity."
It seems to me that, both by Articles 1 and 13, we are pledged to introduce this into our domestic law, and are in breach of the Convention in not having done so.
My Lords, coming to the objections, the first and main one is the difficulty which would arise for our judges in construing it, and the delays which would occur. So far as the delays are concerned, I thought, with the greatest respect, that the noble and learned Lord, Lord Hailsham, perhaps somewhat exaggerated what was likely to arise; although it is possible that in the first year or two there would be one or two cases going as far as the House of Lords. I feel that the judges will have no real difficulties in interpretation.
It may well be that there will be different views. This very often happens over the question of interpretation. I

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have never said so, but if I may say so now with regret and courtesy, I have never agreed with the view which I understand the noble and learned Lord to take as to the true construction of that Article of the Convention which deals with trade unions. We have lately had this conscience clause. The last time we had it I sympathised a good deal with my noble friend Lord Brockway in what he said. The reason that I voted against the conscience clause was simply and solely because I thought the time had come when the hereditary Chamber ought to give way to the elected Chamber. We pursued this all last Session. We have gone on pursuing this quarrel with the elected Chamber for a large part of this Session.
The noble Lord, Lord Carrington, made the classic statement in the 1968 debate, in which at col. 1077 on 21st November he said:
"My Lords, like it or not, most people in this country do not believe that in 1968 a man should sit in the Second Chamber because his father did; nor do they think it fair that one Party should have a permanent majority over the other—and I am bound to say that I find it impossible not to agree with them".
Nothing that this House did in relation to that Bill was the least unconstitutional; but it seems somewhat illogical that a Party, which in those days acted in a restrained way—and there has been a great change in the past 12 months with 30 Divisions alone on the Community Land Bill—should go on operating powers to that degree which they themselves say are unfair. But now I am diverting from the point.
I do not think our judges, who are used not only to construing Acts of Parliaments, Ordinances, Statutory Instruments, charter parties and contracts, but any piece of paper on which there are words, will have any peculiar or unusual difficulty in dealing with the Convention. My Lords, for that reason, I think as a whole that the time has come when we ought to do what we are already pledged to do under the Convention: making it part of our domestic law and letting our citizens go to our judges, if they think their rights have been infringed, and leaving the judges to develop that. There is no reason to suppose that any higher proportion of people will go on from our judges to the European Court than do so from other countries. I
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hope therefore your Lordships will give this Bill a Second Reading.
4.22 p.m.
Lord LLOYD of HAMPSTEAD: My Lords, anyone who has the temerity to oppose a Bill of Rights at the present time is at a considerable disadvantage because every one in a democratic society favours human rights, especially when they are urged with such studied moderation as by the noble Lord, Lord Wade. Therefore it may be asked what possible objection can there be to giving such rights further protection? I suggest that this is too facile a position because we have to look at the effects and implications of such a Bill on our whole constitutional position.
As the noble and learned Lord, Lord Hailsham, pointed out, today of course we are not dealing with what I might describe as the "strong" alternative; namely, a restructuring of our Constitution and the elimination of the sovereignty of Parliament. Sir Leslie Scarman has argued for this in his now celebrated Hamlyn Lectures. What is being put forward today is what one might call the "weaker" alternative. The courts are to have power to declare legislation, past or present, invalid, but the ultimate sovereignty of Parliament is still to remain where it is.
As I understand it, there are two arguments which are addressed to us in favour of such a Bill of Rights. First, it is said that it is desirable in principle; secondly, that it is desirable in order to enable us to comply with the provisions of the European Convention. May I say a few words about the argument that it is desirable. I emphasise that what is being sought here is not just to control the Executive and the subordinate areas of power, whether it be Government Departments or local authorities; these can be dealt with by a system of administrative law. It may be that our present system of administrative law is insufficient, and this is something which the Law Commission are at present examining. But we do not need to have resounding Bills of Rights to deal with that aspect of the matter. What is aimed at here is the control of Parliament itself because it is complained that Parliament either frequently or at any rate occasionally—whichever view you like to take—encroaches on the area of human

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rights. This, it is said, ought to be curbed, and who better to do it than the Courts?
Sir Leslie Scarman makes his view absolutely clear on this. He refers to the "overweening power" of Parliament. This is something which he says should be curbed, preferably by a new Constitution. But, like Sir Leslie Scarman—even in the weaker alternative of today—the aim primarily is to limit the legislative function of Parliament and the political choices which lie before it. There are powerful reasons for opposing this situation. In the first place, its effect will be to bring our Judiciary into the arena of political controversy. It is a traditional wisdom of our system that judges are better kept out of political decision-making. The United States takes a different view. But as the noble and learned Lord, Lord Devlin (a distinguished judge) remarked in an article in The Modern Law Review the other day,
"The Supreme Court, like the vines of France, is not for transplantation".
I do not think our traditional view on this matter is either foolish or outmoded.
But then it is said: "The judges are only going to have the task of interpreting this document". It is a sheer illusion to think that applying these vague general words of the European Convention is a task comparable to interpreting the words of an ordinary Statute. If your Lordships look at the Schedule containing the Convention you will see it contains such resounding concepts as the right to life and liberty, the right to privacy, freedom of expression, freedom of association, the right to education, or to peaceful enjoyment of one's possessions, and a great number of others. All these are doubtless wholly admirable, but what do they really mean? If you look at the situation in the United States a vast jurisprudence has developed, mush of it conflicting, on the meaning of these resounding concepts. For example, the United States' Supreme Court has established what we in this country describe as "trial by newspaper" on the basis of freedom of speech. Recently the United States' Supreme Court has rejected the control of electioneering expenses on similar grounds. There are laws controlling racial segregration, abortion, obscenity
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and numerous other measures of social regulation, which the Supreme Court has either upheld or rejected—it has changed its mind from time to time—all on the basis of these basic freedoms set out in their Bill of Rights.
Mr. Michael Zander's article has been referred to several times during this debate. I draw attention to one striking phrase of his, referring to the famous case of Brown v. Board of Education of Topeka, Kansas in 1954, where the United States reversed its previous attitude on segregation on the principle of whether separate but equal was or was not constitutional. This is how Mr. Michael Zander describes that case:
"The court strikes down the country's entire educational system as not conforming with the requirements of equal opportunity for black and white citizens".
My Lords, is this what we want to have in England? Do we want to hand over effective decisions in policy matters on, for instance, comprehensive education, development rights in land, abortion, fluoridation of water, wearing of seat belts in cars, wearing of crash helmets by the Sikhs, the closed shop, and the law of privacy? Do we really want to hand over these policy questions to our heavily beset Judiciary?—who, if I may venture to say so, I do not believe have any pretentions to assuming this rather invidious mantle?
Surely Parliament, with all its faults—and I am not complacent about Parliament because, having spent a number of years in your Lordships' House, I appreciate its great virtues but am not unaware of the defects of some of our procedures—is better qualified to make political choices. It is, after all, a representative body, even though the noble Lord, Lord Wade, doubtless does not approve of the present electoral system. It is to a large degree a representative body. It represents virtually all shades of political opinion; it conducts its affairs in the open with free discussion and can seek advice and guidance from any quarter it may desire. This is a very different arena from the narrow forum of a court of law. What we are doing in introducing a Bill of Rights of this sort—I think we must face this—is to transfer the political battles from Parliament to the courts. I venture to think that our experience over the 1971 Industrial Relations Act, so far

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as that represented a similar exercise, does not afford a very encouraging precedent.
I yield to no one in my tremendous respect for our Judiciary, but one ought to recognise that judges are appointed because they have a capacity for preserving a total impartiality and a tremendous talent for rigorously investigating very complicated issues and disputes. Policy decisions, on the other hand, do not call for impartiality but for moral and political convictions. There, again, perhaps I might quote the noble and learned Lord, Lord Devlin, taken from the article to which I referred earlier. On the question of policy decisions by judges, he says this:
"If judges were men endowed for such a task they would not truly be judges"
I do not accept that human rights are seriously threatened under our system. I think this is a gross exaggeration. On the whole, that system has served us well and I would venture to agree with the words of the noble and learned Lord, Lord Hailsham of Saint Marylebone, that human rights have fared a good deal better in this country than in most others, even in those which have high-sounding Bills of Rights and written Constitutions. Of course there are defects, but these can be and are being put right. For example, we have the Race Relations Act and the Bill concerning bail which we are at present dealing with. These may not be quite as good as some people would wish, but they show that Parliament is applying itself to these problems.
There is another point which should not be overlooked if a Statute such as is proposed by the noble Lord, Lord Wade, were to be enacted. The effect of this would be to throw the whole of our law into a state of total uncertainty for almost an indefinite period. There would be a situation where every Statute on our Statute Book would be liable to be impugned in legal proceedings—what a marvellous field day for lawyers! Anyone who is familiar with the legal scene in the United States will know the endless range of constitutional issues which the ingenuity and pertinacity of lawyers enables them to raise in almost every case; but even if cases fail no one will know where they stand until the courts—
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and in many instances the highest court—have pronounced. If it is found that the Act does not work and is causing a great deal of unnecessary difficulty, it will be a peculiarly difficult piece of legislation to repeal. Nothing could be more invidious than for this Parliament, having passed a Bill of Rights, to repeal it. Therefore we shall be saddled with this Bill for ever, whether we like it or not.
I hope I have not taken longer than I should have done, but in order that the argument shall not go by default I should like to spend a moment or two on the second argument; that is to say, whether the Bill is necessary or strongly desirable in order to bring us into line with the European Convention. I would argue that it misconceives the underlying political philosophy of the Convention. That Convention was entered into by a number of civilised States, who all assume that by and large their law meets the requirement of human rights. In other words, the Convention is intended to deal with marginal situations. For this purpose, the Convention provides elaborate machinery. First, there is the Commission, which tries to reach a friendly settlement. If that fails there is the possibility, but only the possibility, of a reference to the Court of Human Rights.
Most cases will not involve any changes in the law, but only changes in the prison regulations, and so on, which have been mentioned today. These do not necessarily require legislation to put them right; it may be a matter for administrative regulation. But in the rare cases where national law is found to be inadequate it may have to be changed; and what the Convention does, in my opinion, is to leave this to the constitutional processes of the particular State involved. There is nothing in this Convention, as I read it, which compels a State to confer special legislative power on its own courts. If there is an adverse decision by the European Court, a question of policy will arise as to the extent and manner in which we might want to amend our law. I think this is a matter which is better dealt with by Parliament than by judicial decision.
Lastly, I would say that it is really an illusion to think that our ills rest primarily on deficiencies in our institutions and that we have only to change these and all will be well. On the contrary,

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I would argue that we should be mindful to preserve those institutions which have served us well in maintaining our democratic way of life. I should not lightly cast these aside, save in the face of irresistible arguments such as I have certainly not heard this afternoon; so on this occasion I am not on the side of the would-be reformers.
4.38 p.m.
Lord DENNING: My Lords, I am sorry I was not here earlier this afternoon so as to hear the opening speeches, being detained by my official duties. May I ask your Lordships to be very cautious before giving a Second Reading to this Bill. There is a grave problem as to whether we should have a Bill of Rights with entrenched clauses which are able to set aside Acts of our Parliament here. Sir Leslie Scarman, in his Hamlyn Lectures says that:
"…entrenched or fundamental laws, protected by a Bill of Rights—a constitutional law which it is the duty of the courts to protect even against the power of Parliament."
It would be contrary to all our history and tradition if the courts of this country should set aside any section or Part of an Act of Parliament. The supremacy of Parliament is one of the pillars of our Constitution. As against Sir Leslie Scarman's view, another of the Lords Justices of my Court, Sir Arthur James, has warned to the contrary. He said:
"A Bill of Rights has its own Charybdis and its own Scylla. Wide and flexible terms may put a power of exploitation into those who are irresponsibly bent on the disruption of government and society, of whom there are not a few."
If your Lordships wish to consider the opposing arguments on this big and important question, there is no paper that I know better than the discussion paper by the Commission headed by the noble Lord, Lord Feather, in regard to the situation in Northern Ireland.
May I say that the arguments in our own country seem to me to be against those in favour, because, if judges were given power to overthrow sections or Acts of Parliament, they would become political, their appointments would be based on political grounds and the reputation of our Judiciary would suffer accordingly. One has only to see, in the great Constitutions of the United States of America and of India, the conflicts which arise from time to time between the judges and the
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Legislature. I hope we shall not have such conflicts in this country. The independence of our judges and their reputation for impartiality depend on their obeying the will of Parliament and on their being independent. The independence of the judges is the other pillar of our Constitution.
What does this present Bill seek to do? It seeks to lift principles from this Convention of Europe and make them, as they are declared, part of our law and supreme over our Statutes, and the judges must enforce them. In so far as the Convention just expresses our principles—and it does—there can be no objection to it. Looking through this Convention, one sees that article after article contains principles which the judges of England evolved. Your Lordships will see that no one shall be held in slavery or servitude. Lord Mansfield enunciated that in our law 200 years ago, when the slave was brought to England and his master wanted to keep him here in chains. He brought in his habeas corpus. Lord Mansfield said:
"The air of England is too free for any slave to breathe. Let the black go free."
Article 5 is about the right to liberty and security of person. For 600 years we have had our writ of habeas corpus which has protected the freedom of the individual far better than any Convention could ever do. Article 6 is about a fair trial. Every day we see trials, whether by tribunals or anyone else, conducted fairly in this country. In so far as those articles simply enunciate principles which have been culled from the law of England, we do not need them. But the Convention goes further than the principles we have enunciated. It uses high-sounding phrases and generalities, such as is common when the European countries legislate; quite contrary to our system. Let me tell your Lordships that those high-sounding phrases and generalities can be brought into play by individuals who, as Sir Arthur James said, may tend to disrupt and embarrass our society. But, first, let me tell your Lordships that we have in the courts considered this Convention half a dozen times. We have had cases in which it has been prayed in aid, and we have declared that we would consider it, give every weight to it and enforce those principles, so long as they were consistent with our own law.

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Let me give your Lordships a few illustrations of the cases we have had on this very Convention. An immigrant came into England, he said, before 1st January 1973, so he was entitled to the amnesty for those who came over illegally in the little boats. The Home Office, after close inquiry, found that he had come after 1st January 1973, and he was about to be sent back because he had come illegally. He brought his writ before the Chief Justice and before us. He prayed in aid the Articles of this Convention. We said that we would go by them, so far as they were consistent with our principles, but we were not going to let them upset the organisation of our society. That is one case.
In another case, a man had come as an illegal immigrant and he had been here for a couple of years. He had come over in a little boat and so on, and was found out at the age of 26 and was about to be sent back. Lo and behold!, my Lords, what did he say? His solicitor said that he had been engaged to be married to a girl of 16. The couple had not arranged it themselves, but the parents and their community arranged marriages of that kind and he wanted to be set free so that he could marry that young lady of 16, just out from school. He prayed in aid the article of this Convention which says that men and women of marriageable age have a right to marry and to found a family. So he argued before us that we should give effect to that Convention, and let him out in order that he could marry the lady. We did not consider the Convention to that extent.
Another case occurs to me where, at about 2.15 in the afternoon, a prisoner—I think he was in Dartmoor or somewhere like that—was going to be brought before the board of visitors or the governor, because he had assaulted another prisoner and was being dealt with in disciplinary proceedings. At 11 o'clock in the morning, his lawyers came before us and asked that the inquiry should be postponed, so that he could have lawyers to represent him and everything could be dealt with in full legal fashion—no doubt, after some weeks—with lawyers and the like, quite contrary to the disciplinary procedures in the prison service. It was drawn to our attention that, in the ordinary course, commanding officers deal with their soldiers, and governors deal with their
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prisoners, perfectly fairly in disciplinary proceedings without legal representation. But if this Bill of Rights is brought into operation, we shall have lawyers coming before us and arguing that those decisions were erroneous and contrary to this Bill of Rights, which is part, they would say, of our English law.
In other words, I foresee that this Bill of Rights will be taken advantage of by disgruntled people who will bring proceedings before the courts challenging the orderly system of our society. We may turn them down but I foresee a great deal of litigation: people praying in aid these fundamental rights, as they say, and giving much embarrassment and disturbance to society. It happens in other countries where they have written Constitutions.
It is because of these words and the extent to which they can be carried that I ask that they be not made part of our law of England. We should do well, as we are doing at the moment, to give them every consideration. May I quote words which I ventured to say in the Court of Appeal. This is how we, I suggest, should deal with the Convention. In the case of Bhajan Singh I said:
"The court can and should take the Convention into account. They should take it into account whenever interpreting a statute which affects the rights and liberties of the individual. It is to be assumed that the Crown, in taking its part in legislation, would do nothing which was in conflict with treaties. So the court should now construe the Immigration Act 1971 so as to be in conformity with a Convention and not against it."
I suggest that if we are committed to applying that principle—namely, that we should take into account this Convention—we should apply it in every circumstance in which we think it legitimately ought to be applied but that we should not carry it so far as to say that we can thereby upset any Act of Parliament.
One final word I would say is this: see the width of the Bill. If this Bill and its protocols were passed, they
"shall have the force of law, and shall be enforceable by action in the Courts of the United Kingdom."
I suppose that would apply to a civil action for damages or an injunction. See what you can make of it. Article 2 of Protocol No. 1 to the Convention provides that
"No person shall be denied the right to education."

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It is as wide as that. Article 2 continues:
"…the State shall respect the rights of parents to ensure such education and teaching in conformity with their own religious and philosophical convictions."
These are high sounding principles, but shall not we have every sect or community coming to the courts and claiming to have their own schools and the like? There is no end to the extent to which people can argue on words as wide as this.
I am sure that judges will uphold fundamental freedoms in this country, as they have done through the centuries. Judges can be trusted to do as they have done in the past, but they must be supported by Parliament. I would add the fear of Sir Leslie Scarman, that Parliament may be rushed by a Government—by prejudice, or inadvertence, or oversight—into passing legislation which infringes the rights of individuals. I hope that Parliament in both places will have sufficient Members with vigilance and skill to uphold our fundamental principles and ensure that no Act of Parliament is passed which will infringe those principles. So long as that is done and so long as the judges of England do as they always have done and put the individual liberty of the citizen above all else, we need no Bill of Rights.
4.55 p.m.
Lord BROCKWAY: My Lords, I shall be speaking on the second Bill of Rights which is to come before the House. Therefore my remarks will be very brief. I want to say at once that I support the Bill which the noble Lord, Lord Wade, has introduced and hope very much that the House will give it a Second Reading. I have been deeply impressed by the discussion which has followed the introduction of this Bill. One of the privileges of belonging to this House is that when we discuss matters of this kind, speeches of deep thought, great experience and an obvious seeking for the truth are delivered. I believe that is one of the attributes of this House.
I want to make only two comments on what has been said. The first is on a remark made by the noble and learned Lord, Lord Hailsham of Saint
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Marylebone, who suggested that if this Bill were carried, cases which were taken first to the courts in this country—perhaps up to the House of Lords—and then to the European Commission would take much longer than at present—the 300 and more cases which have gone to the European Commission and which have taken nearly five years. I recognise at once that there might be exceptional cases of that kind, but I suggest to the House that they would be exceptional and that on average, under this Bill, cases would he dealt with far more rapidly by British courts and would not have to go through the long procedure suggested by the noble and learned Lord.
My second comment is on what the noble Lord, Lord Lloyd of Hampstead, contributed to the debate and on what was said by the noble and learned Lord, Lord Denning. It is perfectly true that the European Commission lays down certain broad principles, which I believe would be accepted by all of us. They were recited by the noble Lord, Lord Lloyd of Hampstead. However, as the schedule to the Bill introduced by the noble Lord, Lord Wade, indicates, there are, following the statement of those principles, a series of articles which go into detail and which are far more precise. To the noble and learned Lord, Lord Denning, I would say the fact that he was able to indicate that, in giving their decisions, British judges had, years ago, appealed to principles which the European Convention has now adopted shows that that Convention is relevant to judicial decisions. As for the series of cases which the noble Lord recited, he will forgive me for saying that I desire a British legal system which embodies the basic rights of this Bill rather than some of the laws of the land against which there were those appeals.
The Bill introduced by the noble Lord, Lord Wade, covers both Britain and Northern Ireland. At this point I want to say only that whilst I am in favour of such a Bill, I submit that a Bill for Northern Ireland itself is more urgent than a Bill for Britain. I urge that on two grounds. First, in Britain there is not yet a consensus of opinion which is in favour of such a Bill—I hope it will come. In Northern Ireland there is that consensus of opinion; as I shall show later, it is almost unanimous.

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Secondly, I would say to the noble Lord, Lord Wade, that in Britain we have a stability despite all our economic crises—a democratic stability which does not make a Bill so immediately necessary. In Northern Ireland the situation is different. There is an emergency, there is violence and if, as I hope I may show, a Bill for Northern Ireland itself would be valuable in restricting violence, then I think my Bill should supplement the one introduced by the noble Lord. I hope that support will be given to the Bill on Second Reading for which the noble Lord, Lord Wade, has asked.
5.1 p.m.
Lord BANKS: My Lords, it is with great trepidation that I, a mere layman, venture to enter this debate which deals with constitutional law and in which two former Lord Chancellors and the Master of the Rolls have already spoken, but we are dealing with the individual rights of each one of us and perhaps it is not inappropriate that the lay voice should be heard.
When he introduced the Bill earlier this afternoon, my noble friend Lord Wade pointed out that as long ago as 1947 the first Bill to preserve the rights of the subject was put forward from these Benches. In the interim period, many such Bills have followed and have been put before your Lordships' House by my noble friends. I know that in proposing today that the European Convention on Human Rights should be incorporated into British law, my noble friend Lord Wade was greatly encouraged by the growing volume of support for some legislation of this kind which is coming from such a variety of sources.
The noble and learned Lord, Lord Hailsham of Saint Marylebone, agrees with our intentions, if he does not always agree with our formulæ, and he has spoken this afternoon in support of entrenched rights in a written Constitution. Sir Keith Joseph has called for a Bill of Rights. The noble and learned Lord, Lord Gardiner, has told us today how he has changed his mind in this matter and how he wishes that this Bill shall receive a Second Reading. I understand that a sub-committee of the Labour Party National Executive has supported the main proposition which is incorporated in this Bill today, and on 12th
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February the right honourable gentleman the Home Secretary made a very interesting speech to the Birmingham Law Society on the question of guaranteeing human rights. In that speech he spoke not unsympathetically of the possibility of incorporating the European Convention into our domestic law.
The age-old assumption by the British courts that a citizen is free to do as he likes provided he does not commit a specific breach of the law is no longer felt by many people to be sufficient protection for individual rights. There are many reasons why this is so. I will mention three very briefly. The first, and most obvious, is the increasing volume of legislation—the increasing volume of the law against which he must not offend. Then there is the complexity of that law, and we have only to think of some of the pieces of legislation which have passed through this House within the last 12 months to realise how great that complexity is. Sir Leslie Scarman in the Hamlyn Lecture, to which reference has been made several times this afternoon, said this:
"So long as English law is unable in any circumstances to challenge a Statute it is in dangerous and difficult times at the mercy of the oppressive discriminatory Statute. Without a Bill of Rights protected from repeal, amendment or suspension by the ordinary process of a bare Parliamentary majority controlled by the Government of the day, human rights will be at risk."
There is a third reason—to which we should give great consideration—why many people are coming to believe that a Bill of Rights is necessary. We are now in a new constitutional situation, brought about by our membership of the European Community and by the prospect of devolution. With some power being exercised in Brussels, some in London, some in Edinburgh and some in Cardiff and with, perhaps, as we on these Benches would hope, some in the regions of England; with, in addition, direct elections to the European Parliament, much more of our Constitution will be written than previously and the case for a fully written Constitution will grow stronger. A Bill of Rights would form a natural part of such a Constitution and, as has been said many times this afternoon, we are of course committed as a nation to the European Convention on Human Rights. Listening to some of the opposition, one might feel that perhaps the

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people who were opposing the Bill would have preferred it if we had not ratified the Convention. But the fact remains that we have, and the noble and learned Lord, Lord Gardiner, gave it as his opinion that we were committed not merely to the terms of the Convention but to incorporating it into our domestic law.
It has been argued that the terms of the Convention are too broad; that they are not sufficiently detailed. In this connection, I think we ought to bear in mind the view expressed by the Royal Commission on the Constitution—the Kilbrandon Commission. They said this:
"There is force in the argument that giving precision and substance to rights, defined only in general terms by the Legislature, by the method of judicial decisions in actual cases is more likely to produce an apt and workable body of law than any attempt at initial comprehensive definition, and that in time the law would assume a degree of certainty whereby the citizen might know tolerably well what his rights were and how, if they were infringed, he could seek redress."
In the speech which he made on 12th February and to which I have already referred, the Home Secretary said:
"Much would depend on the way in which the Convention was made part of our law"
He asked a series of questions. He asked first:
"Would it be necessary to fetter the sovereignty of Parliament so that the Convention guarantees were entrenched against any future repeal or amendment by Parliament or would Parliament retain ultimate sovereignty?"
In the quotation which I gave a few minutes ago from Sir Leslie Scarman, it is clear that he was arguing in favour of entrenchment, as was the noble and learned Lord, Lord Hailsham of Saint Marylebone, and it may well be that that in the end will be desirable. As has been explained, the Bill does not entrench the Convention guarantees. The ultimate sovereignty of Parliament is preserved, but the terms of the Bill do not prevent in the future entrenchment as part of the wider constitutional reform to which I have referred. Secondly, the Home Secretary asked:
"Would the Convention have any special status or priority in United Kingdom law or would it be treated as an ordinary Act of Parliament?"
In answer to that, it is clear from the Bill that although the sovereignty of Parliament
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would be preserved, the Act would have a special status.
Then the Home Secretary asked:
"Would the Convention be able to be invoked in the ordinary courts or only in a special constitutional or human rights court?"
The Bill clearly refers to the courts as a whole and does not seek to limit it to a constitutional court. The Home Secretary went on:
"Would the public be willing to entrust to the Judiciary the task of construing the widely drafted Convention guarantees?"
This is a matter of opinion, but I think they would. After all, if the Convention were thought to be inadequate at any point, proposals for amendment at European level could be put forward through the normal political channels.
Finally, the Home Secretary asked:
"Would the extension of judicial powers into controversial areas of public policy risk compromising the independence and impartiality of the Judiciary by requiring the judges to work in a more political arena?"
Of course, to avoid that is the basis of the case for a constitutional court. It may be that ultimately we shall have a constitutional court as part of our apparatus to deal possibly with appeals and tribunals connected with devolution and controversy between Parliament and the Assemblies. But the aim behind the Bill has been to bring the possibility of redress closer to the people. Of course, there would be a right of appeal, which, as I understand it, would go right up to the European Court, which is already accepted, and whose precedents would guide the Judiciary in making the decisions they would be called upon to make in the new circumstances.
My Lords, when this problem is raised, people usually make reference to the United States of America. We have been informed this afternoon that eight countries have incorporated these Conventions into their domestic law, of which, of course, the United States is not one. These eight countries seem to have managed to do this without the Judiciary becoming unduly tarnished in the eyes of the public, and I see no reason why this should not be the case here.
My Lords, may I say in conclusion that we are entering a period of great constitutional change. If we do not face up to his fact, then instead of evolution we shall have revolution. By that I do

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not mean we shall all be taking to the streets and manning the barricades. I mean that eventually, if we do not face up to the fact of change, there will be the wholesale tearing down of much that exists, including much that is good and ought to be enduring in our tradition. If we face up to the fact of change, we can then see that our Constitution evolves to meet the new situation; we can mould it. We can discriminate in what we retain and what we discard. We can carry all that is best in our tradition of government into the new constitutional structure of the European Economic Community, the nation State, and the devolved regions. This Bill is designed to ensure that in our new constitutional structure, the rights we have long enjoyed in this country shall be suitably protected in changing circumstances.
5.13 p.m.
The MINISTER of STATE, HOME OFFICE (Lord Harris of Greenwich): My Lords, the Government very much welcome the initiative taken by the noble Lord, Lord Wade, in bringing forward this Bill to the House for discussion today. The subject with which it deals is clearly of the greatest constitutional and legal importance. It is also a highly topical subject. As the noble Lord, Lord Banks, said, my right honourable friend the Home Secretary delivered a major speech on it to the Birmingham Law Society only last month. The House will be gratified to discover that the noble Lord, Lord Banks, dealt with the speech of my right honourable friend so fully that I have been able to excise fairly significant parts of my own speech this afternoon. The subject has also been dealt with by the noble and learned Lord, Lord Hailsham of Saint Marylebone, and others, including Lord Justice Scarman, who have both spoken and written about it on a variety of occasions outside this House.
My Lords, this public discussion reflects a growing concern about the balance of the relationships between the individual and those instruments of authority which we loosely describe as "the State". As the size and complexity of modern society increase, so the rights of the individual need more protection from abuses of power. The adoption of a Bill of Rights would not, of course, remove existing legislative and common law safeguards
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against those abuses. Unwritten conventions; the sense of fair play of most Ministers and Governments of both Parties, and civil servants; the vigilance of the Opposition and individual Members of Parliament, including Members of this House; the influence of the Press and public opinion; the independence of the Judiciary and, above all, the periodic right to change the Government through free elections with a secret ballot—all these provide a valuable protection for the rights of the individual. But the question is whether something more is now needed, and whether a statutory Bill of Rights would provide the answer.
My Lords, at the moment, this question is being discussed and debated by a number of bodies. The Government have been making their own study, and I will come back to that point in a moment, if I may. As has been said by a number of speakers, last month the Labour Party published a discussion document setting out a proposal by the Human Rights Sub-Committee of the National Executive that the right guaranteed by the European Convention on Human Rights should be embodied in a United Kingdom Act of Parliament. I understand that the Party opposite have commissioned their own study of the subject, which is still going on. In Northern Ireland, the Standing Advisory Commission under the chairmanship of my noble friend Lord Feather, who I am glad to see here this afternoon, is carrying out a study of the adequacy of existing safeguards for human rights, and of the form that any new safeguards might take. The Commission published a discussion paper earlier this month setting out the issues which, in their view, require consideration. This is a valuable document, and I commend it to the House.
My Lords, this Bill, therefore, has been introduced in the middle of a growing public debate. I welcome it as an interesting contribution to our public discussion. It illustrates a number of the important issues now before us. The meaning which the phrase, "Bill of Rights" has in contemporary political discussion comes primarily from its use in the United States of America. As the House knows, there it describes provisions embodied in, or added to, the Constitution, which declares in broad and

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general terms the principal rights of the individual against the Government, such as the rights to life, liberty and property, to free speech and a free Press, and to clue process of law. The absence of a Bill of Rights in this sense from our own legal system reflects—indeed, the noble Lord, Lord Wade, said this when moving the Second Reading of this Bill—our own unique constitutional tradition of having no written Constitution or "basic law".
Our system is also unique because the sovereignty of the Queen in Parliament is absolute and unfettered. As the noble and learned Lord, Lord Hailsham, said, the essence of our system is the omnipotence of Parliament, which, in practice, means the Government in Parliament, and equally the relatively limited role of the Judiciary in relation to questions of legislation and public policy. The introduction of a Bill of Rights would have significant implications for the essential aspects of our present Constitution.
My Lords, the distinctive feature of a Bill of Rights of the kind we are discussing today is that it enunciates a set of fundamental rights in broad and general terms which need to be expounded, filled out and interpreted by the courts, or some other independent authority. Not the least of the implications of this Bill would be its effect on the role of the Judiciary. The task of interpreting a Bill of Rights would take our courts and judges well beyond the range of the relatively narrow role they have hitherto had. The generality of the provisions would inevitably give them more latitude, and provide less guidance, than is available to them in interpreting legislation in our normal style. They would find themselves having to balance conflicting values—and not merely legal or even social, but political—in spheres that have hitherto been the preserve of Parliament.
My Lords, I think it is right to recall in this context that noble Lords, sitting with distinguished colleagues from other Commonwealth countries in the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council, have to deal with such questions under the provisions of some Commonwealth Constitutions. In addition, the Judiciary in the United States and its component States have performed the same function
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with great vigour and authority since the establishment of the Union. The enriching contribution of the United States Supreme Court to the life of that country is beyond doubt, but it is necessary none the less to recognise that the conferment of this function on the judges of our domestic courts could bring their decisions, and criticisms of those decisions, right to the centre of the political arena.
If one just gives one single illustration from the experience of the United States, one need only go hack to the second term of President Roosevelt, when there was a dispute between the then American Administration and the Supreme Court, who had just struck down a number of vital pieces of reconstruction legislation in the United States. As will be recalled, this brought a head-on clash between the President, armed with a very substantial majority in both Houses of Congress, and the United States Supreme Court. It created a major constitutional crisis, because the President then took steps—whether he was well advised to do so or not is clearly a matter for debate—to change the character of the Supreme Court, "pack it" as it was described by his critics, and for a very substantial period of time the Supreme Court of the United States was right in the centre of the political arena. I think we have to face this issue head on, because it is clearly a very revolutionary doctrine to consider incorporation of procedures of that sort into our own arrangements in this country.
I come now to consider the particular form and content which the noble Lord, Lord Wade, has chosen to give to his Bill. He has founded it upon the European Convention on Human Rights and there are, as he explained, a number of very sound reasons for his choice. The Convention (with certain qualifications which I will come to in a moment) is already binding on the United Kingdom in international law. Individuals who wish to claim any breach of its provisions by this Government have the right to bring their grievances before the European Commission of Human Rights in Strasbourg. The Government, as the House will recall, renewed this right of individual petition in January of this year for a further period of five years. The Court of Justice of the European Communities now looks to the Convention

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as a source of guidance on the fundamental rights and freedoms of which the Court sees itself as the guardian within the Community legal order.
Our acceptance of the Convention as binding on us in international law in no way requires us to incorporate its provisions into our own domestic legal system. All that is required is that our law and the way it is administered should conform to the Convention and not be inconsistent with it. However, many of the other member countries of the European Community have incorporated the Convention into their legal systems, as my noble and learned friend Lord Gardiner has pointed out—and examples are France and Germany—because an international instrument like the Convention becomes, by the mere fact of ratification, part of the domestic law of their State.
In these States there are generally also pre-existing constitutional guarantees of fundamental rights which cover much the same ground as the Convention. So, for them, incorporating the Convention into their framework of domestic rights is not as novel a step as it would be for us if we were to follow their example. For us, it is, frankly, difficult to assess the full effects in advance; they would appear only gradually as we experienced the operation of the Convention in a domestic context, and this would depend on the way in which the Convention was made part of our law. Some difficult and controversial questions, I think, clearly face us if we embark on such a course.
I now, if I may, turn to consider some points of detail arising from the noble Lord's Bill. He will forgive me if, like the noble and learned Lord, Lord Hailsham, I sound critical. This is not my intention. As I have indicated, the Government have sympathy for his intentions, if we have doubts about certain aspects of the Bill. First, the Bill seeks to incorporate into our law "without any reservation" not only the Convention itself—which we have indeed already accepted without reservation—but also the five protocols which have subsequently been concluded. One of these protocols, the Fourth, has not been ratified by the United Kingdom, because its provisions about the right of "nationals" to re-enter their own country
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could not, as they stand, be reconciled with our present nationality and immigration law. In addition, Article 2 of the First Protocol has been accepted by the United Kingdom, subject to a reservation.
Secondly, there is the question of remedies for breaches of the Convention. Clause 1 provides that the Convention and Protocols "shall be enforceable by action in the Courts of the United Kingdom". I doubt whether this is sufficiently adequate as an indication, either to the courts themselves or to complainants, of what remedies Parliament would intend the courts to afford. In particular there is the difficulty that Article 6 of the Convention affects the actions of the courts themselves, in criminal as well as civil proceedings. The whole question of remedies needs, I suggest, considerably more consideration.
A further problem is whether the Convention should be interpreted as requiring States to guarantee the rights contained in it only against infringement by public authorities, or also against infringement by private individuals and organisations. As a question of law, this is a matter on which expert opinion is divided. As a question of policy, it has particular significance in relation to privacy, as protected by Article 8 of the Convention, and membership of trade unions, dealt with in Article 11. The question is one which Parliament would have to face in enacting any general legislation on human rights. It is, again, one that needs careful study and consideration.
My Lords, these are only some of the issues and problems which legislation of this kind is bound to raise. Part IV of the discussion paper, published by the Commission chaired by my noble friend, lists no fewer than 20 questions. In addition, the discussion paper comments:
"It is easy to be in favour of a Bill of Rights in the abstract. However, some difficult and controversial problems have to be faced before an informed and balanced judgment can be made about an issue of such profound importance."
While I in no way oppose the noble Lord's Motion for his Bill to be given a Second Reading, I suggest that in this debate we are only just beginning the process of facing the problems which it raises. We are some way yet from the stage of being ready to form an informed and balanced judgment. In the Government's view, the need at the moment is

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for wide public discussion so that we can begin to form such a judgment. I think our debate today has been a valuable part of that process.
Finally, I should like to turn to the Motion in the name of the noble and learned Lord, Lord Hailsham, that if the Bill receives a Second Reading it should be referred to a Select Committee of the House. I have no wish to oppose this Motion, if that course commends itself to your Lordships, but I think it is right that I should make two points. First, must refer to the question of servicing any Select Committee on this Bill. I know that the House would expect the usual efficient service if this Committee were to be set up. But I am given to understand that there are problems because of the number of Committees in existence at the moment, and an additional Committee would create significant difficulties. I feel that the House should at least be aware of this consideration. But, secondly, there is another point which I should like to make to the House, and that is the point I made earlier, that the Government, too, have been making their study of the question of a Bill of Rights. Last year we set up a working group of officials from the Departments principally concerned to study the implications of general legislation on human rights.
Among other things, it examined in some detail what would be involved in incorporating the European Convention on Human Rights into our domestic law. We believe that the results of this study could make an important contribution to public understanding of the complex issues with which it dealt and in view of the exceptional importance of this issue, my right honourable friend the Home Secretary intends shortly to make them available in the form of a discussion document. I suggest that this study is likely already to have covered a significant number of the sort of questions to which a Select Committee would no doubt address itself. In these circumstances, the noble and learned Lord may feel that he would rather await the public debate which will no doubt follow the publication of the Working Group's report, rather than to proceed by Select Committee at this stage.
5.31 p.m.
Lord WADE: My Lords, I am greatly indebted to noble Lords who have taken part in this debate and I am glad that there have been differences of view because if everyone had been of the same mind it would have been a much less interesting discussion. It has been a fascinating debate and those who have taken part have spoken with great authority. Obviously I cannot attempt to answer every point that has been made and I am inclined to agree with the noble and learned Lord, Lord Hailsham of Saint Marylebone, that we should obtain as much evidence as possible on this subject from all quarters. That idea I certainly welcome.
I rather wish that we could have had an entirely separate debate between the noble and learned Lord, Lord Denning, and the noble and learned Lord, Lord Hailsham, on the subject of entrenched law. It would have been an extraordinarily interesting debate, listening to their differing views on that subject. There was a kind of cross-current, although some of the remarks of lord Denning do not directly affect the Bill, because we are not now advocating entrenched law, although we may have to face that when we come to devolution, as I said in my opening remarks. I appreciate the point made by Lord Hailsham about Article 26 but I am not so sure that it would make all that difference if the Convention was incorporated because in any case a matter cannot be taken to the European Court until the possible courses of action have been attempted here or until the complainant has found that there is no possible remedy in this country.
I agree that no Bill of Rights can be perfect, but many noble Lords have, I feel, come to the view that case law coupled with statute law is not entirely adequate. As to the question of an unrepresentative Parliament, noble Lords will not be surprised when I say that this is something to do with the method of electing a Parliament. I was grateful for the observations of the noble and learned Lord. Lord Gardiner, and to hear that lie is in favour of the Bill. I am not sure whether it was he or another noble Lord who referred to the United Nations

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Charter. In my view, the European Convention, which I think Lord Gardiner praised, is very much better than the United Nations Charter; I feel that the Charter muddles up needs and rights, but I must not embark on that subject now.
The noble Lord, Lord Lloyd of Hampstead, made some powerful criticisms. In fact, he made the case against the Bill. I can only say that on balance I disagreed with the views which he expressed. As for the remarks of Lord Denning, I hesitate to question anything he said because he speaks with such experience and knowledge. I can only repeat that I was not advocating entrenched law, although we shall have to face that, and Lord Hailsham is probably in a better position than I am to answer some of the remarks of Lord Denning. Certainly I would nay tribute to the importance of the independence of the Judiciary and the principles evolved by the judges of England. What some of us question is whether case law evolves sufficiently speedily to deal with all the new problems that arise in our modern world. I was glad to hear that the noble Lord, Lord Brockway, supports the Bill. I quite understand that he considers that Ireland provides a special case, and we will listen later to what he has to say on that. I was glad that the noble Lord, Lord Banks, referred to the volume of legislation and the complexity of modern statute law, and also to hear his assertion that we must face up to the effects of change.
I would be only too ready to agree that I have dealt far too briefly with the contributions that have been made to this debate. I listened carefully to the speech of the noble Lord, Lord Harris of Greenwich, who said that the question was whether we needed something more, and that point has run throughout the debate. There is a growing feeling that something more is needed. I would also agree that this whole subject is now being discussed; I read the document by the noble Lord, Lord Feather, and found it very interesting. I have noted the points of detail and I think they are points that could be considered in Committee or in Select Committee. In the meantime, I would welcome wide public discussion.
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So we come to the question whether there should be a Select Committee and on this I must wait to hear what the noble and learned Lord, Lord Hailsham, has to say. I would accept the decision of the House as to whether we should have an ordinary Committee stage or a Select Committee—or whether we should wait a little while before further discussion, in which case I think there is much to be said for a Select Committee. That, of course, is a matter for the House to decide.
I hope that the Bill will be given a Second Reading; the significance of a Second Reading is that it marks an important stage; namely, it implies that we are moving from academic debate to a serious intention to legislate. Precisely what form it will take when it reaches the Statute Book I would not go so far as to say. I hope I am not going back on anything I said when I moved the Second Reading, but I think we have reached the stage when there will have to be legislation. In the light of that, I hope that the House will give the Bill a Second Reading.
On Question, Bill read 2a.
5.39 p.m.
Lord HAILSHAM of SAINT MARYLEBONE: My Lords, the question now arises as to what we should do with the Bill to which we have just given a Second Reading. I interpreted the speech of the noble Lord, Lord Harris of Greenwich, as a mild but quite clearly defined request that I should not move my Motion that the Bill be referred to a Select Committee, and that for two reasons. The first was the nuts and bolts of setting up a Select Committee—of which we already have a number; in my private opinion, rather too many—which I cannot altogether ignore. The second was the publication by the Government of some working paper by a group of Civil Servants, which I gather is imminent. I am quite sure that if the Bill were to be taken further—and at the moment I rather hone that it will be put into the fridge for a little while—a Select Committee would be the correct way of handling it. We have heard from, for instance, the noble Lord, Lord Denning, views which, from his point of view, cannot be ignored and which would have to be ventilated before a Select Committee before we allowed the Bill to

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go to another place. We have also heard from the noble Lord, Lord Lloyd of Hampstead, a reasoned case against the Bill, in which many of the points which I made were put with a good deal more precision and in greater detail.
I believe that, if we were to proceed with this as a serious legislative project, there would be no alternative but to ask a Select Committee to take evidence. By that, I do not just mean studying the arguments as presented by the noble Lord, Lord Feather, in relation to Northern Ireland or the civil servant's paper, although those would obviously have to be taken into account. I believe that we should have to go about the matter in a workmanlike way, taking evidence from the judiciary and from the Government and asking trade unions and other possibly interested bodies and political parties to present their views and should, then, have to produce an important constitutional document containing recommendations as to whether we should go forward with this proposal or with some other or, perhaps, as the noble Lord, Lord Denning, would seem to prefer, with no proposals at all.
If we are to go forward with this proposal, I believe that that is what we should have to do. In the meantime, however, I should like to study the document of the noble Lord, Lord Harris of Greenwich. Therefore, if it is fully understood that should the proposal go forward I shall raise this Motion again at some stage, I would beg leave of the House not to move it at this stage.
Bill committed to a Committee of the Whole House.

ROYAL ASSENT
5.42 p.m.
The LORD CHANCELLOR (Lord Elwyn-Jones): My Lords, I have to notify the House, in accordance with the Royal Assent Act 1967, that the Queen has signified her Royal Assent to the following Acts (and Measures):
Consolidated Fund Act 1976,
Road Traffic (Drivers' Ages and Hours of Work) Act 1976,
Trustee Savings Banks Act 1976,
Education (School-leaving Dates) Act 1976,
Solicitors (Scotland) Act 1976,
818
Trade Union and Labour Relations (Amendment) Act 1976,
Prevention of Terrorism (Temporary Provisions) Act 1976,
Water Charges Act 1976,
Post Office (Banking Services) Act 1976,
Cathedral Measure 1976 (No. 1),
Ecclesiastical Judges and Legal Officers Measure 1976 No. 2.

BILL OF RIGHTS (NORTHERN IRELAND) BILL [H.L.]
5.45 p.m.
Lord BROCKWAY: My Lords, I beg to move that this Bill be now read a second time. At the outset I wish to correct a mistake in the text of the Bill for which I accept responsibility. Clause 6 (1) refers to a "Northern Ireland Constitutional Court Act 1975". From documentation received from Northern Ireland I believed that that expected measure had reached the Statute Book. It has not. The Public Bill Office drew my attention to this error but, unfortunately, I received their communication after the Bill had been printed. In those circumstances, if the enforcement clauses, to which I attach a great importance, are to operate, it will be necessary either to amend the Bill in Committee or to introduce a separate Bill to set up the Court. I apologise for the error and regret the inconvenience caused to Members of this House and to the Printed Paper Office staff who give us such good service.
I want to acknowledge the help which I have received in draft Bills already prepared on this subject by the Northern Ireland Civil Rights Association and the Ulster Citizens' Civil Liberties Centre, where the Protestant community has very considerable influence. This is the third time I have introduced a Bill for rights in Northern Ireland. On each previous occasion, sympathy has been expressed on both sides of the House and I recognise that progress has been made. Part III of the Northern Ireland Constitution Act 1973, providing for the prevention of religious and political discrimination by local authorities, has been considerably applied, particularly in relation to housing, and we have recently passed the Fair Employment Bill through this House.

819
Nevertheless, more comprehensive safeguards are required in Northern Ireland for rights and liberties.
In the Discussion Paper recently issued by the Standing Advisory Commission on Human Rights, of which my noble friend Lord Feather is the chairman, there are compiled arguments both for and against a Bill of Rights. In the arguments in favour are included a series of indications that wider safeguards are necessary. That section of the Discussion Paper concludes by suggesting that the absence of a Bill of Rights, enforceable by the courts, against the misuse of public powers may have contributed to the present situation in Northern Ireland.
I am tremendously encouraged by the fact of the extraordinary unity in Northern Ireland in asking for a Bill of Rights. I was unable to see or hear the television—or it may have been radio—feature in which repreentatives of Northern Ireland discussed the necessity for a Bill of Rights, but I am told that even Mr. Paisley came out enthusiastically in favour of such a Bill. The recent Northern Ireland Convention, despite its deep differences on the question of power sharing and its subsequent dissolution, was united in demanding a Bill of Rights for Northern Ireland. It agreed that there should be,
"a general Bill of Rights and Duties to protect the rights of the individual citizen."
My Lords, I want to be fair and to recognise that there were differences at the Convention as to the scope of a Bill—whether it should extend to Britain, as well as to Northern Ireland—and the initiative in passing it. The United Ulster Unionist Coalition and the Northern Ireland Labour Party would prefer an all-United Kingdom measure, as has been suggested by the noble Lord, Lord Wade. But both accepted that the need for a Bill of Rights was so great that as a secondary proposal they would accept a Northern Ireland measure alone. With the Independent Unionist Party, the UUUC took the view that the Bill of Rights should be initiated by a Northern Ireland Legislature, but as there is no such Legislature, and as there is unlikely to be one for some time, I submit, in view of the urgency of the situation, that a Bill must be immediately introduced at Westminster.
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My Bill, like the Bill put forward by the noble Lord, Lord Wade, is based on the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms. I agree with the Social Democratic and Labour Party in Northern Ireland that it is the best detailed document on human rights produced to date. I am interested to see that this endorsed by the UUUC in Northern Ireland, and that the Alliance Party takes the view also that the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, of which the European Convention is an application, should be the measure to which an appeal should be made.
As I indicated earlier, there is a Standing Commission on Human Rights in Northern Ireland, of which the noble Lord, Lord Feather, is chairman. It has recently issued a Discussion Paper. The noble Lord, Lord Feather, will be aware that in Northern Ireland the Commission is attacked as a delaying tactic, when the need for a Bill of Rights is immediate. I want to dissociate myself from the criticism which is made of the noble Lord, Lord Feather, personally. I recollect that he said, when addressing the Northern Ireland Chamber of Commerce:
"Human rights mean freedom of association, freedom of speech, freedom from fear, freedom for all of us."
I have known him all his life, and I know that he is dedicated to the cause of personal liberty, of racial equality, and of social justice. I am saying this because some attacks are being made on him in Northern Ireland at this moment.
But I also want to say this to him. When the Commission was established he indicated that it might take one year to come to its conclusions. From the beginning I wondered whether the Commission was ever necessary. All the facts are known. For five years now there has been open discussion of the need for a Bill of Rights in Northern Ireland. The pros and cons have been debated. There is the Gardiner Report. There is the very detailed discussion in the Constitutional Convention. The attitude of all Parties and groups in Northern Ireland is already known. In my view a civil servant could have drawn up a memorandum which would have covered all the facts, and certainly the Department in

821
Northern Ireland could have collected the necessary evidence.
I should like to say to the noble Lord, Lord Feather, that, whatever happens to my Bill tonight, I beg him to speed up the conclusions of his Commission, because a decision is so urgent. I suggest that it is specially urgent because of the breakdown of the Constitutional Convention. There is a great danger that in the vacuum which has been left disillusionment of a political solution will lead to an increase of the violence that is taking place. Among both Protestant and Catholic communities in Northern Ireland there is scepticism as to the contribution of politicians. The IRA will exploit this situation among the Catholics. The aggressive para-militarist groups will exploit it among the Protestants. I welcome the initiative of the Government, in this vacuum, of taking action in the economic and social sphere. I urge them to accompany that by applying human rights in Northern Ireland. In this vacuum we need positive action to open the ivory gate to end violence, and to encourage co-operation.
It is suggested now that power sharing is the solution. Immediately, yes—and one is encouraged by the fact that opinion polls in Northern Ireland are indicating that a majority in Northern Ireland is now in favour of power sharing. It may easily be that in the near future a referendum will encourage that solution. But I do not believe that power sharing is the permanent solution. The problems of Northern Ireland are poverty, unemployment, slums, the underdevelopment of the West. Power sharing would mean a Coalition between the capitalist-orientated businesmen of the UUUC with the socialist-orientated members of the Social Democratic and Labour Party. They have fundamentally different approaches to the solution of the problems of Northern Ireland, and, as in this country, a Coalition Government of Parties with different views would just dither and fail to act.
If one rejects rower sharing as the long-term solution in Northern Ireland, then it becomes imperatively important that whatever Government are in Office there, there shall be underneath a basis of equality between the communities, an assurance of individual liberties (which
822
in the past have been denied) to give confidence and to give security. The supreme need is that we create a new climate in Northern Ireland, a sense of security, the removal of the fear of discrimination, the spreading of a soil in which tolerance and mutual respect would flower. I believe that in the present situation a Bill of Rights would do more in those directions than anything else. My Lords, I beg to move.
Moved, That the Bill be now read 2a.—(Lord Brockway.)
6.0 p.m.
Lord BELSTEAD: My Lords, when considering the possibility of a Bill of Rights for Northern Ireland I think it is worth taking note of existing legislation, and this the noble Lord, Lord Brockway, did, but only briefly, in his introductory speech on this Bill. Section 5 of the Government of Ireland Act 1920 prevented the Parliament of Northern Ireland from making laws which would discriminate on grounds of religion. Section 17 of the 1973 Northern Ireland Constitution Act in effect extended this provision to discrimination on the grounds of religion or political opinion. Section 8 of the 1920 Act prevented the Executive, which was then the Lord Lieutenant, from discriminating on religious grounds. Section 19 of the 1973 Act extended this prohibition to discrimination on grounds of political opinion as well, and made it clear that United Kingdom authorities, Northern Ireland local authorities and other public bodies fall within the scope of this section. Section 19 of the 1973 Act did another thing. It also made it clear that an individual may resort to the courts if an authority discriminates against him—a right which was not clearly defined by the 1920 Act.
It is true that the prohibition of discrimination under the 1973 Act was confined to discrimination by Government, local authorities and appointed bodies—in other words, the public sector—but, as the noble Lord mentioned, subsequently the Northern Ireland (Fair Employment) Bill has passed through your Lordships' House and is now before another place, and that Bill deals with job discrimination, not only in the public sector but also in the private sector of employment.
Whether Sections 17 and 19 of the 1973 Constitution Act taken with the Northern

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Ireland (Fair Employment) Bill provide a sufficiently comprehensive framework of legislation to prevent religious or political discrimination in Northern Ireland is obviously open to discussion, and I am deliberately confining myself to this rather narrower scope after the previous, wide-ranging debate, although, of course, the noble Lord, Lord Brockway, has every right—and, indeed, I think was quite right—to go a great deal wider in moving the Second Reading of this Bill.
In addition to the legislation which I have sought to mention, the 1973 Act established the Standing Advisory Commission on Human Rights, which was then appointed under the chairmanship of the noble Lord, Lord Feather; and it was clearly provided for in the 1973 legislation that this Commission was appointed with the purpose of doing far more than simply backing up the Act which had given it birth. The noble Lord's Commission was charged to survey the existing law against discrimination and to recommend improvements to it. With respect, I think this was an aspect which the noble Lord, Lord Brockway, did not perhaps give quite enough credence to in his words. As your Lordships know, the Commission has not proceeded so far as making recommendations one way or the other with regard to the desirability of a Bill of Rights for Northern Ireland. The Commission's work has progressed so far as the discussion paper which the noble Lord, Lord Brockway, mentioned, which was published on 5th March, and which is I think most valuable, in that it sets out so clearly the arguments for and against the case for a Bill of Rights.
This Bill, however, seeks to draft legislation. It would import into the law of Northern Ireland Section 1 of the European Convention. The desirability of doing this has been debated on the previous Bill in the context of the United Kingdom as a whole, and I would not venture to enter into those arguments; but perhaps I may make one thing clear. Although I do not agree with the noble Lord, Lord Brockway, that there is evidently a consensus of opinion in Northern Ireland as to how a Bill of Rights ought to be drafted (if this was so, I fail to see how it is that the
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Commission of the noble Lord, Lord Feather, is asking the questions that it is), and although I do not agree with the noble Lord, Lord Brockway, that the State of Emergency in Northern Ireland in itself requires a Bill of Rights (I take my stand on that from paragraphs in the Gardiner Commission to which I will return in a moment), none the less, if it is thought desirable to develop what the 1973 White Paper on the Northern Ireland Constitution called a Charter of Human Rights and to turn that into a Bill, I would certainly be ready to support such a course when it is clear that there is a consensus as to how such a Bill ought to be drafted. I am bound to admit that I do not believe we shall know about this until Lord Feather's Commission has reported, and I apprehend that we shall be unlikely to reach anything remotely resembling a consensus until the issue of whether or not powers can again be devolved to a Northern Ireland Legislature is resolved.
If I may venture to say so, I think there are perhaps some defects in this Bill to which the House perhaps would wish to turn its attention. The thought of combing through the Race Relations Act or any subsequent Act concerning racial discrimination and tacking on the words "religious discrimination" wherever appropriate seems, if the noble Lord will forgive my saying so, rather a cumbersome form of legislation; I was surprised to discover when I began to do just this that the definition of racial discrimination which is contained in the very first section of the Race Relations Act is virtually identical to the definition of religious and political discrimination which is to be found in Section 23 of the Constitution Act 1973. I appreciate the noble Lord's concern that the right to derogate from obligations under the European Convention when there is a public emergency should not be an easy derogation to claim. But the provision which is in his Bill that a public emergency in the United Kingdom should depend upon a two-thirds majority in another place surely runs counter to all Parliamentary practice in this country, and I think it is scarcely a suitable provision in a Bill starting its life in your Lordships' House.
I listened carefully to what the noble Lord said at the beginning of his speech

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about the relevant section for the Constitutional Court. My only conclusion from what the noble Lord said is that I am still unsure as to what would now be done about jurisdiction. The Judiciary in Northern Ireland is under very great pressure indeed, and perhaps the noble Lord, Lord Donaldson, will be saying a little more about this. If this Bill were to proceed, I would imagine that the setting up of a new court would mean very considerable consultation.
But I think there is a more fundamental issue than the ones which I have ventured to put forward; namely, what would be the relationship between this legislation and the sovereignty of Parliament. In the previous debate this afternoon my noble friend Lord Hailsham said that we deceive ourselves if we believe that we can legislate on the subject of human rights and fundamental freedoms and to some extent at the same time do not undermine the sovereignty of Parliament; and my noble friend explained in what way this could, in his opinion, be desirable in a context of a written Constitution with entrenched clauses. But, my Lords, the effect of the Bill of the noble Lord, Lord Brockway, as I understand it, is that this legislation would take precedence over all other Statutes, and I would be interested to hear the Government's view about that aspect of the Bill.
The issue, however, which I believe would make it inappropriate for this Bill to be read a second time is the issue of whether or not Northern Ireland alone ought to have a Bill of Rights, and I put this view because no decisions have yet been reached with regard to Great Britain and because the Standing Advisory Commission has yet to complete its work. But a further reason I would also give. I appreciate the noble Lord's concern that emergency legislation for Northern Ireland can threaten individual liberty. All of us ought to be concerned with this, and the noble Lord is quite right to have reminded us of it on several occasions in this House. But the temporary nature of the legislation which is passed by Parliament in this respect is, I think, evidence of our concern.
But the fact is that in paragraph 15 of their Report the Committee of the noble and learned Lord, Lord Gardiner,
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rejected the argument that certain features of the present emergency provisions constitute a violation of human rights. The noble and learned Lord's Committee went on to say:
"While the liberty of the subject is a right which ought to be preserved under all possible conditions, it is not an absolute right which would allow one man to use his liberty in order to take away the liberty of another."
I recognise in quoting that part of the noble and learned Lord's report that his Committee left the issue of a Bill of Rights open to further consideration and pointed out that the continued use of emergency powers should be limited by a solving of the Northern Ireland problem in political terms. But as your Lordships know, this has not yet been achieved.
May I make it clear that I do not dissent in any way from Lord Brockway's objective of securing fundamental rights of freedom for the people of Northern Ireland. I would go further. I long for the day when we will be living in a society in which the Executive, which has more and more control over the Legislature, will at least allow the individual to be protected more from the decisions taken so often, it seems to me, in breach of human rights. But having said that, I think there are too many questions which the noble Lord, Lord Feather's Commission asked and which remain as yet unanswered. The noble Lord has proceeded as swiftly as he can. I notice that he has asked for the final lot of evidence to come in very shortly, I think it was by April of this year.
I think that it is interesting to find that both the 1972 Green Paper—which was the discussion document before the 1973 Constitution was hammered out—and the 1976 discussion paper agreed that this sort of legislation has got to be practical in effect. It has got to be practical by incorporating a considerable measure of agreement as to content, jurisdiction and enforcement.
My Lords, until the Commission completes its work, I do not believe that those sort of issues can be resolved. This view that I venture to put does not reflect any hesitation about improving social conditions and community relations in Northern Ireland. The 1973 White Paper referred to a Charter of Human Rights for Northern Ireland. On these Benches we will certainly support

827
any proposal which strengthens the laws and administration of Northern Ireland which together can be said to comprise a charter; but I believe that we need to await the conclusion of the work of the Standing Advisory Commission before any Bill of Rights is finally drafted.
6.13 p.m.
Viscount BROOKEBOROUGH: My Lords, the noble and learned Lord, Lord Hailsham, said that no Act of Parliament, as such, would change anything unless the will was there. Having listened to the noble Lord, Lord Brockway, I should like to say that he really will be living in Cloud Cuckoo-land if he thinks that to pass a Bill of Rights for Northern Ireland would change the atmosphere in that country at the moment. The discrimination, the appalling intimidation that is occurring through lack of law and order is the most vital matter at the moment. Until that is settled the people in Northern Ireland will not be in the least impressed by legislation affecting human rights and Bills of Rights. Therefore, I should like to start by saying that I believe the noble Lord should withdraw this Bill. He has mentioned the Convention and the Convention Report. I was in that Convention and the unanimity about the requirement of a Bill of Rights by that Convention was dependent solely upon there being devolved Government within Northern Ireland. That unanimity would not exist at all in the present circumstances. We are now under a period of Direct Rule. We therefore require to be treated as part of the United Kingdom. Therefore, in my view, nothing should be done outside the United Kingdom context.
Also, I feel that this is a bad Bill in itself. Secondly I personally feel—and I was very impressed with my noble friend Lord Belstead's polite way of dealing with the subject—that while the Standing Committee on Human Rights, with the noble Lord, Lord Feather, in charge, is in existence, for us to pass a Bill of this variety is insulting and provocative both to him and to my friends who sit on that Committee. In saying that, I know I may be misinterpreting the noble Lord, Lord Brockway. He is not an insulting person, but people who do not know him and perhaps friends of mine will feel that is
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so. Also, for the noble Lord to include in this Bill reference to a non-existent court is, in my view, irresponsible. It merely gives the stamp on this particular Bill of its authorship, which is that of the Northern Ireland Committee of Civil Rights. That is a Committee for which I have little time and whose record in the past seven years is not something that I would admire.
My Lords, I found it hypocritical, to say the least, when we have not heard a word from the noble Lord about the denial of the prime civil right that applies to everybody in the United Kingdom, except the citizens of Northern Ireland, of equal representation in Parliament here. We have in Northern Ireland 110,000 people in North Antrim represented by one M.P. Yet in the rest of Great Britain we have a constituency of 23,000. There have been peculiar reasons given for that, among others that this Government do not wish to have in Parliament those who are elected by people who do not want to be within the United Kingdom. But the right of the citizens is to elect those who they wish to represent.
My Lords, I should like to refer to the brilliant speech by the noble and learned Lord, Lord Hailsham, and to say that I, too, agree that there is a great need for a Bill of Human Rights for the United Kingdom as a whole. But it must be for the United Kingdom as a whole. Northern Ireland has more organisations and more Acts of Parliament to deal with this problem than has any other part of the United Kingdom. Indeed, as my noble friend Lord Belstead enumerated, we even had enshrined in Section 5 of the 1920 Act the equivalent of a Bill of Rights.
To quote the problems of local government and other problems which existed in Northern Ireland and, at the same time, to neglect the problems of certain local governments in this country is a matter of double standards. But during the whole of the period of the Parliament of Northern Ireland—even though the ordinary citizen had the right to appeal against any Act of Parliament which was considered to offend against that Bill of Rights under Section 5—this power was never invoked; so well did the Government of Northern Ireland govern for people of Northern Ireland.

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To suggest that the Northern Ireland Government abused the civil liberties is just not true. The facts of the present method of government, the intrusion of Government in all forms of life, mean that a Bill of Human Rights is now necessary. The problem we must solve is how to achieve a proper balance in the United Kingdom and in Northern Ireland. Before I sit down, I will ask the House to excuse me if I leave before the vote because I have to catch an aeroplane.
6.19 p.m.
Lord MONSON: My Lords, much as I support the concept of a Bill of Rights for the whole of the United Kingdom, I regret that I cannot possibly support this Bill in particular. I say "regret", because I acknowledge the sincerity of the noble Lord, Lord Brockway, in this matter, misguided though I believe it to be. I think it wrong for Parliament at Westminster to legislate for one part of the United Kingdom alone on an issue of this magnitude. I am pleased to hear from the noble Lord, Lord Brockway, that the Northern Ireland Labour Party agrees with me on this point. It seems to me particularly immoral that the part of the United Kingdom concerned is so grossly unrepresented at Westminster, as the noble Viscount, Lord Brookeborough, pointed out. If a devolved Assembly were to legislate for a regional Bill of Rights, one would have no objection whatsoever. But there is no devolved Assembly and there is not likely to be one for some time to come. The continual treatment over the decades of Northern Ireland as totally different from the rest of the United Kingdom has bred the fears and suspicions which have led to the tendencies which the noble Lord, Lord Brockway, deplores.
On the detail of the Bill, there are a number of criticisms which I have to make. Clause 1(1) refers to
"fundamental rights…such as race, colour, sex, religious or political or other belief",
and so on. The phrase "such as" seems unacceptably vague for an Act of Parliament. Regarding Clause 1(2), I agree with the noble Lord, Lord Belstead, that there are considerable difficulties in trying to link this Act to a Race Relations Act, particularly as it refers to subsequent Acts and we do not know the content of subsequent Acts. Clause 2(1) seems to
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seek to bind future Parliaments in a way which is alien to our Parliamentary and constitutional traditions. Clause 2(2) would make it impossible for any part of the Act to be suspended in the case of a national emergency. That is surely undesirable. Clause 4 stipulates that men and women shall have equal rights and the same legal status not only in "state" life but in social and private life also. This seems to bring the law into hitherto unexplored spheres. One visualises husbands or lovers being compelled to wash dishes and make beds on alternate days of the week.
Clause 5 seems unnecessary because I cannot think that the provisions in that clause are not available at the present moment to citizens of Northern Ireland. If the noble Lord were to insist upon the retention of this clause, why does he exclude the majority? The rights in question are only given to the minorities. This may seem academic until one considers that the Provisional IRA, and their supporters in the political field, have never disguised their intention, if they ever come into power and formed a 32-county republic, or a republic consisting of four provinces, to abolish the English language. They now play this down because it is unpopular with a lot of their own supporters; but, none the less, that is their declared policy. So the English language of the majority would be abolished. It could be argued that if the IRA or their supporters came to power the Bill of Rights would be superfluous anyway. None the less, it is the omission of any provision for a majority that tends to feed the flames of suspicion. The inclusion of religious rights does not seem to be confined merely to Church services. Religious rites, taken literally, include such things as animal sacrifice and even possibly forms of witchcraft. I do not hold strong views on the matter either way, but blanket provisions for the right to carry out religious rites, unqualified by considerations of public order, are surely not permitted in the rest of the United Kingdom.
Finally, I turn to Schedule 1, paragraph 4. I appreciate that this provision is not unique. It appears in other Bills and Acts. I none the less believe it is wrong to allow people to seek damages for injury to feelings and humiliation while English law does not provide for

831
financial damages for parents whose children are killed in a motor accident or other forms of accident. I have mentioned this before. They are not allowed to claim damages in such circumstances because there is no monetary value which can be put on a child's life. If this is so, how much less can value be put on something as relatively trifling as injured feelings? With that, I conclude what I have to say, my Lords, but I hope the House will reject this Bill for the reasons which I have mentioned.
6.25 p.m.
Viscount MASSEREENE and FERRARD: My Lords, before the noble Lord, Lord Donaldson of Kingsbridge, speaks, may I say that I feel that this debate has been rather academic while Northern Ireland is in a state of emergency. Under direct rule it seems, as my noble friend Lord Brookeborough said, surprising to speak about human rights. If you take, for instance, North Antrim, with an electorate of 110,000, they have such slight representation in this Parliament. Apart from that, I should like to point out to the noble Lord, Lord Brockway, that to hear him speak one would think that people in the North of Ireland never had any rights. The Stormont Parliament, before its dissolution, as my noble friend Lord Belstead pointed out, enacted many laws which carry out much of what the noble Lord, Lord Brockway, has in his Bill.
I could mention other matters of legislation which my noble friend did not point out: for instance, regarding housing, there is the housing executive which deals with these things, including allocation for the local authorities. There is also legislation regarding equality of opportunity; local councils made a declaration of equality of opportunity. I cannot remember whether my noble friend mentioned that the Northern Ireland Government passed much legislation for protection against discrimination. There is a Parliamentary Commissioner and a Commissioner for Complaints. To a great extent that is comparable to our own Race Relations Act. We also have the Prevention of Incitement to Hatred Act. It is now an offence orally or in writing to incite hatred or fear on grounds of religious belief.
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The Northern Ireland Government, before it was dissolved, passed these Acts. To hear the noble Lord, Lord Brockway, it would be thought that the people of Northern Ireland had no rights at all. This matter of a Bill of Rights is surely academic at the moment during a period of direct rule by what used to be called the Imperial Parliament. While terrorism continues, I find it impracticable to talk about a Bill of Rights. Until we have peace in the North of Ireland it is surely rather impractical to discuss these matters. I support my noble friend's remarks regarding the Standing Advisory Commission on Human Rights. The noble Lord, Lord Feather, is their chairman and we must wait for their report. I could not support this Bill and I hope that the noble Lord will withdraw it.
6.29 p.m.
The PARLIAMENTARY UNDER-SECRETARY of STATE, NORTHERN IRELAND OFFICE (Lord Donaldson of Kingsbridge): My Lords, the noble Viscount will not get a majority vote from the population of Northern Ireland, when he says that everything was perfectly all right under the old Government. There are arguments about how much was wrong. I do not think one can argue against the necessity of a Bill for human rights on the basis that because everything was so splendid it was not required. On behalf of my noble friend, I must reject that argument.
The criticisms of the Bill are under two heads: those against having one at all—and these views were put forward by the noble Lord, Lord Monson, and the noble Viscount—and the criticisms of those who, like the noble Lord, Lord Belstead, the Government and myself, believe something of the kind is required but that this particular version will not do at the moment. In my opinion, my noble friend is right in saying that there is a large consensus of opinion—though it is not unanimous—in Northern Ireland which would like to see a Bill of Human Rights. My right honourable friend the Secretary of State is on record as belonging to this group. He said in another place, and the words were later printed in a White Paper:
"The Government recognise that there is a consensus that there should be further legislation on human rights and will consider how

833
best to make appropriate statutory provision in the light of the detailed study currently being undertaken by the Standing Advisory Commission on Human Rights."
Admittedly, the context was rather different from that of today, and the noble Viscount, Lord Brookeborough, made reference to the views of the Convention. The context was one in which it was hoped that such legislation would form part of a new constitutional settlement in Northern Ireland; but even so, I should like to assure the House that the dissolution of the Northern Ireland Convention does not mean that the tempo of the work being done on human rights, notably by the Standing Advisory Commission on Human Rights, will in any way abate. But let not my noble friend expect something that I cannot deliver. The Government do not wish to proceed along the particular path to the end outlined in my noble friend's Bill. There are compelling reasons for this, which I shall now explain.
The troubles and tribulations which have beset us in Northern Ireland over the past decade have very often been seen as issues of human rights. Whether or not this is a true analysis, as the noble Viscount and the noble Lord, Lord Belstead, both pointed out, successive Governments have taken pains to improve the means by which a citizen may secure his rights and obtain redress if they have been violated. Since this was dealt with by both sneakers, I shall not go through it again, though I have a list of the things concerning human rights which have been accomplished at various legislative periods. My own view is that specific legislation is always more effective, in practical terms, than the generalities of a Bill of Rights, though such a Bill can give comprehensive coverage of the loopholes left by other legislation. I think that the noble and learned Lord, Lord Denning, in the earlier debate, said that he was frightened that the "blanket" effect of a Bill of Human Rights might lead disgruntled people to abuse it. I am certain that if we had a Bill of Rights in Northern Ireland that would happen, but that does not mean we should not have one. We are quite used to disgruntled people using whatever means they can find to make trouble, and a Bill of Rights would certainly be no
834
exception to this. But that is not a reason for not having one.
The Standing Advisory Commission on Human Rights was set up under the 1973 Constitution Act to advise on the adequacy and effectiveness of the law in Northern Ireland, to prevent discrimination on the ground of religious belief or political opinion. In the last few months it has been giving its full attention to the more general proposition of a Bill of Rights for Northern Ireland. This study, taken at the Commission's own initiative, nevertheless has the Government's full support. It seems to us the most effective way of establishing the nature of public opinion in the Province on the subject and thus coming towards a determination of what should be done. The Government do not believe, as the noble Lord, Lord Harris, made plain in the earlier debate, that this is an area in which decisions can be taken without the very fullest consideration both of shades of public opinion and of the consequences of any particular course of action on our legislative, political and social structure.
My noble friend said that in Northern Ireland all the facts are known. Anybody who heard the noble and learned Lords, Lord Hailsham and Lord Denning, and my noble friend Lord Lloyd of Hampstead earlier, must be perfectly clear that all the facts axe not known, whether about Northern Ireland or anywhere else. There are very many doubtful issues as to how a Bill of this kind, be it in Northern Ireland or the United Kingdom, would apply to the Judiciary and other things. Therefore the Government would like to formulate their own opinions in the light of the recommendations which eventually will be received from my noble friend Lord Feather and the Commission—and may I say how very pleased we are to see him back and looking well. We welcome this debate: it is valuable as an indication to the Commission of the thoughts of one body of legislative opinion on the subject.
The Government believe that the introduction of a Bill on these lines, limited to Northern Ireland, must be premature at this time. I must say to my noble friend Lord Brockway that we hope he will not feel it desirable to press his Bill to a Second Reading. The Government would not feel able to assist its passage either by providing time or by advising ways

835
in which its substance or drafting could be improved. The noble Lord, Lord Wade, in opening his debate—indeed, I think almost everyone who spoke in that debate—felt that it would be better to have a single Bill of Human Rights for the entire United Kingdom, if that could be arranged. My own view is that it is perfectly clear that this should be done and that it would be premature to begin discussing the details of a Bill before we knew what was going to happen in the United Kingdom as a whole.
I shall not go into the details of what I believe to be wrong with this Bill. However, I do not think it is really helpful at the moment, as my advice to the House is not to give a Second Reading on general grounds and not on particular grounds. Even if the Bill was much more workable and less easily criticised, I would not be able to recommend it for a Second Reading. Once the principles upon which we are to act are agreed, there will be no difficulty in putting a Bill of this kind right with the draftsman. So the fact that there are a number of things wrong is not the reason why I ask the House for their support in refusing this Bill a Second Reading.
If I may express a personal view, there must in due course be further human rights legislation in Northern Ireland, but we cannot expect my right honourable friend the Secretary of State to commit himself until he has had an opportunity to consider the report of the Standing Advisory Commission on Human Rights. Clearly, he must take into account the outcome of public discussion on human rights in this country, which has begun as a result of the Bill put forward by the noble Lord, Lord Wade, which was given a Second Reading this afternoon.
I believe that the discussion on my noble friend's Bill today represents a step forward, and I think he will feel that I have committed my right honourable friend the Secretary of State rather further in this direction than has happened in previous debates. I hope my noble friend will agree with me that, though there must be an intensive debate on the Bill of the noble Lord, Lord Wade, it would be a great mistake to have an additional Bill being discussed at a tangent at the same time. Therefore, I hope
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I can persuade my noble friend to change—
Viscount MASSEREENE and FERRARD: My Lords, before the noble Lord sits down, may I explain that I never said I was against a Bill of Rights. That is the last thing I said. All I said was that this is the wrong time to do it, as the noble Lord himself said, for Northern Ireland. I also think that it ought not to be done by a Private Member's Bill; it should be done by a Government Bill. But I never said that I was against a Bill of Rights and I do not know what made the noble Lord say that.
Lord DONALDSON of KINGS-BRIDGE: My Lords, I apologise most deeply for misunderstanding the noble Viscount, and I am delighted that we agree.
Lord MONSON: My Lords, will the noble Lord permit me to make a correction? I did not say that I was against a Bill of Rights. I am strongly in favour of one, provided that it applies to the whole United Kingdom, and in this respect my views coincide with those of the Government.
Lord DONALDSON of KINGS-BRIDGE: My Lords, I think the fact that I misunderstood was due to the fact that I am suffering from a heavy cold.
6.41 p.m.
Lord BROCKWAY: My Lords, I shall use my right of reply only to make a few comments. First, I had the impression from the speech of the noble Lord, Lord Belstead, who recited a whole series of measures which have been introduced dealing with human rights problems in Northern Ireland, but still more from the speeches of the noble Lord, Lord Monson, and the noble Viscount, Lord Massereene, that there was little need for a Bill of this kind, because all was well with liberties and rights in Northern Ireland. On that, I want to endorse what the speaker from our Labour Front Bench said, that none of us on this side of the House can accept that view. During the last few years, yes, there has been progress. But for nearly 50 years there was government in Northern Ireland by one community alone, which led to the repression of the minority community, and it is that history which is largely responsible for the present position.

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Secondly, as regards the suggestion that there is no consensus of opinion in Northern Ireland in favour of a Bill of Rights, I would point out that every political Party in Northern Ireland has declared for a Bill of Rights. The United Ulster Unionist Coalition, the SDLP, the Alliance, the separate Unionist Party of Northern Ireland all declared in the Convention Document for a Bill of Rights. The difference between them is not as to the necessity for a Bill of Rights but as to who should introduce it and what should be its scope. The United Ulster Unionist Coalition and the Northern Ireland Labour Party, as I indicated, take the view that it should be a Bill on the lines of that which the noble Lord, Lord Wade, has introduced applying both to Britain and Northern Ireland. The UUUC, as a secondary proposal, says that it should be a Bill introduced by a Parliament in Northern Ireland. But there is no such Parliament.
The other Parties to which I have referred support the proposal of a Bill for Northern Ireland, not necessarily the Bill I have introduced but they accept the principle of a separate Bill for Northern Ireland. In that situation, in view of the absolute unanimity of opinion of all Parties in Northern Ireland that there should be a Bill, the Government themselves should now look at the practical problem of how it can best be introduced and, even in the present political vacuum in Northern Ireland, seek discussions with representatives of the political Parties to see how this difference of opinion about who should introduce it and about method can be overcome. This is essential when they are absolutely united about the need for a Bill.
Thirdly—and this is most in my mind—there is the suggestion that a separate Bill for Northern Ireland is not necessary. We already have our precedents. We passed through this House last week a separate Bill for Northern Ireland because there was evidence of discrimination between Protestants and Catholics in employment. Of course, in this situation we have to have separate legislation for Northern Ireland. While there is a difference of opinion in Britain as to whether a Bill of Rights is necessary here, and there is absolute unanimity in Northern Ireland that a Bill is necessary, to say in that situation: "We shall not have
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special legislation for Northern Ireland", is to deny all the relevant facts.
Lord DONALDSON of KINGSBRIDGE: My Lords, will my noble friend just let me say that I do not think he attributed that remark to me from the Government Bench. It is not our view.
Lord BROCKWAY: No, my Lords. I certainly did not. I now come to my last point, which is about my attitude to this Bill and the opinions which have been expressed in this House. The first point that is in my mind is that we have already carried the Bill of the noble Lord, Lord Wade, which, in addition to applying to Britain, also applies to Northern Ireland. That Bill would have the support of the majority Ulster Unionist Coalition, and I think that is a very considerable advance. Secondly, there is the Standing Advisory Commission for Northern Ireland, of which my noble friend Lord Feather is chairman. I believe that that Commission has asked that the evidence shall be produced by April. I hope that, if the evidence is produced by April, the recommendations of that Commission will be in the hands of the Government in, say, the early autumn. We have had from our Front Bench a statement which has never been made before, and which represents a remarkable concession as a result of this debate, the statement that the Secretary of State for Northern Ireland will introduce human rights legislation, and that that legislation is being held up at this moment only to await the Report of the Standing Commission.
Lord DONALDSON of KINGSBRIDGE: My Lords, my noble friend must not commit me further than I went. This is just a tiny bit further. My right honourable friend has said that he thinks such a thing will be necessary. It is not quite the same as saying that he will do it.
Lord BROCKWAY: I will make only this remark, that in Parliamentary terms I am prepared to accept from a representative of the Government which I support that he thinks it will be necessary. I can assure him that those of us who desire this will press and press him until his thought is realised.

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I hate having to withdraw a Bill, but for those two considerations, which seem to me to represent a very considerable advance, I will ask leave of the House to withdraw the Bill.
Motion, by leave, withdrawn.
Bill, by leave, withdrawn.

GAS HEREDITAMENTS (RATEABLE VALUES) ORDER 1976
6.51 p.m.
Baroness BIRK Baroness BIRK rose to move, That the Gas Hereditaments (Rateable Values) Order 1976, laid before the House on 11th March, be approved. The noble Baroness said: My Lords, I am moving this order on behalf of my noble friend Lady Stedman, who unfortunately has been stricken down with the flu. The order before this House concerns the rating of property occupied by the British Gas Corporation. Premises occupied by the British Gas Corporation other than dwellings, shops, showrooms and offices not on operational land are at present rated by formula under Section 33 of and Schedule 6 to the General Rate Act 1967. These provide both for the calculation of the total rateable value of the industry and also for the distribution of that rateable value to rating areas. Quite a number of other public utilities are rated by formula, which is a convenient method of determining a rateable value where the ordinary methods of assessment would be difficult and cumbersome to apply. However, some of the formulae in use are old and during the past two years most of them have been reviewed. The order now before us is the result of the review of the gas industry formula.
As noble Lords will know, the whole nature of the gas industry has changed dramatically in recent years from manufacturing gas to storing and distributing natural gas. The current formula substantially undervalues the gas industry, partly because it gives undue weight to manufactured gas. After extensive consultation with the British Gas Corporation, the local authorities and the Valuation Office—the Government's professional advisers on rating and valuation matters—we have arrived at a total rateable
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value for the gas industry of £60 million for 1976–77 compared with a rateable value of £30 million in 1975–6. The Government feel that this is a fair balance between their obligations to local authorities on the one hand and to the gas industry on the other.
Our sole aim in increasing the rateable value of the gas industry (and, indeed, that of any other public utility) is to bring the rates they pay into line with those paid by other industrial ratepayers. If the rateable value of the gas industry were allowed to remain artificially low, ratepayers would effectively be subsidising gas consumers. Noble Lords will agree that the fact that these are sometimes the same people does not detract from the unfairness of this situation. The purpose of the order before us today therefore is to provide a new basis for the rating of premises occupied by the British Gas Corporation in England and Wales (other than dwellings, shops, showrooms, and offices not on operational land) with effect from 1st April 1976. The position in Scotland will be reviewed later by my right honourable friend the Secretary of State for Scotland.
The order is fairly complicated and it might help noble Lords if I briefly run through its main provisions. Article 4 (i) of the order provides a method for the calculation of the total rateable value of the gas hereditaments for 1976–77. This works out at £60 million. This figure is adjusted in accordance with the formula set out in Article 4 (ii) for 1977–78 and subsequent years to reflect the expansion or contraction of the industry. This is measured in terms of the changes in the number of therms supplied per mile of trunk main.
The adjustment formula set out in Article 4 (ii) differs from the adjustment used in the current formula in two main ways. First, the current formula distinguishes between gas manufactured and gas purchased—that is to say, North Sea gas—by the Board. This distinction is abolished in the new adjustment formula. Secondly, in the new formula 25 per cent. of the increase in output per mile of trunk main is taken instead of 20 per cent. of the increased output over a standard number of therms as in the current formula. Noble Lords should not, however, assume that this higher percentage necessarily means a higher rate liability.
These percentages are not comparable because they are not percentages of the same thing.
The method of distributing total rateable value to rating areas is set out in Article 5. Under the current formula the total is distributed to rating areas in proportion to the number of therms supplied in that area, plus nine-tenths of the number of therms manufactured or produced in that area. Natural gas terminals have separate rateable values which accrue to the rating areas in which they are located. The total rateable value of the industry is then reduced by the amount of the rateable value of these terminals and the rateable value apportioned to all rating areas is adjusted accordingly.
In the order before us today, however, the distribution has been amended to give a bigger share to those rating areas with large installations. Seventy-eight per cent. of the total rateable value is distributed to rating areas in proportion to the therms of gas consumed in those areas—and, incidentally, I am told that gas is consumed in every rating area in England and Wales. The remaining 22 per cent. is apportioned to those rating areas with large installations. These are identified in this order as trunk mains and large compressor stations. These two kinds of installations account for 93½ per cent. of the 22 per cent. Noble Lords may wonder what has happened to the remaining 6½ per cent. This is to be distributed to those rating areas having natural gas terminals or liquid natural gas storage systems. Provisions for determining the rateable value of such installations are set out in a separate order (the Natural Gas Terminals (Rateable Values) Order 1976) at present lying before the House.
This order repeals, amends and modifies provisions in Section 33 of and Schedule 6 to the General Rate Act 1967, as modified by the Gas Act 1972. My right honourable friend the Secretary of State has consulted all those who are affected. My Lords, I beg to move that this order be approved.
Moved, That the Gas Hereditaments (Rateable Values) Order 1976, laid before the House on 11th March, be approved.—(Baroness Birk.)
Lord MOWBRAY and STOURTON: My Lords, first may I say how sorry I am that the noble Baroness, Lady Stedman, is unwell. I am sure that the whole House will be grateful to the noble Baroness, Lady Birk, for stepping at short notice into her shoes, and may I thank her very much for the way in which she has introduced this order. I can assure the noble Baroness that these rateable values are not simple, but the information which she gave to the House, that in the coming financial year the rateable value will be increased from £30 million to £60 million, was most useful.
The noble Baroness will be pleased to hear that I do not intend to go into the details of Articles 4 and 5, which I am sure would stymie cleverer mathematicians than either of us. I merely thank her again for having introduced the order.
On Question, Motion agreed to.

ELECTRICITY BOARDS (RATEABLE VALUES) ORDER 1976
6.58 p.m.
Baroness BIRK Baroness BIRK rose to move, That the Electricity Boards (Rateable Values) Order 1976, laid before the House on 11th March, be approved. The noble Baroness said: My Lords, in moving the Electricity Boards (Rateable Values) Order 1976 on behalf of my noble friend Lady Stedman, may I thank the noble Lord, Lord Mowbray and Stourton, for the friendly and kind way in which he dealt with the previous order; I appreciate it very much.
The order before the House concerns all premises which are rated by formulae belonging to the thirteen Electricity Boards in England and Wales. In practice, this means all their property with the exception of shops and showrooms, together with any offices which are not situated on operational land. The thirteen Boards consist of twelve Area Boards, plus the Generating Board. The order before us today is a direct result of the general review of the formulae under which public utilities are rated. It has been drawn up after consultations with the industry, local authority associations and the Valuation Office of the Inland Revenue. The current formula is laid down in Schedule 7 to the General

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Rate Act 1967, as amended by the Electricity Boards (Rateable Values) Order 1972.
The order before the House provides that the current provisions shall continue but with three amendments. First, the aggregate value of the Electricity Boards is to be increased to £175 million with effect from 1st April this year. This compares with a rateable value of about £160 million under the existing provisions for the 1975–76 rating year. Secondly, for future years it has been decided that the value for each Board will be adjusted annually to reflect expansion or contraction in the output of the industry. Although this continues the current practice, there are one or two changes in the way the adjustments are calculated. At present such adjustments are based on 20 per cent. of the difference between current output and output in 1957. However, as this is now so long ago it seems reasonable to choose a more recent date. Therefore, the base year will now be 1974. However, output in 1974 was much greater than in 1957, and this is the main reason why the increase sounds so large—from 20 per cent. to 45 per cent.
The final change concerns the distribution of the rateable value of the Generating Board to rating areas. At present one-half of the Board's total rateable value is apportioned among the rating areas on the basis of the proportion which the total rateable value in each rating area bears to the national total. The other half is apportioned among rating areas according to the capacity of generating stations in their area. However, it has been represented that this apportionment does not reflect the value of power stations. Therefore it has been decided that 75 per cent. of the Board's value should go to generation, and 25 per cent. to distribution. The way in which these parts are allocated to rating areas will remain unaltered.
The rest of the formula together with its attendant provisions remains unchanged, except for a few minor amendments to ensure that the new rateable values for 1976–77 will be calculated and notified to all interested parties during that year. As I mentioned earlier, my right honourable friend has consulted all
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those affected. I therefore beg to move that this order be approved.
Moved, That the Electricity Boards (Rateable Values) Order 1976, laid before the House on 11th March, be approved.—(Baroness Birk.)
Lord MOWBRAY and STOURTON: My Lords, I merely wish to thank the noble Baroness. I have no questions to put.
On Question, Motion agreed to.

REDUNDANT MINEWORKERS AND CONCESSIONARY COAL (PAYMENTS SCHEMES) (AMENDMENT) ORDER 1976
7.2 p.m.
The PARLIAMENTARY UNDER-SECRETARY of STATE, DEPARTMENT of ENERGY (Lord Lovell-Davis)The PARLIAMENTARY UNDER-SECRETARY of STATE, DEPARTMENT of ENERGY (Lord Lovell-Davis) rose to move, That the draft Redundant Mineworkers and Concessionary Coal (Payments Schemes) (Extension) Order 1976, laid before the House on 17th March, be approved. The noble Lord said: My Lords, the outlook for the coal industry has changed for the better over the last year or so, but it is an extractive industry, so collieries are bound to close from time to time when reserves become exhausted or grossly uneconomic to work. When that happens the National Coal Board always do their best to find employment in another pit for the displaced men. But some men will continue to be made redundant and have to face the particular difficulties of redundant miners. Many of them live in isolated colliery villages where no alternative work is available. Many of the elderly men, after a lifetime's work in a harsh environment, may be sick or maimed, and find it that much harder to get alternative work.
The Government have therefore considered it right to extend the Redundant Mineworkers Payments Scheme for a further period. The scheme was originally established in 1968 under powers conferred by the Coal Industry Act 1967. It was extended and improved in the Redundant Mineworkers and Concessionary Coal (Payment Schemes) Order 1973, which was made under the powers of the Coal Industry Act 1973. That Act also allowed the scheme to be

845
extended by order so as to include men made redundant between 10th December 1972 and 26th March 1978. The Coal Industry (Redundancy Payment Schemes) (Extension) Order 1976, has been laid in another place for that purpose. It does not require the approval of your Lordships' House.
The order now before your Lordships is the Redundant Mineworkers and Concessionary Coal (Payment Schemes) (Amendment) Order 1976. This amends the 1972 and 1973 orders in three ways. First, it amends certain of the definitions in these two orders so as to bring them into line with the Social Security Act 1975 and the Supplementary Benefit Act 1966 which have replaced earlier legislation. Secondly, it extends the application of the 1973 order to include men made redundant up to, but excluding, the 26th March 1978. Thirdly, it substitutes a new table of benefit in Appendix 4 for men made redundant after 6th April 1976. This is necessary because a man's total benefit is made up of basic benefit, as shown in Appendix 4, plus unemployment benefit; the two together need to be equivalent to 90 per cent. of the man's previous net pay. Consequently, whenever unemployment benefit increases it is necessary to adjust the rate of basic benefit. The new table in fact takes into account the increase in unemployment benefit which took place in November 1975.
It will be seen from this that no changes have been made in the benefit a man actually receives. The generous benefits of the 1973 order will continue to be paid. I might add that the unions have asked for certain changes to be made and the Government are considering these very carefully. However, the changes will all cost money, and I have to say that it will not be easy to make any such changes at present. The order before your Lordships for which the Government are seeking approval is a necessary measure to make needed changes in the special arrangements for redundant mineworkers, which are to be extended by another order in another place. We still foresee a need for this scheme, which has worked well over the last nine years, in easing the lot of those who have been made redundant. I beg to move.
Moved, That the draft Redundant Mineworkers and Concessionary Coal
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(Payments Schemes) (Amendment) Order 1976, laid before the House on 17th March, be approved.—(Lord Lovell-Davis.)
Viscount LONG: My Lords, I am most grateful to the noble Lord, Lord Lovell-Davis, for the speedy, kind and generous way in which he has given us the information we needed on this order. I should like to say at the outset that I find it somewhat depressing that there are something like four orders tonight, three going through another place and one in your Lordships' House, all of which are finance orders, and yet having received one in this House we have not received the other three. No doubt somewhere down the corridors of rower they will link up, and I am wondering whether the noble Lord can give some idea of the reason why all these orders should be floating about in Parliament at the moment and yet we have received only one of them.
The second point I should like to make is that this is a finance order which, as your Lordships know, we may criticise, but that is as far as we may go. Yet recently in your Lordships' House we had a finance National Coal Board Bill which dealt with pensions and other matters connected with finance in the National Coal Board. I should have thought this order could well have been placed in that Bill a few weeks ago. I am somewhat unhappy that once again at this time of night we are faced with an order which, although one would not say it is wasting our time I am amazed that it should come before us when we have already dealt with finance in the National Coal Board.
Having said that, as the noble Lord has said, the order is in fact concerned with concessions to redundant mineworkers and it is designed to bring it into line with the orders of 1972 and 1973 and up to the new Social Security Act of 1975, and we have a time limit that it must be through by the 27th March. In that case, I do not wish to delay it. I believe it can only do good to review these redundancy payments. Any redundant miner must surely have had a feeling of insecurity when he lost his job and he had no money. In the near future two or three mines will probably be closed and there will be more redundancy. This

847
order can only promote good feeling between the miner and the National Coal Board and therefore from this side of the House we welcome it.
7.10 p.m.
Lord LOVELL-DAVIS: My Lords, I am grateful to the noble Viscount, Lord Long, for his support of the Government's decision to extend this order. I should also like to return his compliment and thank him for his expedition at this hour on a Thursday evening. The noble Viscount raised a very interesting point as to why this order has to be approved by both Houses, whereas the other four need be approved only by the other place. For the answer, we must go back to the origins of the Redundant Mineworkers Payments Scheme. An announcement was first made that there was to be a scheme in the middle of 1967, and powers to establish it were included in the Coal Industry Act 1967, which was enacted in December of that year. At that time, no one knew precisely what shape the scheme would take, so it was provided that it should be established by Statutory Instrument. This Instrument would clearly have to include many details related to such matters as to who was to receive payment, what the qualifications were going to be, how the payments were to be calculated, for what periods of time, and so on. For all these reasons, it was thought right that both Houses of Parliament should have the opportunity of examining the details of the Scheme before it was finalised.
In contrast, the other four orders being dealt with in another place are simply extensions in each case to an existing provision, all stemming from the Coal Industry Act 1973. The respective provisions in that Act give powers for moneys to be paid out in a particular period of time, which expires later this month. There is no question of the other orders establishing a new system or organisation, as the Scheme orders did. They simply extend to March 1978 the time in which moneys can be expended and through the wording of the 1973 Act this amount of money is automatically extended. This House assisted in the enactment of the Coal Industry Act 1973, which established the shape and character of the various schemes of payment which are thus being extended.
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Since their extension is simply a matter of adjusting the amount of money and the time in which it may be spent, I think your Lordships will agree that it was entirely appropriate that those simple orders need receive the approval of the other place only.
My Lords, turning to the second point raised by the noble Viscount, as I have said all tour orders are being made under the Coal Industry Act 1973. The Redundant Mineworkers and Concessionary Coal (Payments Schemes) (Amendment) Order 1976 now being discussed depends on the Coal Industry (Redundancy Payment Schemes) (Extension) Order 1976, which is one of the four being considered in another place. Having, I hope, explained that to the satisfaction of the noble Viscount.
On Question, Motion agreed to.

AUSTRALIAN ESTATES COMPANIES BILL
  STANDARD LIFE ASSURANCE COMPANY LIMITED BILL
  Brought from the Commons, read 1a, and referred to the Examiners.