EEC SUMMIT CONFERENCE, DECEMBER 1974

HL Deb 23 June 1976 vol 372 cc380-418

7.8 p.m.

Lord NORTHFIELD

rose to ask Her Majesty's Government what progress has been made in implementing the detailed decisions concerning institutional progress and common policies made by the Summit Conference of the European Communities in December 1974. The noble Lord said: My Lords, I beg leave to ask the Unstarred Question standing in my name. I am delighted that it falls on a day when we have as our guest in this country President Giscard d'Estaing, who, if I may say so, clearly led and inspired the Summit Conference of December 1974, and whose hand is clearly visible in the Communiqué which came out at the end of that Summit Conference. In my view, that Summit Conference was momentous and historic. That is why I chose to raise this matter this evening, and to ask my noble friend to give a report on the progress that has been made on the many decisions taken at that time.

May I make three points by way of introduction to the questions I want to ask. First of all, I would say to my noble friend that I hope he will acquit me of any charge of being a headstrong federalist expecting everything to arrive overnight. I am nothing of the sort. From my own work in Europe, and from my long period in politics, I understand that nine very proud and historic nations who have lived separate lives for so long, whose economies have diverged so greatly, whose ways of life are so different, whose traditions and constitutions differ so greatly, are not going to be rushed overnight into a new federalism. Therefore, I regard the building of Europe as a long process which will certainly last the rest of my lifetime before we see any final results—and even then they probably will not be final.

So I take a cautious, pragmatic view of the way in which Europe will evolve towards union. I very much agreed with President Giscard d'Estaing when he said this morning: A nation cannot be decreed and organised by treaty. It gradually takes shape by virtue of its deeds ". If this is true of a nation, it is very much more true of European union. It is going to be not a question of technical, mechanical paper constitutions; it is going to be a slow process of drawing together, learning to work together and reaching common objectives in company with each other. On the other hand, if it is slow and if it is pragmatic, I think it is nevertheless important for people in politics, and in a noble House like this, to put on pressure for all possible speed.

Here I would just make two points before I pass to my second major point of introduction. I am bitterly disappointed with the Tindemans Report. It was a pathetic failure, in my view, to face up to the grand strategy of European advance. I do not believe it should only have dealt with grand strategy; it had to deal with some of the detail. But what was wrong with it was that it was all detail and no strategy. This was a great historic opportunity missed, on the morrow of this great historic Summit Conference of December 1974. I shall go on in public life, as long as I can, trying to set out the alternative to Tindemans, which is, in my view, a much stronger grasp of the strategy, a stronger grasp of the institutional framework which could evolve in Europe, on the basis not just of what is in the Treaty but of the way we have evolved in running the Treaty and the Community, which is something quite different. I will not stress that today. I just remain bitterly disappointed. I was one of those who was consulted by Mr. Tindemans, and I tried my hardest over many hours of consultation with him and his advisers to get him to change. I am sorry I failed.

The other point is this. If we are putting on pressure—and I was hoping it would come through the Tindeman Report—I think we have a duty to say to the British Government that, of course, after the Referendum and after the period of entry, we do not expect Her Majesty's Government to take spectacular new initiatives in Europe. We are new boys. We have to feel our way, we have to be modest; we must not be impudent on the day we enter. But we are, or at least we ought to be, encouraged by a second thing which President Giscard d'Estaing said recently, and which I venture to quote. In an article in The Times on 19th June he said: Britain has taken stands on current issues in the Community, she has put forward no initiatives nor expressed any very structural views on the future organisation of Europe ". When asked what he meant by " structural ", he said this referred to the institutional life of the Community, how it would be organised, the operation of its executive, administrative and representative or Parliamentary spheres.

He went on to say and twice repeated it, in the same article in The Times: It would be useful to know better what the British conception of the future of Europe is". This is a point which I feel very strongly; that our time of settling in, if I may put it that way, in the European Community is now over, and it is now up to us to begin as soon as we can to take some initiatives. That is my first point, that although I believe we should be pragmatic and slow and patient, we nevertheless must move on to the offensive soon in our proposals.

My second point of introduction is this. I think we have really got to look at the Communiqué of December 1974 against the background of our diagnosis of the Treaty of Rome and the system that has grown up under it. Here I must say I am reminded of a story—perhaps it is apocryphal, as many of these stories are—about Sir Winston Churchill, one of those stories which we all hear and probably never believe. I think this story will strike a chord with my noble friend, because it refers to someone whom he and I will remember very well, Sir Alfred Bossom, a very genial Member of Parliament for many years, a great friend of many of us. Sir Winston passed him in the corridor one day, and said to his advisers, " Who is that man?" The advisers said, " Sir Alfred Bossom, Sir ", and Sir Winston is reputed to have said, " Bossom? Bossom? That's very strange—neither one thing nor the other ". In many ways the Treaty of Rome is like that. The European Community is neither one thing nor the other. It is not a treaty of federation. It is a hybrid international treaty. It contains federal elements, it contains supranational elements.

Let me take them one by one; there are federal elements where we have actually got law which we apply federally at the centre. We have the rules of competition, for example, federal elements exercised and run by the Commission. It has supranational elements in it, that we have in common certain policies, like energy or agricultural policy, or freedom of movement. We agree to have common policies. The third element in the treaties, or what has grown up round the treaties, which is a purely inter-governmental element. That is to say, there is no constraint, no federalism; it is Governments co-operating together. The most notable part of that is foreign policy, which is not even in the Treaty, but which we have added into the treaty system. On that there is no federal power; it is merely Governments agreeing to act together when they can.

What is really happening in the Treaty of Rome and in the European Community now is that we are seeing a period of upgrading of these elements towards a para-federalism over the years. More and more we act in common. More and more we agree rules in common. More and more these issues will move to something like federalism at the turn of the century or beyond. We have to look at every summit conference and every great advance in European structure against a background of diagnosis of that kind. Is it upgrading the institutions. Is it pushing common policies forward so that we see the final goal, at the end of the century perhaps, or later, beginning to emerge. So we have to look at what the summit of 1974 decided about the institutions, the powers of Parliament, in the light of that continuous upgrading of common activity to more intense forms of joint work towards union of Europe.

That was my second point, and I come to my third, before I finally put my questions. The third point is the importance of the 1974 Summit. Summits come and go. Some are hopeless, some make no progress, some make spectacular progress. This was one of the great ones, rather like 1972. Europe will proceed like this for many more years. Sometimes it will pause, sometimes it will accelerate, sometimes it will not do one thing or the other. This Summit was a spectacular one. But is was, interestingly enough, one mainly devoted to institutional progress.

I quote for the third and last time from President Giscard d'Estaing, from a Press conference of his some years ago. I forget whether it was just after or just before this Summit Conference. He said that when one raises the subject of institutions people immediately say, " What do institutions matter ? Tell us about the substance, about the policy ". When one talks about the substance, the policy, people then turn to you and say, " You are getting bogged down in detail. What about institutions ? " He is quite right. In other words, you have to take both together, or both when they are possible.

Sometimes in Europe at particular periods we will make progress in institutional matters. At other periods we will make progress in policy matters, in common policies. We must catch the tide, whenever it comes, in either of those directions, and both will reinforce the advance towards the final construction of European union. This was what this Summit was about. It was a period at that time when the opportunity was suddenly seen for institutional advance, while the chance of policy advance was receding for a little while. I shall come to that in a moment.

I must not be too long, so I come now to my specific questions with those three points as background: the three points being the need for steady progress; the need to look for steady upgrading of the institutions; and the need to grab the possibilities of progress whenever they appear. When one looks at the communiqué after the 1974 Summit Conference—and I am a " Summiteer "; I believe in the immense impetus that Summits give—the proposals and the decisions fall into three groups. Paragraphs 1 to 4 of the communiqué really deal with political cooperation and foreign policy. It is agreed that Summits shall henceforth be three times a year. A very good thing indeed, and this is now taking place. We accept that, and think this will keep up the momentum, or help to keep it up.

What happened to the second one? It was agreed that there should be a secretariat for the Summit, a very important mechanism which will create a body of international civil servants who presumably will have a vested interest in keeping momentum going. I regard that as of some considerable importance. Foreign Ministers were to meet not outside the Council of the European Communities, which they had been doing before to co-ordinate foreign policy, but now, building on the earlier Davignon procedure, foreign policy, by this communiqué, is brought right into the European Community system; a landmark, if ever there was one, that the European Community system was expanded in this way. The political co-operation—" initiating and coordinating " were the words used in the communiqué—was to be done in the Council and not outside. I ask my noble friend: is that taking place? Is it working that way ? Is he satisfied that it is making progress?

Furthermore, in those paragraphs it is said that the President in office would begin to act increasingly as spokesman for the Nine; and, paraphrasing again, the countries would gradually adopt common positions and co-ordinate diplomatic action in all areas of interest in affairs which affect the interests of the European Community. How far has that gone? How much success can my noble friend register in the common foreign policy field? I think of failures like Angola, where we did not act as Nine, or failures in the Lebanon, where we certainly seem not to have acted as Nine; Cyprus too, perhaps. What about the recognition of the Palestine Liberation Organisation in the United Nations? Did we act as Nine then ? I doubt it very much. I know that my noble friend will have other examples of where we did manage to agree and did co-operate, but it seems to me that there are some spectacular failures in that field. I should like to hear my noble friend's reflections on them. Of course, the last part of paragraphs 1 to 4 of the communiqué dealt with the possibility of the European Parliament's putting questions about foreign policy. Another great advance. This has taken place, and I am satisfied that that is under way.

I come now to the second group of decisions in the Summit communiqué, paragraphs 5 to 12. Again this was mainly institutional advance. Referring back to my introduction, the whole problem of upgrading, and the way we work together in searching for common policies. Paragraph 5, new common policies in areas to be decided on. I have not seen any. I should like to know from my noble friend whether there has been any outcome from paragraph 5, which seemed to herald some new departures in common policies in Europe. Paragraph 6, majority voting in the Council. I know that there has been an eight to one vote on the wine lake, and they have occasionally voted on things like calf subsidies, or whatever. I asked my noble friend a question in the House the other day and he was good enough to reply. But are we really making any start on voting in the Council ? One suspects that it is not as good as it should be, and that small beginnings are not leading fast enough to a general system of voting on perhaps relatively minor issues as a means of creating mutual confidence and moving on to bigger ones.

Paragraph 7, COREPER, the permanent representatives, to be given greater latitude and brought into foreign policy coordination. Has that happened ? Is COREPER working in this way ? Is foreign policy really being co-ordinated in this active way at the level of permanent representatives of the Community ? Paragraph 8: Greater use of the Commission to implement and manage the exercise of rules made by the Council. President Ortoli told one of the European Parliament Committees the other day that he had not seen any signs of that one. So I should like to know whether any of that has been projected, and if not, why not ? What new areas outside the Treaty—this is paragraph 9—have been selected for more co-operation ? What is happening about the proposed European passport in paragraph 10? Paragraph 12, we know about. That was the proposal for direct elections. But the end of paragraph 12 says that the European Parliament is to be given powers in legislation. I have not seen any. When are they coming? What is actually going to be proposed? This cannot wait much longer, because the Parliament will soon be elected and will want to know a greater reality of power.

I come finally to the last group of proposals and decisions in the communiqué, and these were economic and associated policies; the whole question of greater policy co-ordination in those kinds of field. Paragraph 19 talked about permanent consultative machinery of economic Ministers. I know this exists, but how often do they meet ? How successful is it proving in co-ordinating economic policy ? There was talk of guidelines on the emergence from the recession, and a plan to get convergence of the economies of the Nine. Has there been any of that? Is there any approaching agreement on the reform of the international monetary system coming out of the Nine ? That is one thing on which we surely must be taking a lead pretty soon.

Then of course you get the remaining paragraphs. Regional policy we know has begun at a miserable level, if I may say so. A small beginning. Paragraph 25; co-ordinating employment policies. I know something has happened on this. Paragraph 26, " When the time is ripe " an increase in the Social Fund. When is the time going to be ripe? This is very important indeed if we are to get convergence of economic growth in our Community. The Social Fund and the Regional Fund must be much bigger than they are. Paragraph 28 talked of greater harmonisation of the degree of social security in each of the Nine and set that on foot, but I have not seen any results of that one, either. Lastly, the heads of Government were asking the institutions, in paragraph 33, to work out and to implement a common energy policy in the shortest possible time. Dear me! that is 18 months ago. I have not seen a great deal of progress on that one.

I apologise that inevitably towards the end of my remarks it has become a catalogue of questions, but they are so important. They illustrate again how historic, how momentous, if I may say so, this Summit Conference was. It was one of those occasional breakthroughs which chart the progress of constructing Europe. I hope that my noble friend will forgive me if I am slightly impatient, if I am nudging his elbow, if I am saying that against the background of my way of looking at the Community, the time is right for Britain to say, now that the Summit Conference is behind us, now that our place in Europe is assured, with the growing confidence of our European role, that every one of those parts of the communiqué matter desparately and that we will help in whatever way we can, modest though our help may be—we are not the boss of Europe; we can only contribute in a modest way to the European construction—and that Her Majesty's Government will now say clearly that we will aim to get every one of those paragraphs implemented so that the European construction can proceed apace.

7.31 p.m.

The Earl of BESSBOROUGH

My Lords, we should be grateful to the noble Lord, Lord Northfield, for asking this Question. Despite the warmth of the evening, it is a little cooler here than it is in Brussels or Strasbourg and, despite the lateness of the hour, we should be grateful to him for having raised a number of interesting points which cover a very wide field. It is difficult for us to do justice to them in the form of an Unstarred Question or indeed in any other single debate. However, it is useful to take stock from time to time of progress, or the lack of it, within the Community, and our debate is perhaps not quite the ragbag of items that was presented in another place last Thursday. Our debate is however bound to be a kind of omnibus discussion which could I think more usefully be broken down into at least half a dozen debates.

As my honourable friend said in another place last Thursday, nearly every national issue now has a European dimension. There are 37 paragraphs in the 1974 Communiqué as published in the European Community's Bulletin. It varies a little from the Stationery Office version in which the paragraphs are not numbered; I have been working hard on the same paragraphs as the noble Lord, but I do not know whether the noble Lord, Lord GoronwyRoberts has the same numbering. However, we can go ahead and not worry too much about the numbering of the paragraphs. The Communiqué deals with almost every aspect of Community affairs and I will therefore concentrate my remarks on certain specific areas, particularly on political co-operation, a little on the economic situation and Community policy on research and development and hope that my noble friends, Lady Elles and Lord O'Hagan, will cover other important aspects of Community policies.

Paragraph 3 of the Communiqué deals with the meetings of the European Council, a body which, as the noble Lord pointed out, is outside the Community institutions. There were three of these in 1975 and we should ask ourselves to what extent those meetings have resulted in progress in political co-operation. The meetings have been characterised by the fact that they deal with a wide variety of matters of greatly varying importance, as the noble Lord will recognise. At Dublin in March 1975, the discussion ranged from New Zealand butter to the world economic situation. Other meetings have dealt with the questions of Cyprus, the United Nations and Rhodesia, but the resulting resolutions did, I fear, little more than express either pious hopes or general desiderata in regard to co-ordinated action, or merely reaffirmed previous statements.

In my view, the European Council, this body outside the Community institutions, has singularly failed to carry out the objectives set by the 1974 Summit, and I have sometimes felt that using the European Council in this way has perhaps been a method of avoiding decision-making in the Community rather than helping it to take decisions. For example, at Brussels in July 1975 all important matters concerning the economic and monetary situation were merely passed back to the Council of Finance Ministers within the Community. Then, at Rome in December 1975 the Council was unable to reach any decision on the convergence of economic policies. At Luxembourg in April 1976 no decision was taken on the economic and social situation, on direct elections or on the Tindemans Report, about which, incidentally, I was not quite so disappoin- ted as Lord Northfield. It is true that there have been a few successes. The greatest of them of course was the renegotiation of the British entry terms, which was finally agreed in March 1975. At the same meeting there were useful preparations for the North-South Conference. Then, in December last, the Council made a thorough study of the control of Community expenditure and budget policy. It was also agreed in principle that direct elections should take place in 1978.

As Lord Northfield said, paragraph 4 of the Communiqué refers to diplomatic action to be co-ordinated. It refers, as he said, to the duty of the President of the Council of Ministers to express the views of the Nine, especially before the European Parliament. Unfortunately, very little of this part of the Paris Communiqué has been honoured. It is true that common positions were adopted over the Conference on Security and Co-operation, the Euro-Arab dialogue, on Portugal and on Rhodesia; but in regard to Cyprus, the Arab-Israeli dispute, the Lebanon, Angola, the Nairobi UNCTAD Conference and the co-ordination of the activities of the United Nations, the Nine have failed repeatedly either to take any action or, if a joint position has been reached, to adhere to it. The worst examples were of course Angola, when one Member State announced its policy before the others, and, perhaps the next worst, was the failure to adopt a common view on the recognition of the Palestine Liberation Organisation.

I was particularly interested to look back at paragraph 7 of the Communiqué, on page 4 of the Printed Paper, regarding the importance of the Committee of Permanent Representatives, COREPER as we call it, and its Working Parties that play such an important role in preparing for Council decisions. I agreed very much with the Communiqué when it stated that only the most important political problems needed to be discussed in the Council of Ministers, and I should like to know whether Lord Goronwy-Roberts can give examples of COREPE playing a stronger role. In one industrial sector with which I have of late been very closely concerned—that is, the Commission's proposals on aerospace, or, as the Community describes it, the aeronautical sector—I was disturbed to find less than a month ago that no COREPER Working Party even existed to consider this highly important document. I was gratified to learn later, after I had complained about this in the relevant Parliamentary committee, that a Working Party had now been set up and that it was awaiting with interest the views of the European Parliament, which will be discussing these proposals at the plenary session next month, having already debated them at considerable length in three of the Parliament's committees this year. I should like to know whether the Minister is happy about the functioning of COREPER and whether he considers that its role has been strengthened.

Paragraph 8 of the Communiqué also on page 4 of the Printed Paper, referred to the Treaty provisions to be used to confer on the Commission powers of management and implementation. I can confirm what Lord Northfield said; namely, that the President of the Commission, Mr. Ortoli, has told the Committee of the Parliament that the Commission has not been given such powers. I would add that I was interested to hear the President of the Council, Mr. Gaston Thorn, answer a question during our last plenary session in Strasbourg. He replied to the effect that he considered the Commission to be no more than a general secretariat to the Council of Ministers. This took the breath away from some of us. It was a very positive reply by a man who always speaks his mind in a positive manner.

Paragraph 9 of the Communiqué speaks of co-operation in areas outside the scope of the Treaties. Like the noble Lord, I should be interested to know whether the Government can give us some idea of the scope of work in these areas which, budgetarily speaking, can presumably come within the scope of non-compulsory expenditure over which the European Parliament has the final say. I know that there has been some agreement in this field on ways of dealing with political terrorism, and of course I should like to stress particularly to the noble Lord, Lord Northfield, that a coherent research and development policy which is outside the scope of the Treaties has been developed. It has been developed especially in the field of alternative energy sources. It is a pretty substantial programme, amounting to 90 million units of account in the first place and when we get to the fusion programme these sums will be vastly greater. The Community has an energy research policy which has been developed even if the Community has not been able to agree on oil prices and other significant aspects of energy policy. I welcome at least this not insignificant advance, even if the expenditure is only a very small percentage of the total national R and D expenditure of Member States.

As I say, I cannot in a speech short enough to fit into an Unstarred Question debate go through anything like the principal areas covered by the Communiqué. However, I hope that my noble friends will cover some of the other important sectors which have been widely and constantly under discussion since the Communiqué was issued over a year and a half ago. I hope that something more will be said about regional and social policy and even agricultural policy, the question of direct elections and the proposed passport union. In coming to the end of my remarks, I should, however, like to refer to the paragraph at the bottom of page 4 of the Stationary Office version of this Communiqué and to say that no action has been taken on the legislative powers of the Parliament; although it is true, as I know from being a member of the Parliament's Budgets Committee, that the budgetary powers of the Parliament have been increasing significantly in the past few years, even if they still represent only a relatively small percentage of the Community's total budget.

On economic and social policy, I am glad to see that, in most Member States, unemployment has been tending to diminish in recent months, even if it does not appear to be doing so in this country. I hope my noble friend Lady Elles will say more about this and that she will agree that, in the social field, the good intentions of the 1974 Summit have not been completely without effect. But I regret to note that, in terms of economic growth and units of production per man, Britain is notably behind France and Germany. To compare our deficits and the extent of our borrowing provides an appalling picture of this country. Unless we can really match up to the hard work and productivity of our principal partners, our prospects seem pretty glum. The United States Treasury warnings published today should not go unheeded.

Certainly, in various sectors, some perceptible progress has been made. It is, however, in political co-operation and progress towards political union that results have not been conspicuous. As one shrewd observer said recently, " Europe still has no global strategy, and the Community, which offers such a tremendous potential, has barely been used so far for the great strategic tasks which individual Member States are no longer able to carry out separately ". If it is to exercise effective influence in the world, the Community must learn to speak with one voice, not only on relatively non-controversial issues but on the whole range of international political problems. I agree with the noble Lord, Lord Northfield, that this will be a long process, but, as the President of the French Republic said in the Royal Gallery this morning: In the political realm in which the destinies of peoples arc shaped, Europe is absent or, what may he worse, silent ".

7.47 p.m.

Lord BANKS

My Lords, for those of us who believe that the whole future of our country is bound up with the establishment of an effective European union, it is difficult to conceive a more important subject than that raised in the Question before us tonight. I, too, am grateful to the noble Lord, Lord Northfield, for having once again directed the attention of the House to these matters. I listened with great interest to the speech of the noble Earl, Lord Bessborough, who brought his great experience of Community affairs to bear on the subject.

Behind the Question on the Order Paper lie deeper questions. Do we want a genuine European union with a European level of Government, democratically controlled, but supranational, or is national sovereignty to reign supreme and the European Economic Community to be regarded as nothing more than a customs union and a loose alliance of nations—an adjunct to their normal diplomatic activity and something extra-national rather than supranational ? It is in the light of those questions that we have to consider the progress which has been achieved with regard to the decisions of the Summit Conference in December 1974. As we have already heard, that Conference set up the regular meetings of the European Council.

I do not share to the same degree the satisfaction of the noble Lord, Lord Northfield, with that body. Doubts were expressed at the time. Mr. Ortoli, the President of the Commission, said in a address to the European Parliament on 18th February 1975, Let us not close our eyes to the danger that force of circumstances, lack of courage, confusion as to who is responsible for what, expediency, may tempt us to choose the low road of intergovernmental co-operation when we should he taking the high road of integration ". Is that not exactly what has happened ? Is the European Council anything more than an attempt to express the Gaullist idea of l Europe des Patries?

Lord NORTHFIELD

My Lords, I wonder whether that is not really a false antithesis. Have we not to learn first by inter-Governmental co-operation to work together and then, as I suggested, gradually upgrade that to supranationalism and perhaps later to federalism ? I suggest that it is a false antithesis to say that we can choose the other option right away in many spheres.

Lord BANKS

My Lords, I would not myself regard it as being a false antithesis, because it seems to me that in accepting the Treaty of Rome and its implications, we were accepting the principle of a supranational institution, a supranational authority. I think that this is implicit in the Treaty. Therefore I think we have committed ourselves to that principle and the danger is that by working through bodies that are outside the institutions which have been created under the Treaty, we may slide back from the degree of supranationality, limited though it is, which we already have.

I can see the point of having the leaders of Europe being the people who are responsible for controlling the activity of the Community. Yet at the same time, I very much doubt whether we are going to have Europe run by national leaders in their spare time, which it seems to me is what is happening at the moment, and we shall have to come to the time when there are Ministers who are spending their full time on this job. Until we get that situation, and until their jobs are regarded as even more important than the jobs of national Ministers, we shall not find the Community run as effectively and as efficiently as we all want to see. When we come to consider whether the European Council has produced the results, when we apply the famous pragmatic test—which is supposed to be the test which we British are so fond of—we find, for example, that John Palmer, writing in the Guardian, on the 12th of this month could say: The last summit conference of Common Market Heads of Government in Luxembourg last March proved so fruitless that it led one foreign Minister to remark, The more we meet, the less we agree. How long can the Community stand the strain ? ' ". There is the passing backwards between the Council of Ministers and the European Council, as the noble Earl, Lord Bessborough, pointed out, which tends to hold matters up, rather than expedite them. That is one of the problems that we have to face at present.

Mr. Tindemans wanted to bring the European Council within the institutions, and quite clearly this is the object of that part of his report. I should like to know what the Government feel about that. Do they accept that? In particular, do they accept the statement by Mr. Tindemans that the European Council should, act in accordance with the forms and procedures prescribed by the Treaties "? This would seem, among other things, to involve a move towards qualified majority voting; certainly Mr. Tindemans recommends this for the Council of Ministers. The Summit Conference in December 1974 had this to say about majority voting: In order to improve the functioning of the Council of the Community, they consider that it is necessary to renounce the practice which consists of making agreements on all questions conditional on the unanimous consent of the Member States ". I wonder what progress is being made among the Nine? The noble Lord, Lord Northfield, also asked this. What plans are being worked out among the Nine to move towards majority voting where it is prescribed in the Treaties?

The Eighth Report of the Commission on the Activities of the European Communities in 1974 pointed out that the deadlock in the Community decision-making system was due to the fact that the principle of unanimity, even when not explicitly invoked, overshadowed the entire range of Community activity down to the smallest detail. As we have already been reminded, the Summit Meeting in December 1974 called for direct elections to the European Parliament as soon as possible, and we know about the problems which have arisen in connection with that in recent months. I wish to ask the noble Lord who is to reply whether he can give any opinion as to whether it is now likely that at the Summit Meeting in July we shall see a convention agreed for direct elections, and whether the British Government, fortified by the report of the Select Committee, feel that they can now go forward with constructive proposals of their own in this particular field ?

The Summit Conference in December 1974 spoke of the competence of the European Assembly being extended, in particular by granting it certain powers in the Community's legislative process. I am wondering whether any progress at all has been made on that. Mr. Tindemans also spoke in his report of a growing exercise of the legislative function on the part of the Parliament. Have the Government any proposals themselves to put forward as to how that might he brought about? If we are to move towards a supranational, integrated Community, then it seems to me that it is essential that we should have a move towards qualified majority voting in the European Council and in the Council of Ministers, direct elections to the European Parliament, and increasing power for the European Parliament. All these things seem to me to be essential.

Equally important is a clear interpretation of the concept of European union. The Summit of December 1974 concluded that the time had come to agree as soon as possible on an overall concept of European union. That was why a report was commissioned for Parliament, and why there were the reports involving the court of justice and the Commission, and, indeed, Mr. Tindemans' report as well. What is the Government's reaction overall to the Tindemans' report, about which the noble Lord, Lord Northfield, was not very enthusiastic, but which nevertheless contains a considerable number of proposals which, if put into effect, would take us considerably forward along the lines I have suggested in my earlier remarks? Do we accept, for example, that we should present a united front to the outside world on all occasions? Do we accept Mr. Tindemans' idea that we should have one person, or one country, to speak on behalf of Europe, on particular matters at particular times, to the United States of America?

If that is accepted by the Government, then how do they reconcile it with the separate representation of West Germany, Italy, France and the United Kingdom at the Puerto Rico Summit with the United States, Canada and Japan? Do the Government think that the resentment that that caused is settled by having the EEC as an additional member, or should there not be just one EEC representative and delegation at such a conference? Reference was made earlier this evening to occasions when the line had been divided, and last night in this House we were considering the UNCTAD Conference and, unfortunately, the line again divided there.

Do the Government accept Mr. Tindemans' dictum that the Member countries of the EEC have an obligation to reach agreement on all matters affecting their attitude to the outside world?—not just that they should try to reach agreement and then go their own way if they cannot, but that they should feel that they have an obligation to reach an agreement. Finally, the President of the Commission in the covering letter which he sent to the Council of Ministers with the report on union of the Commission said this: The Member States, tempted by purely national solutions, have faced international discussion divided. The Community institutions have been too weak, and the means at their disposal too meagre, to counteract this tendency. Do the Government agree that that is an accurate description of the situation? If they do agree, do they agree that it is a serious situation, and what plans have they to put the matter right?

8 p.m.

Lord O'HAGAN

My Lords, I have enjoyed this debate so far, and I have enjoyed it because it has reminded me of debates in the European Parliament. Apart from the fact that it has been of high quality of itself, we have been talking about the European Commission, which is accountable to that Parliament, and we have been talking about the European Council, which should be accountable to that Parliament. But I want to talk about the British Government, who are accountable to this Parliament. In doing so, I do not want to look backward and complain; I want to look forward with anticipation. So in commenting on some of the failures of the past, I am trying to use those failures as a way of pointing towards what should be, and could be, the successes of the future. I have certain fixed points in my mind. We are going to have a new Federal Chancellor in Germany, a new President of the United States and a new President of the Commission in Brussels, and we are going to have the British in charge of the Council of Ministers at the beginning of next year. So when criticising quite severely the Government of the noble Lord, Lord Goronwy-Roberts, for some of what has happened since the Summit Meeting to which this debate is tied, I am not attempting to " knock " him—I am far too fond of him for that—or the Government for their own sake, but I am trying to focus our minds on the future, where we should avoid the mistakes that we have seen in the past.

I must confess to your Lordships that I spent five years of my adolescence wishing to be ordained as a priest, and if I were preaching tonight (which I am not going to do) I would choose as my text some words of the noble Lord, Lord Goronwy-Roberts, in our debate on the 20th January, when he said, at col. 454: Whenever this country asserts its proper national interests in its obvious national context somehow everybody falls on it and criticises it for doing what so far as I can see the rest of the Nine are assiduously doing all the time, and nobody says a thing ". The noble Lord may have felt that and he may have been justified, but the spirit of what he said, if it represents the spirit of the Government in Community matters, is not a complaint about them; it is an epitaph on the futility of our own efforts inside the Community. Let me explain. I am overstating it to make it clear without going on for 48 minutes, as some speakers have done recently. If the French can get away with something which is in their own national interest and seem to be comniunautaire, we should be able to do the same; and if we cannot, it is a failure of our diplomacy. If we are criticised for being selfish and we cannot " get away with it " occasionally, it is sometimes our failure and not their nit-picking Anglophobia.

My Lords, how are we going to change that? I am afraid I must explain my views as to what has gone wrong in order to point to what could go right. There are three failures. There is a failure of political will in the Cabinet. That explains itself. There can be no cohesion on many Community matters. There is a failure of co-ordination inside the Government, between the Cabinet Office and the Foreign and Commonwealth Office, I suspect but do not know. But I more than suspect that there is a failure to prepare our position in the Council of Ministers and in Brussels in time, by lobbying and by preparing the ground, as a result of the political deadlock which sometimes happens in the Cabinet, so that there is not time to do it. Above all, because of these two, there is a failure of vision. I used the metaphor of preaching. The Community is a matter for belief, faith and trust; and if we do not at least doff our hats to the sacred text that so many of the others in the Community believe in, we cannot expect them to excuse our forays into nationalism. It is the lack of vision that makes it more difficult for us to be excused. If the new Foreign Secretary can give what President Giscard d'Estaing was asking for, which is an appearance, and something of a reality, of an overall gaol towards which the Community is moving, and towards which Britain inside the Community is giving a shove, then, and then only, will it be easier and more acceptable for us to impose, if and when we want to and need to, our own particular national interest without being continuously criticised for it.

My Lords, so far as the debate this evening is concerned, I suspect that there are items in which we in Britain have a very special expertise, where we have special interests and where we could make a special contribution. In the field of agricultural reform we have a great deal to offer as long as we do not keep moaning on and on about deficiency payments and things which are part of our imperial past. We have an enormous experience of managing a highly efficient agricultural industry. The time is right for a structural reform. It would be appropriate for us to lead the way, when the Germans are able to think again seriously about Community matters, in suggesting practical mechanisms for dealing with the 3 million or 4 million surplus cows that there are in the Community and which give us so much trouble at times. We could do something which was in our own interests and lead the Community at the same time, because, apart from Ireland, we grow the best grass in the whole of the Community.

Then, again, in the field of employment policy, there is a tripartite conference of the two sides of industry and the social affairs Ministers tomorrow. If the noble Lord has anything to say about that, I am sure we should like to hear it. We have a highly-developed system for discussing things among unions, management and Government—so developed that it has almost taken over the role of Parliament. It may be that that is a field where we can help the Community, in bringing the unions into the construction of Europe, as Mr. Gormley and Mr. Basnett have already started to do in such a constructive way. That, again, is something special and British that we could add constructively, and not seem to be dragging our feet. Then, if we can avoid having the donkey's tail pinned on us about the European Parliament, that would be marvellous as well. I hope the noble Lord will be able to say something about the Government's attitude, if possible, to the report which has come from the Select Committee in another place today, though naturally one would not expect a great deal in detail.

My Lords, I have not tried to be rude for the sake of rudeness. I have tried to use this debate, instead of as an academic seminar, as a way of looking to see how the future could be changed to Britain's benefit and to the Community's benefit. We are going to have a special chance. The President of the Commission may have the opportunity of having some colleagues who agree on certain matters, and may have people who are able to work together for a change. He may be able to evolve certain policies that they all want to achieve inside the Commission—something which has never been heard of before. He may even be able to reorganise the Commission inside, so that the Directors-General occasionally speak to each other. One Director-General may dare to discuss, and he allowed to discuss by the Cabinet, before it gets to Cabinet level, the overall implications of any particular sectional policy. This is something which I dare to mention, although it is not really relevant to the debate because the noble Lord, Lord Harris of Greenwich, is sitting opposite. But there is an opportunity to regain some of the credit we have lost through squandering the capital of the success of our referendum. We have had the success of that; we have disappointed people. Now is the chance to show that we meant this referendum and that those people, the politicians who asked for the referendum, will go and carry on what the majority of the people have asked them to do and that Mr. Wilson's words about playing a meaningful role in the Community are going to come true.

My Lords, it is always difficult, if one is talking about something about which one feels extremely intensely, to be dispassionate, especially when one has made another speech earlier in the afternoon. I apologise for any excess of enthusiasm in the way I have expressed myself, but I would hope that when he comes to answer the noble Lord will speak not only from his brief but from his heart. We know where his heart is in this matter, and that he will be able to say that, however we may differ about the past, there is a real chance that inside the Government there is real thought and serious thought going on now about what we in Britain can contribute at the beginning of next year inside the Community.

8.11 p.m.

Baroness ELLES

My Lords, the noble Lord, Lord Northfield, has done the House once more a service in drawing attention in this particular case to what is undoubtedly to my mind one of the most important foreign policy and domestic policy documents of recent times to which the United Kingdom contributed and by which developments in the United Kingdom must be influenced. I know that the Minister will be aware that there are two issues which always arise when the noble Lord, Lord Northfiled, puts down these Unstarred Questions on Europe. The first is that, arising from the one Question, the Minister is almost bombarded with a series of further questions to which, of course, we hope that answers will be given but, nevertheless, do not always expect them to be given. But I think he will also be aware that each time the noble Lord has put down such a Question, every Member of this House, from whichever side of the House, has spoken with the deepest concern for the future of our country, with the deepest concern for the future of our country in Europe and even more so with very deep concern as to the views of the Government on the future of Europe in the world ; and, furthermore, in order that the Government should have a chance to be able to state their views so that the people of this country should know what those views are and how the Government see our future bound in with Europe.

My noble friends Lord Bessborough and Lord O'Hagan have touched on many important issues, as has the noble Lord, Lord Banks; so that I shall try not to overlap any more than is necessary the points to which they have already referred. But there are very considerable and important issues connected with the progress of the institutions and on the convergence of policies so that it is almost impossible at some stage not to cover some of the points that have already been referred to. I understand that so far as the issues of direct elections and the Tindemans' Report are concerned, we might have an opportunity to discuss these in greater detail when we have the chance of debating the White Paper on the developments in the Community over the last six months. If I do not touch on these two aspects noble Lords will understand that it is not because I underrate their importance in the policies of the development of Europe but because we shall have this opportunity later.

My Lords, the Communiqué provides practical guidelines, as I see it, for all future co-operation both within and outside the terms of the Treaty of Rome, and I must say that I consider that it was a traumatic episode for the Community as a whole that this spirit of co-operation which should have and could have contributed to progress both in the development of the institutions of the Community and its policies was completely halted by the United Kingdom and by the Referendum. Noble Lords will understand that I do not want to rake over old history. This is not the purpose of the discussion and I do not think it will be helpful, but I think that it should be said that if ever institutions were put to the test, as a test of the quality of the individuals concerned, it was in the period leading to the Referendum.

It is my personal opinion that the Commission and the other institutions of Europe—the Council of Ministers and the European Parliament—composed of members of the Nine Member-States all of whom are directly concerned, some even with their own jobs, never received the recognition that they deserved for their patience, tolerance, understanding and, above all, their evident deep desire that Britain should remain in the European Community. I would refer to paragraph 35 of the Communiqué which is directly relevant here. It is referring to Britain's membership of the Community and it is stated: that if unacceptable situations were to arise, the very life of the Community would make it imperative for the institutions to find equitable solutions '. I think that we may all be grateful to the institutions that equitable solutions were found to the satisfaction of the United Kingdom Government, its people and the other peoples of Europe. After the Referendum, as we all know, 67 per cent. of the electors decided that it was in Britain's interest to stay in Europe. We have all looked for British initiative and co-operation in developing the institutions and in the formulation of policies. We looked first, as my noble friend Lord Bessborough has already said, to the role of the European Council and Britain's own role in that body. It was set up, as is said in paragraph 2 of the Communiqué, because the Heads of Government recognised: .…the need for an overall approach to the internal problems involved in achieving European unity and the external problems facing Europe …". I will not go into detail which has already been covered by other speakers, but I think that it would be interesting to know how far the European Council has had an overall approach on major issues and what role the Government see the European Council should play.

It has been said in another place by my honourable friend Sir Peter Kirk that the European Council has acted not as the spur that was intended but as a brake, because it was dealing with so many varied subjects and asked to make decisions not because decisions were needed at that level but because, and only because, bodies at lower levels had failed to make the necessary decisions. I would ask the Government how they view the role of the European Council, whether it is to discuss major policy for the future or everything from butter to world problems.

Yet, not only for Europe as a whole but also for Britain as one of the Western industralised countries, economic issues are even more important, not only in domestic but also in foreign policy. The economic independence is gradually developing the whole time, but what joint actions are being initiated? What joint commercial ventures do the Government encourage? Are the massive sums we are receiving from the European Community to assist in our own economic restructuring being considered on an overall basis or just on a piecemeal basis by different Departments without sufficient consultation between Government and local bodies? We only have to think of all the numerous European foundations—the European Social Fund, the European Investment Bank, ECSC, CAP, to mention only some of them—to see that last year we had a plus of £57 million from all these sources. Are we using them in a spirit of co-operation with Europe? Are we trying to improve our economic growth in order to catch up with other countries from whom we are getting ever further away?

Then we turn to paragraph 19 which refers to the economic convergence. It will only be meaningful if it works towards Community solidarity and is based on effective consultation machinery. Does that consultation machinery exist ? Is it in action ? Is it functioning well ? Might we know more about it? I accept that the Minister may not be able to answer the question specifically now. At some stage I think we should have the right to know what the Government are doing on this particular action, whether we are in fact co-operating in the economic field. It is the economic structure of the Community on which all our co-operation is based.

There is another area in which co-operation has been evident. I say this with the greatest of pleasure because all share the deep concern of the Western industrialised countries for less developed countries. It is not specifically mentioned in the Communiqué. We should recognise that one of the great achievements of the Community was the Lomé Convention. If ever there was a spirit of co-operation, recognising a need for vast numbers of the world's population, it was shown by the conclusion and adoption of that Convention.

The development of political co-operation, however desirable, will not be achieved without proper co-ordination of diplomatic action envisaged in paragraph 4, which says: With a view to progress towards European unity, the Heads of Government reaffirm their determination gradually to adopt common positions and co-ordinate their diplomatic action in all areas of international affairs which affect the interests of the European Community. Where is that diplomatic action which is meant to be so desirable and which should have an even more desirable end? A look at the voting on resolutions at United Nations does not lead one to believe that co-ordination is 100 per cent. effective, or indeed sometimes existent at all. It should be said in fairness that President Rumor, at the United Nations special session last year, made an excellent speech, uniting, as I understood it, the policies of all the Nine. This was an example of close co-operation.

Reference has already been made to UNCTAD. My Lords, so many have had experience of working in the United Nations. What do we learn, above all, in the United Nations? It is that it is not our own individual view that matters; it is what concerns the peoples within a region of the world. Why is the Organisation of African Unity so strong? It is not because they do not have problems—they have problems which are far deeper and graver than we have in Europe. They always speak with one voice; they always vote together on a resolution. This is their strength. Why cannot we Nine nations, who claim to have the oldest civilisation in the world, manage to vote together on issues which one would have thought were our common concern ?

I should like to turn now to the Commission. Only if we have adequate representation in the institutions of the Community can we make our own policies felt, our own presence felt. I mentioned to the Minister that I would raise this question. There was an article in the Observer last Sunday which referred to the fact that the United Kingdom have only two-thirds of the quota to which they are entitled in post in the Commission. I telephoned the European Information Office in London and they were kind enough to give me some figures. I say this not because I doubt their accuracy, but because I have not seen the document. I should like to refer to figures which are highly relevant. "A" posts filled by United Kingdom citizens are 331; for France the figure is 476; for Germany, 558, and Italy, 573. This will give an indication of the fact that we have not by any remote figment of the imagination reached the desired number to which we should he entitled.

It may be that there are not vacancies now; it may be a hangover from the Referendum. If you are going to have a change in balance between nationals, it is well known that some people have to be demoted, pensioned-off or whatever the organisational system might be. Nevertheless, I should like to know what action the Government are taking to ensure that when vacancies are available it is people from the United Kingdom who fill those vacancies—and the best people that are available.

I suppose I shall he teaching the Minister like a grandmother, to suck eggs, but he will know better than anybody that it is the first person who prepares the draft who has the best chance of getting that draft through. We all know that nationals in the Commission—quite rightly—tend to put their own views. This is a natural instinct, without blaming them for being nationalistic or possibly having a political bias. Surely, if we are going to talk about the Commission and Brussels, the way it acts and the way people in it behave, we should have an adequate representation of United Kingdom nationals.

We should he grateful—and I do not want to make a great issue of this point but, nevertheless, it must be said in fairness—if the Minister will allay the doubts which are constantly aroused by the activities of at least one member of the Cabinet who continues to attend and apparently support the Labour Common Market Safeguards Committee. As was reported in The Times, that particular Minister, when talking of the Common Market, said it was the biggest single constraint on getting the economy back in order again. Is this the attitude of a Cabinet Minister in charge of energy, one of the major aspects of the economic development both for this country and for the rest of the Community ? Do we have to put up with somebody who makes that kind of statement when the Government actually signed this Communiqué talking about convergence on economic issues ? Either you believe what you sign, or ask the Cabinet Minister to do what is in accordance with the policy of the Cabinet. Perhaps, on the other hand, the Minister will say that it is not the policy of the Cabinet or the Government to look towards convergence on economic issues; but then we have a right to know it because this document was signed by the United Kingdom Government, the same Government as are now in office. We should like some reassurance on this particular issue.

My Lords, time is getting on and there are many other aspects that I know we should all like to discuss, but one has to exercise a certain self-restraint. I know it is very difficult when talking about subjects—as the noble Lord, Lord O'Hagan, said—which are very dear to our hearts. We have covered a large area of the important aspects of the Communiqué. All we ask is that we can be assured that the British Government regard it as their duty to see that the next European Summit shows that the Government are concerned with the role of the United Kingdom in the European Community, and that they undertake to play their full part in developing the Community as is envisaged in the Communiqué of December 1974.

8.28 p.m.

Lord GORONWY-ROBERTS

My Lords, Lord Northfield's Unstarred Question refers to all the points mentioned in the December 1974 Paris Summit Communiqué on institutional questions and common policies. This covers a very wide area. Your Lordships will not expect me to deal at all exhaustively with every aspect of it. Certainly you will not expect me to answer the approximately 600 questions which have been raised in this debate under the aegis of a perfectly inoffensive-looking Unstarred Question. The Question raises a number of important matters. It should not also promote the proliferation of entire galaxies of other questions. Therefore I respond at once to the noble Baroness's implicit suggestion that I should listen carefully to all these questions and not, in the next ten or fifteen minutes, try to dispose of the 600 other questions which have been raised in the past hour.

The noble Baroness quite rightly said that if we are to look at the noble Lord's Unstarred Question and the important points it raises, we must apply the denying ordnance to ourselves and look to another occasion—possibly a more extended one—where at least three documents which come together can be properly debated. Those are, first, the Report of the Select Committee produced in another place and which emerged only yesterday, so that few of us, I suspect, have yet had the chance of reading and properly considering it. Secondly, there is the Green Paper. I would say that in essence the Select Committee Report matches up with the Green Paper in a great many respects. Thirdly, there is the regular report of activities in the Community—the " six-monthly report," as we refer to it, which is debated in this House. There will be a future occasion for that kind of debate which will deal with a great many of the questions which have been raised in this one.

Before I deal with the issues raised by my noble friend Lord Northfield, I should like to say this about the Tindemans Report. I agree that one of the most important decisions recorded in the Communiqué of December 1974 was the request to the Belgian Prime Minister, M. Leo Tindemans, to draw up a report to help the European Council in their search for a way forward towards an hitherto undefined goal of European union. It still remains undefined, and I am tempted to observe that there are as many varieties of ideas about the scope and nature of it in this House as there are among the Nine—and that is saying something!

We shall not reach this goal by popular rhetoric. Rhetoric offends by not using the right kind of words about what is essentially a very difficult bit of engineering—engineering plus psychology. I suppose nobody could do it better than British leaders, if sloganising and popular rhetoric would meet the case; but this is not going to do the trick. We need some hard thinking and hard work done about this. If I may say so, the very thoughtful book produced by my noble friend Lord Northfield, The Road to European Union, I find to be among the three or four best published contributions to proper thinking about what is after all a revolution— the conversion of age-old nationalisms into a quite new relationship.

This is the point at which not only loud shouting but hard thinking is essential. Is it enough to ask the British Government alone? I hope that the questions put to the British Government will, through the Official Record of today's debate, be considered also by the leaders of the other Members of the Community, because it is not enough to ask the British Government for answers to these questions and for initiatives, and to be asked to do something. Do what ? We are not quite sure. It is not enough always to put it on to the British Government. There are eight other Governments, and the Council of Ministers is as united, as initiative, as effective, as the will and purpose of its component national members permits it to be.

This is something we must realise, because it is only on the basis of that kind of realism that we can go forward. Otherwise we shall talk ourselves into inertia by applying to the British role in the Community the kind of incessant " knocking " that too many of us have been applying to the British role at home. This is one way of paralysing a country—a great country : the greatest in the European tradition. Of course it will give the lead, but it has a certain duty of preoccupation just now and for the next year or two to gird itself and organise its tremendous resources, mental and material. It should be allowed to concentrate a little on its own problems without being pulled and pummelled by so many kinds of insatiate demands. Give this country a chance, and it will once more astonish not only Europe but the world.

Now I go on to my noble friend's questions. He rightly asked for a progress report. We can give it. Most of us would like to see more progress made on the points he raised, but the rest of us will be glad that this much progress has been made, always remembering the nature of the task we have set ourselves, namely, the internationalising of a very nationalistic Continent.

The first point in the Communiqué was that the Heads of Government and Foreign Ministers should meet together at least three times a year to ensure progress and overall consistency in the activities of the Communities and on the work of political co-operation ". This development has been consistently welcomed and supported by the British Government and in fact has been successfully implemented. That is a fact; a major institutional fact. My noble friend quite rightly gave us today its true value. It has now been endorsed by M. Tindemans in his report in terms with which the British Government are in agreement.

Next, my noble friend raised the question of political co-operation among the Nine. This has certainly developed since the Paris Summit, and certainly has developed at a faster pace during the past two years than it did between 1957 and 1972. When we feel a little discouraged by the pace of advance of these matters in the last two or three years—dating everything from the referendum—let us cast our minds back and note how far and how fast political co-operation and institutional integration proceeded between the founding of the Market and the time when this country joined: that is, 15 years.

The most significant institutional development, as foreshadowed in the Paris Communiqué, is the emergence of the President in Office as the spokesman of the Nine in relation to third countries and international bodies. This point was made by a number of noble Lords: how far is this a fact? It is a fact that the President now speaks on behalf of the Nine Governments. He frequently does so to a text approved by them but also often in his own words, indicating the consensus view which the Nine have achieved. There is a necessary flexibility here and an element of trust which, in the short time since the adoption of this idea at the Summit, has been justified.

The Paris decisions have also led to the erosion of some of the artificial divisions between Community business and political co-operation. While the legal distinction must be preserved, there is now a healthy co-ordination between the two spheres under the general control of the Foreign Ministers and the European Council. I see no reason to criticise the practice of the Council of from time to time referring to specialised Ministers the proper detailed consideration of major questions of future policy. I think this may well evolve into an inherent part of the Council, as a substantial and important part of the general constitution governing the Community, and I do not myself think that this is a point of weakness. Rather I would say that it is a point of strength of the Council as a whole. As it allows the Committee of Permanent Representatives to go a very long way indeed in discussing, and even a long way along the road of decision on important matters, so the Council should devolve to its specialised members consideration of the many important and complex matters that come before it.

So far as the development of the substance of political co-operation is concerned, I can with satisfaction report that political co-operation among the Nine has both broadened and deepened in the last 18 months. Their discussions are, of course, confidential and the House will not expect me to go into detail. But the House will be interested to know, for instance, that during the last General Assembly of the United Nations the Nine voted together more than 80 per cent. of the time. When one looks at it closely, there emerges not only an increasing amount of political co-ordination; they have also achieved a very substantial productivity, one might say. Roughly four out of five times at the United Nations they have acted and voted together. It may well be that this is not quite up to the bench mark of the OAU, but the Nine are not quite the OAU. These are the nine countries of Western Europe and 80 per cent. productivity is very well worth getting. During the 20 per cent. of the rest of the time when we did not act and vote together, it is fair to say that the issues involved reflected varying degrees of disagreement, and some of these areas—for instance, issues arising out of the situation in the Middle East—are important, and still have a residual national importance for various members of the Nine. But liaison and consultation among them is constant, and at the next General Assembly we hope and aim to improve on last year's performance, good as that was.

To give another example, the Nine have also kept in close touch over the Cyprus situation. They have not succeeded, any more than anyone else has succeeded, in solving the problems of that island. But I think it would be fair to say that the diplomacy of the Nine has made a contribution to preventing a serious deterioration in the situation. What has not happened is not news. Just as the United Nations itself may have prevented catastrophe more than once in the last 30 years, and because catastrophe has not happened it is not on the record and, therefore, is not counted as something in favour of the United Nations, so in the case of the Nine one cannot prove this. But it is highly probable that the démarche in more than one instance has helped to maintain a position of possibility for peace, and to prevent a catastrophic deterioration.

Last year at Helsinki, the Nine together made a major contribution, and they will continue to work together, as they are now doing, in preparation for the review conference in Belgrade in 1977. They have made a start on developing common positions on the difficult issues which we all face in Southern Africa. It would be easy, of course, to say that one or other has stepped out of ranks, or has sought to gain some illusory advantage by some diplomatic action ahead of the rest. This is the currency of change, and as my noble friend strove to show, and I think succeeded in showing, the test is not that everything has been done overnight or even in the last 18 months or two years. The test is whether, on the whole, we are advancing on this very difficult but worth while road. I think we are, even in our attitude towards the problems in Southern Africa. There are other examples of' co-operation which I could cite; for example, the Euro-Arab dialogue. These examples show that in political co-operation the Nine are succeeding in making the kind of solid progress envisaged in the Paris Communiqué.

The Paris Communiqué also records that the Heads of Government: …consider that it is necessary to renounce the practice which consists of making agreement on all questions conditonal upon the unanimous consent of the Member States". We should note the carefuul wording of the Communiqué on this point, because it is not just the United Kingdom that has reservations on this question. We are all given to being very frank about the shortcomings of our own country, and very reserved about criticising the shortcomings of our friends and partners. That is quite right, but perhaps I may be permitted to say this much. On this, as on other points of practical reservation, the thoughtful reluctance to proceed more swiftly than many people would like the Nine to proceed is, to say the least, shared by many of our partners in the Nine. Without laying myself open to the accusation of being a bad European, I hope I can say that much.

We must note this careful wording, because it does not call for the immediate application across the board of majority voting. if it did, one would not need to raise objections. The air would resound in at least eight other languages to very practical and determined objections. In the first place, the Treaties themselves require unanimity on many major decisions, and specifically allow for majority voting in only a limited number of cases, and I am not aware that there has been an initiative from any quarter to amend the Treaty of Rome. In practice, of course, the Council has rarely resorted to formal voting. Normally it seeks to reach its decisions through the achievement of consensus. Why not? When we come to think of it, is not a decision reached by consensus more likely to be acceptable and to stick than one which may have to be forced through by vote?

Perhaps I may break off at this point to refer to the referendum, and this is only because I have been invited to do so by more than one noble Lord. Can we agree not to attribute all the difficulties of this massive experiment to the referendum ? May I ask those who are tempted to find in the referendum an alibi for all the difficulties that afflict the Common Market to ponder for one moment this proposition: would we still be in the Common Market but for the referendum? The British people are not all to be found in the milieu where these matters are habitually discussed and where certain ideas are taken for granted. I believe that the referendum made it possible for the British people to feel that they were entering the Community of their own political will. For that reason, the referendum was an inevitable and necessary bridge from a totally unacceptable situation to one which makes it possible for the British Government and people gradually to work towards the development of the kind of Europe that we all want.

The Communiqué also mentions the need to extend co-operation among the Nine to areas not already so covered. I was asked to indicate some of these areas. Suffice it to mention that since then the Education Ministers of the Nine have met to consider the beginnings of co-operation in educational matters and that preparations are well advanced for a meeting of Ministers of the Interior, as my noble friend will be called across the Channel, although I hope that he will continue to be called either Home Secretary or Minister of State for Home Affairs. These are two examples of moving in a coordinated European fashion into areas not previously formally co-ordinated.

On direct elections—I agree that this is a question of institutionalprogress—the House is well informed and I will not dwell upon them in the time available to me, unless, of course, I am pressed. The powers of the Assembly over budgetary matters are about to be extended when the Treaty signed on 22nd July of last year has been ratified. It is the view of the British Government, a view which is shared by others, that taking these latest amendments into account—they are important amendments and constitute one of the initiatives of Britain since its confirmed accession : namely, an improvement in the powers of the Parliament practically to control expenditure—direct elections should take place on the basis of the present powers. No doubt the European Parliament will put forward proposals for enlarged powers, including legislative powers, but we do not think that those proposals should be made before direct elections can be held. Our policy is to prepare for direct elections in the middle of 1978, and we are studying this policy practically and genuinely.

Because of their own private reservations about direct elections, I hope that nobody will endeavour to manoeuvre Britain into the position of being the one country which is dragging its feet on this matter. We are not dragging our feet. Some Members who have rendered splendid service in the Assembly—I refer to the noble Earl among others—know that elections conducted in the way that we conduct them here, related in time to local elections, possibly to Assembly elections and to the moveable feast of a British General Election which could be held at any time, throw up practical questions of organising and, indeed, possibly amending Statutes and regulations.

I am sure that my noble friend will allow me to say that the Home Office are studying these practical matters. We are doing so genuinely in order to cooperate with the rest of Europe in holding these elections in the middle of 1978. If other people have practical reservations about this, let them be heard and let them not be denigrated as poor Europeans. It is better to do properly these big revolutionary things, even if they prove to take a little more time than most people thought that they would, rather than to rush into them and finally have to chop and change afterwards and, perhaps, have further referenda to put things right.

These are the main institutional points in the document to which the noble Lord's Question refers. He put those points in an admirable speech and I appreciate the balance and thoughtfulness that his speech presented. The noble Lord did not hark back to the past; he looked to the future in insisting that the experience of the past should inform the experiment of the future.

There are a number of practical points—a few of the 600 extra questions—which in the next two or three minutes, although I have already taken far too long, I must try to answer. There is no formal quota for the number of people from each Community country. The Commission is expected to maintain a balance more or less approximating to the populations of Member countries. The United Kingdom is well represented in the senior posts in the Communities, but the proportion of United Kingdom nationals in junior posts does not at present correspond to the number that the United Kingdom might expect in relation to our population. I understand that one of the problems is that there are not enough United Kingdom applicants in the junior grades. This problem will probably correct itself as time goes on, and through their proper agencies the Government will certainly continue to do everything that they can to encourage and, indeed, to assist suitable people at all levels to apply for posts in the Commission.

Baroness ELLES

My Lords, will the noble Lord allow me to intervene? The figures that I have refer to senior posts in which we are very much under-represented. I explained that I did not see the document that contains these figures but I was informed that it is the senior posts where there is very much under-representation. I will not take issue now with the Minister but perhaps he will look into the matter to see whether that is correct.

Lord GORONWY-ROBERTS

By all means, my Lords. As at present advised, I am bound to say that the position is that the United Kingdom is well represented in the senior posts, but that it is in the junior posts where we fall short of what would be notionally a broadly proper proportion. Certainly, however, I will look into the question and see whether the advice that I have relates to the question that the noble Baroness has put to me.

On the question of the Tripartite Conference which the noble Lord raised, I have a good note here which I should like to read to him. He very usefully brought up this specialised point, and I should like to give him this information which I think he will find encouraging. We welcome the Tripartite Conference for the opportunity it provides for an exchange of views between Ministers dealing with financial and social affairs, representatives of the trade unions and employers' organisations and, thirdly, the Commission. I agree with him that we have in this country a background of experience in this kind of negotiation—tripartite discussion—that may prove useful in Europe. As I said, I should be glad to make available a copy of some notes I have made on this point because I know that he is particularly interested in this aspect of the matter.

On the function of COREPER—the body which is made up of the permanent officials in Brussels—a very great deal of business is settled in the Committee of Permanent Representatives. Some people think that too much is entrusted to them. It is a traditionally respectable view that not too much should be entrusted, certainly for decision, to civil servants. That is one view. I would say that the Council is very much in control but naturally extends a great deal of latitude to the Committee of Permanent Represent atives, always with the capacity for the Council to exercise the ultimate control and decision.

I am not myself unduly alarmed by the position there. I can well see this latitude being extended, with complete safety, in the next few years; but here we must hasten slowly because, as I have said, a substantial and respectable view is taken by many people, not just in this country but abroad, that we must not let the expertise of the adviser outstrip the control of the elected member—in short, the Ministers.

I will not deal with any of the other questions raised, but I will simply echo once more what the noble Baroness quite rightly said ; namely, that the record of this debate will be useful for Ministers in this country certainly, and, I hope, for Ministers in other countries of the Nine, because much of the criticism, the feeling of disappointment about the pace of advance, can equally be addressed to eight other Ministerial addresses and, indeed, we must learn to think in European terms, must we not, when we consider how fast Europe is progressing.

The noble Lord, Lord O'Hagan, and indeed the noble Baroness, Lady Elks, asked me for an assurance that Her Majesty's Government—and I quote the noble Lord—are " giving thought to " the present position of the Community and the way in which it should develop; and the answer, of course, is, " Certainly ". I know from my own Ministerial experience how much time and devoted energy is spent by officials and Ministers, and I know that this is true of the cognate Ministers concerned with Europe in this Government. If from time to time we raise questions of real difficulty, it is not because in any way we want to arrest the proper development of this tremendous experiment; it is because we wish to see it based firmly on proper foundations. This may sound trite. There have been one or two attempts in the history of Europe at rather idealistically thoughtless union—our Scandinavian friends have experience of this. It did not last, because the basis was not properly thought out.

We are in the Community; we are deeply attached ; we are committed. We are making our contribution ; we hope to make an increasingly more valuable and effective contribution, given the proper understanding of our difficulties—our temporary difficulties—and that understanding, I suggest, must not only be accorded to us by our friends in Europe, but occasionally by our own neighbours in this House.