CYPRUS

HL Deb 14 June 1976 vol 371 cc1046-70

8.45 p.m.

Lord CARADON rose to ask Her Majesty's Government whether, in view of their obligations under the Cyprus Treaty, they will take action in the United Nations with a view to ending the present deadlock and contributing to a just solution to the Cyprus problem. The noble Lord said: My Lords, I believe it may be that, even at this comparatively late hour, the few of us who are anxious to speak this evening may be able to make some constructive contribution. I hope that it may be so for, in another place —the Security Council of the United Nations—a debate goes forward today on the question which we are considering. I trust that it will lead to the reappointment of the United Nations force which, over a period of years, has performed a valuable service under very great difficulties. I believe that we are perhaps entitled to make a self-denying ordinance in our short debate this evening. I hope we shall not give ourselves to recrimination and to the repetition of actions with which we are very familiar. I believe that all of us who have followed what has taken place in Cyprus over the past ID to 20 years are only too well aware of the errors, cruel mistakes, suffering and misfortune which have come to that beautiful island. No good will be done, it seems to me, if we endeavour to go back over those terrible events.

Surely, our whole determination should be directed to endeavouring to suggest a way of giving some help towards a break away from the present disastrous deadlock. I hope that we can concentrate our main attention on that purpose. At the same time I would say that I hope there will be no complacency. What has happened in the last two years since the mad coup which took place almost exactly two years ago? Has there been in the discussions any marked advance, any great success, any indication that we can look to the discussions to bring us 'to a successful conclusion? No. Indeed, almost every session that has taken place between the representatives of the communities has looked more hopeless. We now reach a situation when even on humanitarian subjects—and they are important enough —no progress appears to be possible.

Therefore, recognising that communal discussions must be a part of the final settlement, must we not look for some way in which we can escape from the impasse and suggest, indeed initiate, new proposals which may enable us to go forward to a more helpful future? At the same time, if we are not to be complacent, we should certainly not despair. The dangers are increasing. The dangers of the discussions grinding to a bloody halt are obvious enough. The dangers are not only for the island but for the whole of the Eastern Mediterranean, and indeed for the relationships between the major Powers of the world. Perhaps there is still time to step in before we find that all efforts so far attempted come to a halt. Therefore, our discussion this evening, with a number of Members of this noble House who have a special knowledge of this subject, may, I believe, be helpful.

I shall look for a few minutes at the principles which we should bear in mind and then at the procedures, because this is one of the situations in which in the end the procedures may make just as important a contribution to the conclusion as a recognition of the principles themselves. What are the principles? In my Question I refer to the obligation on Her Majesty's Government. I recognise that I am not speaking here in legal terms. Perhaps there is no legal obligation for our Government to intervene in any way. But if, When with the authority of my Government I signed the Treaty of Guarantee, I had been told that the events—of which we now know—would take place without our Government intervening to take effective action to prevent the disasters which have befallen the island, I would not have believed it possible. I should have thought that it was inconceivable. I go hack to the first occasion when the coup took place and when, it seems to me, there was an absolute demand, a necessity, for our Government—being a signatory of the Treaty of Guarantee, which meant to some of us what it said—to act. That was when we failed to act and when we deliberately decided to take no action in the United Nations at that time. That was the original fault from which all other disasters flowed.

What are the principles? What was the principle accepted in 1960? Basically it was not only a matter of constitutional arrangement: it was an agreement made by the Greek and Turkish Governments, confirmed in full by the Greek Cypriots and the Turkish Cypriots. With what purpose? To ensure that there would never be Enosis—that is union with Greece—nor Taksim: division of the island. That was the basis. We all agreed with it. It was agreed by both communities in the island. There were provisions in the Constitution which led to difficulties, disputes and indeed conflicts. But the basic conception that the island should be united and independent, free from the two threats which had bedevilled its existence previously, was well accepted by everyone concerned, including our Government and including both sides of the House of Commons.

That, therefore, is the basic principle. If we are to get an agitation for Enosis, then we are to get an agitation for Taksim, and the other way round. So the basis which was agreed with Greek and Turkish initiative, and fully accepted, as I can give witness, is still the basis on which a peaceful Cyprus can emerge. It follows from that that if there is not to be union with Greece, and if there is not to be partition of the island, then the island should be united and independent, as has been constantly reaffirmed by overwhelming votes in the United Nations. It also follows from that, particularly bearing in mind the circumstances of the past year or two, and indeed of the last decade, that if we are to have a united and independent island we must also be able to give the Turkish community in Cyprus security—certainty of security, absolute security. That is the problem we have to consider. How it is possible that we can, by taking a new initiative at this time, work towards an arrangement whereby we eliminate as it was eliminated by the Greeks and Turks themselves, both Enosis and Taksim and at the same time ensure that the Turkish community in the island is given full security? That is the problem.

So I turn from the question of principles to the question of procedures. So often when one faces a two year old deadlock, which becomes more dead as time goes on, it is a matter of seeking a way out, an escape, a key to peace. I think that there are all kinds of ways in which international action can be taken to give stimulus to the communal talks. I do not wish to advocate one particular method rather than another, but let me put suggestions as to what might be considered.

The Secretary-General of the United Nations is chairman of the communal talks. He has no power in himself, as we all know. He has only the power given to him by the Security Council in such matters. How would it be if we called on the Secretary-General, through the Security Council, to take a new initiative as chairman of the communal talks? How would it be if, for instance, we asked him through the Security Council—through perhaps a unanimous vote of the Security Council—to proceed with the discussions with the representatives of the two communities and to seek, for example, consideration of a federal system? That is point No. 1. Point No. 2 is to seek for positive advance in negotiation on territory.

The third point perhaps might be to consider, with the representatives of the two communities, how there could be established a constitutional commission. I remember in 1959, following the Zurich agreements, that there met in Nicosia at that time representatives of the Greek Cypriots and the Turkish Cypriots with expert and leading representatives from Athens and Ankara who worked together —and successfully worked together—to work out the details of constitution. I well remember those who came from Athens and Ankara, for both of whom I had very great respect. Would it not be best to work out a new federal constitution by such a means? Would it not be best for the Secretary-General to be given the authority, the mandate, on those three issues to press forward in the discussion? Would that perhaps break the present deadlock in which no progress is being made whatsoever? Maybe.

But there are all kinds of methods to he used when once it is decided that the international community shall act. Another might he that two or three nations, impartial nations, be associated with the Secretary-General in his task. This is something which has been endeavoured in the past and it can be extremely useful to give to the Secretary- General people—experienced diplomats—who can work with him, so that he is not left alone but has others to whom he can turn for advice and guidance as he proceeds.

There is yet another proposal. I put it forward publicly some months ago and I know that it has been considered in a number of quarters. I went to the Ambassadors of Greece and Turkey in London; I put it to both of them and, of course, I put it to the British Government. It was the proposal that there should be a conciliation mission from the United Nations. When an impasse, a deadlock, is reached, so often it is desirable to send people to talk to those on the spot who are concerned. I would recommend that the conciliation mission should go to Athens, to Ankara and, of course, to Cyprus, to talk with all concerned, and should then come back with practical proposals for the Security Council, in order to make progress; not to work against the communal discussions, but to give them encouragement. It should consult with them to see where the difficulties lie and to see whether they can, in consultation with all, come back with something which will enable the whole movement to go forward instead of being bogged down as it is now and as it has been increasingly over the past two years.

There are all sorts of ways in which the procedures can be pursued. What are the essentials? The essentials, believe, are that there should be an international initiative to break the deadlock; an international initiative to come from a British lead. We have an obligation more than any other country, other than Greece and Turkey. It is for us, surely, not to sit back and refuse to participate. I have spoken of the original failure—the American failure and our failure—to act when that bloody attack took place on the presidential palace. Now we have the chance—we still have the chance—of a British initiative being taken on an impartial basis in order to come up with something to save the island from disaster.

I turn to a general point. There is in these days, particularly, I think, in the United States, a great deal of criticism of the United Nations. I am always annoyed when I read of criticisms of the United Nations. I never fail to say that there is nothing wrong with the United Nations except its members. It is the failure to act. So often have we seen a resolution passed—yes, soundly based and widely supported. In this case we have unanimous resolutions of the General Assembly—almost unheard of. Then everybody turns to something else, and nothing more is done. Is that the fault of the United Nations? No, it is the fault of the members. It is the follow-up that matters; it is the pursuit of the purposes agreed. That is what is lacking; and that my Government should not, for two years, have been prepared to take a lead in searching for the advance that we all need is a matter which we pray, we hope, may soon be ended. The opportunity is there: let it not be thrown away again.

I would say, finally, that I have had the very good fortune to serve twice in Cyprus, once in the days of the last war. The world was at war, but the communities in Cyprus were at peace. It was a great encouragement to me later, when I went back to-the island when it was in a state of ferment and, indeed of rebellion, to remember the days when the people of Cyprus lived in happiness, understanding and mutual respect. Strangely enough, I believe that, with all that has happened, there may now be a greater readiness by Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots to work together than ever before, because they see the disasters that have come from the dreadful errors that have been made on both sides. I believe there is now a wish to come together. What they wait for is some lead. Where should it come from? I think it should come from us. Some of us who have served in Cyprus or who have had responsibilities in regard to Cyprus are not to be excused if, when we sail away, we forget about our commitments and our obligations. Having served twice in Cyprus I myself feel a sense of obligation to the people of Cyprus. It is not for me to go away and turn to other matters.

We have a commitment, with all the kindness and all the constructive endeavour that we found in the people of Cyprus, of both communities. Those of us who had any association with the island cannot turn away. It is essential that we should continue to endeavour to discharge the commitment which we have arising from our association. I therefore hope that following our discussion this evening our country will feel the obligation—not the legal obligation, you may say, but the obligation of commitment— and will now make a new endeavour to ensure that the opportunity which still exists should not be thrown away.

9.5 p.m.

Baroness ELLES

My Lords, the noble Lord, Lord Caradon, with all his experience and knowledge of Cyprus, has done your Lordships' House a very great service in bringing before your Lordships this very important Question relating to the role of the British Government as a contributor to the search for and achievement -of a peaceful settlement for the people of Cyprus. Though I know the noble Lord will understand if I do not follow him on every point. he has already made some very valuable suggestions towards reaching this goal, which we all share; and I am certain that my noble friends, and certainly I myself, endorse his wish that it should be a British initiative which should lead to this end. However, in the framing of his Question the noble Lord shows a certain degree of what might he called optimism which, regrettably, imagine, is not shared by all noble Lords: first, that Her Majesty's Government still consider they have legal obligations under the Cyprus Treaty: and, secondly, that if Britain were to take action in the United Nations, such action would necessarily contribute to a just solution of the Cyprus problem. Regrettably, not everyone in your Lordships' House shares with the noble Lord his deep faith and conviction in the possibilities of the United Nations. I think all of us who have had the opportunity to serve in that body will know of its immense potential but also of the regrettable distance between the potential and the reality.

However, I should first like briefly to examine the assumptions which are contained in the Question within certain narrow limits. I certainly share with the noble Lord the desire not to raise any historical background. It would serve no useful purpose to look back into the history of the island, or to attempt to evaluate the periods of violence and bitterness between its people and those who have been involved in its affairs. All Governments concerned have made mistakes, individuals have erred in their judgments and decisions and consequently there is a multiple responsibility which must be shared for the present tragic and unjust situation in which the people of Cyprus find themselves today. In fairness I think it should be added that, although it may be clear in retrospect when an erroneous decision is made, the successful solution or solutions are not always so apparent.

I will turn now to the widely publicised Report of the Select Committee on Cyprus of 1975–76. The many comments made on its findings require some explanation from Her Majesty's Government, not because of why we did not intervene or for various other matters brought up, but for one particular reason: that I think we need some assurance as to the course of future action Her Majesty's Government intend to take and what our existing obligations really are. The replies given to the Select Committee by Mr. Callaghan and in particular those relating to the validity of the Treaty of Guarantee and to our legal duties and rights under the Treaty are far from clear. I should like briefly to draw your Lordships' attention to page VIII, paragraph 13, where it states: The Foreign Secretary appeared very uncertain about Britain's right to intervene. When pressed on whether she had a right under the Treaty of Guarantee, he replied ' I daresay legally we had '. This was in answer to Question No. 138.

Further on, on the following page in paragraph 21: The Foreign Secretary suggested that it was politically inexpedient to seek to uphold the 1960 Treaty of Guarantee because this was in practice a dead letter. Or take his apparent misunderstanding of the role and essential objectives of the UN Peace-keeping Force. These were raised in Questions 179 and 188 referring to the role of the United Nations force: … I myself would have been willing to have resisted but I think there was a feeling that the United Nations force should not stand in the way. And the apparent contradiction which appears in the answer to Question 188: I did not expect the Turks to advance, but if they were there and crossing a line that would have been agreed, I would have expected them to resist. Or his misunderstanding of the status of the self-declared Turkish-Cypriot Federated State in answer to Question No. 210 referring to the Turkish-occupied area of Northern Cyprus: Sovereign countries are very funny animals. The Foreign Secretary did not seem to appear to know that the Turkish-Cypriot Federated State was not a sovereign State.

All these references, small though they may be, do give serious grounds for apprehension as to the basis on which Her Majesty's Government's decisions were made in July 1974 and, more relevant, as to the view that the Government now take as to the kind of role they should be playing as a guarantor of the territorial integrity and sovereign independence of Cyprus.

The noble Lord touched on the tragic sufferings of the people of Cyprus and we on this side of the House share his deep concern in a humanitarian solution to very serious humanitarian problems, and only mention in passing the question of the missing persons and the families suffering in Cyprus to know what is happening to them, the refusal to honour the Vienna Agreements after the third round of the talks with regard to the services to be provided for the Greeks still remaining in the occupied zone. Indeed I would also refer, because I do not want to appear unbalanced for this is not the purpose of the debate, to those Turkish Cypriots who were removed from the South part of the island unbelievably, apparently unanimously agreeing to leave their permanent homes and be removed to another part of the island, which is just as though 12,000 people were uprooted and upsticked from Sussex and dumped in the Northern part of England.

Must all of these people become unidentified cyphers to be used as a bundle in a package deal? The Turkish Cypriots indeed now have the opportunity to show their good faith in a desire for settlement if they were to recognise their humanitarian and legal obligations by satisfying the demands and fulfilling their undertakings in relation to the two matters that I have referred to and in particular the question of the missing persons and the provision of services to the Greeks in the North. This would, I believe, be a statesmanlike act which would be recognised as such and given due credit in the comity of nations.

There still remain many other issues which, of their nature, require urgent settlement or the tide of events will once more change the basis on which a peaceful settlement can be obtained. I name briefly five elements. The 180,000 displaced persons in the South, some of whom are still under tents. Are these to be left until there is a political solution or will the Government press for observance of the United Nations General Assembly Resolution 3395 (XXX) paragraph 4 that they should be allowed to return to their homes? When is the deadline to be given, or is there a deadline to he given, beyond which they cannot or will not return? Or are they to be encouraged to cut their losses, to receive some reconstruction aid and be given an opportunity to earn their living and so accept the status quo? What is the view of the Government on this matter? There is the presence in the North of occupying forces. over 40.000 at the time of the Turkish invasion, now numerically uncertain but estimated, I understand, at about 30,000 minimum. And again it must he asked: is pressure to be brought that observance of the demand for the withdrawal of these troops should be again pressed for and that they be returned to their homeland in conformity with paragraph 3 of the same resolution to which have referred?

There is the continued immigration of so-called seasonal workers, with no evidence, of which I am aware, that they are returning to Turkey now estimated at from between 20,000 and 40.000. Both these last elements make a total of at least 50.000 to 60,000 people making a serious readjustment to the proportional balance between the ethnic groups, which were roughly 82 per cent. Greek Cypriots, and something varying between 15 per cent. to 18 per cent. Turkish Cypriots. It is hard to believe that this added incursion of unskilled and untrained people into an area where there is already unemployment can be welcomed by Turkish Cypriots as a whole. I do not believe that this is so. This is a matter imposed from ouside.

There is the removal North of the Turkish and expulsion to the South of Greek Cypriots, a systematic alteration in the distribution of ethnic groups originally scattered throughout the island which was one of the ways by which partition was unlikely to occur. Will the British Foreign Secretary be able to say, as was said regarding Article IV, Legally, I suppose we had an obligation, hut in political practical terms, we had none "? Here, of course, I refer to Part 2 of Article II of the Treaty of Guarantee: Greece, Turkey and the United Kingdom likewise undertake to prohibit, so far as concerns them, any activity aimed at promoting, directly or indirectly, either union of Cyprus with any other state or partition of the island. The invasion and penetration of Turkish troops over about 40 per cent. of the island, a part of the island that represents about 60 per cent. of the economically productive areas, in comparison with the remaining 60 per cent. of the island which is at present available to by far the greater proportion of the population, can surely not be the basis of a settlement. If it were, it could not endure and would merely provide the fuel for future strife. I have outlined these elements, not in a spirit of saying that I prefer or have feelings of sympathy for one side or the other in this question. But these are facts which are happening on the island, which are changing the situation from day to day and will make it ever more difficult to come to a solution if Britain and other Powers do not unite to find a solution which will help the Cypriot people.

It is for Britain to take every possible measure to ensure that we do not once again fail in our moral and legal commitment to a nation which is part of the British Commonwealth, with whom Britain, as a member of the European Economic Community has a commercial agreement, with whom we sit in the Council of Europe, side by side, believing in the upholding of the European Convention on Human Rights. I therefore put it to the Government to state what obligations they consider they have under the Treaty of Guarantee and, if they believe they have obligations, what measures do they propose to adopt? What proposals are they willing to make, or what measures would they support in the United Nations Security Council to assist the Secretary General? Here, I absolutely concur with what the noble Lord, Lord Caradon, said in the speeding up of a resumption of the inter-communal talks. Surely most of us in this House believe that this is the only way in which to achieve a satisfactory solution for the people of Cyprus.

What diplomatic efforts are the Government making, or intending to make, bilaterally with the other guarantor Powers and with the Government of Cyprus? Has any consideration been given to action through the European Community? Here I believe that there is a great possibility through finding sonic senior statesman who would act in a neutral way to ensure co-operation between the two parts of the island in a more enclosed enclave than a very wide international sphere. I believe that here is a possibility which the Government might consider. We, on this side of your Lordships' House, would welcome a positive assurance from the Government that they will take note of what has been said, particularly in the observations on demographic and humanitarian issues and that these are taken into account in any settlement in which the British Government are involved. Following on the remarks of the noble Lord, Lord Caradon, will the Government consider issuing new instructions to the permanent representative at the United Nations in the light of our discussions which are being made this evening?

So, my Lords, we want an assurance that Her Majesty's Government recognise clearly their moral obligations, if not any more their legal obligations as guarantors of the territorial integrity of the island, at least as a member of the Security Council under Article 2(4) of the Charter of the United Nations and under the authority given to the Security Council by Article 39. We ask the Government that they will do all in their power to honour those obligations, be they by Treaty, be they under the Charter or as a country which has had nearly 100 years of the closest connection with the island of Cyprus. We ask that they contribute to the maximum of their ability to the attainment of a lasting and permanent settlement, above all for the people of Cyprus.

9.20 p.m.

Lord BANKS

My Lords, the whole House is indebted to the noble Lord, Lord Caradon, for raising this important and difficult subject in such a constructive way this evening. We recognise his great first-hand knowledge of Cyprus and its problems, and we recognise his deep concern about those problems. I should like to support his plea for a British initiative in the United Nations to bring nearer the just solution of the Cyprus problem, and I shall listen with great interest to the reply which is to be given by the Minister.

As in so many similar situations in other parts of the world, nobody, no community or nation which has been invoked in this long, sad history can escape some of the blame for this situation, and certainly all sides have strongly blamed the others. I agree with the noble Lord, Lord Caradon, that it is no use this evening raking over the past: there is nothing to be gained by that. But the situation in Cyprus remains explosive. There is a theory that the Turks may want to retain a permanent partition of the island and there is a fear of a further Turkish advance. Therefore, the need for an initiative is urgent.

The Question speaks of our obligation under the Treaty. Having read the evidence given to the Select Committee in another place by the Minister of State and the present Prime Minister when he was Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs,. I am still confused as to the exact nature of our obligations under the Treaty, particularly at the present time, and if the noble Lord, Lord Goronwy-Roberts, could throw some further light on that it would be very welcome.

The communal talks do not seem to achieve any progress towards a solution, and the agreement on procedure which was reached a few weeks ago has not been followed by any agreement on a settlement, or any part of a settlement. I agree that no solution can be imposed on the communities in Cyprus but I believe that the key lies to a large extent in Greek/Turkish relations and the relations between Greece and Turkey. If these are bad, no settlement will last: if these are good, a reasonable settlement would have a chance. So, in my view, an overall- Greek/Turkish accord must be sought at the present time as an essential background to the Cyprus situation, although such an accord would be welcome for other reasons, of course, and not least for the sake of NATO's Southern flank.

The United Nations resolutions speak of the withdrawal of all foreign armed forces from Cyprus, and I would heartily endorse that. They also speak of the desire of refugees to return to their homes. The difficulty here is that the Turks seem to want two entirely homogeneous areas with the minority populations exchanged and turned out into other areas. The Turkish Government, in their Memorandum which they sent to the Foreign and Commonwealth Office and which was presented to the Select Committee, said that experience had taught that the communities in Cyprus could not live together if they were intermingled. I hope that humane considerations will prevent their seeking a rigid application of that principle, on which agreement is most unlikely, but I think there is fairly general agreement that the most likely solution is a bi-zonal federation—a federation of two communal zones. This seems to be accepted now by the Greek Cypriots, though they would have preferred a multi-regional federation, and I believe they are right to accept that. But the question immediately arises as to how distinct the two zones should be. I mentioned this matter a minute or two ago, and I repeat that I hope the principle that they should be entirely distinct will not be pressed too far.

The next question is: what should the boundaries be? I think it is clear that the Turks have to give a great deal of territory which they now hold. The Greek Cypriots have suggested that they should give half of the territory which they hold. But however much it should be, it must be a fair amount of what they hold at the present time. The Turks argue that what they are left with must be economically viable. This, again, raises the question of how economically separate the zones should be; how much each should, in fact, be a separate economic State.

This leads me on to the question of the powers which the central Government should have. The Turks want it to be very loose, and to have very limited powers. But, again, I think there must be some give and take here and we must, in the end, have a rather more central power than the Turks at present seem to want if Cyprus is to remain, as I think we here this evening believe it should remain, a united independent nation. The Turks want parity in all the institutions of the new Constitution—a little difficult to concede when they are only 18 per cent. of the population. But one realises that account must somehow be taken in the Constitution of the grievances which they believe they have suffered over the past years. A great deal will clearly depend on the statesmanship of the Turkish Government and the advice which they give to Mr. Denktash. They are, after all, in the strongest position.

We are told in the evidence which was given by the Government to the Select Committee, that they could not have resisted the Turkish invasion of Cyprus even if they had wanted to do so, and we have seen that the American embargo on arms to Turkey has repercussions in the NATO Alliance. What we have to do, it seems to me, is to persuade the Turkish Government that their interests lie in NATO: that their interests therefore lie in accord with Greece and in a peaceful settlement of the Cyprus question. In attempting to get this, I hope that the British Government will work closely with the other members of the European Economic Community and will be able to express their support for any action which it takes. We ought not to neglect, either, the significance of the Commonwealth in this connection. Archbishop Makarios is much regarded by non-aligned countries and, at the same time, there is a strong Moslem influence within the Commonwealth as well.

So I hope that at the United Nations, supported by the other members of the European Economic Community and by the Commonwealth, the British Government will seek to secure that the United Nations should call a conference of the guarantor Powers and of representatives of the communities, in order to seek a solution to this problem. No doubt some discussions would take place purely between the two communities, which would report back to the wider conference. Possibly. the alternative idea put forward by the noble Lord, Lord Caradon, of some form of conciliation commission which would go around the various partners in the conference beforehand to seek some basis of agreement, some basis for discussion upon which we could start to seek agreement, might well be the way to approach it. But I am quite sure that a great deal of patient negotiation is necessary. I am sure also that the task is formidable, but it is a task which must be attempted.

9.30 p.m.

Lord MAYBRAY-KING

My Lords, friends of Cyprus are indeed grateful to the noble Lord, Lord Caradon, for raising this matter tonight, and especially for the wealth of experience and wisdom with which he opened the debate. I am also happy that I am to he followed by an old Parliamentary colleague: a former Cabinet Minister, the Viscount Boyd of Merton. I am looking forward to hearing his significant contribution to our debate.

Those of us who know Cyprus intimately know how grievously many Cypriots are suffering. They have been driven from their homes, most of them having lost literally everything. I think of Greek villages that I know Very Well in the part that was Greek-Cypriot and is now occupied by the Turks. The few Greek Cypriots who live in those villages now are a conquered people. Their property has been seized not by Turkish Cypriots but by immigrants who have been brought in from Turkey. Most of them fled from their homes after the Turks had deliberately expelled the doctors, the teachers and the potential leaders of the Greek Cypriot communities.

It is fair to say that the immediate cause of the Turkish military occupation of part of Cyprus was due to Greeks. However, it was not due to the Greek people. but to the Greek dictatorship. It was the Greek colonels who, in a last desperate throw. trained and encouraged fanatics like Sampson and staged, under his mad leadership, an attempted coup—the assassination of Makarios because they regarded Makarios as a moderate—and the seizure of Cyprus by the Greek Cypriots. The Turks could never have allowed that. I spent a great deal of my time in Cyprus saying this again and again, year after year, to the fanatics who talked about Enosis. But the Turks used their righteous anxiety as an excuse to invade the island, not only to protect Turkish Cypriots but to seize and plunder industries, businesses and homes, including the homes of British residents in Cyprus. I still think that at the first critical moment, Britain—one of the three co-guarantors of the independence and integrity of Cyprus, the other two being Greece and Turkey—could have intervened more firmly. We had a legal and moral right to do so. As it is, what was begun as a protective gesture by the Turks is now a permanent occupation by conquerors of part of Cyprus.

I believe that any negotiation between Clerides and Denktash—two very fine men, one from each side—might well have succeeded if there had been a more concrete expression of the will and purpose of the United Nations General Assembly and the Security Council to support the resolutions which those bodies had carried. I believe that we would have had a solution earlier if the Greek and Turkish Cypriots had been left to themselves and if the Turks had realised that this must eventually lead to a political solution: that a military solution is no solution that can last.

All along it has seemed that America, and perhaps ourselves, have been unwilling to criticise Turkey for fear that we might weaken NATO if Turkey left NATO. But the events of the last two years have effectively driven Greece out of NATO. We need both Turkey and Greece in the defensive alliances of the West and I was very pleased to note that at the weekend the Greek Prime Minister warned his fellow citizens of the danger of Communism in Greece and of the drift Eastward, telling the Greek people that the future of Greece lies with the West. For either Greece or Turkey to go it alone is madness. It is had for NATO, it is bad for the country which goes it alone, and I think the wise men of Greece and of Turkey must realise that.

The United Nations must act, and the first call must be for the evacuation from Cyprus of the 40,000 Turkish troops to which the noble Baroness, Lady Elles, referred just now. If that evacuation were carried out in a phased way, it ought to be possible to hammer out a compromise which will give both Turkish Cypriots and Greek Cypriots what they need most—security of life, limb and property. Greece and Turkey are neighbours. Each has much to gain from mutual recognition and understanding. Each has much to lose if there is a steady erosion of good will and a continued growth of ill feeling based on the obviously unjust happenings at present in Cyprus.

Noble Lords will know that Cyprus is a beautiful island. For centuries, Turks and Greeks lived in peace and understanding. Even in this century Turkish villagers went to Greek weddings, and funerals and Greek villagers went to Turkish funerals and weddings. They intermingled and those on both sides who would polarise the good people of Cyprus —the Turks and the Greeks in Cyprus—have much to answer for. I believe it is for Greece and Turkey to provide statesmen who will get together and bind up the wounds that war has inflicted on an island most of whose inhabitants want. as we all want, just to live at peace, and it is for Britain and the United Nations and the European Economic Community and NATO to create conditions which will get these two nations together and make Cyprus once more an island, not of two hostile peoples, but of different peoples, but inside an independent and sovereign Cyprus.

I regret very much the decision of Greece to come away from NATO. I hope—and indeed I feel sure— that if the Cyprus problem were solved, we should find Greece once more inside NATO. A Select Committee of the House of Commons has criticised the Government for their handling of the Cyprus situation though I must point out that one of the Committees' most distinguished members, Sir George Sinclair, defended the Government and sought to put in a paragraph to minimise the criticism of Her Majesty's Government's behaviour over the Cyprus question.

But even that critical report rightly pays tribute to the humanitarian work of Her Majesty's Government in Cyprus: some £800,000 towards the United Nations Refugees Fund, another £800,000 spent by the Ministry of Overseas Development in purely humanitarian help to the refugees of Cyprus, and I think this House would add its own tribute to the Red Cross for all that it has done in bringing comfort to separated families, to lost families, seeking out and getting human beings together again.

But the report indicates that the position in Cyprus is getting worse, not better. At present, 180,000 Greek Cypriots are uprooted. A solution is urgently needed, and in the words of the report at paragraph 28, which I quote: Any solution reached must contain guarantees for the human rights of every individual on the island whatever his ethnic origins, particularly the right to return to his own house and property, and it must guarantee the future integrity of Cyprus as a sovereign state and independent member of the Commonwealth. My Lords, I hope that the report of the House of Commons Committee and this debate will spur on the Government in their efforts to bring peace to Cyprus.

9.40 p.m.

Viscount BOY D of MERTON

The noble Lord, Lord Caradon, in his moving and uncontroversial speech, referred to the obligations on Her Majesty's Government arising out of what he calls the Cyprus Treaty. As he knows well, the first of the undertakings was signed in London in February 1959, to be followed the next year by what we all hoped was the final settlement. Attached to the first lot of documents were a number of other provisions, including the declaration on behalf of the Government of the United Kingdom, signed by the noble Lord, Lord Selwyn-Lloyd, as Foreign Secretary and by myself as Colonial Secretary, so your Lordships will understand my continuing interest in Cyprus. Like the noble Lord, Lord Caradon, having sailed away from executive responsibilities, one does not forget one's obligations.

My Lords, it also fell to me to recommend the noble Lord, Lord Caradon, to Her Majesty as Governor of Cyprus, a decision which I have never regretted. The noble Lord also knows well that this did not mean, and does not mean, that I. agree with everything he says. I take some comfort, however, from the words he wrote of me in his book, A Start in Freedom. I hope it is not immodest of me to quote them. He says: His good nature and his good humour and his generous fairness repeatedly rescue him from the consequences of his reactionary policies. I hope that if another edition is contemplated, he will not want, because of anything I say tonight, to alter that phrase. But I am bound to say that I cannot impose on myself the same self-denying ordnance altogether, or a refusal to look back which I agree characterised his speech.

My Lords, like him, I, too, am much more concerned about the future of Cyprus than about the past. In the intense distrust and bitterness today, it will not help us to arrive at a wise decision for the future if we form or maintain a distorted picture of the past. The documents signed in London in February 1959 included a memorandum sent by the Prime Ministers of Great Britain, Greece and Turkey, the Declaration of the three Governments to which I have referred, the Basic Structure of the Republic document, and the Treaties of Guarantee and of Alliance. As the noble Lord will remember, there was also a declaration made by Archbishop Makarios and Dr. Kutchuk representing the two communities declaring that they accepted the documents as the agreed foundation of the final settlement of the problems of Cyprus. These agreements were founded on mutual trust, and neither the noble Lord, Lord Caradon, nor I will ever forget the extent of' it or its warmth and sincerity at that time. I must confess that in my first enthusiasm I envisaged other States where a comparable solution to ethnic and other problems might evolve.

The noble Lord, Lord Banks, asked what was the Treaty of Guarantee, or something to that effect, and where were our obligations? The House will remember that in the Treaty of Guarantee, the United Kingdom, Greece and Turkey agreed that in the event of any breach of the provisions of the Treaty, they undertook to consult together with a view to making representations or taking the necessary steps to ensure observance of these provisions. They added: And in so far as common or concerted action may prove impossible, each of the three guaranteeing Powers reserves the right to take action with the sole aim of re-establishing the state of affairs established by the present Treaty. Noble Lords will also remember that in the Basic Structure of the Republic it was agreed by all—and I am bound to mention this because it was often forgotten, and there is scarcely any reference to it in the Press—that the Turkish Ministers would play an effective role, that 30 per cent, of the civil service would be Turkish, that in the armed forces, the gendarmerie and police, one of the three heads should be a Turk, and in each case the deputy should be either Turkish or Greek Cypriot, of another race than the head man. It was also agreed that 40 per cent. of the army and 30 per cent. of the gendarmerie and police should be Turkish Cypriots, and that separate municipalities should be created in the five largest towns by the Turkish inhabitants. These were the terms which we all signed and to which the Greeks and the Turkish Cypriots agreed, the terms on which the three major Governments, the United Kingdom, Greece and Turkey agreed.

Unhappily, and this cannot he denied, those rights were soon and steadily eroded. It was claimed by Archbishop Makarios and others that the constitution to which they had solemnly agreed, and as a result of which the settlement was made, would not work and demands were made to amend the constitution in such a way that the Turkish Cypriots, instead of enjoying the promised communal and partnership status, would be left with nothing but minority rights. This could not in the circumstances of Cyprus give to the Turkish community that security that the noble Lord, Lord Caradon, so rightly spoke about. Then came the tragic events leading to a large number of Turkish Cypriots being uprooted from their homes, as the noble Lord, Lord MaybrayKing, has said, and becoming refugees, followed by the coup d'etat of July 1964 and the two Turkish invasions, and here again the noble Lord had a wise thing to say about the Sampson coup.

There has been much discussion in recent weeks on our failure to intervene in 1974, but some of us may feel that the time to have fulfilled our duty under the Treaty was in 1964, when the constitution solemnly agreed on was repudiated. Had that then happened, there would have been, I believe, no likelihood of the Turkish invasion and subsequent events, and had there been any such likelihood, we would have been absolutely right to have come in and stopped it.

The noble Lord, Lord Caradon, argues in a very persuasive way that we should now pass the responsibility, or a share of it, to the United Nations, and that thereby the present deadlock might end and a just solution might emerge. I am afraid I am convinced that this is not the w. ay to proceed, that a successful attempt to involve all the United Nations States would greatly complicate and aggravate the situation. I agree with the noble Lord, Lord Goronwy-Roberts, last week in this House, that the best course is intercommunal talks under the auspices of the Secretary-General of the United Nations, and that the attempt to impose a solution by the United Nations itself might well be disastrous. But I do agree with my noble friend Lady Elles that there is now an obligation and an opportunity for the Turkish leaders and Cypriots to respond to the humanitarian appeal that she and others have made, concerning in particular the tragic plight and the anxieties arising out of the fact of the many missing people. I hope that the noble Lord who will answer this Question will be able to give us some reassuring news about the resumption of inter-communal talks.

9.48 p.m.

Lord BROCKWAY

My Lords, it is like old times for the noble Viscount, Lord Boyd of Merton, and myself to he speaking in sequence. The only difference is that in another place it was generally I who was making the criticism and the noble Viscount was replying. He will be a little surprised as I continue to speak to find me endorsing many of the remarks which he has made. I want to acknowledge that I have been more unhappy about British policy in relation to Cyprus than anything in foreign affairs since British support of America in Vietnam. Nevertheless, tonight I do not want to go over that ground. I want to speak, if I can, in the spirit of Lord Caradon, who opened this debate, and I hope to be constructive. My references to the past will be brief and will certainly not be recriminatory.

My Lords, I do not know how long ago it was since I first went to Cyprus, but what impressed me more than anything else were the reports from the villages about the amicable relations between the Turkish Cypriots and the Greek Cypriots. In the heat of the day there were Turkish Cypriot families and Greek Cypriot families together in the shade of the trees, and their children playing together. One of the tragedies of Cyprus is that that co-operation between the two communities was destroyed by external events.

The second remark I want to make about the past is this: I think, in looking at the present situation, we must appreciate that if there have been faults they have been faults on the sides of both communities. In 1960 there were the agreements at Zurich and at London. The London Agreement, accepted by the Turkish Cypriots and the Greek Cypriots, as the noble Lord, Lord Caradon, has said, insisted principally upon two things; that is, that the Greek Cypriots should give up the idea of Enosis (unity with Greece) and that there should not be partition of the island. But in addition to those two principles a constitution was established, and I want to express my agreement with the noble Viscount, Lord Boyd of Merton, that the Turkish Cypriots had the right to criticise the manner in which that constitution was carried out. It was conducted by Archbishop Makarios and his associates in a way which was not true either to the letter or the spirit of the original decision. In that sense the Turkish Cypriots had a justifiable right of complaint. I think they also had a right of complaint, despite the agreement ruling out Enosis and unity with Greece, with the campaign which was still carried on for that purpose in Greek Cypriot ranks. At that moment I went with the Labour deputation, with two other Members of another place, both to Cyprus and to Athens, and we then had assurances from Archbishop Makarios and the Foreign Secretary of the Greek Government that they accepted the independence of Cyprus. Those are the only references I shall make to the past situation.

I want to turn to the present. There were great hopes when the communal discussions began under the chairmanship of the Secretary-General of the United Nations. Those talks came very near to agreement in 1973, but I think we now have to recognise that they have broken down, and because there has been that deadlock in those communal talks, international action is now necessary.

I do not think that any of us can believe that the present situation in Cyprus can he accepted permanently. Before the Turkish invasion the population of Cyprus consisted of 18 per cent. Turkish Cypriots and 80 per cent. Greek Cypriots, but today that small minority of Turks occupy 40 per cent. of the territory of Cyprus and, indeed, the richest land responsible for 70 per cent. of the total productivity of the island. There have been appalling disturbances and atrocities to families on both sides; they are now refugees turned from their homes. In the case of the Turkish Cypriot refugees, British action led to the return of many of them, first to Turkey and then back to Cyprus, and the Greek Cypriots have since allowed the remaining Turkish refugees to return. The situation is different for the Greek Cypriots, evicted from their homes, in displaced persons' camps and elsewhere, and the terrible problem of the evicted Greek Cypriots remains. None of them has been allowed to return home and, whatever view we may take of the conflict in Cyprus, none of us can be satisfied that that situation shall continue.

The United Nations has twice in the Security Council discussed this situation. The United Nations on each occasion has asked, first, for the withdrawal of all foreign troops; secondly, for the return of the refugees to their homes; and, thirdly, for respect for the independent sovereignty, territorial integrity and non-allignment of Cyprus. On the first occasion the Turkish Government actually voted in favour of that resolution. on the second occasion against. The tragedy is, as the noble Lord, Lord Caradon, said, that the United Nations reaches these decisions but fails to take the necessary action to carry them out. There has been some suspicion that on the part of the West there has been some reluctance to act in this matter because of their military confrontation with the East and the importance of Turkey, Greece and Cyprus in these respects. I plead with Her Majesty's Government not to allow any other considerations to dominate the necessity of dealing with the tragedy of Cyprus on its own merits.

What can be done? The Greek Cypriots have proposed a federal solution with autonomy for both communities and have proposed that 20 per cent. of the land of Cyprus should he placed under Turkish administration. Archbishop Makarios has offered to resign his position as President if this would lead to a solution of the problem. Surely this is a basis upon which negotiations can take place and agreement be found. I want wholeheartedly to endorse the constructive proposals which my noble friend Lord Caradon has made, and perhaps to supplement them slightly. First, I wish to agree entirely with the noble Lord, Lord Banks, in his suggestion that the Commonwealth and the EEC should take some initiative in this matter. Cyprus is a member of the Commonwealth and Cyprus also has an associated agreement with the EEC. In those circumstances, it is very desirable indeed that both the Commonwealth and the EEC should take some initiative to bring about international action for a solution to the problem of Cyprus.

I want to go further than that. I want to lay the greatest stress upon the proposal which the noble Lord, Lord Caradon made, that the Security Council of the United Nations should appoint a Mediation Commission, and that that Commission should go to Cyprus and meet the representatives of both communities, should go to Athens and should go to Ankara. It might perhaps eventually meet representatives from all these places together. It should exert the whole authority of the world to bring a solution to this problem. I feel that it would probably be most effective if the Commission were composed of a representative of the West, a representative of the East and a representative of the unaligned countries. If one had a mediating Commission of that charater, I do not believe that its recommendations could be rejected either by the two communities in Cyprus or by Turkey or Greece.

I began with a reference to the time when there was accord and amity between the two communities in Cyprus. I believe that that can be restored. I believe that the opportunities are there to establish a federal administration with local autonomy for the Greek community and local autonomy for the Turkish community, but with a central administration expressing their common interest. If we can move towards that solution, I. believe that the time will return when the Turkish and Greek Cypriot communities may again live in concord and amity.