FATAL ACCIDENTS AND SUDDEN DEATHS INQUIRY (SCOTLAND) BILL [H.L.]

HL Deb 13 January 1976 vol 367 cc21-69

3.21 p.m.

The MINISTER of STATE, SCOTTISH OFFICE (Lord Kirkhill)

My Lords, I beg to move that the House do now resolve itself into Committee on this Bill.

Moved, That the House do now resolve itself into Committee.—(Lord Kirkhill.)

On Question, Motion agreed to.

House in Committee accordingly.

[The EARL OF LISTOWEL in the Chair]

Clause 1 [investigation of death and application for public inquiry]:

The Earl of LISTOWEL

Before I call Amendment No. 1, I should point out to the Committee that if this Amendment is agreed to I cannot call Amendments Nos. 2 and 3.

Lord CAMPBELL of CROY moved Amendment No. 1: Page 1, leave out lines 7 to 15.

The noble Lord said: I beg to move Amendment No. 1 which is in my name, and I think that it would be for the convenience of the Committee if my Amendments Nos. 4 and 5, which are consequential, were discussed with this Amendment. I can immediately put the Committee at rest by indicating that this is a probing Amendment and I do not seek to eliminate discussion on Amendments Nos. 2 and 3. If my noble friend Lord Selkirk, and the noble Lord, Lord Wilson of Langside, agree, it might be convenient if their Amendments, Nos. 2 and 3, were also discussed, because my Amendment ranges over the whole of their Amendments, too. Therefore, I propose that we have a debate, which would be concerned largely with the question of employment and occupation, on Amendments Nos. 1, 2, 3, 4 and 5. Unless there is any difficulty about that, I suggest that we proceed on that basis.

The Earl of SELKIRK

I would be in full agreement with that proposal.

Lord CAMPBELL of CROY

The effect of my Amendment No. 1 would be to give the Lord Advocate very wide discretion in deciding whether or not there should be a fatal accident inquiry. We believe that it is for the Government to convince the Committee that inquiries should be mandatory for the various categories of fatal accident proposed in the Bill. We can then consider at a later stage what type of Amendment—if any—it would be suitable to make to the Bill.

I now deal with the question of fatal accidents during the course of employment or occupation. My Amendment No. 1 touches on the question of fatal accidents to a person in legal custody, but that would be better considered in detail on my Amendment No. 7. I remind those noble Lords who are familiar with the system South of the Border that in Scotland there are no inquests and no coroners. There is a different and separate system. There is an important additional matter in this Bill. It is not just a question of reforming the law in Scotland to bring it up to date. There is now no proper system governing fatal accidents on installations in the British sector of the Continental Shelf; that is to say, accidents at sea beyond territorial waters and not affecting ordinary seagoing vessels, which are covered by other legislation.

I remind the Committee that, sadly, another diver died yesterday when involved in North Sea operations. So there, is a significance in this legislation and the reform suggested and the extension to the Continental Shelf, which covers most of the North Sea operations going on at present. Since 1895 it has been mandatory in Scotland that there should be a fatal accident inquiry whenever a death occurs in industrial employment, requiring both a sheriff and a jury. The Grant Committee, chaired by a senior Scottish judge, has recommended that this is no longer necessary. Since 1895 much legislation has been passed covering inquiries into industrial accidents, and a system of inspectors has been introduced. Most people interested in this subject have assumed that modernising legislation, such as this Bill, would carry out that recommendation of the Grant Committee, and that in future there would not need to be an inquiry in every single case of a fatal accident in industrial employment.

This would avoid time-wasting and overlapping. The Grant Committee proposed that it should be left to the Lord Advocate to decide whether or not a fatal inquiry was necessary. That view seemed to be confirmed in August 1973, when the Scottish Courts Administration circulated a memorandum giving its view that the requirement to hold an inquiry into every fatal industrial accident could not now be said to be necessary. It was proposed that discretion be left to the Lord Advocate to institute inquiry proceedings when necessary or appropriate. I must make it clear that I was the Minister responsible for the courts' administration at that time.

However, this Bill goes in the opposite direction. The Government are now extending the mandatory requirements to cover other forms of employment in addition to industrial employment. Why are the Government making this change of course? Is it correct that the Scottish TUC pressed for the change? If it did, I can quite understand this being taken into account and great weight being attached to it. The Scottish TUC is naturally very concerned about conditions of work and safety in employment in Scotland. But we need an explanation, not only of the Government's views but also, if they were largely influenced by the views of the Scottish TUC, an explanation of the representations by the STUC. One of the principal reforms to existing legislation that would avoid unnecessary and duplicating procedures appears to have been thrown overboard, and we need to know why. I wish to draw attention to one example. Where a criminal trial has already arisen from an accident, surely it should be left to the Lord Advocate to decide whether there should be another inquiry as well under this legislation, where many of the things that are said and the matters investigated would have to be gone over again.

We ought to consider the arrangements which now exist but which did not exist in 1895. There are systems for inquiring into industrial accidents and establishing their causes under, for example, the Mines and Quarries Act 1954, the Factories Act 1961, the Agriculture (Safety, Health and Welfare Provisions) Act 1956 and others. Indeed these measures go wider than industrial work. Are we really to contemplate inquiries under that legislation as well as an obligatory inquiry under this Bill in every case where a death has occurred? The Government must explain the reasons.

The Government themselves leaned heavily on the Grant Report in respect of other matters which arise in this Bill; for example, doing away with juries. We discussed that on Second Reading and I, for my part, agree with it. It is an important step to do away with juries, but I do not intend to oppose the Government's following of the Grant recommendation on that. The Grant Report has been much quoted by the Government in these matters; but in this case they are now proposing to take a course opposite to the Grant Committee's recommendation. In his Amendment my noble friend Lord Selkirk has put forward something very similar to my Amendment as regards paragraph (a)(ii). The Amendments of the noble Lord, Lord Wilson of Langside, do not go as far as mine and he will no doubt explain what he has in mind. I have made it clear that my Amendments are probing in order to enable the Government to explain where, in their opinion, mandatory inquiries are necessary.

I must also refer to a matter raised by the noble Lord, Lord Wilson, on Second Reading; namely, the method of obtaining views about the proposals of the Government. The noble Lord, Lord Wilson, referred to the memorandum of August 1973, when the sheriffs were told that the Government intended to accept the Grant Committee's recommendation in this respect. However, they were not later notified, apparently, that a complete change of attitude on the part of the Government had taken place, and they were not given the chance to comment on that before the Bill appeared. Of course, I immediately absolve the noble Lord, Lord Kirkhill, from any responsibility at all for this, because he was not in office during any of this period, but I must confess that I was surprised that the Sheriffs' Association of Scotland should have been left thinking that the Government were going to reduce the number of mandatory inquiries, in accordance with the proposals for legislation which had been circulated. They ought surely to have been consulted again, or at least informed that the Government were changing their minds; and here, again, I think some explanation is needed.

In sub-paragraph (ii) my Amendment touches on the question of persons who have died when in legal custody. I suggest that this is not the moment to go into this in detail. The Government themselves have down an Amendment to alter the definition of legal custody; and I should point out that, owing to a printing error, Amendment No. 8, to subsection (4), is in my name whereas it should be in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Kirkhill. But, again, the purpose of my Amendment, No. 1, is to ask: is it necessary to make inquiries mandatory in all cases, including cases of legal custody?

I have made it clear that this is an opportunity that I think the Government could take to explain why they have thought it necessary to extend instead of reduce the area of mandatory inquiries. Could not the Lord Advocate be left to decide, as was suggested by the Grant Committee? It will be noted that apparently I have the greatest confidence in our Lords Advocate. I think we have been lucky. We were very lucky in the last Conservative Administration; and it is my impression that all Lords Advocate, over many years, have served the community extremely well (the present one is no exception) in matters such as this. I personally have confidence that, in the many different combinations of circumstances in which fatal accidents can occur, they can take sensible decisions as to whether it is necessary in every case to have an inquiry, in addition to other inquiries which may be taking place. I beg to move.

3.36 p.m.

Lord WILSON of LANGSIDE

At the outset I should declare an interest. The matters with which this Bill is concerned relate exclusively to the jurisdiction of the sheriff court in Scotland, and I hold the office of Sheriff Principal of the largest of the six sheriffdoms into which Scotland is divided. The second thing I should say is that yesterday I made it known to the noble Lord, Lord Kirkhill, that in the light of discussions which I had had with the Lord Advocate I would withdraw the Amendments which were down in my name. It would nevertheless appear, particularly in the light of what the noble Lord, Lord Campbell of Croy, has said, that we should be able to have a useful and constructive debate on the clause with which your Lordships' Committee is now concerned, because it would be my submission to your Lordships that this clause is entirely misconceived.

The Grant Committee on The Sheriff Court, to which the noble Lord, Lord Campbell, referred, was set up to consider, among other things, what changes might be desirable in the function, organisation, practice and procedure of the sheriff court in Scotland to secure the more speedy, economical and satisfactory dispatch of civil and criminal business in that court.

Its conclusions numbered, in all, some 375; and with the exception of the recommendation to which the noble Lord, Lord Campbell, has referred, all of these, with perhaps some negligible exceptions, have been accepted by successive Governments of both Conservative and Labour complexion.

It is worth noting, incidentally, that the Committee was not unanimous in all the views it expressed. There were three Notes of Dissent put in at the instance of some four members of the Committee; but so far as these fatal accident inquiries are concerned the recommendation was unanimous. That was that these compulsory fatal accident inquiries under the Fatal Accidents Inquiry (Scotland) Act of 1895 should be abolished, but that the Lord Advocate should continue, as Lord Campbell has said, to have discretion to order accident inquiries under the 1906 Act. Of course, the Amendment moved by the noble Lord, Lord Campbell, would in effect adopt the recommendation of the Grant Committee. The clause as it stands, as Lord Campbell has said, not only rejects it but would widen the range of these compulsory inquiries; and the inevitable result—I do not think this would be disputed—would be significantly to increase the number of these compulsory inquiries. In the view of the Grant Committee Report and of most people with practical experience in the field, already these inquiries are unnecessary, are formal, and are largely a waste of the time, not only of the courts but of all those involved in them.

The Government's grounds and reasons (as so far declared) for refusing to accept the Grant Committee's recommendations are quite unconvincing and unimpressive. They really miss the point in the context of the Scottish legal scene, because what must be emphasised is that if the mandatory inquiries are replaced by discretionary inquiries it does not follow that the public interest in safety at work will be prejudiced. Indeed, there is room for the view that it will be more effectively and constructively protected, because, in accordance with our well-established Scottish practice, all these deaths with which the Bill is concerned will be the subject of a report to the Crown Office in Edinburgh by the procurator fiscal of the area in which the death occurs, and there, in the Crown Office, as the noble Lord, Lord Campbell, said, the Lord Advocate is of course responsible for ensuring that each of the reports of these deaths is not only just looked at by Crown counsel but is looked at in a quasi judicial way. In practice, any case which presents any difficulty is looked at by one of the Scottish Lords.

It seems to me that the Government's proposal in this clause ignores this fundamentally important feature of the Scottish legal system. Their answer to the criticisms of those who want Grant implemented suggests that the Government have lost sight of this fundamental feature of the Scottish legal system; or, if they have not lost sight of it, they are unaware of it. To those of us who care about our Scottish legal system, this is just a little disturbing, for it is this special feature which should and would ensure that where there is a real public interest in having a public judicial inquiry such an inquiry will be held, and the inquiry when held would be a real inquiry and not simply formal. At present it is a fact, and this cannot be over emphasised, that the great bulk of these inquiries are formal and serve—to quote from the words of the Grant Committee Report— "no very useful purpose". You could count—I will not risk saying "on the fingers of one hand"—certainly on the fingers of two hands, the number in any one year that are more than a formality of that description, serving no useful purpose. This is a fact which is quite inescapable. This is something that has been going on in the courts in Scotland for years and which the Grant Committee said should be stopped.

There is one last point I would mention and that is that where the next-of-kin or others with an interest are anxious to have a public inquiry, then of course in the normal course of events their wishes are ascertained and taken into account in reaching a decision on whether or not such an inquiry is necessary. This would protect the public and the private interest and this would sweep away the unnecessary inquiries that no one in the know really wants. The noble Lord, Lord Campbell, referred to the views of the Scottish TUC. I find it difficult to believe that the situation in its complete context and perspective was explained to the STUC. I may be wrong about that but, in the light of what I have said about the way in which the Scottish legal system deals with these matters, I find it difficult to believe that it has been put to them. It is a body for whose views I should certainly have the greatest respect.

The continued holding of these unnecessary inquiries, as the Grant Committee called them—and I think that this is important to your Lordships—has tended to bring the whole system, the set-up of the courts in Scotland, into disrepute. To hold more of these inquiries would surely only add to that tendency—and I do not say that it is more than a tendency. Moreover, there is the point —and this is my last point—which was mentioned by the Grant Report that this type of inquiry, the unnecessary type, the type where the next-of-kin are quite happy about the situation and are satisfied that there is no matter of public interest to be investigated, can be a cause of considerable distress (this is what the Grant Committee would tell you) to the next-of-kin and to the relatives of the deceased. That kind of stress is something which must be accepted where there is a necessary judicial inquiry, where the inquiry has, if you like, a purpose; but surely it should be avoided where it has no purpose at all.

That, in effect, is very much what the Grant Committee said about these inquiries which the Government propose not merely to continue but to extend. In these circumstances, I would agree with the noble Lord, Lord Campbell, that the Government should consider very carefully whether in Clause 1 they have not made a bad mistake.

3.44 p.m.

The Earl of SELKIRK

My Lords, I am very glad indeed that the noble Lord, Lord Wilson of Langside, has been able to join the discussion. He speaks with quite unusual authority having been a Lord Advocate and having been responsible for the reorganisation of the sheriff courts and is now a Sheriff Principal. He adds his words to those of the noble Lord, Lord Grant, in saying that there are a number of unnecessary inquiries. I am going to quote only one passage from Lord Grant's Report but I think it is an important one. He says that not only are these inquiries unnecessary but—I quote: we are not convinced that inquiries of this kind provide the relatives of the deceased with helpful information. That means that it does not help them in any action for reformation at all. It continues: We are told that they can be on occasions a cause of acute distress to close relatives. That is the point that the noble Lord has already made.

The Grant Committee was by any standards a very responsible committee. I cannot believe that, if there was any danger of unfairness happening to anyone in what the noble Lord called the "work force", they could possibly have recommended that obligatory inquiries were not really necessary. What, however, I find most difficult is the terms in which obligatory inquiries have been extended. That is the point of the wording in Clause 1(1)(a). It starts off by repeating the words of the Act of 1895 and it then goes on—and I believe the intention is to include anybody who is conceivably employed or self-employed but I think it goes too far: …while the person who has died, being an employee, was in the course of his employment or, being an employer or self-employed person was engaged in his occupation as such". I do not know whether it is realised how wide is that range. It means in effect that any running-down case, any car accident, any road accident, would come under this Bill. That is to say, that from the moment anybody leaves his house on his way to work if he is killed in the streets there is an automatic inquiry. I would say with the greatest respect that that is wholly unnecessary.

However, the situation is a good deal more complicated than that. Supposing that you were driving the baker's van and got killed on the road, there would he an inquiry; supposing that you killed the other man and he has golf clubs in his car and that it may be presumed that he was going to play golf, there would be no inquiry. If he were a professional golfer and that was his occupation there would be an inquiry; but supposing that he was just out to play golf for the week-end with a chum, there would be no inquiry. I think that the hazy edge there becomes quite ridiculous.

May I take this a step further? Would not the words "self-employed person…engaged in his occupation", include a housewife? Most housewives would describe themselves as self-employed when engaged in that occupation. That means that if there were any accident in the house—and there are far too many in the house; at one time, although I do not know the figures today, there were more accidents in the house than on the roads —and a housewife engaged in her employment or occupation is for any reason killed, say, by an electric shock, by falling downstairs or by falling out of bed, there would be a compulsory inquiry; but there would not be one if one of the children were killed. There would not be one if the husband was killed.

Let me take the case that the noble Lord himself quoted on Second Reading. He spoke about schools, about shops, about hospitals. If a doctor is killed or (as we would say in the Navy) a sickbay attendant is killed, there would be an inquiry; but if a patient were killed there would not be an inquiry; it would be discretionary. Take the case of the schools. If a teacher were killed there would be a compulsory inquiry; if a pupil, there would not. The same situation applies in a shop if an assistant working there is killed. But, if a client comes into the shop and is killed there would not be a compulsory inquiry.

The point I am making is that this distinction is wholly unreal. It is an untenable position. I say with respect to the noble Lord that we shall have to move further on that line and go straight into the situation of a coroner's inquest which now prevails in England. I do not think this is wanted in Scotland. I always regard a coroner's inquest as something of a survival from mediaeval times. I do not know very much about coroners' inquests, but I do not think that those are wanted at the present time in Scotland. The alternative to this untenable position would be to have some element of discretion. As the noble Lord, Lord Wilson of Langside, said, our whole system depends upon the confidence that we have in the Lord Advocate and the whole organisation of the procurator fiscal.

By stretching the words of this clause you are undoubtedly showing lack of confidence in the capacity of the Crown Office, the Lord Advocate, and the procurator fiscal. This is wrong. If the noble Lord gets what I think he wants—as I understand it there is pressure from the Scottish TUC—he means this: if anyone is engaged in his employment or occupation and some safety regulation is broken, or may be broken, an inquiry should be obligatory. I would not differ from him and I would not find myself in opposition to that. But the broad way in which this is expressed today goes much too far and will in the end be completely untenable.

I doubt whether this part of the Bill is all that important. This deals really with Clause 9. The Bill is not at all political. We all have exactly the same interests in ensuring that examinations of the circumstances of death should be fairly and properly conducted. We all want that; there is no division of opinion. But, as the noble Lord, Lord Wilson of Langside, said, one should not make this a routine business. When inquiries are conducted, they should be carried out properly and should not be prejudiced in any way by making a large number of inquiries which are totally unnecessary. For these reasons, I hope that the noble Lord will either grant a revision of the words which I have quoted or, alternatively, permit the introduction of an element of discretion.

Baroness SUMMERSKILL

Will the noble Lord forgive a mere "Sassenach" for saying a word? I have in my medical life been involved in a number of postmortems and inquests, and I well understand the English system. The Scottish system, which I have been learning about today, is foreign to me. But I was astonished when the noble Lord, Lord Wilson of Langside, said that one reason why these inquiries should not be conducted is that they would distress the relatives. All inquests and inquiries in this country—and post-mortems particularly—distress relatives to some degree. That is inevitable. They are anxious that their relation who has died should be buried and that that should be the end of the business. But a long time ago the law of England decreed that there should be the system which we have. We have to comfort the relatives and tell them that this is the law and proceed with the business. Surely that is only right and proper for this very important inquiry. An inquiry into the death of some individual to be denied in Scotland because it might distress the relatives seems absolutely illogical. Then the noble Earl, Lord Selkirk, said that another reason why we should not proceed is that there have been so many omissions; that is, whereas there might be an inquiry into the death of a certain person in the family, there would not be an inquiry into the death of another. But surely that is no reason for weakening the Bill. He is suggesting that, because certain people are omitted from the Bill, none should be included. I am not a lawyer but, listening to this argument, it seems to me the reasons being adduced for not going forward with the Bill have been extremely weak and completely illogical.

Lord WILSON of LANGSIDE

As a simple lawyer, may I say that of course I am just as aware as the noble Baroness—I hope she will accept this from me—that inevitably these situations create distress. Throughout my professional life—as no doubt in that of the noble Baroness—I have been involved in situations of distress. I was not saying that this was a reason why these inquiries should not be held. I was saying the Grant Committee had drawn attention to the circumstance that a very large proportion of these peculiar Scottish inquiries was unnecessary. I have known situations where the relatives did not want inquiries and said to me afterwards, "Why on earth did you inflict this on us when it was not really necessary?"

Baroness SUMMERSKILL

May I—

Lord WILSON of LANGSIDE

If I may answer the noble Baroness, because she made a point about this and I should not like her to think, as she thought before, that I am stupid. I appreciate the point. I was not suggesting inquiries should not be held because they upset people. I was saying that the Grant Committee, which looked into this matter, said that these rather peculiar Scottish inquiries sometimes caused unnecessary distress. I would think that the noble Baroness would agree with me that unnecessary distress is something which should be avoided. I had thought of saying that this would be part of the compassionate argument about which we hear a great deal in politics. I stand between political Parties now, but I seem to have heard a lot about compassion. It would be good compassion to avoid unnecessary distress.

Baroness SUMMERSKILL

The noble Lord said that it is found so often after an inquiry that the inquiry was unnecessary. We all agree with that. I suggest that probably 90 per cent. of inquiries of many kinds have been found unnecessary. But that does not invalidate the inquiry. That is precisely why an inquiry should take place; that is, to see whether it was necessary or unnecessary. The fact that a great majority are unnecessary does not rule out having the inquiry.

The Earl of SELKIRK

Perhaps I may put the noble Baroness at ease by saying that all deaths are inquired into by the Lord Advocate or the procurator fiscal, no matter what happens. The question is whether it is necessary to have a public inquiry. Unless death is by natural causes, all deaths are fully inquired into, and this system has held the confidence of Scotland in the nature of those inquiries.

Lord WILSON of LANGSIDE

It is not only a public inquiry but a public judicial inquiry. Many of these present public judicial inquiries which are unnecessary follow a variety of other inquiries which have also been held.

Baroness SUMMERSKILL

I am glad to say that it was necessary to have two men against one woman on this issue!

3.59 p.m.

Lord KIRKHILL

May I say at the outset that of course I accept and agree that Amendments Nos. 1, 2, 3, 4 and 5 are associated, and that it is profitable to have a wide-ranging debate to include points made by the noble Lord, Lord Campbell of Croy, the noble Earl, Lord Selkirk, and the noble Lord, Lord Wilson of Langside. I feel I rather more than just touched upon the substance of the Government's case at Second Reading. I felt I had clearly explained the reason for the change in Government policy. But before I come to that major point of substance, I should like to touch on one or two points as they have arisen thus far in the debate.

I should say first to the noble Lord opposite that I am unable at this time to give him a firm view of the position relating, for example, to a rig on tow outside territorial waters. That might be one example of what he had in mind. However, I undertook to look into this point and will certainly communicate with him. I can reassure the noble Lord, Lord Campbell, on his point anent the duplication of inquiries because I am advised that there will be no such duplication. Section 14(7) of the Health and Safety at Work etc. Act 1974, as amended by Schedule 1 to this Bill, makes clear that where an inquiry is held under that Act no inquiry will be held under this Bill, unless the Lord Advocate directs that one should be held. I understand that inquiries under the Health and Safety at Work etc. Act 1974 have replaced inquiries under the earlier safety legislation mentioned by the noble Lord. I thought I should place that on record. It is fair for me to state that the Government accept that although liaison did take place—indeed liaison with 14 bodies at one time, if one goes back to 1973—perhaps continuing liaison was not maintained because of the change of Government. That takes account of the year 1974. To that extent I think it is reasonable to say that the sheriffs principal might well have had more contact with Government.

In referring to the points made by the noble Earl, Lord Selkirk, I can assure him that, as I understand it, the legal definition of "employee" does not include the word "housewife". On the other points that he made, I am not sufficiently skilled to reply in detail at this time but I will certainly communicate with him regarding the professional golfer and the various kinds of car accidents to which he made reference.

I now turn to what in this clause I regard as the major issue of substance between the Government's view and the points which have been raised this afternoon by some of your Lordships. Although the noble Lord, Lord Campbell of Croy, suggested that at this stage I might leave over the question of people held in custody until we discuss a later Amendment, I should like to refer now to people in custody because it has a bearing, at any rate at one point, on the matter of substance to which I wish to refer. The effect of this Amendment is to delete from the Bill all provision for mandatory inquiries, whether into deaths resulting from fatal accidents at work or into deaths of people in legal custody. This would leave in the Bill only the provision for inquiries ordered by the Lord Advocate in exercise of his discretion under Clause 1(1)(b). This Amendment is not acceptable to the Government. We consider that the provision for mandatory inquiries is an essential part of the Bill.

I quite agree that we can refer to this matter again later, if your Lordships wish, but as regards people in custody at present, under Section 25(2) of the Prisons (Scotland) Act 1952 an inquiry must be held into the death of any person confined in a prison, remand centre, detention centre, borstal institution or young offenders institution. It is clearly desirable that there be an automatic public inquiry into such deaths, not dependent on the exercise of discretion by a Minister, but in order that no suspicion should attach to the death and that no imputation can be made that the true facts were concealed. No suggestion has ever been made that a mandatory inquiry is unnecessary or undesirable in these circumstances. The Grant Committee, when it suggested that mandatory inquiries were unnecessary, was looking solely at inquiries into fatal industrial accidents under the Fatal Accidents Inquiry (Scotland) Act 1895. The Committee's attention was not directed to inquiries under the Prisons (Scotland) Act 1952, and the Government's view is that that Act cannot be ignored. I would add that while the provisions of the Prisons (Scotland) Act 1952 do not apply to deaths of people in the custody of the police, there is an equally strong public interest in ensuring that such deaths are beyond suspicion. For this reason the Lord Advocate has in recent years used his discretion under the Fatal Accidents and Sudden Deaths Inquiry (Scotland) Act 1906 to direct that public inquiries be held into all such deaths. It therefore appears appropriate also to provide for mandatory inquiries into such deaths.

As regards mandatory inquiries into deaths resulting from accidents at work, I would concede that the Grant Committee recommended that there should not be mandatory inquiries into such deaths. We now come to the point of substance and, if one may use the phrase, the disagreement between the Government and those who have spoken today. As I indicated to your Lordships on Second Reading, there have been extensive consultations about tile recommendations of the Grant Committee on fatal accident inquiries, and in particular in August 1973 a consultative paper was circulated to all interested bodies. The Scottish Trades Union Congress and also the Law Society of Scotland made strong representations against the abolition of mandatory inquiries into fatal industrial accidents.

The main arguments stated by them were as follows. First, unless there is a mandatory obligation to hold an inquiry there is the risk that many cases of fatal accidents at work will not be fully investigated and that some cases where there has been a breach of safety requirements or the employers have otherwise been at fault will not come to light. There are many cases where the employers' version of the facts appears at the outset to be fully corroborated or at least not contradicted, and this would seemingly justify the cessation of inquiries at an early stage if it were not mandatory to hold an inquiry. Secondly, the public inquiry is of value to the relatives of the deceased in revealing whether they have likely grounds for a civil action against the employer. Without an inquiry it would often be very difficult to ascertain this.

Throughout further consultations the STUC persisted with their objection to the abolition of mandatory inquiries, while the Law Society—and I emphasise this—were prepared to withdraw their objection only if the Lord Advocate undertook that only in exceptional circumstances and after full investigation would a public inquiry be dispensed with. On consideration, the Government decided there was considerable weight in the arguments adduced by the STUC and the Law Society and that it would be wrong to abolish mandatory inquiries into fatal accidents at work in the face of opposition from the representatives of the interests of the employees, who are the people directly interested in such inquiries.

I would submit therefore that mandatory inquiries should be retained both into deaths of people in custody and into deaths resulting from accidents at work; and I would ask your Lordships not to accept the proposed Amendment.

4.10 p.m.

The Earl of SELKIRK

The noble Lord has said that there should be obligatory inquiries into accidents at work. In the normal sense of the word, I would not object to that; but that is not what the Bill says. Does the noble Lord wish to include all running down accidents on the road, and would it therefore depend on what the driver is doing at the time he is killed? Should those cases not be excluded from this form of inquiry? There must be a procedure, which I have no doubt is well worked out, for handling these matters—whether there is a prosecution or any other steps are taken—and that there should be a great variation according to what a man is doing at the time seems to me a trifle absurd.

I never said that housewives were employees, but I do not think the noble Lord can say with unquestioned authority that they are not self-employed persons engaged in their occupation. This is something which might well be interpreted at some time or other in a different sense. The interesting point is that the noble Lord has said that these inquiries are of value to the relatives. He admitted in his Second Reading speech that that was not the purpose of an inquiry. The purpose of an inquiry was to find the cause of death and the Grant Report, which I quoted, stated specifically that an inquiry was not of value to the relatives in an action for damages or for reparation. If the noble Lord would confine this clause to what he has stated—that is, the safety of those at work—I should not have any strong objection. It is the very wide connotation of the words in this clause to which I take exception.

Lord CAMPBELL of CROY

I am quick to say that I am not seeking to end this debate and, of course, I shall not withdraw, as I said I would, until everyone has finished speaking. But I think that the noble Lord should take very much into account what my noble friend Lord Selkirk has said. He has been viewing with a lawyer's eye the extent to which these mandatory inquiries might be stretched, particularly the question of road accidents where the persons involved are in some way engaged in their occupation or employment, because this would make the system much wider than I think any of us had considered the Government intended. I hope that the noble Lord, Lord Kirkhill, will look again at this question. The matter has been put most cogently by the noble Lord, Lord Wilson of Langside, who perhaps has more experience of these matters than any of us in your Lordships' House. It is clear from what the noble Lord, Lord Kirkhill, has said that it was the Scottish Trades Union Congress who brought particular pressure to bear in this matter, and rightly so. If they felt that this was something which affected safety and conditions at work, then of course they were right to do so. But I hope that the noble Lord, or his right honourable colleague the Lord Advocate, or others, will quickly have further discussions with the STUC and others in the light of what has been said, to see whether the effect of this Bill is really what they want.

The noble Lord mentioned the Law Society and I, and no doubt others, have heard about this matter direct from the Scottish Law Society. It is clear that they withdrew their original objection and were perfectly ready for the mandatory element to be removed from industrial employment, provided that the Lord Advocate considered in every case whether or not there need be an inquiry. So I do not think that they can be regarded as a body who were objecting, in the end, to the Grant Committee's recommendation. But I hope that the noble Lord will have further discussions with the STUC, because I understand from what he has said that they are virtually the only body who feel strongly about this matter. I think that the effect has been to reverse completely the original intention and it may be that, as the noble Lord, Lord Wilson of Langside, indicated, they have not fully understood what the effects will be.

I welcomed the intervention of the noble Baroness, Lady Summer skill, and I am delighted when she and others who have experience of a similar system South of the Border take part in our debates. I think that she, with her experience of having had to deal with some of the difficult and delicate questions affecting families at inquests, spoke most sincerely about the fact that this none the less has to happen in certain cases South of the Border. I would only repeat what my noble friend Lord Selkirk said that is, that what we are considering is not whether an inquiry must be held, but whether there needs to be a second inquiry which will go over all the ground which another inquiry, under some other legislation or under some other system, has already dealt with.

I now come to the point which I put, because when the Government are look- ing at possible changes in this Part of the Bill I hope that they will consider whether to give the Lord Advocate, at the very least, discretion to waive a fatal accident inquiry where criminal proceedings a real ready taking place or have already taken place, and where everything that could conceivably be relevant has already been raised and gone into, because there seems to be a most unnecessary and possibly damaging duplication in that. So I hope that the noble Lord, Lord Kirkhill, will be able to give us some indication, before we end this debate, that the Government will look at this again and will also have discussions with the STUC.

Lord BALERNO

May I just make one very small and minor point? Other arguments have been so well put that I do not propose to go over them again, but I would draw attention to the rather naive approach of the Government to the financial effect of the Bill. The Government say that: The financial effects of any increase in the number of inquiries held resulting from the terms of the Bill should be completely offset by the saving consequent on ceasing to have juries in such inquiries. That is taking a very optimistic view of how few additional inquiries a sheriff will have to make if they are mandated. My noble friend Lord Selkirk has made it quite clear that there will be many more inquiries, which also means many more sheriffs and all that goes with them. So I believe that the Government are perhaps being deliberately optimistic about the additional cost that will be incurred if this measure passes as it is now.

4.17 p.m.

Lord KIRKHILL

I return yet again to the point raised by the noble Earl, Lord Selkirk, and repeat the reasoning behind the Government's determination to extend mandatory public inquiries. The present position is that a public inquiry must be held under the Fatal Accidents Inquiry (Scotland) Act 1895 into accidental deaths of people engaged in any industrial employment or occupation; in effect, factory workers, agricultural workers and, generally, manual workers or people tending machinery. Deaths of people working in offices, shops, hospitals and schools would not normally give rise to an inquiry under the 1895 Act, as I indicated on Second Reading.

The effect of this Bill is to extend the mandatory requirement to hold an inquiry into deaths resulting from accidents in any employment or occupation—not merely in an industrial employment or occupation. The reasons for this extension are that it appears that the law should be equally concerned with the safety of the whole workforce, and that developments such as the greater use of office machinery have increased the risks of non-industrial employment. So it is in an attempt to be fair to all of the work force, to those who are self-employed as well as to those who are employees, that the Bill is extended in this mandatory fashion. I cannot hold out hope at this point that the Government will change their mind, nor that they will consult yet again with the STUC, for I have to say that the Government have had extensive consultations with that body and they have accepted the representations which it put to them.

At this stage I can say in reply to the point which has been raised by the noble Lord, Lord Campbell of Croy, that the Government will look again at the provision to see whether it is possible to deal with cases where criminal proceedings have already taken place by an alteration that would be deemed to be suitable both to this side of the House and to the noble Lord. I can give an undertaking to consult on that point.

May I briefly mention the point made by the noble Lord, Lord Balerno, and advise him that consideration has been given to the effect of having mandatory inquiries into all fatal accidents at work. So far as can be estimated, the resulting increase in the number of inquiries will be in the region of 33 per cent. The Government are satisfied that given the saving of time and money consequent upon doing away with juries—which is something that we are all agreed about—this increase can be accommodated without any significant increase in expenditure or manpower.

Lord BALERNO

My argument is that, if inquiries are mandatory, the Government have grossly underestimated the number of inquiries that will have to be held.

Lord KIRKHILL

At this stage only time will prove whether or not that assertion is valid.

The Earl of SELKIRK

Of course, the Government should be fair to the whole of the work force but they should also be fair to everybody else. May I ask the noble Lord whether the Government will consider taking out road accidents. It seems to me to be quite absurd that road accidents should be dealt with in a totally different way according to who was driving the car. It is fair and reasonable that everybody should be treated in the same way. May I, therefore, ask the noble Lord at least to look at this matter again, if nothing else.

Lord KIRKHILL

I shall certainly look at that point.

Lord CAMPBELL of CROY

I am grateful for the noble Lord's undertaking to look at this matter again, even though it is only a small part of what we were suggesting in the way of changes. When he does so—and I hope that he will give the matter very early consideration as I understand that the next stage of this Bill may be only a week or so away—I think that the noble Lord may find that other points would arise. We shall welcome Government Amendments and will try to make it as easy as possible for the noble Lord to make changes in the direction that we have suggested. This has been a debate which has enabled the whole subject of fatal accidents in the course of employment and occupation to be considered, and I now beg leave to withdraw the Amendment.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

4.23 p.m.

Lord CAMPBELL of CROY moved Amendment No. 7: Page 2, line 20, leave out subsection (4).

The noble Lord said: I beg to move Amendment No. 7. This is the Amendment which I indicated deals with the question of mandatory inquiries where a person has died in legal custody. If the noble Lord, Lord Kirkhill, agrees, it may be convenient if we discuss Amendment No. 8, which appears under my name but which is a Government Amendment, at the same time because Amendment No. 8 seeks to redraft most of the subsection which my Amendment seeks to take out. If the noble Lord, Lord Kirkhill, agrees that we can discuss both, it will save time. No doubt he will move his Amendment after the debate, and again I say that I shall not press my Amendment.

It is our intention that the Government should persuade us why it should be necessary to have mandatory inquiries in all cases where a person has died in legal custody. At present I understand the position to be that an inquiry is obligatory only if a person dies in prison. During his earlier remarks the noble Lord, Lord Kirkhill, appeared to confirm that. Now the Government are to extend it to legal custody, even, so far as I can see from the wording of the subsection, if that means travelling in a black maria between one place and another. Can the noble Lord tell us whether there has been pressure from certain bodies for an extension of mandatory inquiries in this sense? For example, I could understand that in certain cases it would be right to have an inquiry, and this could be at the discretion of the Lord Advocate. If, for example, there was a suspicion that the police had not immediately handed over an injured, arrested person for urgent medical treatment and that later he died because he had not received that treatment, I assume that a Lord Advocate would order a fatal accident inquiry.

We should like to know whether there has been pressure to extend, as this Bill seeks to do, the mandatory system to every case where a person dies in legal custody. It has been mentioned to me that there could be cases where much distress and embarrassment to families would be caused by it being publicly determined at an inquiry that, for example, a young person who had died at a police station had died from an overdose of drugs and that he was a drug addict. That is the kind of case which would be inquired into, anyway, but which would not need a public inquiry and all the publicity in the newspapers that could occur. I mention that matter because it has been represented in relation to what is now proposed in this Bill, but my purpose is to probe and find out why the Government have sought, against the recommendations of the Grant Committee, to extend the mandatory system rather than to reduce it. I agree that the noble Lord mentioned earlier that in relation to legal custody it appears that the Grant Committee were not suggesting a reduction but, so far as they were making any recommendation, that the situation should stay as it is.

Baroness HORNSBY-SMITH

Could the noble Lord advise me whether detention in a criminal lunatic asylum is to be covered by this mandatory term? If so, anybody who was incarcerated for life and died a perfectly natural death would have to have a mandatory inquiry into his death.

Lord KIRKHILL

First may I assure the noble Baroness that there is no provision in this Bill for the situation which she has outlined. The provision relates to detention in a prison, remand centre, detention centre borstal institution, or young offenders institution, all within the meaning of the Prisons (Scotland) Act 1952. If I may turn to the major point which was touched upon by the noble Lord, Lord Campbell of Croy, regarding whether or not there had been pressure for the extension of mandatory inquiries to questions of all persons in legal custody, I can answer unequivocally, No, but for the reasons that I gave in my answer to Amendment No. 1 it seems only right that in this instance inquiries should be mandatory. May I also point out to the noble Lord, Lord Campbell of Croy, that, if left undefined, the expression "a person is in legal custody" is too uncertain in its meaning and might he interpreted as including the normal custody of children by their parents.

We sought to define that in some measure. If I may respond to the major point made by the noble Lord in his brief remark, Amendment No. 8 which I shall move at the end of this debate replaces Clause 1 (4) with a new subsection which is intended to ensure that anyone who is required to be detained in, or subject to detention in, any of the penal institutions listed in that subsection but who is for any reason outside the institution at the time of his death, is considered to be in legal custody for the purposes of this Bill. This means that the death of any such person will give rise to a mandatory inquiry under the Bill.

Without such an Amendment, it appears that a mandatory inquiry would be required only into the deaths of people who were physically inside the institution or who were being taken there at the time of death. For instance, the Amendment is designed to cover the case of a prisoner who at the time of his death is a member of a group working outside the prison under the supervision of prison officers. It will also cover the case of a person being taken from a penal institution to attend a court. In the Government's view, it is clearly desirable that inquiries should be mandatory into deaths occurring in such cases.

Lord CAMPBELL of CROY

It appears from what the noble Lord has said that he has not received representations from outside bodies on this matter, but this is something which the Government have decided to do as this legislation is passing through the House. I can only assume that it is some form of protection for the police and the authorities. I should not have thought it necessary. I should have thought that, if there was any kind of criticism, the Lord Advocate would have the discretion to order an inquiry. I think perhaps it is going further than is necessary to say that in every case there must be a fatal accident inquiry.

On the point raised by my noble friend Lady Hornsby-Smith, I should like to get the answer absolutely clear from the Minister. If he cannot reply immediately, no doubt he will give the answer later during the progress of this Bill. The equivalent of Broadmoor in Scotland is the State Hospital at Carstairs, and I think that is the institution to which my noble friend refers. It does not seem to be covered by the new definition in Amendment No. 8, but I should like to be sure that what the Minister said is absolutely clear; that is, that a person dying while detained, and sometimes detained against his will, at the State Hospital at Carstairs would not necessitate a mandatory fatal accident inquiry.

Lord KIRKHILL

I cannot respond at this stage to the last point made by the noble Lord, Lord Campbell of Croy, but I will certainly let him know the official view on that question. With regard to his earlier points, I can only repeat that it is a balance of judgment and, in the view of the Government, for the reasons which I have explained it seems sensible to have a mandatory inquiry into the type of situation which I referred to.

Lord CAMPBELL of CROY

I am glad to have had the opportunity of this short debate on the point of legal custody. We will reserve our position and will consider carefully what has been said, but in the meantime I beg leave to withdraw the Amendment.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

4.35 p.m.

Lord KIRKHILL

We have already discussed this Amendment in the mini debate we have just concluded and I now formally ask your Lordships to accept Amendment No.8. I beg to move.

Amendment moved—

Page 2, line 21, leave out from ("if") to end of line 26 and insert—

1. ("(a) he is detained in, or is subject to detention in, a prison, remand centre, detention center, borstal institution, or young offenders institution, all within the meaning of the Prisons (Scotland) Act 1952; or
2. (b) he is detained in a police station, police cell, or other similar place; or
3. (c) he is being taken to any of the places specified in paragraphs (a) and (b) of this subsection to be detained therein.").—(Lord kisrkhill.)

The Earl of SELKIRK moved, as an Amendment to Amendment No. 8, manuscript Amendment No. 8A: In paragraph (c) line 1 after ("to") insert ("or from").

The noble Earl said: I beg to move this Amendment in the form of a question. This is an Amendment to paragraph (c). I am adding words to indicate that he is being taken to or from any of the places specified in paragraph (a). To some extent that covers one or two of the points made by my noble friend Lord Campbell of Croy. For instance, if he is being taken to a hospital it might be a hospital outside the prison. He might be taken to the law courts, and I do not know whether the law courts can strictly be defined as a police station or a similar institution. I am merely asking whether this sort of situation is covered. I beg to move this manuscript Amendment as an Amendment to Amendment No. 8.

Lord KIRKHILL

As the noble and learned Earl will appreciate, we on this side of the Committee have hardly had sufficient time to give proper consideration to the point which he has just raised but if he is willing to withdraw the Amendment I will undertake to look at this as a drafting Amendment.

Lord CAMPBELL of CROY

Before my noble friend responds I must immediately say that I have not even seen this Amendment and was not aware of its existence as it is a manuscript Amendment separate from the Marshalled List. I mention this only because otherwise should not have failed to mention it in the earlier debate. I am sure it is a useful point and I hope the Government will look into it.

The Earl of SELKIRK

Perhaps I should just refer to the wording of the Amendment. I am saying that he is being taken "to or from" any of the places mentioned. I beg leave to withdraw the Amendment.

Amendment to the Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

On Question, Amendment agreed to.

On Question, Whether Clause 1, as amended, shall stand part of the Bill?

Lord CAMPBELL of CROY

I should like to raise a point which arose at Second Reading. It is related to Clause 9, which has the effect of extending the fatal accident procedure to the Continental Shelf. The parts of Clause 1 are (1)(b) and (3)(a) and the questions relate to which procurator fiscal and which sheriff are to be the ones who initiate proceedings when an accident has occurred 100 or 200 miles out to sea.

At Second Reading I welcomed the extension of the new system to fatal accidents connected with winning oil and gas from the Continental Shelf. There has been a tragic toll of divers' lives in the past two years, but the Government ought to explain which authorities will be involved. Reading from the top of page 2, the Bill requires: …the procurator fiscal for the district with which the circumstances of the death appear to be most closely connected to investigate and apply to a sheriff for an inquiry. If I may put a possible case as an example, if a rig is operating 120 miles from the Shetland Isles and about120 miles also from the mainland, which is the relevant district for the purposes of this clause? Is this something which is to be left to the Lord Advocate to indicate at the time?

Again, if a death occurs from an accident while a structure is being towed round the West and North coasts of Scotland—for example from Loch Carron, which I mentioned at Question Time today, where the largest oil platform in the world is being constructed and which, in a little over a year, will have to be towed round the West and North coasts of Scotland—will these provisions apply if there is a fatal accident on or in connection with that structure off the West Coast?

The first point I have raised is which authority—the procurator fiscal or the sheriff responsible for Argyllshire or the West Coast—is to initiate action in that case? There is also a second point arising which was just touched on earlier by the Minister. Who decides whether it is an accident connected with the exploration of the seabed and exploitation—those are the words used in this Bill—or whether it is a normal maritime accident involving seagoing vessels, if a tug or several tugs are towing the structure which is part of a platform not yet installed in the North Sea? Does the structure, for example, have to be connected with the seabed and operating in exploration or exploitation? I have recognised that the noble Lord may need notice of this, and may wish to reply on Clause 9, or at some later stage. But there could be cases where it has to be decided whether it is an accident to be dealt with by the ordinary maritime laws as if it were an accident on board ship in the area concerned, or whether it is something directly related to the oil and gas operations on the Continental Shelf, which therefore will fall within this fatal accident procedure.

There is another example. There are supply boats which now are continually working to and from the rigs and platforms of our Continental Shelf. If there is an accident involving a supply boat beside a rig, somebody will have the difficult decision as to whether it was a fatal accident on a boat, which would come under existing legislation, or whether it was a fatal accident more related to the winning of gas and oil, which should therefore come under the new legislation. So without wishing to complicate, but seeking to clarify, I put these points at this stage.

Lord KIRKHILL

The points raised in this debate have been wide ranging. Perhaps I might start by saying that the State Hospital, Carstairs, is not covered by the Bill—I make that point very clearly. As the noble Lord opposite will understand, he and I know a bit about the difficulties of oil extraction in these Northern waters. Some of the very points he has made this afternoon are now beginning to occur to us, and we intend to look into many of the points the noble Lord has raised. At this stage, we are not in a position to give him firm answers; nor, I should add, will I be in a position to give the noble Lord firm answers this afternoon. It is my intention to return to these points at a later stage in the Bill.

Clause 1, as amended, agreed to.

Clauses 2 to 4 agreed to.

Clause 5 [Criminal proceedings, compellability of witnesses and admissibility in other proceedings of evidence given at public inquiry]:

4.43 p.m.

Lord KIRKHILL moved Amendment No. 9: Page 4, line 36, leave out subsection (3).

The noble Lord said: This Amendment deletes from the Bill the provision that transcripts of the evidence given at an inquiry and reports of the proceedings at an inquiry shall not be admissable in any judicial proceedings arising out of the same death. It is considered that it is unnecessary to make express provision for this in the Bill, as the admissibility of such evidence in other proceedings is sufficiently covered by the general law of evidence. The types of judicial proceedings which might arise out of the death are civil claims or criminal prosecutions. In both types of case transcripts of the evidence at the inquiry and reports of the proceedings at the inquiry would normally not be admissible as evidence of the circumstances of the death; firsthand evidence would always be required. There is only one exceptional case where a transcript of evidence given at an inquiry might be admissible in other judicial proceedings. This is where it is put to a witness in the subsequent proceedings that he made a different statement on a previous occasion. In this case evidence can be led, as permitted by the Evidence (Scotland) Act 1852, to show the witness made that different statement. Where the previous statement was made in evidence at the inquiry, the official transcript of evidence might well be admissible as the best evidence that that statement was made. I think this is a Government Amendment which will commend itself to your Lordships.

The Earl of SELKIRK

May I ask whether in fact taking this out makes any difference or not? I appreciate the point the noble Lord, Lord Kirkhill, has made, but even if this clause were in, statements in a preliminary inquiry could certainly be put to a witness in a judicial inquiry. All I am asking—and perhaps the noble Lord will tell me later, if necessary—is whether in fact taking this out actually alters in any way the manner in which evidence can be led in a judicial case.

Lord KIRKHILL

This is something to which I will respond at a later stage.

Lord CAMPBELL of CROY

I would say only that I referred to this subsection on Second Reading, as the noble Lord said. I raised a query about it, but I was somewhat surprised when it appeared to lead to the Government taking out the subsection altogether. But we shall consider carefully what the noble Lord has said.

On Question, Amendment agreed to.

Clause 5, as amended, agreed to.

Clause 6 [Sheriff's report etc.]:

Lord KIRKHILL moved Amendment No. 10: Page 4, line 40, leave out ("On") and insert ("At").

The noble Lord said: This is a drafting Amendment to make it clear that, depending on the circumstances of the inquiry, the sheriff may either issue his determination immediately on the conclusion of the inquiry or issue it after he has taken time for consideration.

On Question, Amendment agreed to.

Lord KIRKHILL moved Amendment No. 11: Page 4, line 41, after ("thereon") insert ("or as soon as possible thereafter,").

The noble Lord said: Again, this is a drafting Amendment to make it clear that, depending on the circumstances of the inquiry, the sheriff may either issue his determination immediately on the termination of the inquiry or issue it after he has taken time for consideration.

On Question, Amendment agreed to.

Lord KIRKHILL moved Amendment No. 12: Page 4, line 41, leave out ("issue a report to the Lord Advocate") and insert ("make a determination").

The noble Lord said: The effect of this Amendment is that at the conclusion of the inquiry, the sheriff instead of issuing a report to the Lord Advocate, will make a determination not addressed to any particular authority or person. This is more in accord with the position under the present legislation, whereby the verdicts of juries at inquiries are not addressed to any specific person. This change will not affect either the content of the sheriff's determination, or its availability to the general public, or to relevant Government Departments or public authorities.

On Question, Amendment agreed to.

4.48 p.m.

Lord WILSON of LANGSIDE had given Notice of his intention to move Amendment No. 13: Page 4, line 41, leave out ("issue a report to the Lord Advocate") and insert ("proceed forthwith, or in any event within a period of not more than thirty days, to pronounce in open court his findings in the form of a report").

The noble Lord said: I had a meeting with the right honourable friend of the noble Lord, Lord Kirkhill. Following upon that, I saw the proposed Amendment of the Government, and so will not move my Amendment No. 13.

Lord KIRKHILL moved Amendment No. 14:

Page 5, line 14, at end insert— (" ( ) The determination of the sheriff shall not be admissible in evidence or he founded on in any judicial proceedings, of whatever nature, arising out of the death or out of any accident from which the death resulted.").

The noble Lord said: This Amendment provides that the determination of the sheriff at the conclusion of the inquiry setting out his findings regarding the death may not be used as evidence, or be founded upon in any judicial proceedings arising out of the death to which the inquiry related, or in any judicial proceedings arising out of the accident which caused that death. Similar provision was made under Section 6 of the Fatal Accidents Inquiry (Scotland) Act 1895 regarding the verdict returned by a jury in an inquiry under that Act.

The reason for making the sheriff's determination inadmissible in judicial proceedings is that the inquiry is essentially concerned with ascertaining the facts while civil and criminal proceedings, and most other judicial proceedings, are concerned with people's legal rights and duties. It might prejudice the discovery of the true facts of an inquiry if people considered that the results of the inquiry might affect their civil or criminal liability. It would equally be wrong if civil or criminal proceedings, where safeguards for individuals' rights are built into the procedure, could be prejudged as a result of findings in a completely different kind of procedure. I beg to move.

On Question, Amendment agreed to.

Lord KIRKHILL moved Amendment No. 15: Page 5, line 16, after ("shall") insert ("send to the Lord Advocate a copy of the determination of the sheriff and").

The noble Lord said: The effect of this Amendment is to require the sheriff clerk in every case to send a copy of the sheriff's determination to the Lord Advocate. This provision is consequential upon the earlier Amendment, No. 12, in terms of which the sheriff's determination is no longer to be issued direct by the sheriff to the Lord Advocate. It is clearly appropriate that the outcome of the inquiry should be made known to the Lord Advocate since the inquiry is initiated by a procurator fiscal responsible to the Lord Advocate. I beg to move.

The Earl of SELKIRK

Might I ask the noble Lord at what point is the determination of the sheriff to be made public?

Lord KIRKHILL

The sheriff will have a discretion in this regard, because he has to give a determination, and I think it would be usual for that to be made public quite quickly I do not knew of any particular time limit.

The Earl of SELKIRK

Am I to understand that there is no obligation to make it public at all?

Lord KIRKHILL

There is clearly an obligation to make the determination public and publicly known. I have indicated that earlier this afternoon.

The Earl of SELKIRK

I am much obliged.

On Question, Amendment agreed to.

Lord KIRKHILL moved Amendment No. 16:

Page 5, line 18, leave out from ("copy of") to end of paragraph (a) and insert—

1. ("(i) the application made under section 1 of this Act;
2. (ii) the transcript of the evidence;
3. (iii) any report or documentary production used in the inquiry;
4. (iv) the determination of the sheriff, and").

The noble Lord said: This is a drafting Amendment. It has two purposes: first, to make it clear that it is only copies of the various documents listed in paragraph (a) of Clause 6(3) of the Bill which must be delivered to an authority requesting them in accordance with that paragraph. The present drafting of the paragraph might be interpreted as obliging the sheriff clerk to deliver a copy of the application made under Section 1 of the Act and the principals of the other documents listed. This would clearly be inappropriate, as the principals should, like the court records, be retained by the sheriff clerk. Secondly, it is to make it clear that it is only copies of documentary productions which must be delivered in terms of paragraph (a) of Clause 6(3). It would obviously be impracticable to deliver copies of productions which were not in documentary form. I beg to move.

On Question, Amendment agreed to.

Lord KIRKHILL moved Amendment No. 18:

Page 5, line 27, leave out from ("under") to end of line 30 and insert ("paragraph (i) of section 7(1) of this Act, any person—

1. (a) may obtain a copy of the determination of the sheriff;
2. (b) who was entitled by virtue of this Act to appear at the inquiry may, within such period as may be prescribed in rules made under paragraph (ii) of the said section 7(1), obtain a copy of the transcript of the evidence,

from the sheriff clerk."

The noble Lord said: This Amendment makes two alterations to subsection (4) of Clause 6. One of these is essentially a drafting alteration; the other is more substantial. The drafting alteration is intended to make it clear that persons obtaining copies of the transcript of the evidence from the sheriff clerk must pay such a fee as may be prescribed in rules made by the Lord Advocate under Clause 7(1)(i) of this Bill. At present, in terms of Section 5(5) of the Fatal Accidents Inquiry (Scotland) Act 1895, fees are payable on obtaining transcripts of the evidence given at inquiries, so the charging of fees under this Bill merely continues the existing practice. It will also, of course, be necessary to amend Clause 7(1)(i) to provide for the fixing by rules of fees payable on obtaining transcripts of evidence. We are seeking to do this by Amendment No. 19, which follows.

The other and more substantial alteration made by this Amendment is to insert a provision in subsection (4) for a limit on the period of time within which transcripts of evidence may be obtained. This limit is to be prescribed by rules made under Clause 7 of the Bill. Section 38 of the Administration of Justice (Scotland) Act 1933 at present provides in effect that transcripts of evidence at an inquiry under the Fatal Accidents Inquiry (Scotland) Act 1895 or the Fatal Accidents and Sudden Deaths Inquiry (Scotland) Act 1906 need only be provided to persons who appeared or were entitled to appear at the inquiry if they apply to the sheriff for a transcript within one month of the close of the inquiry and the sheriff directs that the transcript be provided. This time limit would apply equally to inquiries under the present Bill, at least so far as it replaces the 1895 and 1906 Acts. As this is a consolidating Bill, however, it appears desirable to include in the Bill all relevant provisions, thus making it possible to repeal Section 38 of the Administration of Justice (Scotland) Act 1933.

This provision differs from the 1933 Act provision in that, instead of setting out in Statute the rigid limit of one month, it enables the limit to be prescribed by rules, and this limit may be altered from time to time. Such alteration might well be considered desirable in the light of experience in operating the limit. As a consequence of this Amendment, a new paragraph will require to be inserted in Clause 7(1) providing for the fixing of a time limit by rules. Amendment No. 20, which will follow, seeks to do this. The consequential repeal of Section 38 of the Administration of Justice (Scotland) Act 1933 is provided for in Amendment No. 26, which follows. I beg to move.

The Earl of SELKIRK

Might I ask the noble Lord, is it compulsory for a record in shorthand to be taken, or is it not? I understood from the 1933 Act that it was within the discretion of the sheriff whether or not a record should be taken. Does this make it obligatory, or it it still left within the discretion of the sheriff?

Lord KIRKHILL

I am not able to answer that at this moment. I shall inquire into the point and let the noble Earl know the outcome.

On Question, Amendment agreed to.

4.59 p.m.

On Question, Whether Clause 6 shall stand part of the Bill?

Lord CAMPBELL of CROY

I think it was convenient that all the Government Amendments should be explained to us so that we could look at the clause in the light of the changes. I would draw attention in particular to paragraphs (c) and (d) at the top of page 5 which require the sheriff's report to contain, where relevant, the reasonable precautions, if any, whereby the death and any accident resulting in the death might have been avoided"; —and the defects, if any, in any system of working which contributed to the death or any accident resulting in the death". Amendment No. 14, which has just been added by the Government—

Lord HOY

By the House.

Lord CAMPBELL of CROY

—by the House—moved by the Government and agreed to by the House—considerably affects this because it means that the determination of the sheriff shall not be admissible in evidence to be founded in any judicial proceedings. The point is that the sheriff, in carrying out the duties in paragraphs (c) and (d), may find himself allocating blame in these particular findings.

I am sorry if I offended noble Lords. It is not even the House; it is the Committee.

Lord HOY

I did not want to interrupt the noble Lord, but it is not for the Government Front Bench to make decisions; it is for the House to make decisions.

Lord CAMPBELL of CROY

Even that is not correct. The Committee has taken the decision, and the House will come to this later and may well do other things.

Reverting to the point I was making, the sheriff may well be allocating blame in making these findings in paragraphs (c) and (d). He is not required to find fault, but none the less he may do so if it is clear that an accident has occurred because somebody has been less than fully efficient, or careful, in the arrangements or in the supply or maintenance of equipment.

As I understand it, under existing legislation the sheriff is not required to find fault for fatal accidents but that he may; it can happen. Where it is clear that someone is to blame, the sheriff may not be able to deal with those points under (c) and (d) without clearly allocating the blame to some person or persons who would he named. Amendment No. 14, which the Committee has just made, means that the sheriff's finding cannot then be used as evidence in a subsequent criminal proceeding. All the relevant matters have to be gone into again. Therefore, that is some protection for the person who may have the blame allocated to him but who may be contesting it, because we may have a situation where a public report from a sheriff states that X and Y are to blame and then X and Y publicly, through the Press or other ways, state that they are not to blame. Presumably there are courses open to them. They have a remedy in the appropriate courts if they wish to prove their point. Alternatively, it is for the procurator fiscal or the Lord Advocate to decide whether further proceedings should be taken in any case arising from the fatal accident. I should like the Government to confirm that this is the interpretation: that the sheriff does not have to allocate blame, but that he may none the less find himself doing so if he is in certain cases to carry out paragraphs (c) and (d).

There is a further point. In the past, the sheriff has been able to make recommendations. He is not required to, but if there is an accident involving some new procedure or new plant or equipment, then the sheriff is able to make a recommendation. This, of course, can be extremely useful. It could be the first authoritative proposal arising from an inquiry which, if acted upon, could prevent a repetition of that kind of accident. I would ask the noble Lord whether he can confirm that it is open to a sheriff in his report to make recommendations immediately in general, or in particular, as well as carrying out the tasks laid down in these paragraphs.

The Earl of SELKIRK

The noble Lord has raised an important point. In Amendment No. 14 it is said that, The determination of the sheriff shall not be admissible in evidence or be founded on… In every case the determination of the sheriff will be public knowledge. It will be in the newspapers. It seems to me difficult to avoid a witness, either deliberately or otherwise, actually saying what the determination was. All this emphasises that if possible any proceedings should take place before the public inquiry. I do not know whether the noble Lord would consider that point.

Lord HOY

I do not want to delay my noble friend but I would make two points here. I also want to make explicitly clear that the decisions made in this place are made by this House, whether we are meeting as a Committee or as a House, and the decisions we made were reached by a Committee of this House, the House of Lords, and not by the Government. Irrespective of their political complexion, it is not for the Government to make the decision but for a Committee of this House. The Committee having made that decision, I find it a little difficult when the noble Lord, Lord Campbell of Croy, said that the Government had made it. The Government did not make the decision; it was made by a Committee of the House.

It may well be that there may be some dispute as to whether the judgment of the sheriff, whatever that may be, will he taken into consideration. I regard the sheriffs in Scotland as being in a high position. When we had sherriff's substitute, I never regarded them very highly. I regarded the sheriffs as being very high but not the titular claim that they had, because I always regarded a sheriff as being a sheriff and not a sheriff's substitute. I was grateful when we altered the nomenclature to sheriff principal and sheriff, because that put them into the right position. If they are to make decisions and judgments, I have no doubt that they have to be taken into consideration. All I am saying is that when the Government conic to this House and introduce legislation it is for this House to approve or disapprove of that legislation; and when we approve it on the Committee stage I always find it a little difficult, having approved it unanimously, that some noble Lord gets up and asks for an explanation. The explanation ought to come during a Committee stage.

Lord CAMPBELL of CROY

Would the noble Lord give way, as we are on Committee stage? I was not asking for an explanation of Amendment No. 14; I was asking for an explanation of two paragraphs which appear in the Bill but which arc much affected by the Amendment, and affected in a sense which I approve. I am sure that the Committee of the House would not expect me to make a long speech about something of which I approve. I am trying to save the time of the Committee.

Lord HOY

The noble Lord, at the beginning of his speech, said, "Having just passed Amendment 14". He then produced his argument following Amendment No. 14. Amendment No. 14 was passed by a Committee of this House. That having been done, I felt that the noble Lord on the Front Bench had done his job competently and well. All I am saying is that I am not objecting to what might follow from it, but I do not think it is right, having passed it without dissent, to raise it again on the Question, Whether the clause shall stand part.

Lord CAMPBELL of CROY

I should like to deal with this point. I thought it would be convenient for this House and the Committee too—I am perfectly ready to change my ways—when there were three or four Government Amendments to a clause, and the point I wished to raise was on another part of the clause but none the less affected, to have one debate at the end of the clause rather than have a debate on each individual Amendment. That was the purpose of my waiting until the end, and then to ask about a part of the existing clause which has not been changed by the Amendments but affected.

Lord KIRKHILL

I do not rise to intervene nor to add to this sophisticated Scottish altercation which has been taking place, but merely to bring your Lordships back to one or two points raised particularly by the noble Lord, Lord Campbell of Croy, and the noble Earl, Lord Selkirk. On the point the noble Lord raised as to whether or not the sheriff can make recommendations in his findings, he can make recommendations so far as relevant to his findings under paragraphs (c) and (d). So far as the question as to whether or not the sheriff can indicate that a person is, or is not, at fault, I would refer your Lordships to the point I made at Second Reading on 9th December 1975 at column 840, when I said: The noble Lord, Lord Campbell of Croy, wanted to know the position of the sheriffs as it relates to their continuing or otherwise to make recommendations. Clause 6(1) repeats the provisions of Section 4(7) of the 1895 Act, setting out what the jury can deal with in its verdict, but excluding the provisions that appear in Section 4(7) empowering the jury to brine in a finding of fault.

Lord CAMPBELL of CROY

May I deal with that point. The jury is being eliminated under this Bill, so references to the jury in the 1895 Act will no longer have any validity in the new legislation.

Lord KIRKHILL

It repeals that section of the 1895 Act.

Lord WILSON of LANGSIDE

As a matter of courtesy to the noble Lord, Lord Kirkhill, to whom perhaps I owe a little courtesy because I have been rather critical of some aspects of this measure, I rise to thank him for the trouble he and his right honourable and learned friend have taken over Clause 6, the Amendments to which follow a meeting which a number of those interested in the matter had with his right honourable and learned friend. I wish to express my appreciation for the speed and efficiency with which these Amendments have been brought forward.

Lord CAMPBELL of CROY

I congratulate the noble Lord, Lord Wilson of Langside, for being able to withdraw his Amendments apparently as a result of a meeting he had with the Government and which must have led to part of these Amendments to Clause 6 which have been made to the Bill. I would encourage the noble Lord, Lord Wilson of Langside, to have further meetings with the Government, perhaps in respect of Clause 1. The noble Lord, Lord Kirkhill, has made some changes which I think are satisfactory. I am not sure that he has been able to answer completely my question about the sheriff finding fault and the position that would then result, but perhaps he will have an opportunity at a later stage to say more about that.

Clause 6, as amended, agreed to.

Clause 7 [Rules]:

5.12 p.m.

The Earl of SELKIRK moved manuscript Amendment No. 18A: Page 6, line 6, leave out ("to solicitors").

The noble Earl said: Under Clause 7 the Lord Advocate may by rules provide for a variety of things, one of which in subsection (1)(h) has regard to …the payment of fees to solicitors and expenses to witnesses and havers. I wonder whether it is necessary for him to lay down fees for solicitors. This is already controlled, I believe, by the Lord President and by the Commission on Payments. Is it necessary, therefore, for this also to be under the control of the Lord Advocate? Surely the existing controls are sufficient to meet any point that may arise. Is there any advantage in creating an additional control over the fees of solicitors? I ask this question because this provision seems to be redundant.

Lord KIRKHILL

Before I reply to the question asked by the noble and learned Earl, Lord Selkirk, perhaps I may take this opportunity to thank the noble Lord, Lord Wilson of Langside, for his generous remarks to me. May I also assure him that the Government are always prepared to meet him at any time on points as they arise on this Bill. Perhaps I should at the same time confirm that on Clause 1 the Government remain implacable.

Coming to the Amendment, of course the Government have not had much time to consider it. At this stage we think that the Amendment would leave it to the solicitors themselves to regulate the fees they charge their clients for representing them at a public inquiry, and while we have no reason to believe that solicitors will act with anything less than their customary sense of public spirit, it is considered that the Lord Advocate, in carrying out his responsibility for the supervision of all matters relating to the procedure of these inquiries, should have this power. The Amendment was handed in only today, and if the noble and learned Earl will agree to withdraw it then I can assure him that the Government will look into the matter. I cannot go beyond that, but I can give him that assurance.

The Earl of SELKIRK

With that assurance, I beg leave to withdraw the Amendment.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

Lord KIRKH1LL moved Amendment No. 19: Page 6, line 9, leave out ("report of the sheriff relating to the inquiry") and insert ("determination of the sheriff or a copy of the transcript of the evidence").

The noble Lord said: This Amendment is consequential on Amendment No. 18, which amended Clause 6(4), to make it clear that a person who obtains from the sheriff clerk a copy of the transcript of evidence given at an inquiry must pay a fee to be prescribed by rules made under paragraph (i) of Clause 7(1). This Amendment modifies paragraph (i) of Clause 7(1) to include a power to prescribe such a fee. The Amendment also deletes from paragraph (i) of Clause 7(1) the words "relating to the inquiry", which words are unnecessary. The Amendment also substitutes "determination of the sheriff" for "report of the sheriff" in consequence of Amendment No. 12.

On Question, Amendment agreed to.

Lord KIRKHILL

I beg to move Amendment No. 20, which is consequential on Amendment No. 18.

Amendment moved—

Page 6, line 9, at end insert— ("( ) as to the period within which a person entitled may obtain a copy of the transcript of the evidence at the inquiry.")—[Lord Kirkhill.]

On Question, Amendment agreed to.

Clause 7, as amended, agreed to.

Clause 8 agreed to.

Clause 9 [Application to Continental Shelf]:

5.17 p.m.

The Earl of SELKIRK moved Amendment No. 21: Page 6, line 25, leave out ("or accident").

The noble Earl said: I am glad that my noble friend Lord Campbell of Croy has redrafted this provision because it has not been easy to understand and I would have asked certain questions about its meaning. I am at this stage merely asking whether the words "or accident" are really necessary. The line in the clause reads: For the purposes of this Act a death of accident which has occurred…". This measure is concerned exclusively with death; it is not concerned with accidents. If the word "accident" means anything in this context, it must refer to something rather wider than "fatal accident." If it does refer to something wider, then I should like to know what it is. If, on the other hand, it refers merely to a fatal accident, then these words are unnecessary. I am therefore asking why these words appear; if they are not necessary, they should be deleted.

Lord KIRKH1LL

This clause relates to providing for mandatory inquiries into fatal accidents at work. Paragraph (i) of Clause 1(1)(a) as read with Clause 1(2), provided that the accident as well as the death must have occurred in Scotland. It was therefore necessary in Clause 9 to provide for accidents on the Continental Shelf to be treated as having occurred in Scotland, and that is the only reply I can give at this time.

Lord CAMPBELL of CROY

If I understood my noble friend Lord Selkirk correctly, this is about the only occasion in the Bill—I have not been through it, but I think I am right—where the word "accident" occurs without the word "fatal". An alternative Amendment might be to insert "fatal" before "accident", otherwise it makes it look as though this clause extends beyond fatal accidents and affects accidents on the Continental Shelf which have not caused death. It is not just a matter of drafting, but of whether the Government intend to have a mandatory inquiry into an accident which has occurred on the Continental Shelf but which has not caused death.

Lord KIRKHILL

Prior to the noble and learned Earl, Lord Selkirk, speaking, I had bowled along merrily imagining that this was a consequential Amendment harking back to an earlier Amendment which had been moved by a noble Lord opposite. However, if noble Lords feel that there is a point here that. should be looked at, I shall certainly look at it. I do not have the legal knowledge to express an opinion on this point and I would therefore prefer to communicate with the noble and learned Earl on the subject.

Lord HOY

I hope noble Lords will forgive me if I add a word on this point. Clearly, when one introduces the Continental Shelf into Scottish law one is widening the latter's scope very considerably. If my noble friend is saying that the provision in question is intended to look after the people on the Continental Shelf who are designated as working from Scotland, I can perfectly well understand that. Indeed, I am certain that neither the noble Lord, Lord Campbell of Croy, nor the noble Earl, Lord Selkirk, nor any Member of this House would want to think that people who are engaged in a part of Scottish industry were left out of legislation. I am certain that I am expressing what they feel and that they will not disagree. All we are asking is that my noble friend should say that these people, who are Scottish employees whether they be on the Continental Shelf or elsewhere, will be covered.

We have recently had some little difficulty about people who were not covered because they were on the Continental Shelf, and we recently had a trade dispute with regard to people who had been dismissed from industry. A court decided that it had no right to rule because the people in question were on the Continental Shelf. In other words, they did not come within Scottish jurisdiction. If my noble friend says that the position of such people is safeguarded, I am quite prepared to accept that; but it is a not unimportant point and one which might perhaps be looked at again if the Scottish Office has not already reached a decision. However, I hope that in the process of discussing what is not an entirely new matter, for oil development in Scotland is not a new phenomenon, the necessary provisions will have been decided upon. I should be grateful if my noble friend could then give a further explanation.

Lord CAMPBELL of CROY

We are of course in agreement on this point. The noble Lord, Lord Hoy, has been detained elsewhere during part of today's debate or he would have heard me say at least twice this afternoon how much we welcomed the extension of this legislation to the Continental Shelf, for the kind of reason which he has given. At this point, we are simply seeking information because my noble friend Lord Selkirk has hit on a point—that is, that this is the first time that the word "accident" appears without being a "fatal accident". We simply wish to know whether or not it is the Government's intention to extend it further than fatal accidents. Once we know what is their intention we can consider whether this is something to encourage or discourage, but at this stage it is a question of simply ascertaining what is intended and of discovering whether this is only a piece of drafting which needs alteration because it is only fatal accidents which are supposed to be covered. That is the point which is being raised at this stage.

Lord WILSON of LANGSIDE

Without wishing to join in the perhaps rather esoteric debate between the noble Lord, Lord Campbell of Croy, and the noble Lord, Lord Hoy, I venture as a lawyer to suggest—though I may be wrong—that the noble Earl is right and that in the context in which they appear the words "or accident" are otiose. Perhaps the answer would be that given by the noble Lord, Lord Campbell of Croy—that is, to call it a "fatal accident".

Lord KIRKHILL

I should first like to thank my noble friend Lord Hoy for his helpful intervention, and to take this opportunity to restate that one of the principal aims of the Bill is to extend the legislation exactly as he has described. His intervention also gave me the opportunity to go back to page 1 of the Bill, where mention is made in Section 1(1)(a)(i) of the question of death which has resulted from an accident. I suppose that it is on that kind of consistent point that the matter is raised further on in the Bill in just the same way. However, if noble Lords are concerned about this question, I will give an undertaking to look into the matter.

The Earl of SELKIRK

I am very happy with the explanation which the noble Lord has given, and I understand the object of this exercise. The simple way would be to use the words, a death arising from an accident", which are exactly the words which the noble Lord quoted from Section 1. However, as the noble Lord has said he will look at the matter, I beg leave to withdraw the Amendment.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

5.27 p.m.

Lord CAMPBELL of CROY moved Amendment No. 22: Page 6, line 26, leave out from beginning to end of line 35 and insert ("has occurred—

1. (a) in connection with the exploration of the sea bed or subsoil or the exploitation of their natural resources; and
2. (b) in that area, or any part of that area, in respect of which it is provided by Order in Council under section 3(2) of the Continental Shelf Act 1964 that questions arising out of acts or omissions taking place therein shall be determined in accordance with the law in force in Scotland,

shall be taken to have occurred in Scotland.")

The noble Lord said: The purpose of the Amendment is not to alter the sense of the clause. Given their task, it was clear that the Parliamentary draftsmen had done what was required in the terms of the Bill as it stands, but those who are not Parliamentary draftsmen—and there are many of us—might misunderstand the expression, Scottish area of the Continental Shelf. At the Second Reading of the Bill, I pointed out that internal arrangements had been made in the United Kingdom whereby a line was somewhat arbitrarily drawn between the part of the Continental Shelf where Scots law would be applicable and that where English law would be applicable. That followed the international convention on the Continental Shelf which enabled the North Sea to be allocated from the point of view of exploring the seabed and extracting substances from it. That international agreement did not grant sovereignty to the countries concerned, either over the seas—which remained high seas beyond the territorial limits—or over the seabed. The countries have not claimed sovereignty over either but have merely recognised each other's rights to explore and extract minerals, hydrocarbons and substances from the seabed. There is therefore no question of United Kingdom sovereignty over the sea or the seabed over the Continental Shelf where this clause seeks to apply the fatal accident procedure.

Taking up a point made by the noble Lord, Lord Hoy—and I know that he is extremely interested in these subjects—a certain amount of law applies to rigs and platforms, as do a certain number of procedures. I believe that the noble Lord was referring to a tribunal whose jurisdiction has not yet spread to the Continental Shelf. What is happening is that procedures are gradually being extended to the Continental Shelf. Here we are seeking to extend the fatal accident procedure. A certain amount of law applies to rigs, platforms and other structures which are not normal shops, boats or seagoing vessels. This applies beyond territorial waters and above the British sector of the Continental Shelf. I believe that the new wording proposed in the Amendment has the same effect as the Government's wording but avoids the dangers of misunderstanding. It does not give the impression that, as a country, we are claiming sovereignty over part of the Continental Shelf beyond the territorial seas. Certainly, much mischief could be caused by those who are not familiar with these matters if the expression were used out of context and it could be shown that it had appeared in recent legislation without its being pointed out that a very restricted scope of meaning was also included in the interpretation in the second paragraph. So I hope that this redrafting, which would remove possible misunderstandings, and even misrepresentation by those who wanted to cause mischief, will be removed by this Amendment. I beg to move.

Lord KIRKHILL

I would recommend to your Lordships that the Amendment be accepted. It is a drafting Amendment which represents an improvement over the original drafting and I thank the noble Lord, Lord Campbell of Croy, for putting it down.

Lord CAMPBELL of CROY

May I, not with great surprise but with gratitude, thank the noble Lord, Lord Kirkhill, for accepting the Amendment. May I also take the opportunity of thanking him for dealing with some extremely complicated legal matters during the course of these Amendments. I am sure that they must have been very difficult to deal with, since the Bill comes from the Lord Advocate's Department. I thank the noble Lord fox what he has given us so far and for the matters which he has said he will look into.

On Question, Amendment agreed to.

Clause 9, as amended, agreed to.

Clause 10 [Interpretation, transitional, citation, commencement and extent.]

Lord KIRKHILL

I beg to move Amendment No. 23. This is merely a drafting Amendment and makes no change of substance.

Amendment moved— Page 6, line 39, leave out ("proceedings") and insert ("inquiry")—(Lord Kirkhill.)

On Question, Amendment agreed to.

Lord KIRKHILL moved Amendment No. 24: Page 6, line 41, after ("Act 1906") insert ("or section 25(2) of the Prisons (Scotland) Act 1952")

The noble Lord said: This Amendment rectifies an omission in Clause 10(2), which provides that where an inquiry under existing legislation is in progress at the time of commencement of this Bill, the inquiry may be concluded under that legislation. At present, Clause 10(2) refers only to inquiries under the Fatal Accidents Inquiry (Scotland) Act 1895 and the Fatal Accidents and Sudden Deaths Inquiry (Scotland) Act 1906. Therefore there is no reason why it should not also apply to inquiries under Section 25(2) of the Prisons (Scotland) Act 1952. This Amendment therefore applies Clause 10(2) to such inquiries. I beg to move.

On Question, Amendment agreed to.

Lord KIRKHILL moved Amendment No. 25:

Page 6, line 43, at end insert— (" (2A) Where, before the date appointed under subsection (4) below, a death has occurred in respect of which an inquiry is required to be held under the said Act of 1895 or the said section 25(2) but that inquiry has not been instituted before that appointed date, an inquiry shall take place, but shall be held under this Act as if the death was one in respect of which application is required to be made under section 1(1) of this Act.")

The noble Lord said: The new subsection inserted in Clause 10 by this Amendment is a transitional provision to cover the case where a death has occurred prior to the commencement of this Act in circumstances which give rise to a mandatory inquiry under the Fatal Accidents Inquiry (Scotland) Act 1895. or the Prisons (Scotland) Act 1952, but the inquiry has not yet been instituted before the commencement of this Act. The existing transitional provision in Clause 10(2) does not cover this case, as it applies only to the case where an inquiry has been instituted before the commencement of this Bill.

The new subsection (2A) therefore provides that where a death has occurred before the commencement of this Bill in circumstances giving rise to an inquiry under the 1895 or 1952 Acts, but the inquiry has not been instituted before the commencement of this Bill, the inquiry shall proceed. It is, however, to be conducted as an inquiry under this Bill, not as an inquiry under the 1895 ox 1952 Acts. It seems sensible that where an inquiry is begun only after this Bill comes into force, the provisions of this Bill should govern it—not those of repealed legislation. It must be stressed, however, that it is the 1895 and 1952 Acts which will determine whether an inquiry is to be held at all. It is merely the procedure which is being altered. I beg to move.

On Question, Amendment agreed to.

Clause 10, as amended, agreed to.

Schedule 1 agreed to.

Schedule 2 [Repeais]:

Lord KIRKHILL

I beg to move Amendment No. 26. This Amendment provides for repeal of Section 38 of the Administration of Justice (Scotland) Act 1933. It is consequential on Amendment No. 18 to Clause 6(4) of the Bill.

Amendment moved—

Page 8, line 40, at end insert—

("1933 c. 41.	The Administration of Justice (Scotland) Act 1933.	Section 38.")
—(Lord Kirkhill.)

On Question, Amendment agreed to.

Schedule 2, as amended, agreed to.

House resumed: Bill reported with the Amendments.