Lords Sitting of 24 February 1976

Preamble
The House met at half past two of the clock: The LORD CHANCELLOR On the Woolsack.
Prayers—Read by the Lord Bishop of Norwich.

BRUNEI AND UN RESOLUTION 3424
Lord BROCKWAY: My Lords, I beg leave to ask the Question which stands in my name on the Order Paper.
The Question was as follows:
To ask Her Majesty's Government whether they will consult with the Sultan of Brunei regarding the implementation of the resolution of the General Assembly of the United Nations affirming the right of Brunei to self-determination and independence and asking Britain to facilitate democratic elections following the lifting of the ban on political Parties and the return of political refugees.
The MINISTER of STATE, FOREIGN and COMMONWEALTH OFFICE (Lord Goronwy-Roberts): My Lords, we have transmittted to the Sultan of Brunei Resolution No. 3424 of the General Assembly. However, Brunei is a sovereign State in treaty relationship with the United Kingdom. We have no responsibility for its internal affairs, but we have made our view on participatory government known to the Sultan, and continue to do so. A formal review of the treaty is now proceeding at the request of Her Majesty's Government.
Lord BROCKWAY: My Lords, while thanking the Minister and welcoming his reply, as I do very often, may I ask him this supplementary question? Although Brunei is internally self-governing, has not the United Kingdom very considerable responsibility, not only in view of the past, but because so many of its officers are now active in the administration of Brunei? Is it not the case that there have previously been consultations, and is my noble friend aware that one's
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hope is that the consultations would now lead to a democratic society in that country?
Lord GORONWY-ROBERTS: My Lords, I am very grateful to my noble friend for the concluding remarks in his supplementary question, and I warmly join with him in his hope that Brunei will move steadily, and indeed quickly, to democratic institutions. As to our responsibilities, as my noble friend knows, Brunei has never been a colony and is not a colony in relation to the United Kingdom. We have certain limited responsibilties there by treaty, not through rights or otherwise of colonisation. As to our influence, I would say that to some extent in the last few years we have been able to influence the Brunei Government in the direction of a phased release of political detainees.
Lord BROCKWAY: My Lords, will the Minister bear in mind that in 1970, when a democratic Opposition secured all the elected seats, Parliament was dissolved, and that since then there has been no democracy in the territory at all? In the negotiations with the Sultan, will Her Majesty's Government do their utmost to secure that democratic liberties and human rights are gained there?
Lord GORONWY-ROBERTS: My Lords, I would not markedly dissent from the first part of my noble friend's supplementary question; and to the second part of it I say again, "Yes".
The Earl of SELIKIRK: My Lords, may I ask the Government whether there is any sign of rapprochement between the Government of Brunei and the Government of Malaysia?
Lord GORONWY-ROBERTS: Yes, my Lords; I would express a cautious optimism as to the improvement of relations between these two countries. I had a recent opportunity to talk to the Sultan and, indeed, to Ministers in the Malaysian Government, when I put Her Majesty's Government's view that nothing can be solved or improved in this area except on the basis of peaceful agreement. I am bound to say that I was gratified by the response in both capitals to the suggestions I made.

TIVERTON AND DISTRICT HOSPITAL
2.41 p.m.
Viscount AMORY: My Lords, I beg leave to ask the Question which stands in my name on the Order Paper.
The Question was as follows:
To ask Her Majesty's Government why a decision has been confirmed by the South-Western Regional Health Authority to terminate all tonsillectomy operations at the Tiverton and District Hospital, greatly to the inconvenience of local people, when that hospital has had an unblemished record of successful operations with no failures over a period of very many years.
Lord WELLS-PESTELL: My Lords, the decision was not one for the South-western Regional Health Authority. It was taken by the Exeter Health District management team, and subsequently confirmed by the Devon Area Health Authority. It was motivated by Departmental and regional guidance on ear, nose and throat services, with particular reference to the safety of patients.
Viscount AMORY: My Lords, does the noble Lord appreciate that there is a widespread feeling that these measures of centralisation in the National Health Service do not always achieve the economies or the improvement in service which are claimed for them, and sometimes result simply in the service being more remote and less accessible? I think he may find that this may well be one of those cases.
Lord WELLS-PESTELL: My Lords, there is no criticism whatsoever of what has happened at Tiverton—let me make that perfectly clear—but I think we must bear in mind that developments in medicine have led to a greater interdependence of the various branches and to an increasing realisation of the need to bring together a wide range of specialised facilities for diagnosis and treatment. This is becoming increasingly necessary; and, if I may say so with very great respect, it can be done only at district general hospital level. It is really for the benefit of the patients.
Viscount AMORY: My Lords, may I ask the noble Lord to believe that the first part of his Answer gave me more pleasure and satisfaction than the second part?
Lord ABERDARE: My Lords, if it is for the benefit of the patients, may we ask whether the local community health council was consulted, and what its view was? Presumably it would be representing the views of the patients.
Lord WELLS-PESTELL: My Lords, my understanding of the situation is that it was not opposed to it, but I think I ought to tell your Lordships that this matter was in fact decided as far back as 1972 by the then Regional Hospital Board, and what has happened since is merely a review of the situation and a confirmation of that decision.
Lord SEGAL: My Lords, could my noble friend say where the residents of Tiverton now have to go for their tonsillectomies?
Lord WELLS-PESTELL: My Lords, I do not know the actual hospital. What I do know is that with any reorganisation of this kind certain people must of necessity be put to a certain amount of inconvenience. This is inevitable. With a tonsillectomy operation there are provisions, particularly where a child is involved, for the parent to stay overnight.
Viscount AMORY: My Lords, does the noble Lord appreciate that I know the answer to the supplementary question of Lord Segal if he would like me to give it?
Lord WELLS-PESTELL: My Lords, I was hoping that the noble Viscount was going to say so.
Viscount AMORY: My Lords, I can phrase it as a question. Does the noble Lord understand that patients must go to a new big hospital on the far side of Exeter, a distance of 16 or 17 miles; that the bus fare is over £1, and that for parents going to see their children in hospital that represents a substantial additional cost?
Several Noble Lords: Hear, hear!
Lord WELLS-PESTELL: My Lords, this is perfectly true. Noble Lords may say, "Hear, hear", but one must weigh

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this against the need to provide in every kind of operation a back-up service should anything go wrong. This has not always been possible in the past.
Lord SLATER: My Lords, would my noble friend agree that the one who seems to be on trial here is the superintendent of the particular hospital? If anything goes wrong so far as the medical side of that hospital is concerned in regard to the care of the patients, surely it would come to the ears of the medical superintendent and it would be his responsibility then to take action with the Medical Council or the Regional Hospital Board, or whatever channels exist? We are moving in the direction here of laying the blame indirectly on the medical superintendant of that particular hospital.
Lord WELLS-PESTELL: My Lords, I am grateful for the intervention of my noble friend, but may I point out that the number of in-patients' beds required for any given population in regard to this matter is comparatively small. We require only about 12 beds per 100,000 population. It is necessary in these matters, as well as others, that full medical, nursing and technical staff are available, and that they are available throughout the year. It has been done simply and solely so that there will be two, and sometimes three, consultants available all the time to deal with anything that may go wrong, or that may need expert treatment.

THE EASTER ACT 1928
Lord MERTHYR: My Lords, I beg leave to ask the first Question which stands in my name on the Order Paper.
The Question was as follows:
To ask Her Majesty's Government on what date it is intended to bring into force the Easter Act 1928.
The MINISTER of STATE, HOME OFFICE (Lord Harris of Greenwich): My Lords, it remains the postion that the Government do not think it right to bring the Act into force until the full concurrence of the Churches has been obtained. We continue to hope that agreement will be reached, and the Government would be ready to do what they could to help bring this about.
Lord MERTHYR: My Lords, in view of the fact that this Act cannot now come into full operation until the end of next year, would it not be a good idea to celebrate the golden jubilee of the passing of the Act by bringing it into force now?
Lord HARRIS of GREENWICH: My Lords, that is certainly a most attractive suggestion and I will communicate it to my right honourable friend; but it would be only frank of me to say that the present Government, like their predecessors, take the view that there should be wide agreement between the Churches before we move in this matter.
The Lord BISHOP of ROCHESTER: My Lords, may I ask the noble Lord whether he realises that some of us who look forward immensely to Lord Merthyr's annual question on this subject are beginning to wonder whether, a country that took the initiative in this matter might not, now that there is such widespread agreement among the Christian Churches, take a view that they will announce their intention to bring this Act into force unless a responsible Christian body can prove objections to the contrary?
Lord HARRIS of GREENWICH: My Lords, I will draw my right honourable friend's attention to what the right reverend Prelate has said.
Baroness WOOTTON of ABINGER: My Lords, can my noble friend explain what is the purpose of passing legislation in Parliament if it may remain inoperative at the whim of successive Governments until it celebrates its golden jubilee; and, furthermore, why there are others not quite so ancient?
Lord HARRIS of GREENWICH: My Lords, I feared for a moment that my noble friend was going to ask a question about the Firearms Act. The particular point concerning the Easter Act situation was that the Act can be brought into operation only by an Order in Council, which would have to be approved by both Houses of Parliament, and in 1928 it was provided that regard should be had to any opinion officially expressed by a Church or other Christian body before this could be done.
Lord BYERS: My Lords, is it too much to hope that a good deal of the

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Government legislation could be inoperative over the next few months?

PEERS AND PARLIAMENTARY FRANCHISE
2.48 p.m.
Lord MERTHYR: My Lords, I beg leave to ask the second Question which stands in my name on the Order Paper.
The Question was as follows:
To ask Her Majesty's Government whether any decision has been reached about enabling Members of this House to vote at Parliamentary Elections.
Lord HARRIS of GREENWICH: My Lords, the Government incline to the view that such a change might be made when a suitable legislative opportunity arises.
Lord ABERDARE: My Lords, could the noble Lord go a little further? What does he mean? Is there likely to be a suitable legislative occasion? Does he mean that he thinks that Peers should have the power to vote at Parliamentary Elections?
Lord HARRIS of GREENWICH: My Lords, I hope that the noble Lord will be appreciative of the fact that the reply I have given is similar to the reply that I gave on a previous occasion; namely, that the Government are perfectly prepared to look at this matter, but they cannot at the moment give any assurance that they would provide Parliamentary time for such a Bill.
Baroness ELLES: My Lords, in connection with Parliamentary Elections, can the Minister say whether Peers might take part in elections to the European Parliament and whether this is an allied subject?
Lord HARRIS of GREENWICH: My Lords, as the noble Baroness will appreciate, this matter is covered in the Government's Green Paper.

RHODESIA
Baroness LLEWELYN-DAVIES of HASTOE: My Lords, with the leave of the House, at a convenient moment after 3.30 p.m. my noble friend Lord Goronwy-Roberts will repeat a Statement on Rhodesia.
CITY OF ABERDEEN DISTRICT COUNCIL ORDER CONFIRMATION BILL
Brought from the Commons, read 1a; and (pursuant to the Private Legislation Procedure (Scotland) Act 1936) deemed to have been read 2aand reported from the Committee.
MAPLIN DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY (DISSOLUTION) BILL [H.L.]
Read 3a, an Amendment (privilege) made; Bill passed, and sent to the Commons.
NATIONAL COAL BOARD (FINANCE) BILL
Read 3a, and passed.

TRADE UNION AND LABOUR RELATIONS (AMENDMENT) BILL
2.51 p.m.
The LORD PRIVY SEAL (Lord Shepherd): My Lords, I beg to move that the House do now resolve itself into Committee on this Bill.
Moved, that the House do now resolve itself into Committee.—(Lord Shepherd.)
On Question, Motion agreed to.
House in Committee accordingly.
[Viscount HOOD in the Chair.]
Clause 1 [Repeals of the principal Act]:
Lord HAILSHAM of SAINT MARYLEBONE Lord HAILSHAM of SAINT MARYLEBONE moved Amendment No. 1:
Page 1, line 21, at end insert:
(" (2) In paragraph 6(5) of Schedule 1 to the principal Act there shall be inserted after the word "objects" the following words:
"on grounds of sincerely held personal conscientious conviction not motivated by hope of financial gain of material advantage or".").
The noble and learned Lord said: I rise to move the Amendment standing in my name. In doing so, I apologise to this Chamber, and, if necessary, to another place if matters should go that way, for taking up the time of your Lordships

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once more upon this Bill which has already been so frequently discussed and of which no doubt others besides myself are really heartily tired. But the question of conscience which I now seek to isolate and to which I now seek to revert is of such paramount importance to all of us in both Houses that it is not an imposition on my part to ask your Lordships and, if my Amendment should meet with approval in this Committee, another place to give it consideration for an hour or two in the context of this Bill.
May I remind your Lordships of the state of play on this issue and say why I think another look at it is desirable. My first reason is that, even as recently as the Second Reading this time round, two of the most respected Members of the Labour Party, whom I am happy to see sitting below the gangway, forming a sort of cave of Adullam among the Cross-Benches, showed a misunderstanding of what this issue was about. There are further reasons, and I shall develop those as I go along.
The Amendment refers to Schedule I to the Act of 1974, and paragraph 6(5) of Schedule 1, which this Amendment seeks to amend, deals with the situation which arises if, particularly in a closed shop context, a man is dismissed because he will not join a particular trade union. The Schedule at present provides that unless he has a religious objection—the phrase used is "grounds of religious belief"—forming grounds for his action, he is not to be considered as being unfairly dismissed. It makes no similar provision for somebody who, either because he has no religious belief but still has conscientious objections or, if he has religious belief, has conscientious objections which do not relate to the religious belief which he has. In that event, under the general provisions of the paragraph, he is not to be considered to have been unfairly dismissed if, on those grounds and no other, he neglects or refuses to join a trade union. The question we have to consider is whether that is fair.
I said that only as recently as the Second Reading this time round two of the most respected Members of this Chamber, Members of the Party opposite, misunderstood the position, because it will be within the recollection of your Lordships that the argument was pre-
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sented at length that one could not confront the unions, one could not contemplate again the possibility of unions or union members suffering from a failure to obey orders of a court. Indeed, only a little earlier (just before Christmas) we heard a speech from the noble and learned Lord, Lord Gardiner, which I thought fell into the same error; because the noble and learned Lord said rightly during the course of a lengthy speech that one could not—and he used "lawyers' language" as one would expect from him —specifically enforce a contract of employment. I hope to show that none of that has the smallest reference in this context because, as was pointed out by the noble and learned Lord during that speech and as was illustrated (but no more than illustrated) by the decision of the industrial tribunal in the case of the "Ferrybridge Six", there could be in this context no confrontation with the unions, no failure either by the unions or the union members to obey any decision of any court, and there could indeed be, if I am right and if the noble and learned Lord is right, no possibility of the person so affected regaining his job.
If an employer—and it matters nothing from this point of view whether the employer is a public corporation like the Central Electricity Generating Board or a private employer operating for profit—chooses for his own reasons to conclude and operate a closed shop agreement with the union, the only question for decision is whether, if by refusing to join a union somebody loses his job as a result, he is to be entitled to compensation or not. That compensation, under the unfair dismissal proposals which were re-enacted by Schedule 1, is payable by the employer and enforceable against the employer only; so the question of the specific enforcement of the contract of employment does not arise, contrary to what I believe the noble and learned Lord then thought. The question of any confrontation between a union or union members with the court does not arise either.
The sole question is whether we protect a Plymouth Brother by giving him a right to compensation against his employer but not a respectable Agnostic, or whether, if they are acting sincerely and on conscientious grounds, we put the two on the same footing. To my mind no case

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has been made either in this House or in another place for not putting them on the same footing. When we have dealt with this question before, perhaps naïvely I inserted, or sought to insert, in the Act—as did the Liberal Party below the gangway, in slightly different words but to the same effect—conscientious grounds or grounds of conscience as well as grounds of religious belief. Twice during the course of the 1974 Bill, which we now have here again, and once during the Protection of Employment Act 1975 the noble Lord, Lord Houghton of Sowerby, said in terms that if we had only drafted it a little differently he would have supported us. He made the suggestion that in our draftsmanship, instead of using the word "conscience" or "conscientious grounds", we should seek to borrow the words from the Parliamentary Labour Party'sStanding Orders, and that is what I have now sought to do. I do not want to argue as to whether I have got it exactly right because I have not bespoken a copy of the Standing Orders myself and I have not thought it right to acquire one by surreptitious means, but if I have not got it right we can put it right on the Report stage.
I have sought to constrict the matter still further by insisting that the grounds of conscience as defined by the Parliamentary Labour Party'sStanding Orders should not include people who are motivated by hope of material gain or personal advantage. In other words I was seeking to exclude—although I never thought they were affected one way or the other—the so-called free-riders. That is a further refinement tying it even more strictly to disinterested conduct on sincere grounds of deeply held personal conviction, which I understand is the phrase used in the Parliamentary Labour Party'sStanding Orders. Hitherto, as distinct from the Back-Benchers who, like the noble Lord, Lord Houghton of Sowerby, have put forward a variety of arguments, the Government have adopted one ground only for resisting a conscience clause at this point in our legislation. That is—if I may paraphrase what the noble and learned Lord said on previous occasions, and he will correct me if I am being unfair to him, though I do not think I am—you cannot operate a conscience clause apart from religious belief
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because it it is too indefinite, and difficult to define conscience. I never accepted that and I do not accept it now. I pointed out that the word was used in the European Convention of Human Rights which is enforceable against this country and to which this country is an adherent, and I could not help noticing in passing that the Labour Party has now issued a pamphlet seeking to make the Convention on Human Rights, conscience clause and all, part of the law of England. No doubt it will be interesting to hear the speech of the noble and learned Lord—assuming him still to be Lord Chancellor —when that pamphlet is sought to be introduced as a Bill into your Lordships' House. He may have a certain amount of words to eat when that time comes.
Apart from that, we have the experience of the conscientious objectors' tribunal during the war and the fact that the Labour Party has operated a conscience clause in one form or another from time immemorial. Although, no doubt, like all conscientious questions, it gives rise to difficulty it has not proved so impracticable that it has been removed from their Standing Orders. I do not think Parliament ought to accept, and I am sure public opinion will not accept, that what the Parliamentary Labour Party can operate an industrial tribunal, which usually has a trade unionist on it, can not operate because it is too difficult.
I do not accept that the Lord Chancellor's argument is right, although for the purposes of this Amendment I will assume that it is right. I have taken the hint from the noble Lord, Lord Houghton of Sowerby, when he said that if we adopted this particular form of words he would support us both on the Protection of Employment Act and on this Bill when it came before us again. All I am asking is that Parliament should look at this question again in the light of what the noble Lord, Lord Houghton, has said about his attitude to the matter and in the light of what I have tried to show about the context in which it is proposed; namely, that all we are discussing is the question of financial compensation payable not by a union or its members but by an employer who chooses to make a bargain excluding non-members of a particular union.
There are two other matters to which I think I am entitled to refer here as mak-

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think about this again. The first is the Ferrybridge Six. I am prepared to assume in favour of the Government, and in favour of the attitude they have hitherto adopted—and I am prepared to assume for the purposes of this argument, without asserting, because I have not been into that case except to read the judgment of the industrial tribunal—that the Ferrybridge Six were pursuing an unreasonable course. Many people who are motivated by conscientious grounds do pursue unreasonable courses, but the experience of humanity is that they should none the less be respected. I saw with considerable surprise that it was even doubtful whether they should be entitled to unemployment benefit after they had been dismissed, still less compensation. I do not think it should be so doubtful. The sight of the Secretary of State, Mr. Foot, doing poojah in front of the doctrine of sub judice, genuflecting in front of the judiciary in the shape of the National Commissioners was edifying, uplifting and a little surprising. So much so that I do not think it should pass altogether without comment. All the same, I do not think it should be a matter of argument as to whether such people should receive compensation from their employer, though I fully concede it is quite impossible to give them back their jobs.
The other reason I wanted to give was this. As I explained on Second Reading, I am reluctant to the point of determination not to do so, to send back to the Commons our old Amendments relating to the enforceability of the Press charter. I think we were right to select this issue last time round, owing to the overriding importance of the freedom of the Press in the Constitution of this country. But I do not think it would be fair, for the reasons I gave on Second Reading, to do it again; the matter has been fully ventilated. But I must, of course, point out that this Amendment, if passed in the form in which I proposed it, would benefit the Press no less than the other workers in this country.
It would not give to the editor who refused on conscientious grounds to join a union the right to get his job back if he lost it; but it would give him compensation, which is something. The same would be true of any journalist, as it would be of any other worker who was sincerely moved by conscientious grounds.
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So we are now in a position to examine in isolation what seems to me to be a matter of overwhelming importance for the good name of Parliament and of our Parliamentary democracy; namely, whether we are going to protect an employer against paying compensation to a conscientious worker who does not happen to be actuated solely by religious belief.
I want to say here and now to the noble Lord the Leader of the House, who is a reasonable man, that I have not the slightest desire to stand in the way of the Government's getting their way about the Bill, after proper discussion. I do not want to delay the matter. The last thing I want to see is a kind of game of pat-ball between the two Houses. Quite apart from the Parliament Act, it would do infinite harm to the relations of comity which ought to exist in Parliament. Nor do I want to score off the Government in any way. I think that on this issue I have been right and they have been wrong. But I would rejoice, like the Company of Heaven over the one sinner that repenteth, if I could only persuade them that they were wrong; and I should be delighted to lose, so that I could never utter again the point of Party controversy which, if they stand fast upon their previous decision, one will have to make. I do not want to score off them, nor do I want in any way to score a political triumph. I am sincerely concerned solely with this question of conscience, and the right to compensation where people act conscientiously.
Having said that, I do not think I ought to detain the Committee any longer. I hope there is nothing that I have left unsaid. I only ask the Government to accept that this Amendment is not moved in a spirit of vindictiveness, in a spirit of dilatoriness, or in a spirit of defiance. It is simply that, if I may use the phrase for the first and last time of myself, for reasons of deeply held personal convictions, on conscientious grounds not connected with my religious views, I think that this is something which Parliament in its own interests ought to look at again. I beg to move.
3.13 p.m.
Lord SHEPHERD: Whatever our feelings may be about the Amendment, I am sure your Lordships would in no

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way criticise the way in which the noble and learned Lord has moved it this afternoon. May I start by saying to the noble and learned Lord that I am advised that his Amendment would in no way deal with the Ferrybridge episode. Nor can I leave unchallenged the question whether these men had unemployment benefit withheld from them. That had nothing whatsoever to do with the Secretary of State for Employment or any other Minister. It was an insurance officer pursuing his statutory duty to ensure, before payment was made, that those who claimed it were entitled to it. So, if I may, I will brush Ferrybridge well out of the debate this afternoon.
I should like to suggest that there are two issues: first, the merits of the Amendment moved by the noble and learned Lord; and, secondly, the question of what your Lordships' House sitting in Committee should do, and of our relations with another place. Both are important issues, and that is why I have risen very early in this debate to put not only the position of the Government, but also my own feelings as Leader of the House in regard to our relations with another place.
I have been involved in these Bills concerning industrial relations since the first one was introduced to repeal the Industrial Relations Act. I agree with the noble and learned Lord that, in all our discussions, nothing has given greater concern on both sides than what one might call individual liberty, and the position of a person who is in a union and who is seeking or retaining employment in a closed shop situation. I am sure that the noble and learned Lord will be the first to admit that his Amendment goes well beyond the Industrial Relations Act—an Act in which he played a very prominent role indeed. That Act provided that there should be an exception in cases of dismissal, where a person sincerely has a conscience about joining a union. At the time we had a good deal of debate about the matter.
The noble and learned Lord referred to the tribunal's decision. A considerable amount of case law has now been built up since the passing of the Industrial Relations Act, defining "conscience" in industrial matters as religious belief. The case which the noble and learned Lord had in mind was considered, if I
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remember correctly, by Lord Thomson, and was Hinds v.Spillers French Baking Limited and Anr. It was argued for the workmen who were claiming unfair dismissal that political beliefs were matters of conscience. I could well believe that this might be argued, but the decision of the court was:
"In our opinion, grounds of conscience necessarily point to and involve a belief or conviction based on religion in its broadest sense, as contrasted with personal freedoms however strongly held, or intellectual creed. We find it difficult to envisage a case in which a worker could object on grounds of conscience, as we understand that expression, to being a member of a particular trade union, without at the same time objecting on grounds of conscience to being a member of any trade union."
The case history has now been built up and, because it is identifiable, religious belief is something on which conscience—according to the interpretation in the Industrial Relations Act—should be sustained. We put "religious belief" into our legislation, because we believe that when one is dealing with industrial relations affairs the law should be as clean-cut and explicit as possible. So we put in religious belief because it can be identified, based upon Scripture. Perhaps it is not solely a reluctance to join a trade union, but is also a reluctance to join any other form of association. It is not the union itself; it is the association which those objectors appear to have in mind. So I would make the case for the Government's insistence on the words "religious belief" in the Bill on the basis that they are clear and specific.
Next we turn to the Amendment before the Committee. This is about the twentieth time that an Amendment on the question of conscience has been moved, either in this House or in another place. All have been seeking to identify, as the noble and learned Lord has tried to do this afternoon, the statutory grounds upon which a person who objects to trade union membership should receive special treatment. This question has been debated many more than the 20 times I have just mentioned and I think now we should take a little stock of where we are heading. The noble and learned Lord has moved his Amendment on grounds of conscience. There were many Amendments which (shall I say?) were disguised as "grounds of conscience" but which were quite clear and specific. They were

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seeking to nullify the consequences and the effect of a closed shop into which the employers and the trade unions themselves had voluntarily entered.
Let us be clear, since there may be misunderstanding on the Benches opposite, that the legislation proposed by this Government does not enforce a closed shop agreement upon any employer or employee. It is for both sides voluntarily not only to agree to a closed shop but also to take into account the terms and conditions. I will say to the noble and learned Lord, and I am sure that he will be the first to confirm it on behalf of this House, that very many, if not all, of the closed shop agreements governing our major industries include clauses dealing with conscience. The record is that the trade unions and employers have all taken a very tolerant view of those who genuinely believe that they could not and should not belong to a union. In fact, I would say to the noble and learned Lord, Lord Hailsham of Saint Marylebone, that much of the difficulty that surrounded the Ferrybridge decision, and the reason why the decision was taken by the tribunal that there had been unfair dismissal, was not that these men had been unfairly dismissed. It was because the employers, the Electricity Board, had not taken similar proceedings against a very large number of men within the industry who were not members of the union; and this was because the unions themselves were taking a tolerant and relaxed view of their non-membership. It was only because these six men were taking a much more abrasive attitude and acting like grit within the trade union machinery and the relationship of trade unions with employers that action was taken.
If your Lordships look at the Amendment which has been moved by the noble and learned Lord, Lord Hailsham of Saint Marylehone, you may wonder what a tribunal or court would make of those words. The courts have already been severe about certain drafting which your Lordships' House insisted upon putting into previous legislation. I do not know what the courts would make of these words. However, we are dealing with a matter which one always hopes would not have to go to the courts, because this concerns a relationship between employers and employees. If, therefore, there is
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doubt about what a learned tribunal would make of these words, what would an employer make of them? It is the employer upon whom the penalty would fall; it would be the employer who would have to make up his mind what these particular words mean. Would they mean that a man who holds strong Conservative political views and finds that the whole system of the trade union movement is so alien and disruptive could say, "I have conscientous convictions about not joining a union"? I can think of a number of other political organisations who might well claim the same, and I have not the slightest doubt that the noble and learned Lord would not wish these people to be able to use those particular convictions for not being members of trade unions. These words could be construed so widely that I have to say to the Committee that if they were put into the Bill they would nullify the lawful closed shop; and yet your Lordships have agreed that closed shops should no longer be unlawful.
I have to say that if these words were put into the Bill and were to be construed as I believe they could be construed, then one would have a very grave situation indeed. I believe, and I have said this many times on the Floor of the House, that our legislation should be aimed at keeping men at work and that we should look to the unions to find ways and means of overcoming difficulties with the object of keeping men at work. I believe that these words could be so interpreted that men might well lose their jobs by believing that these words gave them a certain position which the tribunals or the courts might find that they did not hold, and that instead of being able to be retained in work their jobs would be lost. I must say frankly, too, that as an employer I would not know what to do about taking on an applicant for a job if these words were included in the Bill. I might well have to say to myself, "What is this man's political opinion likely to be? What views may he have, other than religious views, which might mean that I find myself in a position where, in order to fulfil my contractual obligations to the unions with whom I have entered into an agreement, I take on this man, only to find that I have to dismiss him and will perhaps have to pay him compensation?"
I come back to a view in which I passionately believe: that, if you are

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dealing with legislation which is for the purpose of improving industrial relations, the drafting of the law should be as free from ambiguity as possible. Not once, except when he mentioned the position of editors, did the noble and learned Lord suggest who might be within the ambit of this clause and who might be excluded from it. As the noble and learned Lord himself has said, this matter has been considered on many occasions. There was an Amendment moved in another place to provide for personal convictions as a ground for objection to trade union membership. It is true that the wording of that Amendment, which was discussed both in Committee and in Report in another place and defeated by substantial majority, was not word for word identical with the Amendment of the noble and learned Lord, but its import and intention are the same. Therefore, I do not believe that the noble and learned Lord can really say that his Amendment raises a new issue. I believe that on its merits this Amendment should not be accepted. I believe it would he highly dangerous to the health and stability of the refreshing developments that we have seen over the last twelve months in the field of industrial relations in terms of the activities and co-operation of employers and employees.
I come now to the question of what your Lordships' House should do. I said at Second Reading that the contents of this Bill have been considered exhaustively and that I doubted very much whether anything fresh can be produced. May I first say how pleased we all are that the noble Lord, Lord Goodman, is back in his place. The noble Lord, Lord Wigoder, suggested that we should send the Goodman Amendments back to give the Commons yet another chance to consider them. The noble and learned Lord did not agree, and here I find myself in full agreement with him. In fact his words were very close to those that I delivered in his absence, because he was sitting judicially when I was speaking; but both of us referred to the deep sense of frustration that there must be in another place if this House keeps sending back to them matters which they have considered, not once, not twice, but three and four times. If this Amendment were to go back to another place it would occupy at least two and a half to three hours, and as the noble and learned Lord
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knows, two and a half to three hours is of great value in another place, both to the Government and to the Opposition.
So the noble and learned Lord agrees with me that the Goodman Amendments should not be sent back. I suggest to him that the issue which he has put forward so reasonably today has already been considered two, three, if not four times in the House of Commons. But when a vote is taken in the House of Commons it is not just to oppose the Amendment that has been moved; it is to approve the inclusion in the Bill of words that the Commons themselves wish to see in the Bill. So every occasion on which this matter has been decided by the House of Commons has been concerned not only with the rejection of proposed Amendments, but with the insistence of the majority of the House of Commons that the words that are in the Bill, and which I hope your Lordships will agree, should remain in the Bill.
How would it be seen in the House of Commons if this House were to send this Amendment back, rejecting that which was in the Bill and to which your Lordships agreed, perhaps reluctantly, last Session; and, if that is not bad enough, seeking to reject the words that your Lordships agreed to and which are now in the Employment Protection Act? Is it conceivable, is it really being suggested by the noble and learned Lord, that in regard to this matter we should have different words in one Act of Parliament from those in another Act which this House approved during the last Session? I believe that if we have any respect for ourselves as a Parliamentary assembly we should not do that sort of thing.
If this matter goes back to another place, I personally have no doubt what the decision will be, and I suspect that the noble and learned Lord himself knows because he needs only to look at the record of the views expressed by a substantial vote in the House of Commons. The noble and learned Lord said, "Send it down, let it be rejected, then it comes back and we will acquiesce". If I really thought that what the noble and learned Lord was proposing had the remotest chance of being accepted by another place, I would not speak in this way. I am as much concerned about the status of this House in respect of another place

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as any noble Lord. That is why I am asking your Lordships to act sensibly here; to act as you did last Session in relation to this Bill and in relation to the Act that is now on the Statute Book.
I do not believe that any accusations will be made to the noble and learned Lord and to the noble Lords behind him that they, as a Party, acted with cowardice in allowing the Bill to go through. They have made their views abundantly clear on more than one occasion, and no one really believes that because the House of Lords, with a Conservative built-in majority, overturns the views of a Labour Government, that is anything more than representative of the Conservative majority in your Lordships' House. But as a House we have a great deal more to do in the future in a constructive role. I believe our voice will have far greater weight with another place if today we take the view that we have done everything possible in relation to this legislation; that we have given another place a full opportunity to consider the matters that we considered important, but we recognise that the other place has the popular mandate and that sooner or later their views must prevail. I suggest to the Committee that if its Amendment were to be withdrawn no harm would be done, and a great deal might well be achieved in the sense that, in my view, and in the view of many, this House will have acted responsibly. We have used our Parliamentary procedures to the full; we have not abused them.
3.36 p.m.
Lord WIGODER: I rise to advance the somewhat startling proposition that on these Benches we agree with much of what has been said both by the noble and learned Lord, Lord Hailsham of Saint Marylebone, and by the noble Lord the Leader of the House. If this Amendment were to be considered in a vacuum —simply on its own merits—it would meet with the enthusiastic support of my noble friends on these Benches. We have always felt and contended that it is quite wrong to restrict to a claim on religous grounds only the right of an. employee, who does not wish to join a union and who loses his job as a result, to bring an action for wrongful dismissal. We are aware, of course, that grounds
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of conscience have worked perfectly satisfactorily as a means of determining whether or not a person is entitled to object to military service. As the noble Lord the Leader of the House has said, we accept that in many cases both unions and employers have been able to operate a conscience test. We know that the Donovan Commission in paragraphs 603 to 617 recommended the adoption of the conscience test rather than the narrower religious one; we believe it is an affront to many people who may not have specific religious convictions to suggest that, for that reason, they do not have consciences.
For all those reasons we believe that, on its merits, this is a thoroughly desirable and thoroughly commendable Amendment. We believe that the Government's alternative proposal, restricting the right to a purely religious belief, might cause real hardship to individuals and quite unnecessarily restrict their freedom. But we are not considering this Amendment in a vacuum. We are considering it in the light of a particular political situation; in the light of the development of the relationship between two Houses of Parliament. One of those Houses is elected, and for this purpose it matters not by whatever ludicrous system it may be elected. We have the procedure of amendment and counter amendment which we have gone through exhaustively on this Bill as between the two Houses over the last year or so.
At one stage your Lordships will remember an Amendment was carried in this House which substituted for the religious test the words, "or reasonable grounds of conscience". When that Amendment was sent to the other place it was rejected by them and they reinserted their religious test. That came back to your Lordships' House and, on 20th October last year, your Lordships, perhaps unwillingly, accepted that they wished it to remain in the Bill. But the fact is that those words would now be enacted in this Bill, and they would be part of an Act of Parliament were it not for the incidental fact that there happened to have been a disagreement between the two Houses on the issue of the Press charter. As the noble Lord the Leader of the House reminded us, in this House we have always accepted, however unwillingly, the religious test rather than the conscience test in the Protection of Employment Act.

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In all these circumstances I would venture to suggest that where that situation has arisen we can justify now reverting to something which contradicts that which we have already agreed only in the light of possible developments. First, it might be said there have been wholly new developments since October of last year which warrant taking another look at this question; but I would suggest to your Lordships that that is not so. We know of the Ferrybridge Six and the difficulties in Barnsley with the National Union of Journalists, but I venture to doubt that those are matters wholly unanticipated, or that they are not precisely the sort of matters liable to arise where the closed shop legislation of the present Government takes effect.
The only other way of justifying reverting to this issue at this stage is if it could be argued that on a previous occasion it was not possible to find a satisfactory wording for the conscience test, and that that has now been done. Again, if I may say so, I find that difficult to accept. I cannot believe we ought to regard the Standing Orders of the Labour Party as being necessarily monuments of legislative clarity!
In those circumstances, my noble friends on these Benches would suggest that the House perhaps finds itself in something of a dilemma today, an Amendment being put forward which on its merits is entirely commendable, but being put forward, we would suggest, at a time wholly inappropriate. For that reason, I began by saying that there is much in what the noble and learned Lord, Lord Hailsham of Saint Marylebone, said on the merits; there is much in what the noble Lord the Leader of the House said as to the desirability of bringing this matter forward at this time. We on these Benches have considered this matter as best we can. Somewhat reluctantly we come to the unhappy conclusion that if there is a Division on this Amendment today, it would not be possible for us to support either side for the reasons I have given.
Lord SHEPHERD: My Lords, there is to be a Statement. I think it would be in the interests of the House if we were to resume the Sitting of the House in order that the Statement can be made. I hope that we do not spend too long on it, because we have an important debate,
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and it would be a pity to interrupt the flow of argument. I beg to move the House be now resumed.
Moved accordingly, and, on Question, Motion agreed to.
House resumed.

RHODESIA
3.44 p.m.
Lord GORONWY-ROBERTS: My Lords, with the permission of your Lordships, I shall repeat a Statement being made in another place by my right honourable friend the Minister of State. The Statement is as follows:
"I will, with your permission Mr. Speaker, and that of the House, make a Statement on Rhodesia.
"The House will be aware that there has been increasing evidence that the talks in Salisbury between Mr. Smith and Mr. Nkomo have not so far achieved agreement and that the gap between the two sides has seemed still to be very wide. Shortly after Mr. Nkomo's recent visit to London to see my right honourable friend, there were some indirect indications that Mr. Smith has reconsidered his position about some British involvement in the negotiations for a constitutional settlement in Rhodesia.
"My right honourable friend therefore thought it right to send a message to Mr. Smith seeking clarification of his attitude. At the same time he made it clear that he would see no role for the British Government unless he was satisfied that Mr. Smith was ready to go very much further to meet current African proposals for an early transition to majority rule. My right honourable friend naturally emphasised the serious consequences for all the people of Rhodesia of the end of the prospect of a negotiated settlement.
"In the light of the reply received last weekend my right honourable friend has decided to send a representative to Salisbury in order to assess Mr. Smith's position. A former Permanent Under-Secretary at the Foreign and Commonwealth Office, Lord Greenhill of Harrow, is accordingly leaving

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for Salisbury this evening. The Government are grateful to Lord Greenhill for agreeing to undertake this task.
"The purpose of Lord Greenhill's mission is purely exploratory. He will try to find out whether Mr. Smith's attitude is now such that there is any real possibility four helping to promote a settlement which would provide for an early and orderly transfer of power in Rhodesia. He is not taking with him proposals, nor will he be in a position to negotiate or take part in substantive discussions about a possible constitutional settlement. In the light of Lord Greenhill's report, my right honourable friend will consider with his colleagues whether there is some way in which Her Majesty's Government might usefully become involved."
My Lords, that is the end of the Statement.
Baroness ELLES: My Lords, I am sure my noble friends would wish me to thank the noble Lord, Lord Goronwy-Roberts, for his courtesy in giving us the information contained in the Statement. On this side of the House we appreciate the manner in which this very delicate matter has been handled, requiring, as it does, both statesmanship and diplomacy. It was understood that the meeting between Mr. Nkomo and the Foreign Secretary held in London quite recently was secret, and I think this is the first time we have had any indication of what the contents of those discussions might be.
My Lords, it is clear that the progress between Mr. Smith and Mr. Nkomo has still not gone as far as to reach any form of settlement. From the Statement we can now understand that clearly some differences exist. However, it is also clear that the radical change in the military and political situation in that part of the world, the establishment and apparent non-removal of the Cuban troops and the establishment of their families in Angola, will certainly affect the lives eventually of all the citizens of Rhodesia. I am sure it is also clear to all sides of the House that time is of the essence in this matter. In view of the urgent desire on all sides of the House, I am quite certain, for the avoidance of violence and bloodshed, we commend the action of
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the Government in sending such a distinguished diplomat as the noble Lord, Lord Greenhill of Harrow, and wish him every success in his difficult and delicate task.
Lord BANKS: My Lords, I thank the noble Lord, Lord Goronwy-Roberts, for repeating the Statement made in another place. On behalf of my noble friends I should like to give the Statement a cautious welcome: a cautious welcome for the announcement of the proposed visit to Salisbury of the noble Lord, Lord Greenhill of Harrow; a welcome because I think that an early settlement is very much to be desired for the reasons which have been expressed by the noble Baroness, Lady Elles, and a cautious welcome because I should not like to see the British Government involved in a long and fruitless period of semi-negotiation.
My Lords, as the Statement said, the crux of the matter is whether Mr. Smith is now prepared to talk seriously about majority rule, and I hope that his intentions in that respect will be quickly ascertained. I am sure that the noble Lord, Lord Goronwy-Roberts, would agree that it is important that any settlement should be acceptable to Rhodesian Nationalist opinion outside Rhodesia as well as inside, and also to the Governments of Zambia, Botswana, Mozambique and Tanzania. But most important of all is that the settlement should be acceptable to Rhodesian public opinion, and that this should be clearly expressed in a suitable test of public opinion. Like the noble Lord, Lord Goronwy-Roberts, we wish to see a settlement in Rhodesia based, as the greatly-to-be-welcomed Statement by the EEC Foreign Ministers put it yesterday on the self-determination of the Rhodesian peoples.
Lord GORONWY-ROBERTS: My Lords, I am sure that the entire House will join with me in welcoming the tone and content of the two statements we have just had, from the noble Baroness, Lady Elles, on behalf of the Opposition Front Bench, and also the noble Lord, Lord Banks, for the Liberal Party. Nothing they have said can do anything but help in this very delicate situation, as the noble Baroness, Lady Elles, so aptly described it. I welcome what Lord Banks said about our extending a cautious welcome

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to this move—certainly a very warm welcome, and gratitude, to my noble friend Lord Greenhill of Harrow for undertaking this mission—and great care in not expecting too much from it. I join with them in expressing the hope, which I know is shared by the Prime Minister and the Foreign Secretary, that this move may expedite, may make possible, an early settlement, not only for the future of Rhodesia and all its peoples, but also for Central and Southern Africa.
Lord WIGG: My Lords, would the noble Lord agree that one of the concomitants for a satisfactory settlement of this very delicate problem is that at all costs the confidence of African opinion should be retained? In that context may I ask him two questions? First, when was the decision taken to send Lord Greenhill? Secondly, have steps been taken to inform Mr. Nkomo, and, if so, what has Mr. Nkomo's reaction been?
Lord GORONWY-ROBERTS: My Lords, I cannot say precisely when Lord Greenhill was invited to undertake this mission, but I should say that it was very recently indeed. We have, naturally, had in mind the possibility of a move such as this, without precisely deciding who would be the most suitable emissary for this purpose. Of course, Mr. Nkomo and everybody else involved in this delicate situation in Rhodesia will have been informed of our decision to send a special emissary at once to assess the situation, and certainly to assess Mr. Ian Smith's present attitude to the possible involvement of Britain.
Lord ALPORT: My Lords, may I ask the noble Lord whether the Government will bear in mind that, whatever may be the outcome of Lord Greenhill's visit, the key to a settlement in Rhodesia is now the control of the security situation and the position of the Security Forces during the period of transition, however long that may last? If this country and this Government are to play a constructive part in reaching a settlement, they must beforehand make up their minds whether they are prepared, perhaps in conjunction with other Southern African Governments, to do something to ensure the continuance of internal and external security in Rhodesia.
Lord GORONWY-ROBERTS: My Lords, in responding affirmatively to what the noble Lord, Lord Alport, has said, may I also say how much I agree with my noble friend Lord Wigg when he says that any agreement must, of course, command the full support of the African peoples.
Lord PAGET of NORTHAMPTON: My Lords, in view of the fact that the African nationalists outside Rhodesia have made it quite plain that a Government formed by Mr. Nkomo would be just as unacceptable to them as a Government formed by Mr. Smith, what is the object of this intervention? If Mr. Nkomo became the ruler of Rhodesia he would have to fight for his political life against the other nationalists, in the same way as his opposite numbers on the other side of Africa have done, and he would, equally, be defeated by the superior arms of the Cubans. If we achieve an agreement and Mr. Nkomo becomes Prime Minister, are we going to send troops to support him? We do not have any troops to spare.
Lord GORONWY-ROBERTS: My Lords, nor have we any hard and fast assumptions. As usual my noble friend very forcibly puts forward what are not facts but assumptions. Even if the chances of Mr. Nkomo—who has so far engaged in peaceful negotiation—areas small as my noble friend suggests, that is no reason why we should not grasp at every opportunity of helping him and other moderate elements among the African peoples.
Lord COLERAINE: My Lords, the noble Lord will understand that I do not wish to add fuel to a situation which is already highly inflammatory, but may I ask the Leader of the House whether, after Lord Greenhill's visit, there might be an opportunity to debate the whole question of Southern Africa?
Lord SHEPHERD: My Lords, of course, we arc always willing to consider representations for debate through the usual channels. The noble Lord himself referred to the sensitive position, and I suggest that a decision on whether we have a debate should be taken in the light of the general circumstances. This is a matter which we can certainly discuss through the usual channels.
3.57 p.m.

TRADE UNION AND LABOUR RELATIONS (AMENDMENT) BILL
House again in Committee.
Debate on Amendment No. 1 resumed.
Lord HOUGHTON of SOWERBY: I hope that noble Lords can recall the words of the noble Lord, Lord Wigoder, and I should like to say how fully I agree with what he said. I think that it is too late in the day to send a revised conscience clause back to another place without any prospect of fruitful result. After all, it is fruitful result that we want; it is not merely to have a clash with another place. We want to do business, if business is to be done. But, as my noble friend the Leader of the House said, we know what the answer is likely to be, because we have debated this matter in both Houses so many times. It would have been possible for noble Lords opposite to put down this Amendment long ago and not left it until this late hour.
Moreover, I think if the noble and learned Lord, Lord Hailsham of Saint Marylebone, had wished to lean so heavily on me he might have found out whether I was able to bear his weight. He is apparently relying on me for his form of words, but has failed to get them right, and, presumably, is hoping that I will give him support. I hope that there is no underlying political motive in what is happening this afternoon. We are all talking about integrity and conscience; so it would be unbecoming if I were to say that this looks very much like a political ploy. Is it that noble Lords opposite want to enforce the Parliament Act on some aspect of this Bill, without, presumably, wishing to imperil the main Amendment to the Bill, which is contained in the suggested Amendments from the House of Commons? It looks as if, in default of any other line of attack, noble Lords opposite have gone back to conscience.
May I say also as gently as I can that I doubt whether, by history or temperament, noble Lords opposite are entitled to bear the torch of freedom of conscience in trade union affairs. After all, the history of trade unionism is littered with the martyrs of conscience, not at the hands of their fellow workers but at the hands
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of their employers. Although in these days we all stand for freedom, and wish to see workers protected from the tyranny of their unions as well as from the tyranny of their employers, nevertheless I think they might now and again leave it to some of us on this side of the House to uphold the Ark and the Covenant of individual freedom in industrial matters.
I stated my views on conscience. I object to conscience, I object to religion, as the criterion for deciding whether a person has good grounds for objection to a particular compulsion or course of action. But I am not going to weary the Committee with an examination of the meaning of words and whether, as in the judgment of the tribunal that was quoted by my noble friend the Leader of he House, there is any basis for a genuine objection to doing something, except that of religion. I do not accept that view myself, and I would hope that one day it would be possible to find a basis for conscientious objection not based on any religious faith.
However, when this House preferred conscience to religious belief and sent the Bill to the other place, the other place preferred religious belief to conscience and so it came back in that form. Those who were stoutly defending religious belief as a basis for objection to joining a union were the Agnostics in another place. But, for my part, I am prepared to leave the matter where it is. I do not like it, but the debate has to end somewhere. We cannot go on with a game of battledore and shuttlecock between this House and another place. If it comes to the final point surely we must concede—especially in this matter—the right of another place to the final judgment of this issue. I am not prepared on any grounds at all to endanger the inclusion in the Act as it is finally passed of the so-called "Press charter". That is the really important matter that we have to consider, and that is really why the Bill comes back to your Lordships' House with suggested Amendments from the Commons, which I sincerely hope will provide a wide measure of agreement.
Apart from the possible political and procedural consequences of insisting on this Amendment there are one or two other points that might be considered which I suggest can give comfort even

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to uneasy consciences in this matter. The first is that the obstacle to joining a union on grounds of conscience or religious belief usually occurs at the outset of a closed shop agreement. It is when the closed shop is being agreed to that the question of conscience mostly arises. It is then that the pressure of the unions for a closed shop is applied to nonmembers. It is among the non-members that the conscientious objectors are likely to be found. It is therefore at the point of negotiation and agreement between the unions and the employers that the position of conscientious objectors has to be resolved. My noble friend the Leader of the House made precisely the point that we arc dealing, after all—and I have emphasised this many times—with employers and unions coming together to negotiate a closed shop agreement, and there can be many terms and conditions within it before it is finally acceptable.
I heard the other day of a closed shop agreement which had been negotiated between Burton's, the tailors, and the National Union of Tailors and Garment Workers. They were already organised as to something over 90 per cent. but the question arose as to what was to happen to those who were not members of the union and who might have conscientious objection to joining. According to my information, the agreement reached was that workers should not be compelled to join the union and have their job put at jeopardy if they had genuine, conscientious grounds for refusal. There was nothing about religion; it was conscientious grounds. The agreement provided for a joint committee of employer and union to determine appeals for exemption on grounds of conscience. That seemed to be an eminently tolerant and sensible arrangement. It provided that those who were exempted from union membership on conscientious grounds should pay an amount equal to the trade union subscription to some charity.
There is nothing to prevent other closed shop agreements following these sensible lines. I suggest that no worker will be dismissed by the employer for refusal to join a union unless the employer is pressed by the union or unions to do so. The pressure comes from the unions, and much therefore depends on the tolerance of the unions. I suggest also that few unions will press for the dismissal of a fellow
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worker if he has genuine objections on conscientious grounds, or other genuine reasons of conviction or religion, if that worker can satisfy either his fellow workers or a committee appointed to adjudicate on the strength of his feelings. In most cases those who have this kind of objection to joining a union are known already. It is not something they can trump up at the last minute. Union representatives have been going round seeking their membership probably for years, and they have probably been met all the time with this position of conscientious objection. Therefore, one does not necessarily have to have religion as a basis; one has to have however a reputation for being an honest, truthful, and sincere person. I believe that the unions will know that grounds exist in particular cases for a worker's objection to joining the union. We shall probably find in many closed shop agreements provisions of the kind that I have mentioned, which will avoid any serious trouble.
The unions are not really out to penalise conscience, but they are out to stem the possible tide of hypocrisy. This is what the unions have to guard against. After all, their ultimate aim is solidarity and not necessarily the membership of the last worker unit in an undertaking. It is solidarity, trade union strength, that they are seeking to get by a closed shop arrangement. Subject to their consent to exemptions, which, in the case I have quoted, seems to be possible on tolerant grounds, there should be no real trouble in many of these agreements. I think, therefore, that we should leave the matter where it is and hope that the common sense of employers and unions will prevail to get in closed shop agreements provisions which will overcome any real ground for concern.
Both unions and noble Lords want to safeguard in men and women those qualities of character, of integrity and strength of conviction, which are too valuable in a democratic society to be made the victims of tyranny on one side or the other. And if there is any common sense to be expected in this situation, as I am sure there is, and if there is any reasonable degree of tolerance to be expected in this situation, as I am sure there is, then let us give it a try and see what happens. If there are serious grounds for concern

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in the future, then it will be possible to come back to this matter; it will be possible to promote fresh legislation to safeguard workers from unreasonable treatment, martyrdom and loss of employment.
I appeal to noble Lords to view this matter with a full understanding of the traditions, the history and the motives of unions and the history of trade unionism in this country, and to place some confidence in the trade union movement to fulfil its obligations to the community without doing an injustice to individuals whom Parliament might feel it had to intervene to protect.
4.12 p.m.
Lord HAILSHAM of SAINT MARYLEBONE: I do not want to intervene if it is the desire of your Lordships to continue this debate, but I rise in case I may be right in surmising that that is not your Lordships' desire. I would, I am bound to say, find it easier to answer some of the arguments which have been put, and particularly the speech of the noble Lord, Lord Houghton of Sowerby, if I was really able to understand them to the full. Lord Houghton is not a person from whom I wish to score debating points, but I must remind him of what he said when he last addressed your Lordships on this matter. He said:
"What is good enough for the Parliamentary Labour Party is good enough for a Labour Government's Act of Parliament on any matter you like affecting conscience or religious belief".—[Official Report, 23/9/75, col. 196.]
I really wonder whether, having regard to that quotation, the noble Lord will in years to come feel altogether satisfied with the speech which he has just delivered. In fact, of course, he has just delivered a speech which establishes the principal point which I was seeking to make; namely, that a conscience clause not confined to religious belief is, at least in his opinion, workable. Lord Houghton appealed to the Committee to consider the Montague Burton agreement, of which I was previously unaware. He said it contained a conscience clause which had no relation to religion and was clearly workable, and therefore it is not correct, as the noble Lord, Lord Shepherd, said, that such a clause would open the door to every kind of abuse.
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The noble Lord also said, truthfully, that this problem is likely to arise in its most acute form and probably in most numerous cases where a closed shop arrangement has just been arrived at between a union and employer. I agree with him, but that is just what makes mincemeat of the argument addressed by Lord Shepherd, because he was thinking that an employer would be reluctant to take a new man on if he thought he might be a potential conscientious objector. But he is entirely free, whether or not this Amendment is passed, to reject a would-be applicant for employment on any grounds whatever because this Amendment has no kind of application to persons applying for employment; it applies only to compensation for those who are dismissed from employment which they already have.
Lord Shepherd began by saying that he appreciated the way and the spirit in which I had proposed the Amendment, and I was grateful to him for that acknowledgment. The only other thing that Lord Houghton suggested was that this was a political ploy. I do not suppose that those on the Benches behind me would support me for an instant if they thought it was a political ploy, but if there are any noble Lords on the Benches opposite who think that this is a political ploy, let me hasten to disabuse them. Lord Shepherd was correct in thinking that this Amendment is put forward on its merits, and that brings me to the other two speeches which have been made on this subject.
There are two separate issues which have to be considered: is this Amendment inherently desirable and is it something which we ought to send back for another look by the other place? The second issue arises only if an affirmative answer is given to the first, because clearly if this Amendment is not inherently desirable we ought not to pass it, even if it were the first blush of a virginal Bill. But I find a little difficulty in supporting, or even understanding, Lord Shepherd and Lord Wigoder in saying that even if, in effect, we thought the Amendment was inherently desirable—as Lord Wigoder expressly said that it was—we ought not to send it back for another look by the other place. Let me assure the Committee, as I say, that I recognise no less than Lord Houghton and Lord Shepherd that in this particular

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matter at this particular stage another place has the last word; it has the last word by law and even if it did not have the last word by law I would acknowledge its right to use the last word as a matter of constitutional propriety. However, that does not mean that if, on a matter affecting the conscience of the individual and the protection of an individual against unfair dismissal, we happen to hit on something which is right intrinsically and has not been thought of before, we should not ask the other place to look at it.
Lord Shepherd said that it would take two or three hours to discuss the matter in another place. I accept that, and having been perhaps for longer than most Members of your Lordships' House a Member of another place—for longer than I care to remember, from 1938 onwards—may I say at once that I take that argument extremely seriously. I would not ask another place to spend two hours of its valuable time, not even one hour of its valuable time, discussing a matter unless I thought it was of sufficient importance intrinsically that it should do so. On reflection, I do think that it is of sufficient importance to ask them to do it. The noble Lord, Lord Shepherd, said that there was not the smallest chance of another place concurring in our opinion, even if it is a right opinion.
I wonder whether that is an argument which really bears examination. We must realise the constitutional facts of life. The whole situation would be transformed overnight, in a moment, in a trice, in the twinkling of an eye, if the Government accepted it. I am not really asking for another place, on a free vote, to consider the question of conscience, for I believe that, if it did so, the arguments which I am proposing would overwhelmingly win. I am asking the Government to give the advice—if they are persuaded and to the extent that they are persuaded—for the Government and its members to search their own consciences, which are not necessarily their religious beliefs, and to see whether they cannot have another look at this.
There are reasonable men in the Government. There is the noble and learned Lord who decorates the Woolsack. There is the noble Lord the Leader of the House. There is the Home Secretary.
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They are all members of the Government. I simply do not understand the arguments of merit which have been put to us. Nor do I understand why it is considered improper for this House to ask the Government to reconsider the matter when everybody knows that, if the Government did reconsider the matter in this sense, there would be no difficulty about obtaining the adherence of the other place. Nor is there the smallest danger of losing the so-called "charter" to which the noble Lord, Lord Houghton, attaches so much importance. The only effect of this going back to another place and of being rejected—unless the Speaker were advised to certify, instead of sending it back here and saying that the Commons would not agree, which I hardly think he would do on a single Amendment—wouldbe that we should have to look at it again. As I say, I do not dispute that the Commons have the last word, so I do not feel, on balance, that there is anything in that argument.
Nor is there anything whatever in the argument that the words in the Schedule to the 1974 Bill to which I personally take objection are repeated in the Employment Protection Act. If the Government took the view that we could improve this Bill, they could as easily improve the Employment Protection Act. What stands in our way is not the conscientious objection to what we say of the tribunes of the people, but the members of the Government—or, rather, perhaps without seeking to probe the secrets of the Cabinet Room at any rate until the next volume of memoirs comes out, some members of the Government.
I turn last of all to the so-called merits. They really depend on one proposition and one proposition only. That is that one cannot work a conscience clause. I should have thought that after this debate and after the speech of the noble Lord, Lord Houghton, one could hardly make that argument stand up but, when the noble Lord, Lord Wigoder, says to me that nothing has happened since the last time we discussed it except perhaps that I have taken the noble Lord, Lord Houghton, at his word, I venture to say that a good many things have happened. Not least of these is the suggestion that we should adopt a European convention which has a conscience clause in it. That suggestion comes from the Labour Party.

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It is quite clear that the conscience clause in the European convention will apply to the present Bill and, if the Labour Party's suggestion were accepted, it would become part of the law of this land. But let us assume that the Labour Party's suggestion is not accepted. It means that this country may have the humiliation of being hauled before the European Convention Commission for a breach of this piece of legislation which we are being asked to pass without amendment at this moment.
I sincerely ask the Government to think again. Of course if they refuse they have their machine-made majority in the House of Commons and of course if they use that machine-made majority we shall have to give way. I have never pretended

CONTENTS

Aberdare, L.

Grenfell, L.

Northchurch, B.

Aldenham, L.

Gridley, L.

Nugent of Guildford, L.

Allan of Kilmahew, L.

Grimston of Westbury, L.

Orr-Ewing, L.

Allerton, L.

Grimthorpe, L.

Peterborough, Bp.

Arran, E.

Hailsham of Saint Marylebone, L.

Piercy, L.

Astor of Hever, L.

Platt, L.

Auckland, L.

Hankey, L.

Powis, E.

Audley, L.

Harcourt, V.

Rankeillour, L.

Belhaven and Stenton, L.

Harmar-Nicholls, L.

Reading, M.

Belstead, L.

Hartwell, L.

Redesdale, L.

Berkeley, B.

Hawke, L.

Reigate, L.

Birdwood, L.

Hereford, V.

Roberthall, L.

Brecon, L.

Hill of Luton, L.

Ruthven of Freeland, Ly.

Broughshane, L.

Hood, V.

Sackville, L.

Campbell of Croy, L.

Homsby-Smith, B.

St. Aldwyn, E.

Cathcart, E.

Hunt of Fawley, L.

St. Davids, V.

Chelwood, L.

Inglewood, L.

St. Helens, L.

Cholmondeley, M.

Jessel, L.

St. Just, L.

Clifford of Chudleigh, L.

Killearn, L.

Saint Oswald, L.

Coleraine, L.

Kings Norton, L.

Sandford, L.

Cornwallis, L.

Kinnaird, L.

Sandys, L.

Cottesloe, L.

Lauderdale, E.

Saville, L.

Croft, L.

Lloyd, L.

Selkirk, E.

Cullen of Ashbourne, L.

Long, V.

Sempill, Ly.

Daventry, V.

Lucas of Chilworth, L.

Skelmersdale, L.

de Clifford, L.

Lyell, L.

Somers, L.

de Freyne, L.

Macleod of Borve, B.

Stamp, L.

Denham, L. [Teller.]

Macpherson of Drumochter, L.

Strathcona and Mount Royal, L.

Deramore, L.

L.

L.

Derwent, L.

Mancroft, L.

Strathspey, L.

Dundee, E.

Marley, L.

Suffield, L.

Dundonald, E.

Massereene and Ferrard, V.

Tenby, V.

Ebbisham, L.

Merrivale, L.

Terrington, L.

Elles, B.

Mersey, V.

Teviot, L.

Elliot of Harwood, B.

Mills, V.

Teynham, L.

Elton, L.

Milverton, L.

Thomas, L.

Emmet of Amberley, B.

Molson, L.

Tranmire, L.

Faithfull, B.

Monck, V.

Vickers, B.

Falmouth, V.

Monson, L.

Vivian, L.

Ferrers, E.

Mottistone, L.

Wakefield of Kendal, L.

Fraser of Kilmorack, L.

Mowbray and Stourton, L. [Teller.]

Ward of North Tyneside, B.

Glasgow, E.

Westbury, L.

Glenkinglas, L.

Moyne, L.

Wolverton, L.

Grafton, D.

Newall, L.

Yarborough, E.

the opposite, but will they be wise, in the light of the arguments, to do so? I do not believe that they will be and I do not believe that, when it goes forth that this House has decided and decided only this, that a person who, for conscience other than religious belief, is dismissed from his employment can have from his employer, and only from his employer, compensation for unfair dismissal, this House need fear the verdict of public opinion. For that reason, I am bound to say that I am not convinced by the noble Lord the Leader of the House.
4.26 p.m.
On Question, Whether the said Amendment (No. 1) shall be agreed to?
Their Lordships divided: Contents, 128; Not-Contents, 91.

NOT-CONTENTS

Allen of Fallowfield, L.

Gardiner, L.

Maelor, L.

Ardwick, L.

Geddes of Epsom, L.

Maybray-King, L.

Arwyn, L.

Gordon-Walker, L.

Melchett, L.

Aylestone, L.

Goronwy-Roberts, L.

Noel-Buxton, L.

Balogh, L.

Greene of Harrow Weald, L.

Northfleld, L.

Beswick, L.

Gregson, L.

Oram, L.

Birk, B.

Hale, L.

Paget of Northampton, L.

Blyton, L.

Hall, V.

Pannell, L.

Bradwell, L.

Hanworth, V.

Pargiter, L.

Brown, L.

Harris of Greenwich, L.

Parry, L.

Buckinghamshire, E.

Henderson, L.

Peddie, L.

Burntwood, L.

Hirshfield, L.

Phillips, B.

Burton of Coventry, B.

Houghton of Sowerby, L.

Pitt of Hampstead, L.

Champion, L.

Hoy, L.

Popplewell, L.

Collison, L.

Hughes, L.

Rhodes, L.

Cooper of Stockton Heath, L.

Jacobson, L.

Ritchie-Calder, L.

Crook, L.

Jacques, L.

Shepherd, L. (L. Privy Seal)

Crowther-Hunt, L.

Janner, L.

Shinwell, L.

Cudlipp, L.

Kirkhill, L.

Slater, L.

Darling of Hillsborough, L.

Kissin, L.

Snow, L.

Davies of Leek, L.

Leather! and, L.

Stedman, B.

Davies of Penrhys, L.

Lee of Newton, L.

Stewart of Alvechurch, B.

Delacourt-Smith of Alteryn, B.

Leigh, L.

Stow Hill. L.

Llewelyn-Davies, L.

Strabolgi, L. [Teller.]

Douglas of Barloch, L.

Llewelyn-Davies of Hastoe, B. [Teller.]

Taylor of Mansfield, L.

Douglass of Cleveland, L.

Wallace of Coslany, L.

Elwyn-Jones, L. (L. Chancellor.)

Lloyd of Hampstead, L.

Wells-Pestell, L.

Loudoun, C.

Wigg, L.

Evans of Hungershall, L.

Lovell-Davis, L.

Winterbottom, L.

Feather, L.

McCarthy, L.

Wootton of Abinger, B.

Fulton, L.

McLeavy, L.

Wynne-Jones, L.

Gaitskell, B.

Resolved in the affirmative, and Amendment agreed to accordingly.
Clause 1, as amended, agreed to.
4.36 p.m.
Lord SHEPHERD Lord SHEPHERD moved Amendment No. 2:
After Clause 1, insert the following new clause:
Freedom of the press
After section 1 of the principal Act there shall be inserted the following section:—
"Charter on freedom of the press
1A.—(1) If, before the end of the period of twelve months beginning with the passing of the Trade Union and Labour Relations (Amendment) Act 1975, there is agreed among parties including employers of journalists (or employers' associations representing such employers), editors (or editors' organisations), and trade unions representing journalists, a charter containing practical guidance for employers, trade unions and editors and other journalists on matters relating to the freedom of the press, the Secretary of State shall lay before both Houses of Parliament a draft of that charter.
(2) For the purposes of subsection (1) above, practical guidance on matters relating to the freedom of the press must include guidance on the avoidance of improper pressure to distort or suppress news, comment, or criticism, the application of union membership agreements to journalists (and in particu-
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lar the right of editors to discharge their duties and to commission and to publish any article) and the question of access for contributors.
(3) If no such charter has been agreed as mentioned above, or if a draft charter laid before Parliament (under subsection (1) above or this subsection) is not approved by resolution of each House of Parliament as mentioned in subsection (6) below, the Secretary of State shall after consultation with the Press Council and such of the parties referred to in subsection (1) above, such organisations representing workers, and such organisations representing employers, as he thinks fit, prepare in draft a charter, as follows:—

(a) where, or so far as, there appears to the Secretary of State to be agreement among the parties referred to in subsection (1) above on any matter relating to the freedom of the press, he shall incorporate in the draft charter such practical guidance as he thinks appropriate to give effect to that agreement;

(b) where, so far as there appears to the Secretary of State to be no such agreement on any of the particular matters referred to in subsection (2) above, he shall incorporate in the draft charter such practical guidance on that matter as he thinks fit,

and the Secretary of State shall lay the draft charter before both Houses of Parliament.
(4) A charter agreed as mentioned in sub-section (3) above, shall define its field of retary of State in accordance with sub-section (1) above, or prepared by the secoperation.

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(5) A charter agreed as mentioned in subsection (1) above, or prepared by the Secretary of State in accordance with subsection (3) above, shall provide for the constitution of a body which shall have the functions of—

(a) hearing any complaint by a person aggrieved by a failure on the part of any other person to observe any provision of the charter;

(b) issuing to the parties a declaration as to whether such a complaint is well-founded; and

(c) securing the publication of its decision.

(6) If a draft laid under subsection (1) or (3) above is approved by a resolution of each House of Parliament, the Secretary of State shall issue the charter in the form of the draft.
(7) A charter for the time being in force under this section may be revised from time to time by agreement between such parties as are referred to in subsection (1) above, and the Secretary of State shall lay a draft of the revised charter before both Houses of Parliament.
(8) If a draft laid under subsection (7) above is approved by a resolution of each House of Parliament, the Secretary of State shall issue the revised charter in the form of the draft.
(9) On issuing a charter or revised charter under subsection (6) or (8) above the Secretary of State shall make by statutory instrument an order specifying the date on which the charter or revised charter is to come into effect.
(10) A failure on the part of any person to observe any provision of a charter which is for the time being in force under this section shall not of itself render him liable to any proceedings, but in any proceedings—

(a) any such charter shall be admissible in evidence, and

(b) any provision of such a charter which appears to the court or tribunal to be relevant to any question arising in those proceedings shall be taken into account by the court or tribunal in determining that question."

The noble Lord said: May I remind the Committee of the procedures that we are adopting in regard to this Amendment? The text of the Amendment is of course precisely the same as that of the Commons suggested Amendments sent to us by another place under the provisions of the Parliament Act 1911, which did not form part of the Bill. Those suggested Amendments we considered, as was our duty under the Parliament Act, when we gave this Bill a Second Reading. We did not, however, move that the Commons suggested Amendments should be agreed. If the suggested Amendments had been agreed at that stage, this new
660
clause on Press freedom could not have been tabled and discussed as a normal Committee stage Amendment capable of becoming part of the Bill in the normal way. The chance for noble Lords to pass this Bill as a normal Bill, but containing some safeguards for Press freedom, without resort to the Parliament Acts would have been lost. Noble Lords will know well from what I said on Second Reading that this is a chance which I sincerely hope they will take, and that they will therefore agree to this Amendment today.
This new clause is of course substantially the same as that introduced by my noble friend Lord Houghton during the Committee stage in your Lordships' House on the original Amendment Bill as subsequently amended in both Houses on the proposal of the Government, or with their agreement. It provides for a charter giving practical guidance on matters relating to the freedom of the Press to be agreed by relevant parties within the Press industry, and to be given Parliamentary backing. The key matters relating to Press freedom on which guidance must be given are spelt out in subsection (2). The charter must also provide for a body to be set up to deal with complaints about non-observance of the charter's provisions. Moreover, the charter would, like the Industrial Relations Act's Code of Practice, have a status in legal proceedings to which it was relevant. It could therefore assist a person who took legal action to which the charter was relevant in winning his case.
Some changes have been made from the final version supported by the Government during the 1974–75 Session. Most of the changes are minor, drafting improvements. In particular, however, new provision is now made for the situation which might arise if Parliament did not approve a charter laid before it. The Secretary of State would, in these circumstances, be under a duty to pursue consultations on the preparation of an alternative version until one was produced which was acceptable to Parliament. The Government support all the provisions that are in this Amendment. They have been arrived at as a result of close co-operation between both Houses. I think that the contents of the Amendment are well known to Members of your Lordships' Committee, and I do not think I

661
need go into any further detail on it. I hope that the Committee will agree to this Amendment so that this Bill may reach the Statute Book by our normal processes with the question of the Press fully dealt with in it. I beg to move.
4.40 p.m.
Lord HAILSHAM of SAINT MARYLEBONE: I do not know that we can let it go quite as simply as that. I was expecting the noble Lord, Lord Goodman, to rise, which was the reason why I did not rise myself. While he is collecting his thoughts, may I say this to the Committee. I agree that the wise thing would be to pass this into the Bill. I confirm what the noble Lord, Lord Shepherd, has just said about the position under the Parliament Act. I have made my criticisms of the proposed charter but, like the tribunal in the earlier part of the Bill about unjust exclusion and reasonable exclusion or expulsion which is proposed to be set up by the TUC, my belief is that, contrary to my better convictions about its value, it would be wise now to let it have a run.
Lord ROCHESTER: Before the noble Lord, Lord Goodman, rises in his place, I think it might be for the convenience of the Committee if, very briefly, and in the most general terms, I were to express the view of my noble friends on this Amendment. It is not quite in the form that we should have preferred it; particularly in relation to the point that, in our view, the freedom of the Press is one so basic as to mean that its preservation should be safeguarded in some way by law rather than that aggrieved persons under the charter concerning Press freedom should merely have the right to complain to some independent body or that the provisions of the charter should be admitted in evidence before a body of that kind, a court or a tribunal. However, our view and that of the majority of your Lordships was taken as far as it reasonably could be taken in the last Session of Parliament and it would not be appropriate, as we see it, to pursue that view further now.
Similarly, as regards this Amendment based on the proposition first put forward by the noble Lord, Lord Houghton of Sowerby, we do not propose to oppose it now. As the noble Lord, Lord Houghton, reminded us in our debate at Second Reading, there is built into this
662
Amendment the safeguard that the draft charter to which it refers will eventually have to be approved by a Resolution of each House of Parliament. If, therefore, the Bill is passed there will be further opportunity for whatever charter emerges from the Bill later to be debated. I recall, too, in our discussions last year on the noble Lord's Amendment, that it was said that the half loaf that it represented was, at any rate, better than no bread at all. I recall that various estimates were then made as to what precise fraction of a loaf the noble Lord's Amendment amounted to.
May I say that, in my opinion for what it is worth, based on some experience of the practical difficulties of bringing the law into the field of industrial relations, it is anyway a large slice of bread. If there is one thing more than another in the industrial field which our country stands in need of today it is, in my view, that at least some measure of agreement should be sought and found between the main political Parties, on the one hand, and between the Government and both sides of industry, on the other, as to the main policies that should be followed. When it comes to the crunch we all tend to feel that any such agreement should be based upon our view rather than upon the view of the other fellow.
In this instance the policy involved is not one of our choosing, but we on these Benches have all along recognised that in introducing the original Amendment the noble Lord, Lord Houghton of Sowerby, was trying, in a genuinely disinterested way, to bridge a gap between two sincerely held but differing opinions. It is in that same spirit that by noble friends and I should now like to give the policy involved in this Amendment a fair crack of the whip and we very much hope that it will prove successful in the event.
Lord GOODMAN: I do not know why my medical advisers are so benevolently disposed towards every Member of your Lordships' House as firmly to advise me to remain on my feet for a very short period. We have had a very low-key debate on the whole and that is probably a good thing. I think that it has been particularly distinguished by contributions from the Liberal Benches since the noble Lord, Lord Wigoder,

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conforms so closely to Ruskin's famous definition of Gothic architecture, "petrified vertical motion"!
Lord LLOYD of KILGERRAN: As chairman of the Ruskin Association it seems to me that the noble Lord has got the quotation totally wrong. If he is proposing to base his theme on that quotation in addressing your Lordships, he is without doubt wholly wrong.
Lord GOODMAN: I will be prepared to discuss the matter with the noble Lord afterwards, in the Library.
Lord LLOYD of KILGERRAN: May I—
Several Noble Lords: Order, order!
Lord LLOYD of KILGERRAN: May I say with the greatest respect, and despite the Conservative proposition that I should not be heard, that on the third Bench of the Liberal Benches I cannot hear what the noble Lord, Lord Goodman, has to say in relation to his introduction on Ruskin.
Lord GOODMAN: I can only say that for the noble Lord to be so alert as to interrupt and correct me, he does well in not having heard a word of what I said. But I do not think that Ruskin's views about Gothic architecture are fundamental to our discussion.
Lord LLOYD of KILGERRAN: I should like—
Several Noble Lords: Order, order!
Lord LLOYD of KILGERRAN: We are in the technological age and Ruskin does not count in this.
Lord SHEPHERD: I hope that we shall not continue this exchange. I think that the noble Lord, Lord Goodman, had the Floor of the Committee and that we should now permit him to deliver his speech. I hope he will keep off Gothic architecture for a moment.
Lord GOODMAN: I give a solemn pledge not to mention Ruskin, architecture, or any cognate subject.
There are two matters on which I should like to touch in the course of what I assure your Lordships will be a brief speech. The first is the constitutional position and the second is the merits of the proposal. On the con-
664
stitutional position, we have had a very interesting and enlightening discussion in the last few weeks about how the Parliament Act works, how the interchanges between the Houses operate and what can and cannot happen.
The last time I addressed your Lordships I made it clear that I was a confirmed constitutionalist and had no intention of challenging the supremacy of the other place. This I totally accept. Although I am a confirmed constitutionalist—indeed perhaps because I am one—I saw no reason why we should not be able to exercise the rights that we had under the Parliament Act; and if because of some accident, inadvertence or mistake the Act were to come into operation with a chunk of it we did not like still available to us to be rejected, I could see nothing unconstitutional in our operating that right. I may say that in the short time which has elapsed since my complete recovery from a recent indisposition, I have taken the best advice I can and the most respected and revered advice available in this Chamber, and I am informed that there is nothing remotely unconstitutional, irregular or contrary to precedent if we should decide not to accept the suggested Amendments sent from the other place. This is a right that we exercise.
The whole matter therefore turns simply on the merits. If we consider it is more meritorious and more to the advantage of the situation to reject those proposals, we have an absolute right to do so. There can be no resentment and no suggestion in the country that we have acted unconstitutionally or flouted the other place, that we are exercising a "built-in majority", whether it be Tory or anything else. We have a perfect right to decide to reject the suggested Amendments. I would emphasise that point because I do not propose this afternoon to ask your Lordships to reject the Amendments. What I am anxious to do is to test the feeling of the Committee after there has been the opportunity to hear certain arguments which so far have not been presented and which I shall make as briefly as possible.
There is one feature of this suggested code which is especially obnoxious to me and also to those newspaper colleagues who are associated with me in the conduct of the discussions we have had over

665
many months. I may say that represents a very great majority of the editors of London and provincial papers and many other people associated with the Press. The feature we find wholly obnoxious and unacceptable, even if the idea put forward by the noble Lord, Lord Houghton of Sowerby—a very worthy and conscientious idea of a Press charter —should be accepted, is that it should be drafted by a Cabinet Minister, a Member of the Government. We do not know of any civilised country where the Government intervene to prescribe a code for the Press. We regard this as a really hideous notion, which is contrary to all precepts of freedom and all ideas of freedom of speech and of expression. Even at this late stage I venture to invite the Government to consider whether that particular feature of this legislation—and it is not a fundamental or basic feature—might be withdrawn. That is the feature to which we consider basic objection can be taken legitimately. We think it should be withdrawn.
I should like to say that I do not propose to divide your Lordships this afternoon, but I am asking every Member of this Committee to consider whether, if the Government are unable to accede to this very modest request, it would not be appropriate for us to reject the whole of the charter regarding which this particular provision is so fundamental. That is a situation we may reach on Report stage. I do not say we shall necessarily reach it, because it will depend wholly on the amount of support which is likely to be forthcoming in this Chamber from those of your Lordships who have had the opportunity to weigh the situation. I shall not divide your Lordships on the basis that it is an empty gesture or a piece of futile defiance. I shall divide the House if I feel that enough people share my view that we ought not to have a Press code made for us by the Government, and that it would be a tragic thing in the history of British freedom of expression and freedom of thought if in1976 a Government official is to determine what is to go into the Press and how the Press is to be regulated. If the Government will withdraw that proposal at this stage I shall think it right to withdraw all further opposition.
We have had a good, long and honourable fight. We have been defeated by significant majorities in the other place,
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and it would be quite wrong to maintain that fight. But we have the constitutional right to reject this charter out of hand. That, I believe, is the only right we have: I do not think we have a right to amend the charter, because then it would be a question of again sending it back to the other place and resuming a discussion that ought to be concluded. But, while we have that right, I think it would be timid, pusillanimous and cowardly not to exercise it if, in the ultimate analysis, we are to be left with a charter which is to be drawn up by a Government Minister. It is really no help to say that it is a charter which has to be approved by both Houses. Having regard to the guidelines contained in the present Bill, once they are operated by a determined and dogged Minister—if I may say so, a Minister of the most obstinate, obdurate, disposition—there is very little doubt that his notions of what the Press charter ought to be will be carried into effect. We shall find ourselves in the utmost difficulty in getting any revisions.
It is right to say that I believe, at the conclusion of a long and by no means happy argument, that the Minister is a man of total sincerity—I have never suggested anything to the contrary—but he is a man totally incapable of changing his mind or of appreciating the implications of this matter which have dawned on a few of us who have taken part in these discussions. I am compelled to say that his latest performance in a speech made the other day only reaffirms this. I should like to quote some observations that he made on this matter which are highly relevant to the sort of charter he is likely to produce. He made a speech only yesterday, and perhaps I might quote to your Lordships:
"Mr. Foot said he repudiated charges made against the Bill that it curtailed the rights of editors, the rights of non-journalists to write for newspapers, and 'the right to work' of individual trade unionists. But let me admit also that, while many of these accusations are wild and malicious, some of them arise from genuine fears and genuine misapprehensions."
The notion that these apprehensions might not be fanciful but valid, and based on a secure and well-founded fear that, if we allow this to happen, people will be prevented from writing and a very small union of 20,000 people, as a result of the Press charter, will find themselves in a position where it is unavoidable

667
that the Institute of Journalists is destroyed, because the consequence of having this Press charter must inevitably be—and I can assure you of this from the discussions I have had—that the Institute of Journalists will have no chance of survival. If we dispense with the charter, then the Institute of journalists has a chance of surviving. Several newspapers might fight doggedly against the closed shop, except under conditions that would allow it to survive. If I may say so, that is something which will happen if there is no charter. If there is a charter, and a charter to be written by Mr. Foot, there is no prospect except that a perfectly worthy institute of 3,000 members will be totally immolated, for no reason except a principle that we do not regard as having sufficient validity to justify the carnage and damage.
This is what we are really concerned about. We are concerned that if there is a charter, it should be freely negotiated. Time and time again I heard the noble Lord, Lord Houghton, say with total sincerity that we did not need the law intervening in these matters. I shall not revive that debate, or comment again as I have commented before about the sad and strange situation where we decide to exclude the law from our transactions in 1976, in the belief that human affairs can be conducted without some legal coercion and some legal compulsion or protection. We have arrived at this conclusion. So be it. But if we do not need the law, why do we need Mr. Foot? If we are to accept the position that, as free men, we are able to negotiate a charter in free terms, let us negotiate it without Mr. Foot and let us spare Mr. Foot, with many arduous duties already falling upon him, from this particular additional one.
In my view, it is common sense and common reason that if there is to be a charter it should be one freely negotiated by the parties concerned. We have great support and encouragement for this view in current developments in the newspaper industry at the moment. In the last two or three months particularly, there have been very happy signs of trade union and employer negotiations being conducted between the parties towards a fruitful conclusion directed towards producing a safer and more secure Press.
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Great advances have been made in discussions, which I initially chaired until I was compelled to abandon them, and they were then brilliantly and successfully chaired by the deputy who took over. They have produced a result so that voluntarily, without the intervention of any Minister, without any assistance from well-meaning Governments and officials, there is an agreed, negotiated position where everyone has arrived at certain very firm principles as to how redundancy is to be dealt with, how casual labour is to be dealt with—matters which seem to have defied agreement for years. If we can arrive at this situation without the intervention of a Minister we can, I say hopefully, arrive at a situation where we do not need the intervention of a Minister as the ultimate arbiter as to what the charter is to be.
I conclude by saying that at the Report stage I will return to this. If the Government insist that there is to be a charter drawn by a Minister, I would venture to invite those who feel sufficiently strongly about the libertarian aspects of the matter to consider whether they would join with me in defeating this Amendment—something we have an absolute right to do. I do not ask anyone to make a decision until we have had a response from the Government.
I would point out something which I think it is right that I should point out. The original Amendment for a Press charter that my colleagues and I nut forward was to contain in unequivocal terms a provision that nobody was to be excluded or expelled from a trade union, from the newspaper union, without just cause. In short, the first principle of the Press charter was to guarantee that people should not be expelled from their profession or prevented from exercising their profession unless there was a valid ground for doing so. If it was unjust, then the charter was to give them protection. It is difficult to believe that there could be an honourable charter which did not contain that as a first provision. It is difficult to understand why it should be resisted, why anyone should not want that in the clearest terms. But after consideration it was deliberately resisted. I asked for that provision. In fact I went further. If that provision was inserted I was prepared to withdraw all my further objections, even the objection to the Secretary

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of State, because at least we should know that there was a clear-cut provision, and even the most ingenious and doctrinaire Secretary of State would require a great deal more ingenuity than a human being could command to remove the effect of those clear-cut words. That has been refused. There has been no suggestion that that would be agreed and in the circumstances if the charter remains adumbrated in that form with a provision that the Secretary of State is ultimately to draft the charter I think we should be failing in our duty if we did not take advantage of the constitutional opportunity which has been afforded to us to throw the charter out root and branch.
It would be an unfortunate thing if we did not seize that opportunity, if we do not get the very minor concession and safeguards for which we are asking. The issue has now been narrowed to an enormous extent. We are no longer asking about legal sanctions and legal restraints. We are prepared to accept that in a Chamber which contains at least two former Lord Chancellors, they can sit quiet and supine and accept the fact that the legal system which they have proclaimed and operated for years throughout their professional lives is one that need not be introduced into trade union affairs.
There may be some explanation of this mystery and we may hear it in due course. I have no doubt we shall hear in due course, when the matter of the nature of the legal profession comes before the Royal Commission, from the very same voices what an admirable system it is; how wrong it would be to make any change to it, and we may then be asked how it is that a system so admirable is totally unacceptable to the trade unions. I do not know what the answer to that will be; nor is it a totally relevant inquiry at this moment. But it is relevant to know how, at the same time as we are expelling the law, we are determined to have something which is just as powerful and perhaps more sinister than the law in the person of a Minister who is to be substituted for it.
I am sure I have remained longer on my feet than my doctors would want and, I am certain, longer than your Lordships would want. I would only say that I shall return, if necessary to be carried
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here by force from Nubians, to the Report stage in order to hear what reply the Government are to give and whether, if the reply is unsatisfactory, we shall all have screwed up enough courage to take advantage of the undoubted constitutional right and show the Government not that we are asserting some advantage by the Lords over the Commons, not that we wish to proclaim that the Second Chamber has better rights than the First Chamber or has rights in excess of what it is historically believed to have, but that we have a right to exercise the machinery and the powers of the Parliament Act if the Government contrive a situation where they are available to us to be exercised. But I hope we shall not have to enter into discussion. Even at this late hour I hone that Mr. Foot will remember that, in making his speech about the fanciful misapprehensions, he is not solely candid and ingenuous in making that statement. I hope he will remember that a great many of his colleagues, who, I think to their discredit, have remained supinely silent over this matter, nevertheless share my anxieties and the anxieties of a great many people about the passage of this Bill in its present form. Even though there is not the remotest possibility of persuading Mr. Foot to a contrary view, I hope that his colleagues may at this last moment stir themselves and remember that perhaps the liberties of England should take priority over political advantage and political convenience.
5.6 p.m.
Lord WIGG: I agree with a great deal, in fact almost all, of what the noble Lord, Lord Goodman, has said, but there are two points upon which I profoundly disagree. First, he does not need to go to the most revered and learned Member of this House to find support for his proposition that this House has an absolute right to do what it wishes within the terms of its own procedures. But that carries with it another responsibility which rests in this House, not in any collective sense but in the responsibility of each individual Member to do his or her duty as he or she may see it. The second point on which I disagree even more profoundly is that he is obsessed by Mr. Foot. Let us assume for a moment that Mr. Foot is just the reverse of the description given to him by the noble

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Lord, Lord Goodman—that he is not a person who is obstinate, one who having made up his mind will never change it. Let us assume that he is a person like the noble Lord, Lord Goodman, himself, or the noble and learned Lord, Lord Hailsham of Saint Marylebone, the epitome of reason and sweetness, objectivity and nobility. I would still object to givng a combination of the noble and learned Lord, Lord Hailsham, and the noble Lord, Lord Goodman, the powers which Mr. Foot seeks to take in this charter.
For me, freedom belongs to me and I have only a right to it to the extent to which I seek to attain and retain it, and indeed to widen it. I am astonished at the extent to which we are seeking to rely upon institutions at the expense of relying upon ourselves to exercise the freedom without which, for me anyway, life is not worth living. I live in North Staffordshire, and I had the great honour to live near, to know and constantly to converse with the late Josiah Wedgwood. He wrote a book,Forever Freedom. He started on the Liberal Benches, but he quickly realised the ridiculous political position in which he found himself and wisely joined the Labour Party. But whatever the subject, he was on the side of free men.
I am not going to flog the Jeffersonian concept, on whether it is more important to have newspapers or to have the law, to have Parliament; but I am sure that the free interchange of opinion, the expression of views, is an essential requirement to a flourishing democracy. I believe that to a major extent the crisis of our time is that the media as a whole are not discharging that duty. Newspapers, television or radio are today not discharging the duty which enables individuals of no great resource to discharge the first duty of any democrat or one who seeks to exercise a political function within a democracy, namely, the ability to make up one's mind on very limited evidence.
I would not give to any Minister or to any one man the power to exercise or have access to the potential power contained in this charter. I agree completely with the noble Lord, Lord Goodman, that this is not the job of Governments, however noble and good. Certainly, I do not
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trust the Labour Party or the Conservative Party, because I believe that all power tends always to corrupt. Noble Lords can complete that quotation for themselves; it is familiar to all of us. Therefore, I believe that the approach of the Amendment of the noble Lord, Lord Shepherd, is wrong in principle, and if I wanted evidence I have listened to it today.
May I be frank? I intend to be frank, whether your Lordships want it or not. I was disgusted with the speeches of the noble Lord, Lord Shepherd, and the noble Lord, Lord Houghton. They made it impossible for a person like myself really to get at the innards of the noble and learned Lord, Lord Hailsham. He started off in that banal, polite kind of way, "Of course, we all agreed with the way in which the noble Lord delivered his speech." I did not, and if the noble Lord, Lord Shepherd, had any political guts he would not, either.
I will enlarge upon the description of the noble Lord, Lord Goodman. I will not go to Ruskin or to architecture. I will fall back on a story often told me by my old friend the noble Lord, Lord Shinwell, who tried to earn an honest copper by writing for American journals. Whenever he came across a new word, he researched to find out what it meant, and he came across the word, "mug ump". He tried to discover what a mug ump was, and his search led him to the conclusion that it is an animal and its mug is on one side of the fence, and its wump is on the other. We found a perfect example in the speeches of the noble Lord, Lord Wigoder, the noble Lord, Lord Shepherd, and the noble Lord, Lord Houghton. What the noble and learned Lord, Lord Hailsham, was doing was asking the House of Commons to approve what the noble Lord behind me described as a rogues' charter. It was never thought through. Of course it was a political ploy. If noble Lords had listened very carefully, they would not have followed him into the Lobby.
What did he do at the conclusion of his speech? He talked about the Government in another place, with their machine-made majority. Machine-made majority, forsooth! Does that not apply to any Government or Opposition? What is Party politics about, but the ability of a Government to command a majority

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in the House of Commons; or of Mrs. Thatcher, on the other hand, even after the broadcast last night, finding one or two Tories to support her? That is what it is all about. When the noble and learned Lord, Lord Hailsham, having laughed at his own jokes, gets to the point where he makes a quip like that, he gives the game away. In the meantime, he has cast an aura of respectability over a perfectly legitimate political manoeuvre. But he is trying to make respectable a proposition which, when examined in the clear light of day, would make absolute nonsense of the relations between trade unions and workpeople and employers.
I ask your Lordships to think for a moment of a horny-handed son of toil, who has had a bad run at the dogs and wants a quick couple of hundred quid. What better than to develop a conscience, going along and saying, "Unless you sign on the dotted line, and unless I have a couple of hundred quid which can be left behind in the lavatory or given to me in an envelope, I am going to develop a conscience and will find a few others to do the same"? That is where this proposition will take us, and there has been more humbug talked about this Bill than enough. I congratulate the noble Lord, Lord Goodman, on spelling it out. But in relation to some of his associates in this political battle, I would say that birds of a feather do not flock together. However, the noble Lord has become respectable today, because he is associated with me, and if at Report stage he cannot find any other Teller to join him in the Lobby he can count on me, and when I say, "Count on me", I promise I will be there.
5.15 p.m.
Lord HARMAR-NICHOLLS: I gather that the noble Lord, Lord Wigg, was supporting the noble Lord, Lord Goodman, in his very modest request and I should like to do the same. I should also like to feel that the noble Lord the Leader of the House will take heed of the point made by Lord Goodman. He based it, as did the noble Lord, Lord Wigg, on a matter of principle, but there is also a practical point behind it which ought to be taken into account. If this code is to be negotiated by the two sides affected by it, then they will have to come
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to some sort of conclusion—if they can come to a conclusion at all—which covers to some extent the views that both sides hold. But if either side feels that somebody has a power which will be used in a way which is more in keeping with what they want but have not been able to negotiate, then they will not come to an agreement. That argument would apply whether the present Minister in the other place was responsible, and where one side had doubts about his objectivity or impartiality, or whether, by some wonderful magic, he was replaced by another Minister in a different Government who was accepted by the newspaper proprietors' side but not by the unions. I believe that if we genuinely want this code to be negotiated by the people concerned, and get to a pitch where it is likely to be accepted by both sides, then we must not give either side the feeling that if they will not agree the job will be done for them by a Minister who they suspect may well have the same kind of thinking as themselves. This very practical part of negotiation is something which ought to be borne in mind, because many of us have had that experience in other fields. If it has been agreed that unless you can reach a mutual agreement somebody will be brought in as arbitrator, and if at the back of your mind you have the feeling that the arbitrator will be more likely to come down on your side than the other, it prevents a voluntary agreement being reached.
On those grounds, I hope that the noble Lord the Leader of the House will use his influence in getting accepted this very modest suggestion of the noble Lord. Bearing in mind the formidable arguments of the noble Lord on bigger issues than this during the passage of this Bill, if this very modest suggestion, which has both principle and practicality behind it, is not accepted, then it will cause many people, who up till now have said that the point of view held is not that of somebody wanting to be piratical or tyrannical in his approach, to feel that there may be some ulterior motive behind the whole thing. If this Bill is to come out looking clean in its intent, then I should have thought this modest suggestion of the noble Lord, Lord Goodman, ought to have been accepted by the time we get to Report stage.
5.18 p.m.
Lord SLATER: I should have thought the noble Lord, Lord Harmar-Nicholls, would have made his stand and backed the other place in the Amendments which they have submitted to this House. I am surprised that he has gone the other way. Also, I was surprised that the noble Lord, Lord Wigg, talked about giving support to the noble Lord, Lord Goodman, who referred to Mr. Foot in the other place. One point that has been overlooked is that Mr. Foot is a political animal. He has lived politics for the greater part of his life, and that cannot be said for the noble Lord, Lord Goodman, who belongs to a profession which is entirely different from that of a politician. It was very unfair of the noble Lord to make those charges against the Minister responsible for introducing the Bill, and for considering the Amendments which went from this place to the other place, and which were turned down and sent back for further consideration here.
I sincerely hope that noble Lords took note of what the noble Lord, Lord Goodman, said in conclusion. He said, "I have only this to say", and he then went on for another quarter of an hour. The noble Lord talks about repetition and about coming back at Report stage. Will there be repetition of the tripe that he has tried to put over today? Does the noble Lord have a vested interest? It is about time that the noble Lord, Lord Goodman, and other people who are sitting on the Cross-Benches had second thoughts about entering the political arena and about what it stands for and means to the general public in this country, instead of coming along and arguing the case, as they have sought to argue it on this occasion, away from the legal profession. No closer amity exists than that within the legal profession. It is like that which exists in the medical and economic fraternities. Therefore, I hope sincerely that they do not get their own way and that we shall fight this issue on the Floor of the House. Let the noble Lord, Lord Goodman, come back at Report stage. We shall be here to listen to a repetition of what he has said in his speech.
Lord HOUGHTON of SOWERBY: After listening to my noble friend Lord Wigg, I am confirmed in the opinion that
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the eccentricities which many of us had in another place become more noticeable when we come to your Lordships' House. I do not think that the noble Lord, Lord Harmar-Nicholls, understands what the noble Lord, Lord Goodman, is proposing to do. He is proposing to remove from the charter the only provision which makes the charter necessary at all as part of the Bill. If there is not to be the ultimate sanction, so to speak, of the Secretary of State to be there in the event of failure to agree, then there is no need to include in an Act of Parliament any exhortation to both sides to get together. They can do it of their own free will; there is no need to include it in the Bill.
We shall have to consider whether the charter remains part of the Bill or whether it is to be completely thrown out. However, I do not intend to anticipate the debate which obviously the noble Lord, Lord Goodman, will begin at Report stage. However, I am bound to say that if he intends to come back to this point, some of us will have to go back to the beginning and remind your Lordships why it was ever proposed that a charter should be inserted in the Bill. It was proposed because the noble Lord, Lord Goodman, and other noble Lords wanted so many additional legal provisions to be included in the original Bill that some of us got together to discover a means of avoiding more and more legal intervention in industrial relations and a means whereby joint consultation and negotiation might lead to an agreement; and in default of an agreement the Secretary of State for Employment would then have a statutory duty to perform. It is in that framework that one has to consider whether this is a modest proposal. Let us fully understand that this is a wrecking proposal of the charter as it stands in the Bill at the present time.
Lord GOODMAN: I am obliged to the noble Lord for giving way because I want to say—it is of some importance —that it is not the case that if we take out this provision there is nothing left in the charter which needs to be included in an Act of Parliament. It will be remembered that we have left the charter in the situation where there is no legal redress, but there are other forms of redress which have been put into the charter and which, whether we like it

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or not, we are now prepared to accept. Hence the charter would need to be included in the Act of Parliament if it is to retain that shape and to have won, as the Government did win, the very protracted argument about the exclusion of legal remedies.
Lord HOUGHTON of SOWERBY: I am obliged to the noble Lord and I shall not follow his intervention because I do not wish to prolong the debate. However, it is obvious that when the noble Lord, Lord Goodman, comes back to this matter he will virtually reopen the long discussions we have had on this subject to arrive at the point where we are now, where the charter is a combination of the wisdom of this House and another place and is put to your Lordships' House as a suggestion from the House of Commons as meeting the wishes of another place and of the Government, and as hoping to meet the majority view of your Lordships' House. But clearly the debate is going on and on, and if this is the intention of the noble Lord, Lord Goodman, I give him fair notice that I shall play my part in it.
Lord HAILSHAM of SAINT MARYLEBONE: I wonder whether I may try to pour a little oil on this troubled water?
Lord SHEPHERD: And not for the first time!
Lord HAILSHAM of SAINT MARYLEBONE: First of all, this is about as far as we can take the discussion this afternoon, except that either the noble and learned Lord the Lord Chancellor or the noble Lord the Leader of the House might perhaps give us a little constitutional advice. I am going to tender my own view of the point which we have reached and if I am wrong I am sure that it would be helpful if I were contradicted. As I see it, the debate arises in this way. In order to comply with the Parliament Act, the Government must introduce the Bill into another place in the form in which it was originally introduced. Therefore it could not contain what I will call now the Houghton Charter. What another place can do under the Parliament Act is to put in what is called a suggested Amendment which is written into the Bill in this House. If it does, it does not obstruct the operation of the Parliament Act
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because it is a suggested Amendment for which special provision is made in the Act of 1911. What we are discussing now is something which has not happened since 1911. We are discussing, I think for the first time in the history of Parliament, whether to write into the Bill a suggested Amendment in that sense. The noble Lord, Lord Goodman, has made two quite separate suggestions and I think that they have two quite different constitutional consequences. The noble Lord says that he is not going to have a Division this afternoon and I am sure he is right about that. If he is right about that and nobody else divides the House, which is what I have recommended, the suggested Amendment will then be part of the text of the Bill, and there will be a Report stage because the Bill will have been amended.
Then the noble Lord, Lord Goodman, wants something which has been described by various terms—as a "modest Amendment" and as "wrecking Amendment". He wants to leave out the reference to the Secretary of State because of what he said about the Secretary of State. If he wishes he can, unless I am mistaken, propose an Amendment to that effect at Report stage. It will then go down on the Marshalled List and be discussed in the ordinary way. If it were carried, I think it would have to go back to the House of Commons. It is not an Amendment which we have a constitutional right to insert into the Bill and leave there, because if the suggested Amendment is not accepted in its entirety and without alteration it has to go back to the House of Commons for discussion there. If, of course, the Government in the House of Commons rejected the Amendment to the suggested Amendment, that would be the end of it because We have no further powers in the matter. Therefore, what one will have to discuss at some stage is whether the Government are prepared to accept the suggested Amendment of the noble Lord, Lord Goodman, otherwise we shall be wasting our time.
Obviously, we cannot take the matter much further this afternoon. If between them the noble Lord, Lord Goodman, and the Government can arrive at some kind of formula which modifies the suggested Amendment, I certainly will not I put any difficulty in their way, but I

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think that we ought to be very careful about rejecting the suggested Amendment—when I talk about the "suggested Amendment", I am referring to the Houghton Charter—for this reason. Although it was no part of the Bill as originally proposed by another place, in fact it embodies what a great number of people want to see as the law. I have expressed my own criticisms of it and I do not retract them, but I think we must consider the general effect on public opinion. I am not afraid of a row between the other place and ourselves about this because the noble Lord, Lord Goodman, is perfectly right: if we do not write the suggested Amendment into the "Houghton charter"—into the Bill—then it will not be part of the Bill and the Bill will go through under the Parliament Act without it. But we must consider the matter with a great deal of care before we take that step.
What I was going to suggest was that possibly the noble Lord the Leader of the House will comment on what I have just said, and also will say whether between now and Report stage there cannot be a discussion between the noble Lord, Lord Goodman, and the noble Lord the Leader of the House—because it is not a matter in which I would wish, nor, I think, would my noble friends wish, to take any part. I must warn the noble Lord, Lord Goodman, that I might find it difficult to persuade some of my noble friends to vote with him in the Lobby, either on sending a second matter back to the Commons or on rejecting the proposed Amendment. I say that with reluctance because we have worked together with great amity and in alliance with each other throughout the Bill and what I suggest is based on a political assessment of the situation and without doubting for an instance the reaction to the proposed charter of members of the profession with which the noble Lord, Lord Goodman, has been so closely in touch.
I remind them, and him, of two things. The first is that any charter written by the Secretary of State has to have the approval not only of the other place but also of this House, which would not be a foregone conclusion if it contained objectionable provisions. The second concerns one factor which I was not sure
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that I had got straight in my mind as to what the noble Lord, Lord Goodman, was saying. He said that if the Secretary of State wrote out a charter of his own it would be lethal to the Institute of Journalists. I do not want to enter into journalistic politics because I do not understand them and I am quite unqualified to do so, but it occurs to me that even if he rejected the charter in toto, under the Bill he still would be in no better position vis-à-vis that matter. To my mind his hope has always been that we might be able to persuade the Government to introduce legal sanctions behind it—which we have failed to do. The second hope was that one day this Parliament, like other good or bad things, will come to an end and we shall have a Government which will be more sensitive to some of the arguments which have been put forward by the noble Lord, Lord Goodman.
In the meantime, I commend to him and his friends the thought which I tried to start when he was collecting his thoughts, that certainly on these Benches, and without in any way retracting our position, we have thought it right not to interfere with the proposed trade union tribunal on the issue of unreasonable expulsion or admission and it might be wiser and more sensible to take a similar line about this charter, notwithstanding the views which I know are deeply held.
There is something which has caused disquiet, and I do not know whether either of the two noble Lords would think it appropriate to comment upon it or whether they would prefer not to comment. Certainly I have been written to three times by the Institute of Journalists during the last ten days, complaining that there was a move by one of the branches of the NUJ to persuade a local authority—Barnsley—to withhold information from members of the Institute. I cannot help thinking that the central organisation of the NUJ might be wise to discourage action of that kind because, quite apart from any other considerations, the freedom of access by all working journalists to sources of information is something to which many of us would attach a good deal of importance in this connection. I have said what I can. I am sure we would be wrong to press this to a conclusion today and I am wondering whether the Government could either confirm or

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correct my views as to the constitutional position and possibly add any other comments they might think were useful.
5.35 p.m.
Lord WIGODER: I have always contended that the gap between those who support the noble Lord, Lord Goodman, and those who support the noble Lord, Lord Houghton of Sowerby, and the Government is bridgeable; I still believe that is so, despite some of the observations made by some of the supporters of the respective sides this afternoon. I hope the noble Lord the Leader of the House will appreciate fully the great step forward that has been taken this afternoon by the noble Lord, Lord Goodman, in seeking to reach agreement; he has indicated that he would not desire to persist in his argument that the charter should be legally enforceable. That is a great step forward which removes one of the stumbling blocks to agreement.
The other suggestion that has been made by the noble Lord, Lord Goodman, is that there should be a very simple Amendment to the existing Amendments, which would merely be to omit subsection (3), the power of the Minister. I have no doubt that the noble Lord the Leader of the House will consider carefully the argument which was developed, for example, by the noble Lord, Lord Harmar-Nicholls; that is, that the existence of that fall-back power might prove a positive disincentive to the parties to agree upon the terms of a charter. I am sure the Government will recognise, as they have on previous occasions, that if a charter can be voluntarily agreed between all the parties that is an infinite improvement upon any possible charter that might be imposed by any outside source, quite irrespective of who the Minister may happen to be at a particular time. We on these Benches venture to echo the words of the noble and learned Lord, Lord Hailsham of Saint Marylebone, that serious consideration might be given to this proposal, in the hope that at long last an agreed solution might be reached at Report stage.
Lord SHEPHERD: It is in fear and trepidation of my noble friend Lord Wigg that I agree with the noble and learned Lord, Lord Hailsham of Saint Marylebone, that perhaps we have taken this
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matter as far as we can this afternoon. The procedure that we have adopted—that is, moving this Amendment in Committee—was to ensure that if we were to see this Bill on to the Statute Book by our normal processes and without the use of the Parliament Act, then by moving the Amendment in Committee it becomes part of the Bill. Whatever we may do in regard to this Amendment and right up to the very stage—and one foresees (shall we say?) the worst case in which the Parliament Act procedure had to he adopted—up to the very moment of the processes being brought into operation in the Commons and by the Crown on the advice of the Speaker, this suggested Amendment from the Commons is standing in isolation in limbo outside the Bill. As I said on Second Reading, up to that very last moment, whatever may be happening, it is open to this House by a Resolution to agree to the Commons suggested Amendment, in which case it goes straight into the Bill, wherever the Bill may be. If the Bill is in the House of Commons it still goes into the Bill; it does not have to come here.
So we have a great deal of flexibility, but we have adopted this procedure in the hope that we could get the material into the Bill and pass the Bill without the Parliament Act. I have a feeling that this is still very much the wish of the Committee. I was interested in the way in which the noble Lord, Lord Goodman, developed the argument on what we now call the "Houghton Amendment". I am sure the noble Lord, Lord Goodman, will remember a number of my speeches where I have said time and time again that it really was not the right role of Ministers to be involved in matters concerning the Press. This was one of the basic arguments I had against the noble Lord, Lord Goodman, in regard to the various legal sanctions that he was pressing upon this House. I have no doubt at all that my right honourable friend the Secretary of State for Employment is the very last person who would wish to have placed upon him by Statute any requirement for dealing with laying out a charter for the Press. It was put in, therefore, in recognition of the fact that the two sides might fail to reach agreement upon the charter.
Originally, we said six months; we extended it to 12 months, recognising this particular problem, and the House

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agreed to 12 months. Only in the case of failure of both sides to reach an agreement upon the charter would the Secretary of State have any decision in this matter, and whatever he may propose would be open to agreement between the two Houses. If there was disagreement, then the Secretary of State has to take the charter back and work on it again after consultation with both sides of industry.
I was asked whether I would look at the matter. Of course I will. But I do not want to mislead the Committee in this matter. A great deal of work went into this particular subject. It is there because there was real, genuine concern about certain matters in the Industrial Relations Bill as it might affect the freedom of the Press. So we put it in, and did so with a degree of reluctance. The Amendment of the noble Lord, Lord Houghton of Sowerby, came from his own initiative; it had nothing at all to do with the Government. So it is there. Many Members in both Houses have been involved in it. A great deal of time and research has gone into it. Therefore, I should not like to say we ought to give special consideration to the point of the noble Lord, Lord Goodman. It can be seen by some as a wrecking procedure, for if one side was not prepared to agree to a charter, then there would be no charter. I do not take the sense of both Houses in this matter that that is what they would wish to see. However, I will look at the matter because I have been invited to do so by the noble Lords, Lord Wigoder and Lord Goodman, but I would be misleading the Committee if I were to give any sense of optimism to the noble Lord, Lord Goodman.
This has been a debate of good humour. I must say I feel a sense of gloom and despondency creeping over me that we have to deal with this matter yet again on another day. I feel like the noble and learned Lord, Lord Hailsham of Saint Marylebone—I am slightly "cheesed off" about it, but this is the Constitution and we must go through with it. I would hope we could deal with it with some expectation of getting down to some matters which are just as relevant and important, but matters which we have not discussed as exhaustively as we have this particular matter.
Remaining clauses agreed to.
In the Title:
Lord SHEPHERD: I beg to move the Amendment in the Title.
Amendment moved—
Line 4, at end insert ("and to provide for a charter on matters relating to the freedom of the press").—(Lord Shepherd.)
Title, as amended, agreed to.
House resumed: Bill reported with the Amendments.

SOLICITORS (SCOTLAND) BILL [H.L.]
5.45 p.m.
Report received.
Clause 7 [Investigation by lay observer of Society's treatment of complaints]:
The Earl of SELKIRK The Earl of SELKIRK moved Amendment No. 1:
Page 5, line 17, at end insert—
(" (12) In part 3 of Schedule 1 to the House of Commons Disqualification Act 1975 (offices disqualifying for membership) there shall be inserted at the appropriate place in alphabetical order the entry "lay observer appointed under section 7 of the Solicitors (Scotland) Act 1976".").
The noble Earl said: My Lords, under Clause 7 the Secretary of State is entitled to appoint a lay person to see that the Society's treatment of complaints from their clients is satisfactory. This Amendment is in common form and does no more than say that such appointment cannot be a Member of the House of Commons. The lay observer under Clause 7 of this Bill is an addition to the list of those appointments not available to Members of the House of Commons. I beg to move.
Clause 26 [Citation and construction]:
The Earl of SELKIRK: My Lords, this Amendment is consequential to the Amendment I have just moved. I beg to move.
Amendment moved—
Page 12, line 37, at end insert—
("(2) This Act except in so far as it relates to the amendment of the House of Commons Disqualification Act 1975 extends to Scotland only".)—(The Earl of Selkirk.)

SHOPS (HOLIDAY RESORTS— SUNDAY TRADING) BILL [H.L.]
5.47 p.m.
Baroness PHILLIPS: My Lords, I beg to move that this Bill be now read a second time. It will be unnecessary for me to take up much of your Lordships' time in explaining the purpose behind this short Bill. Nevertheless, it is a valuable Bill which amends in a very important particular the provision contained, in Section 51 of the Shops Act 1950. Perhaps I should remind your Lordships that in 1936 the noble Earl, Lord Munster, introduced and piloted through his Shops (Sunday Trading Restrictions) Bill, the terms of which are now reenacted in the Shops Act 1950. This was a consolidating measure, bringing within the compass of one Statute the eight Acts previously representing the code applying to retail trading hours and the conditions of employment of shop workers. In passing, I think it is worth mentioning that of the 1950 Act Mr. Justice Humphreys once said in the Appeal Court:
"Thesis one of those Acts in which the opening words indicate a perfectly plain statement of what is to be done, and the rest of the Act is taken up with exceptions to the general statement of the law".
A great deal has happened since 1936 and, indeed, since 1950. There have been many changes in attitudes. Peoples' views on Sunday trading have not escaped these changes, but your Lordships will see that the improvement in law contained in this Bill has nothing to do with the problems—and, indeed, there are problems—relating to what may or may not be sold on Sunday, or which types of shop may or may not be open on Sundays. I warn the House that I may well be returning to some of these problems on another occasion.
My Lords, there is at present the special problem in connection with shopping hours at holiday resorts. These were provided for, in relation to trading on Sundays, by the provisions now contained in Section 51 of the Shops Act 1950. They are that the goods referred to in Schedule 7 to the Act may, subject to an order made by the appropriate local authority, be sold on Sundays, during the hours stated and under such conditions as the local authority may set out. The duration of the order is restricted to a maximum of 18 Sundays in the year. In
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1936, this probably was ample provision because holidays were then taken in July, August and September. But over a long period of years there has been a continuing attempt to persuade people to take off-peak holidays. At long last there is a greater spread of the year during which holidays are taken, and indeed it is very good to recall that many more people now enjoy holidays, and longer holidays at that.
I think it is relevant to refer to the Crathorne Report, the Departmental Committee Report on the Law on Sunday Observance, to which your Lordships have referred on many occasions. It took a long, hard look at trading, as well as entertainment, sport and pastimes on Sundays. Examining the position at holiday resorts and the power to make orders, the Committee recommended that:
"The local authority should have complete discretion as to the number of Sundays to be specified in the order".
It so happens that this is one of the many recommendations of that Committee which has never in fact become law.
Your Lordships may well ask why I have not gone all out for this proposition. I believe that such freedom would entail an examination in depth of the arrangements for staffing shops, and it would also take out of context one particular item in a Report of importance and length. The figure of 26 Sundays which I seek to have substituted for 18 will enable local authorities to exercise their order-making powers in such a way that all or most of the holiday weeks are covered, thereby giving traders the opportunity to serve the public in the holiday resorts from spring to the end of the summer. I should add that the figure of 26 Sundays will be a maximum. There will not be any need for the local authority to use any more Sundays than is necessary. What is also important is that the Sundays need not be consecutive.
My Lords, there is a wide measure of agreement that this small change will be of real value. It is also my understanding that those representing shop workers accept the need for this slight alteration. I hope I have said enough to show your Lordships that this modest Bill is designed to bring about the opportunity for local authorities to exercise their discretion to meet the reasonable

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needs of the public at places where they go to enjoy themselves. I beg to move.
Moved, That the Bill be now read 2a.—(Baroness Phillips.)
5.52 p.m.
Viscount COLVILLE of CULROSS: My Lords, the Bill of which the noble Baroness has moved the Second Reading seems to those of us who sit on this side of the House to be wholly admirable. I was particularly glad to hear her say that the unions concerned are also in agreement that it would be a change that they would accept. I would approach it from the point of view that evidently made the Crathorne Committee report in the kind of terms that they did. This would seem to me to be eminently a question which a local authority is able to deal with on behalf of those who live in the area and those who take their holidays in the area, and also on behalf of the shopkeepers. After all, there is no point in having reorganised local government and being prepared in general to trust them to take many important decisions if what is essentially local matter is not to be within their power. I would therefore welcome the extension of their discretion on this particular count. They need not, of course, use all the 26 Sundays. They need not use any of them.
The noble Baroness did not even tell the House about all the trappings of the order-making procedure which would attend their exercise of this power if they wanted to use it. After all, they do not even do it entirely on their own resolution. They have to make an order; they have to publish it; they have to accept and consider any objections. Even after all that, if they consider it to he expedient, they can make the order only if occupiers of not less than two-thirds of the shops or classes of shops to he affected approve it. So there are many safeguards. I cannot believe that this is not something we should happily leave to the local authority.
My Lords, it has nothing to do with it, but the noble Baroness mentioned the Shops Act which started off fairly simply, but made things more and more difficult as it went along. One of the later sections of that Act refers to "seagoing ships". Seagoing ships are expressly not dealt
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with under Section 51, with which we are concerned here. I observe this note, which seems to me to carry with it the connotation that sometimes the law really is an ass. It says with regard to seagoing ships:
"The expression is not defined, but it has been held that a seagoing ship is a ship which goes to sea".
And we have the reference in a case heard in the Queen's Bench Division in 1893. There has evidently been a good deal of litigation and muddle on this. I congratulate the noble Baroness on one point which I think everybody would agree would be an improvement in the law.
5.55 p.m.
Lord DERWENT: My Lords, I could not let this Bill be read a second time without my support. Some of your Lordships will know that for many years I have been interested in Sunday trading. Your Lordships have tried on at least two occasions to improve the Sunday trading provisions of the Shops Act but successive Governments have proceeded to block it in the other place. Your Lordships will also know my opinion of Part IV of the Shops Act, which deals with Sunday trading. I suppose it is the worst drafted legislation that any of us have ever seen. Most of it is incomprehensible. If your Lordships do not believe me, you only need to read what successive High Court judges have said about it to know that I am speaking the truth. The section with which this Bill is dealing is one of the few sections of Part IV which happens to be comprehensible, and very sensible with it.
As the noble Baroness said, since 1950 circumstances have altered. The resorts—I do not like the phrasing "holiday resorts": I prefer to call them "tourist resorts" which is not quite the same thing—have tried desperately hard to extend their season, particularly the Northern resorts, and they have to a large extent succeeded. Now, of course, resorts have a different season as well as the holiday season, with the conferences and so on. These bring in many more visitors, the wives and children of the delegates and so on. So it is necessary to extend the number of Sundays for which the orders can be made. The noble Baroness pointed out why we cannot at the moment give an absolutely free hand to the local authorities to make the orders

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for any number of Sundays. That will come one day. But at the moment it is important to get this Bill through now without argument with the unions, the Lord's Day Observance Society or anyone else. So, my Lords, I hope that your Lordships will give this Bill a very rapid passage through this House, and I hope to hear an undertaking from the Minister that the Government have firmly made up their mind to give it a fair wind when it gets to the other place.
5.58 p.m.
The Earl of KIMBERLEY: My Lords, I shall take up very little of your Lordships' time. I am sure we are all very grateful to the noble Baroness, Lady Phillips, for what she has done this afternoon, because really it is high time that something was done about this. We have heard mention already of the Easter Act, which was passed 50 years ago. This has been going for 25 years, so it is almost the Silver Jubilee. If we go back further to the Sunday Fairs Act, that came under Henry VI in 1448, 528 years ago, and was, of course, on religious grounds. I am sure that most of your Lordships agree that Sunday is not a day that should be entirely devoted to God; part of the time, yes, but other times, no. We should examine, as the noble Baroness said, the other Sunday activities of sport, recreation and theatre and so on.
It is understandable that the shop-workers' union does not want exploitation of, for want of a better word, shop assistants, due to unsocial hours. I believe that one of their arguments has been that if shops opened on Sunday, every shop would have to open in order to survive. I do not believe this. Anyway, there are many shops on the Continent which open on Sunday and shut on Monday.
The other point I would make is that I think this is a great opportunity for the small corner shop in the town; it is probably a family business, and it would very much help them to survive against the giant supermarkets and monopolistic chain stores we have nowadays. May I for one moment point out to your Lordships some of the strange anomalies of the Sunday Trading Act. You cannot sell fish and chips, but you can sell fried chicken and take-away meals. You can-
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not sell partly cooked meat, but you can sell fresh meat. You cannot sell tinned clotted cream, but you can sell untinned clotted cream. If you go to a garden centre, you may buy their own produce, but you may not buy a potted plant they have bought somewhere else. I think in 1976 we should adopt a whole new attitude. The only reservation I would have on the Bill of the noble Baroness is that it does not go far enough; it should be nationwide.
6.1 p.m.
Lord WELLS-PESTELL: My Lords, it is seldom that your Lordships have so many speeches in such a short period of time. It is an indication that the Bill itself is regarded by your Lordships as a good one. May I say, on behalf of the Government, that the Government have traditionally been neutral to Bills seeking to amend the Shops Act, and this is precisely the position of the Government in respect of this Bill. As my noble friend pointed out, her purpose is to provide facilities in the Bill for shops in holiday resorts to be open for a maximum period of 26 Sundays each year as against the 18 at the present moment. I remember only too well, I think in 1967 and again in 1971, when the noble Lord, Lord Derwent, tried to do something about implementing the recommendations of the Crathorne Committee. It may be that my noble friend has decided to approach this by making less radical changes and. by so doing, has commended the Bill to the House.
The only point I need to make is that the drafting of the Bill, so far as our advisers are concerned, is very acceptable as it stands, and one cannot often say that with regard to a Bill that comes before your Lordships' House. It may be a matter of interest to your Lordships to know that it would have no financial, manpower, or EEC implications.
Lord DERWENT: My Lords, before the noble Lord sits down, will he give me the undertaking about the other place for which I asked?
Lord WELLS-PESTELL: My Lords, perhaps the noble Lord will allow me to convey that to my right honourable friend, and I shall certainly do so.
6.3 p.m.
Baroness PHILLIPS: My Lords, I should like to thank your Lordships for

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accepting the Bill in such a generous spirit, and particularly the Government. I recall on the last Bill that I brought before your Lordships that the Minister said it was badly drafted, irrelevant, and unnecessary—apart from that, I think it was all right. It was not this Minister. It was a delight to find the Minister not only commenting on the content of the Bill but on the drafting.
To the noble Earl, Lord Kimberley, I would say that I cannot personally recall what happened in the time of Henry VIII—indeed, one of my colleagues murmured that it was even before his time—but I agree about the total nonsense of what you can and cannot sell. Most of us in towns, at any rate, see the rather charming way in which certain people open shops, and since they obviously do not read the law they sell almost everything. There is no doubt that there is a great need for many changes. The Minister hit the nail on the head when he said that I had learned one lesson—I hope I have learned others —that in this House particularly you are quite likely to get a Bill accepted if you have one simple idea, but if you have a great radical reform different people will be opposed to it for different reasons. Therefore, I am now adopting a policy of "Softly, softly". Perhaps I should not have told the Minister that.
Of course, I pay great tribute to the noble Lord, Lord Derwent. I recall his eloquent speeches on his Bill. Indeed, he persuaded me to follow in his steps as president of the Administration of Shops Inspectors, which I am enjoying very much. I think I can assure him that the local authorities take a broad view of the expression, "holiday resort", and I believe they are rather keen to have that phrase, which they interpret in their own way. The noble Viscount, Lord Colville of Culross, highlighted the safeguards which will prevent any local authority going mad. The various processes which have to be gone through are a safeguard to any earnest local authority. I was delighted with his quotation—which I shall undoubtedly use—of the ship that goes to sea. There is little doubt that one does not need to read any prepared jokes one has only to read legal definitions of what the law is. I am grateful to your Lordships for
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your acceptance of this Bill, and I beg to move.
On Question, Bill read 2a, and committed to a Committee of the Whole House.