Lords Sitting of 22 September 1975

Preamble
Reassembling after the Summer Recess the House met at half past two of the clock: The CHAIRMAN OF COMMITTEES on the Woolsack.
Prayers—Read by the Lord Bishop of Saint Albans.

HELSINKI CONFERENCE
Lord BROCKWAY: My Lords, I beg leave to ask the Question which stands in my name on the Order Paper.
The Question was as follows:
To ask Her Majesty's Government what supervisory body is to be established to implement the decisions of the Helsinki Conference for Security and Co-operation and what initiative they have taken to establish bilateral or multilateral meetings to apply the decisions.
The PARLIAMENTARY UNDER-SECRETARY of STATE, FOREIGN and COMMONWEALTH OFFICE (Lord Goronwy-Roberts): My Lords, the signatory States agreed that it would be for each State to take the necessary steps, unilaterally and, where appropriate, with other States, to implement the decisions of the Conference. Multilateral action will be largely conducted within the framework of the United Nations Economic Commission for Europe and
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UNESCO. The Review Meeting in 1977 will make a thorough assessment of the extent to which the Conference decisions have been put into effect, and in the light of this assessment will consider proposals for continuing the dialogue in future, for example by further meetings or possibly even a new conference. Meanwhile, we are working closely with our friends and allies both in the political co-operation machinery of the Nine and in the North Atlantic Alliance.
Lord BROCKWAY: My Lords, while very much welcoming that statement, which anticipates a proposal I was going to make, may I ask the Minister whether the Communist countries as well as the West have accepted the idea that the European Economic Commission should act in this manner, or is it at present just an exploratory proposal?
Lord GORONWY-ROBERTS: My Lords, they are all signatories to the Articles of Agreement, on page 51 of which, under the heading "Follow-up Arrangements", precisely this course is agreed to by 35 countries, including the Communist countries.
Lord CARRINGTON: My Lords, may I ask the noble Lord whether the Government are satisfied with the attitude of the Soviet Union and the East European countries after the signing of the Helsinki Pact?
Lord GORONWY-ROBERTS: My Lords, it is perhaps early to pronounce judgment. The agreement was concluded on 1st August, some seven weeks ago.

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August in Europe, as here, is somewhat a month of recess and, apart from certain hardworking Upper Chambers, to some extent September is also.
Lord BROCKWAY: My Lords, while we welcome the pressure which the Prime Minister has exerted on the Communist countries to carry out the obligations, is it not also the case that as a result of that pressure a number of them are putting into operation the proposals made?
Lord GORONWY-ROBERTS: Yes, my Lords, the Prime Minister in particular, for instance in his recent visit to Romania, has very strongly urged, not without success, bilaterally, a forthcoming attitude on basket III provisions—in particular Movement of People and Ideas.
If I may revert to the question put by the noble Lord, Lord Carrington, we agree that it is of the highest importance that the progress of implementation should be scrupulously watched and that representation should be made whenever it seems to us that there is no clear intention of implementing this very important agreement.

FOOTBALL MATCH HOOLIGANISM
2.39 p.m.
Lord CAMPBELL of CROY: My Lords, I beg leave to ask the Question which stands in my name on the Order Paper.
The Questions was as follows:
To ask Her Majesty's Government what action they are proposing to take to help reduce hooliganism connected with football matches.
The PARLIAMENTARY UNDER-SECRETARY of STATE, DEPARTMENT OF THE ENVIRONMENT (Baroness Birk): My Lords, last July, the Working Party on crowd behaviour, chaired by my honourable friend the Minister of State for Sport and Recreation, issued detailed recommendations for preventing, hooliganism both inside and outside football grounds. The need for further action, in the light of some recent and serious incidents, is now under urgent consideration.
Lord CAMPBELL of CROY: My Lords, as a small minority are spoiling the enjoyment of football for many thousands, will the Government give full support to measures to stamp out this hooliganism, in particular to the steps which have been taken by British Rail, where the costs eventually fall on the taxpayer? Will the Government also encourage the Sheffield proposal for directed community service for offenders on Saturday afternoons, as well as improving the protection of employees in the transport services?
Baroness BIRK: Yes, my Lords; the Government feel that the ban on rail football specials is a very important step. It was taken on 30th August. This means that several clubs are already chartering their own transport and having their own stewards and supervisors. As to the second point raised by the noble Lord, we are entirely in agreement over this matter, particularly the use of both attendance centres and community service orders, which can be much more effective than imposing fines on these hooligans. The Government are now looking into the question of setting up some long-term research into the motivations for this aspect of violence. We are hoping that a meeting will take place within the next two weeks between my Department, the Home Office and the Sports Council.
Lord HAILSHAM of SAINT MARYLEBONE: My Lords, is it not important that there should be careful selection of the charges brought when offenders can be identified? For instance, is it not important that, where criminal damage is of a serious kind, or bodily harm of a serious kind is done, the offenders should be brought before a Crown Court, and not simply left to lay magistrates on a summary charge?
Baroness BIRK: Yes, my Lords; but, as the noble and learned Lord is aware, this depends on the charge which is brought by the police and to which court the matter goes; and it then depends on how magistrates and judges deal with it.
Lord HAILSHAM of SAINT MARYLEBONE: My Lords, I am sorry to press the noble Baroness, but is it not important, since selection of the charge is the crucial factor (this is the question I

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was putting to her before), that the prosecuting authorities should select indictable offences where indictable offences have apparently been committed?
Baroness BIRK: Yes, my Lords, I think it is. But the matter depends on the defence, the circumstances, and a number of other factors. The Minister for Sport has had an informal talk with the Home Secretary about this matter, and at the moment the general view is that this is a matter for the police and the magistrates. But I am hoping that, when the research and other meetings are set up, they will cover this question. Also involved is the whole question of education authorities and parents; it is a much wider subject than it would be if the matter was kept within its narrow limits.
Lord SOPER: My Lords, would not the Minister agree that on the question of hooliganism there is a vestigial if not a causal relationship between the availability of beer cans on such occasions? Are the Government prepared to consider whether there is any way in which there could be a restriction of this opportunity for alcohol to be taken in such quantities as to make hooliganism even more serious than it is at the moment?
Baroness BIRK: My Lords, on the question of alcohol, clubs are being asked to review their arrangements for allowing alcohol on the grounds. The banning of the railway specials will, we hope, aid this. It is very much a central point for the Government. It is understood that the availability of alcohol is very important in this context.
Lord WIGG: My Lords, will not the Minister agree that rather than these adolescents behaving in the way that they do they would be far better employed in kicking about a football than kicking each other and kicking the police? Is it not a fact that the present Administration and previous Administrations have failed to provide adequate facilities for young people to engage in sporting facilities? Is it not a disgrace that this is the only advanced industrial country in the world which has no football training centre and no policy whatever for developing football grounds as community centres in the service of the community of which they are a part? Before spend
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ing too much time on deciding what you are going to do when you have caught them, why not spend money and energy on providing facilities for the young people of our day?
Baroness BIRK: My Lords, one of the points which came out in the White Paper was the point touched on by my noble friend, that there are not sufficient facilities and that in the very large built-up areas of this overcrowded country there are certainly not the opportunities for young people to participate in sports as they did previously. We feel very strongly that this question of being a spectator rather than participating is also part of the trouble. We are very much aware of this problem and it is not being ignored.
Lord WIGG: My Lords, is it not a fact that a generation ago the Wolfenden Report spelled out in detail what needed to be done but the Government said, "Sorry, we have got no money"? In August of this year the Government produced a White Paper saying exactly the same thing. What needed to be done was spelled out but again the Government said, "Sorry, we have got no money".
Baroness BIRK: My Lords, there is a great shortage of land and this has had to take its place with other priorities. However, this is very much in the Government's mind and I can assure my noble friend that it is not being overlooked.
Lord SHINWELL: My Lords, may I ask my noble friend whether, in view of certain disquieting incidents which have been recently reported, it would be of value if some prominent footballers exercised rather more discretion and prudence, and themselves indulged in civilised behaviour?
Lord AIREDALE: My Lords, if football clubs can provide stewards and supervisors on the transport which they arrange, can they not also provide stewards and supervisors on the special trains and thus enable British Rail to run excursion trains at a profit?
Baroness BIRK: My Lords, this is a quite different point. The point about clubs arranging the trains is that then they take the responsibility for supervising them. This also relieves the taxpayers.

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Many of the clubs are also taking responsibility for having stewards in the grounds to try to prevent these incidents. The whole question depends on prevention so far as possible, and also on trying to find out more about the motivations and diverting into more positive outlets the energy that goes into this violence.
Lord PAGET of NORTHAMPTON: My Lords, if I may refer to the question asked by the noble and learned Lord, Lord Hailsham of Saint Marylebone, when Parliament has prepared Bills to set out summary offences, is it not highly undesirable that temporary indignation should be assuaged by searching the Common Law for obsolete felonies?
Lord HAILSHAM of SAINT MARYLEBONE: My Lords, is criminal damage obsolete and is causing grievous bodily harm obsolete?
Lord PAGET of NORTHAMPTON: My Lords, they have been prepared by Parliament and should not be sidestepped.
The LORD PRIVY SEAL (Lord Shepherd): My Lords, I suspect that a number of noble Lords are turning this Question into a debate. Therefore, may I suggest that we now move to the next Question?

UPWOOD AERODROME
2.48 p.m.
Baroness STEDMAN: My Lords, I beg leave to ask the Question which stands in my name on the Order Paper.
The Question was as follows:
To ask Her Majesty's Government whether any decisions have been taken regarding the use of surplus land and accommodation at RAF Upwood, Huntingdon.
Lord WINTERBOTTOM: My Lords, detailed studies are still continuing into the long-term future of RAF Upwood, but I hope that an announcement can be made shortly.
Baroness STEDMAN: My Lords, while thanking my noble friend for that reply, may I ask him whether he has had any success in conveying the views of the county council and the district authority,
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whom he was gracious enough to meet during the Recess, that if no alternative military use can be found for RAF Upwood it will be a tremendous waste if those buildings are just let off piecemeal to a hotchpotch of occupants? Has the Minister expressed to his colleagues in the Ministry of Defence the view of the local authorities, that if there is no further military use for RAF Upwood then there should be long-term planning so that the site can be viewed as a whole?
Lord WINTERBOTTOM: My Lords, the noble Baroness knows that the views of her local authority have been conveyed with great clarity to the Ministry of Defence, but since the visit which she mentioned the pattern regarding the future deployment of RAF Upwood has become reasonably clear. An early completion of the present studies is expected and then the future of RAF Upwood can be made known. Consideration is being given to the use of the runway by a private gliding club, which I know is something that is much wished for by the area, and some of the hangar accommodation is to be used for storage. I will make a point of stressing to my right honourable friend the Secretary of State the need for comprehensive development of the good facilities that remain there.
Lord SEGAL: My Lords, as this is one of the finest pre-war stations of the Royal Air Force, would my noble friend see to it that, pending the decisions being taken, none of these buildings is allowed to fall into a state of disrepair?
Lord WINTERBOTTOM: My Lords, the station is on a care and maintenance basis, and as a result of personal inspection I am satisfied that the care and maintenance is of a high quality.

NORTHERN IRELAND
Lord CARRINGTON: My Lords, may I ask the noble Lord the Leader of the House whether, since the House of Commons is not sitting, it is the intention of the Government to make Statements in this House during this week on matters on which it is said Ministers are going to make statements outside this House?
Lord SHEPHERD: My Lords, in my view the question of whether the House of Commons is sitting is utterly irrelevant.

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Parliament is now sitting because your Lordships' House is now sitting and, therefore, any matters which normally call for a Government Statement will be announced in your Lordships' House. I understand through the usual channels that noble Lords opposite have been informed of a Statement that it is intended to make tomorrow. Press Statements are perhaps different. I understand that in the light of certain allegations that were made in the Daily Telegraph today, my right honourable friend the Secretary of State for Northern Ireland intends to issue a personal Statement in regard to those allegations. I take the view that this is not something for your Lordships' House, but I will look at what he intends to say to see whether it ought to be repeated here. But I give the noble Lord this very firm assurance, that the fact that this House is sitting means, in my view—and I think my colleagues would accept this—that we should have an opportunity of having Statements made here as though the House of Commons itself were sitting.
Lord CARRINGTON: My Lords, I am much obliged to the noble Lord the Leader of the House. With regard to the Statement, or whatever it may be, which the Secretary of State for Northern Ireland is to make, I should have thought—and I think most of those on these Benches would agree—that what the Secretary of State has to say is as a Government Minister, and is of the greatest possible importance in our relations with Northern Ireland, and I believe your Lordships would expect that Statement to be repeated here.
Lord SHEPHERD: My Lords, I might have been in a better position to reply to the noble Lord if I had received earlier notice that this matter was to be raised, and that there was any question in regard to the proposed Press Statement of my right honourable friend the Secretary of State for Northern Ireland. As I have said to the noble Lord, I have asked for a sight of that Statement. I understand that his colleague in another place has been made aware of the matter, and once I have seen that Statement I will consult to see whether it should be repeated here. I think that one has to use some discretion as to the Statements that are made and as to their character, but I will
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look into the matter and will consult with the noble Lord.
Lord CARRINGTON: My Lords, I hope that the noble Lord will acquit me of any discourtesy in not giving him any earlier notice, because it is hardly likely that the Opposition will know what Statements are to be made by the Government. As a matter of fact, I happened to have heard it myself on the 2 o'clock BBC news and it was difficult to give the noble Lord any notice other than the one I gave him before the House met. But I would say to the noble Lord that I think it quite likely that if he decides that he will not make a Statement I shall find it necessary to put down a Private Notice Question.
Lord SHEPHERD: My Lords, the noble Lord does not need to put it quite so strongly as that, if I may say so. Over many years, we have had to consult each other in regard to what Statements should or should not be made; some may be in the interest of the House in terms of our timetable, but that does not arise today. I was aware of a private statement Press release by the Secretary of State. It did not seem to me at that stage that it was one that fell within the category of a Statement to Parliament. However, I said that I will look at it and I shall do so. I am willing to consult with the noble Lord, and I hope he will agree with me that, certainly, I have always sought to be a servant of this House and not its master.
Lord BYERS: My Lord, quite apart from personal statements—and, of course, if they are truly personal they are in a different category—may we have an assurance that any Government Statements which are made are made first to this House, before being given to the Press?
Lord SHEPHERD: My Lords, I thought that in my first response to the noble Lord, Lord Carrington, I gave that assurance.
Lord WIGG: My Lords, the noble Lord the Leader of the House used the term "personal statement", but if another place was meeting and a Minister or any Member of the House was making a personal statement then that statement would have to be submitted to Mr. Speaker for his approval. So I take it

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that when the noble Lord the Leader of the House used the term "personal statement" he was using it in a wider context and not in a Parliamentary sense.
Lord SHEPHERD: My Lords, that is so.
Lord HAILSHAM OF SAINT MARYLEBONE: My Lords, without seeking in any way to prejudge the question, the noble Lord has used the expression "personal statement" but, unless I am mistaken, he gave us to understand that the statement related to certain allegations in today's Daily Telegraph. When he comes to consider the question as to whether this House should not be informed, will he bear in mind that today's Daily Telegraph made very specific allegations about a senior official of the Department, and therefore not simply about the Minister in his personal capacity? When allegations of that kind are applied to officials for whom the Minister is responsible, can a statement be purely personal in the sense that Parliament ought not to be informed about it?
Lord SHEPHERD: My Lords, I intended to indicate to the House that I had very little knowledge that this matter was being raised. I have to say to the noble and learned Lord that I have not myself read the allegations that are printed in the Daily Telegraph. I was merely responding to information that was made available to me while I sat on this Bench. I hope the House will show a degree of fairness in this matter and will leave it to me, in consultation with the noble Lord, Lord Carrington, to decide whether a statement ought to be made here. I think this is a matter which can satisfactorily be dealt with through the usual channels.
Lord BYERS: My Lords, I do not want to press the noble Lord too much, but perhaps it is unfortunate that the term "personal statement" has been used at all, because in my knowledge a personal statement is not subject to debate at all. Therefore, it is important in the course 'of the next few hours to determine whether this is a purely personal statement or whether it is a Government Statement, in which case it will have to be debated.
Lord SHEPHERD: My Lords, perhaps I used the term "personal statement" in a non-Parliamentary sense. I understood that certain allegations had been made about the Secretary of State himself and that he wished to reply to them. I suggest that we should leave this matter there. We will consult through the usual channels. I will certainly see that the available information is made known to noble Lords opposite, and if they so wish we will arrange for a Statement to be made here. This is what I suggested at the outset and I do not think that to press this matter any further will do your Lordships' House much good.
Lord WIGG: My Lords, will the noble Lord, just for a moment, reconsider what he said? It is all right as far as it goes, but when he says that he will consult with the Front Bench opposite and will then consider jointly whether the Statement shall be made in this House, that is absolutely monstrous. If the Secretary of State for Northern Ireland wishes to refute a statement made in the Daily Telegraph, so be it: if he wishes to make a personal statement that is a matter for the Speaker. But the question of whether or not there should be a Statement in this House must be the responsibility of the Government, which is not shared with the Opposition because they have no part to play.
Lord SHEPHERD: My Lords, the responsibility is not the Government's, but that of the Leader of the House. The practice in your Lordships' House is that we do most, if not all, by consultation. Without consultation in your Lordships' House, very little works here. Therefore, I suggest that we leave this matter and proceed with the next business.
Lord BALFOUR of INCHRYE: My Lords, before we leave this matter, may I ask the noble Lord the Leader of the House to make clear whether this Press statement is to be issued today, or not until this House has heard the Statement? If it is to be issued today, would it not be more proper for the Statement to be made first in this House, even though we interrupt our Business to hear it?
Lord SHEPHERD: My Lords, I have indicated to the House that I was not

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aware of the situation and, obviously, the noble Lord did not understand what I said. I was not aware, nor am I at this moment aware, of the context of this Statement. I was responding to a question put by the noble Lord, Lord Carrington, on information given to me while I was sitting on this Bench. I am at the disposal of the House and will consult with the noble Lord, Lord Carrington, as to whether this Statement ought to be repeated. I cannot go any further than I have gone already.
Lord DUNCAN-SANDYS: My Lords, for the convenience of the House, could we perhaps be told the subject of the other Government Statement which is to be made tomorrow?
Lord SHEPHERD: My Lords, that is not usual. The noble Lord, Lord Carrington, himself is aware of it.
The Earl of ONSLOW: My Lords, will the noble Lord the Leader of the House recall how cross his Front Bench was two years ago during the miners' strike, when the noble Lord, Lord Carrington, made a statement to the Press? Will he recall how hot under the collar they got? When they think of fairness and consultation, will noble Lords bear that in mind and practise what they preached then?
Lord SHEPHERD: My Lords, my memory of that occasion is very clear. It was more involved than the matter we now have before us, so I suggest that the noble Earl, Lord Onslow, should not pursue that point.

PETROLEUM AND SUBMARINE PIPE-LINES BILL
3.1 p.m.
The MINISTER of STATE, DEPARTMENT of ENERGY (Lord Balogh): My Lords, I beg to move the Motion standing in my name on the Order Paper.
Moved, That it be an instruction to the Committee of the Whole House to whom the Petroleum and Submarine Pipe-lines Bill has been committed that they consider the Bill in the following order, viz.:

Clauses 1 to 16,

Schedule 1,

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Clauses 40 to 43,

Clauses 17 to 19,

Schedules 2 and 3,

Clauses 20 to 25,

Schedule 4,

Clauses 26 to 39,

Clauses 44 to 49.

—(Lord Balogh.)
On Question, Motion agreed to.

EMPLOYMENT PROTECTION BILL
3.2 p.m.
Lord JACQUES: My Lords, I beg to move that the House do now resolve itself into Committee on this Bill.
Moved, That the House do now resolve itself into Committee.—(Lord Jacques.)
On Question, Motion agreed to.
House in Committee accordingly.
[The EARL OF LISTOWEL in the Chair.]
Clause 1 [Advisory, Conciliation and Arbitration Service]:
The Earl of GOWRIE The Earl of GOWRIE moved Amendment No. 1A:
Page 2, line 9, leave out from ("relations") to the end of line 12 and insert ("providing facilities for advice, conciliation and arbitration and, where appropriate, encouraging the extension of collective bargaining and the development and reform of collective bargaining machinery.")
The noble Earl said: The Committee stage of a Bill, even one that takes place during a recall of this House from Recess, it seems to me is usually a time for reasoned reflection, for making improvements, for considering technicalities, and so on. But I think that our Committee today is in a very different situation. It will be impossible for us to ignore, even as we scrutinise the details of a long and detailed Bill, what might be called the burning topicality of the issues underlying this legislation—issues subject to the industrial, political and employment tensions that can so easily build up, burst out, and tear apart this kind of legislation. For example, how can we initiate a debate on the early clauses of the Bill, our first debate on the Advisory, Conciliation and Arbitration Service, without the eleventh hour settling, or at least postponement, of the steel strike being in our

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minds? How can we not be aware that if we get something wrong in the Bill, even if it is wrong only in tone or emphasis, we in Parliament may be doing our bit to worsen industrial relations, to dampen industrial activity, and so put off for longer than need be that revival of confidence in the work place which must initiate and then accompany national economic recovery?
Our Amendment to Clause 1 is primarily a matter of tone—of trying, if I may so put it, to improve the "manners" of this Bill. I make no apology for this, because there is almost universal agreement—certainly among all the commentators whom I have read—that the Bill openly discriminates in favour of trade unions and the shop floor and against the manager's office and the boardroom. Far from trying to break down industrial divisiveness and the idea of "us versus them" which foreign commentators have noted, the Bill glories and celebrates division.
Quite apart from the detailed provisions, many of which we shall seek also to modify and moderate, in many crucial places the Bill is infected with the kind of "four legs good, two legs bad" spirit. Of course this is mirrored in the language of the Bill. One purpose of our Amendment is to civilise and soften the tone of subsection (2) without in any way blurring its meaning. We support the concept of the ACAS charged in this subsection with:
"… the general duty of promoting the improvement of industrial relations, …"
Therefore, we approve and support the meaning of the Government. What we do not like—and the Amendment does not alter the meaning of the subsection a whit—is the psychological assumption in the second part of the subsection that "extension of collective bargaining" is the only important method of improving industrial relations. We do not contest its importance, and so in our Amendment we include the phrase "the extension of collective bargaining". But by linking this concept to the specific tasks of ACAS we present it in a more balanced way, and we lessen the suspicion that the bald inclusion of the phrase "extension of collective bargaining" is purely a trade union directive. Surely both sides of industry need all the
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diplomacy, tact, and good manners they can get. I have said that as well as moderating the language of the paragraph our Amendment seeks formally to define the purpose of ACAS.
If we now turn to the wording of Clause 1(2), we find that, despite the full title of the ACAS which precedes the clause, nowhere is a specific duty laid down for the Service to provide advice, conciliation and arbitration. It may be claimed that these are dealt with under Clauses 2, 3 and 4, but if we look closely at the terms of those clauses, we find they are all discretionary. In any case, they are surely meant to be explanatory of what is laid down in Clause 1.
Lord ROYLE: Would the noble Earl permit me to interrupt? I apologise for doing so, because while what I have to say has no connection at all with his argument, many of the Committee are in the same fog as I am. I cannot find Amendment No. 1A anywhere. I understand it is not available. We have not got it. Perhaps the noble Earl in the Chair can help. I should have thought that Amendment No. lA would have followed Amendment No. 1.
The Earl of GOWRIE: I do not wish to usurp the function of the noble Earl the Chairman of Committees. Clearly, Amendment No. lA would follow Amendment No. 1,but I do not think that noble Lords opposite would wish me to put down an Amendment under the heading of "zero", whatever they might think of my opinions. Therefore, for the first time off, we have to do it this way. There are two Marshalled Lists of Amendments. I think they are widely available. Perhaps someone could provide one for the noble Lord, Lord Royle, so that he can see our Amendment in detail.
As I was saying, I support the concept of ACAS and wish to make it clear that nothing said here in criticism of the relevant provisions of the Bill is meant as criticism of the Service itself, or the role we hope it will play. The ACAS has an important central role to play in improving industrial relations, but if it is to do so, it must have the full support of both employers and trade unions. It will need to be independent and impartial if people are to have confidence in it. People will not have the necessary confidence unless the Service is seen to be

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independent and impartial in the way in which it functions.
The Conciliation Service has a long and honourable record. It used to operate under the aegis of the Department of Employment, where I, for one, first worked. Unfortunately, some people felt that its independence was jeopardised through becoming involved in statutory incomes policies. Its transfer to ACAS is understandable and acceptable in order that it may be seen to be making a new and independent start. Therefore, it is all the more important, it seems to us, to guard against the Service being laid open to charges of bias or any misinterpretations of this kind. As we know from last week, it has made a good beginning. The reports of its work to date are impressive. All the same, one must realise that it has not yet started to tackle some of its more controversial work—controversial, as we shall see under the terms of the Bill: for instance, dealing with recognition claims and formulating Codes of Practice.
In the meantime, then, in the Amendment we wish to lay a specific duty on the ACAS to provide facilities for advice, conciliation and arbitration. It is hoped that it will be agreed that not only is this structurally necessary for the purposes of the Bill, but also, with the other point I mentioned, the point of language, that it will contribute a better balance to the statement of its duties. I beg to move.
Lord WIGG: I have down an Amendment later on the Marshalled List, but I may be able to shorten what I have to say then by saying something now. In general I have sympathy with the views expressed by the noble Earl, Lord Gowrie. In some respects I would go a little further. I should like to delete the word "advisory". Looking well into the future, it seems to me that this Bill is one of the most important that has come before this House, indeed before Parliament as a whole, since the end of the last war, because on the view we take of it and what we do about it will depend, in my judgment—I hope I do not exaggerate—the survival of this country as an industrial power and as a democracy. What is implicit in the operation, in the ultimate way in which the ACAS will work, is nothing less than
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this: that no man or no organisation must be judge in their own cause.
Other countries which are more wedded to the capitalist system and perhaps more reluctant than we are to accept a mixed economy—the United States—are light years ahead of us in the handling of industrial relations. They have developed a breed of men who are professional conciliators, and the word "professional" in capital letters and underlined. They do not only, as it were, explore the light at the end of the tunnel; they bore a tunnel where no tunnel exists, and they perceive the possibilities of conflict long before they arise. It seems to me that it is in this field that ACAS has to operate. Indeed, my Amendment would ultimately give the Secretary of State the power to impose arbitration without coming back to Parliament.
This takes me back to my original principle, that any dispute, however complex it may be, has ultimately to be settled by somebody, so why not settle at the beginning. But there needs to be stages in this, and it needs to be undertaken by a body which has built up for itself the reputation of impartiality. First, they must ascertain the facts; they must see what the dispute is about. They must then seek to concilitate by every means in their professional power. Then, ultimately, it must go to arbitration, as it does in the United States; it goes to arbitration as a result of a decision by somebody other than the parties to the dispute. This seems to me what it is all about. Therefore, I do not want even the word "advisory". I want a Conciliation and Arbitration Service with ultimate powers which are accepted by all sides of industry, powers which the trade unions would accept and which would be effective upon the factory floor, and which would be accepted by the employers.
I have very much in mind—and I am not going to weary the Committee today, unless I am forced, by giving a detailed account—a recent industrial dispute which still survives, in which, in my judgment, the blame is wholly on the employers, and for their own reasons they have refused arbitration. I have no doubt that noble Lords on the other side, or even on this side, could balance my arguments by a case on the opposite side. But we are a long long way from even exploring the initial stage of inquiry, of establishing the facts; we have not even got

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there, so we are miles away from conciliation. When it comes to arbitration this is a dream. Yet the time is very short indeed. Every industrial dispute that breaks out, that inconveniences the public, that damages the economy of our country, in the ultimate has to be settled round a table, like every war has to be settled; when you have killed millions, you have still got to talk and settle. So why do not civilised men start?
I would say to the noble Earl, Lord Gowrie, and the noble Earl, Lord Mansfield, and those associated with them, the impelling force of their idea is right, and I would take my vote into the Lobby with them in saying that. But I think it needs to be looked at again; I think it needs to go further and drop out the word "advisory", and I think the words need to be more carefully drafted. I would suggest to him that he goes to representatives of the TUC, or Members on this side of the House who have experience in trade union negotiations far greater than I have, and see whether the words can be taken a little further, to mean a little more and to be put into practice not in the arbitrary way as at this moment; because it cannot be done. To talk about arbitration at the moment is almost a dirty word. The reasons for this are largely historical. It used to be said of Mr. Foster Dulles that on his desk he had a text. I never quote the Bible very correctly, but it is something like this:
"Be not mocked, God is not mocked, be not dismayed; As a man sows so shall he reap".
We are reaping in our industrial relations today the fruits of what happened after the First World War, the General Strike, the unemployment of the 'thirties, the suspicion that it may happen again. All these are bearing fruit which is bitter, and yet it is as plain as a pikestaff that for us as individuals and as a nation the time has run out. We have got to find a more civilised, a more humane and sensible way of handling our affairs.
It seems to me to be quite simple. I repeat myself, and I hope noble Lords will forgive me. First, one must ascertain the facts. If you are going to have a hell of a row, at least know what you are fighting about; and then bring in the professional conciliator, the man trained in this art. Thirdly, if there can
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not not be any agreement, then, as in the United States, the cooling-off period and compulsory arbitration. We have got a long way to go before ultimately we reach that goal, but to my mind that is the goal. If that is in the mind of the noble Earl, Lord Gowrie, and if he decides to divide, he takes me with him.
Lord BRIGINSHAW: I thought the noble Lord, Lord Wigg, touched on one or two important points that underline the necessity of the Bill being unamended. I would say, with the noble Lord, that we are taking advantage of all the experience that we have had since the Second World War. But, at this moment, if I had the Amendment before me and studied it, I think I should still take the view I am seeking to express, that the Amendment ought to be withdrawn, the Bill ought to be left as it is; its overall intent is to take advantages of the experiences of the First World War period, subsequent developments and the immediate past two or three years' experience. I declare an interest, so far as the ACAS is concerned, in being a member of the Board. I was surprised to hear the noble Earl on the other side indicate that perhaps the first success of the Service was last week, so far as the steel dispute was concerned.
The Earl of GOWRIE: If I may briefly correct the noble Lord, that is not what I wished to say. I said that the events of the last week brought the successful work of the Service sharply into relief.
Lord BRIGINSHAW: As if this has been the only thing that has happened in the past year. Over 1,000 successful handlings by the Service have taken place. My experience and the experience of the Service is that the more you leave it in a position of flexibility, the more you cease to burden it in any way, the more successful it will be. Therefore, taking this into consideration, listening to what the noble Earl has said rather than being at a disadvantage so far as the Amendment is concerned, not having it before me. I strongly hope that this Committee will press the view that it would be better if the Amendment in terms was not accepted.
3.20 p.m.
Lord SHEPHERD: May I be allowed to intervene, because this is a matter on

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which there should not be a great deal of difference between us. First of all, the three Parties have given their full support to making the statutory provisions for ACAS. Like my noble friend Lord Briginshaw, my impression of the speech made by the noble Earl, Lord Gowrie, was that so far as he was concerned this was a new organisation which had had a notable introduction to the problems of industrial relations in the way in which they had handled the steel dispute. This is of course an organisation of quite a number of years standing, and where there may have been an element of doubt in the minds of the members of ACAS this was put right by a letter of, I think, 8th August, from the Secretary of State to the Chairman indicating the broad lines under which it should function.
We are legislating here for a long period because problems of industrial relations are bound to be with us; because as we change and modify our industrial structure new problems are thrown up which have to be dealt with. Therefore, when laying down a general duty I would suggest that one does not wish to be too specific. It is quite right that subsection (2) says:
"The Service shall be charged with the general duty of promoting the improvement of industrial relations"—
and it could be argued that it could be left like that, but it goes on—
"and in particular of encouraging the extension of collective bargaining and the development and, where necessary, reform of collective bargaining machinery."
The words are being put in there because it was the view of the noble and learned Lord, Lord Donovan, and his Royal Commission; it was the view of the Conservative Administration in 1971, and it is the view of any who have been involved in any form of industry or commerce that the only way in which human problems within industry and commerce can be dealt with satisfactorily is through negotiation. Collective bargaining is negotiation: it is a negotiation or collective bargaining between the two sides. I do not believe that within a democracy, the sort of society we have or which we wish to see, there is any other satisfactory way in which we can conduct our affairs than
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through negotiation. That is the other word for collective bargaining.
All the experience of CIR and ACAS since it was set up leads us to believe that there is much yet to be done in the field of the improvement of industrial relations and collective bargaining and negotiations. I had personal experience of this for a short period between being in Office, and one thing that became perfectly clear to me in my experience in this field was that the method by which you negotiate is of paramount importance, and that both sides understand the procedures to be adopted. The general concept of the Government in subsection (2) is the general duty of the improvement of relations, and drawing particular attention to the extension and the improvement and, if necessary, reform of the negotiating positions and procedures.
In his Amendment the noble Earl relegates it to a more minor situation: it is "where appropriate". Appropriate means that there is a degree of discretion. My view is that this should be the desire and purpose of all, and that no company has in itself a cast-iron, first-class system of negotiation. In my view the setting up of the facilities for advice, conciliation and arbitration, important in themselves, are, in the end, solely a safety net. They are to be brought into being when the negotiating procedures of an industry or a company have been completed.
Baroness SEEAR: I apologise for interrupting the Minister, but can he explain why the Service has this title, unless it is for purely historical reasons? While I have sympathy with what the noble Lord is saying, it is peculiar to call it the Conciliation and Arbitration Service and then to object to having a reference to "conciliation and arbitration" as a major part of the definition of what it does. Are the words, "industrial relations" not included in the title because the CIR became unpopular?
Lord BRIGINSHAW: I think it is because the Service knows what it has to do, and the experience of those involved in the Service is that they are aware of something to which the noble Lord, Lord Wigg, referred; that is, the application of the art of worker involvement. I would add that it is both an art and a

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science. Therefore, they do not need to be directed in this regard.
Lord SHEPHERD: As to the arguments I am making in terms of the organisation, the organisation was set up before this legislation had been prepared. But there is no doubt at all what was the intention behind the Service. The difference between us here is the question of method and purpose. The purpose of this organisation is the improvement of industrial relations. The method lies through the advice, the procedures under Clause 4, and if the negotiating procedures of companies have failed, then the conciliation and arbitration requirements under Clauses 2 and 3 could be brought into force, but as we shall deal with later even the arbitration clause does not become effective unless there has been failure in Clause 2 of the conciliation. In other words, one seeks to use the methods and the procedures within an industry, within a company, before using the broader net of conciliation and arbitration.
I do not think that there is a great deal of difference between us, except perhaps, as the noble Earl has said, a question of tone. I hope that the Committee will believe that this Service should have a general duty of improving industrial relations, and that it should recognise that the essential part of the improvement of industrial relations—and I cannot believe that there can be anything between us on this—is the improvement of collective bargaining, or system of negotiation or the procedures within industry. Clauses 2 and 3 should become necessary only when there is a failure in the general procedure within an industry or a company. There is very little difference between us here. I hope that the Committee will take the view that the broad concept in subsection (2) should be adhered to.
Lord POPPLEWELL: May I support my noble friend in his appeal that it is better to leave the Bill as at present drafted rather than accept the Amendment, because the weakness in the Amendment is the words, "where appropriate". Who will decide whether or not it is appropriate? One can visualise a great deal of argument about whether it is right that the machinery should
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operate for a certain industry. I would ask the noble Earl to give further thought to this matter and to realise the weakness he is suggesting and the difficulties that will ensue in consequence. Is it not better to leave the broad outline of the Bill as it is and encourage the extension of collective bargaining? There are sufficient safeguards to meet the point he raised about introducing the words "where appropriate". We are not dealing with a lawyers' paradise; we are dealing with practical affairs of industrial management and good relationships. In my opinion, the words "where appropriate" will increase the difficulties in achieving the objectives behind the Bill which, on balance, are accepted by both sides of industry.
Lord GEORGE-BROWN: Every speaker so far has misused or confused terms. Let me go back to the beginning. A trade union—or a number of trade unions—deals with a particular employer. That is what my noble friend on the Front Bench called negotiation and collective bargaining. But that has nothing to do with what happens if they cannot reach agreement. He was talking about collective bargaining, negotiating, as though that was the ultimate in industrial relations. But it is not. With all the good will in the world—and we do not always have all the good will in the world when discussions are taking place—there comes a point where, for one reason or another, we cannot break through and therefore that needs to be supported or supplemented by something which seeks to bring the two parties together to find out why and how to get around the difficulty.
I agree with so much of what the noble Lord, Lord Briginshaw, said that ACAS as we call it with our passion for initials—is the supporting body to which one can turn without any loss of face. The important thing is that there must not be loss of face. It can come in because somebody knows someone on the employers' side, and somebody else knows someone on the trade union side. Everybody knows why these things happen. I am tremendously in favour of leaving the Advisory Conciliation and Arbitration Service as an almost ill-defined, or not very well defined, body which can find its way through. But, as my noble friend on the Front Bench

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seemed to put it, that is not part of the negotiation and collective bargaining, except in the rather vague sense that it helps the thing to work. Anything which for malises that, which seems to make it more a part of the machinery will destroy it. It has to learn its own way, and the present personnel are finding out how to work it and how to apply it. It is going very well and has been going well for quite a while, and it has had both minor and major successes.
My noble friend Lord Wigg—a great old friend of mine, with whom I have fought many a battle—will only complicate matters again if he tries to introduce the concept of compulsory arbitration. There is nothing that gets the hackles up more than being told that, in the end, this involves somebody telling you what you have to agree to. We here, almost as academics in this field, can make a case on paper for that being the end of the road. But if you introduce it at this stage in the proceedings you will ruin the whole thing. I ask my noble friend Lord Wigg not to pursue that one, although I see the academic case for it.
What we now have to do is to try to get the trade unions and management—and I have now served my time on that side of the field as well as a long time on the other—to go along more often. But if we are to persuade them to accept the fact that they may feel the need to clash—rather like the two Front Benches here—then they have to know that behind them there is something like the ACAS which looks wholly independent and weaponless, but which everybody knows will be there. May I say as a trade union official, that it is sometimes nice to be able to go to your members and say, "I did not give way. Those fellows came in and persuaded me that I got a better deal this way." I imagine management do the same. I suggest that we do not talk about compulsory arbitration—that will only complicate matters. Let us not mix up collective bargaining with a voluntary and acceptable Conciliation and Arbitration Service. To the noble Earl I would say: Let the thing go. It is working its way through. We are coming out of a very gloomy and rather frightening period. We are getting a little better now. Let it work as it is.
Lord HALE: The noble Lord the Leader of the House said almost precisely what I was going to say, and more clearly than I could have expressed it. However, may I express my opinion in two sentences? The effect of this Amendment, judicially interpreted, might be to make no difference, but I do not think that would be so. I think it is much more liable to be interpreted as imposing an obligation. If it imposes an obligation, it not only limits the power of the Conciliation and Arbitration Service which has now been legislatively enacted, but it lays it open to constant litigation. It lays it open to being challenged because certain obligations were imposed by the Amendment and in this particular connection the obligations have not been obeyed. On the other hand, under the drafting of the clause the Service is absolutely free to introduce what arbitrary measures it likes—to recommend them in some cases and not in others, to adapt them for some purposes and not for others—and that is precisely what such a Service should have.
3.40 p.m.
Lord LEE of NEWTON: I am all for the improvement of the conciliation and arbitration services and I am all for improving the machinery of collective bargaining, but I am inclined to say, "A plague on both your houses for the clause and the Amendment", because I do not understand what we mean when we talk about "the extension of collective bargaining". Are we thinking in terms of the millions of employees in this country who are not covered by any kind of collective bargaining, those in agriculture and industries covered by different types of machinery? It seems remarkable that both sides of this Committee can accept the use of an expression about the extension of collective bargaining at a time when we have agreed almost to suspend collective bargaining. Indeed, from the Government Front Bench we heard about the virtues of negotiation; but I do not think there is a great deal of scope for negotiation when a maximum is fixed beyond which there shall be no negotiation. I am not criticising the £6 limit; indeed, I am all for it. Nevertheless, we should be careful what we say in legislation. Frankly, I do not want to see the extension of collective

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bargaining; I want to see its diminution because I want to see it succeeded by a more scientific and sensible method of determining our incomes.
The last time I had the honour to address your Lordships on this subject I described collective bargaining as being like haggling in a Middle Eastern bazaar, and I do not withdraw from that position. What do we mean when we use the phrase "the extension of collective bargaining?" Are we thinking in terms of asking all those services and industries which do not have collective bargaining now to accept it? If so, I assure noble Lords that we are in for a lot of trouble, for whatever we think about arbitration and conciliation it is the very opposite of collective bargaining, because when the parties go to arbitration they have in fact failed in their collective bargaining.
Lord SHINWELL: Surely my noble friend is mistaken. If both sides are in dispute about something and they refer the matter to the Arbitration and Conciliation Board, then surely that is collective bargaining. It is not the Board that is indulging in collective bargaining but the contending parties, and that is what we mean by collective bargaining.
Lord LEE of NEWTON: Exactly, the contending parties have failed in their attempt at collective bargaining and have therefore gone to arbitration. One reads that Galbraith and others are now coming round to believing that by fixing a £6 limit we are not merely putting in a stop-gap because of inflation but are now reaching a higher stage of civilisation in the way we conduct ourselves in determining the incomes of our people. It seems to me that we are now beginning to reach that stage. We are realising that collective bargaining has failed and has brought us to the awful extremes in which we now find ourselves; instead of continuing to produce low-paid workers because they have no power to indulge in collective bargaining and are therefore low paid, we are trying to achieve a more sensible way of deciding matters. What I am saying is that while we are doing that it is not very appropriate to talk in this Bill about "the extension of collective bargaining".
Lord DOUGLASS of CLEVELAND: I listened with great interest to the
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remarks of my noble friend Lord Wigg and I must tell him that he is wrong about America. There they have legislation which carries them a long way along the path of finality with regard to collective bargaining, but there is nothing to stop the Americans striking if they wish to strike. What we are facing today in the industrial world is the power of the inertia of the trade unions—they do not have to fight; they just have to sit down—and what we must do is overcome that particular inertia. That will be done only by persuasion. That we in this country have proved.
Those who were at the TUC Conference this year must have noted a remarkable change in attitude towards the acceptance of some method of decision in wage bargaining when an impossible situation is reached, and the £6 limit has now virtually been accepted by all, even by those who were objecting violently to it and who were saying before the conference that whatever happened at that conference they would not accept it. They emerged from the conference saying, "It is a majority decision and it will have to be abided by." Of course, we must watch what happens when the end of the period is reached. The noble Earl, Lord Gowrie, must be smiling to himself at the thought of not having to argue this case because he has us arguing among ourselves. That is not such a bad thing, although maybe it would be better if we did it in private rather than in this Assembly. Nobody can compel trade unionists to work. My noble friend Lord George-Brown and I were dealing with this some ten years ago. In a case where agreement is impossible between two sides the only conclusion we have had up to now has been strike action. The trade unions in this country are as conscious as the employers of the folly of striking at the present time and of the economic chaos which is resulting in this country as in no other country in Europe as a consequence of the inability to find a conclusion when that impasse is reached.
It is some time since I advised the noble and learned Lord, Lord Hailsham of Saint Marylebone, that we in your Lordships' House often do not speak the same language. On that occasion the noble and learned Lord was talking about law and case law and I pointed out to

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him that inside the trade union movement we do not call it "law and case law" but "rule and precedent", yet the two things are the same and we think they are different only because they have different names. What frightens me about this Bill is the thought of those words going before the courts, where legal people will argue about what they mean, and at the end of the day probably causing even more confusion for those who have to deal with industrial relations.
The conciliation and arbitration services have, as the noble Lord, Lord Briginshaw, pointed out, settled a thousand or more cases, but up to now nobody has heard about them. Each one of those cases represents a precedent for us—case law for others—and this has been building up into something really credible; but it has also been building up into something big, like the steel problem. The steel problem today is a plain indication of what a small number of men can do, if they want to, to paralyse industry. We are trying to find a way of dealing with this matter. Mr. Mortimer and his colleagues have gone into that particular problem, have examined it and have persuaded people who were determined to get their own way by stopping their industry, to have an inquiry and to examine it on the job. They will examine the steel industry and they have set precedents inside the steel industry that will certainly be reflected in other industries.
I ask the noble Earl, Lord Gowrie, not to press the Amendment, though I do not see much objection to it except that it introduces more words for us to argue about and I want fewer words to argue about. I shall use the same argument about quite a number of the Amendments which are to be moved. Unless they are absolutely essential they should be withdrawn and the Bill left as it is. Let the Conciliation and Arbitration Service go ahead with forming precedents for us and case law for you, so that, in the economic difficulties in which the country now is, we shall find a combination of effort from all three sides of the House—and I am certain that the Cross-Benches will enter into this—and so that all sides of the House and all sides of industry can at least get together in order to improve our economic situation; so that
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we are not talking about what we are going to share out or about how we shall share it out, but are making something to share out. If we have many more words such as have been suggested or many more Amendments to the Bill, the issue will be so confused that we shall never reach that situation. I appeal to the Committee to be very careful about creating problems for the sake of argument with respect to the present Bill.
Lord WIGG: I would go along completely with my noble friend if I were sure of one thing. The Bill, in some form, will go on to the Statute Book. If I thought that, in the light of events, next year, the year after or five years hence the Government would bring forward another measure so that the Statute would be kept up to date in the light of developments as they occur, I should be wholly satisfied. All my Amendments and the comments which I have already made are a reflection not of what exists or is likely to happen during the next year, but of what I want to see happen or what I think will happen five years hence.
I am a 100 per cent. supporter of ACAS. I said so on Second Reading. I do not agree with my noble friend that what happens in the United States is exactly as he said. There, a bargain has been struck and it has been struck in many other advanced industrial countries. They have accepted the principle of collective bargaining in the sense that my noble friend Lord Lee of Newton has mentioned. They have accepted that, but a price has been paid. In return for the acceptance right across the board of the principle of collective bargaining, there has also been accepted something which the Conservative Party very unwisely tried to stuff down the throat of the trade union movement in the heyday of their accidental electoral triumph in 1970. In fact, they broke—as they always do—the first lesson in politics, which is to distinguish very sharply between what one wants and what one can get. The ultimate ambition here is to elevate the differences to the point where they can be decided objectively and accepted by both sides, and it is agreed. That is the ultimate target. That is what I believe they want. That is what I want, because though the principle of the right to strike

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is one which I have defended during all my working life and I shall continue to defend as long as I live, I have to remember that we live in an age in which the division of labour has been carried to its logical conclusion. In the industry of my noble friend Lord Douglass the end product is the product of many skills—but be it a small group of men who supply a washer worth three pence who decide that they will have their way, the whole industry will come to a standstill and ultimately the whole nation will come to a standstill. This will often happen about things which are imperfectly understood and this would not have happened if there had been a trained conciliator. This is a class which does not exist in this country and it is something I want to see. It does not exist in ACAS at the present moment, but it has started to exist in the United States and in other industrialised countries.
Let us take the recent strike. I entirely agree with what my noble friend Lord Douglass said. Here is an industry—a nation—looking into the abyss. Yet it has Mr. Mortimer and his friends who with great skill have managed to avert this disaster. We should never have got anywhere near that situation. That process ought to have started a year or eighteen months ago. As I said earlier, we need men who not only can see the light at the end of the tunnel but who can bore a tunnel where no tunnel exists. Here is the problem. I hope very much that we shall get agreement. I certainly do not regard it as a weakness that all the speeches which have been made have come from this side of the House because there is no disagreement between the noble Lord and myself nor has there been from any other speaker, even from the noble Lord, Lord GeorgeBrown—which is saying something! We find a great deal to agree on, but we generally find something on which to disagree, but I do not disagree with him today. I think he is quite right. If you like, I have fetched out the bogey man of what must happen ultimately. That is where my thinking takes me, so I have come down here and, for what it is worth, I say to the Committee that, in the ultimate, if we are to survive as a major industrial power and as a democracy, no man and no institution can be judge in
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his own court. Ultimately, we must find a more civilised way.
Of course, at the end of the day there will be strikes and disputes which cannot be rationalised or solved. But I believe that they will be far fewer than we have at the present time and far less damaging in extent. That is really what the Bill is about. It is the first step along the civilised road and it is one which I should have thought noble Lords in all parts of the Committee would support. If I apprehend here what we ought to do a year or two years hence and say so, it is not to damage that in any way. I should withdraw at once if I thought so. It is not to damage or to hinder those who are taking this first step. More power to their elbow. For what it is worth, Mr. Mortimer and his colleagues and my noble friend Lord Briginshaw have my 100 per cent. support, but I remind noble Lords in all parts of the Committee that this is but the first step. What I am afraid of is that this Bill—the first step—will in five years time find us still bogged down in the word "advisory". What I want to do is to have the cane available even if nobody uses it.
Lord SHINWELL: We shall certainly not survive as a nation if we seek to impose compulsory arbitration on both parties in a dispute. That would cause more harm. We have enough trouble as it is. This debate, though it began on a very muted note, has now developed into a discussion as to whether we should accept compulsory arbitration or whether we should rely on encouraging collective bargaining between contending parties and refer disputes to the Conciliation and Arbitration Board. That is the difference between us.
It appears to me that a great deal depends on what the Opposition want. If they really want to encourage collective bargaining, they can use the word "encouragement" or "extension". It is a matter of semantics, and it does not matter a great deal. But, if the intention behind the Amendment is to effect, through the means of legislation—and through this piece of legislation—that both parties in a dispute must, without any question of a strike either official or unofficial, go to the Concilation and Arbitration Board and take what is coming to them that is going to cause more trouble than ever.

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Of course, it would be an ideal system if everyone—both sides of your Lordships' Committee, both sides in the other place and both sides of industry and the whole country—agreed to collective bargaining and arbitration compulsorily imposed on both sides. It would be very nice. But they would not accept it. No doubt the employers might accept it, although I have doubts about that. Some would accept it but some would refuse to have anything to do with it. Certainly the trade union movement is not in a mood to accept it. We have had some experience of this matter in your Lordship's House when we had to deal with the Conservative Government's Industrial Relations Bill. We see what happened there: all the time that was taken; all the time that was wasted; the arguments, the contention, the disputation and all the rest of it; and in the end it came to nothing.
That would be precisely what would happen if we injected into this measure some aspect of compulsory arbitration which would not be acceptable. I agree with my noble friend Lord Wigg on what would be the position if we could adopt an ideal system of this kind—but of course it does not exist in the United States. They have compulsory arbitration. They have the cooling-off period. We have had the cooling-off period in this country. We have tried that and many expedients and devices, but we have not met with much success. Therefore with what do we content ourselves?—to encourage collective bargaining. Let me say this about collective bargaining. I have ideas about it which would not be acceptable to Members of your Lordships' House, and they would certainly not be acceptable to the trade union movement. But I have ideas about it. I do not ask anybody to accept them. But when we talk about collective bargaining, what do we mean? How do we define it? The operation of contending forces—am I right? One side want more than the other side are prepared to concede. That is what it is.
Nevertheless, the trade union movement, and the Labour movement, and every one of my colleagues on these Benches are hostile to the operation of market forces in industry. That is the position: they are against the operation of market forces. The operation of
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market forces works to the detriment of those on the lower scale. It is not advantageous to the country itself. Nevertheless, when it comes to disputes between contending parties in industry, we refuse to accept anything but the operation of market forces; in other words, those who are strongest will be advantaged and those who are weak will be disadvantaged. That is the situation.
Therefore it seems to me that we should rely on what is in the Bill, and extend and encourage the operation of collective bargaining, by which we mean that both sides, before they venture upon an industrial dispute by going on strike (which is the worst thing that could happen in the interests of the country or even in the interests of themselves) should have the matter referred to the Advisory, Conciliation and Arbitration Service. We should encourage them in every possible way. But we shall certainly discourage the trade union movement—or at any rate a very large section of it—if we seek to impose on it any obligation of the kind—
Lord GEORGE-BROWN: Before my noble friend sits down, may I ask whether he would agree that the only place in the world where compulsory arbitration has been employed has been in a totalitarian society? That is the only place where it can be employed.
Lord SHINWELL: I do not want a totalitarian society. Nobody here wants a totalitarian society. We have had our experience of that sort of thing in other parts of the world. We do not want it. But here is an opportunity of conciliation. How are we to bring about conciliation?—not by contending too much one with another, but by saying that here is a means of escape. Here is the conciliation and arbitration machinery. Take advantage of it. We ought to encourage it in every way we can. My noble friend Lord Douglass of Cleveland, or some other Member on this side of the Committee, mentioned that the Advisory, Conciliation and Arbitration Service had dealt successfully with 1,000 cases. That is to our advantage. Let us have all the cases sent to the Advisory, Conciliation and Arbitration Service. I say to the Opposition that they should be very careful about this and should not press it too hard. Some of us are in agreement

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with this sort of thing. We should like this ideal system. It would be highly satisfactory and encouraging to the country and to its future if everybody accepted compulsory arbitration. There would be no further disputes. There would be collective bargaining, but compulsory arbitration. But we cannot get that. It is unacceptable. Therefore in the circumstances we must make the best of what we have—the Government legislation.
The Earl of GOWRIE: Some of my noble friends sitting behind me wish to come in on this matter. But I must say to the noble Lord that my Amendment is not about compulsion. I accept that the debate ranged fairly widely, and I am glad that it did so. But my Amendment is not about compulsory arbitration.
Lord DRUMALBYN: May I say a word about this? I have listened with the greatest of interest to this debate and I find myself agreeing with a very large proportion of what every speaker has said. It is true that some of us—including, I think, the noble Lord, Lord Wigg, and the noble Lord, Lord Lee of Newton—hold the view that in the long run if two parties are unable to agree, and it is essential in the national interest that they should agree, then somebody has to settle the issue. But this is not what the Bill is about. We are here talking about what the duty of ACAS is to be. May I make this suggestion to your Lordships? It seems to me that in a way the definition of the duty in the Bill confuses two things. We are accustomed to having duties and functions set out separately in Bills. Let us look at Clause 1 of this Bill. There we find the duties set out. If we look at Clause 2 we see that it says:
"In exercising its functions under subsection (1) …
That is on the conciliation side.
There are two things that can be done. The duty can be set out in the broadest possible terms, or the functions that are conferred in the Bill can be enumerated. It seems to me that subsection (2) as drafted, and my noble friend's Amendment, go into the functions side of the matter as well as the duty side. Having listened to the debate, I am not at all
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certain that the best thing to do would be simply to say:
"The Service shall be charged with the general duty of promoting the improvement of industrial relations …"
in accordance with the provisions of the Bill, and leave it at that. But if reference is to be made to functions, it seems to me sensible to refer to a very important function—and here I disagree with the noble Lord, Lord Wigg—and that is the advice function, because obviously one of the most important things is that ACAS should have the very full confidence of all who will be using its services, including in that confidence the knowledge that if they go to it for advice they will receive advice, and very well informed advice at that.
That is why I think it would be desirable to refer to the advice function as part of the duty. If duties such as the encouraging and the extension of collective bargaining are to be enumerated, then the advice function, which is a slightly different one, ought to go in. But I should be perfectly content—indeed I should prefer—to leave the duty in the broadest possible terms.
Lord LEATHERLAND: There are almost 200 Amendments to this Bill set down on the Marshalled List, but what have we been debating for the past hour or hour and a half? We have been debating the subjects which are specifically put down for consideration in later clauses in the Bill. Let me look at the clause as now printed and at the Amendment moved by the noble Earl. The first sentence of subsection (2) of the clause says:
"The Service shall be charged with the general duty of promoting the improvement of industrial relations …".
The Amendment put down by the noble Earl says precisely the same thing. The subsection then goes on to say:
"and in particular of encouraging the extension of collective bargaining …".
The noble Earl's Amendment also suggests that it is a good thing to encourage:
"the development and reform of collective bargaining …".
The noble Earl's Amendment also says that facilities should be provided for "advice, conciliation and arbitration …". Clause 2 deals with conciliation. Clause 3 deals with arbitration. Clause 4 deals with advice.

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I suggest that we have spent sufficient time already on the first clause of the Bill. Bearing in mind that some of the subjects raised—especially the question of compulsory arbitration, which is the subject of a later Amendment—have to be raised on subsequent clauses, I believe that we should now get on with the job.
The Earl of GOWRIE: Perhaps I may take my cue from the noble Lord, Lord Leatherland, and come in at this point. The noble Lord, Lord Douglass of Cleveland, said that I might be smiling to myself at the amount of argument or disagreement that has been provoked. I am; but I hope in no sense in a malicious way, because I think the debate has shown that while there are great areas of disagreement as to how collective bargaining should take place and what the role of arbitration is, whether there should be a statutory incomes policy and so on, we are arguing as citizens and as a House of Parliament and not directly across Party lines. That is an important improvement.
I did not quite expect my fresh-faced, mild and, I thought, innocent little Amendment to put the cat among the pigeons in this way; but perhaps it will save us from returning to some of these points later. I cannot help pointing out that there are some ironies. The noble Lord, Lord Douglass of Cleveland, made an impassioned appeal that we should not have more words to argue about. On the Back Benches of this House, on the industrial relations legislation of Mr. Heath's Administration, I remember sitting through impassioned pleas that we should not have legislation of any kind in this field. In fact, we have this slightly longer Bill of legislation in this field to contend with now. But there are ironies and we accept that historical events have created them.
Lord DOUGLASS of CLEVELAND: Would not Mr. Heath at that time have been well advised to take our advice? And, if this is so, would your Lordships not be well advised to take our advice today?
The Earl of GOWRIE: I thought I was making a good showing of taking advice but perhaps the noble Lord is anticipating me a little. I want to answer a specific point put by the noble Lord, Lord Popplewell. He asked who is to decide
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where the extension of collective bargaining should be appropriate. Looking forward in the Bill to Clause 4 which we shall be debating imminently, that says:
"The Service shall if it thinks fit, on request or otherwise, provide, without charge … advice …"
and so on. This is the kind of thing that I had in mind: that the Service would decide where the extension of collective bargaining would be appropriate. To those noble Lords who suggest that it is always appropriate, I would say that there may be many situations where its extension and improvement may be justified and our Amendment allows for that; but that surely there are also situations where it has no part to play. The example which I think of is in managerial positions, and there are some small firms where participative management is already effective at an individual level without trade union intervention.
The noble Lord, Lord Shepherd, I would correct on one point. He implied that I was saying that the Conciliation Service was a new organisation of which we were only recently aware. I would contest that. Looking back at my notes, I see that I said that the Conciliation Service has a long and honourable record. I really meant that the steel dispute threw it into sharp relief and we were all glad that it did so. He said that there was little between us but a question of tone. I tried to argue earlier that tone is very important in this Bill, because the tone of this Bill is directed towards one side of industry rather than another. I hope that he will take that point on board. I also hope that we may be sensitive throughout our debates to the somewhat loaded and biased tones which crop up in the sentencing in this Bill, and alert ourselves to them and try to improve them where we may. With that and the long deliberations ahead in mind, I beg leave to withdraw the Amendment.
Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.
4.4 p.m.
Lord SHEPHERD Lord SHEPHERD moved Amendment No. 1:
Page 2, line 13, leave out from ("provisions") to ("III") and insert ("(so far as applicable) of Parts I and").
The noble Lord said: This Amendment makes a minor correction. One of the

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provisions of Part I of Schedule 1—namely, paragraph 13 of subsection (2)—does not strictly relate to the Service as such but relates to the certification officer who is to have a separate statutory existence. Therefore, it is necessary to qualify the effect of Part I of the Schedule in respect of the Service by the addition of the words "so far as applicable". I beg to move.
On Question, Amendment agreed to.
Clause 1, as amended, agreed to.
Clause 2 agreed to.
Clause 3 [Arbitration]:
Lord WIGG Lord WIGG moved Amendment No.2:
Page 2, line 35, leave out from ("may,") to ("refer") in line 36 and insert ("subject to subsection (6A) below").
The noble Lord said: I am sorry that the noble Lord, Lord George-Brown, has left the Chamber, because in his absence I have to mellow some of the things I have to say. He made the surprising statement that the only countries that have limited the powers of the trade unions in the sense that I, or the employers, for that matter, would wish to limit them, are the totalitarian countries. This seems to be the most arrant nonsense—and I am expressing myself mildly in putting it in that way—because the more complex our lives become, the more we rely upon the machine and upon organisation alike, the greater necessity there is to regulate. We do it in a variety of ways. It is done in one way in totalitarian countries and in another way in the societies which have legislative Chambers. But in the ultimate, however it is done, it must be done by consent; otherwise, it will not work. If enough people will not "wear it" then it breaks down.
What I am arguing for here—and I am not going to repeat myself more than once, because I have already said most of what I want to say—is that when I look at this Bill again I think it is a first step, but that ultimately we have to recognise where we want to go. It is no good our blindfolding ourselves or saying that this is terrible, that this is totalitarian in concept, that the trade unions are not going to wear it or that
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the employers will not wear it. We have to accept the conditions under which we live.
I find myself politically almost midway. Thinking about it, I fall back on some words of Cecil Day Lewis which were written at the beginning of the war:
"It is the logic of our time, no subject for immortal verse,
"That we who live by honest dreams, defend the bad against the worse."
That is roughly my point of view about the political and economic policies of both Parties. The Labour Party is not as bad, and can never be as bad, as a Conservative Government. But as I am at the end of my life and I have those around me, I naturally, from time to time, look ahead and say and repeat that this country is not going to survive. It is no longer in the first division; nor is it in the second division; nor is it in the third division. It is steadfastly sinking to the bottom of the fourth division, and mainly because the citizens of this country and their leaders—the word "leaders" is expressed in inverted commas—either do not recognise what the truth is or, if they do, are afraid to tell the people what it is. The simple fact is that you cannot survive as an industrial power, with all that that means, if you are to be at the mercy of anybody who at any moment cares to put his foot on the throttle or on the brake. It is just not a starter.
We have begun—very belatedly, sheerly under the impact of events or because, if you like, we are frightened—to take the first step. The Conservative Administration introduced the Industrial Relations Act. Like the noble Lord, Lord Douglass of Cleveland, I tried to stop the Gadarene swine from going over the precipice but they would not listen; they are deaf, so they went on. So that we find this Bill—and I must say that one or two noble Lords who spoke with great authority seemed to know singularly little about what they were talking. When the present Administration came in we did not have this Bill; we had the Trade Union and Labour Relations Act. What did it do? It repealed in toto the Industrial Relations Act; but it realised, quite by accident, if you like, that that measure contained something which ought to be retained. So that as an interim measure we proceeded to re-enact in the Trade Union

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and Labour Relations Act certain provisions that were contained in the Industrial Relations Act. We have this Bill which builds on the foundations; and presumably we are building not as a stopgap measure but for the future for some distance ahead.
I agree that the Advisory, Conciliation and Arbitration Service is the first step, but it is only the first step. If it is the last step, then all that I fear will come to pass. But it need not if we accept that it is the first step; if we do not arouse fears; if we take into account all that has been said in this debate; if we do not seek to impose, but hope that in the ultimate, not by imposing but by recognising the objective facts of the situation, all parties will take the common sense view and say that we cannot be judges in our own cause, and we have to find some other method, so that where there is a breakdown somebody, at some time, ought to decide.
My noble friend Lord Shinwell said: "Do not leave it to market forces, do not leave it to the muscle of the strongest. Let us try to find another way." If we leave it to the muscle of the strongest, if we leave it to the lawyers, all we are doing is creating here the conditions for a further row later on. What we want to do is to build a bridge which will last. I have put in a new subsection which will retain consent. I do not wish to proceed except by consent. There must be consent in the interim, but ultimately, I am proposing to give the Secretary of State the power to table regulations which would be subject to the Negative Resolution procedure, which means they can be debated in both Houses. The Secretary of State would lay down the rules. So we retain consent until such time as the Secretary of State decides otherwise. When we are ready, when we are wise enough, and sensible enough, he will be able, through a Statutory Instrument, to lay down the conditions for the step forward. In other words, I want to tread on nobody's corns, to arouse no animosities. I do not want to impose anything. I have learned the rule that you cannot govern, except by consent. All that I accept.
More power to the ACAS. I think, to be realistic about it, I would drop the word "Advisory", because it is more than advisory; it has a lot more muscle
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than that. I leave it to the Government of the day, to the Secretary of State, to choose. He is responsible to both Houses of Parliament, and when he is ready he can table his regulations, perhaps not right across the board, perhaps by the agreement of a particular industry, and be able to move in a certain direction, so that ultimately each side will accept without imposition that they cannot be judges in their own cause. That is what my Amendment is about. I tabled it with no great hope that it would be accepted. Indeed, I fall back on another half-remembered quotation: if you can bear to hear the truth spoken twisted by knaves to make a trap for fools. Again, the day on which facts will convert my fellow countrymen to its realisation, they must cease to be the fools they have been since the end of the last war in the field of industrial relations.
4.23 p.m.
Lord SHEPHERD: I am grateful for what my noble friend has said. When I saw his Amendments on the Marshalled List, particularly referring to the Secretary of State and to regulations, I was not certain what he was seeking to achieve. Therefore, I need to speak to this Amendment and to advise the Committee that the Government would not recommend that it should be accepted. Amendment No. 3 would leave out the need for consent before an arbitration report could be published. I think that that would create great difficulties. It could be that that might persuade one party to a dispute not to go to arbitration.
Lord WIGG: I wonder whether the noble Lord would be kind enough to read my Amendment. I carefully wrote in that no reference shall be made until all the parties to the dispute so consent. The Secretary of State cannot at the moment refer it, unless all the parties agree.
Lord SHEPHERD: I am taking the Amendments as I am advised, and I am seeking to advise the Committee what would happen if these Amendments were accepted. My noble friend is right in saying that later on we have these references to the need for the consent of the two parties. There is nothing between us here. Paragraph (b) reads:
"The Secretary of State has made regulations to reserve such consent to himself or to the service."

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If that were to be included in the Bill, there would be doubt about whether it would permit the Secretary of State to withhold consent even though there had been consent by the two parties in dispute to go to arbitration. I cannot believe that that is what the Committee would have in mind.
Another construction that could be placed upon it—that which most of my noble friends on this side of the Committee seized upon—is that this would permit compulsory arbitration; in other words, the Secretary of State, requiring arbitration in a dispute where the two parties, or one of the parties, has not agreed to it. There are two aspects in this. Arbitration, at the end of the day, can succeed only when both parties are prepared to co-operate, to give evidence, and the purpose of arbitration is that both sides should agree to the award. In the majority of cases, the practice is that an arbitrator's award is accepted. It may be that a further claim is made later on. Most experience is that arbitration awards are accepted. The greatest concern that I would have about such a provision, for the Secretary of State either to prevent or to make compulsory arbitration for a case, is that this would go right against the whole principle which all the parties have been concerned with here, that the ACAS should be an independent body. It should not be seen by either side of industry as in any way an instrument of government or of a particular Minister. I cannot believe that compulsory arbitration is either desirable, or would work. We have to rest upon the spirit under which the ACAS is working, and under which it is being accepted by both sides of industry. I think my noble friend Lord Briginshaw referred to the large number of cases which have been referred to it—about a thousand—and, in most cases, most satisfactorily dealt with.
My noble friend asked whether this was the end of the road and the last Bill we shall have in the field of industrial relations. It would be a very foolish man who would say that we may not see legislation in the next Session dealing with industrial democracy, because industrial democracy has as significant a role in industrial relations as anything that is being proposed in this Bill. But I agree with my noble friend that unless we can put right all the problems and all the
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difficulties that beset us in the industrial relations field, until we can give confidence to those investing capital that what they invest will earn a proper return, unless the workpeople themselves feel that there can be greater satisfaction in the job they are doing and in the atmosphere and conditions under which they are working, then there is very little future for this country. I accept the view of my noble friends who have spoken earlier in this matter, that it is best to leave this broadly based as it is in the Bill, and that we should not consider any questions, either of compulsory arbitration being imposed or, as it could have been constructed under paragraph (6A) of a Secretary of State withholding consent to arbitration where the two sides of industry may themselves have already agreed to take that step.
Baroness SEEAR: I rise on a point of clarification. A good many people have considerable sympathy with the point made by the noble Lord, Lord Wigg, in that behind his Amendment, if I understand him aright, is the conviction that disputes of this kind can be so serious for the national interest that they cannot be left to settlement between the two parties, and that there conies a point at which there has to be overriding third party intervention. While accepting that, one also accepts the fact that consent is vital if there is to be ongoing satisfaction in industrial relations. But I would have thought that the point put by the noble Lord, Lord Wigg, is covered if the noble Lord, Lord Shepherd, would confirm as a fact what I believe to be the case—that the power to set up a court of inquiry under the 1919 Industrial Court Act still stands. Therefore, in the event of a dispute affecting the national interest the Secretary of State can set up a court of inquiry. I fully realise that is technically not arbitration, but we all know that in effect it is arbitration. Would the noble Lord, Lord Shepherd, confirm that the public interest is still protected by the court of inquiry procedure under the 1919 Act—because, if so, the urgency of the Amendment moved by the noble Lord, Lord Wigg, becomes very much less.
Lord SHEPHERD: What the noble Baroness has said is perfectly correct. I had intended to refer to it, but I perhaps forgot. I was really dealing with the

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Bill. But what the noble Baroness has said is correct: the existing powers under the 1919 Act remain and the Secretary of State, if he wishes to do so, may set up a court of inquiry if in the national interest he thinks he should do so.
Lord WIGG: In view of what has been said, it is perfectly clear that I shall not take the Committee with me if I divide. I will therefore seek the leave of the Committee to withdraw the Amendment, but I must say I am by no means satisfied. I was aware of the 1919 provision, but the fact is that this was a new deal and if therefore the Secretary of State was prepared to use these powers—and I must say if he is prepared to do so—then there is no reason why a reference should not have been made in the Protection of Employment legislation. But if indeed you rely upon the measure of 1919 without a reference, it means that you depend on the political courage of the incumbent or the man who holds Office at the time when the matter arises. I have no faith in the political courage of Ministers or Administrations when they come under pressure of that kind. But I have said what I have to say: I believe that what I say is the truth. I have believed this consistently over a number of years and I can think back over many occasions, though I will not weary the Committee by detailing them, on which I have mentioned it. But I believe I am right on this one, and if the Government are content to rely on this measure because they have not the courage to spell out what needs to be done, that is their responsibility and not mine. But I say this with absolute confidence: this country has absolutely no future politically, militarily or as a democracy unless it can solve this problem. It has today in this Bill once again signally failed to face up to its responsibilities. I beg leave to withdraw my Amendment.
Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.
Clause 3 agreed to.
Clause 4 [Advice]:
4.34 p.m.
The Earl of GOWRIE The Earl of GOWRIE moved Amendment No. 4A:
Page 3, line 31, at end insert ("and procedures in connection with claims made under Schedule 11 of this Act;").
The noble Earl said: With the leave of the Committee, I should like to talk to Amendments Nos. 4A, 4C and 4D together. We now come to the second of the debates on the ACAS and the Amendment which my noble friends and I wish to propose to Clause 4. Clause 4 is concerned with the advisory side of the Service's work. It is our contention that this all-important function—the aim of prevention rather than the need to cure so to speak—must be allied to consideration of Schedule 11, which deals with the extension of the terms and conditions of employment. As we shall note later, Schedule 11 in its present form, besides confusing and perhaps interfering with the Government's counter-inflation policy, is likely to create considerable industrial relations difficulties.
Clause 4 requires the Service to provide on request—and I am thinking here of paragraph (d)—advice to employers and employers' associations among other groups as to how to avoid and settle disputes and workers' grievances. Employers anticipate profound industrial relations problems in connection with Schedule 11, and so we seek to include Schedule 11 in the wording of Clause 4. Employers will need advice in this area for two reasons: first, so that they may know whether they are liable to have a claim registered against them; and secondly, so that they may avoid reaching a settlement which is going to be used against other employers in their area or industry. Further—and from a national point of view this is of even greater importance—the advice that ACAS might wish to give or be required to give in respect of employees seeking comparable wages and conditions with those employed in similar situations might now be in direct conflict with the counter-inflation policy. So we also seek to add a paragraph, (f); that is, to clarify the ACAS relationship in respect of any such present or future counter-inflation policy.
It is of course easy to see why the Government have got themselves into such a royal muddle here, so that in respect of this Bill their left hand does not know what their right hand is doing. I am reluctant to use the old joke about feet here, but really only the Secretary of State and Mr. Jack Jones seem to have reconciled in their own minds the confusion at the heart of this legislation. It

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arises because it was conceived under the ill-fated star of Social Contract Mark I, but has been delivered under what we must all hope will be the more auspicious planet of Social Contract Mark II. As I said, the need for advice in this area will be much greater now than when the Bill was originally presented in another place. A £6 limit has been set upon pay increases universally, and while the Trades Union CFongress support of this is encouraging, there will be those who will be looking for ways of getting pay increases above the £6 level. If some get higher increases the justice of the policy, which has already been admitted by the Prime Minister to be rough justice, will be lost altogether. We know from experience of the Conservative counter-inflation policy that Schedule 11 could act to provide higher increases for some. This would be inflationary and would run counter both to the needs of the present difficulties and the spirit of the Remuneration, Charges and Grants Act.
We are not denying the need to help the low paid which the Government say was the original motivation behind Schedule 11, and I think we shall be able to demonstrate this to the Committee when we come to amend Schedule 11. What we are now saying is that the best help we can give to all, including the low paid, is to see that inflation is kept down and that the Government's counter-inflation policy will work. Employers are, as I said, genuinely afraid that Schedule 11 can be used in a way which would undermine the £6 limit. My contention is that, if only to allay that fear and to help them counter any unjustifiable abuse, the advice of ACAS should be available, but of course the need for their advice on pay does not stop there. Employers have no detailed advice as to how to implement the £6 limit: they have it from no one.
It is ridiculous, for instance, that the CBI should have to issue guidance to local negotiators based on statements by Ministers in another place and unofficial assistance from the Department of Employment. Wires are bound to get crossed and misinterpretations proliferate. Acts of Parliament cannot cover every eventuality in pay negotiation and more detailed guidance is needed. I think we
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would all agree that the ACAS should be the body to give that advice.
This is in effect the second year that the Government and the unions have agreed to the idea of wage limitation, but have done so without offering guidance on its achievement at plant and company level. Perhaps this is partly why the first phase of the Social Contract failed. It seems to me that lack of such guidance can make policies of this kind meaningless. We know that there could be no reference to ACAS offering advice in the event of statutory policy. At the time that this Bill was first drafted there was no such statutory policy. At that time, I think we all remember, the Government did not even contemplate that they would ever have to introduce such a policy. Now even Mr. Jack Jones is talking about some kind of version of this policy becoming permanent. But now that we have effectively statutory control, surely it is time that we should recognise that employers need advice on implementing it, whether it is voluntary or whether it is a statutory control.
As ACAS becomes involved in pay disputes this winter—for example, in the recent blast furnacemen's dispute—it will need to be able to offer advice in the knowledge that it is competent to do so. Otherwise we could easily imagine a case where the ACAS arbitrates in a dispute resulting in a pay settlement and as the law stands at present the Department of Employment could then decide that such an arbitrated agreement was outside the £6 limit and instruct the Price Commission to penalise the employer accordingly. That situation is intolerable for ACAS, for the employer, for the country and indeed, I should have thought, for the Government's whole counter-inflationary policy.
The need for the addition of the word "retention" has become evident due to the plight of the country to which the present Government have brought us. The last-minute amendment of Clause 103, to permit the Secretary of State to provide temporary employment subsidy, is a case in point. The Government's Amendment to Clause 103 was prompted by their fears for unemployment—and I understand from our exchanges in the House this afternoon that we are going to hear

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more of these tomorrow. As unemployment figures continue to soar the Government have come up with the temporary employment subsidy whereby employers will be paid to keep on workers even though they might not be able to afford to do so. It does nothing, therefore, to meet the needs of the 1¼ million people already unemployed—more than at any time since the 1930s—and it certainly does nothing to help the 120,000 or so unemployed school leavers who have never had any employment which could be temporarily subsidised.
While we are sceptical—we must reserve our position here—about whether the temporary subsidy can stop the unemployment caused by the fiscal policies of the Government, everyone must surely want to see it being helpful where it can be. We want to see particularly encouraged the philosophy which should lie behind action of this kind; namely, that in a recession, which world conditions suggest may be with us for some time yet, employers should be encouraged to keep their workers on. This means that advice will be needed on how to reorganise production so that useful and profitable work can be found for as many as possible. That seems to me to be an area where ACAS can also have a useful role. That is why we seek to amend this clause, and I beg to move.
Lord BROWN: Can anyone doubt that the provisions of each one of these three Amendments are already included in the terms of the Bill? They add nothing to the Bill. No reasonable interpretation of the Bill could possibly exclude them. These Amendments would merely add words for the sake of a degree of particularisation which is entirely unnecessary.
4.45 p.m.
Lord SHEPHERD: I am not entirely with my noble friend Lord Brown, particularly in regard to Amendment No. 4D, which I wish to explain in some detail. I think that the noble Earl is mixing up the responsibilities of Government with the proposed duties of ACAS. We have throughout stressed that it is our desire, and the desire of both sides of industry, that ACAS should not only be independent but be fully seen to be independent. I hope we shall keep
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that point very much in mind when considering duties to be placed upon it.
In regard to Amendment No. 4A, the wish is to include the words "and procedures in connection with claims made under Schedule 11 of this Act;". We shall have an opportunity of debating Schedule 11 later on and I will indicate, and I hope that the noble Earl will accept, that the consequences of our suggestions in Schedule 11 are not at all inflationary; they change in a minor way some of the provisions that have been on the Statute Book for very many years. Basically, such changes as there are deal with pockets of low pay. I do not believe there will be any dissent from the suggestion that there is a real need to deal with this particular area. Of course advice will be available from ACAS within this field. If the noble Earl will look at paragraph 5 of Schedule 11 he will see there are a number of procedures under which ACAS is required to operate when a claim is made to it under Schedule 11. One of them is that there should be conciliation. One of the most important parts of conciliation is the extension of information and the explanation of information. If the noble Earl again will refer to paragraph 5 he will see that, if this fails, arbitration is available. Therefore, I should not have thought there was any need specifically to refer to this particular matter in the various general requirements embodied in Clause 4.
In regard to Amendment No. 4B, I should have thought that advice on training of officials of trade unions would be within the definition of facilities for officials of trade unions. I think it is on Clause 49 that we shall have a full opportunity for a debate on this subject. Therefore, I should not like to go any further on this Amendment.
The Earl of GOWRIE: I think the noble Lord must have missed something I said. I said that I was not speaking at this time to Amendment No. 4B. That would be the subject of a later moving.
Lord SHEPHERD: Does the noble Earl intend to move No. 4B?
The Earl of GOWRIE: Yes, I do, later on.
Lord SHEPHERD: Then we will leave that. In regard to Amendment

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No. 4C—after "recruitment" to add the word "retention"—I was of a mind to accept the Amendment, although I am not quite so enthusiastic about it after some of the words that the noble Earl used in putting the Amendment forward. But I myself would take the view that retention of employment is a matter on which ACAS could well provide advice to employers. If the noble Earl wishes, I am willing to accept that Amendment, but on condition that it is part and parcel of the general provisions in paragraph (g).
In regard to Amendment No. 4D—to add "(l) compliance where appropriate with statutory and voluntary incomes policy"—this is the area where we have to lay down quite clearly the Government's responsibility. This is Government policy. It is a statutory policy. It is also true if it is a voluntary policy but a voluntary policy is one that has been agreed to by the unions and the CBI, the two sides of industry. I suggest that ACAS has not yet got a statutory role. The Chairman, Mr. Mortimer, has made his position clear. Of course, information on policy will be given if requested, but in my view it is not a statutory duty that ought to be imposed upon ACAS, particularly if you wish to preserve not only the outward presence but also how it is seen by both sides of industry—as a body which is independent of Government. This is especially true when one looks at the question of arbitration.
One should remember that it is not the Service itself that is carrying out the arbitration. The Service appoints the arbitrators. Therefore, they are fully independent. If you are to get both sides to come to arbitration, it cannot be dealt with in any other way. In regard, therefore, to Amendment No. 4D I can tell the noble Earl that the Government think that it is very inadvisable and that they are utterly opposed to the proposals in Amendment No. 4D. We are prepared to accept Amendment No. 4C. We do not think Amendment No. 4A is necessary. Similar provisions are already contained in the Bill. It would be wrong to make it a specific point in this general approach on advice which is laid out in Clause 4.
Baroness SEEAR: The Committee probably knows that my Party believes that a statutory incomes policy will have to be enforced. At the same time I should like to say that this cannot be any part of the job of ACAS. The thing which killed arbitration in the 1960s, because it went into grave disuse, was the fact that Governments had incomes policies and the arbitration machinery was seen as an instrument of the Government's economic policy. We on these Benches believe that the Government will have to develop more effective instruments for their incomes policy in relation to wages but that ACAS is not its instrument. This is a very important distinction to be made. There can be no arbitration if the arbitration body is perceived to be part of the enforcement of the Government's statutory policy.
The Earl of GOWRIE: Having listened not only to the Government but to the noble Baroness, Lady Seear, I confess myself to be in some difficulty. As I understand it, her position is that while there may be a need for a statutory incomes policy and while, presumably, she accepts that there is an incomes policy of some kind in effect at present, ACAS is not the body that should administer it. I hope that is a tolerable representation of what the noble Baroness said. I am not maintaining that ACAS should administer it; far from it. As the noble Lord the Leader of the House told us, ACAS is supposed to be an independent and an a-governmental body. My argument is that if the Government of the day—be they Labour, Liberal or Conservative—decide for reasons of their own to impose either a voluntary or a statutory incomes policy, or the kind of policy we have at the moment where the one masquerades as the other, ACAS must be able to advise employers about the effects of it, otherwise the other advice that they are charged by Statute with being given under his legislation will be meaningless. Will the noble Lord enlighten me on that point a little further?
Lord SHEPHERD: If either side of industry were to go to ACAS for an explanation of the incomes policy as of now, no doubt they would give an explanation of it, but they would do so on a voluntary basis. The noble Earl is proposing a statutory duty to give that

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advice. When you impose a statutory duty to give advice immediately you attach it firmly to an area for which they themselves are not responsible. That is Governmental responsibility.
The Earl of GOWRIE: I am still in a quandary. We come back to the point made in the first debate about a conflict between interpretation of duties and interpretation of functions. As I understand it, Clause 4 sets out perfectly clearly and fairly some of the functions of ACAS. It says:
"The Service shall if it thinks fit,"—
it may not think fit—
"on request or otherwise,"—
it may or may not be requested—
"provide, without charge,"
advice to various bodies. I think we are in agreement about that. This advice as it thinks appropriate—the provision is covering its likelihoods here—is itemised as being the kind of issue about which ACAS might be called upon to advise, if it thought appropriate. If these hypothetical situations are clearly itemised in the Bill, why cannot we equally itemise the hypothetical but the noble Baroness, Lady Seear, would say all too likely eventuality of a statutory incomes policy? I wish that the noble Lord the Leader of the House would clarify that point.
Lord BROWN: The noble Earl must surely be aware that last week the Service was engaged in helping the country over the blastfurnacemen's strike and during the discussion, the contents of which I do not know, reference to the present voluntary incomes policy was made. He must know that this is part of their role. To use the word "compliance" in an Amendment of this kind is immediately to raise the hackles of people, because, whatever the proper interpretation of that word may be, to insert that word into the Bill in the present context would have damaging results, and I am quite sure that the noble Earl is well aware of this.
Lord ROBERTHALL: I agree very much with the points made by the noble Lord the Leader of the House, the noble Lord, Lord Brown, and the noble Baroness, Lady Seear. It seems to me that "compliance" is a quite different matter from the kind of advice which this body is supposed to give. The two difficulties which will arise are whether
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or not a proposed settlement falls within the terms of the policy. That will be a kind of ministry of law which it is not proper to put into the hands of a body of this kind. It is more like the powers that the Treasury have to say whether or not a dividend payment falls within the regulations. The other point is that if one side or the other is determined to breach the incomes policy there is a problem, but it is not a problem which in my view is at all appropriate to this proposed body.
The Earl of GOWRIE: I asked the noble Lord the Leader of the House whether he could enlighten me a little further about the difficulty I am in. While he is deciding whether this is appropriate, perhaps I could point out to the noble Lord, Lord Brown, what I mean here by "compliance". Perhaps I have chosen the wrong word, although I do not see it. My suggestion is that there may be clashes between the advisory function of ACAS and the policy of the Government of the day. Since these situations under Clause 4 are to some extent hypothetical, anyway, what is the objection to allowing ACAS to advise on a policy which in effect is in existence at the moment and may continue for some time?
Lord BROWN: The noble Lord is well aware that the job of this part of the Service is mediation. To couple a body that is concerned with mediation with the word "compliance" is psychologically very dangerous indeed.
Baroness SEEAR: The noble Earl said earlier that it is a matter of tone.
The Earl of GOWRIE: I am not quite sure that it is, for this reason. I am talking not about compliance in the sense of "you shall comply" but about advice to employers as to whether procedures or activities undertaken by them are complying with the law of the day.
Lord SHEPHERD: The noble Earl must be aware that at the Department of Employment there is already a Department specifically set up, and it has been in existence since the Social Contract was being exercised, for the giving of advice to both sides. That is now available. As I see it, the question between us here is whether this should be a governmental function, whether it should be carried out by the Government, and Parliament

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makes this policy, or whether it should be given to an independent body.
As I said earlier, if anyone was to go to this independent body and ask for advice, no doubt the Service would give the advice but it would not be required of them statutorily so to provide; it would be part of the general service that they are seeking to provide. I would suggest to the noble Earl that this interpretation or explanation of statutory or voluntary incomes policy is that of the Government and the Department directly concerned and not the independent body, because it could then well affect the general approach and understanding of people as to the independence of this body.
Lord LEE of NEWTON: While I agree thoroughly with what my noble friend has just said, is it not the case that there is a need for explanations from the Ministry of Employment as to how the £6 maximum will work? There is confusion wherever there is a system of payments by results. I know that, when we were running an incomes policy at the old DEA, wherever we had a communal payment by results system—supposing we had had the £6 and take that as an example—provided the average of, say, 50 men were within that communal payment by results system, we took the average and within it many would of course go above the maximum; but provided the average worked out right we would advise employers that that was quite within the terms of the incomes policy.
Therefore I think there is a duty on the Government. I do not know whether they have ever issued advice of this type—I have not seen any—but I believe there is a duty for them to say whether they are going to work within the four corners of the kind of thing I have tried to explain, as we did in the incomes policy of a previous day. There is this complication again whereby there is a payment by results system by which you could be getting at national level national increases of X pounds and then, within the factory, the shop stewards would begin to negotiate and it might well result in an increase in payments by result which, if you add to the nationally agreed basic rate, would take you over the £6 limit. I think the noble Earl had in mind some-
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thing of this sort. I do not know that any advice has been given. I know that within my own union there is anxiety on this point, because at this stage there is no advice as to whether there is a method by which you will compile a national agreement, plus the local agreements which take place afterwards. While I thoroughly agree that this is not a job for the arbitration people and it is entirely a job for the Ministry of Employment to make clear, I am just wondering whether that kind of advice has yet been given.
Lord SHEPHERD: If that was an example of what my noble friend thinks was in the mind of the noble Earl I am quite clear whose duty it would be to give that advice, and that would be the Department of Employment.
The Earl of GOWRIE: Since the noble Lord, Lord Lee of Newton, has put the point I was seeking to make to the noble Lord the Leader of the House, with all his experience which is considerably greater than mine in this field, I wonder whether the noble Lord could see whether we could come to some arrangement about this later. I am not wedded, as the noble Lord, Lord Brown, seemed to suggest—and certainly not mischievously wedded—to the word "compliance" because I was using it in a different context from the one he was suggesting. But I object. We on this side strongly object to the anomalous situation at present whereby an incomes policy, the £6 limit, call it what you will—call it by the least contentious name you can think of—is not provided with any kind of real guidance from the body which employers under this legislation would most naturally ask to be advised about. That, when the areas of activity which ACAS is to advise on are so carefully itemised, seems to me to be a pity.
Lord SHEPHERD: If it would help the Committee to get a move on, I am quite prepared to meet the noble Earl in another place—by which I do not mean the other end—in order to see whether we cannot arrive at a mutually acceptable form of words.
Lord COOPER of STOCKTON HEATH: Before we agree to that, may I point out briefly in a couple of sentences—because we do want to get on—that the whole of Clause 4 deals with

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collective bargaining. All the items on which a service shall give advice are items where both sides of industry are involved. But when we talk about compliance we are referring to one party and not two parties, and I suggest that indicates that it is quite inappropriate to put compliance in as part of the duty of this Service under Clause 4.
The Earl of GOWRIE: I certainly readily agree to look for another form of words which does not include the word "compliance" though I still think that noble Lords on the other side of the Committee are thinking in terms of statutory compliance with some arrangement. I am not; I am speaking about whether employers may find themselves in a situation where ACAS is advising on one point and recommending one thing, and statutory institutions are recommending another, and this will create confusion. But in view of what the noble Lord has said on this word, I beg leave to withdraw the Amendment.
Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.
5.9 p.m.
The Earl of GOWRIE The Earl of GOWRIE moved Amendment No. 4B:
Page 3, line 34, after ("facilities") insert ("and training").
The noble Earl said: Clause 49 provides that an employer shall permit an employee of his who is an official of a recognised trade union to take time off for the purpose of enabling him, among other things, to undergo training in aspects of industrial relations relevant to the carrying out of those duties, as such an official. It further obliges the employer to pay the employee for time off. The whole question of training in industrial relations was the subject of a Report by the Commission on Industrial Relations in 1972. This covered all aspects of industrial relations training, including shop stewards. This aspect of the CIR's work is to be undertaken by the ACAS in future under Clause 4(2) or under Clause 5. Clause 4(2) refers to those matters listed in Clause 4(1). It is therefore appropriate that the subject of shop steward training should be included in the list under Clause 4(1).
In addition the ACAS will of course be specifically charged under Clause 6(2)(b) with the duty of preparing a code on time off for trade union officials and
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it could hardly do this without becoming involved in such questions as the appropriate content and length of such training. It may be argued, and I expect it will be argued, that the training of trade union officials is a matter for the trade unions alone, but in my contention this makes it in no way inappropriate for inclusion in Clause 4, since the Service is charged by the trade unions among other people with the duty, if it thinks fit, on request or otherwise, to provide it on the items listed below.
In any case the fact that trade union officials are to be given time off work for this purpose and to be paid for it by the employer gives the employer a very reasonable and real interest in knowing that the time off has been profitably spent. This was recognised in fact in a joint statement on the training of shop stewards issued by the TUC and the British Employers' Confederation, which was a precursor of the CBI, which included the following passage:
"It was agreed that this training is primarily the task of trades unions, but that where questions of release with pay arise, employers should be consulted about the syllabus."
I beg to move.
Lord BROWN: May I point out that in common parlance generally in use in industry and, I believe, among trade union officials, the term "officials" is confined to paid servants of the union, and normally excludes shop stewards. As I believe the main intention of the Amendment of the noble Earl, Lord Gowrie was directed to the training of shop stewards, these are not appropriate words with which to gain that end.
Baroness SEEAR: May I ask the noble Lord the Minister for clarification when he is answering on the Amendment? May I ask him whether it is the case that such training of shop stewards is permissible for grant under the Act covering employment and training? If not, may I ask whether it can be made so permissible, because it obviously affects the position of the employer in relation to training if he can claim grants, as he claims grants for all other kinds of training. It is logical that he should be able to do this, but I am not sure whether it is the case. I am sure it would help very much if this could be considered.
Lord SHEPHERD: Like the noble Baroness, Lady Seear, I also am not sure, but since my noble friend Lord Melchett has left my side I am hopeful that an answer will be shortly available to her.
As I was saying on the earlier Amendment, my understanding is that training would be regarded as a facility, and therefore I could argue that it is not necessary to add this word to this part of the clause. I agree with my noble friend Lord Brown, who was speaking from his great wealth of experience in these affairs, that officials of trade unions are paid officials and are not shop stewards. I can well imagine the great wrath of our trade unions—or, for that matter, any other organisation—if we were to put in here provisions for giving advice as to how a paid official of a trade union should carry out his duties. This is a matter which has been discussed in another place. I wonder whether the noble Earl, Lord Gowrie, would agree that I should look at what he has said. We would also have an opportunity of debating Clauses 49 and 50, and I would then have consultations with my right honourable friend the Secretary of State for Employment to see whether there is any way in which we can meet the spirit of what the noble Earl has in mind. I would not wish to raise too many hopes here, but I will undertake to see what can be done.
Lord COOPER of STOCKTON HEATH: May I just add for the information of noble Lords, and in reply to the question from the noble Baroness, Lady Seear, that under the training Acts the training of shop stewards has been accepted for reimbursement once the syllabus has been agreed. Noble Lords will be able to see the importance of this, because according to the unions and their politics, one might have all sorts of syllabuses. A couple of years ago, my own union arranged this, and so this is a facility which is covered. The term "official" is well understood as being the full-time paid official.
I listened carefully to what the noble Earl, Lord Gowrie, has said, and although he made a case for training—and we would all agree that even the full-time official needs training—this document is 150 pages long. The job of a trade union official is becoming more and more legalistic. He has to be a jack of all
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trades. The requirement for training is well established, but the important point here is who does the training. In this country, the trade unions are very independent; this is one of their characteristics. They do not want the State to do their work for them. Some people argue that they ought to, and it may well be that this will develop. But the trade unions are alive to the requirement for training. I think that this should be left as it is, that the word "facilities" should remain there, and not specify too much.
Lord SHEPHERD: I am most grateful for what my noble friend has said. I did not endeavour to reply to the noble Baroness, Lady Seear, because on this matter the note that I have is not exactly what I would call firm advice. It says they "think it probably is", which I do not feel is particularly helpful as an authoritative statement. However, I will look into the matter and communicate with the noble Baroness.
Equally, I ought to be fair to the noble Earl, Lord Gowrie, and to my noble friend, when I refer to the definition of "officials". I understand that this was changed by Section 30 of the Trade Union and Labour Relations Act which includes shop stewards. But we still could have the difficulty if we had this provision, that it would still cover paid officials, which clearly would not be acceptable.
The Earl of GOWRIE: I accept that it is one of the functions of the noble Lord, Lord Melchett, to come to the rescue of the noble Lord the Leader of the House, but I did not know that it was one of the functions of the noble Lord the Leader of the House to come to my rescue! I am grateful to him on that account. I accept what the noble Lord, Lord Cooper of Stockton Heath, said, with this proviso, that when the noble Lord waved the Bill at me and said in terms more of sorrow than of anger that it is 150 pages long and that the officials who were the shop stewards or otherwise would have to become jacks of all trades to master it, he should have waved the Bill, or even thrown it, at the noble Lord the Leader of the House. It is not my fault that this massive superstructure of legislation is being erected. The noble Lord, Lord Shepherd, said, even if I must be guardedly pessimistic, that he would try to meet me here, and

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in view of such assurances, I beg leave to withdraw the Amendment.
Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.
Clause 4 agreed to.
Clause 5 [Inquiry]:
5.15 p.m.
The Earl of GOWRIE The Earl of GOWRIE moved Amendment No. 4E:
Page 4, line 6, at end insert—
("( ) where an inquiry relates to industrial relations in a particular industry, undertaking or part of an undertaking, the Service shall before entering on the inquiry, inform those likely to have an interest in it of the scope of the intended inquiry and give them a reasonable opportunity to express their views in relation to the inquiry.").
The noble Earl said: This Amendment follows broadly along the same lines as an Amendment tabled in another place, but it has been slightly reworded as I shall explain. Clause 5 gives the ACAS power, if it thinks fit, to inquire into practically anything it likes in the industrial relations field, although not, it seems, to advise on statutory or voluntary relations policies. On the face of it, this is a very wide-ranging power, and one which is likely to give rise to misgivings, particularly among the very large number of people who feel that industry is already subject to far too much interference and intervention. We do not doubt that the Service will continue to conduct its work impartially and without bias. The purpose of the Amendment is to make it quite clear to all concerned that this is how it will act in practice, that it will be constructive, and that there is nothing to fear from an inquiry that it undertakes. It might be argued that this could be assumed in the light of its record anyway, but I remind the Committee of my words in the first debate, that we are dealing with a Bill which contains, by general agreement, very loaded language.
If the Service is seen to be acting fairly, all parties can be expected to have confidence in it. There is no question of any party being given a right to veto here. It is a matter for public reassurance that inquiries will not be undertaken capriciously, or without a proper understanding of the surrounding circumstances. In another place, the right honourable gentleman the Minister accepted that before starting an inquiry the ACAS must prepare the ground thoroughly and
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consult all those likely to be involved. Therefore, the Minister suggested that it was unnecessary to make a specific provision. Pressed to say, since both sides in another place obviously agreed with the objective, what objection he had to such a provision, he replied by saying that it would introduce unnecessary formalisation. We contend that when one is threatened with an inquiry into one's company, which inquiry might exacerbate an already delicate situation, a little formalisation might, indeed, be welcome. I beg to move.
Lord BROWN: I do not know whether the noble Earl has ever had the task of obtaining the help of an industrial consultant to look into an industrial problem, technology, organisation or what not. One of the difficulties always is that he is not able to say before he starts the areas in which he will have to conduct his investigation or analyses. You never know where an inquiry will lead. If you say to the consultant, "You must confine it to this department", his answer may be: "Well, although apparently the cause of the problem lies in that department, if we are allowed wider terms of reference you may be surprised to discover where it does lie'. The same applies to an inquiry by the Service. You cannot predetermine the area into which it is to inquire or the terms of reference in matters as urgent as a dispute over wages or whatnot. To insist that the Service pre-states its terms in this way I think would cause enormous delay in getting the Service to work in mediation on some problem, and would probably result in such restriction of its area that it would be unable to solve the problem through its mediation.
Lord SHEPHERD: This proposal was fully debated in another place, as the noble Earl said. At Report stage, the Minister of State said that the Service had given an assurance that as respects inquiries relating to industrial relations in a particular industry, undertaking or part of an undertaking, it had been the invariable practice to consult all those known to have an interest in the matter to be inquired into; to explain to them the scope of the proposed inquiry; to give them an opportunity of expressing views and to take these views into account before deciding to proceed with the inquiry. The Service gave a further

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assurance that this practice would continue to be followed when inquiries are in future conducted under the provision of Clause 5.
At the end of that speech by my honourable friend the Minister of State, Mr. Prior, I think indicated that what the Minister of State had said had met the main point that the Opposition had raised in Committee and that there was wisdom in the course that ACAS intend to pursue. I was under the impression that the Opposition were satisfied with the position, and, therefore, when I saw the Amendment on the Marshalled List I thought that it may be that they were seeking further assurances to those that were given by my honourable friend the Minister of State. I would confirm that those assurances still pertain and it is the intention of ACAS to fulfil them. With those few words, I hope that the noble Earl will agree to withdraw his Amendment.
The Earl of GOWRIE: I should like to make one more point, perhaps directed to the noble Lord, Lord Brown. The noble Lord, Lord Brown, quite reasonably cites the normal practice, good procedure, a body of good habits in this regard. I am not one who will contradict him. Of course we should expect ACAS to proceed in this way. But the fact is that it is the noble Lord's right honourable and noble friends who are imposing so many conditions, so much legislative underpinning to the activities of ACAS, and we should simply like them, if there is to be this legislative underpinning, to include obviously reasonable provisions as well. I agree that this has been aired. I thought it right that it should be aired in this House as well as in another place. I beg leave to withdraw the Amendment.
Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.
Clause 6 [Codes of Practice]:
The Earl of MANSFIELD: I beg to move Amendment No. 4F standing in the names of my noble friend and myself. This Amendment would have the effect of substituting in subsection (5) of Clause 6 what I might call the Affirmative procedure rather than the Negative procedure, when a Code of Practice comes to be blessed, if that is the word, first of all
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by the Minister and then by both Houses of Parliament. I do not really need to remind your Lordships of the importance that Codes of Practice will have to play in the future.
Lord FOOT: May I interrupt the noble Earl on a matter of procedure? I do not think we have decided that Clause 5 shall stand part of the Bill.
The DEPUTY CHAIRMAN of COMMITTEES (Viscount Goschen): I have already put the Question, That Clause 5 shall stand part.
The Earl of MANSFIELD: If we are now in order, I shall try to proceed. If we are not, we can still make good the damage after this Amendment has been dealt with, as I understand the procedure.
Lord SHEPHERD: I hear various discussions going round. I would not wish in any way to suggest that the noble Lord the Deputy Chairman is in error. On the other hand, there is some doubt whether Clause 5 was put. Perhaps it might be put beyond any form of dispute if the Question could be put now and then there can be no doubt as to whether or not it was put.
The DEPUTY CHAIRMAN of COMMITTEES: The Question is, That Clause 5 shall stand part of the Bill.
Clause 5 agreed to.
Clause 6 [Codes of Practice]:
5.28 p.m.
The Earl of MANSFIELD The Earl of MANSFIELD moved Amendment No. 4F:
Page 4, line 43, leave out subsections (5) to (7) and insert—
("(5) If a draft laid under subsection (4)(a) above is approved by a resolution of each House of Parliament, the Service shall issue the Code in the form of the draft and the Code shall come into effect on such day as the Secretary of State may by order appoint.").
The noble Earl said: I am sure that we are very grateful to the noble Lord, Lord Foot, for being, as it were, in his place and aware of what is going on, even if he has ruined what was left of my concentration. What I had been saying was that Codes of Practice will be extremely important in the scheme of things in the future. Subsection (1) provides that ACAS
"may issue Codes of Practice containing such practical guidance as the Service thinks fit for

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the purpose of promoting the improvement of industrial relations."
I certainly would not complain about that. In subsection (2) the Service is charged with the duty of preparing Codes to provide practical guidance on two further matters; that is to say, the disclosure of information, which we shall debate a little more in the future, and matters such as time off to be permitted by an employer. One hopes that there will be further Codes published in the future, because in many ways they are preferable to the rigidities of legislation. Indeed, they will not be any the less important, nor can they be ignored.
Under subsection (10) of Clause 6 it is specifically provided that although non-observance of a Code will not lay a person open to proceedings, the terms of any Code shall be admissible in evidence in any proceedings before an industrial tribunal or the Central Arbitration Committee. Indeed, as I understand the position, since the present Code has come into force it has played a significant part in cases of unfair dismissal and redundancy, and many points—and indeed, questions—have turned on whether there has been a proper observance or a failure to observe the Code. Therefore, the position is that these Codes will amplify the law and they will have a legal status, even if they are without the force of law; and, indeed, they will have an important legal effect on occasions. Their effects are likely to be broad, particularly over such matters as disclosure of information, and they may go a good deal further than such matters as pure industrial relations alone.
It was in this light that in the other place, both in Committee and on Report, urgent and bipartisan consideration was given to how Parliament should play its part, and to what part it should play in giving its assent to these codes as they should come along. In the other place—and I hope I am not being unfair about this—the Committee was bogged down by the fact that it discovered that it could not change any portion of a code, it could not amend a code, as indeed neither House can amend any statutory legislation of this nature, so that if anything was objected to in a code, as it were the baby would have to go out with the bathwater. By the time the matter came to be debated on Report in another
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place, they had certainly run out of steam if they had not run out of time, and the matter was left in a slightly unsatisfactory state with the Minister of State really saying that the procedures of the House of Commons would have to be reviewed and possibly improved rather than the Codes of Practice for delegated legislation.
It was in those circumstances that those of us who came to table these Amendments considered how best to go about it. The matter is too important to be left to the Negative Resolution procedure. Certainly in the other place the pressure of work is such that if they did object under that procedure, any time provided for a debate would certainly be in the middle of the night and of short duration. Your Lordships' House is now meeting at a time when all good Scots should be North of the Border, and our time is too precious not to be properly spread about the things that should be debated. I hope that I have opened this little debate reasonably fairly and objectively. What I ask the Government to do is to take this away again and see whether there is anything that can be done to relieve the undoubted fears that both Houses have over this matter of these important Codes of Practice. I beg to move.
5.33 p.m.
Lord SHEPHERD: The noble Earl invites me to take this matter back for further consideration and I would assure him and the Committee that I am very willing to do that. I was intending so to do without the noble Earl's invitation. I have a good deal of sympathy with the proposition contained in this Amendment, particularly when one considers it in relation to the Industrial Relations Act where, if my memory is right, similar provisions were put into the Bill because of pressures of the Labour Opposition.
My understanding of the concern in another place was the opportunity to debate the Code of Practice. I do not recall any steps being taken there for the Affirmative Resolution procedure, for the reasons which I shall indicate in a moment. So far as your Lordships' House is concerned, we get over our difficulties of providing time for debate through discussions through the usual

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channels, but in another place time is of great essence. It is perhaps the most valuable commodity that the House of Commons possesses.
In the case of the Industrial Relations Act, there was one comprehensive Code of Practice introduced by the Secretary of State, and it could be dealt with at one go. However, in this case we have the difference that we shall have a Code of Practice formulated by ACAS after full consultation with both sides of industry. As the noble Earl said, under Clause 10 it has a position in terms of the industrial tribunals, so to that extent it is different from the Industrial Relations Act. There is one other difficulty. It may well be that there will be a whole series of codes being issued, not one comprehensive document. It may be that ACAS will produce Codes of Practice governing particular subjects. That is one of the difficulties about another place in finding time for debates on matters which may not be of immediate or essential importance, or perhaps of interest, but time has to be provided.
I had intended to take this back to find out, first of all, whether we were likely to see a substantive Code of Practice covering the broad frontiers of ACAS, in which case I would seek to persuade my colleagues, the business managers in another place on both sides of the House, that we could have the Affirmative Resolution procedure in regard to the substantive documents; and where there were Amendments or additions to them have the Negative Resolution procedure, so that it would be open to Members of either House to raise the matter if they felt that it was right and proper for it to be raised. We could get a substantive document approved by Parliament by the Affirmative Resolution procedure, but any Amendments could go through without a great deal of difficulty unless they raised matters that were contentious.
I shall have a look at this matter. I would not wish to say that I shall be able to persuade my colleagues in this matter, but I shall certainly see what can be done, expressing a general sympathy with the line made by the noble Earl, which is not dissimilar to the line that we, when we sat on the other side, had taken when the noble Lord, Lord
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Drumalbyn was introducing legislation of this sort.
Lord DRUMALBYN: In view of what the noble Lord has said, I think I am right in saying that there have been occasions recently when Motions for Negative Resolutions have been put down on the Order Paper in another place and there has not been time to debate them. Therefore, might it suffice for the challenge to be in one House only? We might debate this kind of thing where we have more time even when they have not time to debate it in another place.
Lord SHEPHERD: I shall certainly respond to what the noble Lord has said. I can only speak for your Lordships' House. If the procedures remained as they are now in the Bill, I could without hesitation say that the Government would find time for these matters to be debated, but I could not speak for another place. This is a matter which I shall look into and will perhaps discuss with the noble Earl, Lord Mansfield, and we will see what needs to be or can be done on Report.
Lord WIGG: Can I be told what is meant by the phrase, "could not find time for it"? If it is subject to the Negative Resolution procedure and if a Motion is tabled, it is surely the duty of the Government to find time. Surely we are not at a point where matters of this importance are to be subject to the kind of thing referred to earlier in the afternoon, the kind of friendly arrangements made between the two sides that important matters are swept under the carpet.
Lord SHEPHERD: I wish the noble Lord would listen. I said that so far as your Lordships' House is concerned there would be no difficulty at all. What I said was that I could not speak for another place. I was responding to what the noble Lord, Lord Drumalbyn, said. I think that there is some degree of truth that there are occasions when Prayers are put down in another place and because of pressure of time they have not been taken. That is not applicable in your Lordships' House.
Lord WIGG: The noble Lord misunderstood me. I am not raising this question with him as Leader of the House but as a Minister. He does not speak

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here with authority except with the authority with which he speaks on behalf of the Government. We must know that in both Houses of Parliament nobody is going to use the excuse in the Negative Resolution procedure that there is not time. I was not asking him that as Leader of the House, but as a Minister.
Lord SHEPHERD: I cannot speak for another place, but my understanding is that Prayers have been put down in the past but because of pressure of time they have not been taken or decided. Either as Leader of the House or as a Minister, I have been in your Lordships' House long enough to know that the noble Lord has only to choose the day on which he wants to put a Prayer on the Order Paper and the Government can do nothing about it.
Lord WIGG: I am sorry to keep on at this but I am going to. That is not the point. The question is whether the Negative Resolution procedure is satisfactory. Does it provide a long-stop or not? In the case of the Negative Resolution procedure, to be told that because it meets their convenience the Government cannot find time, destroys half of the long-stop. If that is the case I think the Opposition Front Bench have made an unanswerable case for the Affirmative Resolution procedure. If, for the convenience of the Whips, we are to be told in a matter of great importance that the Negative Resolution procedure does not apply, I am not satisfied; I want the Affirmative Resolution procedure.
Lord SHEPHERD: Since this is Committee and as the noble Lord and I appear to be at cross purposes, may I ask whether he is referring to your Lordships' House or to the other place?
Lord WIGG: I am not referring to this place or to another place. I am referring to the procedures here. What happens if a Motion is put when a Member of either place is seeking to use the Negative Resolution procedure? This is a brake on both wheels. We are now being told—and the Leader of the House confirms it—that on occasions the brake will always go in this House, but that it may not go in another place because it suits the Government's convenience. What is all this about? If they use the Negative Resolution procedure it is the Gov
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ernment's responsibility to see that there is an opportunity for the brake to go on both wheels. If that is not so we should not rely on the Negative Resolution procedure but go for the much stronger safeguard, the Affirmative Resolution procedure.
Lord SHEPHERD: I said to the noble Earl that I had a good deal of sympathy for the case he made and that I would look at it, but presented the difficulties. So far as your Lordships' House is concerned the brake is there. It is a fairly effective brake, and it is up to the House to use it when and where they wish. I cannot speak for another place, but this is a matter which we can go into between now and Report.
Lord SHINWELL: I do not follow the merits or demerits of this dispute, and perhaps the noble Lord the Leader of the House will clarify the issue. When he asserts that he cannot speak for another place, obviously that is true so far as its procedure is concerned. But obviously he speaks for the Government, and as this is Government legislation surely he has full control over the Government legislation passing through your Lordships' House. Is that not so?
Lord SHEPHERD: That is so, and I have been seeking to respond to the noble Earl, Lord Mansfield, to see whether there was some way in which we could overcome the difficulty to provide a degree of brake in this matter while recognising that there are certain difficulties in another place. It is interesting to note that another place did not move an Amendment in this form. They were more concerned about achieving a debate. If my memory is right, there was general agreement that procedures would be provided. The noble Earl is looking for something more formal, and this I have undertaken to look at.
The Earl of MANSFIELD: It seems that the noble Lord the Leader of the House has more difficulty than I over this Amendment. As I recollect the position, the other place was really concerned about something which they called a Merit Committee and how, as it were, they could have their cake and eat it. By keeping the Negative Resolution procedure they could still debate individual parts of the Code of Practice. They came

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to the conclusion, unfortunately, that they could not do so. It was in those circumstances that no thought was given in the other place to the Affirmative Resolution procedure, which perhaps bears out the value of your Lordships' House in these matters. Certainly I am more than content to take the noble Lord's word that he will consider the matter and possibly come back at a later stage with something which would be helpful. In those circumstances, I beg leave to withdraw the Amendment.
Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.
Clause 6 agreed to.
Clauses 7 to 10 agreed to.
Clause 11 [Reference of recognition issue to Service]:
5.45 p.m.
Lord DRUMALBYN Lord DRUMALBYN moved Amendment No. 5:
Page 8, line 40, leave out ("an independent trade union") and insert ("one or more independent trade unions").
The noble Lord said: It may be for the convenience of your Lordships if I move Amendment No. 5 and at the same time speak to Amendments Nos. 7 and 8. These Amendments deal with trade union recognition. I suppose there are few more contentious subjects than trade union recognition; therefore it behoves us to get the provisions as nearly right as possible. I am afraid I shall have to go into a little detail if I am to make clear what I am driving at, and I hope what I am driving at will then be apparent to your Lordships. I am moving this Amendment to obtain clarification of the Government's intention in Clauses 11 to 16. We are dealing with applications for recognition. I presume that an independent trade union can make an application for recognition in at least three sets of circumstances. I take those that seem to me to be outstanding: first, where no independent trade union is at present recognised for the purpose of collective bargaining in respect of the employees whom the trade union making the application is seeking to represent in collective bargaining; secondly, where the employer already recognises another independent trade union in respect of all the employees the subject of the application; thirdly,
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where the employer already recognises another independent trade union in respect of some employees, whether or not the employer recognises the trade union making the application in respect of other employees, not the ones the subject of the application.
Whenever under the Bill an application is made to ACAS the Service has to consult all the parties who in the opinion of the Service will be affected by the recommendation which it will ultimately make. Clearly it will consult the employer and any other independent union which is already recognised in respect of any of the employees covered by the application. Perhaps I might ask in passing whether the parties interested would also include professional organisations where that situation arose, not necessarily independent trade unions. The Bill talks about consultation with all the parties which the Government define. Clearly, as this is an independent organisation, it would be left to the Service to decide whom to consult. I think it is right that the Committee should know whom the Government intend should be consulted in a case of this kind.
Once an application has been made it then becomes a reference—as it is called in the Bill. But as the Bill is drafted, if one trade union makes a reference, though other trade unions may be consulted they are not parties to the reference—at least the Bill does not say so. Clause 12(3)(b) mentions—
"the trade union or unions which made the reference …".
I see no provision for more than one trade union joining in making a reference, though under Clause 13 more than one can apply for variation or revocation of a recommendation. But Clause 12 provides that,
"the trade union or unions which made the reference may … withdraw the reference…"
and any union which withdraws cannot be recommended for recognition. That prompts one to ask whether Clause 11 should not make clear that more than one trade union may join in a reference. If not, is the Service empowered to join other trade unions in the reference?
As the Bill makes clear what is here involved is a recognition issue; that is, what is referred by an application to the Service, "referred" being a technical term here,

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and that, in other words, is the subject of the reference. Clause 11(3) says that a
"… 'recognition issue' means an issue arising from a request by a trade union for recognition by an employer, or two or more associated employers …".
Surely, if the trade union or unions which made the reference can withdraw the reference, then Clause 11 should make it clear that one or more trade unions can together make application, and that is the purpose of Amendment No. 5.
Amendment No. 7 deals with the situation where separate applications are made in respect of the same recognition issue, which might easily happen. In that case it would clearly be appropriate that the separate applications should be treated as one reference because they relate to the same recognition issue. But what if there is more than one application? I submit that the words in Clause 12(3)(b) about unions withdrawing from the reference are not appropriate if there is more than one application and, therefore, more than one reference, even if the references relate to one recognition issue. I suggest that the difficulty could be overcome by Amendment No. 7, which would specifically enable the Service to treat different references about the same recognition issue as one reference.
Amendment No. 8 deals with the case where an independent trade union is already recognised in respect of some or all of the employees concerned in the reference. It is possible that while the reference is under consideration by the Service, the independent trade union already recognised might think fit to withdraw from the reference. To meet that eventuality, I suggest that the independent trade union already recognised ought to be deemed to be a party to the reference. Even though it seems unlikely that such a trade union would wish to withdraw, the eventuality should be provided for, and that is what Amendment No. 8 does.
Since the recommendation which the Service will ultimately make on the recognition issue is to be operative—that is, binding on the employer, as I understand it—it is important that it should be absolutely clear who are to be the parties to the reference. That, of course, is not the same think as the question: which employees are to take part in the ballot, if there is a ballot; whether it
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is those in respect of whom recognition is sought or others who are considered by the Service to be affected by the recognition issue? But we shall come to that in Clause 14. These are the purposes of these three Amendments and I shall be grateful to the noble Lord if he can untangle the issue.
Lord JACQUES: I will first deal with a very pleasant subject. Dinner will be available tonight and it is proposed to adjourn at 7.30 p.m. for that purpose until 8 o'clock. I have had consultations with the Opposition Whips.
I am appreciative of the hopeful spirit behind the Amendments moved by the noble Lord, Lord Drumalbyn, and of course I accept their objective as most desirable. I oppose them only because I do not think they are necessary. I am advised that the provision for an independent trade union to refer a recognition issue to the Service can be interpreted as a provision for one or more independent trade unions to refer such an issue. That I think fairly settles that. I turn to the proposed new subsection (4), and I think that in practice the Service would usually treat references relating to the same workers, or overlapping to some extent, as part of the same problem and would take account of one application in dealing with the other. I think they could hardly do otherwise. It should also be noted that in Clause 12(1) the Service is required to consult all parties whom it considers to be affected by the outcome of any reference. It will therefore in practice be obliged to consult one applicant about the application by the other.
This brings me to the point raised by the noble Lord about professional associations. Whether or not professional associations would be consulted would depend on whether the Service was of the opinion that they would be affected by the outcome. If the Service thought they would be so affected, then the Service would be required to consult with them. I think also that the requirement of the Amendment is a little rigid. Supposing one union had made an application and the Service had completed its inquiries and was; about to report? The Amendment would mean that another union, then deciding to stake a claim for the same workers, could require the report to be deferred until both issues had been examined. I cannot deny that

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that might be desirable, but I think it should be left to the discretion of the Service as to whether or not it is desirable in particular circumstances. Also, to what extent must there be an overlap between the two applications? The Amendment would require one report, however few the workers covered by both applications. There is nothing to prevent the Service, as the Bill is drafted, from combining two issues in one report or issuing two reports simultaneously, and the Government would prefer this point to be left just there.
The third Amendment would deem a recognised union to be a party to a reference by another seeking to be recognised for the same workers. Already, by the operation of Clause 12(1), the recognised union would have to be consulted. There seems no particular point in making it a party formulae, since the Service has discretion whether to make any recommendation at all and the position of an already recognised union would inevitably be dealt with in the report Certain consequences may follow arising from Clauses 13, 15 and 16 from a recommendation for recognition, and already a recognised union does not need to make use of those clauses since it already has what they would help it to obtain. I therefore feel that the Bill covers the issues which the noble Lord, Lord Drumalbyn, has in mind, but probably more straightforwardly, and I hope that, with this explanation, he will withdraw the Amendment.
Lord DRUMALBYN: I am much obliged to the noble Lord for making the position clear, and it will be useful to have what he said on the Record. I entirely take the point he made in regard to professional organisations, and at any rate it will be satisfactory to these professional organisations to know that they can be consulted under the Bill if the Service considers that their members are affected. I am much obliged to the noble Lord and I beg leave to withdraw the Amendment.
Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.
6.0 p.m.
Baroness SEEAR Baroness SEEAR moved Amendment No. 6:
Page 8, line 41, after ("union") insert ("or an employer").
The noble Baroness said: In moving that we should include the words "or an employer" in the clause, I hope the Committee will consider the Amendment very favourably. At first sight, a recognition dispute is primarily a matter which can be seen to concern trade unions and one might think that it is only trade unions which need the services of ACAS in order to establish their rights and, therefore, that it is for them alone to make an application to ACAS. It is, however, by no means true that employers and employers' interests remain unaffected by recognition issues of one kind or another.
There are at least two sets of circumstances in which an employer could legitimately desire the help of ACAS in matters of this kind. In most circumstances where recognition is in question, a union unable to obtain it from the employer is likely to refer the case to ACAS, but there can be envisaged a circumstance in which a union would not wish to refer the case to ACAS, believing that, by taking some other type of action, it might be able more successfully and swiftly to get the result it wanted. That is one set of circumstances in which the employer would have a direct interest in bringing ACAS into a question of recognition.
The second case is where there are different unions in dispute over a matter of recognition. It is quite plain that employers' interests and the interests of an organisation can be very much disturbed by continuing disputes between unions on the question of recognition. It seems reasonable that where a difference of this kind is going on an employer should be able to refer to ACAS for assistance in sorting out the matter.
It may be thought that there are other clauses in the Bill which might enable an employer to get the kind of help he requires. If that is so, it still does not mean that it would not be useful to have the term "employer" included in the clause. It has been said—justly or unjustly—that on the whole the interest that is dominant in the Bill is that of the trade union. I cannot see that it can really do any harm whatsoever to include the right of the employer to refer recognition disputes to ACAS. It could do good. It can do no harm and it would certainly go some way to giving employers the feeling that, in this part of the Bill

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which is so greatly concerned with industrial relations, issues of concern to employers as well as issues of concern to unions are very much in the Government's mind. I beg to move.
The Earl of GOWRIE: It happens that my noble friends and I wished to put down an Amendment on this point which was so much in the same phrasing and so close to the spirit and detail of the noble Baroness's Amendment that when we saw that she had got in first we were very happy simply to support her. We feel, as I argued in the debates on Clauses 1 and 4, that there is a bias of emphasis and aim in the Bill which will be counter-productive, where ACAS is concerned, to the spirit of arbitration, advice and conciliation which that body is supposed to continue to pursue. We feel that, as at present drafted, this provision is extremely poisonous and that the noble Baroness has eloquently argued against it. We believe that the Bill is one-sided and, that while it is sometimes argued where the rights of individuals are concerned, minimum provisions are necessary to redress the balance between employer and employee—and I believe that that was a Manifesto commitment of noble Lords opposite—and while that argument may have some force, the present issue is quite different.
In the Bill as it stands we are engaged in setting up an elaborate organisation—the Advisory, Conciliation and Arbitration Service—which is directed by a council mainly representing trade unions and employees to help improve industrial relations and to resolve disputes sensibly without recourse to industrial action. One of its duties will be to help resolve recognition disputes and a special procedure is to be introduced to deal with such disputes. Yet, we contend, with the noble Baroness, that only one party to such disputes is allowed direct access to the recognition procedure. This seems to be quite wrong and against the spirit of ACAS, so we seek to support the Amendment.
Lord WIGG: I am extremely puzzled. The Amendment would make the provision read:
"A recognition issue may be referred by an independent trade union or an employer to the Service …".
If one looks—as I have no doubt have those who have already spoken—at
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Section 30 of the Trade Union and Labour Relations Act, there is a definition of an independent trade union. It means a trade union which,
"is not under the domination or control of an employer or a group of employers or of one or more employers' associations …".
What sort of independent trade union will it be and how is it to be regarded in the light of that definition if an employer is to come along and make a claim that the trade union which he wants is independent? Quite clearly, the fact that, in a particular field, an independent trade union by that definition is going to operate means that it has not been a very fruitful field in which trade unions in the accepted sense of the word have been operating. In other words, the pirates are coming in and, in this particular case, a pirate of the choice of the employer is to be put forward as the organisation which should represent the workers and should have the recognition. That seems to me to cut right across the meaning of "independent trade union", which, as I say, has already been defined in the Trade Unions and Labour Relations Act. So, from that point of view, I think it is barmy.
Baroness SEEAR: I believe that the noble Lord, Lord Wigg, has misunderstood what I was trying to say. Perhaps I did not make myself clear. I do not wish to repeat the whole of my previous speech and I do not know whether the noble Lord was not listening to it, but the point of what we are saying is that in recognition disputes there can be cases in which in a dispute between two unions—which can go on for a very long time—the employer's interest is very much at risk. The employer is not making a decision between the unions. He is not making a decision at all. This is simply saying that, in those circumstances, he wants ACAS to come in and he wants the matter to be referred to ACAS for it to sort the matter out. That is all. ACAS can of course promptly turn round and take whatever decision it likes. It is a matter of who has the right to refer. That is all we are talking about.
Lord BROWN: If the noble Lord, Lord Wigg, is trying to inform the Committee that there is no possibility of two recognised trade unions having a squabble over whose right it is to have certain employees as members or if he is

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implying that these squabbles have not taken place in the past, I am afraid he is not as familiar with what goes on in industry as we have all supposed him to be. If an employer is in a situation where his factory is not at work because one of these squabbles is in process, it seems to me—and I shall be interested to hear what my noble friend on the Front Bench has to say—that there is some reason in this Amendment. Of course, we all know that since 1967 the trade unions have done a great deal to prevent inter-union squabbles of this sort and that they have diminished very substantially, but that does not altogether cut out the possibility that they may happen in the future.
Lord LEE of NEWTON: While at first sight this looks a reasonable Amendment, we are talking about recognition. I may be wrong but I have never yet come across a dispute in which a trade union was refusing to recognise an employer. It is always the other way round. Therefore, taking it from that angle, it is quite reasonable to say that the union concerned is charging the employer with failing to recognise and that, if one gave the same right to an employer, he would have to show that it was a union which was refusing to recognise him. I think that there could be scope somewhere in the Bill for an employer to approach the tribunal. But on this Amendment, in which comes the straight issue of recognition, I should think that an employer would have to prove that a union was refusing to recognise him. In the general situation, wherever there is more than one union—and we are envisaging here a number of unions—the straight answer which is generally provided in industry is that a works committee is formed within a particular factory.
Lord BROWN: I am sorry to interrupt the noble Lord, but he is omitting to read Clause 11(3) in which recognition is defined. It states
"… where recognition is already accorded to some extent, a request for further recognition."
I was talking about further recognition.
Lord LEE of NEWTON: But it is still an issue, is it not, of the employer recognising a number of unions? I was going on to say that in my experience wherever there are a number of unions
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within one factory—and this is presupposed here—there is in existence a works committee; or if there is not there jolly well ought to be! If there is not, then the trade union and employer are terribly amiss—
Baroness SEEAR: I hesitate to interrupt the noble Lord, but he is talking in the context of industries which are very well organised. But there are a great many industries—particularly those which are becoming newly organised in the white collar sector—in which there is no such thing as an organised works committee. Some industries have advanced to a more sophisticated stage. But we must remember that there are still more people unorganised than there are organised in the working population as a whole. It is in the circumstances of the millions who arc struggling from total non-organisation to a degree of organisation where the kind of institutions to which the noble Lord has referred simply do not exist and in which the disputes of the kind we have been talking about may well arise; and where there is prolonged arguments between different unions as to whether it is union A or union B which ought to be recognised for purposes of negotiation. That can cause a great deal of turmoil and loss in a business. It is in these circumstances that we are arguing that the employer should have a right—
Lord LEE of NEWTON: The noble Baroness is rather confusing her own case. She is now talking about the large number of people who are not organised at all, in which respect there would be no claim by the union for recognition because those people are not in the union. I should have thought that what we are discussing is the situation where there are a number of unions, some of which are recognised and at least one of which is not. That seems to me to be the issue. The noble Baroness spoke about the degrees of organisation. I should have thought that in these days we are now approaching the point where the recognition issue is as between the employer and a works committee. Indeed a proper works committee contains employers as well as trade unions. It therefore seems to me that under this clause one can hardly widen the matter unless one could find a straight issue of where a trade union is refusing point blank to recognise an employer.
Lord COOPER of STOCKTON HEATH: There has been a misunderstanding here in regard to the Amendment. It is asking that the employers should be included, and that would be because of the possibility of an industrial dispute and the union concerned not going to the Service for recognition. On the face of it, that seems very laudable indeed. But I see a very serious snag. It means that we should be compelling the union case to go to the Service although the union does not want to go. This is the snag. It involves a very important principle and it would present a difficulty, although on the face of it it seems reasonable. I have had the experience of where, owing to union difficulty, we have had serious disputes. But if the power is placed in the hands of the employer by reference—to be able, if you like, to compel the union to go—it will not get the Service anywhere. The first thing needed is for the unions to go voluntarily. This is the principle in the Bill. Bringing in the employer as a person who can introduce the problem would restrict union activity.
Lord WIGG: I should like to assure the noble Lord, Lord Brown, that I do not pose as an authority on trade union law or anything to do with it. What I have tried to do—and I commend this to the noble Lord—is to try to understand what it is all about. I still make the claim, and perhaps I have been more successful than he has, for the simple reason that I am not even concerning myself with what has happened in the past. I am concerned with what is in the Bill and what has happened in the Trade Union and Labour Relations Act. The noble Baroness may be entirely right, but let us look to see what she is doing. Under a section which deals with trade union recognition it says that a recognition issue—and the next subsection defines what is meant by a "recognition issue"—may be referred by an independent trade union.
What the noble Baroness wants to do is this. She says that there may be a case where there are employers who are concerned about this issue. Therefore she wants the Bill to contain a provision that if an employer wants to raise the question of the recognition of a trade union he should be free to do so. If
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that is what she wants, why does she not put down a new clause? That would make sense. But to try to link in Clause 11 a trade union or an employer seems to me to embarrass the independent trade union which the particular employer is trying to push. That is to say, an employer is a little concerned about the possible organisation of trade unionism and so he goes round and finds some well-meaning people—there are plenty on the Conservative Benches; they have a trade union committee, I understand—and they would start to organise a little union. Of course the employer wants to get in before the Transport and General Workers' Union, or the NUM, or some other union. Therefore he will make a claim on behalf of that union.
I am trying to point out to the noble Baroness and to the Front Bench opposite that in terms of Section 30 of the Trade Union and Labour Relations Act the employer would be calling into question the independence, because the Act specifically lays down that an independent trade union means a trade union which is not under "domination or control" and it goes on later to refer to not being under any influence whatsoever. Therefore, for an employer to come along and sponsor an independent trade union is the kiss of death in terms of Section 30 of the Trade Union and Labour Relations Act. On the other hand, if the noble Baroness and her Conservative friends want to do this, then it is quite simple to do. But they should not do it here. They should put down a new clause.
Lord JACQUES: I appreciate the importance which those who are behind this Amendment give to it. Therefore I shall summarise the Government's case very briefly and then spell it out in some detail. First, I shall deal with the summary. Clauses 11 and 12 are designed to deal with the straightforward issue of an employer's refusal to grant recognition to a trade union or unions. But where an employer is not refusing recognition, but wishes the Service to examine another kind of recognition question—for example, when there is an inter-union dispute about recognition—he can seek the assistance of the Service more appropriately under Clause 2, "Conciliation", Clause 4, "Advice", or Clause 5, "Inquiry".

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There is there plenty of scope for the employer in which to appeal for the assistance of the Service, rather than confuse the issue with the specialist approach of the trade union on an entirely different issue. It has been suggested that the provisions in the Bill as to the recognition of trade unions are one-sided as between employers and trade unions and that this is unfair. This argument assumes that it would be fair if the same provisions applied to issues raised by employers and to issues raised by unions, but it would be valid only if the employers and the unions each stood in the same position as regards recognition. Of course, this is not so. The trade union is always the applicant for recognition and the employer is always the respondent.
It is a distortion to suggest that it would be fair and even-handed if both had the same right to raise recognition issues. In effect the Bill provides a trade union with a right of appeal against a decision by an employer. That is the purpose of the clauses that we are considering. It is the right of appeal by the trade union against the decision of the employer not to recognise. The requirements of employers for the assistance of the Service are different from those of the trade unions. A trade union will wish to invoke the Service if its request for recognition is refused by the employer; but where an employer needs help it will usually be in the rather special circumstances where he is willing to grant recognition but where there is disagreement between two or more unions which makes it difficult for him to recognise one, for the reason that this would bring him into conflict with another.
Where the trade unions are affiliated to the TUC, machinery already exists to deal with the problems of inter-union disputes. That is the procedure provided under the Bridlington and Croydon resolutions under which the matter is considered by a special trade union committee. Therefore, the employer is in difficulties only where the TUC procedure does not apply because one or both of the unions are not affiliated, or where, for one reason or another, the TUC procedure has failed to produce a settlement. This has only to be spelled out to make it obvious that the kind of recognition issue which the employer is
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likely to want to refer to the Service is of the greatest delicacy and difficulty. It is not one for which the provisions of Clauses 11 to 16 are likely to be appropriate.
It is for this reason that the Government oppose the over-simple proposal that employers should be able to refer recognition disputes to the Service under Clause 11. But that is not to say that employers should not be able to refer recognition issues to the Service; of course they should. Their mode of approach is by means of invoking the assistance of the Service under Clause 2, which enables the Service to conciliate; under Clause 4, which enables the Service to advise employers or unions; or under Clause 5 which enables the Service to inquire into the matter and in certain circumstances to publish a report.
The essential difference is that Clause 11 and the following clauses have to be rather rigid and inflexible: "the Service shall examine the issue, shall make inquiries, shall prepare a written report" and so on; whereas in these particularly difficult cases the Service should be left to decide how it will proceed, having regard to all the special circumstances and bearing in mind its general duty to promote and improve industrial relations. It will want to take account of progress being made in the TUC procedure where that is appropriate, as nothing would be more harmful than to do anything which tended to discredit or sidetrack those arrangements which have avoided or resolved many serious disputes in the past.
If employers are wise, they will accept that the questions they want to raise will need very careful handling if they are to be resolved without an explosion, and will welcome the fact that the Service will have the maximum flexibility in the manner in which it employs its extensive range of powers if the Bill is not amended in the manner proposed, and if they approach the Service under the other provisions which I have mentioned.
Baroness SEEAR: The Minister has strengthened rather than weakened the force of my argument. Of course, there will be many instances in which employers will be wise to apply under Clauses 2 or 5, but there are also other instances in which it is precisely the

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obligation on the ACAS to make a detailed report that will be needed. In these circumstances, in view of the Minister's reply, I fear I have no option but to divide the committee.
Resolved in the affirmative, and Amendment agreed to accordingly.
6.33 p.m.
On Question, Whether Clause 11, as amended, shall stand part of the Bill?
Lord WIGG: I must now say a word about this clause as it now stands. Let me read the words:
"A recognition issue may be referred by an independent trade union or an employer to the Service."
I never expected any political wisdom from that bunch of Poujardists who masquerade under the title of the Liberal
6.25 p.m.
On Question, Whether the said Amendment (No. 6) shall be agreed to?
Their Lordships divided: Contents, 75; Not-Contents, 41.

CONTENTS

Aberdare, L.

Foot, L.

Pender, L.

Amherst of Hackney, L.

Fraser of Kilmorack, L.

Platt, L.

Armstrong, L.

Goschen, V.

Rankeillour, L.

Auckland, L.

Gowrie, E.

Redesdale, L.

Balerno, L.

Grenfell, L.

Ridley, V.

Barnby, L.

Hailsham of Saint Marylebone, L.

Robson of Kiddington, B. [Teller.]

Beaumont of Whitley, L.

Belstead, L.

Hawke, L.

St. Aldwyn, E.

Berkeley, B.

Kemsley, V.

St. Davids, V.

Boyd of Merton, V.

Killearn, L.

Sandys, L.

Broadbridge, L.

Kimberley, E.

Seear, B. [Teller.]

Brooke of Cumnor, L.

Kinnoull, E.

Selkirk, E.

Brooke of Ystradfellte, B.

Lauderdale, E.

Selsdon, L.

Byers, L.

Lloyd of Kilgerran, L.

Stanley of Alderley, L.

Campbell of Croy, L.

Long, V.

Strathclyde, L.

Carrington, L.

Loudoun, C.

Strathcona and Mount Royal, L.

Cathcart, E.

Macpherson of Drumochter, L.

Cork and Orrery, E.

Malmesbury, E.

Strathspey, L.

Cowley, E.

Mancroft, L.

Terrington, L.

Crathorne, L.

Mansfield, E.

Vickers, B.

Cullen of Ashbourne, L.

Mersey, V.

Wakefield of Kendal, L.

Denham, L.

Monck, V.

Waldegrave, E.

Drumalbyn, L.

Monson, L.

Ward of North Tyneside, B.

Ebbisham, L.

Mowbray and Stourton, L.

Wigoder, L.

Emmet of Amberley, L.

Northchurch, B.

Wolverton, L.

Falkland, V.

Onslow, E.

Young, B.

NOT-CONTENTS

Balogh, L.

Gaitskell, B.

Pitt of Hampstead, L.

Bernstein, L.

Hale, L.

Popplewell, L.

Birk, B.

Harris of Greenwich, L.

Ritchie-Calder, L.

Blyton, L.

Henderson, L.

Roberthall, L.

Brockway, L.

Hughes, L.

Segal, L.

Brown, L.

Jacques, L.

Shepherd, L. (Lord Privy Seal).

Champion, L.

Leatherland, L.

Shinwell, L.

Collison, L.

Lee of Newton, L.

Stedman, B.

Cooper of Stockton Heath, L.

Llewelyn-Davies of Hastoe, B.

Stewart of Alvechurch, B.

Crook, L.

Lovell-Davis, L. [Teller.]

Strabolgi, L. [Teller.]

Crowther-Hunt, L.

Maelor, L.

Taylor of Mansfield, L.

Cudlipp, L.

Melchett, L.

Wallace of Coslany, L.

Fisher of Camden, L.

Pannell, L.

Wigg, L.

Fulton, L.

Peddie, L.

Party; they are irresponsible beyond hope. The Conservative Party I suppose could be claimed to be five years away from being the Government of the country. Any group of men, claiming to have a sense of responsibility, which goes into the Lobbies on an issue of the kind that we have just decided, proclaims that it is utterly unfit to govern this country. Those involved learn nothing and they forget nothing—1926, the 'thirties, their own Industrial Relations Act. They have not learned the simplest thing about the delicacy of industrial relations in this country. This is a piece of pure wrecking nonsense.
The Liberal Party do not recognise that, they do not know that. I am sure they put this forward—poor innocents—with the best of intentions. The way to Hell is paved with good intentions! The noble Earl, Lord Mansfield, knows the Amendment to be a piece of irresponsible nonsense. If it were going to remain in the Bill when enacted, in the most delicate field of industrial relations, it would make the situation even more difficult than it now is. The Liberals do not know any better on this or any other subject. But for the noble Earl, Lord Mansfield, and a number of Members on the other side who have been Members of the Government, such as the noble Lord, Lord Crathorne, to go into a Lobby to vote for those words is to proclaim to the trade union movement of this country that the Party opposite have not learned a single thing. All that they have done in the past they will do again. And for what purpose? They know just as well as I do that when this Bill goes back to another place those words will be taken out, because otherwise the Bill will be completely unworkable.
The idea that a group of employees is going to come forward on the recognition issue, and that a trade union is going to deny it, is so preposterous that you would not think that adolescents would pay any attention to it. I have said earlier that I think this measure is the most important one to come before either House since the end of the war. The industrial relations problems have to be solved; we have to succeed or we are sunk. This Amendment has been put down in a lighthearted way although I do not think the Liberal Party are lighthearted, but I do not pay any attention to that. However, the fact that the Conservative Party, who claim to be responsible, should be a party to this particular piece of nonsense makes me sick.
Lord DRUMALBYN: I think the noble Lord gets sick a little too easily. We have been told that it is perfectly possible under Clause 2, Clause 4 and Clause 5, for the employer to make application on a recognition issue. The only question is which is the best clause to use for the purpose. We have also been told that if application is made
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under Clause 11, all the parties concerned will be consulted on the recognition issue. The really cogent point was made by the noble Baroness, Lady Seear, when she said that you can be certain that if this clause is used, there will be a full inquiry and a report thereupon. This is what we voted on.
Lord WIGG: Forgive me for saying this, but it is nothing of the kind. The Minister in reply made it clear that this was a delicate area in the Bill; the most delicate area in the Bill was the question of recognition. We know that, and the noble Lord who has just spoken knows it to be true. This is the point where you whisper lest you start the avalanche. I am not concerned about the noble Baroness; she is an innocent. I am talking about the Conservative Front Bench and the noble Lord—
Baroness SEEAR: If I may—
Lord WIGG: I will give way in a moment. The noble Lord knows perfectly well that the Minister said that all the noble Baroness wanted existed in Clause 2; yet the Conservative Party persist in putting more words into the most delicate part of the Bill. The Minister has told them this is so. What is their purpose? No harm will be done, but the noble Lord has demonstrated once again the ham-fisted way in which the Conservative Party approaches industrial relations. That is all I want to underline.
Clause 11, as amended, agreed to.
Lord JACQUES: I beg to move that the House do now resume in order that my noble friend may make a Statement on Northern Ireland.
Moved accordingly and, on Question, Motion agreed to.
House resumed.

NORTHERN IRELAND
6.40 p.m.
The PARLIAMENTARY UNDER-SECRETARY of STATE, NORTHERN IRELAND OFFICE (Lord Donaldson of Kingsbridge): My Lords, earlier today there was some discussion about a Statement which my right honourable friend the Secretary of State had said he would

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be making about Northern Ireland, and there was a feeling in this House that it should be made here first. My noble friend the Leader of the House has decided that this is correct, so I am making it now and it has not yet been made anywhere else. My right honourable friend the Secretary of State said this in his Statement:
"The Daily Telegraph today carries an article which alleges …"—
Lord DRUMALBYN: My Lords, the noble Lord is making this Statement. Might I ask whether the noble Lord the Leader of the Opposition has been supplied with a copy of it in advance?
Lord DONALDSON of KINGS-BRIDGE: Yes, my Lords. The Statement is as follows:
"The Daily Telegraph today carries an article which alleges that a document containing a list of 12 points of a 'peace deal' with the Provisionals was found when David O'Connell was arrested in Dublin.
"The Irish Government have already said that the story that such a document is in the hands of authorities there is completely false and utterly without foundation and that no such document was found.
"The existence of various documents purporting to belong to the Provisionals has been public knowledge since early this year. For example, one alleged document was extensively covered in a report in The Times on 11th February 1975.
"The Government have been fully aware since before the renewed IRA ceasefire of the existence of 12 points and indeed of other points made by individuals and organisations claiming to represent the views of the Provisional IRA.
"The Government's attitude towards such points has been fully covered by Statements made by the Secretary of State in the House of Commons from 14th January 1975 onwards.
"In particular it has been made clear that the future of Northern Ireland is a matter for the people of Northern Ireland and there is no question of bartering it away; that the action of the Security Forces will be related to the level of activity that
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might occur; that a cessation of violence would bring its own results; that if there is a genuine, sustained cessation of violence there will then be a progressive reduction of Army numbers, an end to detention which is now governed by the Northern Ireland (Emergency Provisions) (Amendment) Act 1975, and to screening, photographing and identity checks; but that anyone involved in acts of violence will be prosecuted in the Courts. For the cessation of violence to be genuine there must be an end to bombings, murders and kneecappings, to kangaroo courts, to armed robberies and hi-jackings.
"There is no immunity from arrest for anyone against whom there is evidence of involvement in criminal activities and who can be brought before the Courts. It is an offence in Northern Ireland to carry a gun unless a licence has been issued by the RUC. There has never been any deal to release 100 or any other number of detainees. The position about incident centres was fully set out in the House of Commons on 11th February 1975. The Government have at no time contributed financially to those centres run by Provisional Sinn Fein.
"The Government's policy has been fully set out in the House of Commons. This will continue to be the case. It has not been, and will not be, influenced by threats, distortions or lies."
That is the end of the Statement.
Lord BELSTEAD: My Lords, I am grateful to the noble Lord for agreeing to the wishes of the House and for making that Statement, which is on a very serious subject. But, rather less seriously, I think that the summer holidays may have rather overcome the arrangements of the House, because certainly I have not seen a copy of the Statement, nor did I realise that it was about to be made. Therefore, I hope the noble Lord will acquit me of any discourtesy in coming in late after he had begun to speak.
The only sentence which I can pick out from the Statement, which has just been thrust into my hand, is that the Government's attitude towards the points which

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were in the newspapers has been fully covered by Statements made by the Secretary of State in another place from 14th January 1975 onwards. If that is the case—and of course I accept that it is—then I think this will cover the point perfectly. But the next 72 hours or so will give time for those of your Lordships who are interested to study the Statement which the noble Lord has just given to us and if necessary we can return to this subject, along with others, when my noble friend Lord Brooke borough puts his Unstarred Question on Thursday evening.
Lord BYERS: My Lords, I should have liked to comment on this Statement but I had no notice at all that it was to be made, or that the House was to be resumed. On these Benches, we have not even received a copy of the Statement. It makes things extremely difficult because I was not here when the Minister rose to speak. So I hope that in future we can have a copy of such Statements a few minutes ahead of time.
Lord LEATHERLAND: My Lords, as several very important Members of this House were not present when the Minister read the first sentence of this Statement, I wonder whether he could perhaps read that first sentence again?
Lord DONALDSON of KINGSBRIDGE: My Lords, I will read the first sentence again in a moment, but first may I say that I apologise for the rather scrambling arrangements. The position was that my Secretary of State regarded this as a personal defence against newspaper attacks. He gave an indication that he was going to make a Statement; he never thought it would be necessary to make it as a Government Statement through Parliament. It was only because your Lordships expressed a view, with which my noble friend the Leader of the House agreed, that this was done suddenly. The point is that my right honourable friend the Secretary of State wants his answer to the statement made in the Daily Telegraph to be out today. Therefore this Statement had to be made today—and today is now. That is the best apology I can give.
Lord BYERS: With due respect, my Lords, it would have been possible to do
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what is so often done; namely, to put out on the annunciator the fact that a Statement was to be made in the House within the next 10 minutes. Then we would have been alerted.
Lord DONALDSON of KINGSBRIDGE: My Lords, I think I can only apologise for that. I will now repeat the first sentence:
"The Daily Telegraph today carries an article which alleges that a document containing a list of 12 points of a 'peace deal' with the Provisionals was found when David O'Connell was arrested in Dublin.
"The Irish Government have already said that the story that such a document is in the hands of authorities there is completely false and utterly without foundation and that no such document was found."

EMPLOYMENT PROTECTION BILL
6.47 p.m.
Lord LOVELL-DAVIS: My Lords, I beg to move that the House do again resolve itself into Committee on this Bill.
Moved, that the House do again resolve itself into Committee.—(Lord Lovell-Davis.)
On Question, Motion agreed to.
House again in Committee accordingly.
[The Earl CATHCART in the Chair.]
Clause 12 agreed to.
Clause 13 [Application for variation or revocation of recommendation]:
Lord JACQUES Lord JACQUES moved Amendment No. 9:
Page 10, line 25, leave out ("under subsection (1)(b)") and insert ("which is not a joint application such as is referred to in subsection (2)(a)").
The noble Lord said: This is a drafting Amendment arising out of an Amendment made in another place. I beg to move.
On Question. Amendment agreed to.
Lord JACQUES Lord JACQUES moved Amendment No. 10:
Page 11, line 9, after ("been") insert ("sufficiently").
The noble Lord said: This also is a—
The Earl of GOWRIE: I am so sorry. What with the alarms and excursions of the Statement, I misheard my Amendment. I would plead, if possible, that we go back over it. It is a very small and short point. I am in the embarrassing position now of having to apologise for my apology.
Lord JACQUES: Amendment No. 10 is a drafting Amendment. It seeks to bring Clause 13(2)(b) into line with Clause 15(1)(b). I beg to move.
On Question, Amendment agreed to.
Clause 13, as amended, agreed to.
Clause 14 agreed to.
Clause 15 [Complaint of failure to comply with recommendation]:
The Earl of GOWRIE The Earl of GOWRIE moved Amendment No. 10A:
Page 12, line 31, leave out from ("he") to end of line 35 and insert ("has not—

(a) considered any representations made by the trade union representatives; and

(b) replied to those representatives and, if he he rejected any of those representations, stated his reasons."

The noble Earl said: The machinery for obtaining trade union recognition allows a union for whom recognition is recommended to make a request to the Central Arbitration Committee for unilateral arbitration on conditions of employment if an employer has failed to comply with the recommendation. The difficulty is that there is no definition of what constitutes compliance by the employer with that recommendation. It is being suggested in some quarters that an employer who wishes to prove he has negotiated may have to show that he has made a concession to a claim, however unreasonable, that is presented to him. Thus, if a union claim, for example, the issue of company cars to a group of employees, an employer will be able to prove that he has negotiated only if he shows that some transport has been made available.
It is undesirable that English industrial relations law should involve itself in the same technical difficulties as the Americans have experienced on what constitutes bargaining in good faith. These provisions would be made much more practical
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if a definition of "negotiation" was included. The intention of our Amendment is precisely this. I beg to move.
Lord JACQUES: This Amendment would change the definition of non-compliance in relation to a recommendation of the Service as to recognition. If the matter is not resolved a complaint would be sent to the Central Arbitration Committee under Clause 16(2)(a) and that Committee would have to decide whether the complaint was well founded. The definition is therefore to be interpreted by the Committee if the matter goes that far, and depending upon their decision the union may or may not get an award as to the terms and conditions of employment. The Service also has to consider whether a complaint has been duly made if it is to conciliate under Clause 15(3). The Bill is drafted in this respect so as to leave a good deal to the common sense of the Service and the Committee. The concept of what an employer can reasonably be expected to do is included, and this will require consideration to be given to the circumstances surrounding the complaint.
The Amendment, on the other hand, would impose much more precise criteria, which would undoubtedly be easier for the Service and the Committee to interpret. But we must be cautious not to impose a too rigid requirement that might not be fully appropriate to all the circumstances. For example, an employer is to be held in non-compliance if he has not replied to a representation by a trade union. Is he to have time to reply, and, if so, how long? This immediately comes back to the question of what is reasonable in all the circumstances. Supposing an employer says that before he negotiates on any matter he would like to set up a procedure by agreement with the union with conciliation and arbitration provisions. This would be sensible and, although it would not bring him into non-compliance with the recommendations as the Bill is drafted, he might be at fault if the Amendment were carried. For these reasons the Government are not willing to accept the Amendment and hope that, with this explanation, it will be withdrawn.
The Earl of GOWRIE: I cannot say I am ecstatic with that reply. It seems throughout these deliberations that if

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something is not put in the Bill common sense is presumed to be applied, but in fact the common sense of most employers is not assumed in very many provisions of the Bill. And the rigidities of which the noble Lord is complaining in connection with this Amendment are made very clear elsewhere. I am not so wedded to the Amendment that I am not prepared to try again or look again before Report, but I think the noble Lord, Lord Jacques, slapped me down a little harshly, because the form of my Amendment was in fact taken from another part of the Bill for which he is speaking—from Clause 90(7). In that point the definition is used to describe consultation, but we feel that it would be broad enough so that most people would regard it as an adequate definition of negotiation to satisfy the requirements of Clause 15. Is the noble Lord able to hold out any hope to me if I return to this question on Report?
Lord JACQUES: I am quite willing to look at the drafting of Clause 15(2) in the light of what has been said in the debate, and to consider whether some of the points which have been strongly advocated can be incorporated in the Bill.
The Earl of GOWRIE: Sweetness and light having been restored to the Committee, I beg leave to withdraw.
Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.
Clause 15 agreed to.
Clause 16 agreed to.
Clause 17 [General duty of employers to disclose information]:
6.57 p.m.
Lord TERRINGTON Lord TERRINGTON moved Amendment No. 11:
Page 15, line 24, at end insert—
("(6) Where an employer is required by virtue of this section to disclose any information to any trade union representatives he shall at the same time disclose the information to the members of the undertaking.")
The noble Lord said. This simple Amendment has exactly the same purpose as those which the House accepted during the proceedings on the Industry Bill; namely, to ensure that by law any information required to be given to trade union
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representatives shall also be given at the same time to shareholders. I am afraid that a good deal of repetition of what I said during consideration of the Industry Bill is inevitable because the arguments concerning the disclosure clauses in both Bills are very similar, but I will be as brief as possible in the circumstances.
As I explained during consideration of the Industry Bill the Stock Exchange, of which I must declare my membership, attaches considerable importance to a legal obligation to publish information for the benefit of shareholders if there is a statutory obligation to make disclosure to trade union representatives. The overriding reason for this is of course to ensure that price sensitive material is not disclosed by companies in such a way to create what would amount to special insiders so far as the stock market is concerned. Nothing could be clearer evidence of this than the wording of the introduction to the Stock Exchange listing agreement from which I should like to quote. It reads as follows:
"Directors should not divulge price sensitive information in such a way as to place in a privileged position any person or class or category of person outside the company and its advisers".
Nothing, surely, could he clearer than that.
During our Second Reading debate the noble Lord, Lord Jacques, expressed surprise that I raised the matter at all. He drew my attention to remarks made by the Leader of the Opposition in another place. I am afraid that all I can say in reply is that I have carefully studied these remarks and, so far as I can see, no reference was made by anybody to this vitally important question of disclosure of price sensitive material. The noble Lord, Lord Jacques, also said during Second Reading that in this Bill there are safeguards which he will spell out in detail if I were to raise the matter again during Committee.
I am not absolutely clear what the noble Lord meant by "safeguards". But if it is safeguards against the risk of creating a new class of insider, I am afraid that neither I nor my Stock Exchange colleagues can see any evidence of this. I imagine the noble Lord has in mind practical guidance referred to in subsection (2) of Clause 6 and possibly

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representations which are referred to in subsection (3) of the same clause; presumably also in subsection (9) which refers to revision from time to time. That may be relevant. But do these really constitute proper safeguards when there is no guarantee that what this Amendment sets out to achieve will ever be included in the Code of Practice? In my view, something far more positive than guidance and representation is now required in the Bill and I should like to develop my arguments for this Amendment a little further.
The major case for it is the need to take care of a situation if unintended leaks take place once the information has been released to trades union representatives under Clause 17. As I explained during the Industry Bill, a good deal of information may not, on the face of it, be price sensitive and may not, therefore, be within the scope of the Stock Exchange listing agreement. If, however, the information were to fall into unauthorised hands and be subjected to distortion and rumour, then it could most certainly be proved price sensitive and possibly be detrimental to the price of the company's shares. In fact, I gave some examples of this kind of situation which I do not want to spend time today repeating, but I can assure your Lordships that they could create very real problems for companies trying to conform with the Stock Exchange listing agreement.
The central issue for our consideration is this. We are contemplating legislation in a very delicate area which creates an entirely new situation for companies and the Stock Exchange authorities. We are proposing compulsory disclosure of information to trades union representatives which would not necessarily have been disclosed to them or, indeed, in the past to anyone. At the same time we are leaving shareholders without statutory rights to the same information.
I have heard it argued that there is nothing in any of these Bills connected with disclosure of information to trade unions which prevents companies from making disclosures at any time to their shareholders. I do not dispute this, but what I do say is that here we are providing the right to information on demand for one group and leaving the other group dependent on a difficult decision by
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directors as to whether or not price sensitive material is involved. This is the crux of the matter because until now the issue has been clear cut and companies have had no difficulty in complying with the listing agreement under a voluntary system.
From this point, however, the task becomes much more difficult in view of the wide-ranging area of compulsory disclosure implied by the words in Clause 17(1):
"all such information relating to his undertaking as is in his possession"—
that is, the employer. This is a very different matter compared with the disclosure clause in the Industry Bill which is more specific about the information to be given and which in any case is unlikely to be used except on rare occasions. None the less, the House decided that an Amendment to the Industry Bill was required to take care of this problem and I submit that my Amendment to this Bill is even more necessary. It is certainly the wish of the Stock Exchange authorities. I can say that with their full authority, and as they have the responsibility for operating these disclosure clauses in the best interests of the investing public their views must surely carry some weight.
Perhaps I may summarise by emphasising three points for consideration by the Committee. First, I refer once again to the Stock Exchange listing agreement from which I have quoted. Secondly, I stress that as this Bill creates greater problems than the Industry Bill in the area of price sensitive information it is for the Bill itself to ease the situation by requiring information disclosed under it to be released to shareholders. Thirdly—and this is important—it would be entirely inappropriate for the listing agreement to include such a provision since the whole tenor of that agreement, so far as disclosure is concerned, is based on the price sensitive nature of the information to be disclosed. The Stock Exchange is not concerned with information that is not price sensitive. Furthermore, it would be inconsistent with the rest of the agreement for there to be incorporated in it a reference to a Parliamentary Statute not strictly being company legislation. As I see it, therefore, the only way out of this difficulty is to make it a statutory

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obligation for companies to inform shareholders at the same time as they disclose to trade union representatives. In that way there could be no risk of creating special insiders.
Having explained the position from the point of view of those responsible for maintaining a fair and efficient market, I must now wait to hear exactly what safeguards exist or what I am going to be offered as safeguards which will make my Amendment unnecessary. As I have already said, I realise that eventually the Service will formulate a Code of Practice relating to the disclosure of information. Also I appreciate that Clause 18 lays down certain restrictions on an employer's general duty to disclose. However, I find it hard to believe that price sensitive material could come within paragraph (e) of that clause because such a restriction would be far too severe and would defeat the whole object of the disclosure for collective bargaining purposes. Therefore I come back to my central theme which is concerned with the timing and the point at which an employer is required to make a disclosure under Clause 17. At this point I can see no safeguards in the Bill to protect price sensitive information.
The House supported my similiar Amendment to the Industry Bill and this Bill has much wider ranging disclosure obligations with much greater risk of creating special insiders. Therefore I respectfully suggest that it would be inconsistent not to accept this Amendment which in no way interferes with the proposed disclosure of information to trades union representatives. In my view, this is the only logical and fair way of dealing with a very real problem which, quite frankly, I do not believe has been sufficiently considered so far in this Bill. I beg to move.
7.7 p.m.
Lord CULLEN of ASHBOURNE: The noble Lord, Lord Terrington, has again made his case very completely and very clearly and there is very little that I need to say in support. I realise that the reason for the disclosure clause is to ensure that the trade unions obtain as much information as possible for collective bargaining purposes. So long as
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this information can be provided without injury to the nation or the undertaking or without any other untoward effect, there seems to me to be no reason for opposition—not that trade unions have been inhibited in any way through lack of information in recent years, judging from the benefits that they have secured for their members. However, the better informed they become the better equipped they will be to judge what terms and conditions of employment are reasonable in the prevailing circumstances. There is no doubt, however, that difficulties will arise in respect of price sensitive information and that the Bill will disrupt the system which is at present working smoothly.
No personal group has been placed in a privileged position with regard to price sensitive information. The management of an undertaking judges what information can he freely given to whomever they wish and which information is price sensitive and can be released only to all shareholders simultaneously, together with anybody else to whom they may wish to disclose it. Under the provisions of this Bill and also those of the Industry Bill the initiative passes from the management to the trade unions who would obtain a statutory right to all kinds of information. Some of this information will naturally be price sensitive and if it is demanded by the trade unions it must be given to shareholders at the same time, or previously, in order that the trade unions do not become insiders.
My contention is that difficulties are bound to arise owing to this change in the system. As the noble Lord, Lord Terrington, has just said, it is often difficult to decide whether or not information is price sensitive. Also it is true that an item of information might not appear to be price sensitive when taken in isolation, but could become so in combination with other items. Until now managements have taken care not to divulge information in a way that would create insiders. In future, they will be forced to give to the trade unions information which they might not have published until the annual report. Therefore, the only way to prevent the trade unions from becoming insiders is to make public whatever information they have been given, in case any of it proves to be price-sensitive.

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I do not believe that the Government will disagree with this argument. They may, however, say that it is the job of management to do just what I have suggested and that there is no need to enforce such action in this Bill. This point of view would leave out of account the fact that companies will be burdened by considerable expense in circulating all their shareholders each time trade unions demand information. They will wish to avoid this expense, especially companies which do not have happy shareholder relations. If the noble Lord, Lord Terrington, is right in assuming that the safeguards to which the noble Lord, Lord Jacques, referred on Second Reading are those which may in due course appear in the Code of Practice, this is just as unsatisfactory as the argument put forward by the Government on the Industry Bill, when similar problems were to be put right in a Companies Bill. It is obvious to me that if this Amendment is not accepted it will be only a matter of time before some insider scandal occurs for which the City is blamed, quite unfairly, when the real culprit is faulty legislation. Therefore, I support this Amendment.
Lord HOUGHTON of SOWERBY: With great respect to the noble Lord, Lord Terrington, I believe that this Amendment is entirely misconceived and the arguments in support of it are untenable. The difference between the Industry Bill and this Bill is that disclosure under the Industry Bill goes far wider than disclosure necessary solely for the purpose of collective bargaining. This disclosure under Clause 17 of the Bill is what many employers do already. Indeed, in many cases it would be impossible to conduct the negotiations on pay and conditions of service unless the employer disclosed information which was material to those negotiations. Clause 17 lays upon the employer the duty of doing what many employers find is desirable, if not necessary, in order to get their negotiations with the trade unions on a frank and constructive basis.
If it is now proposed that when a disclosure is made to a trade union for the purpose of collective bargaining—I stress that subsections (1)(a) and (1)(b) have to be fulfilled in regard to this disclosure—it must be information with
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out which the trade union representatives would be to a material extent impeded in carrying on with such collective bargaining, and information which, in accordance with good industrial relations practice, should be disclosed to them for the purposes of collective bargaining, that may be comparatively narrow information. It may be quite confidential information, material to the negotiations but scarcely suitable for circulation to all the shareholders of the undertaking. Still less might it be desirable to give wide publicity to some aspects of a company's affairs which are material to collective bargaining.
So I think it would be a mistake to make this proviso to disclose to members of an undertaking at the same time as the disclosure to trade union representatives. It would not be necessary, it would be dangerous; it could almost be disastrous on some occasions. Speaking from considerable experience in this matter, I do not believe that disclosure to trade union representatives for the purpose of collective bargaining normally runs any risk of disclosure elsewhere. I emphasise the sense of responsibility of trade union representatives who are engaged in negotiations with an employer upon which will rest the satisfaction, or otherwise, of their demands on pay and conditions of service. I think it would largely destroy the value of disclosure to the trade unions, if at the same time disclosure to the members of an undertaking was made obligatory.
It would be a mistake to press this Amendment. It is not requiring employers to do more than many employers do already, without any serious risk of leaks or misuse of information to other people; and, where employers find that the information they give is misused, they then have a pretty strong case for declining to give that kind of information in the future. But if the negotiations on collective bargaining matters, which are pay and conditions, are to be undertaken in a spirit of mutual understanding with a comprehension on the union side of what the employer is up against—which I think is desirable—then I am certain that it is better to leave the obligation and duty upon the employer, which Clause 17 does, to make this disclosure, voluntarily in most cases and where requested in other

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cases, and let them get on with their collective bargaining. That, after all, is what this clause is all about.
Lord BROWN: I thought the arguments in favour of this Amendment were presented reasonably, and I am sure the whole Committee is sympathetic to the danger of an extension of the circle of people with price sensitive information. But I thought the noble Lord, Lord Cullen of Ashbourne, skated rather lightly over the dangers of this Amendment. When one considers that many of our large companies now have thousands or tens of thousands of shareholders, and that information given during the process of what may be a prolonged negotiation does not all come out at once—in many negotiations further requests are made for information as the negotiations proceed—and, of course, on each occasion it would be necessary to circulate 10,000, 20,000 or 50.000 shareholders with this information, that is no light burden to place on industry. So I doubt whether industry would be enamoured of this Amendment, if it were included in the Bill, when it had experience of it.
Another point which I should like to make is that during the debate in this House on the Companies Act 1967 a great deal of additional disclosure was asked for. Turnover was to be disclosed for the first time; export figures were to be disclosed and directors' salaries were to be disclosed. I am bound to say that this raised very serious emotion on the Benches opposite. Speaker after speaker sought to point to the dangers in Stock Exchange terms and in many other terms, too. However, I understand that there has been not a word of criticism of those disclosure provisions. Therefore, it is possible to exaggerate the dangers envisaged arising from this Part of the Bill.
I am not altogether with my noble friend who has spoken, in his absolute assurance that no trade unionist would ever disclose the information he received. I think it is beyond the hope of human perfection that that would be so. But noble Lords who supported this Amendment are well aware—and I am not making an attack on the City or the Stock Exchange or anything else—that there is a great deal of price-sensitive information which gets into the wrong hands,
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and, one is sorry to think, which will continue to get into the wrong hands because it is widespread in the ranks of accountants and managers near the top of industry, and it can leak out in that way. Yet the extent to which it gets out is happily fairly limited. This price sensitive information is not going to people who regularly deal on the Stock Exchange—the "bears", the "bulls" who invest thousands of pounds, but to men who, on the whole, are poor. Therefore, I think the dangers can be very greatly exaggerated. Trade union officials might pass on remarks to some of their colleagues, but I cannot sec them running to those who make a practice of making large amounts of money—or losing it—on the Stock Exchange, and saying, "I can give you a tip". With great respect, the burden of argument put forward is somewhat exaggerated.
Lord HAWKE: I hope that the noble Lord, Lord Terrington, will not press this Amendment, because it puts an intolerable burden on the boards of companies. I can quite see the theoretical point, but the vast bulk of this information will be pettifogging stuff. The trade unions will want to know what the saving will be when the company puts a new machine in plant A. This is not of the slightest interest to any shareholder. It will be an intolerable burden to have to circulate this kind of information, and an expensive one at existing postal rates, and if the Post Office really gets in its stride in putting up the price, the burden of circulating such information to the shareholders will be an intolerable one. This sort of information is not of the slightest use to the shareholders, and is something they do not want at all.
Lord WIGG: One point about this has interested me. The noble Lord, Lord Terrington, thought—and this is clear from his Amendment—that any information given to the trade unions should be given also to the shareholders. I do not know whether the converse applies—that any information given to the shareholders should be given to the trade unions—but taking the statement of the noble Lord on its merits, and not delving too deeply into it, I would ask the noble Lord whether he read the proceedings recently of the Rank Organisation, because it seems to me that the shareholders

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there were a little short on information. After all, this is not just one swallow; it is happening all the time. The lack of information from the point of view of the shareholders is quite grotesque. Apparently, the shareholders are told just what the company choose to tell them, and in the form that the company can get away with.
Lord HAWKE: It is not lack of information; it is lack of votes there.
Lord WIGG: It was not only lack of votes. I am not concerned with the lack of votes. I do not believe that the shareholders, had they known what was going on, would not have "squealed" at some time or other. The Rank Organisation is just the last case in the shop window, but this sort of thing is going on all the time. The movements of shares, the operations of the "Bulls", the "Bears", the "Stags" and so on obviously are based on what someone believes to be true, but whether or not it is true one would not know in each particular case.
I cannot think it is right, as the noble Lord, Lord Terrington, said, that trade union officials are any less responsible, any less honest than the population as a whole. The noble Lord, Lord Brown, is right. To say that at no time in the future will someone accidentally, deliberately, or whatever you will, disclose information is to expect from humans rather more than one will get. But it seems to me that in the light of the argument put forward by the noble Lord, Lord Houghton of Sowerby, he has answered completely the technical case. The information wanted here is information to enable the union official, on behalf of his members, to be able to carry on meaningful negotiations. I should have thought that the Conservative Party, even assuming they take any element of meaning what they say, would have imported that view with enthusiasm.
I agree that if every time a trade union official goes to the managing director or the company secretary and asks for information, forthwith it has to be circulated to the shareholders, the cost of postage and printing will go up. It may well be that disclosure to all who are interested needs to be looked at again, perhaps when the Company Acts come up for revision. So far as this Amendment is concerned, it would be wise if
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the noble Lord, Lord Terrington, withdrew it.
7.25 p.m.
Lord JACQUES: Perhaps if I butt in now, we might get to dinner at 7.30! I would point out that the Amendment says, "any information", but the arguments which have been put forward in support of the Amendment have been based entirely upon price sensitive information, which is entirely different. Secondly, reference was made to what I said on Second Reading about the Second Reading in the other place of the Bill we are now considering. On the Second Reading of this Bill in the other place, on 28th April 1975, the Shadow Minister leading for the Opposition said that this was all taken from the Industrial Relations Act 1971, and therefore they have no objection to it. That was confirmed by the Shadow Minister who wound up for the Opposition. The point that I am making is that the Back-Benchers on the Opposition side were quite happy to accept it in the 1971 Act, but are unhappy with it in this Bill.
Lord HAILSHAM of SAINT MARYLEBONE: And vice versa.
Lord JACQUES: I have no evidence of the vice versa. There are three reasons why this Amendment is both unnecessary and undesirable. First, if the information would have an adverse effect on the interests of the undertaking, the employer does not have to disclose it. That is made perfectly clear. Secondly, there is nothing in the Bill which prevents employers from giving information voluntarily to shareholders, or anyone else; so that if, on the very rare occasion—and I would stress "very rare"—price sensitive information is given to the trade unions, there is nothing to prevent the company from circulating that information to the shareholders, and it could do so before informing the trade union. So there is nothing at all to prevent any company voluntarily doing what the Amendment calls for.
The third reason against the Amendment is that it would require all employers to give all information to shareholders which they pass to unions. This would create an enormous burden for companies, with little benefit. This is entirely different from the Industry Bill.

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First, the Industry Bill would affect only some employers, the selected companies for planning. This would affect all employers who give information to trade unions; so the companies affected are different. In addition, the kind of information will be different. Noble Lords can imagine the embarrassment and expense which will be inflicted on a company negotiating, say, with the engineers union, on piece rates. This company has to give information affecting these rates which has nothing whatever to do with the price of the company's shares on the Stock Exchange, but it has to go to the trouble to circulate that information to all its shareholders. This would create an unnecessary burden.
In our view the Amendment is potentially damaging because it would require employers to spend greater time and resources than are necessary on disclosing information. This could well have the effect that much information which could be withheld on the grounds that it would involve excessive work or expenditure, could in fact be of little or no interest to the shareholders—for example, plans for the allocation of work within a plant. In any case, the effect would be an unnecessary increase in the load upon the company, and would impose additional costs. It is difficult to see how this can be held to benefit either the company or to be in the best interests of the shareholders.
In this context, it is worth noting, that, unlike the Industry Bill, this Bill applies to all employers who recognise unions, however small their workforce, and to every sector of industry. I hope that with this explanation, the Amendment will be withdrawn.
The Earl of GOWRIE: It is, of course, a matter for the noble Lord, Lord Terrington, as to whether or not he presses this Amendment, but on behalf of my noble friends on this side of the Committee and on these Benches I think I should make our position clear. At the time of the Industry Bill we supported the noble Lord, Lord Terrington, in his Amendment vis-à-vis these disclosures. My natural instinct, of course, would be to say that the situation has not radically changed, and therefore we should support him on this occasion. On the other hand, I have listened very carefully to the arguments,
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and I recognise that on both sides there may have been overstatements of the case and that perhaps we should look at it again. If the noble Lord, Lord Terrington, from the Cross-Benches, chooses to press his Amendment, for my own part I feel that consistency compels me to support him. If, however, the Government can give him some reassurance that we can come back to this on Report, I would tend rather to welcome that alternative.
Baroness SEEAR: I think I ought also to say from these Benches that, while I sympathise with the idea behind this Amendment, I entirely accept that it would involve disclosure of a wide range of information which is of no relevance whatsoever to shareholders and in no sense price sensitive. If the Amendment were drawn in much narrower terms, referring only to price sensitive disclosure, that would be another matter. But as it stands, it seems to me to be impracticable, and we would not be able to support it from these Benches.
Lord CULLEN of ASHBOURNE: I think there is considerable difficulty here. I quite see that there is no point in shareholders being given a whole lot of information in which they are not interested. The difficulty is really to decide what is price sensitive and what is not. It is a question of judgment. Various things taken together can become price sensitive. I am speaking as a simple stockbroker and not as a politician. I should like to think that between us we can somehow work out a way by which, quite unintentionally, we do not have a whole lot of insiders created and difficulties occurring. This may not be the right Amendment. Let us look at it again on Report stage, if the noble Lord decides to withdraw it.
Lord TERRINGTON: I have listened very carefully to the remarks from all sides of the Committee and I think it has been an interesting discussion. This is a very difficult problem. I accept the remarks of the noble Lord, Lord Jacques, and I appreciate the context in which everyone has taken part. I should rather like to reserve judgment on this matter. I have discussed it carefully with the Stock Exchange Council. We are most anxious to have this in the Bill. I am sure the Council will read very

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carefully what everybody has had to say, and I shall be going back to them for further discussion. I will reserve my position until the next stage, and beg leave to withdraw the Amendment.
Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.
Clause 17 agreed to.
[The Sitting was suspended at twenty-five minutes before eight and resumed at five minutes past eight.]
Clause 18 [Restrictions on general duty under s.17]:
The Earl of MANSFIELD The Earl of MANSFIELD moved Amendment No. 11A:
Page 15, line 39, leave out ("substantial").
The noble Earl said: The effect of this Amendment would be to remove the word "substantial" from the subsection. Clause 18(1) provides the restrictions on the general duty by which an employer is bound under Clause 17 of this Bill. Your Lordships will see under paragraph (e):
"any information the disclosure of which would cause substantial injury to the employer's undertaking for reasons other than its effect on collective bargaining, …".
When the paragraph refers to "the employer's undertaking", when one thinks of it in terms of damage it is, of course, not only the employer's undertaking, it is also the employees' undertaking, and any disclosure of information which will do damage to the undertaking as a whole is going to damage the viability of that undertaking in so fax as the employees just as much as the shareholders are concerned.
When this Bill first saw the light of day in the other place the phrase used was "seriously prejudicial to". The matter went into Committee in another place and was discussed on various other grounds, but nobody proposed that the words "seriously prejudicial to" should be disturbed. It was only on Report, late at night, in fact at midnight or thereabouts, that this Amendment was winkled through. I do not say that in any particularly contentious spirit, at least not at the moment. It was only at that stage that, without any debate, the phrase was changed from "seriously prejudicial to" to "substantial injury".
I should like to ask the noble Lord who is to reply, Why the difference?
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Why the change? There was no debate and no explanation. What is different, in the view of the Government, between information which is seriously prejudicial and information which would cause substantial injury? If "substantial" in this context equals "serious", and I suppose it does (it certainly does in the legal sense when it comes to grievous bodily harm), are the Government suggesting that disclosure in this circumstance is more important than the serious injury which will be caused to the undertaking, that is to say to the welfare of everyone concerned with it, not least the employees?
I must mention the fact that, according to the provision as it now stands, if the information is required, even if it would cause substantial injury to the employer's undertaking, and the reason for causing that substantial injury is in connection with its effect on collective bargaining, then the restriction does not apply. In my submission, that is putting far too high a burden on the employer and it is in those circumstances that this Amendment came to be drafted. I will leave the matter there until I hear the reply. But, in any case, I beg to move.
Lord JACQUES: The phrase "substantial injury" replaces the original concept of "seriously prejudiced", which was used in the 1971 Act. The wording was introduced to enable the measure of harm to be assessed independently of the size of the undertaking. Previously, the harm might have been interpreted as being measured relative to the size of the undertaking. "Substantial injury" means that information can be withheld if any substantial absolute amount of damage is likely to result from the disclosure. This is the reason for the change.
This Amendment as it stands would mean that an employer was able to refuse to disclose information no matter how small the injury caused. In practice it would provide the employer with an excuse on virtually every occasion, as every request from a representative of a trade union is likely to involve a company in some expense or trouble in extracting the information, or in putting it into a suitable form for handing it over. Clause 18(2)(b) already allows the employer to refuse to compile or assemble

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any information where this would involve work and expenditure out of reasonable proportion to the value of the information. If this Amendment is accepted he will be able to do so in any case where he could incur any expense, no matter how small, and it could be held that this caused injury to the undertaking.
In considering a complaint about failure to disclose, the Service would have to find that such a complaint was groundless if any expenses would be incurred which would mean that the undertaking would suffer some damage. The Government have attempted to strike a balance between the industrial relations benefits which would accrue from greater disclosure of information, and the cost which, of necessity, must be incurred. However, the Amendment, would wreck this delicate balance and enable an unscrupulous employer to avoid the provisions of these clauses. The present draft leaves it to the Service to decide in the circumstances of each case whether there is risk of substantial damage.
Many employers already disclose a great deal of information voluntarily without there being any compulsion in law, and the Government hope that they will continue to do so. There are, however, many cases where this does not happen, and if the word "substantial" is deleted it will enable such employers to quote these clauses as a justification for not giving the union representative the information which is necessary for collective bargaining. The effect on industrial relations would be to encourage strikes and disputes because there would appear to be legal backing for the employers' action. A similar Amendment to the Industry Bill was successfully moved by the noble Lord, Lord Campbell of Croy, but this, of course, was in an entirely different context. We hope that with that explanation the Opposition will withdraw their Amendment.
Lord DRUMALBYN: In opposing this Amendment, the noble Lord said that there would be a risk of substantial injury. This is not what the Bill says. The words in the Bill are,
"Any information the disclosure of which would cause substantial injury …".
So that the employer would have to prove that certainly and beyond any
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doubt it would cause substantial injury. I am not certain whether my noble friend wishes to stick to this Amendment, but I should have thought that it would be very much better to use the words, "would be likely to cause substantial injury", which I think would get over the difficulty. I am not at all certain that it is fair on the smaller employer to remove the relativity, as, according to the noble Lord's answer, this would do. It makes it an absolutely substantial amount. I am not certain that this is fair and I think this needs looking at again.
Lord JACQUES: There are two issues here. First, there is the issue as to why the wording has been changed from "seriously prejudiced" to "substantial injury". I have explained that and I think it is a reasonable explanation. I do not think it carries the right of the trade union any further it merely solves the problem of size which I said needed solving. The second question is this. Is it right that in the 1971 Act you should use the words "seriously prejudiced"—that is to say, you have the qualifying adverb "seriously"—while in this Bill noble Lords object to the adjective, "substantial injury"? It would seem that if they insist on this kind of Amendment they are acting very inconsistently.
The Earl of MANSFIELD: I hope the noble Lord will not take it amiss if I repeat the phrase that came into my head when I heard his explanation, which was "semantic waffle". It was almost too much to say that if an employer is put to any expense to disclose information it must cause him injury. That is giving the word "injury" far too high a meaning for the purposes of this argument. Equally, it would he true to say that any cost would be prejudicial. It is not the word "injury" as I understand it. Injury denotes something which is causing an injurious effect to the employer or the undertaking, not being put to the expense of finding out or disclosing certain information.
I have a suspicion—and it is no more than that—that this Amendment came about without explanation, because somebody thought it would tidy up the position and bring this Bill into line with the Industry Act, which as the noble

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Lord, Lord Jacques, observed, has been amended in the interim period. If that is the real purpose behind this—and I suspect it is—the purpose of collective bargaining which is set out clearly in Clause 17(1) is quite different from the purpose under which information is gathered under the Industry Act. The latter is for the sake of co-operation in planning the future of the undertaking and its employees. Collective bargaining is a very different concept and I would suggest that disclosure for the purposes of collective bargaining is tantamount to public disclosure.
I was interested in the argument over the last Amendment, before we adjourned, regarding the use to which such information could be put. In my view, by its very nature collective bargaining depends on comparison and it would be wishful thinking to expect that information which is disclosed by one company will not be used by a union in negotiation with another. The temptation would be almost too much, especially when the officials of that union would feel it was their duty to use the information to further the interests of their members in another undertaking. Thus, when we are here talking about substantial injury it seems to me that injury could be caused very much more easily and have greater consequences than perhaps appears at first blush.
As I have said, I hope not too offensively, I am far from impressed with the noble Lord's explanation of how this Amendment came to be made on Report in another place. I would have hoped that he would be prepared to take the matter back to see whether substantial injury really means what he tries to allege it means as to opposed to what I have suggested it means. With the promise, if not the threat, that I may return to this issue at a later stage, for the moment I beg leave to withdraw the Amendment.
Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.
Clause 18 agreed to.
8.21 p.m.
Clause 19 [Complaint of failure to disclose information]:
Lord DRUMALBYN Lord DRUMALBYN moved Amendment No. 12:
Page 16, line 36, after ("part,") insert ("or unfounded,").
The noble Lord said: We are here dealing with the clause which deals with a complaint of failure to disclose information. This subsection says:
"If the complaint is not referred to the Service under subsection (2) above, or, if it is so referred, on the Service informing the Committee of its opinion in accordance with subsection (3) above, the Committee shall proceed to hear and determine the complaint and shall make a declaration stating whether it finds the complaint well-founded wholly, or in part, and stating the reasons for its finding."
That seems to exclude the possibility that they find the complaint ill-founded or, as I put it in the Amendment, unfounded, and certainly excludes the possibility of their stating the reasons for finding it unfounded. The noble Lord may say that in the view of the draftsmen this is clear as it stands, but it is certainly ambiguous and we might as well make it clear.
Lord JACQUES: This clause as it stands specifically mentions only that the declaration shall state whether the Committee finds the complaint wholly or partly well-founded, and the reasons for its findings. However, it also says that the Committee shall hear and determine the complaint. It is inconceivable that the Committee would fail to announce its decision or give the reasons for its findings if it considers the complaint groundless. We do not feel that the Amendment is necessary.
Lord DRUMALBYN: I regret that, but if the noble Lord says it is inconceivable on the advice he has received, then that means that the Government cannot conceive of it happening. That seems to me to be the literal meaning of his words. I would have hoped that this could have been cleared up, but as legal advice has been taken, this is not the sort of point on which one would wish to make a stand, and I therefore beg leave to withdraw the Amendment.
Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.
Clause 19 agreed to.
Clause 20 agreed to.
Clause 21 [Determination of claim and award]:
Lord JACQUES Lord JACQUES moved Amendment No. 13:
Page 18, line 34, leave out ("12(8)") and insert ("15").
The noble Lord said: This is a drafting Amendment consequential upon an Amendment made on Report in another place.
On Question, Amendment agreed to.
On Question, whether Clause 21, as amended, shall stand part of the Bill?
Lord DRUMALBYN: This clause deals with the determination of a claim for improved remuneration and conditions of work where information has not been disclosed which the trade union thinks should have been disclosed and where there has been a further complaint when the information is still not disclosed. Subsection 3 says that if the Central Arbitration Committee
"… finds, or has found, the further complaint wholly or partly well-founded, it may, after hearing the parties, make an award that in respect of any description of employees specified in the claim the employer shall, from a specified date, observe either—

(a) the terms and conditions specified in the claim; or

(b) other terms and conditions which the Committee considers appropriate."

My purpose in raising this is to find out how the Government look at this provision. Is it intended to be a punitive or penal one or is it intended to enable the Central Arbitration Committee to decide what the wages should have been had certain information which has not been disclosed been disclosed, in other words, to find out what the wages should have been in the event of the negotiation reaching a conclusion in the ordinary way? It is important that we get this clear. I know this is the second time this provision has come in the Bill because it came also in Clause 16 relating to failure to comply with a recommendation for recognition. It has to be recognised that when an employer refuses to give information he does that in most cases for very good reasons, one reason perhaps being that it falls within one of the conditions set out in Clause 18 or else in accordance with the Code. He probably does it for the protection of the business as a whole, including the employees and shareholders, and he probably does it in perfectly good faith.
It would seem very odd in those circumstances if, simply because the Central Arbitration Committee disagreed
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with him about whether the information should be disclosed, and came to the conclusion that it should be disclosed, the employer was sentenced, so to speak, to pay a much higher remuneration than he otherwise would have expected to do.
It has to be borne in mind that, whatever the Central Arbitration Committee may decide on, this may also be reflected in the wages and conditions that other employers are called upon to pay. So this could be a fairly wide-reaching decision. I quite understand that, if information is not disclosed, the trade union may be unwilling to go on with the negotiations and that a difficult situation may arise. This may be as good a way of settling the matter as any other, but what I am asking is how do the Government view this? Do they view it as a means of getting out of that difficult situation or as a means of penalising the employer for not disclosing information which he may in good faith for perfectly good reasons have decided not to disclose?
Lord JACQUES: It is expected that the Committee would use common sense. Your Lordships must bear in mind here that the Committee is dealing with what the outcome would be if information which has not been disclosed had been disclosed. Therefore, a good deal of common sense is called for. In general, it will set the terms at the level which would have been reached through free collective bargaining as if the information had been disclosed.
Lord DRUMALBYN: In other words, the Government do not envisage this as a penal clause but only as a means of reaching a conclusion where one has to be reached in a difficult situation?
Lord JACQUES: I would concur.
Clause 21 agreed to.
Clause 22 agreed to.
Clause 23 [General exclusions from right under section 22]:
8.32 p.m.
The Earl of GOWRIE The Earl of GOWRIE moved Amendment No, 13A:
Page 20, line 10, at end insert ("or of an interruption in the supply of fuel and power which is beyond the control of the employer.").
The noble Earl said: The purpose of the Amendment is to ensure that employers who, due to lack of fuel or power as a result of industrial action in the public sector, are unable to provide work, should not have to make guaranteed payments to their workpeople. In recent years there have been examples of this sort of situation which have been caused by national rail strikes or by disputes in the coal mines or the gas or electricity industries. It is no part of my purpose to go into the rights and wrongs of such disputes or to say that they need never or should never occur in the public sector, but I believe that it will be appreciated on all sides that in this situation the ordinary private employer is helpless. He has no say in the negotiations and can have no influence on their outcome. He is already losing business and he has no income from which to pay his workpeople guaranteed payments.
All these situations involve disputes in the nationalised industries where the responsibility is primarily on the Government as employer to try to solve them. It is only right, therefore, that the State should, through the social security system, foot this particular bill. Let us take, for instance, the situation under the present counter-inflation policy. If the unions in one of the nationalised industries decide to strike for an increase in wages above the £6 limit, one presumes—and, indeed, hopes—that the Government will resist the claim. It is, after all, the Government's pay policy and the Government are the employer. Yet all other employers throughout the country will be expected to foot the bill by paying wages to workers who might be laid off as a result of the Government's policy both as a Government and as an employer. This will surely lead to great increases in the costs of production. How can industry, as it is so often exhorted to do, be expected to invest more when its resources are dissipated through meeting directly such bills of Government? I doubt, also, if we would be likely to continue to attract overseas investment in that kind of situation.
Arguments were put forward in another place on various Amendments which sought to widen the let-out for employers where lay-offs were due to industrial disputes. I recognise that this could provide too wide a door, but the present Amendment
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seems to me to be narrow by comparison. It refers only to lay-offs due to lack of basic prime mover materials—fuel and power, in short—without which very few companies can operate. In these cases surely there can be no doubt where the responsibility lies. It lies with the Government, and the Government must therefore hear the ultimate financial responsibility.
Lord MELCHETT: The purpose of the scheme with which this Part of the Bill deals is to provide some statutory minimum form of protection to all employees against fluctuations in earnings resulting from short-time or lay-offs. The Amendment seeks to extend the trade dispute suspension beyond that in Clause 23(1) as it now is. It is the Government's view that the present form of Clause 23 represents a fair and equitable compromise between the interests of employers and employees. Indeed, as the noble Earl will no doubt know, the TUC has said that the suspension of the guarantee should be no wider than the disqualification from unemployment benefit, which, incidentally, they consider to be drawn too widely. In our view, it would not be equitable to penalise employees who are laid off through no fault of their own as a result of industrial disputes in which they are not concerned and in whose outcome they have no interest and nothing to gain.
Of course—and here I am afraid that I must differ from the noble Earl—the Amendment goes further than that, in that it seeks to penalise employees laid off through the interruption of fuel and power supplies resulting from any reason. That would, of course, include Acts of God. While the employers are also affected by events over which they have no control, we would argue that they are in a better position to take alternative action; for example, by arranging for different sources of supply, rescheduling work, and so on. Such options are not open to laid-off employees, who have no power to institute such action and who are dependent upon their wages. I think it would be fair to say that the noble Earl pointed out in some detail the difficulties which employers would have in this sort of situation, and employees would be in exactly the same boat but possibly sinking faster.

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I acknowledge the difficulty of the subject, and the fact is that the positions taken by the two sides of industry are a good distance apart. The position the Government have taken in this clause is, I believe, some way between those two sides. The Government are not, as some would like, providing the very restricted definition of "trade dispute" in the unemployment insurance legislation, under which the disqualification would apply only if the dispute were actually at the employee's place of work. We are going much further than that, so that a trade dispute at any establishment of the employer, or even of an associated employer, will prevent payment of the guarantee. I believe that this strikes the right balance and I hope that, with that explanation, the noble Earl will see fit to withdraw the Amendment.
The Earl of GOWRIE: I welcome the noble Lord, Lord Melchett, to these discussions. I can see that he is forsaking the relative comfort of tents at "pop" festivals for the stormy and nail-strewn beds of industrial relations legislation. I feel for him and I remember my feelings when I first became involved in this kind of thing. However, in spite of his usual lucidity and courtesy, I am afraid that I am not at all happy with his arguments. The Act of God argument will not meet my point at all. It is far too wide-ranging. It is quite clear from my Amendment that I am referring to the effects on ordinary employers and employees of disputes in the public sector and, unless the noble Lord can satisfy me further, I am very loath to withdraw the Amendment.
Lord MELCHETT: It seems to me that the noble Earl has supported me in what I have said. He has said that Acts of God go very wide, and that is exactly what I said about the Amendment. In fact, it goes much wider. As he said, similar Amendments were discussed in another place at great length and ultimately not included in the Bill for the very reason that it was felt that they were extending the suspension of these payments to too great an extent. I have said to the noble Earl that by including Acts of God—in other words, going beyond trade disputes—he is going much further than the Amendments previously discussed. I think that in what he just said he was perhaps agreeing with me. I hope that in view of the fact that this Amendment goes wider than the previous Amendments which have been withdrawn, the noble Earl will at least reconsider this.
The Earl of GOWRIE: I do not feel that I can because my contention is that my Amendment is narrow. As I said, it refers only to lay-offs due to a lack of basic primary requirements of fuel and power, and it refers to situations which no company can control. I do not see how companies can be penalised for situations which they cannot control. Therefore, I shall press my Amendment to a Division.
8.40 p.m.
On Question, Whether the said Amendment (No. 13A) shall be agreed to?
Their Lordships divided: Contents, 36; Not-Contents, 31.

CONTENTS

Aberdare, L.

Gainford, L.

Rankeillour, L.

Balerno, L.

Gowrie, E.

St. Aldwyn, E.

Belstead, L.

Inglewood, L.

Sandford, L.

Brooke of Cumnor, L.

Kemsley, V.

Sandys, L.

Brooke of Ystradfellte, B.

Kinnoull, E.

Strathclyde, L.

Cathcart, E.

Lindsey and Abingdon, E.

Strathcona and Mount Royal, L.

Cork and Orrery, E.

Long, V.

Cowley, E.

Malmesbury, E.

Terrington, L.

Craigavon, V.

Mansfield, E.

Vickers, B.

Cullen of Ashbourne, L.

Molson, L.

Vivian, L.

Denham, L. [Teller.]

Mowbray and Stourton, L. [Teller.]

Wakefield of Kendal, L.

Drumalbyn, L.

Ward of North Tyneside, B.

Exeter, M.

Northchurch, B.

NOT-CONTENTS

Balogh, L.

Brockway, L.

Collison, L.

Beaumont of Whitley, L.

Byers, L.

Crowther-Hunt, L.

Birk, B.

Champion, L.

Foot, L.

Harris of Greenwich, L.

Peddie, L.

Segal, L.

Henderson, L.

Pitt of Hampstead, L.

Shepherd, L. (L. Privy Seal)

Houghton of Sowerby, L.

Platt, L.

Strabolgi, L. [Teller.]

Jacques, L.

Popplewell, L.

Taylor of Mansfield, L,

Lee of Newton, L.

Ritchie-Calder, L.

Wigg, L.

Lovell-Davis, L. [Teller.]

Robson of Kiddington, B.

Wigoder, L.

Maelor, L.

Seear, B.

Winterbottom, L.

Melchett, L.

Moved accordingly and, on Question, Motion agreed to.

Resolved in the affirmative, and Amendment agreed to accordingly.
Clause 23, as amended, agreed to.
Clause 24 agreed to.
Clause 25 [Limits on amount of and entitlement to guarantee payment]:
8.49 p.m.
The Earl of MANSFIELD The Earl of MANSFIELD moved Amendment No. 13B:
Page 21, line 29, at end insert—
"( ) The amount of guarantee payment payable to an employee in any one week shall not exceed the amount, which taken together with his actual earnings for that week (excluding overtime premium), is equivalent to a week's pay for that employee, as defined."
The noble Earl said: This Amendment seeks to alleviate the somewhat ludicrous position which could be reached that a man would earn—if that is the right word—more money in a week for not working than he would actually earn for working. Possibly in these times of liquidity troubles the Committee may be generally sympathetic to this idea. Most voluntary guarantee wage agreements as they now exist are based on guaranteeing every weekly paid employee a minimum weekly wage. I should like to quote from the nationally agreed guarantee in the engineering industry, which probably covers a larger number of people than any other single agreement, and which in my submission is typical in this respect.
I quote this extract from the agreement between the Federation and the Confederation of Shipbuilding and Engineering Unions. It is dated December 22nd, 1964:
"All hourly-rated manual workers who have been continuously employed by a federated firm for not less than four weeks shall be guaranteed employment for five days each normal pay week. In the event of work not being available for the whole or part of the five days, employees covered by the guarantee will be assured earnings equivalent to their time rate for 40 hours."
This would seem to be a logical, and indeed a fair, way of dealing with what
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we on this side of the Committee concede can be, and frequently is, a problem. Since this agreement I anticipate that both the unions and the employers agree that the arrangement is equitable and, as I have said, logical.
We now have a situation where the Government propose to graft on a weekly rate so that we are then left with the position that if an employee between Monday and Thursday had already earned sufficient to bring him above the guaranteed weekly wage, he would not be due to receive any more money if he were laid off on a Friday, except that under this Bill as it now stands he would receive his rate which might well be more than the weekly rate which he would normally get if he did have the opportunity of working. I submit that the statutory scheme as contained in this Bill, which is really designed to impose or set out what I might call the minimum standards to be improved on by voluntary agreement, might well follow the same basis as that which has been generally adopted by agreement in industry.
It may be said—and it was said in another place—that the system as designed by this clause is simple and that any other system, while logical, would be too complicated to work. At various moments, both in Committee and later, the Minister of State expressed sympathy—if that is the right word—and he agreed to examine it further; but eventually on Report it was finally turned down on the ground that it raised too many complexities and that it was in the interests of everyone to keep the scheme simple. Perhaps I can say that this entire scheme is the brain child of the Government and therefore if the choice has to be between the manifestly absurd and the over-complex, then it is up to the Government to go away and think of something which is not absurd and not too complex. That should not be beyond them.
As I have said, the scheme which has been agreed between the Federation and the unions with the hourly-rated manual

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workers in the shipbuilding and engineering industries has worked perfectly simply, and I should have thought that it would not be outside the Government's ability to make a scheme which is reasonably comprehensive and, at the same time, fair both to the employers and the employees.
If I may sum up the attitude of noble Lords on this side of the Committee, this is another part of the Bill which seems in a way to be one-sided and unfair. I appreciate that the whole aim of the Bill is to tilt the balance in a way which the Government conceive to be just; but no employer is going to accept that in the interests of simplicity—and that is what the argument seems to be—he must pay by way of guarantee more than a man's weekly earnings. I beg to move.
Lord MELCHETT: The basis of the guarantee payment scheme embodied in the Bill is that the guarantee should be a daily guarantee. The Amendment would, in our view, graft on to the daily guarantee system part of a weekly guarantee system, and it is this which leads to the considerable complexities which, as the noble Earl has mentioned, have already raised objections to a similar Amendment in another place. It also has other objections to which I will return later.
To try to graft the weekly limit on to the daily scheme would give rise to considerable problems both on principle and of drafting. For example, if an employee were laid off for two days but for the three days worked the employee's earnings were £1 short of the employee's normal week's pay, his guarantee pay would be only £1. Should the two days then count towards the five days' entitlement ill that quarter? Should the employee be paid £1 for two days in which he is being paid this entitlement in that quarter period? Obviously, it would be unfair if they counted. Other employees would be getting £6 for each of their five days in the quarter when they were not working.
The only way to deal with this problem would be to modify the whole entitlement provision by relating it in some way to the amount of guarantee pay actually paid. It is this which would lead to complexities. The noble Earl's suggestion
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in our view is both unfair and would lead to complexities. The weekly limit would introduce considerable complications to the scheme which, as we acknowledge, is already unavoidably complicated enough. It would be neither in the interests of the employers who would have to administer the scheme nor of the employees who ought to be able to understand what they are entitled to.
I hope noble Lords will accept that circumstances in which an employee will, by virtue of the guarantee payment scheme, exceed his normal weekly pay are likely to arise only very rarely indeed. We are talking about a problem which is more theoretical than practical in our view. Further, if an employee by working hard, say, on piecework during a short working week, brings his earnings up to his normal weekly pay, that is no reason why he should lose the benefit of any guarantee pay for days he is laid off.
There is another point that I should like to make. I do not think the noble Earl entirely represented accurately what happened at the Report stage ill another place. It has always been the Government view that this was a problem and it has always been our view that any of the solutions put forward have made matters worse and not better. At Report stage in another place the noble Earl's colleagues acknowledged these difficulties which were raised by an Amendment similar to that which the noble Earl is now moving; but the noble Earl's colleagues added that it would be open to interested associations and organisations to make further representations to the Minister between then and the Committee stage here. I have to tell the noble Earl that no such representations have been received. It therefore remains our view that while it is acknowledged that there is this theoretical problem with what is in the Bill, it is a great deal better than any proposed alternative. I would ask the noble Earl to withdraw his Amendment.
The Earl of MANSFIELD: Perhaps I can say to the noble Lord, Lord Melchett, that there is such a thing as banging one's head against a brick wall. It is no good making ceaseless representations if one knows that they are going to be received unsympathetically and not be given a fair or logical hearing which is going to lead

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to anything. Such representations as have been made are concealed—if that is the word—or, at any rate, contained in the Amendment that I have just moved.
The noble Lord says that any difference to the scheme proposed by the Government is going to make the whole system too complex. My complaint is this. Why should we have a scheme which works perfectly well so far as the engineering industry is concerned, a scheme based on hourly rates, muddled up with weekly rates? There is no need for it. If the Government had thought up a scheme which would take into account, let us say, a guaranteed week of 40 hours, it would be easy to graft that on to a scheme which guaranteed 40 hours' pay for a 40-hour week, whether or not the 40 hours were worked.
The next matter which the noble Lord went into—and he quoted a case—is another red herring: somebody who works hard on piecework for the first few days of the week and then finds himself without a job for the last day, and does not get any money because he has already come up to his weekly hourly rate. That is avoiding the issue so far as this Amendment is concerned. It is taken with his earnings for that week, excluding overtime premium and, in parenthesis, that means piecework, bonus rates, or whatever. If he is already over the earnings plus those bonuses, they would not he taken into account. Therefore he could work as hard as he liked and the position so far as he is concerned would be no worse.
I cannot say that I am entirely surprised by the noble Lord's attitude, but I am slightly disappointed. It is making an absurdity in this Bill. There will come a time when employers are going to tot up the absurdities and refuse to go along with them. It happened in the case of the trade unions, as they say, with the trade union law. It will happen just as assuredly with this Bill when it becomes an Act. It is pointless for me to argue any further. The Government have acknowledged the fact that it is difficult, but do not seem able to produce any more satisfactory arrangements. In the circumstances, and for the moment, I beg leave to withdraw the Amendment.
Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.
Clause 25 agreed to.
Clauses 26 to 33 agreed to.
Clause 34 [Unemployment benefit]:
On Question, Whether Clause 34 shall stand part of the Bill?
9.2 p.m.
Lord MELCHETT: In advising the Committee to omit Clause 34 from the Bill I will, if I may, speak to Amendment No. 97, the new clause which the Government hope will replace Clause 34. In addition, I should like to speak to Amendments Nos. 43 and 101, which are consequential to the new clause contained in Amendment No. 97. The need for the new clause introduced by Amendment No. 97, and the consequential Amendments, arises because the Bill establishes entitlement to a number of payments equivalent to wages which can be awarded by a tribunal in respect of a past period for which unemployment or supplementary benefit may have been paid. In such cases the tribunal award would have the effect retroactively to disqualify the employee for receipt of benefit. It would obviously be against public policy to allow the employee to retain the money paid in benefit on top of the other payment, for example guarantee pay, arrears of wages, and soon. The new clause gives the Secretary of State power to make regulations which will enable the benefit in these cases to be recovered from the employer, so that the employee will receive from the employer the amount awarded by the tribunal less the benefit the employee has already received. The details of the procedure for recovery of the money will be laid down in the regulations.
Subsection (1) of the new clause replaces and extends Clause 34. It obviates the need to submit in draft to the National Insurance Advisory Committee regulations providing that a day for which wages or the other payments set out in subsection (7) are payable shall not be treated as a day of unemployment. Clause 34 was more limited in that it related only to regulations about dual payments of benefit and guarantee payments and medical suspension remuneration. Subsection (2) gives the Secretary of State power to make regulations to provide for the recovery of unemployment or supplementary benefit in a case where a tribunal award would lead to double payment to the employee. Recovery is possible in three ways: first, from the

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employer; secondly, by requiring or authorising the tribunal to order the payment of a sum representing the benefit payment to the Secretary of State and not to the employee; thirdly, by requiring the tribunal to order payment to the employee only of the excess of the gross amount awarded by the tribunal over the benefit payment and enabling the Secretary of State to recover the amount paid in benefit from the employer.
Subsection (3) of the new clause provides that the regulations made under subsection (2) may, first, apply to one or more or all of the payments to which this clause applies, and either to unemployment or supplementary benefit or both; secondly, confer powers and duties on tribunals, the Supplementary Benefits Commission and insurance officers or other persons; thirdly, give an employee dissatisfied with the recovery of supplementary benefit the right of appeal to an Appeal Tribunal under the Supplementary Benefit Act 1966; fourthly, provide in tribunal proceedings for proof of benefit paid; and finally make different provision in different cases. Subsection (4) extends Section 114 of the Social Security Act 1975 in line with this new clause.
Subsection (5) provides that specified sections of the Social Security Act 1975 and Supplementary Benefit Act 1966 shall not apply to the recovery of benefit under this clause. Subsection (6) provides that any unemployment benefit recovered under this clause shall be paid into the National Insurance Fund. Finally, subsection (7) specifies the classes of payments to which this clause refers—that is, wages or compensation for loss of wages and any payment from an employer to an employee under this Bill and any similar payments from employer to an employee. I hope that this proposed extension of the present Clause 34 will answer some worries expressed by the colleagues in another place of noble Lords opposite, and that your Lordships will agree to this useful tidying-up of this important clause in the Bill.
The Earl of GOWRIE: It is not every day, or even late every night, that a Government delete an entire clause in a major Bill, and we must be grateful on
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the principle that nearly every omission is liable to yield an improvement. We will have to take our own advice and our own time to consider what the noble Lord very clearly but in some detail, as he will appreciate, substituted in its place. I do not say that I have followed all the arguments though I did my best to do so. I should like to consider the new clause between now and Report.
Clause 34 disagreed to.
Clause 35 [Dismissal on grounds of pregnancy]:
On Question, Whether Clause 35 shall stand part of the Bill?
Lord WIGG: When we were on Second Reading the noble Baroness, Lady Vickers, raised the point—and I supported her argument—that it was important to know whether Clauses 35 to 45 should constitute a charge upon industry or whether in fact the matter should be dealt with by other methods, say, the Social Security Fund. I would submit to the Government that it would be an advantage if we could have a statement from them on this point at an early stage, because I believe this would facilitate our considerations. The noble Baroness, Lady Vickers, will speak for herself, but I personally have no objections to any part of Clause 35, which is the one we are discussing now, or to Clauses 35 to 45, provided that the charge does not fall upon industry. It seems to me, at a time when we are doing our best to get on our feet from an economic point of view, that a great deal of the success of the next stage in this country's economic development will depend on the viability of the smaller concerns. Therefore, particularly in the part of the world which I once represented in another place—that is the Black Country, the West Midlands, an area of small industries—to impose a charge of this kind on the smaller employer, particularly when he employs a large amount of female labour, is in fact to invite bankruptcies, inefficiency, and so on.
I am quite sure that, following what the noble Baroness had to say on Second Reading—and others supported her—the Government will have had second thoughts, and it seems to me it would be reasonable if the Minister was now able to tell us the Government's views

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on this point. Have they considered what was said on Second Reading, and are they considering removing this charge from industry and tackling it in another way? I understand quite well that here we are moving towards the end of the Session and it may be very difficult indeed to amend this Bill as it stands; but, of course, one way would be to delete the whole of Clauses 35 to 45 and give your Lordships an assurance which perhaps would be repeated in another place to take this away and reintroduce in the next Session another measure which would deal with the point in a way which, whilst doing all that the Government want and all that every one of us wants to do in making it possible for a woman engaged in industry to have a child in a civilised way and not have to meet the grinding economic consequences of a shortfall in the weekly income, would recognise that this is a charge which ought to be borne by the community as a whole and not by particular industries, and particularly the smaller industries which are struggling for economic survival. Therefore, I would ask the Minister if he would find it convenient to give an indication of the Government's thinking on this matter at this stage, because I am sure this would facilitate our deliberations on these clauses.
Lord JACQUES: If your Lordships feel that that would be helpful and would expedite our business, I am quite willing to make a statement.
The Earl of MANSFIELD: So far as I am concerned, this is a debate—if it is to be a debate—on whether Clause 35 shall stand part of the Bill, and my copy of this Bill deals with dismissal on the grounds of pregnancy. I do not think there is any argument in the Committee that an employee should be treated as having been unfairly dismissed if the principal reason for dismissal is that she is pregnant, or for any other reason connected with her pregnancy. So far as I am concerned, the question of payment or anything of that kind does not arise until we come to the next clause, Clause 36. Therefore, I am wondering just what sort of manoeuvre the Government's side of the Committee is getting up to. Perhaps it would be better to debate Clause 35 as it stands, and thereafter get on to the rights of the good lady who happens
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to be pregnant when we get to the proper place.
Lord WIGG: I can assure the noble Earl that I am not indulging in any manoeuvre at all. It seems to me—and I said this on Second Reading—that Clauses 35 to 45 are wholly acceptable, provided that the charge is not imposed upon industry. Therefore, it seems to me that if the Government would say, "No, we do not accept that argument", or, "Yes, we do" or, "Yes, we have it under consideration", then we should be able to get on and perhaps make greater speed. I do not manoeuvre, unless the application of common sense to your Lordships' procedure is a manoeuvre, in which case I plead guilty.
Lord WIGODER: Can the noble Lord, Lord Wigg, find any reference in Clause 35 to any charge to be paid by anybody for anything?
Lord WIGG: On the Question, Whether the clause shall stand part, I entirely agree. On the letter of the law, of course I absolutely agree. If it is inconvenient and your Lordships wish to look at Clause 35 strictly in terms of what is in the clause, I agree. I rose as soon as I could to say that, as we had on Second Reading taken Clause 35 and Clause 45 together, it might be convenient. If it is not convenient, we do not do it. All right. I do not mind.
Clause 35 agreed to.
9.16 p.m.
The Earl of KINNOULL The Earl of KINNOULL moved Amendment No. 13C:
After Clause 35, insert the following new clause:
".—(1) An employee who is the father of an expected child and who is living in the same household as the mother shall be entitled to three days leave from his employment without loss of pay, at the time of, or within four weeks after, the confinement.
(2) The Secretary of State may by order vary the period of three days referred to in subsection (1) above, or that period as varied from time to time under this section, but no such order shall be made unless a draft has been laid before Parliament and approved by resolution of each House of Parliament.").
The noble Earl said: I beg to move, but I would say at once that this Amendment affects neither Clause 35 nor Clause 36. The purpose of this Amendment concerns an issue which could be known affectionately as paternity leave.

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Perhaps it is strange that in a very carefully worded set of clauses in this Bill concerning maternity, which gives protection to mothers against loss of their jobs and loss of income during confinement, no apparent thought has been given to the role and position of the father. Dumas once wrote that so heavy is the chain of wedlock that it needs two to carry it, and sometimes three. I believe those words are pertinent today. Today no longer can a proud father stand back and be congratulated, leaving the grandmothers, the sisters and the aunts to help his wife. Today the pattern of life has changed and one knows that so many female relatives of the family are working. We know that home helps are extremely scarce and the father is often left not only as an alternative, but as the only alternative, to holding the baby. I speak as the proud father of four children, and of course other noble Lords have far greater experience. But all fathers will know not only of the joy of the birth, but also of the pressure imposed at this time—helping with the baby, helping with the cooking and housekeeping and looking after the older children.
This Amendment, which would form a new clause, seeks to give the right to a father to be granted by his employer up to three days' leave without loss of earnings, in order to assist at home during the four-week period immediately after the birth of a son or daughter. I suggest to the Committee that this is a very small concession but is a humane right. The three-day period has been drafted into this clause, first to recognise the principle of paternal leave and the need for it; and secondly, not to place on the employer and industry too great a burden—and this is very much a point that the noble Lord, Lord Wigg, raised on the Question, That Clause 35 stand part.
What are the precedents for paternal leave? Is it accepted, for instance, in other countries? If one cites the excellent Second Reading speech on this Bill of my noble friend Lady Vickers one notices that Sweden recognises paternal leave as a legal right, and fathers may claim sickness benefit for looking after their children, up to 10 years of age, during their wife's confinement. How do employers regard paternal leave at
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present? The Greater London Council—and I am glad to see the noble Lord, Lord Pitt of Hampstead, here—include it in their employment contracts. They grant up to, I believe, five days without loss of pay. The Civil Service include it under provisions termed "urgent domestic circumstances". And I am sure that 99·9 per cent. of employers would respect and voluntarily grant leave. But in a Bill which safeguards one parent against loss of job and loss of income, is it right to discriminate against the male parent?
The second part of my Amendment would give the Secretary of State power to vary this period of three days by order before Parliament. I hope that both the Government and indeed this Committee will consider this Amendment with sympathy, and will recognise the pressures that fathers often bear at times of a happy event. I beg to move.
Lord SEGAL: Will the noble Earl perhaps, for the sake of clarification, inform the Committee whether his Amendment is intended to include also the putative father in cases where paternity may be in doubt?
The Earl of KINNOULL: I am a little puzzled by the noble Lord's medical question. Will he put it again?
Lord SEGAL: In the case of a child who may happen to be born out of wedlock, would the noble Earl's Amendment also include the putative father of the child? In some cases, of course, the paternity of the child may even be in doubt and the subject of legal disputation.
The Earl of KINNOULL: If the noble Lord will read the Amendment, I think I am correct in saying it would cover the unmarried father.
Lord JACQUES: The Bill proposes to establish for the first time in this country a statutory right to paid maternity leave and the subsequent reinstatement of those women employees who wish to return to their work. An increasing number of employers already make some provision for their female employees under voluntary arrangements. The Government have never ceased to give this kind of thing their blessing. They believe the time has now come to take it a little further and to make it

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compulsory that, provided a woman fulfils the conditions laid down in the Bill she shall have maternity pay and the right to return to work. In the case of the father there are fewer firms which grant the paid leave which this Amendment seeks to provide. We have never doubted or denied the fact that the Bill as it stands will impose some cost upon industry. We believe that at this point we have reached the limit and that in the present circumstances we should be unjustified in going as far as the noble Earl wishes. Let us learn to walk before we run.
The Earl of KINNOULL: The noble Lord is certainly poetic, but I am sorry to say that I find his answer very unsympathetic. One is asking for a minimum period of three days and one would hardly have thought that would impose an enormous cost on industry. Supposing that the Government have a change of mind and that this section, Clauses 35 to 44, moved away from being a charge on industry to the creation of a new fund, can the noble Lord say whether he would support this Amendment?
Baroness SEEAR: We hope that the Government will consider very seriously this proposed Amendment. It is not imposing a very large additional charge; it is a way of providing a service which is very badly needed at times when childbirth is taking place. It may be that the presence of the father in the home would ease the strain on the community social services which would otherwise have to step in to assist in a home in which a birth is taking place, or because the mother is away when the birth takes place elsewhere. If the father is able to have the charge of looking after the children during the time that the mother is in childbirth, this could be a saving rather than a cost so far as the community is concerned.
Lord WIGG: Regarding this section of the Bill, I am wondering whether the Minister could tell us something about costs. I am sure that he must have been able to do a few sums. Given the statistics we have about the birthrate and its distribution in this country, could the Minister tell us what the charge on industry would be if this Amendment were accepted? If he does not respond to my well-tentioned invitation to cut
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short the discussion, perhaps he would consider what we could be told at a later stage regarding the charge of these commitments on industry. I am sure this information must be available.
Lord JACQUES: These costs were given twice in Second Reading. They were given when the Second Reading was moved and they were referred to again in winding up. My noble friend was not here on either occasion. He was here only during the middle period when he was querying why he did not get the costs. Here I am speaking from memory, but I think the costs of this Bill are 10p per week per worker. Eight pence of that 10p is in respect of the guaranteed payments and the 2p is the remainder, and that is largely the maternity benefit. So far as the costs of this Amendment are concerned, we just cannot get these costs overnight. I received the brief on thin Amendment only about two hours ago. When noble Lords submit their Amendments they expect to receive answers, but they do not allow time for them to be obtained. It is quite impossible for me to give the costs on this or to promise that they will be available in a day or two.
9.26 p.m.
Lord HOUGHTON of SOWERBY: I do not think one needs more than 10 minutes to consider this Amendment. The Amendment proposes to make statutory provision for a compulsion upon employers to provide for these three days' leave with pay. In moving the Amendment, the noble Earl referred to certain sections of employees who have this concession. It has been obtained by negotiation on conditions of service, taking this kind of concession into account with other conditions of service, including pay, and when the pay of the public sector goes through the machinery of the Pay Research Unit and fair comparability is applied, then these additional concessions applicable in some sections of the public service are taken into account. There is a plus and a minus. There are plusses in the Civil Service and there are minuses, because civil servants do not get free holidays and other benefits in kind which are frequently given to employees in private industry. So one thing is taken along with another in reaching conclusions on different elements in conditions of service. That is all right.

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If we reject this Amendment, as I think we should, that does not rule out any trade union or body of employees negotiating a concession of this kind with their employer, and it may be that the employer will say, "If I am to give this concession I must set it off against other parts of your conditions of service". But if there is to be a statutory provision for leave with pay at the expense of the employer, I think we have to consider whether it is reasonable as an obligatory and statutory requirement for the employer to bear the cost.
After all, the woman bears the child; there is no argument about maternity in her case. The father does not bear the child and different considerations may apply in individual cases as to whether the father wants three days' leave either at the time of the confinement or within four weeks of it, but the woman requires to be absent when she is having the child. There is no argument about that. I suggest that if employees want this it can be negotiated through the normal machinery. Alternatively, if it is regarded as something which is a matter of social service, of social benefit—a community right to have this kind of leave at the time of the woman having a child—then it should be provided for through the social services, and I believe that when we come to it the maternity payment should be provided by the social services. That is a matter which we shall reach shortly.
The unions have been saying for about three years that they do not want the law to interfere with free collective bargaining, free negotiation, and all the rest of it, but we have Bills before us at the present time which are littered with statutory intervention in the normal course of free collective bargaining. There are some things which we can justify being there but, with great respect to the noble Earl, I do not think this is one of them.
The Earl of KINNOULL: The noble Lord, Lord Houghton of Sowerby, said that so far as the male was concerned and as regards maternity leave, this could be negotiated, and we should leave it alone. I suppose he would agree that this should also apply to maternity, because in many cases the maternity benefits are agreed by negotiation. Does the noble
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Lord agree with that? Does he see the necessity for having these clauses in the Bill? I do not know whether he wishes to reply to those questions now, but so far as the reply of the Government is concerned, the noble Lord said the whole thing would be too costly. Then, when asked by the noble Lord, Lord Wigg, to produce figures, the noble Lord said it was impossible to produce any figures. One would ask him on what basis does he come to the conclusion that it is too costly if he has no figures to justify it?
I withdraw my Amendment with unhappiness. In view of the time and the necessity for making progress on this Bill, I withdraw the Amendment, but do so with the right to return to it later.
Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.
The CHAIRMAN of COMMITTEES: Before I call Amendment 13D, I should point out to the Committee that if this Amendment is agreed to I cannot call Amendment No. 15.
Clause 36 [Rights of employee in connection with pregnancy and confinement]:
9.32 p.m.
Baroness VICKERS Baroness VICKERS moved Amendment No. 14:
Page 28, leave out lines 41 and 42 and insert—
("(a) from the Maternity Pay Fund to be established in accordance with Schedule (Provisions relating to the Maternity Pay Fund) of this Act to be paid a sum to be known as maternity pay and determined in accordance with that Schedule;").
The noble Baroness said: As the noble Lord, Lord Wigs, reminded us, I raised this on Second Reading, and was grateful for the support of the noble Lord. As the Bill is drafted, and will become law, I consider it will not help the employment of women. In view of the implementation of the Equal Pay Act due to come in in December this year, if employers of small and large firms have to pay both maternity benefit and equal pay, especially in those industries which employ large numbers of women, those women are unlikely to obtain employment.
With high unemployment among men, women of child-bearing age will not have an easy chance of getting a job. But if they do get a job, and it is essential that they work in a factory, it is likely that the cost of what they produce will have to

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be put up because the employer will have to pay the extra amount. Since the Second Reading debate, I have had backing from women's organisations, including women in the media and women's rights campaigns and others. I should like to mention some of the points they have raised.
In view of the present economic situation, it is understandable that the Government should wish to put the cost of paying further maternity benefits, in addition to the maternity allowances already provided by the State, on the employers instead of on the State. However, under this Bill, the burden will be distributed very unevenly. Only employers of pregnant women would have to pay. This is bound to have a harmful effect on small firms and industries such as the textile industry which employ large numbers of women; whereas those industries like steel and coal which employ men will not have to pay any tax at all. They will not have to bear any of this cost.
I suggest, as I did on Second Reading, that childbearing is a function which benefits the whole nation as well as the family. This should be recognised by providing that employers throughout the nation should not bear the cost of maternity pay regardless of whether or not they employ pregnant women. The concept of providing maternity leave and the right to return to work for expectant mothers has a double function; it benefis the woman by giving them some security in their work and it benefits the nation as a whole. It encourages women, which is desirable, to remain in the labour force. If this responsibility for payment is left solely to the individual employer, the effect may well be the opposite to that intended.
If employers know they are liable to pay maternity benefits if they employ women liable to become pregnant they will be strongly discouraged from employing women of child-bearing age. I believe it may come to the fact that an employer may say to a woman, "Do you intend to have your family early or are you willing to work a number of years without having children?", therefore bringing pressure on the woman in a very undesirable manner. Therefore, I think employers will be tempted to cut
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down the number of women in their employment, because they will not be able to afford it.
The National Council for One Parent Families is also worried about the present provisions of the Bill. They would like a form of maternity levy collected from all employees throughout the National Insurance Fund and paid out as enhanced maternity benefit allowance. Noble Lords may have seen an article in the Sunday Times which also comes out in favour of a State-funded scheme. Having discussed what happened in the other place, it says:
"But a far more fundamental change ought to be pressed by all women and those concerned with their welfare …"
and they go on about the difficulties of getting employment. They suggest that it is unfair that all the payment falls on the employers, and therefore they would like to have some maternity pay funded by the State.
I am advocating something slightly different from either of the proposals I have just mentioned, and that is a maternity fund based on the lines of the Redundancy Payments Act 1965. The effect of the scheme I am suggesting would also eliminate the women's need to go before an industrial tribunal if their employers are unwilling to pay them the maternity benefits to which they are entitled. Going to law, as we all know, is very expensive and time-consuming, both for the complainant and for the country. Women could apply directly for their maternity pay in the same way as for their maternity allowance. The individual employer would not be involved in this and therefore would not—I think this is very important—be in a position to withhold payment. If the provisions for maternity pay are left unchanged so that individual employers are liable to make maternity payments, employers will employ fewer women. I think this would be very unfortunate indeed in view of the clauses in the Sex Discrimination Bill. I think it might undermine that Bill.
Therefore, I have suggested in the Schedule on page 20 certain specific points. I do not wish to go through them all because I mentioned at the beginning that it is based on the Redundancy Payments Act 1965. But I think

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I should point out paragraph 4 in particular:
"Every person who, in respect of any week beginning on or after the commencement of this Schedule is liable to pay Class 1 or Class 2 contributions under the Social Security Act 1975, shall in respect of that week be liable to pay a contribution to be called a 'maternity fund contribution'."
This is based on Section 27 of the Redundancy Payments Act 1975, but it was limited in that case to the employers' contribution. It is my intention that the sum should be paid by employees as well, and the payments made by persons liable to pay Class 1 or Class 2 contributions under the 1975 Act. Class 1 contributions under the 1975 Act are contributions both from the earners and the employers. Class 2 contributions are the flat-rate contributions payable by self-employed earners.
The other paragraph I would draw attention to is paragraph 5 which is a provision enabling the Secretary of State to determine by regulations the amount of contributions and the period of maternity pay. This corresponds with the present Clause 37, the method of calculating the maternity pay, and this corresponds with Clause 38, and the conditions subject to which maternity pay is to be paid. Clause 110 of the Bill provides that any power imposed by the Act to make regulations shall be exercisable by Statutory Instrument subject to annulment in pursuance of a Resolution of either House. Therefore, there will be Parliamentary control over these regulations.
Paragraph 6 is based on Section 28 of the Redundancy Payments Act 1965, and applies to the provision of the Social Security Act with a view to enabling contributions to be collected. Paragraph 7 excludes certain provisions of the Social Security Act 1975 which are not appropriate, and corresponds to Section 28(3) of the Redundancy Payments Act 1965. There may be other provisions of the 1975 Act which should be excluded. If it is suggested that this is not the correct way of doing this, I could put down Amendments to the Social Security Act 1975 at Report stage, so as to make maternity payments payable under that Act. But I hope that what I have said tonight may receive the blessing of the Government, and that they will give me the assurance that they will consider this
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suggestion, as I think it is much fairer than putting the entire payments on the employer, especially in view of the employment of women, which is of equal importance, particularly now that the Government are implementing the Sex Discrimination Act. I beg to move.
9.42 p.m.
Lord JACQUES: I think that it would be useful to the Committee if I spoke on this Amendment now, and it might save some time. We are all grateful to the noble Baroness for giving us the opportunity of considering the financing of maternity pay. Your Lordships will be aware that this Bill was amended in another place so as to remove the obligation on a woman to notify her intention to return to work in order to qualify for maternity pay. In consequence, maternity pay becomes the right of all women with the requisite service qualifications. Obviously, this raises questions about the way such a scheme should be financed. I would not, however, wish to give the impression that we think the present arrangements do not have merit. In our view, they have very considerable merit. In any such scheme as that proposed by the noble Baroness, there would be substantial expenditure out of the public purse and a considerable increase in the bureaucracy needed to operate it. The present scheme involves no increase in public service and no expenditure by Government. It is straight forward and simple to understand and is comparable to many employers' sick pay arrangements.
It is, of course, true that it would bear heaviest upon those employers whose labour forces were predominantly female, but I would point out that employments which are predominantly female are usually lower paid than employments which are predominantly male. This position will continue without discrimination after the operation of the Sex Discrimination Act. Consequently, there is a good deal to be said for leaving the cost where it lies.
Lord HOUGHTON of SOWERBY: What about the Equal Pay Act in this connection?
Lord JACQUES: What I am saying is that employments which are predominantly female usually have a lower standard of wage than employments which

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are predominantly male, and they will continue to do so without in any way breaking the Sex Discrimination Act, because they are dominated by women in the one case and by men in the other. In the industry dominated by women the men will get the same wage, and where dominated by men the women will get the same wage when they do that job. What I am saying, and this cannot be denied, is that in those employments where women dominate the rate of pay is lower than in those employments where men dominate, and statistics prove that. There is, therefore, a case for the cost remaining where it lies.
I am, however, aware that fears have been expressed that it will tend to militate against the employment of women. The Government believe that those fears, if they are in any way justified, are exaggerated. We acknowledge that there have been misgivings on this score. It is also true that if the financing of the scheme can be spread over employers in general instead of being concentrated on those who employ women the benefits of the scheme could be improved. This would be an important advantage. Your Lordships will be aware that in another place these provisions were criticised on the grounds that six weeks' maternity pay was insufficient and the two year qualifying period was too long. We might get away from those standards more quickly if the costs were spread. In the light of these factors my right honourable friends in another place undertook to examine whether some arrangements could be reached for spreading the load more widely among employers. I must emphasise in particular the words "among employers".
The Opposition spokesman in another place, in response to questions from my right honourable friend, confirmed that they were not seeking to shift any part of the cost of the scheme to employees. In the light of the discussion the Government have been considering what might be done. That consideration is continuing. I regret that I am not in a position today to make a definite response to the proposition advanced by the noble Baroness, except to say that I see quite substantial objections to the method which she has proposed for achieving her objective. However, if the noble Baroness is
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willing to withdraw her Amendment I will undertake that between now and Report stage the Government will carefully consider, in the light of what has been said here today as well as what was said in another place, whether it is practicable, having regard both to the stage the Bill has reached and to the implications for public expenditure, at a later stage to introduce provisions which would have the effect of spreading more widely the financial burden of these provisions.
9.47 p.m.
Baroness SEEAR: In his statement the Minister has not explored all the possible options for dealing with this problem. Clearly, we are embarking upon a new development in social policy and it is important that we get it as near right as possible and highly desirable that the matter should be considered again at Report stage when all the options have been laid before us, and when indeed the costing of the various options has been gone into in greater detail.
So far the options have included the one in the Bill which put the whole cost on employers who are employing women, the option of spreading the cost among all employers, and there is the third option contained in the proposal put forward by the noble Baroness, Lady Vickers, that it should become a social security charge financed through a special scheme similar to redundancy payment. I should like to suggest a further possible option which I hope the Government will consider while considering the proposals already presented. There is one point in favour of the option which I wish to present. All the options so far discussed are losing sight of one argument which lies behind the case for maternity benefit; namely, that where a woman intends to continue working and regards maternity as a short interruption while she is child-bearing, it should be regarded as a period off similar to sick pay and she continues on the books of the employer and this is a charge on her employer. It is distinct from the idea that the employer is responsible for maternity pay for all women he has employed, whether they return to work or not.
I should like to suggest that when a woman leaves employment temporarily to have a child the charge for maternity pay in the first instance is borne through

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social security payments, however those may be financed, through some system of financing on a national scale along the lines proposed possibly by the noble Baroness, Lady Vickers. But in those cases where a woman takes up her option to return to employment and has in her mind intended all along to return, then the employer takes financial responsibility in that he then has to pay back into the Social Security Fund the amount that for six weeks has been paid out in maternity pay. This means that he is financing the woman who regularly continues to be his employee. That is, I think, the spirit which lay behind the idea of charging the employer with the cost of the woman's maternity pay. This seems to be equitable; but I see very little equity in charging to the employer the cost of maternity pay for a woman who has ceased to have anything to do with that employment.
It is clear that this evening we are not going to reach any conclusion on this matter, and it is highly desirable that we should not because there are all these various options and, for all I know, there may be other options which have not been put forward. It is quite plain that people are not satisfied to consider only the options contained in the Bill; that these are in a sense very radical changes of considerable cost, and that it is reasonable to ask the Government to consider all these proposals, their value in terms of social policy and their cost, and that we should be able to look at them again in detail on Report.
9.52 p.m.
The Earl of MANSFIELD: It is to be welcomed that following the attractive, indeed compelling, argument of my noble friend Lady Vickers the Government have extended some sort of a hope, if not an indication, that they will think again over this rather difficult and vexed question of maternity payments. The next time this Bill comes before your Lordships it will be on Report, which is a much more formalised stage than that which we are conducting at the moment, and it will be much more difficult then to go into all these options again and really to discuss the Bill in the way one does in Committee; so to the extent that the noble Lord is, as it were,
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putting off the evil hour until Report, he may be compounding the difficulties at a later stage.
One of the reasons I rise to speak now is to make perfectly plain the feelings that noble Lords on these Benches have on this whole question of maternity pay. I reinforce that we do not oppose the provision of maternity pay, but we do object to the fact that the scheme as propounded by the Government puts it on the individual employer who employs the individual lady in question, and that divides us from the Liberal Benches and possibly from the noble Baroness, Lady Seear. As my noble friend Lady Vickers pointed out, as opposed to some industries, including building and civil engineering, there are certain industries which use female labour; so that is one inequality. That means that an employer in the food, clothing or textile industry, for example, would have a very much heavier burden by virtue of the composition of his workforce. Thus, an equal contribution through the whole social security range would in our view be a more equitable means of satisfying an obligation which really should rest on society as a whole, even if, in the view of the Government, that obligation should rest on only one side of the industry.
Secondly, payments by the individual employer would also bear particularly heavily on the smaller employer and more particularly on the self-employed. Dare I mention too, on Members of your Lordships' House with female secretaries? A large firm, even if it does employ a certain number of ladies in its workforce, may not find it too oppressive to pay maternity pay; but a self-employed person with only a handful of employees would find that the payments become disproportionately onerous on his cash flow. As my noble friend succinctly pointed out, the eventual result of this would be that those of us who are self-employed would inevitably not employ women of child-bearing age. I cannot resist the facetious comment that that would be unfortunate. Indeed, that would also be a negation of the principles underlying the Sex Discrimination Act to which this House has devoted many hours. So that quite apart from any other consideration which has already been ventilated in this House, we believe that the burden should be spread over employers

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as a whole, and to that extent the commitment of the Government to look at the whole matter again is to be welcomed.
9.56 p.m.
Lord WIGG: It is a sad heart that never rejoices, and I am delighted that I stayed late enough to hear that the Government are reconsidering the matter. However, I must say that I did not think that my noble friend Lord Jacques did himself justice in trying to ride off my questions about cost. In the Second Reading debate, my noble friend Lord Hughes ventured the view that the cost would be of the order of £100 million to £120 million spread over industry as a whole. He then broke it down a little and said that it would be 10p per employee per week. He thought that that was inconsiderable. My noble friend Lord Jacques also gave the figures, but all he did was to repeat the 10p a week. The point which I made then, and which I now repeat, is that one cannot possibly assess what will be the burden on industry unless the matter is quantified. It has not been quantified and the only reason, I believe, why this has not been done is that the Government have not known how to do it. We want to know what the cost of the maternity charges will be spread right across industry.
Lord JACQUES: I gave the answer to that. I said that it would be 2p per worker per week.
Lord WIGG: I am sorry, but my noble friend can keep that to himself. I do not want that. He said that it would be a total of £120 million to be spread over the whole of this Bill on the basis of the previous year's figures, and that it would be £120 million if the Bill were applied as a whole. He then went on to say that it would be 10p per employee per week. The noble Lord, Lord Jacques, now says that the difference is 2p. I want that broken down. The Government have the figures. Why be coy about it? They either know what the figure is or they do not. What is the total charge on industry of the maternity clauses—Clauses 35 to 45—and what will industry have to bear? If the Government have been doing some sampling, perhaps they can ascertain whether the incidence in terms of cost will fall on the larger firms or on the smaller ones. I
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entirely agree with the noble Earl, Lord Mansfield, and I made this point on Second Reading. My concern is with the small industries in the West Midlands. This will undoubtedly have the effect of making life much more difficult for them and, ultimately, it must work adversely to the interests of women employees. That goes without question.
I want now to turn to the practical considerations. We are now getting towards the end of September. This House and the other place have to consider the Bill. When we come back it will have to go back to the other place. With all this there is such a pressure time-wise that the operation really cannot be done properly. That is why I suggested what I did in the early stages in practical Parliamentary terms. Take Clauses 35 to 45, and take them right out. Then go away and think the matter through. Come back and tell us what the cost is and what the impact will be. The Minister has the support of the Conservative Opposition. They say that it should be spread right across industry. Come forward with a practical scheme which marks a step forward in terms whereby a woman bearing a child will be treated in a more civilised way from an economic point of view. But also look at the needs of industry and balance the two. See where the cost should lie and come forward with a scheme which has been worked out and which has not been produced as a result of a last-minute conversion on the part of the Government, because they feel that they will face an awkward political situation. Please do some sums and come back and tell us what the total cost will be. Do not try to ride it off with 10p, 8p and 2p a week.
Lord MOLSON: I am sure that the whole Committee will welcome the indication that the Government are prepared to look again at this problem. The representations have come from all three political Parties in this country, and notably from some supporters of the Government. I wish to raise only one point. It is a point of procedure, but none the less a point of some substance. The suggestion that the whole of this Part of the Bill—10 clauses—should be dealt with on Report stage surely is entirely wrong from a procedural point of view. I have frequently criticised the procedure in this House which puts too much detailed

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work on to the Report stage. No noble Lord is really entitled to speak more than once on the Report stage. If this extremely complicated and important matter is to be revised by the Government, surely it ought to be dealt with on a recommittal of these clauses of the Bill. It need not take up any more Parliamentary time.
If the matter is thrashed out properly in a recommittal stage—which will give an opportunity again for points of importance which perhaps the Government are prepared to agree to to be reconsidered, and some slight redrafting to take place on the Report stage—that should not take any longer than the proposal that the noble Lord, Lord Jacques, has made that it should be dealt with on the Report stage.
Therefore as the Government have gone so far as to show a certain flexibility of mind in looking at this matter again, I hope that they will deal with it in a procedural way which enables it to be dealt with properly by a recommittal of these clauses, and that they will not attempt to push the thing through on the Report stage.
Lord HOUGHTON of SOWERBY: I am sure that the Government must have been giving more consideration to this matter than perhaps the remarks of my noble friend Lord Jacques implied. After all, it is many weeks now since Mr. Harold Walker, the Minister replying for the Government on the Report stage of the Bill in another place, said that the Government would consider this matter, although he entered a cautionary note that it was rather late in the day to begin to consider major changes of the Bill. But I am sure that the Government must have anticipated that this matter would be raised in your Lordships' Committee. They were not born yesterday.
Therefore I hope that consideration of this matter is quite well advanced, and if it is, surely it is not beyond the capacity of the Parliamentary procedure to introduce a new scheme into the Bill, even as late as this. But I sincerely hope that while the matter is under consideration the Government will bear in mind the comments being made from all parts of the Committee at the present moment. I am sure that Ministers concerned will have read the article in the Observer
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newspaper yesterday, which drew attention to some of the weaknesses of the proposals as they now stand: that they would benefit the better paid women in steady jobs rather than the lower paid women in less secure jobs who would not qualify on the qualifying service condition for a benefit. They perhaps were going to be at a disadvantage. There would be the unmarried mother, for example, who might be holding employment for only short periods and who would be in serious difficulties.
There are suggestions there which I believe emphasise the desirability of doing something better, provided that the cost can be more widely spread. The real difficulty—I believe I commented on this during the debate on Second Reading—is that if the cost is placed on the shoulders of an individual employer, there is a limit to the burden which can fairly rest upon him. He is entitled to ask. "Why should this fall upon me? If it is going to fall upon me, then I must be permitted to take such action as I fairly can to avert too heavy an imposition on my resources." I think, with respect, that my noble friend Lord Jacques is underestimating the degree of discrimination that could follow the introduction of the scheme which puts the burden on the employer. I can understand the employer asking some rather personal questions. "How many children have many more?" "Are you on the have many more" "Are you on the Pill?" He has to measure his risk in terms of maternity. He has women employees and wants to know what the incidence of absence on account of maternity may be.
I think that we underestimate the effect of this on shopkeepers and on small businesses of one kind or another where the burden resting on one employer can be quite serious. I thought that a long time ago the Government had made up their mind to provide a comprehensive family endowment policy and put everything together instead of having family allowances here, tax relief on children there and now maternity pay somewhere else, or maternity benefits somewhere else. It seems to me that we have not yet got it right. We were going to have a tax credit scheme. That was going to sweep up the family allowances, the income-tax relief. That did not happen;

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something else was substituted for it. It does not seem to me that we are getting anything coherent out of it. That is why I think something comprehensive should be considered in this connection.
I do not agree with my noble friend—and I am sorry that I seem to be in disagreement with him so much on the first day back, so to speak—in saying that this is a burden which should necessarily fall on the employer. He said that he emphasised those words, "the employers". Frankly, maternity is no business of the employer. He does not, so to speak, create this situation.
Lord JACQUES: Those were not my words. Those were the words used by both the Government spokesman and the Opposition spokesman in another place. The Government spokesman asked the Opposition if it were pooled whether they were seeking to unload some of the costs on the employees and they said, "No". They said they were content for it to be on the employers. I was quoting. I was not giving an opinion
Lord HOUGHTON of SOWERBY: I acquit my noble friend of that absolutely and I blame whoever said it from one side of the House or the other. If this is to be made a social benefit, which I think it should, then one considers separately how it shall be financed, out of the National Insurance Fund or otherwise. We have family allowances paid with contributions out of State funds. They are not part of a charge on the National Insurance Fund. It may be that a maternity pay scheme should be treated similarly or it could go on the Social Security scheme on the normal basis of contributions from employers and employees, and a contribution from the State. There are various options. But I do not think we ought to let pass the suggestion that maternity has anything to do with the employer.
The normal incidence of sickness applies to both men and women. Men have not yet begun to have children. The incidence of sickness is part of the hazards of employment. A man can get 'flu at work by reason of the conditions by which he is employed. A woman could contract some illness. But in the normal course of work women do not become pregnant. That differentiates the
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normal incidence of sickness from the normal incidence of pregnancy.
I think there is a distinction between the two. Therefore, there is no reason at all why employees, as a matter of principle, should not contribute something to their own or their wife's maternity benefit. It is a question of how you look at the whole system of payment for a social benefit. I do not think anyone need take a dogmatic stand on a matter of this kind. At the end of the day if the benefit can be spread—whatever basis is acceptable for spreading it—it should be accompanied by improved conditions for the grant of maternity pay. That is the important part from the employees' point of view. Those are my observations on this delicate matter.
Baroness VICKERS: I was very interested to hear what noble Lords had to say, especially the noble Lords, Lord Houghton of Sowerby and Lord Wigg. I am grateful for their support. I was disappointed by the answer of the noble Lord, Lord Jacques, particularly that women in certain industries will always be low paid. They will not get the pay rises which they might get if employers have to pay these extra insurance contributions for their maternity benefit. I should like to remind him that in the EEC countries it is usually done through social security, and it seems a pity that only the Republic of Ireland and ourselves have a different method at the present time.
Lord JACQUES: I must remind the noble Baroness that both methods are used in the EEC.
Baroness VICKERS: I meant the majority. I think you will find that that is so. I do not see why we cannot have a major change. There are 46 new Amendments put down by the Government to this Bill; it is a completely different Bill since it came from the other House, and I do not see any difficulty in making a further change which will be beneficial and which is desired by women. The noble Lord has no reasons for fearing their anger over this. It would help industry tremendously. Therefore, during the few days that he has at his disposal, I hope he will take the suggestion of my noble friend Lord Molson and deal with the matter under

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the procedure which he put forward. I beg leave to withdraw the Amendment.
Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.
10.12 p.m.
The Earl of KINNOULL The Earl of KINNOULL moved Amendment No. 15A:
Page 28, line 45, at end insert—
("( ) In determining entitlement to any benefit connected with pregnancy or confinement, whether or not that benefit arises under subsection (1) above or under a contractual or other agreement made by the employer, no distinction shall be made concerning the marital status of the employee, so that all such benefits shall be granted equally to employees irrespective of their marital status.")
The noble Earl said: This is a short but, I believe, important Amendment. Clause 36, as the Committee will recall, concerns the rights in connection with maternity and confinement, all of which are specially well-timed in view of the fact that it is International Women's Year. As the clause is drafted, fears have been expressed by a number of women's organisations concerning the unmarried mother and how she will find herself treated under this clause. The cause for that concern is not that the rights under Clause 36 will exclude unmarried mothers—and perhaps the noble Lord replying for the Government will confirm this—but that discrimination between married and unmarried mothers already exists in certain negotiated arrangements for paid maternity leave. In the case of the teachers' profession, the regulations for paid maternity leave extend to 18 weeks, which is far more generous than the statutory period suggested under this Bill of six weeks. These regulations apply so far as unmarried mothers are concerned only at the discretion of the local education authority.
These discretionary powers are used in varying ways, and in certain cases unmarried mothers have not been granted this 18 weeks maternity period. This discrimination is hurtful, unkind and patently unfair. The effect of this Amendment would be to clear up any discriminatory arrangements already in force and prevent any in the future. Some fears may be expressed that this Amendment, if accepted, would interfere with negotiated contracts already in being. My answer to that criticism is that if any interference to an existing contract occurs,
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it will be very minor in character but would safeguard a section of our society, the unmarried mothers, who do not deserve the indignity of being treated as second-class citizens. I beg to move.
Lord JACQUES: Under the maternity clauses as they stand, an employer will have an obligation towards his employees in respect of both maternity pay and reinstatement, whether or not such employees are married. There is no way in which he will be able to avoid his obligation under this head by reference to the marital status, or lack of it, of the employee. The only quarrel we have with the Amendment is that we feel it is unnecessary and we hope that, with this explanation, it will be withdrawn.
The Earl of KINNOULL: I know the hour is late and, obviously, it is my fault if there has been some misunderstanding about this, as perhaps I did not explain the purpose of the Amendment clearly enough to the noble Lord. It is not that under this clause the unmarried mother is not looked after; it is that in the case of the teachers' negotiated contract a mother may not get the benefit of that negotiated contract because she is unmarried. What I am suggesting by this Amendment is that instances under Clause 36 and also outside negotiated contracts should be covered. Perhaps the noble Lord would be good enough to look at that again. I am waiting for an answer. Perhaps the noble Lord would wish to look at that again.
Baroness VICKERS: While the noble Lord is looking at this point, I should like to support this Amendment. I have previously raised this point in connection with the Sex Discrimination Bill. As I understood it then, the reply from the Front Bench opposite was that they were going to circulate some local authorities who were known to take this action, in order to prevent it happening in the future. We now have a definite Amendment, which might be helpful in consolidating any action which is to be taken. Perhaps the noble Lord would let me know whether local authorities have been circulated, since these are known to be the chief offenders, as I understand it, in regard to education, or whether any further action is necessary on the lines suggested by the noble Earl.
Lord JACQUES: I will undertake to write to the noble Earl, and to send a copy to the noble Baroness.
The Earl of KINNOULL: May I ask with what sort of comment? Having received that undertaking, I am happy to seek leave to withdraw this Amendment.
Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.
The CHAIRMAN of COMMITTEES: Before I call Amendment No. 16, I should point out to the Committee that if this Amendment is agreed to I cannot call Amendment No. 16B.
Lord JACQUES Lord JACQUES moved Amendment No. 16:
Page 29, line 12, leave out from ("and") to ("she") and insert ("(c)").
The noble Lord said: With the permission of the Committee I will speak to Amendments Nos. 16, 17, 18 and 20 together. All of these Amendments are to correct a drafting error. An Amendment was promised in the other place. It was moved and in fact the promise was fulfilled, but the Amendment was badly drafted and it is hoped now to correct that drafting.
Lord JACQUES: I beg to move Amendment No. 17.
Amendment moved—
Page 29, line 15, after ("practicable") insert ("(i)").—(Lord Jacques.)
Lord JACQUES: I beg to move Amendment No. 18.
Amendment moved—
Page 29, line 17, after ("and") insert ("(ii) in the case of the right to return,").—(Lord Jacques.)
Clause 36, as amended, agreed to.
Clause 37 [Maternity Pay]:
Lord JACQUES: I beg to move Amendment No. 20.
Amendment moved—
Page 30, line 16, leave out ("or (3)") and insert ("(c)").—(Lord Jacques.)
Clause 37, as amended, agreed to.
Clauses 38 and 39 agreed to.
Clause 40 [Right to return to work]:
10.22 p.m.
Baroness VICKERS Baroness VICKERS moved Amendment No. 23:
Page 31, line 35, after ("job ") insert ("or a job similar to that").
The noble Baroness said: I should like to move Amendment No. 23 briefly. In the clause, at line 35, it is stated that a woman must come into
"the job in which she was employed under the original contract of employment and on terms and conditions not less favourable than those which would have been applicable to her if she had not been so absent."
I agree fully that the terms and conditions should not be less favourable, but it is asking a great deal of employers to require them to put a woman back in the job she occupied under the original contract. There may be other equally good jobs—indeed, there will have to be if employers keep to terms and conditions which are not less favourable—but they need not necessarily relate to the original job in which the woman was employed under contract. As I understand it, during the months of her pregnancy other persons will have to be employed to take her place. It will be very unsettling for both if the person doing the job is unnecessarily changed. It is also very unfair to the employer, who has had to retrain somebody for the job concerned. The woman who held the job originally probably knows more than one job in the firm, whereas the one who is taken on in her place will have to be trained for that specific job. Therefore, I hope that the noble Lord will accept my suggested Amendment. It is quite simple. It clarifies the position in regard to the employer and also will help the employee. I beg to move.
Lord JACQUES: The definition of "job" in Clause 40(2) already ensures that the clause will give effect to the intentions behind the noble Baroness's Amendment. By stating that "job" means "the nature of the work which she is employed to do", subsection (2) provides that the definition is not narrowly tied to the identical post which the employee had occupied before taking maternity leave. In our view the intentions of the noble Baroness are already achieved by subsection (2), and we hope that with that explanation she will feel able to withdraw her Amendment.
Baroness VICKERS: I am not very satisfied with that reply because it is not clear. One has to look at another part of the Bill. Any woman reading Clause 40(1) would consider that she was going to be given back her exact job again—that if she was a secretary she was going to get that exact post. If, however, the noble Lord tells me that it is not the same, I hope that both the employer and the employee will have the same understanding. I suggested in the Second Reading debate that in view of this highly complicated Bill it might be necessary to have a simple pamphlet pointing out the rights of the employee under this Bill, as the employer will obviously get legal advice. I am not very satisfied with what the noble Lord has said. If, however, he can convince me that this can be done, I will withdraw the Amendment.
Lord JACQUES: The noble Baroness is seeking to amend Clause 40. I am saying that Clause 40 achieves the objective which she has in mind. The same clause, not some other part of the Bill, achieves her object.
Baroness VICKERS: This is where I beg to differ, but if I am not going to get any further with the noble Lord I beg leave to withdraw the Amendment.
Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.
Clause 40 agreed to.
Clauses 41 to 43 agreed to.
Clause 44 [Interpretation of sections 36 to 43]:
10.26 p.m.
Baroness VICKERS Baroness VICKERS moved Amendment No. 26:
Page 35, leave out lines 9 and 10.
The noble Baroness said: This provision will be very difficult to implement; "expected week of confinement" means the week in which the confinement is expected to take place. It will be extremely difficult for the woman to know exactly when this is going to take place. One knows that infants do not appear at the exact time when they are expected. If a woman has to give notice in advance concerning this, it would be very much better if these lines were left out of the Bill because I do not think they are workable. I beg to move.
Lord JACQUES: I must apologise to the noble Baroness. We had understood that Amendments Nos. 14. 24, 26, 27 and 107 had one objective. When the noble Baroness withdrew Amendment No. 14 on the undertaking given to promise the pooling of the cost between now and Report stage, I thought she had withdrawn the whole batch of Amendments.
Baroness VICKERS: I am afraid that these Amendments are completely different. They do not tie up at all with the others. If, however, the noble Lord will consider them before Report stage, I shall be only too pleased to put them down again.
Lord JACQUES: I will give that undertaking.
Baroness VICKERS: I beg leave to withdraw the Amendment.
Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.
Baroness VICKERS Baroness VICKERS moved Amendment No. 27:
Page 35, leave out lines 22 to 32.
The noble Baroness said: I presume that what the noble Lord has said refers also to these two lines. Therefore I will withdraw the Amendment on the assurance that he has given me.
The Earl of MANSFIELD: Before my noble friend withdraws her Amendment, is the noble Lord, Lord Jacques, saying that Clause 44, which is what I might call a mini-interpretation clause, is not worthy of debate at this moment as opposed to when the Government have had a chance to look again at and to rethink all these clauses relating to maternity payment? As I understand the position, what my noble friend is seeking to do is to discuss what is meant by "the expected week of confinement". That is quite irrespective of who will pay for the lady's maternity payment when eventually she gets it—whether it is her own employer or whether it will be spread among the field of employers as a whole. I do not want to go over old ground, but I should have thought it would be wrong to say that it should not be discussed as of this moment because the Government are going to review the whole method and type of maternity payments. Similarly, with respect to the noble Lord, Lord Jacques, I should have thought that if my noble friend wants to discuss the meaning of "a week", and so on, it is

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up to her to discuss it at this stage and up to the noble Lord, Lord Jacques, to answer any such questions as she may have.
Lord JACQUES: I suggest that it would be convenient for the Committee to adjourn now and for us to resume tomorrow with Amendment No. 27. That will give me a chance to look at the issue which has been raised.
Lord PITT of HAMPSTEAD: Before the Committee decides on that I am not quite sure that I realise why we should be having a long debate on the definition of the term "expected week of confinement". I must admit that these days I do not do much midwifery, but when I did I was always signing certificates for the expected date of confinement; so every pregnant woman has an expected date of confinement, and the week in which that date occurs is the expected week of confinement. I cannot see why we are having this long debate.
Lord JACQUES: I am suggesting that we now adjourn at Clause43 and resume tomorrow at Clause 44, when the first Amendments will be Amendments Nos. 26 and 27.
The CHAIRMAN of COMMITTEES: As I understand the position, the noble Baroness, Lady Vickers, has moved Amendment No. 27 and she has not at the moment withdrawn it, so that the Committee is in the position of discussing Amendment No. 27.
The Earl of MANSFIELD: My understanding is that, with the leave of the Committee, my noble friend has withdrawn Amendment No. 26 and we are therefore unfortunately precluded from discussing that particular Amendment; but I leapt to my feet in time and, if my noble friend so wishes, tomorrow afternoon we can continue with the exciting Amendment No. 27.
Baroness VICKERS: I should like to accept that proposition.
Lord STRABOLGI: This may be a convenient moment for the Committee to call a halt, and I beg to move that the House he now resumed.
House resumed.
House adjourned at twenty-seven minutes before eleven o'clock.