§ 11.13 a.m.
§ The PARLIAMENTARY UNDER-SECRETARY of STATE, DEPARTMENT of the ENVIRONMENT (Baroness Birk)My Lords, I beg to move that the House do again resolve itself into Committee on this Bill.
§ Moved, that the House do again resolve itself into Committee.—(Baroness Birk.)
§ On Question, Motion agreed to.
§ House in Committee accordingly.
§ [The Earl of Listowel in the Chair.]
§ Schedule 4 [Acquisition and appropriation of land]:
§
Baroness YOUNG moved Amendment No. 49B:
Page 55, line 41, after ("Act") insert ("for the purposes of designated relevant development").
§ The noble Baroness said: Now that we have reached Schedule 4we have, I think, reached what is the most important and in many ways the most contentious part of this Bill. I am moving Amendment No. 49B because I should like, first, to find out what are the intentions of the Government in their use of the special procedures on compulsory purchase order inquiries. I am aware of course that in our deliberations at the last meeting of the Committee the Government undertook to look at the wording of Clause 15(1) again, and to an extent this Amendment will depend on the definitions that are given in that clause; in particular, whether it applies only to relevant development.
§ However, the purpose of this Amendment is to limit the operation of the Schedule 4 procedures to acquisitions, under the powers of the Community Land Bill, of land which is defined as designated relevant development; that is land which local authorities will have a duty to acquire. If the land was acquired under some other Acts that conferred compulsory purchase powers, the authority, as I understand, might be able to use the procedures in Schedule 4. I should 1726 like to know whether I am correct in thinking that this is how Schedule 4 would work, and I should like an answer to my question and to know whether indeed we shall find that the Schedule 4 procedures are therefore used not only because of the duties under this Bill but under other Acts as well. I beg to move.
§ Baroness BIRKAs the noble Baroness, Lady Young, has said, we are getting on to an extremely important part of the Bill dealing with procedures. I would make one or two general points about this before dealing with the specific Amendment she has now moved. On Wednesday we discussed the new power of acquisition in Clause 15, and with this Amendment we come to the procedures that apply when the new power is used. Before we discuss the detailed provisions, it may be useful for me to restate a very simple point. This is relevant not only to our contention that a new and wider acquisition power is needed but also to the proposed changes in procedure that we are about to discuss.
There is really no point in pretending that this is a consensus Bill. There is a very strong difference of view between the two sides of your Lordships' House. My right honourable friend the Minister pointed out on Third Reading in another place that he did not wish to blur the clear differences in philosophy that exists between the two sides of the House; neither do I. This is what has been underlying all the debates so far, and no doubt it will continue to underlie them, so even when we are discussing quite precise and small Amendments which are concerned with minor procedural matters, or even drafting, the basic philosophy and principles keep on raising their heads. I therefore do not want to pretend that this is not an extremely radical measure. We do not want to give authorities wider powers of acquisition. We do want to make changes in compulsory purchase procedure in order to speed up public acquisition; and, as will be seen when we come to later provisions of the Bill, we do want in time to arrive at a situation in which virtually all significant development takes place on publicly-owned land and all betterment accrues to the community.
This, of course, is fundamentally where there is such a strong difference of 1727 opinion, and with most of the Amendments, whatever appears to be the top layer, it comes down to these principles upon which we have based this Bill and which the Opposition, despite some of the remarks that have been made on Second Reading, totally disagree. It is obvious that a radical scheme of this kind must involve some considerable shift in some areas in the balance between public and private interests. If there were no argument about how to strike the right balance here we should, I am sure, be able to adjourn much earlier than we frequently do these days and perhaps there would not be such a constant flood of Amendments coming in all the time.
Of course, there is room for argument and that argument is, I believe, the Parliamentary guts of our political life. But the argument takes place within an agreed framework of democratic institutions in a mixed economy. Therefore, what I utterly repudiate are the suggestions that have been made by some noble Lords opposite, particularly in the rather abortive Second Reading we had the other night, that the principle behind the Bill goes outside this democratic framework and is inspired by Marxist thinking, by Communism, by authoritarianism, or by whatever word is chosen by the Peer at the time he thinks it suitable to make the point. Noble Lords opposite are probably not convinced by this argument. However, may I remind them of a point that I made in August on the Second Reading of the No. 2 Bill. I pointed out then that the basic principles of this Bill—that all development land should come into public ownership and that all betterment should accrue to the community—derive basically from the Report of the famous Uthwatt Committee on Compensation and Betterment in 1942.
I go back to that because it seems to me that in the discussions which have taken place since this point has been lost, or wandered away from, or conveniently forgotten. Are noble Lords opposite seriously suggesting that the experienced and distinguished members of that Committee were politically motivated? Of course they were not. They were taking a rational look at the subject and were doing so—this is an important point—at a time when people were thinking about how to reconstruct 1728 this country after the war and when Party political divisions were subjugated to national unity. They concluded that public ownership of development land was the rational solution to the problem of achieving a lasting solution to the linked problems of planning, compensation and betterment. Now 33 years later, we are bringing forward another land plan that is based on the concept of community ownership of land. It is no new "pie in the sky" or highly revolutionary idea. It is part of the establishment so far as recommendations and reports are concerned.
In view of a great deal that has been said, it is therefore timely to warn noble Lords opposite that when we discuss their Amendments, however much they may go on about it and however many speakers from their Front Bench they may put up, we shall not necessarily see eye to eye with them. We want to change the procedure and believe that as a result of the modifications which have been made since the Bill was introduced we have got the balance right.
Something that both amazes and shocks me is that there does not seem to be any acceptance or acknowledgment by noble Lords opposite that between the Committee and Report stages in another place considerable changes have been made to this Bill which are due entirely to recommendations and suggestions made by the Opposition there and also to proposals which were put forward by outside organisations. Quite frankly, from so many of the points to which we have been listening patiently on this side of the House, one would think that there had been no changes, that no consultations had taken place and that nothing had been done. My noble friends and I will be quite happy to debate the proposals and to consider very seriously—we are doing so all the way through—any constructive points which are made in debate, but I think we should start the day by recognising that at the end of it there will still be strong differences of principle between us.
§ The Earl of KINNOULLMay I interrupt the noble Baroness. I have listened most carefully to what she has said and have followed most carefully her arguments on Amendment No. 49B, but may I ask the noble Baroness whether 1729 she is making a Second Reading or Third Reading speech?
§ Baroness BIRKI feel I am doing something which may be helpful to the House. As the noble Baroness opposite has pointed out, we are coming to the procedural part of the Bill which is extremely important. Judging by the Amendments which were still flooding in last night from noble Lords opposite it seems that they are taking a very keen interest in this part. Since the noble Earl has raised the Third Reading point, I must point out that some of those Amendments are so corrosive that they are almost wrecking Amendments. The noble Baroness opposite said that she considered that this was a key Amendment and I feel that it is my duty to state at the beginning of today's debate how we feel about this part of the Bill. Frank speaking cannot be wrong in this House. It is right here, just as it is right anywhere else. May I say—we are now down to two again—that I have not drawn the attention of the House to the number of Second Reading or Third Reading speeches which have been made by the Front Bench opposite and would not have mentioned this point if the question had not been raised by the noble Earl.
Let me turn now to the Amendment of the noble Baroness. It would limit the proposed changes in the compulsory purchase procedure in Part I of Schedule 4 to acquisitions for designated relevant development. The noble Baroness put tome a direct question. The procedures in Schedule 4 apply only to acquisitions, and then only to relevant development. We feel that there is not very much logic in this Amendment. If it is considered right that there should be a power to dispense with a further public inquiry when the issues have already been adequately considered at a previous inquiry, this power should apply to all acquisitions for relevant development under the land scheme, not simply to cases of designated relevant development; that is, where the full duty under Clause 21 is in operation.
Although it may be argued that this should await the full duty, in practice the publication of the authorities' five-year rolling programmes of land acquisition will indicate the areas where authorities intend to operate. They will thus indicate to landowners the areas in which 1730 land is likely to be acquired. There is no practical difference between an area where the full duty is in operation and an area where an authority are acquiring all land that is needed for relevant development under the general duty. This is a rolling, phased programme. It is not that anyone is suddenly being jumped into anything by surprise. As noble Lords opposite see it, the effect of the Amendment of the noble Baroness would be to put off the so-called evil day. So far as we on this side of the House are concerned, it is not an Amendment which we could accept.
Viscount COLVILLE of CULROSSThe noble Baroness has, I am afraid, chosen a particularly unfortunate moment to start making, as she did at the beginning of her speech, her major political thesis. May I say why? The noble Baroness will no doubt have read the chapter in the Uthwatt Report as recently and as carefully as I and will, I am sure, be fully versed in the background of that Report; namely, the system which used to operate under the Town and Country Planning Act 1932, with which I am sure she is completely familiar, and also in the background of the bombed cities of Britain, the beginning of whose reconstruction was then in hand, probably starting with Plymouth. She will, I am sure, have recognised the context in which that Report was written and may possibly have shared some of my feeling, that it was not quite the same background as that which we now have in this country some 33 years later.
The noble Baroness will remember that parts of the Uthwatt Committee Report were first put into an Act of Parliament in 1947. That Act did not work because of the reaction of ordinary people all over the country who did not like it and who thought that it was unfair. Therefore, parts of it had to be repealed. The Party opposite introduced the Land Commission Scheme in 1967. That did not work, either, because people up and down the country did not like it and thought that it was unfair. Those of us who are concerned with Schedule 4— and I beg the noble Baroness to pay attention to this—are putting forward Amendments to try to deal with procedure, not necessarily because we wish to assault the basic principles of the Bill, but because we wish to try to ensure that 1731 unfairness and injustice are, so far as possible, taken out of these provisions.
The noble Baroness and the Party opposite must be aware that, if people find their land is being compulsorily acquired in circumstances where they think they are being unfairly deprived of a chance to protest, nothing will bring this legislation into disrepute more quickly. We believe that even the Party opposite, for the sake of the good name of their own legislation, ought to be prepared to listen, and listen carefully, to those of us who are putting forward Amendments to Schedule 4 which are constructively aimed at improving the machinery and ensuring that people do not think that their land is being taken unjustly, or that the land next door to them is taken for use in relation to which they have never had any chance to protest.
Some of us on this side of the Committee are not being quite as ultra-partisan as the noble Baroness has suggested, and I very much hope that she has not quite closed her mind. At the end of her speech, she said something about being prepared to listen to constructive suggestions and I beg her to consider, even for the wellbeing of her own creature—this legislation—some of the procedural points which we shall make on this Schedule, because I believe that if she does not get it right, that is where the whole thing will fail. That is where the front line will come, and that is where people will become disenchanted more quickly than anywhere else with this legislation, and I beg of her not to take an intransigent view at this point.
§ Lord FOOTI should like to take the opportunity of making one or two general observations about the position which we on these Benches are adopting towards this Bill. We have been criticised, especially from the Tory Benches, for the fact that we have not tabled any Amendments to this Bill. I should like to explain to the Committee why that is the case. As a matter of fact, we have tabled one or two minor Amendments but the general reason why we have not tabled a whole list of Amendments, as the Tory Party has done, is that we have accepted that, although we have serious reservations about the workability of this Bill and about some of the general principles behind it, we disposed of them at 1732 Second Reading and we are now proceeding to consider the Bill in Committee. So it is really quite pointless to fill up the Marshalled List with Amendments which are either trivial—of which, I may say, we have had our full measure up till now—or strike at the root principle of the Bill. We are wasting the time of this Committee, and indeed everybody's time, if we are to be faced with Amendments of that sort.
I have been reading through the Amendments in the names of the Opposition with which we shall be concerned here today, and many of them are quite obviously wrecking Amendments which would destroy the whole principle of the Bill. I think we are wasting our time. I should like to say that I exclude from those remarks the noble Viscount, Lord Colville of Culross, because I have read his Amendments and I believe they are constructive and useful. But that does not go for many of the other Amendments which are in the names of his colleagues and which we shall be discussing today. Therefore, if we are to be engaged, as apparently we are, in a prolonged debate and perhaps on Monday or Tuesday going into the early hours of the morning, the responsibility for that does not rest with the Government; it rests with the Opposition.
§ Lord HYLTONI should like to ask two rather brief questions. First, if this Amendment were accepted would it be possible to recover betterment by any means other than taxation? May I also ask my noble friend Lady Young what is the meaning in her Amendment of the word "designated"?
§ Baroness YOUNGThe answer to that question is that it is the term that is used in the Part of the Bill where, after the second appointed day, local authorities have a duty to acquire.
§ 11.32 a.m.
§ The Marquess of SALISBURYSince some of the earlier remarks made by the noble Baroness appeared in part to refer to what I said on Second Reading, I should like to make a few comments. First, she said that there is a strong difference of opinion between the two sides of your Lordships' House; of course there is, because there is a serious principle involved in this matter. That is why 1733 we on this side take such strong exception to some of the proposals that are being mooted. The principal one would seem to be the use of the word "community" as an all-embracing term to cover the requirement to give benefit to the national community. It takes no account of the rights of individuals of which the community consists, and this seems to me to be where clauses such as the one we are discussing now infringe so greatly on the rights of the individual.
Perhaps I may quote from what Mr. David Widdicombe, QC, said in the Estates Gazette on 17th May of this year:
I can deal with these powers quite shortly, for they are absolute. The authority does not have to state any purpose for the acquisition; the rights of objection are nominal only; there is no right to a hearing, and there is not even any right to have a decision on the compulsory purchase order as a whole.Referring to another point made by the noble Baroness, about the Bill stating that some areas will be required for development, Mr. Widdicombe said:As regards the decision, it is provided that the Secretary of State can confirm the order as to part of the land and postpone a decision on the remainder 'until such time as may be specified'. It appears that planning law has borrowed from the criminal law the idea of the suspended sentence!This is the sort of problem that we are trying to deal with.It seems to me that noble Lords opposite are more interested in ensuring that no individual makes a profit, rather than in trying to ensure that the community benefits, for later we shall be coming to issues as to how the Bill is to be administered. Under the plans raised here, I cannot see that it will be anything other than an extremely expensive operation which will erode the notional profit that Her Majesty's Government hope to obtain for the benefit of the community.
§ Lord SANDFORDI should like to respond to the general remarks made by the noble Baroness. It is perfectly true that we do not like this Bill, but three years ago I was in the position that she is in now when I introduced the Housing Finance Bill which the then Opposition did not like either, and I should like to make a few comparisons. I did not find it necessary to advise the noble Lord, Lord Diamond, as to how he should conduct his Opposition. In fact, after the 1734 First Reading of that Bill, we provided 11 days for him and his colleagues to consider how to deal with it. We have been given one day. After the Second Reading we gave the Party opposite 17 days to prepare their Amendments. We have been given four days. How can the noble Baroness possibly expect all our Amendments to be prepared and tabled before the Committee stage begins?
When the Committee stage began, we gave the party opposite nine days of debate, spread over 21 days; we are being given four days and nights spread over eight days. That is the reason why there is some difficulty about the Bill, but we will bear with that. What we are doing now we are doing because we do not want the rights of individuals eroded; we do not want the independence of the local authorities abrogated; we do not want the sovereignty of Parliament diminished; we want the tyranny of the Secretary of State checked and curbed. We shall work hard on that to the last clause of the last stage of the Bill.
The Earl of BALFOURI should like to add a few words to what my noble friend Lord Sandford has just said. The speed with which we have been asked to deal with this Bill is really unfair, and at the end of the day I think it will be to the disadvantage of the Bill. There is a number of points where I consider this piece of legislation defective. I am not being destructive; I mean defective from the point of view of working in law. I regret to say, because of the rush. I have not yet managed to complete reading all the reports on the Report stage of this Bill in another place. This is pressing us almost beyond our capabilities, and it will be to the disadvantage of the working of the Bill at the end of the day.
§ Baroness YOUNGWhen I introduced the first Amendment this morning, I did not realise we were to have a major debate on the principle of Schedule 4 and, indeed, of the Bill. I should very much like to thank by noble friends who have spoken up so forcibly in defence of what we regard as the fundamental principles of individual rights. I think I should make it absolutely clear to the Government that although they feel very strongly about the principle of the nationalisation of land—because that is 1735 what we are talking about—we feel equally strongly about the rights of the individuals who are involved. I have been sent some of the correspondence that passes between Socialist councils out to acquire individuals' property, which is now a most astonishing procedure. Once this Bill becomes law, of course, this kind of procedure will be increased. The rights of the individuals will be diminished; noble Lords opposite need not think they will escape from it, because their properties will be included in it as well and they, too, could be on the receiving end of some of the disadvantages of this Bill.
We feel these are such fundamental principles that we would be failing in our duty if we did not stand by them at this stage, and if we did not seek a full debate. I must say I was astonished by the speech of the noble Lord, Lord Foot. I take it now that the Liberals are in favour of this Bill, although their Chief Whip in another place seemed to indicate that they were against it. But perhaps that is a Liberal attitude; you really do not know where you stand on anything. We in the Opposition are quite clear where we stand on a number of points on individual rights, and I will say this for the Government: they are quite clear where they stand. So we can debate what are the real points at issue and I make no apology for the Amendments we have put down.
My colleagues and I have worked every night, well into the small hours, trying to master the material that lies behind the Bill, in order to put down Amendments as quickly as we can. If one or two have been duplicated, I would say that, as everybody knows who has been in Opposition, it is very difficult to manage this amount of work within a week on an immensely technical and complicated subject, and then, at the end of the day, to be told that Amendments are still flooding in; I do not know what the Government expect us to be doing. Whether or not they think we are just amusing ourselves working like this, I can assure the Government and the speakers that we take this very seriously and have been working extremely hard. I can assure them that we shall speak on all the points we believe to be important, of 1736 which, in fact, my Amendment No. 49B is the first.
It is not an Amendment that I intend to press this morning. I know now what the view of the Government is about this. As I understand it, we can draw the conclusion that they believe it is right that they should dispense with public inquiries on a great deal of compulsory purchase. Of course, we shall be debating these issues in later Amendments. They believe the shift in balance should be towards the State and against the individual. An attitude of "the State is right" creeps in under every single remark we hear from them. On this Amendment, it is now perfectly clear that they intend to apply the procedures in Schedule 4; that is, to do without a public inquiry wherever they can, on this Bill and on others. We know now where we stand. I beg leave to withdraw the Amendment.
§ Baroness GAITSKELLMay I add a very few words in support of my noble friend Baroness Birk and also in support of the noble Lord, Lord Foot. Listening to this debate, it seems to me that it has been very healthy to underline the great divide which exists on this Bill between the Parties. It is no good fudging this issue. I remember 30 years ago going around with my husband Hugh Gaitskell who was 100 per cent. in favour of a Bill such as this, so it cannot come as a shock to noble Lords opposite that we believe in this Bill. There are many things, perhaps, that could be done to improve it, but we believe in the principle and we on our side will fight to obtain it.
§ Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.
§ 11.47 a.m.
§
Lord MELCHETT moved Amendment No. 50:
Page 55, line 45, leave out ("the land") and insert ("there are no material interests").
§ The noble Lord said: I hope I may take advantage of the lull after the squall has passed to move Amendments Nos. 50 and 51. In essence these are tidying-up Amendments. In bringing forward on the Report stage in another place the Amendment now to be found at paragraph 1(2) of Schedule 4, we overlooked the fact that this would create a difference between cases where exclusion from the duty was 1737 achieved by the excepted development mechanism and those where the non-outstanding interest definition applies. The two approaches are needed because in the one case—that is, the type of development—it is the excepted development case, for example up to 10,000 square feet floor-space that has been excluded. In the other approach, the other exclusion depends on the status of a person or body owning the land; for example, land owned by a charity. The Amendment ensures simply that this potential anomaly is removed. I beg to move.
§ Baroness YOUNGWe are not going to have a lengthy debate on these points. I entirely agree that they are matters of clarification, and it is as well to have them in the Bill.
§ On Question, Amendment agreed to.
§ Lord MELCHETTI beg to move Amendment No. 51.
§
Amendment moved—
Page 55, line 45, leave out ("is") and insert ("other than outstanding material interests in").— [Lord Melchett.]
§ On Question, Amendment agreed to.
§ The CHAIRMAN of COMMITTEES (The Earl of Listowel)Before I call Amendment No. 51B, I should point out to the Committee that if this Amendment is agreed to I cannot call Manuscript Amendment No. 51C.
§ 11.50 a.m.
§
Baroness YOUNG moved Amendment No. 51B:
Page 55, line 46, leave out from ("land") to end of line 2 on page 56.
§ The noble Baroness said: This is an Amendment which, I hope, despite what the Government have already said, they will consider. It raises an important point. It certainly is an important point so far as the rights of the individual citizen are concerned. If I have understood Schedule 4 correctly, paragraph 1 enables an acquiring authority to certify whether the land is development land and consquently, if it is, whether or not the Schedule applies. It enables the authority to issue a certificate and, as I understand it, provides that such a certificate cannot be challenged at an inquiry. It seems to me difficult to see the justification for this, but perhaps there is a reason that has escaped me, and if so I shall be glad to hear what it is.
1738§ The kind of problem that I see arising on this issue is, for example, whether the development land is exempted or excepted development; and if that is the case, surely the acquiring authority ought not to be allowed to issue a certificate. In many cases this will be absolutely clear, but it is easy to foresee cases, particularly of excepted developments, where a dispute arises as to whether or not something fell within 10,000 square feet, in which case the authority could issue a certificate; there would be no inquiry and the individual affected would have no right of appeal. My Amendment seeks to provide that, where an individual feels that he has been unjustly treated by this procedure, he will be able to apply to the court to have the certificate quashed. It seems to me that this raises a very important matter of principle. I beg to move.
§ The Earl of KINNOULLIt may be helpful if I spoke to my manuscript Amendment at this stage, as the Chairman of Committees said, quite rightly, that it is concerned with this point. Perhaps it would be helpful if I read out the manuscript Amendment:
Page 55, line 47, after ("certificate") insert ("which the Secretary of State after giving any owner of a material interest in the land who maintains that the land is not development land an opportunity of being heard may, if he is satisfied that it is development land, issue").The purpose of this Amendment is similar to my noble friend's, which I very much support.Many people outside this House are worried as to the real significance of this certificate procedure. As I understand it, it is simply the local authority who will issue the certificate, and as we see in sub-paragraph (3):
A certificate under sub-paragraph (2) above shall be conclusive evidence of the facts stated in it.The concern which has been expressed—and I know it was also expressed in another place—is that at no stage will the owner of the land be able to challenge the words, "development land". At no stage will he be able to say that it is, in fact, excepted development. My Amendment would have the effect of allowing the owner to appeal to the Secretary of State, who could consider the arguments and then say whether or not 1739 he was satisfied that the certificate should be approved.In another place, when this matter came up on Report (col. 1057) the Minister was asked who, in fact, can question the certificate, and the reply the Minister gave was that he can—I assume the Minister and not the local authority—because he has to confirm the certificate. I hope the noble Baroness will be able to clarify this whole issue, because it is a worry not only inside the House but very much outside the House. I beg to move.
§ Lord MELCHETTAs I understand it, the noble Earl has not actually moved his manuscript Amendment but has spoken to it. I agree that this is the time to speak to that Amendment, and I hope I will be able to clarify why the certificates are needed and why we think the provisions in the Bill which apply to them at the moment are the right ones. I accept that there have been doubts expressed. I think they are based on misunderstandings and I hope we can clear them up.
A certificate is needed because the fact whether or not land is development land depends on the opinion of the particular authority. That is because of the definition of development land which we will come to later. Only the authority can say, therefore, whether it is development land. The objections to the certificate procedure are mainly on two grounds. The first is that the authorities might deliberately misuse the procedure and declare all land development land. I am delighted to say that that particular issue has not been raised today, and I do not think it would be worthy for your Lordships' Committee to consider at all. The second objection is that in some borderline cases authorities might get the answer wrong. In practice, in our view, this is likely to be a rare situation, because the excepted development proposals have been constructed in such a way as to make the dividing line between excepted and exempted development a clear one. The noble Baroness said that there might be a question as to whether something was 10,000 square feet, but that is surely a matter of fact, and one can go along with a tape measure if necessary.
I should have thought that the room for dispute was limited. Nevertheless, I 1740 accept that there could conceivably be room for dispute. If this occurs, there is a simple answer. There is nothing to stop the owner objecting to a compulsory purchase order on the grounds that, in spite of the certificate, the land is not development land. I think this contradicts something which the noble Baroness indicated was her understanding. If the owner does this, the Secretary of State would then consider this, and if he took the view that the authority had got it wrong, he would simply not exercise his discretion to use the modified compulsory purchase procedure. Even if the land is unquestionably development land, only the Secretary of State can dispense with an inquiry. So the certificate does no more than enable the Secretary of State to have a discretion.
If there were no certificate the result would be, in our view, complete chaos. Any owner would be able to attempt to take the issue to the courts to be decided, but the courts would be in some difficulty in trying to reach this decision, given that they could not substitute their opinion for that of the authority. It has in any case been accepted for many years in other contexts—for example, in enforcement proceedings—that planning issues should be dealt with by those concerned with planning; in other words, local authorities and the planning Minister, and not by the courts.
Turning to the noble Earl's manuscript Amendment, which, of course, does not raise the issue of having to leave the matter to the courts to decide, to start with there are two points I should like to make. First of all, whether or not land is development land is to be decided in the opinion of the local authority. It would be wrong, in our view, merely to substitute the opinion of the Secretary of State for that. But having said that, of course, the Secretary of State always has a discretion. Even if the local authority gives a certificate, anyone who thought the certificate (which would be in the compulsory purchase order itself) was wrong could object to the compulsory purchase order and include representations to that effect. As I have said, the Secretary of State would take these into account in deciding whether or not to dispense with an inquiry. If I may say so, under the noble Earl's manuscript Amendment, we should have a slightly 1741 odd procedure, whereby, first, there would have to be a hearing to decide whether or not the Secretary of State has power to dispense with an inquiry; secondly, the Secretary of State would have to decide whether to exercise his discretion; and, thirdly, the Secretary of State may decide that there should be an inquiry. So there would, in fact, be two hearings or inquiries on virtually the same point.
I think the point to emphasise is that the issue of the certificate may be conclusive as to whether or not the Secretary of State has a discretion, but it has no effect at all on how the Secretary of State exercises that discretion.
§ 12 noon.
Viscount COLVILLE of CULROSSI am very interested in what the noble Lord, Lord Melchett, has said in reply, because I am concerned about how this will work in practice. I wonder whether he could answer some questions about this. As he very rightly says, the certificate accompanies the compulsory purchase order itself, and it presumably says, "the land which is the subject of this order is, in the opinion of the authority, development land …"which is needed for the development they propose within 10 years. If you look over the page at sub-paragraph (3), it says that the certificate "shall be conclusive evidence of the facts stated in it". Expressed in that way, I suggest that that is conclusive against the Secretary of State as well as against anybody else. If the noble Lord wants the Secretary of State to be able to consider that before he decides whether or not, if the other circumstances are correct, he will dispense with a public inquiry, ought not sub-paragraph (3) to say that for the purposes of any proceedings in the courts the certificate will be conclusive? Otherwise, the present drafting of the Bill precludes the Secretary of State from considering the matter at all. It is certainly conclusive against the other parties. It is certainly conclusive against the courts. Why is it not conclusive against the Secretary of State as well? If there is a defect here, would it not be right to get it corrected in the Bill so that we can be quite certain that the Secretary of State is not debarred from doing what the Government evidently wish him to be able to do?
Secondly, the noble Lord said that when the owner of the land which is being 1742 acquired, or anybody with a material interest in it gets the compulsory purchase order and the certificate that goes with it, he is allowed to object if he considers that the land is not development land. Some of us will have to deal with this in practice, so would the noble Lord be very kind, and tell us exactly what form this objection is to take? Are we allowed, if we are drafting objections for this purpose, to look at all the development land that has already been decided upon by that particular local authority? Are we allowed to go into enormous detail about their housing programme; their industrial development programme; the employment situation; the length of the waiting list; the state of private development in that area, the state of development promoted by local authorities? And is the objection intended to be, as it were, a trial on paper of the whole of the development land proposals and projects for the next 10 years of the inquiry? Unless it is, I am not sure that I understand how it is that the Secretary of State is supposed to decide this question.
If that is the sort of thing that is to happen, it would be only right for the acquiring authority to give their side of the picture. If the objection is going to contain masses of detail of this sort, obviously it would be fair that the local authority should be allowed to contradict and put its side of the case. The result of this is that we shall have a massive preliminary procedure which will have to be gone through and dealt with by the Department—it will be no small job—before we can even get to the stage of having a public inquiry.
That is one way in which I think the noble Lord's suggestion could practically be worked out. The other way is one which, with all my cynicism about this, I would not think that noble Lords opposite were suggesting: where the unfortunate land owner should put in his objection, "I object on these grounds: first of all, that this is not development land; and secondly", any other grounds that he can think of. But the Secretary of State is not going to have any grounds whatever, either by way of argument from the person whose land it is, or from the acquiring authority, upon which he can in fact make the decision that the noble Lord has just been saying he would make. I cannot think of any course between 1743 those two which will provide the Secretary of State with the necessary facts upon which he can make the necessary decision. I am genuinely puzzled how this is to work. So that we can consider the effect of this Amendment, and my noble friend's manuscript Amendment, I should be grateful for some practical guidance, to see whether the noble Lord is making a very sensible proposition.
§ 12.5 p.m.
§ Lord MELCHETTAs to the first point, I hesitate to take issue on legal drafting points with the noble Viscount, but I am advised that, while the certificate is conclusive that the land is development land, the Secretary of State still has an absolute discretion as to whether or not to dispense with an inquiry. I hesitate to take issue with the noble Viscount, and if I am wrong and he is right no doubt we shall look at the matter again. However, this is a part of the Bill which has been looked at with great care by the draftsmen and my advice is clear on the point. I am afraid I cannot take it any further than that.
As to the second point raised by the noble Viscount, as I understand it there is nothing to stop the objection being in any form the objector wants it to be. If there was a need for the local authority to put their case, the Secretary of State would simply have an inquiry into the order, and that would be that, because the Secretary of State has a discretion. I think the noble Viscount is right that, although it may be against his professional interests to say so, we do not want a long preliminary inquiry, but in practice it would be open to an objector to raise anything he wanted to.
The noble Viscount raised the question of the local authority's general plans for development over the next period of years, and so on. These will be submitted to the Secretary of State in their five-year rolling programmes which will be submitted to the Secretary of State annually. Therefore, the Secretary of State, in a sense, will be continually judging the authority's side of the position. That might dispense with some of the paper work.
§ Lord FOOTI think that the point made by the noble Viscount has force, and we have not had a satisfactory 1744 answer to it. I hope that the noble Lord, Lord Melchett, will get advice from his legal advisers on this. There are two points I should like to make. The criticisms that the noble Viscount made go to sub-paragraph (3), that there will have to be some Amendment there and not the Amendment with which we are now confronted—that is to strike out altogether the requirement of a certificate.
On that general matter, as to the authority being required, when they formulate a compulsory purchase order, to issue this certificate that it is development land, I sugest that this is a useful safeguard for the individual and the public, because it specifically directs the mind of the authority, when they are proposing to make a compulsory purchase order, to the consideration, "Are we dealing with development land". Every authority, before they make a compulsory purchase order, will have their minds directed to that because they have to put a certificate at the end of the compulsory purchase order, saying, "Yes, this is indeed development land."
Viscount COLVILLE of CULROSSPerhaps this is something I ought to know, but is the rolling programme that is submitted to the Secretary of State by all the local authorities, first of all also submitted and available to the public in the area of the local authority which makes it, and is it specific as to the pieces of land that this is to be development land? Or does it take the form of an acreage, or whatever you have to call it now, a hectareage, of the land which they want for the various purposes that they will be requiring for development over that five years? Can the public also form some judgment, as the noble Lords says the Secretary of State can, as to whether or not what is in the order could be development land?
§ Lord MELCHETTThe answer to the first point is, Yes, it will be available for public inspection. That is our intention. We dealt with that earlier in the Committee stage. On the second point, as I understand it would not be specific as to particular parcels of land, plot A or plot B. As I understood it, the point that the noble Viscount made to me, and in response to which I used the rolling programme, was when he asked whether the objector would be able to put to the Secretary of State objections to the local 1745 authority's general programme, and I was saying that that general programme will be in front of the Secretary of State in the form of a rolling programme.
Viscount COLVILLE of CULROSSIf it is not specific as to plots, will it give an indication of the amounts, perhaps in overall terms of acreage?
§ Lord MELCHETTIt would certainly be specific in terms of amount of acreage as against the amount of money likely to be expended. In the normal course of events, the general amount of land which the local authority was wanting to acquire would certainly be ascertainable from the rolling programme.
Viscount COLVILLE of CULROSSI want to be quite clear about this. If it is simply a matter of how much money they have got to spend, then it is exceedingly difficult for members of the public to know what that represents in terms of land. If they are to give some indication of the amounts of land in terms of area, even if it is only approximate, there will be something which members of the public can go on. But if it is simply that they are to announce that they have £10 million, or whatever it is, to spend, then that is not readily translatable—particularlyduring the transitional period and, I should think, for quite some time afterwards—into anything that makes sense in the case of an individual owner or person who has his land assaulted by a compulsory purchase order. We should get this correct, otherwise we shall again be in danger of creating a situation in which people will consider that an injustice is being done.
§ Lord MELCHETTAs I understand it, the rolling programme will give an indication of the amount of land which the local authority expects to acquire.
§ The Earl of KINNOULLMay I ask the noble Lord, Lord Melchett, two questions arising out of my manuscript Amendment? Does he intend to take back, consider and consult on the point which my noble friend raised, which particularly comes under this provision; namely, the question whether or not the Minister is precluded from taking objections from the owner? Secondly—and this is the point which I am particularly trying to make to the noble Lord—where does the Bill state that the owner may 1746 object to the Minister, and that the Minister may consider his objections under the certificate procedure?
§ Lord MELCHETTI do not know whether the noble Earl has already received advice on his second question. I think that the answer is probably that nowhere in the Bill does it say that the owner may not. Therefore, it is open to anybody to object under the normal procedures and the Bill does nothing to stop that. The answer to his first question, as I have said, is that my legal advice on this point, which has received a great deal of attention and consideration, is perfectly clear, and I do not think I can go any further than that.
§ Lord SANDFORDIt may be clear in that it does not have any provisos attached to it, but it would be enormously helpful to know, if development land is defined, as it is, in Clause 17(4), namely:
In this Act 'development land' means land which, in the opinion of the authority concerned, is needed for relevant development within ten years from the time at which they are acting.how a certificate that that is the opinion of the authority can be anything other than conclusive in relation to everybody, including the Secretary of State. There must be some sort of saving there which would have the effect of making it read:In this Act 'development land' means land which, in the opinion of the authority concerned … and also that of the Secretary of State …".Without some such insertion as that I do not see how the noble Lord can possibly be right. I pass to another point; namely, that it will indeed be necessary—and the noble Lord has indicated how necessary it is—for this rolling programme to be published. That is not in the Bill at the moment, and we shall be coming to an Amendment of mine on Clause 18 to make it so.
§ Lord MELCHETTI look forward to Clause 18 with eager anticipation, hopefully later this morning. It may be helpful if I give a little background to my legal advice, although I see that the noble Viscount, Lord Colville, has left us temporarily. As I understand it, the Secretary of State can dispense with an inquiry, and I must be firm on that point. This is because it is the Secretary of State and not the local authority who may dispense 1747 with an inquiry if it is expedient, and the phrase "it is expedient" appears in Schedule 4(3). That may be of some help to the noble Lord.
§ Baroness YOUNGWe have had a full debate on this issue, but before pursuing my argument I should like to get one point clear from the noble Lord, Lord Melchett. Did he say at one stage that he is prepared to look at this matter again, or did I misunderstand what he said?
§ Lord MELCHETTI am afraid that, not for the first time in the proceedings on this Bill, the noble Baroness misunderstood what I said.
§ Baroness YOUNGIf I have misunderstood, then that is not really surprising when one considers how complicated a subject this is. After all, the noble Lord has the benefit of a great many legal advisers and I, like the non-lawyers, am struggling through it and trying to understand it. I do not feel that I received an answer to the question I asked. The noble Lord, Lord Melchett, himself admitted that although it would be a rare situation, it would be possible for there to be examples where development might or might not be excepted development or exempted development, and over which there could be a dispute between the individual and the authority issuing the certificate. So to that extent, even if it is a rare occasion, it seems to me that the rights of the individual should be safeguarded, even if, as we hope, this will only very rarely occur.
The noble Lord's second argument was that the individual would have the right to object as to whether or not land is development land, but in the exchange between him and my noble friend Lord Colville I think it has become perfectly clear that it will be very difficult indeed for the individual to object at that stage, because he will not know in detail whether or not he will be affected, or at least that could be the case. So that although he may have a right to object, it will be such a general inquiry that it will not be specific enough to help him. In these circumstances, and because I do not feel we have had a satisfactory answer, I do not feel inclined to withdraw my Amendment.
§ Lord MELCHETTBefore the noble Baroness presses the Amendment, may I tell her that her remarks were quite extraordinary? I accepted, as she said, that there could possibly be some ground for dispute but I went on to say—and this has not been challenged by any noble Lord opposite—that a member of the public would have the right to object under the normal CPO procedures and that nothing in the Bill altered that. The noble Baroness said that, because there might on very rare occasions be some room for doubt, the rights of the individual must be protected. Those rights are not affected by the Bill. She then said it would be difficult for the person concerned to know in detail whether he was affected. Considering that the person is having his land bought by compulsory purchase order, he must know whether or not he is affected. The discussion I was having with the noble Viscount, Lord Colville of Culross, was about the sort of evidence a person would be able to bring forward to the Secretary of State and I said there was nothing in the Bill to limit the evidence which could be brought forward. There is nothing in the Bill which limits that. I really do not think the noble Baroness listened to a word I said on the subject.
§ The Earl of KINNOULLThe noble Lord referred to the normal procedures, but I do not think, with respect, that we are dealing with the normal procedures. Could the noble Lord look at the matter again? It is not the normal procedures with which we are dealing, but the special procedures.
§ Lord FOOTWe are in an extraordinary situation, are we not, because the point made by the noble Viscount, Lord Colville of Culross, was in criticism of paragraph 3, and he was wondering whether that was all right. On the other hand, the Amendment which the noble Baroness, Lady Young, is not at present willing to withdraw does not go to the point which the noble Viscount was making. Are we to have a Division to leave in something which the noble Viscount thinks is entirely satisfactory, but which the noble Baroness still thinks is unsatisfactory?
§ Baroness YOUNGWe are in very considerable difficulty over this. As I 1749 said, it is easy for lawyers to be absolutely certain about this matter. I should be the first to admit that, on these very complex points I may not always have understood correctly. I feel that the whole of this is very unsatisfactory but under the circumstances I shall look and see what appears on the Record and shall study it and, if necessary, we can return to it on Report. I beg leave to withdraw the Amendment.
§ Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.
§ 12.21 p.m.
§
The Earl of KINNOULL moved Amendment No. 51A:
Page 56, line 7, leave nut from ("shall") to end of line 9 and insert ("apply").
§ The noble Earl said: We now turn to paragraph 2 of Schedule 4. To many people both outside and in your Lordships' House this gives rise to one of the major procedural problems which arise on Schedule 4. The reason is that, in the past, when a compulsory purchase order has been served on an owner, it has been a fundamental principle of compulsory purchase that a purpose should be stated by the local authority for the making of the order. We see that all this is now to be modified within Schedule 4 and one now recalls that this change affects only development land. It does not affect exempt land or excepted land, so that there will now be two procedures to look at when any compulsory purchase order is made. Therefore, the first criticism that I would make of this provision is that it makes the procedure so complicated for private individuals to understand, as indeed it does for professional people.
§
When the Bill was first drafted, this was an immediate criticism. The criticism is basically the following: instead of stating the purpose for which the land is being compulsorily purchased, the local authority may simply give its general reason and need not state any specific purpose. It may help the Committee if I quote from a brief which I have received from one of the professional bodies on this point. It says:
We consider that it needs to be made clear that it will not be that the land is required for development nor even, as appears to be implied by the note circulated in Standing Committee G by the Minister, for an authority to refer to policies or proposals set out in the various plans. It is essential that
1750
the authority's reason for acquisition be stated in sufficient detail to allow a potential objector to decide whether to object to the acquisition and, if so, on what grounds. In this connection, it must be borne in mind that a landowner may in future be unable effectively to object to acquisition on the grounds that acquisition itself is unnecessary or inexpedient. It is therefore specially important that he should be able to formulate objections having regard to reasons which have been adequately expressed.
§ That summarises the purposes for which the Amendment has been put down. It is intended to allow the owner of the land to object on reasonable grounds to an order. The Amendment recognises that, under the new procedure which is to be adopted, the owner will be given very insubstantial grounds on which to object. When the noble Baroness replies to this point, can she say on what grounds an owner will in future be able to object under this procedure?
§ The second point which I should like to raise with the noble Baroness is one that was raised at about four minutes to midnight two days ago. It relates to the question of compensation, which is very important. Up to now, the basis of market value compensation in compulsory purchase procedures has always been the purpose for which the land was being bought. If the local authority will only give broad reasons, the valuer will be unable to identify the purpose on which to base his valuation. I feel that this is extremely important when the White Paper clearly states that, until the second appointed day, the basis of valuation shall be market value unchanged at present. I believe that this special procedure affects that and I hope that the noble Baroness will take the point into account in her reply. I beg to move.
§ Baroness BIRKAs the noble Earl has explained the effect of this Amendment would be to restore the requirements of Schedule 1 to the Acquisition of Land Acts, that notices relating to compulsory purchase orders, or the orders themselves, should state the purpose for which the land is required—instead of, as paragraph 2 now stands, the reasons for which the authority propose to acquire the land.
When this Bill was introduced in the House of Commons, the provisions in question disapplied any requirement to state the purpose for which the land is 1751 required. The reason for this was that, since the land scheme is concerned with comprehensive acquisition of land in order to achieve the aim of positive planning, the acquiring authority could not always be in a position to say precisely for what form of development the land would be made available. A distinction was drawn between the powers of the Bill and other land acquisition powers under which land purchase is limited to specific purposes.
In the subsequent proceedings on the Bill the provision has been changed so that purposes must be stated in any case where the land is being acquired for "excepted development", but previous to that change the Government had accepted an Opposition Amendment in the other place to the effect that acquiring authorities should be required to give some indication of the type of development they envisaged for the land. So the introduction of the word "reasons" was the result of an Opposition Amendment. This would be covered by the requirement to state reasons—which would not preclude the authority from describing the particular form of development they had in mind for the land if they were in a position to do so—and, as I understand that, "reasons" would in this instance embrace "purposes", but would not saddle them with the impossibility of stating the exact form of relevant development when this will not be known until the detailed planning has been worked out.
I do not really feel that I can go along with the noble Earl's point that it makes it very complicated to have purposes for excepted development because excepted development will be spelt out in regulations under Clause 3(1)(c); so this is very much more specific. This is really in order to cover both points—both purposes and reasons. So, for the type of development to which the modified procedures apply in which a comprehensive approach is envisaged as against a more specific approach, a requirement to state purposes would therefore be too restrictive. Indeed, this was what the Opposition was arguing in the Committee stage in another place. That is the reason for our standing by paragraph 2 of Schedule 4 in its present form.
Viscount COLVILLE of CLTLROSSCan the noble Baroness deal with the practical point made by my noble friend Lord Kinnoull on the valuation? It will apply not only to the private valuer but to the district valuer as well, so I feel that she must have given her mind to this point. I should be very grateful if she can answer this question for me. When land is acquired, the rule under the Land Compensation Act 1973, which will of course be applied under this Bill, is that, unless the amount of compensation is agreed, the claimant—that is, the person from whom the land is being acquired—can ask to be paid 90 per cent. of what the district valuer says is the amount of compensation he believes to be due.
Therefore, in the case of every one of these compulsory acquisitions under this procedure, the district valuer himself will have to make up his mind on what basis of compensation—that is to say, until the second appointed day—he will have to say the land should be valued. He will have to say that there is a different value for land for residential purposes from that for shopping, industrial or other form of development. He will have to say what is to be the basis of his computation. How will he do that? The Inland Revenue must have given some thought to this, because it will be a duty which will fall upon it in large measure every day, all over the country. If we can be told how the district valuer will do it, then we shall have the answer for my noble friend, because private valuers will be able to do the same.
§ Baroness BIRKBefore answering the noble Viscount, I wish to deal with a point which the noble Earl raised earlier regarding the question of when an owner can object. I apologise for the fact that I did not deal with this earlier. An owner can object on any grounds and there is nothing in the Bill to stop him doing so; this is quite specific. With regard to the basis of compensation, I understand that the basis now will be the value on the open market between a willing vendor and a willing purchaser. If the purposes cannot be discovered from the compulsory purchase, and there are no other planning assumptions relevant, then the vendor can apply for a certificate under Section 17 of the Land 1753 Compensation Act. I hope that that answers the noble Viscount's point.
Viscount COLVILLE of CULROSSI do not think it does, because the Section 17 certificate procedure is a procedure which allows one to ask for a certificate to say—or, as amended by this Bill, to suggest—what would be alternative types of development which would be suitable on the land if it was not to be developed for the purposes for which the acquiring authority was acquiring it. If it is not known for what purpose the acquiring authority is acquiring the land then, for the life of me, I do not see how any alternatives can be suggested. Or is one expected to put forward all the possible alternatives, entirely regardless of whether or not they cover the purposes for which the acquiring authority are to develop the land? Is that what it will be necessary to do? I am afraid that the noble Baroness's answer does not quite fulfil the practicalities of the situation, and we still will not know what we are supposed to do.
§ Baroness BIRKAs I understand this—and my legal knowledge on this matter has its limitations—the reasons relate to the much larger acquisition. Once the matter becomes more specific, the purposes would then be stated. What I said earlier would then operate. If the purposes cannot be discovered from the compulsory purchase order, and there are no other planning assumptions relevant, then that is the point where the application for a certificate comes in. But as we are still on this Amendment dealing with reasons and purposes, possibly the point which the noble Viscount is making could be raised more appropriately when we deal with compensation. The question of reasons and purposes does not quite cover this other matter.
It may help him to know that we are again looking at the provisions in this paragraph only on the basis that it is not clear. I repeat that this was changed in response to an Opposition Amendment. The whole object of changing from "purposes" to "reasons" was that it might be more helpful to the local authorities. I wish to return for a moment to the valuation question and to point out that the 90 per cent. rule will continue to apply. I am advised that it should be remembered that the purpose 1754 for which an authority is to use the land is only one of the planning assumptions used on a compulsory acquisition. One can also rely on a designation in a development plan, or any planning permission, which is in existence on a Section 17 certificate. But how can it be known what to apply for if the land is being bought for open space? Therefore, the matter must be left open; otherwise, it would completely cut out the possibility of an authority buying the land for open space.
Viscount COLVILLE of CULROSSThat is not really right, but the noble Baroness is doing her best on a very difficult subject and I do not want to be tiresome. I believe that both I and my noble friend have a point here. The noble Baroness has not answered it, but I do not blame her for that in any way. But this is an appropriate point at which to raise the matter, because as the situation stands under the Acts covering acquisition of land, as they are, this problem does not arise. I am well aware that the change has been made in response to what the Opposition said, and I welcome that. I am simply drawing attention to a further practical difficulty which will actually happen.
Would the noble Baroness be so kind as to get down to the nuts and bolts of this matter with her advisers? Would she be so kind as to let me have a note on how this will actually happen, after conversation in which she can deal with all the details. Clearly, we cannot do that here in the Committee. Will she let my noble friend and myself have a look at the note, so that we can see whether it will really work in practice? That is all we want.
§ Baroness BIRKYes, I am quite prepared to do that. As I have said, we are looking into this matter again. I did not want to prolong what was earlier developing into a very general debate, but I should now like to take the opportunity to say—and I hope that he does not blemish his record; and I agree with the noble Lord, Lord Foot—that most of the points raised by the noble Viscount have been very constructive and helpful ones, upon which we are trying very hard to give answers and information. I shall make sure that the noble Viscount gets a note on this matter.
§ The Earl of KINNOULLI am grateful to the noble Baroness for some of her replies. It seemed that at the end of her last reply she said that the Government were simply trying to be more helpful to local authorities and that that is the reason why the word "purpose" has been changed to "reasons" —
§ Baroness BIRKI said that the idea was put to us that this would be more helpful, and I stated that I did not think it was clear that the change had made the matter any more helpful. It has probably not made it any worse or any better. That is why I was saying that we were looking at this again, to see whether we had it right.
§ The Earl of KINNOULLI am grateful for that assurance. I was going on to say that the noble Baroness said that any objector could—to use her words—"use any grounds". This point spills over to a further Amendment which we shall be discussing later. When the noble Baroness looks at this matter again, will she consider the possibility of the Minister issuing a circular defining what the reasons must include? This is really the burden of the objections outside the House: reasons may be far too wide and woolly for any objector to specify his objections. Will she consider that, please?
§ Baroness BIRKWe must first consider the basic point raised by the noble Earl. From there, once it has been sorted out what should go into the Bill, we get to the next point, which will certainly not be written into the Bill, on the whole general question of information, explanation and so on. That must be considered at later stages, not now. But I will certainly take notice of what the noble Earl said.
§ The Earl of KINNOULLI am grateful for that assurance and for the fact that the noble Baroness will look at this whole matter again. I beg leave to withdraw the Amendment.
§ Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.
§ 12.39 p.m.
§
The Earl of BALFOUR moved Amendment No. 52:
Page 56, line 13, after ("occupier") insert ("(except tenants for a month or any period less than a month)").
§
The noble Earl said: I hope that we can be quite brief here. This expression,
1756
except tenants for a month or any period less than a month",
appears in the Scotitsh Act of 1947 and in various other pieces of legislation. I presume that this Schedule is intended to apply to Scotland, and therefore, I consider that these words should be inserted. I beg to move.
§ Baroness BIRKAs the noble Earl is aware, these Amendments attempt to modify the existing procedure under the Acquisition of Land Acts which apply to compulsory purchase orders where no objections are made. The noble Earl seeks to insert the words:
except tenants for a month or any period less than a month",but I do not quite understand the purpose underlying this. If it is because he feels that the words were omitted in error, which can sometimes happen—and no other reason has been detected—then I must say that this is not so, because subparagraph (1) is identical with sub-paragraph (1)of paragraph 4 of Schedule 1 to the Acquisition of Land Acts, and is to be read with the preceding paragraphs of that Schedule. I must say hastily that if the noble Earl has overlooked that I do not blame him at all.Paragraph 3(1)(b) requires the authority to serve notice of the effect of the order on:
… every owner, lessee and occupier (except tenants for a month or any period less than a month)".Since notice does not have to be served on such tenants, they are not,any such owner, lessee or occupier as aforesaid",and paragraph 3 of the original Schedule explains this. The words that the Amendment would insert are therefore quite unnecessary. I hope the noble Earl will accept this point and will not, therefore, press his first Amendment.As to his second Amendment, if this were accepted the Secretary of State would be in a position of either having to confirm an order to which there were no objections by owners, lessees or occupiers, or reject it. As I see it, he would be faced with a completely straight choice. But it cannot be ruled out that the Secretary of State, when he considers the order, may decide that it is not justified in relation to a particular property; or the authority may well ask him to exclude 1757 a part of the land which they are satisfied, or have been persuaded by the owner, they no longer need to acquire. Without the power to confirm an order with modifications, the acquiring authority would be obliged to start all over again with a fresh order, which would mean unnecessary delay and wasted effort. It would also take away the flexibility, and would in fact in many ways be doing the sort of thing which, on other occasions during the Committee stage, the noble Earl and other noble Lords have been trying to prevent. They have not wanted it all to be restricted: they have wanted to be able to open it up so that there could be modification, so that there would not be a straight, "Yes" or, "No". I therefore hope that the noble Earl will agree that this is perhaps the result of a slight misunderstanding in this very complicated part of the Bill.
The Earl of BALFOURIf I may first go back to Amendment No. 52, I am sorry I have not got the Act beside me but I am fairly certain that words identical to these appear in the Scottish Act of 1947. At this stage, however, I will not press it. Perhaps somebody could check up, and if I am right I shall come back on Report.
§ Baroness BIRKOn that point, perhaps I may say that the noble Earl is quite right. It does come in the Scottish Act of 1947, but it also comes in the English Act of 1946, and this, perhaps, is where it has been slightly overlooked. So that really is covered, I can assure the noble Earl.
The Earl of BALFOURI think this has strengthened my point a little, but this is not something on which I would divide the Committee. The point is that these are objections which are made by an owner, lessee or occupier, and I think that, for the sake of the local authority, what one does not want to happen is for there to be objections made by an occupier whose tenancy is going to be of such a temporary sort that it may be a terrible nuisance to the authority. That is the point I was trying to make. The other point, in respect of Amendment No. 53, is this. If, leaving out the irrelevant words, I may read the substituted paragraph 4, it says:
If no objection is duly made … or if all objections … are withdrawn, the confirming 1758 authority … may … confirm the order with or without modifications".With very great respect—and I am sorry I have not got all the legislation in front of me, but I have about enough as it is—I would think that this is a case where perhaps the Secretary of State could not come in. This is a case where I did not want the confirming authority to confirm the order with modifications when nobody had objected to the original order. What I am trying to do is to make quite certain that the authority cannot alter the order after it has been published when there have been no objections to it or when, if there have been objections raised, they have been withdrawn. I felt that, having published it, they could then bring in a modification, and I wanted to make quite certain that they could not do that rather as an afterthought. That is the point I am making, and perhaps I could ask the noble Baroness, Lady Birk, to have a look at it again.
§ Baroness BIRKI think that situation is perfectly well covered, but perhaps may add another word. On the noble Earl's first point, the words I was referring to are in the previous paragraph (I am afraid I fell into the same trap and got my paragraphs mixed up) so I think he will find, if he looks at that now, that it is quite all right. As to his second Amendment, it is not a case of the Secretary of State intervening, as it were, when something is settled. If I may give an instance, if a local authority manages to reach agreement with objectors an order may become unopposed because all the objections are withdrawn. But, supposing the withdrawal was conditional on the understanding that the authority would ask the Secretary of State to modify the order in some way—and this is the way things have been going in other areas today—then it would be a pity, I would have thought, to take away this flexibility, because sometimes agreement can be reached on condition that there is some form of modification. This is the point that this covers.
The Earl of BALFOURI did not realise that if there was no objection to the order, or if the objections were all withdrawn, the confirming authority still needed to get approval from the Secretary of State, and that it might be the Secretary of State who wanted to alter it. I thought the Secretary of State came in 1759 only where there were objections, under subparagraph (2). I hope that the Secretary of State is able to come in at the first instance and that the authority cannot change its mind after an order has been made.
§ Baroness BIRKNo, but there may be negotiations going on as a result of which objections which have been strongly made are, by agreement, withdrawn, but the objections may be withdrawn on condition that there should be some form of modification of the order. It may be that the agreement is that something should be given up, or the objectors may say, "If you let us retain this or that then we will agree". But in this case—and I think we are perhaps getting a little into a lost area—the confirming authority is the Secretary of State and not the local authority. When one comes to the confirming authority, this is the Secretary of State, and I think the noble Earl will agree that in those circumstances, which obviously will not arise every day or all the time, there must be this element of flexibility.
The Earl of BALFOURI think we really have absolutely hit the nail on the head here, and I hope this may have been of benefit to other noble Lords. Perhaps I had not fully appreciated that the confirming authority in this case was none less than the Secretary of State. That really does make a difference. I feel that we now have so many authorities that I am beginning to wonder which one is which.
But let me leave it at that; and I beg leave to withdraw Amendment No. 52 and not move Amendment No. 53.
§ Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.
§ 12.49 p.m.
§
The Earl of BALFOUR moved Amendment No. 54:
Page 56, line 19, leave out ("may if it considers it expedient to do so") and insert ("shall having regard to all the circumstances").
§ The noble Earl said: Once again very briefly, what I am thinking about here is this. Where an objection has been made and not withdrawn, then I feel that the confirming authority "shall having regard to all the circumstances, and if 1760 sub-paragraph (3) below applies", either hold a public local inquiry or at least afford the person by whom an objection has been made and not withdrawn an opportunity to appear before and to be heard by the person appointed. I feel that where a case for objection has definitely been made the words, "may if it considers it expedient to do so" are not quite as strong as I should like. At least here you do not necessarily have to hold a local inquiry. I beg to move.
§ Baroness BIRKI am sure the noble Earl will agree that it would be better to deal with both his Amendments. They are tied together. I am not quite clear what he is trying to achieve. In spite of the insertion of the word "shall", the addition of the words, "having regard to all the circumstances" suggests that it is intended to leave some discretion with the confirming authority. Legally, there are a great many problems about the use of the word "shall". What seems to be intended—and this is the legal point—is that "shall" is being used in the sense of "may" and the Amendments are trying to convey a presumption that there should be a public inquiry unless the circumstances indicate to the contrary; rather than leave the matter to the discretion of the Secretary of State. It is not very clear.
However, the issues raised by the Amendments go to the basic philosophy behind the power to dispense with a public inquiry in certain circumstances, which is that it is absolutely right for the owner of a site to be able to raise at a public inquiry all the issues related to the development of his land, and the fact that the proposed development may carry with it the likelihood of acquisition by an authority. But once these issues have been threshed out in this way, they should be regarded as settled, and it should not be possible for an individual to go over all the same ground again at a second public inquiry. The Government absolutely accept that if this power is not to be oppressive to the individual—and, in spite of some of the things that were said at the beginning of this debate, they are very anxious about this, and conscious of the basic necessity of seeing that they are not oppressive to the individual—then the circumstances in which it may be used must be carefully framed.
1761 That is why it has been threshed out in discussion both in Commons Committee and with the Council on Tribunals. The formulation now contained in the Bill was inserted at Commons Report stage, and this is acceptable to the Council on Tribunals apart from a minor reservation on the status of structure plans. As the noble Earl is aware, the Council is the statutory guardian of the interests of individuals on all matters concerned with inquiries and related procedures, and it would therefore need to be a very strong case to overturn their judgment. Therefore, I think the noble Earl should rest on that. There is a perfectly good precedent in paragraph 4(4) of Schedule 3 to the New Towns Act 1965, which allows the Secretary of State to dispense with a public inquiry where he is satisfied that he is sufficiently informed as to the matters to which the objection relates; and that is still operative.
The Earl of BALFOURI am grateful for that explanation and I am glad the matter has been gone into. This answer should help us all. I beg leave to withdraw the Amendment.
§ Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.
§ 12.55 p.m.
§
Lord SANDYS moved Amendment No. 55B:
Page 56, line 27, leave out ("either").
§ The noble Lord said: This is my first contribution to the Committee procedure this morning and I should like to preface my remarks by saying that I felt that the remarks of the noble Lord, Lord Foot, in his statement this morning were particularly offensive because they tended to suggest that a large number of the Opposition Amendments are rather vexatious or mischievous and not tending towards helpful amendment of the Bill. He did, however, place in a quite separate category—and one may or may not agree—the Amendments of my noble friend Lord Colville of Culross. I heartily approve of my noble friend's Amendment.
§ Lord FOOTMay I say that if I was offensive about any of the Amendments moved, I regret it; but it certainly does not apply to the Amendment which the noble Lord is about to move.
§ Lord SANDYSI am obliged to the noble Lord, Lord Foot, for what he has 1762 said. Here are two series of Amendments: notably Nos. 55B and 56A to which I shall speak and the two Amendments, Nos. 55A and 56C to which my noble friend Lord Colville of Culross is going to speak.
We are dealing here with the heartland of the Bill; namely, the acquisition of land under Schedule 4. I should like to say quite a lot about this and about the philosophy behind it because I believe it to be very important. Firstly, what measure of consolidation has taken place in this vital area since 1946? The answer is: comparatively little—because we are still relating in Schedule 4 most of the clauses and subsections relating to that basic 1946 Act. We have to consider the Compulsory Purchase Act 1965, the Town and Country Planning Act 1971 and the Land Compensation Act 1973 to which my noble friend Lord Colville has referred. It is here, in my submission, that much of the difficulty arises. I wish to be helpful to the noble Baroness and would suggest that if it is possible that following the discussions she has suggested should take place on Schedule 4, a measure of consolidation can take place on these various Acts, real benefit will he derived.
I shall address myself to another aspect of this matter, the philosophical aspect. I think that the language of the discussions during the earlier part of this morning very clearly indicated the divide between the two sides. I should like to remind the noble Baroness of the language of the discussions which took place in 1968—because I think this is fundamental to our approach—when her noble friend Lord Greenwood of Rossendale introduced in another place the Town and Country Planning Bill of that year.
This is a quotation from the Official Report of the House of Commons of 31st January 1968 when the noble Lord—he was then the right honourable Anthony Greenwood—said (at col. 1361 of Vol. 757):
The problem now is not to establish a new system of control, but to make it more relevant to current needs and techniques, and more sensitive to modern thought and current pressures for change.A little further on (in col. 1362) he said:Above all I am determined that there shall be more real public participation in planning. I want people to have a much better chance of 1763 being involved in the planning of the area they live in and of influencing it.A little further on (in col. 1367) he said:There must, of course, be proper precautions against unfair pressures in the exceptional case, so the Bill provides an elaborate safety net.… The Bill keeps all the normal rights of objection and hearing.This is quite different language from the much more totalitarian language that we have observed to fall from noble Lords opposite this morning.To come to the Amendment itself, we have all experienced difficulty with the modifications of the Acquisition of Land Acts. The Amendment seeks the removal of heads (b) and (c) from sub-paragraph (3) on page 56 of the Bill. If these are removed, it means that the right to a public inquiry under the Act of 1946 is restored. We believe that in both cases this would be a valuable addition and therefore I beg to move the Amendment.
§ Lord STANLEY of ALDERLEYMy Lords, on page 56, paragraph (3) mentions the development plan. Could this mean a structure plan? If so, I think I am right in saying that there will be no public inquiry except a limited examination in public—that is, when discussing the structure plan—and I emphasise that the individual has no right to participate. He has to be invited by the Secretary of State. Perhaps the noble Baroness could help me on that point.
Lord HENLEYPerhaps I could help the noble Lord. I mentioned this subject on Second Reading. It means a structure plan, as the noble Lord will see if he turns to page 57 sub-paragraph (9), which explains what a development plan means. What I said at Second Reading, and it still holds, was that a structure plan is too broad a brush for an individual to base the reasons for wanting an inquiry. Not only is the structure plan too broad a brush for him to work on, but the old style development plans, many of which are out of date, render it difficult for individuals and third parties, such as amenity societies, who may wish to force an inquiry on an acquisition. Head (b) is also the subject of the noble Lord's Amendment. There are perhaps stronger reasons for removing head (c) from the Bill than there are for removing head (b). But on the whole, I prefer to see only head (a), with heads (b) and (c) deleted. 1764 I said this in our Second Reading debate on the No. 2 Bill. On the Second Reading of this Bill, I congratulated the Government on having improved this paragraph by adding the words,… "after having a public local inquiry" to to head (a). I thought at that time that the Government had overcome all my objections. But, when I looked at it more closely, I saw they had not. I am still worried, particularly about head (c), and I hope that the noble Baroness will be able to satisfy me that I have no cause for alarm.
§ Lord FOOTMay I make an inquiry about this? As I understand it, we are discussing Amendments Nos. 55B and 56A together. Regarding Amendment No. 56C the Amendment of the noble Viscount, Lord Colville of Culross, I imagine that would not be called if the present Amendments were carried, because they would be deleting the heads. This is a quite serious inquiry: I should like to know whether the noble Viscount thinks that head (b) would be satisfactory if his Amendment were subsequently adopted, or does he share the view of his Front Bench that the proper course is to cut out heads (b) and (c) altogether?
Viscount COLVILLE of CULROSSPerhaps I may respond to the noble Lord, Lord Henley, about this, and it may be as well to "feed" my Amendment in as well. The Amendment I have down to sub-paragraph (3)(b) is probably a restrictive one. The number of occasions when a local plan will be subjected to a public inquiry by the Secretary of State rather than by somebody appointed, who simply reports back to the local authority which made the local plan in the first place, is rather limited. However, what I am trying to do is find a midway position, whereby the public inquiry which has previously occurred will be of such adequate nature as to preclude the necessity for another one later when it comes to an acquisition under this Bill.
I do not think all public inquiries will necessarily come into that category as they relate just to the local plan system as it is. We want it more restrictive as to those which will preclude any further necessity for a compulsory acquisition. I should like to reserve this point for argument later. If we are slightly more 1765 restrictive on the public inquiries which we choose for this purpose as to local plans, and also so long as we make certain that local plans continue to be kept up-to-date and the whole thing does not fall into complete decay—as did the development plan system—it is possible that I would prefer my own Amendment to the total deletion of head (b).
§ 1.7 p.m.
§ Baroness BIRKWe are aware of this difficulty because there is an overlap between different Amendments of the noble Lord, Lord Sandys, and the noble Viscount, Lord Colville of Culross. I will deal with the Amendment of the noble Lord, Lord Sandys, and my noble friend Lord Melchett will deal with the later Amendment. Amendment No. 55B is a paving Amendment for Amendment No. 56A, which is the substantive Amendment we are discussing. As it is at the moment, it will require the Secretary of State to be satisfied that the provisions of the local plan covered relevant development as defined, or else, unless case (a) applied, he would have to hold an inquiry. Since there will have been an inquiry into the local plan it would be wasteful to have a further inquiry into the CPO solely for the purpose of going over the planning ground again. It should therefore be for the Secretary of State to decide on the basis of other considerations whether it is expedient to hold an inquiry.
Similarly in case (c), where the existing old-style development plan is Ordnance Survey based, and gives detailed proposals for the use of land, there is an expectation, until such time as it may be superseded by a local plan covering the land in question, that the land would be developed according to the allocations in the plan. If relevant development would clearly be consistent with the allocation for the particular land, and these allocations will have been decided after an inquiry, it is inappropriate that the CPO inquiry should be used as an occasion for debate of planning policies for the area. For these reasons, having looked at it very carefully, it is unacceptable that heads (b) and (c) should be omitted. The Amendments should therefore be resisted.
There can be objection that a structure plan will generally be too vague to form the basis for acquisition—this is stated in the note on the planning framework. But there would be technical difficulty 1766 in attempting to depart from the Planning Act definition of what is the development plan before a local plan is in existence. You have to have the saving provision. The Secretary of State would certainly take into account the nature of the structure plan in deciding whether to exercise his discretion, and would hold an inquiry if this were necessary. The new sub-paragraph (3)(c) automatically brings in an approved structure plan. The structure plan was raised by the noble Lord, Lord Stanley, and I will seek to say something about it. This is because until there is an approved local plan the development plan for an area is the old-style plan overlaid by the structure plan, when that is approved.
We accept that the structure plan will rarely be sufficiently precise to provide a basis for land acquisition, as most structure plans would not deal with land uses in enough detail to enable it to be said that a development was in accordance with the structure plan. But if the Secretary of State proposed to rely on the structure plan as a basis for dispensing with an inquiry into a compulsory purchase order he would need—and this is really the important point—to satisfy himself that the structure plan contained sufficient detail to enable a potential objector to identify how his interests were affected and also to consider whether such a person has been given an effective opportunity to challenge the proposal for the development of the land, on the basis that there should be no objection to letting the definition of development plan in sub-paragraph (c) cover an approved structure plan. Therefore, with the present state of the planning laws, making this Schedule to the Bill work effectively and providing as many safeguards as possible, it seems to us that no good purpose would be served by the omission of those two paragraphs.
Perhaps I might say a brief word about public participation. There is nothing in the Bill—and certainly nothing so far as these sub-paragraphs are concerned—that effects public participation on planning issues. We can dispense with an inquiry at the compulsory stage only where there has been an inquiry on the planning issues. Even where, under paragraph 4 of the Schedule, we rely on an unapproved plan, there must have been public participation, as provided for 1767 in the 1971 Act, which derives from the 1968 Act, to which the noble Lord drew our attention.
Viscount COLVILLE of CULROSSI wonder whether the noble Baroness could be a little more precise on one point? She was talking about the structure plan and she said words to the effect that the Secretary of State would probably not consider that that process had been sufficiently centred upon a piece of land to deprive the owner subsequently, subject to compulsory purchase, of a public inquiry for the second time. The noble Baroness referred to the difficulty of definition and said, if I may paraphrase, that the Secretary of State would weigh up whether or not there had been an effective opportunity of objecting to the development of that land. Perhaps the noble Baroness would clarify that, because at the structure plan stage one cannot have an effective opportunity to object given to the development of land.
What I think is meant is: did the person who is now asking for a second public inquiry into a compulsory purchase order under this Bill have an effective opportunity to challenge the provisions of the structure plan, so that he covered the ground now to be the subject of a second compulsory purchase order, if there is one? I should like to remind the noble Baroness that, if you try to get down to too much detail when you seek to make yourself heard at the structure plan public hearing, you are always told by the Secretary of State: "Don't bring this forward now. This is a point for a local plan and I shall not give you an opportunity of being heard at the round table conference." I think that if the noble Baroness looks at the practice of this she will find that there have been very few occasions indeed where at a structure plan hearing anybody would have been given an effective opportunity of objecting to any sort of development or to any proposals for the allocation of land. I should be most grateful if the noble Baroness could clear up this point, because it would be very helpful for those of us who will have to handle this matter in practice.
§ Baroness BIRKI accept what the noble Viscount has said. Perhaps I might 1768 clear up two points. If the Secretary of State proposed to rely on a structure plan as a basis for dispensing with an inquiry, he would have to do two things. First, he would satisfy himself that the plan gave sufficient detail to enable the prospective objector to identify how his interests were affected. Secondly, he would have to consider whether such a person had been given an effective opportunity to challenge the proposal for the development of the land. Those are the two points involved. In answer to the direct question put by the noble Viscount, the answer is, "Yes". There are a few structure plans containing sufficient detail to justify using them for this purpose. There have been, I am told, examples in the West Midlands. However, the noble Viscount is right in saying it is not very often they are called into operation.
Lord HENLEYIt is equally almost impossible for a situation to arise where the structure plan will be detailed enough. Therefore I hope that this will not be used as a device to allow the Secretary of State to escape from the necessity of holding a public inquiry. I feel there are very grave dangers in this.
§ Baroness BIRKNo, it will not be used as a device. I should like to clear that up. I said there were examples in the West Midlands; they have involved cases where there has been sufficient detail, which has been looked at and been taken into account. We are fully aware of these points, and I can assure your Lordships that this will not be used in any, shall I say?, improper way.
§ Lord SANDYSAs I said earlier, we are in a particularly difficult area. I am much obliged to my noble friends who have supported me and also to the noble Baroness for having elucidated some of the dark areas in which we have found ourselves. It appears that it would be for the convenience of the Committee if I ask leave to withdraw Amendments Nos. 55B and 56A. We shall then have, as has been pointed out, the opportunity of discussing Nos. 55A and 56C, which stand in the name of my noble friend Lord Colville. I beg leave to withdraw Amendment No. 55B.
§ Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.
1769
§
Viscount COLVILLE of CULROSS moved Amendment No. 55A
Page 56, line 28, after ("development") insert ("of a kind consistent with the reasons specified by the authority for their proposal to acquire the land").
§ The noble Viscount said: We are concerned here with the first of the three paragraphs, where the circumstances are such, in the view of the Secretary of State, that it is not necessary to have a second public inquiry. I want to make sure that we shall have a situation whereby we can avoid an outcry in the locality if on the second occasion a public inquiry is disallowed. I am concerned because the test whereby the Secretary of State may dispense with a public inquiry on the subsequent compulsory purchase under this Bill in paragraph (a) is that planning permission for relevant development is in force. "Relevant development" is extremely wide. We know it is defined in the Bill and it is everything which is not dealt with in (a), (b) or (c) of Clause 3. That means there are a broad collection of things which could be relevant development.
§ Perhaps I may give a specific example of what might happen. Supposing there is a piece of land about which we have just come back from a public inquiry. There are 50 acres for housing on the edge of a town, largely surrounded by other housing and immediately fronting, on the other side of a quite small road on to a large area of National Trust or common land. It has for some time been the policy of the local authority that this should be developed for housing. Therefore, say this was a called-in inquiry because there were other matters that had to be dealt with, but the Secretary of State eventually gave planning permission after a public inquiry for it to be developed for housing.
§ Along comes the local authority and says: "We wish compulsorily to acquire this land for industry." Nobody would suggest for a moment that the planning authority in the first place would have given permission for that land to be used for industry. Nor in any circumstances would the people who came as interested parties, or possibly as amenity societies, to take part in the first public inquiry have taken the same view of that occasion or been the same people as would have emerged had the proposition been that the 1770 land should be developed for industry. Quite different points would have arisen; quite different people would have been concerned, and the whole matter would have been a different kind of public inquiry altogether.
§ One can think of many points, but among other things one of the major differences would have been the question of the traffic that would have emerged, because one would probably have been dealing with heavy traffic involving quite different road problems from those a residential development would have given rise to. Therefore, one cannot necessarily assume that, because there has been a public inquiry into a development of one kind which has led to planning permission, this necessarily means that a public inquiry can be dispensed with on a subsequent compulsory purchase order if the land is going to be used for something totally different. There may be quite different considerations and the land may be wholly unsuitable for the second purpose for which the acquiring authority then comes along, and which I suppose it may specify in its reasons under paragraph 2 of this Schedule.
§ In those circumstances I am sure that noble Lords opposite would be quite certain, and would be in entire agreement with me, that it would be wholly wrong to dispense with a second public inquiry. But unfortunately under the Bill as it is drafted that could be so. I do not suppose for a moment it would be done, but I would think that if their intention is the same as mine—and I hope that both of them are intentions of good sense—it would be as well to see whether we could devise some form of wording in the Bill which will make it perfectly clear to everybody that nobody will be deprived of a second public inquiry if there is a compulsory purchase order in the kind of circumstances I have spoken about.
§ People are incredibly worried about being deprived of a public inquiry when a compulsory purchase order is in the air. They are genuinely dismayed at having their land taken away without an opportunity to express themselves upon the subject, and so are their neighbours and so are many other interested people. I believe that if this Bill is going to achieve any kind of acceptance at all we must be particularly careful to ensure that people do not get it into their heads that they will 1771 be deprived of a public inquiry on a compulsory purchase order in circumstances where, in practice, this will not be the case. Will noble Lords opposite see whether they can help us on this matter? My drafting may not be the best. It is what I have been able to do by attracting the Amendment that was inserted by the Government in another place. It may not be specific enough even now, but at least it goes along with the way the Bill is now drafted, and I believe it would go along some way towards meeting the kind of fears I have attempted to outline. I beg to move.
§ 1.24 p.m.
§ Lord SANDFORDI rise to support my noble friend and to suggest that it might be for the convenience of the Committee, and I believe for the convenience of the Government, to discuss with his two Amendments the Amendment standing in my name, Amendment No. 56, and that standing in the name of my noble friend Lord Ridley and myself, Amendment No. 57. The Committee will see that Amendments Nos. 55A and 56 are broadly similar. I am quite convinced, however, that the Amendment of my noble friend Lord Colville of Culross is the better of the two and so I shall not be moving No. 56. The purpose of it is identical to the one my noble friend has just explained.
On the other hand, I think that even when his Amendments have been imported into the Bill No. 57 is also needed to apply the same principle to sub-paragraphs (3)(b) and (3)(c) where, although it is already provided that the relevant development should be in accordance with the provisions of that plan in each case, I think the arguments which he has just adduced in putting forward his own Amendment No. 56A nevertheless still apply; that is so particularly in the case of the old development plans, many of which are now very out of date and where approval may have been given, after an inquiry, in quite different circumstances and for quite different things from those for which the local authority now propose to acquire the land for relevant development. Those are my general points which bear strictly on the Amendment my noble friend has proposed, Amendment No. 55A.
1772 There are two more general points to be made. One is that there is some danger in the alternatives offered here, particularly the last one, in that there are a lot of very old development plans about and some of them have not yet been approved. If they are used by local authorities as a way of circumventing a planning inquiry the acquisition of land for the purposes of positive planning will be pressed into a somewhat outmoded mould of local plans. In many cases it would be very much better to go through the business of a public local inquiry and to get the acquisition plans in line with more up-to-date thinking about the area —even though that would involve a public local inquiry. The temptation to use out-of-date or unapproved development plans as a way of avoiding that trouble will be only too clear and only too strong. I should like the noble Baroness to comment on that point.
The use of one of these three devices to avoid a public local inquiry will deprive a number of people of a say in an important act by the local authority; namely, the act of acquisition of land for development. As my noble friend has pointed out, one group of people will have turned up at the planning inquiry for planning permission, or at some stage of public participation for the local plan when local plans come along—but, of course, in many cases they are a long way off yet, and a different group of people will want to have a say from those who were involved in the public local inquiry leading to approval of the old development plan. I hope that the Government are as much wedded to public participation now in the case of public acquisition of land as they were when they promoted the 1968 Act when public participation was a very strong theme in all their speeches on that subject.
§ Baroness BIRKI just said so.
§ Lord SANDFORDThat is fine. That is all I want to say on those two general points, and on the specific one I am very happy to support my noble friend in his Amendment No. 55A.
The Earl of BALFOURI am thinking of a case where perhaps the local authority has acquired, under a structure plan or whatever kind of plan one likes, in order to have a housing development perhaps 1773 with a full new secondary school being built in the area. Then, for some reason or other, it is decided to split the school. It can be done either horizontally—in other words, making two schools dealing with ages 11 to 13 and 14 to 16—or vertically, say to avoid a two-stream school becoming a four-stream school. Then the land is sold off or the purpose for which it is to be used is changed. The school is moved and the land is to be used for industrial purposes. I am certain there are many occasions where nobody would ever dream of objecting to a school going up but people might furiously object to an industry going there. Anybody who has local authority experience will be aware that plans may be drawn up for a local authority school and that then the Department of Education decides to raise the standards.
I can well remember how extremely annoyed I was with a local authority some years ago when, because of a change of standards (although it was an improvement for which we were all very grateful) our plans for the school, which had cost us about £20,000 had to be thrown into the waste-paper basket and re-drawn. In that case there was the further problem that the site which we had originally chosen for the school was no longer big enough and we had to re-site it. I am sure that we all sympathise with this kind of thing, but would we sympathise if that same piece of land were to be used for an industrial purpose? We may have liked to be given the opportunity to object to its being used for that purpose. Because circumstances change, cases of this kind are sometimes beyond the immediate imagination and planning of the local authority. I support my noble friends on this side of the Committee in this respect. Wherever circumstances have changed, let us give the local people a second opportunity to raise objections and to act as though the original inquiry had never taken place.
§ Lord PARGITERBefore my noble friend replies, may I deal with the points that have been raised? To suggest that a local authority will not proceed with a secondary school or any other kind of school, but will use for industrial development a site that is in the midst of a residential area, is stretching the imagination a little. At least, that has not come to my knowledge when I have been dealing 1774 with local planning authorities. It seems to me that we are getting into very deep water. As I see it, a local authority will designate an area for residential development and ancillary purposes and will designate another area for industrial purposes. It will not necessarily specify the type of industry, but it will specify the areas to be used for industry, for residential development and for ancillary developments such as schools, open space, shops and so on. If I were a member of a local authority, I should hesitate to look further ahead than 10 years when deciding how to designate land.
§ 1.32 p.m.
§ Lord MELCHETTI am grateful to my noble friend for those remarks, because they reinforce what I intend to say about this series of Amendments. It would be helpful if I began by saying something fairly general about the procedure and then dealt with the Amendments and the points which have been raised. The modifications to the compulsory purchase procedures to which the Amendments all relate apply only where the acquiring authority certify that the order is for the acquisition of outstanding interests in development land. This morning I have already touched on the point that "development land" means land which, in the opinion of the authority concerned, is needed for relevant development within 10 years. That will exclude exempt and excepted development. The modified procedures, including power to dispense with an inquiry, will therefore apply only to the kind of land which is at the core of the community land scheme, and which is to be brought into public ownership so that the positive planning objectives of the scheme are achieved.
As noble Lords will know, since the Bill was introduced the power to dispense with an inquiry has been amended in another place. It is now circumscribed by important conditions. These state that the planning status of the land as suitable for relevant development must previously have been established under planning procedures involving the holding of a public inquiry. In cases falling within paragraph 3(3)(a), the Secretary of State will need to have granted planning permission after a public inquiry for development falling within the definition of "relevant development". In that event, the principle that the land falls within the scope of the land 1775 scheme will have been settled. If there was any proposal to carry out relevant development of a kind not covered by the planning permission granted by the Secretary of State, a further planning inquiry would have to be held, if the planning procedure so required. This is probably an important point to stress, particularly in respect of what the noble Earl, Lord Balfour, and the noble Viscount, Lord Colville of Culross, said to me. Perhaps I could re-emphaise it. Eventually, it would be necessary to make a planning application for the industrial project which the noble Viscount had in mind, and if this were a departure from the plan there would be an inquiry.
Viscount COLVILLE of CULROSSNo, that is not right. The Department has just issued a new development plans direction—Circular 96/75—which has modified the old rules about departures. I hope that the noble Lord will apply his mind specifically to the terms of the new development plans direction. It greatly cuts down the areas where developments of this kind have to be submitted to the Secretary of State, and gives a great deal more freedom to local authorities to grant planning permission to themselves for something that they wish to do. They will be able to make a compulsory purchase order without a public inquiry, and afterwards to grant themselves planning permission. That is what will happen and that is the problem.
§ Lord MELCHETTIt might speed up the procedure if I were allowed to finish my remarks before points were raised. I am coming to that matter. When deciding whether or not to hold an inquiry the Secretary of State would, of course, bear in mind whether the reasons stated by the authority were justified by the previous inquiry. If an authority, having bought land on the basis of a plan, wants to grant permission for some other kind of development—this is why I said I was coming to this point—the proposal will be subject to public participation. The general regulations which the noble Viscount mentioned are dealt with in another Amendment, but this may be the time to say that at present, as the noble Viscount has said, local authorities can grant themselves planning permission. There is no requirement that they shall subject their proposals to public 1776 participation. However, as the noble Viscount no doubt knows, the Department encourages local authorities to put their proposals to public participation in cases where this would be necessary if the proposals were being carried out by a private person. We propose to amend the general regulations to make it an obligation on local authorities to do so in such circumstances. I think that that answers the point about which the noble Viscount intervened.
In short, the power to dispense with a compulsory purchase order inquiry hangs on the existence of a previous planning decision by the Secretary of State establishing that the land may be used for development other than exempt development or excepted development. It does not override the planning control machinery in so far as that controls the form of development for which the inquiry authority eventually decide the land should be made available. In paragraph 3(3)(b), which deals with local plans, the position is very much the same. The Secretary of State will have to be satisfied that the provisions of the local plan, which will have been the subject of public participation before adoption or approval, cover development other than exempt or excepted development. Normally, a local plan would indicate the kind of development that the planning authority propose should take place on the land. The Secretary of State would then have to consider whether this constituted or covered relevant development. The local plan would also give an indication of the kind of development for which the land would be used or made available after acquisition. The local plan could be amended, but only after the same publicity and the same public participation processes had been carried out as applied to the original local plan.
In sub-paragraph (3)(c), which deals with development plans, "relevant development" would have to be in accordance with the existing old style Ordnance Survey-based plans which allocate land to specific classes of development. These, as my noble friend said when we were discussing a previous Amendment, may be overlaid by the structure plans, but I hope we have dealt with that problem to the satisfaction of noble Lords opposite. Here, again, the provisions of the development plan would 1777 have created an expectation that land would be developed in accordance with the allocations in the plan. The relevant development would clearly be consistent with the allocation for the land. In our view, it is quite wrong that the Secretary of State should be obliged to hold an inquiry solely to allow arguments on the principle of public acquisition of development land.
Of course, I accept the point made by the noble Lord, Lord Sandford, that some of these plans may be very old and out of date, but I think it would be difficult to write a provision into the Bill saying that where a plan is out of date the Secretary of State shall hold an inquiry. This is something which must be left to the discretion of the Secretary of State, and I can give the noble Lord the assurance that if the local plan is wildly out of date, and obviously not appropriate, then the Secretary of State would of course exercise his discretion and hold an inquiry.
Amendments Nos. 55A and 56, which propose that in sub-paragraph (3)(a) the relevant development should correspond with the reasons given by the authority for proposing to acquire the land, are, for the reasons I have set out at some length, not acceptable to us. The reasons given by the authority go to the merits of the order rather than whether the planning background is such that an inquiry or hearing may be dispensed with. But the reasons given by the authority would be taken into account in deciding whether it was expedient to hold an inquiry. There are technical defects in the Amendments, as I think the noble Viscount suspected, but probably it will not be necessary for me to go into those.
Amendment No. 57 is unacceptable for much the same reasons and, as the noble Lord has said, it covers much the same ground. In particular, it runs contrary to the concept of sub-paragraph (3). This concept is based on the prior establishment through the planning machinery that development falling within the definition of "relevant development" would be appropriate to that land. The only point which I should like to re-emphasise, as my noble friend said on an earlier Amendment, is that the proposals in these three sub-paragraphs, and indeed the whole of the new sub-paragraph (4), have been given careful consideration by the 1778 Council on Tribunals who are the statutory "watch dog", as it were, in this area, and apart from the minor reservations on structure plans, on which we spent some time on a previous Amendment, they are happy with the proposals now in the Bill.
Viscount COLVILLE of CULROSSWell, I am not. Until the noble Lord got almost to the end of his speech I thought he was going to accept this Amendment, and I am absolutely amazed that he came to the conclusion that he did. Before I decide what I should ask the Committee to do about my Amendment, can the noble Lord explain something he has said? He mentioned the reasons under paragraph 2 for which the authority proposed to acquire the land. He said something to the effect that these did not relate to planning. Can the noble Lord tell me what they are going to relate to? I thought the reasons they were going to state were the reasons why they wanted to propose that land, and in that would be included what they were going to do with it when they got it. If that is not to do with planning, I do not know what is. Can the noble Lord tell me what he meant by that remark, if I have remembered it accurately?
§ Lord MELCHETTI am not sure that the noble Viscount did get it quite right if he was thinking of the same point in my remarks as I am. Perhaps it will help him if I say it again. The reasons given by the authorities go to the merits of the order rather than whether the planning background is such that an inquiry or hearing may be dispensed with.
Viscount COLVILLE of CULROSSThen, unless the noble Lord contradicts me, may I assume that the reasons which go to the merits would also go to the question of what they are going to use the land for? I entirely see that they do not necessarily go to the question of whether or not the inquiry should be dispensed with, but unless he interrupts me again I am going to assume that they do go into some detail about, at any rate, a range of things for which the land is going to be used if it is acquired.
§ Lord MELCHETTAs silence should always be taken as acquiescence, I think perhaps I ought to intervene and say that it all depends what the noble Viscount 1779 means by "reasons". The authority will decide whether the land is suitable for relevant development.
Viscount COLVILLE of CULROSSIf that is all we are going to get in the reasons I think everybody has been placing a great deal too much reliance upon the Amendment that was made at Report stage in another place and on which the noble Baroness placed so much emphasis this morning. If all we are going to be told is: "We, the—something—district council propose to acquire this land because we consider it to be suitable for relevant development", that is not going to satisfy anybody, and I do not believe that is what anybody expected to happen. However, I shall have to leave my noble friends to contemplate on that matter.
What I think is wrong with the argument adduced by the noble Lord, Lord Melchett, is this: Let us just take the sequence of events which he specified and see whether they make sense. Remember that we are dealing with the context of the compulsory acquisition, by a body of local government nature, of land which belongs to a private individual which, whatever one may hold as one's political philosophy, is in this country a fairly severe step and one that we all accept is surrounded by safeguards. The situation is this: I have a piece of land, let us assume, upon which I have planning permission for houses. The local authority come along and say: "Now we would like it for commerce and trade". They say that there has been planning permission for relevant development: "Housing on the scale of your land is relevant development"—the heartland of the Bill. We therefore have a relevant development planning permission and there is no reason for the Secretary of State to have a further public inquiry into this compulsory acquisition; and Colville's land will be acquired without him having an opportunity, and without anybody else having an opportunity, to express their views on it.
The noble Lord then says that having got the land the local authority will have to obtain planning permission for themselves to develop the land for trade and commerce and, according to what happens under the general development regulations the Amendment which I have 1780 not yet seen and nobody else has, either, they may or may not have to submit their plan to the Secretary of State or to some form of public participation process before planning permission can be granted. We assume that that is so, but the cart is being put before the horse. They have just acquired the land for trade and commerce before they got planning permission, before there has been any public participation, before there has been any possibility of planning permission being given for it.
I am saying that the process should be taken in logical order. If you are going to acquire it for purposes which accord with the planning permission for relevant development which has already been granted, well and good. If you want to acquire it for some totally different relevant development, let it be thrashed out at a public inquiry at the time when the citizen is being deprived of his land and not at some time afterwards. I should have thought there could be no possible contravention of that particular piece of logic. When the local authority form their contradictory plans to what has been said before, that is the time when there should be a public inquiry; that is the time when the noble Lord, Lord Henley, and his Society, and anybody else, should come in; that is the time when the neighbours should have their say: that is the time when—just in case anybody has forgotten —the private person who happens to own the land, should also be allowed to have the right to object to his land being taken off him for a different purpose.
The noble Lord really has got this into a most dreadful muddle, and even if there are technical defects in this Amendment I am afraid that unless he can do something to still the fears that have suddenly arisen in my mind on what I thought was a comparatively harmless and noncontroversial point, I shall have to do something about it.
§ Lord MELCHETTI only have myself to blame for that because I made an error when I intervened in the noble Viscount's speech earlier on. The reasons given by the local authority will give more detail than merely saying that the land is being acquired for relevant development. They will, for example, specify housing, industrial development, mixed development or whatever it may be. The reason why I intervened—and I knew I 1781 was not entirely with the noble Viscount —was that the authority do not have to say precisely what every piece of land is needed for.
§ Lord FOOTThe noble Viscount, Lord Colville of Culross, speaks so fast and his mind moves so quickly that many of us have great difficulty in keeping up with him. What I fail to understand from the replies we have received from the noble Lord, Lord Melchett, is: what is the objection to inserting these words as proposed in this Amendment No. 55A? What harm does it do? In what way is it inconsistent with the intentions of the Government? It is a safeguard which does not seem to do any injury to this general amendment of Schedule 1 to the earlier Act. It seems only to improve it. The illustrations that the noble Viscount has given, as to the way in which one could have a planning permission given for some purpose, and then one could suddenly acquire it without a public inquiry for some entirely different purpose, seem to me to be almost overwhelming. I cannot see why the Government resist this. I should have thought they would welcome the opportunity of giving way on this Amendment.
§ Lord SANDFORDAnd so, indeed, should I. It seems to me that in deciding whether to dispense with a public local inquiry, there are two factors we have to bear in mind. One is the kind of development, and it is a great relief, I must say, to have got it on the Record, that the local authority involved has to give some sort of explanation about the kind of development they have in mind. We have got that right. It is also important—and this is the burden of our anxiety—before deciding that a public local inquiry into a compulsory purchase order can be dispensed with, that an appropriate and reasonably contemporary public local inquiry bearing on the same point should have been held; and if it has not already been held it must be held, and the Bill must so provide. I hope my noble friend will feel that he ought to press this Amendment, because I certainly think so myself.
§ Lord LLOYD of HAMPSTEADMay I from this side express a mild view in favour of this proposal? It seems to me 1782 a little hard to say that because there has been a public local inquiry, therefore you need not have another if the previous public local inquiry had nothing to do with the issue now to be considered. I should have thought the Government ought to give rather careful consideration to this point. I do not know whether the words proposed by the noble Viscount, Lord Colville of Culross, precisely meet the case. I think this probably needs consideration from the drafting point of view, but I hope that the Front Bench will be reasonable enough on this issue to say that they will, at least, give this earnest consideration, and, unless they can justify in detail their resistance to this sort of proposal, either put these words in at some later stage, or put forward some alternative formula.
§ Lord MELCHETTAs I said the last time I was on my feet, I think I have only myself to blame for the misunderstanding. It might be helpful if I briefly set out what I see as the position. First, I should re-emphasise that we are talking about land suitable for relevant development, so it is land of that category which has already been decided, and the planning issues, which have been at the core of this scheme, as the noble Viscount, Lord Colville of Culross, said.
The second point, contrary to what I said when I intervened when the noble Viscount was on his feet, is that the authority will give some indication of the general sort of development for which they wish to acquire the land. I am afraid I got that wrong, and I think that may have led to some of the misapprehensions expressed by my noble friend and by the noble Lord, Lord Foot. I must emphasise again that they will give some indication of general reasons. It is those reasons that they will give as an indication, and, for example, in the case of housing, that must have already been settled at a public inquiry into the planning issues if the Secretary of State is to dispense with an inqury. I hope that is clear.
Viscount COLVILLE of CULROSSNo, that is just not it. That is what would happen if my Amendment went in, and what will not happen if my Amendment does not go in.
§ Lord MELCHETTI am afraid I disagree with the interpretation of the noble 1783 Viscount. I was going on to say that if the local authority subsequently decide to use the land for something else, and the planning permission granted for the land is not apposite for their new intention —for example, they have permission for housing, and decide to use the land for industrial development—normal planning procedures will apply. If the plannning procedures make it necessary, they will have to go to a public inquiry to justify the change in the planning permission on the land.
Viscount COLVILLE of CULROSSI have the solicitors' profession and the active lawyers with me, and I am myself a member of the Bar. I believe that everyone else in the Committee interprets these provisions in the way I have suggested. We now know there will be reasons given why the compulsory acquisition is to be made. There is no difficulty, therefore, in seeing whether they are consistent, as I have suggested, with the planning permission already granted. Only by putting something in this Bill shall we avoid the strange situation which I attempted to describe a moment ago. Something of this sort should go into this Bill and I am going to chance my arm on my one.
§ Lord PARGITERBefore the Question is put, I should like to be quite clear about what the proposal is, and what it will do. Let us assume that the local authority decides the land is relevant for the purpose of acquisition, and decides it on the basis of an existing planning consent for that area. The land is not to be developed immediately, because the whole intention of the Bill is to plan ahead for 10 years. But in five years' time, the circumstances are so changed that it is necessary for the land to be used for another purpose, in the general opinion of the public, if you like, who participated in this; that the land should be used for industrial purposes and another area should be used for residential development. How will this apply in this case? The local authority will say, "We require this land for housing and that is what the purpose already is." If in five years' time they find it necessary 1784 and in the public interest to change that, what would be the effect of this Amendment?
Viscount COLVILLE of CULROSSNone, because they would have acquired the land in the first place, giving their reasons as being housing, which was the purpose for which the planning permission was at that time outstanding. There would be no necessity for a public inquiry. Everyone would be perfectly content, and if in five years they decided to appropriate the land from its original housing purpose to industrial purpose, then that would be an entirely different matter and outside the scope of the Amendment. It would be dealt with by the ordinary appropriation machinery and would, incidentally, require planning permission, which would be dealt with in the way suggested by the noble Lord, Lord Melchett. Therefore, those circumstances have nothing whatever at all to do with this Amendment and are in no way interfered with by it.
§ Lord PARGITERTo complete what I was saying, it seems to me that the statement of the Government is perfectly reasonable. They say, in the event of the local authority acquiring the land for a purpose other than for which planning consent already exists, a public inquiry would be held and it would be necessary for the necessary process of the law to be gone into. In the light of that, as I understand it, this is a clear statement—I see the noble Viscount shaking his head —and it seems to be pushing this a little unnecessarily to the extent that the noble Viscount proposes.
§ Lord HYLTONNone of the numerous replies of the Government covers the case where the local authority buys a site to which no planning permission attaches, and then subsequently grants planning permission for some purpose or other.
§ Lord MELCHETTAs the noble Viscount, Lord Colville of Culross, said, that does not arise under this Amendment.
§ 2.0 p.m.
§ On Question, Whether the said Amendment (No. 55A) shall be agreed to?
§ Resolved in the affirmative, and Amendment agreed to accordingly.
§ 2.7 p.m.
§
Viscount COLVILLE of CULROSS moved Amendment No. 56C:
Page 56, line 33, leave out ("adopted or approved") and insert ("approved by the Secretary of State after a public local inquiry").
§ The noble Viscount said: This is, as I indicated a moment ago when the noble Lord, Lord Foot, intervened on this subject, a difficult point. I do not know which of the noble Lords opposite is going to deal with it; I understand it is the noble Baroness; I am delighted. The noble Baroness will remember the very complicated provisions in the Planning Acts about the process of having a local plan approved. Of course, at the moment they are all theory, because there are not any local plans, or if there are they must be exceedingly rare. For the most part, none of us has experienced the process
1786§ Their Lordships divided: Contents, 73 Not-Contents, 33.
1785CONTENTS | ||
Aberdare, L. | Emmet of Amberley, B. | Newall, L. |
Abinger, L. | Foot, L. | Northchurch, B. |
Airedale, L. | Gainford, L. | Ogmore, L. |
Alexander of Tunis, E. | Glasgow, E. | O'Hagan, L. |
Amory, V. | Gridley, L. | Platt, L. |
Auckland, L. | Grimston of Westbury, L. | Rankeillour, L. |
Balfour, E. | Hanworth, V. | Reigate, L. |
Banks, L. | Hawke, L. | Ruthven of Freeland, Ly. |
Belstead, L. | Henley, L. | Salisbury, M. |
Campbell of Croy, L. | Hereford, V. | Sandford, L. |
Cathcart, E. | Home of the Hirsel, L. | Sandys, L. |
Clitheroe, L. | Hylton, L. | Sempill, Ly. |
Colville of Culross, V. [Teller.] | Kinnoull, E. | Sherfield, L. |
Cornwallis, L. | Lauderdale, E. | Stamp, L. |
Cowley, E. | Lloyd of Kilgerran, L. | Stanley of Alderley, L. |
Cranbrook, E. | Long, V. | Strathclyde, L. |
Crawshaw, L. | Loudoun, C. | Strathspey, L. |
Cullen of Ashbourne, L. | Lucas of Chilworlh, L. | Vickers, B. |
de Clifford, L. | Mancroft, L. | Vivian, L. |
Denham, L. [Teller.] | Mansfield, E. | Wakefield of Kendal, L. |
Drumalbyn, L. | Merrivale, L. | Ward of North Tyneside, B. |
Dundee, E. | Middleton, L. | Wigoder, L. |
Eccles, V. | Monck, V. | Willingdon, M. |
Effingham, E. | Mowbray and Stourton, L. | Young, B. |
Elles, B. |
NOT-CONTENTS | ||
Balogh, L. | Gaitskell, B. | Milford, L. |
Beswick, L. | Goronwy-Roberts, L. | Pannell, L. |
Birk, B. | Hale, L. | Pargiter, L. |
Brockway, L. | Harris of Greenwich, L. | Stedman, B. |
Buckinghamshire, E. | Jacques, L. [Teller.] | Stow Hill, L. |
Burntwood, L. | Leatherland, L. | Strabolgi, L. |
Champion, L. | Llewelyn-Davies of Hastoe, B. | Wallace of Coslany, L. |
Chorley, L. | Lovell-Davis, L. [Teller.] | Wells-Pestell, L. |
Crook, L. | McLeavy, L. | Wigg, L. |
Donaldson of Kingsbridge, L. | Maybray-King, L. | Winterbottom, L. |
Fisher of Camden, L. | Melchett, L. | Wynne-Jones, L. |
§ whereby they go through the public participation exercise and are then subjected to formal objection, inquiry and confirmation. As I said at the beginning of the proceedings today, one of the points that I feel sure noble Lords opposite would agree with—and I do not want to dissociate myself; if we have to have this legislation I would share this view—is that so far as possible the proceedings, the implementation of this Bill, should attract as much public confidence and as much public acceptance as can be achieved.
§ The local plan provision is a complicated one. There are a number of methods whereby a local plan can be approved. I do not want to go into the details, but of the two sorts of public inquiry that can be held, one of them is a public inquiry where the report goes back to the planning authority who made the plan in the first place and they decide 1787 whether or not they should give effect to any of the objections; therefore, they confirm the plan they produced in the first place, if they like without giving effect to any of the objections. There is, however, also a procedure whereby the public inquiry can be held and can report to the Secretary of State, who is then, naturally, the person who decides whether or not objections shall be given effect to.
§ We may have a situation where, after there has been a local plan with matters examined at a public inquiry, the local authority—very likely the same local authority—will come along later on with a compulsory purchase order to acquire the land for the purposes of this Bill as being relevant development. There would be no further public inquiry because the Secretary of State will say, "We don't need that because there has already been one". We would then have a situation where the following would have occurred: the local authority, the district council, will have prepared a local plan; it will have held a public inquiry into it, and the person concerned will have reported to the same local authority, the same district council. The district council will then come along and say, "We want to acquire compulsorily the land", and the Secretary of State will say, "No, I am not going to have a public inquiry, because there has already been one". At every stage the district council will have been the advocate for the prosecution, the jury, and it will have been the judge in its own cause, and there will never have been any scrutiny by anybody from outside that district council.
§ I think—it is a matter of judgment and I shall be interested to hear what views anybody else in the Committee has about this—that people will consider that in those circumstances there has not been an opportunity to have the impartial view of the Secretary of State brought to hear upon this issue at any time, and they will think that it is unfair and unjust. I am sure they would, as we have just seen, be prepared to abide by a decision that has already been made by the Secretary of State sitting quasi-judicially and deciding as between the citizen, on the one hand, and the local authority concerned, on the other; that is, a paragraph (a) situation; but I am suggesting that they would also be prepared to accept his 1788 arbitration and his previous decision in a paragraph (b) case where there was a local plan. But I do not believe that they would accept it where the only decision ever taken—and there was no outside intervention—was by the acquiring authority in the first place.
§ It is in order to give some substance of acceptability to the reliance upon the local plan and an inquiry held for its purposes that I move this Amendment. I am not suggesting that this is necessarily the only way to do it, but I should like to see the reactions of the Government. I would ask them to consider this since I believe that it is a practical problem and one that will cause trouble if we do not get it right. I beg to move.
§ 2.13 p.m.
§ Baroness BIRKThis is another facet of the same point we have been on in recent Amendments. What puzzles and worries me, apart from the specific legal implications, is that if this Amendment were put into the Bill, it would, in practice, mean that all local plans would have to come to the Secretary of State. If this was so, it would wreck the idea behind the local plans that they should be decided locally and not centrally; that is, if there were not an automatic inquiry. The Amendment is unnecessary because it is true that a local plan is adopted by a local authority rather than having to be approved by the Secretary of State, but there has to be a public inquiry before an inspector before a local plan can be adopted.
I should like to refer back to the discussion on Amendment No. 55B, and what I said there, and make the general point that what we are concerned with is whether there has been an inquiry. This condition is satisfied when a local plan has been adopted. And this is the point that I have just made; that the local plan should be decided locally and not centrally, unless there is any dispute over it. I should also stress that the Secretary of State will get a copy of the Inspector's report where the inspector has put in a report on the inquiry into a local plan. He will have the information, and the opportunity of knowing whether somebody who is objecting to a CPO had his case considered at local planning stage and what the inspector said. Listening carefully to all that has been said on the other Amendments to which 1789 my noble friend replied, I find that the noble Viscount seems to be implying all the time that the Secretary of State will automatically dispense with an inquiry. He has a discretion, and one is assuming—and one has to assume it through all manner of legislation—that this discretion will be exercised responsibly.
On other aspects in other parts of the Bill—we have heard it before and no doubt it will come up again—the Government are criticised on the grounds that in this Bill the Secretary of State has too much power; too much rests with him. We have been asked, "What do you mean by calling it a Community Bill?" But it is within the province of the local authorities. On the other hand, many people are arguing that we are taking too much away from the local authorities and giving that power to the Secretary of State. On occasions during Second Reading the word "authoritarian" was attached to that. Here we feel that we have the right balance, without completely over-egging the communal cake with inquiries, but at the same time having a discretionary long-stop to be exercised by the Secretary of State. Where the local authority goes against the local inspector and overrules the recommendation, then this would be a clear area in which the Secretary of State would no doubt step in.
To try to make it as cumbersome as it would be, apart from the sheer merits of it, so that really virtually all local plans would end up with the Secretary of State, seems to me to be the road along which we are progressing with this series of Amendments. We have to take great care over that. I have thought about this deeply, and I have listened carefully to what the noble Viscount said, but I find his Amendment is unacceptable.
Viscount COLVILLE of CULROSSThe noble Baroness is under two misapprehensions. All local plans would only have to go to the Secretary of State if the Secretary of State was determined to dispense with all public inquiries subsequently arising on compulsory purchase orders under this Bill which fall under paragraph (b). If he was prepared automatically to grant a public inquiry on the compulsory acquisition of land in the case of allocations in a local plan, except where that local plan happened to have 1790 already gone to him for confirmation, then I do not believe there would be anything cumbersome at all, and that is the effect of my Amendment. It does not mean all local plans would have to go there it would mean only that we should be able to dispense with a local inquiry in such cases only where they have. That is one misapprehension the noble Baroness is under, and I am glad to have the opportunity of explaining what I meant.
The other misapprehension is perhaps rather more profound and, if I may say so, it betrays a formidable misjudgment of the way in which the public look upon the role of the Secretary of State in these cases. It is not the same role that I am talking about. The criticisms that have arisen about the powers that the Secretary of State has under this Bill relate to his executive position—the powers he has to produce various regulations and to take executive decisions of one sort or another—and I entirely agree that in this respect he has been given exceedingly wide, probably too wide, powers. But I am not talking about that function of the Secretary of State at all. I am on an entirely different point, where his function is entirely benign; where he is looked upon by the citizen as a protector; that is, when he is sitting quasi judicially considering objections to compulsory purchase orders and deciding on the merits between an acquiring authority and the person from whom land is being taken. There is nothing on earth to do with executive power in that respect. If one looks at any of the practices one finds that the Secretary of State bends over backwards to be fair, to be seen to be fair and to go through all the necessary procedures for people to be allowed to have a chance to have their say. I am commending this process and I am saying that the Secretary of State should be allowed to do it more often, so the noble Baroness must not be under the misapprehension that I am talking about the same function that was being criticised in another context.
I should like to give the noble Baroness an opportunity to consider those two points. I will not press this Amendment today, because I believe there may be more difficulties in the drafting than may be thought. However, may I ask her to address her mind to one further point? 1791 She seemed to think that the only purpose of this Amendment was to deal with the public inquiry. If that is the case, she did not follow my argument. The public inquiry is one thing. It is the person who decides at the end of the public inquiry which is perhaps more important. I was drawing a distinction between the local authority making and deciding on the local plan and then implementing a compulsory purchase order itself, and the noble Baroness did not apply her mind to that and answer that argument. I am suggesting that if at no stage there has been any other quasi judicial intervention—if they have never been overseen by the Secretary of State at any stage in this process—people will consider themselves aggrieved and feel that an injustice may have been done. That is the point and not merely the fact that there has been a public inquiry.
§ Baroness BIRKFrankly, I thought I had made the point several times, but obviously I had not made it clearly enough. I was making a distinction between having the local authority empowered over this or whether it should go to the Secretary of State, and I said, and I repeat, that when a local plan is adopted by a local authority there has to be a public inquiry before the local plan can be adopted.
§ Baroness BIRKExactly; and what I was arguing was that rather than snatching away more power and removing, so to speak, more confidence from local authorities—and sewing it all up in a highly legalistic manner—there were enough safeguards and opportunities for the Secretary of State to come in. I do not agree with what the noble Viscount said at the outset of his remarks because looking again at the provision and rereading his Amendment, it is clear that what he is suggesting is that the Bill should read:
… where a local plan for the district in which the land is situated has been approved by the Secretary of State after a public local inquiry.I understood him to be arguing that it should not always go to the Secretary of State, but the words of his Amendment 1792 are that it should always be approved by the Secretary of State.
§ Baroness BIRKIf that is not what the noble Viscount means then his Amendment is incorrect because that is how it reads and I am dealing with the Amendment as tabled.
Viscount COLVILLE of CULROSSThe noble Baroness has clearly not understood my Amendment. However, I do not propose to waste the time of the Committee by explaining it further now. I would be happy to discuss the matter with her because she has genuinely not understood it. Perhaps she will be kind enough to allow me to explain it to her on some other occasion. It is clear that we are not talking about the same thing at all. I should be glad, in another forum, to discuss the matter further with her. Meanwhile, I beg leave to withdraw the Amendment.
§ Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.
§ 2.27 p.m.
§ Lord SANDFORD moved Amendment No. 57:
§
Page 56, line 42, at end insert—
("Provided that in each case the relevant development referred to shall be the development for which the authority propose to acquire the land.")
§ The noble Lord said: I said when we started with discussion on this topic, on Amendment No. 55A,that I would support my noble friend rather than move my Amendment No. 56. I am glad that we have now imported Amendment No. 55A into the Bill because that is certainly necessary and it deals with a particular and precise point. Nevertheless, there is a good deal of merit in Amendment No. 57, even with No. 55A imported into the Bill. I think I have said enough on the general point to indicate why I think it is necessary, and I move this Amendment in case any other Members of the Committee wish to comment on this more general issue.
§ Viscount AMORYI hope the noble Baroness, Lady Birk, will pay great weight to what my noble friend Lord Sandford has said. As this is the first time that I have spoken on this Bill, I want to associate myself with noble Lords who have described it as unnecessary. I believe 1793 that everything it aims at achieving could much more simply be effected by a combination of existing planning measures supplemented by fiscal measures, and that would have resulted in a massive saving of manpower. But if we must have this Bill, then it seems essential that it should offer really adequate protection to the citizen against unfairness arising either by action of the Secretary of State or by action of the local authorities concerned. My humble opinion is that in this Bill, as with most other recent ones, far too many things are left to the discretion of the Secretary of State. I agreed entirely with the forceful observations made this morning by the noble Viscount, Lord Colville of Culross, on the general attitude of the Government to this Bill. I am not criticising in any way either the noble Baroness, Lady Birk, or the noble Lord, Lord Melchett—both of whom have dealt with us in these complicated matters all the time I have been listening with the greatest possible courtesy—when I say that running through it is a spirit of arrogance. The Government should show greater sensitivity to the legitimate interests of the individual citizen, otherwise the Bill will not work.
If these wide powers are to be justified, the citizen must be given the maximum information as to why they are required, otherwise there will be a general climate of inertia and inactivity which will result in much desirable development being frustrated because positive action will have become too difficult and frustrating for the individuals concerned. One reason why I feel it is absolutely essential to make abundantly clear the precise definitions of the circumstances in which action under this Bill is appropriate, is the risk of getting our planning procedures into greater confusion. The new local government structure, by splitting planning functions between counties and districts, has already created enough complications in the minds of ordinary people and I am by no means happy about what we have been told so far about the reasons which local authorities must give, when they must give reasons at all. It seems, from the descriptions we have been given so far, that they could be of such a very general nature as to be valueless.
I therefore urge the noble Baroness to give attention to these reasonable and constructive Amendments which have 1794 been proposed by my noble friends and which can in no sense be described as wrecking Amendments. They have the sole aim of clarifying the definitions and descriptions which are essential and which are in a state of some confusion. My noble friends really understand what they are talking about and I hope that full attention will be paid to what they have said.
§ Lord MELCHETTI have listened with interest to what the noble Viscount has said. So far as the Amendment is concerned, I replied at some length when we dealt with Amendment No. 55A.The Amendment is unacceptable for all the reasons which I spelled out in great detail at that time, but of course it goes considerably wider than Amendment No. 55A which we have already divided on. I hope that the noble Lord will not press it.
§ Lord SANDFORDI was hoping that the noble Lord would take the opposite view so that, the Committee having agreed that Amendment No. 55A should be in the Bill, we need not go to the bother of a Division on Amendment No. 57, which does precisely the same thing in that it applies the same principle to sub-paragraphs (b) and (c), though more widely because those sub-paragraphs are themselves wider. I believe that the issue is quite clear and I agree with the noble Lord, Lord Melchett, that we need not go into it again, but I am still convinced, as is my noble friend, Lord Amory, that, just as we needed Amendment No. 55A to get matters into the right balance on subparagraph (a), we need Amendment No. 57 to achieve the right balance in subparagraphs (b) and (c). This is in spite of the fact that each of them contains the words,
the order would he in accordance with the provisions of the plan".We need this in order to make sure that the "relevant development" referred to is the development which the local authority intends to carry out after the land is acquired. Otherwise, it might happen that, simply because any relevant development had been permitted by a confirming authority after a public inquiry or was in accord with the provisions of the local plan, no right to an inquiry on a compulsory purchase order would exist. I believe that the Committee will agree with me that that would be unfair. I hope 1795 the noble Lord will not put us to the trouble of going through the Division Lobbies again on precisely the point on which the Committee has already agreed to insert Amendment No. 55A into the Bill. However, if the noble Lord wants us to have a Division, we shall have to do so.
§ Lord FOOTI am not at all sure that these words have precisely the same effect as the words we have already inserted in sub-paragraph (a) by means of Amendment No. 55A. On the point of drafting, I much prefer the way in which the noble Viscount, Lord Colville, did it in Amendment No. 55A, using the words:
of a kind consistent with the reasons specified by the authority …I invite the noble Lord, Lord Sandford, to consider whether we cannot leave this here and whether he and his noble friend Lord Colville could not produce for Report stage something which would be strictly comparable with Amendment No. 55A, which I believe to be a better way of expressing this than the words which the noble Lord has used in the present Amendment.
§ Lord MELCHETTIt may perhaps be helpful if I say a brief word. I do not entirely agree with everything the noble Lord, Lord Foot, has said because I cannot accept that Amendment No. 55A is an improvement on the Bill as it stands. But, as I said before—and I dealt with it at some length when we debated Amendment No. 55A—the present Amendment goes considerably further. In particular, Amendment No. 55A would allow an inquiry to be dispensed with if the authority proposed to use the land for the same kind of development, whereas Amendment No. 57 says that the developments must be identical. This may be the drafting fault to which the noble Lord, Lord Foot, has drawn attention and I hope the noble Lord, Lord Sandford, will, if he will not take it from me, look at what the noble Lord, Lord Foot, has said and not press the Amendment.
§ Lord PARGITERA small point worries me. We are referring to the development plan as if it were the law of the Medes and the Persians which can never be altered. In other words, whatever development a plan proposes at any 1796 particular point in time cannot, if it is in accordance with the development plan at that time, be altered even in respect of a small part of it unless the procedures which are envisaged are gone through. This is quite unreal. If in five years' time the plan is altered, it will mean that the whole procedure will have to be gone through and every little piece of land which has been acquired for the purpose of a previous development plan will have to be looked at to see whether, under the compulsory powers, that continues. This would create a quite impossible situation.
§ Lord LLOYD of HAMPSTEADI agree with what the noble Lord, Lord Foot, has said. It seems to me to be very undesirable to have this Amendment inserted into the Bill because we shall have something which is clearly actuated by the same idea, but expressed in quite different language in different parts of the Bill. That will lead to grave difficulties of interpretation, and I should have thought that, on that ground alone, it would be desirable for the noble Lord, Lord Sandford, to take the Amendment away and if he wishes to restore it that could be done in an amended form at a later stage.
§ Lord SANDFORDThat is a good point. We are trying to do in relation to sub-paragraphs (b) and (c) what my noble friend has done for sub-paragraph (a) with Amendment No. 55A. When we drafted our respective Amendments, my noble friend and I were not in consultation and we have hardly had time to compare notes very closely. I agree that, in as much as we are seeking to do the same thing for two different parts of the same clause, it would be as well to have the wording consistent. In the light of the debate, it will be all the easier to do that. I beg leave to withdraw the Amendment.
§ Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.
§ 2.38 p.m.
§
The Earl of BALFOUR moved Amendment No. 58:
Page 57, line 12, after ("may") insert ("except in the case of an owner-occupier").
§
The noble Earl said: I should like very briefly to say that here I have tried to consider the owner-occupier who may not be familiar with the possible proceedings
1797
under the Bill. Paragraph 3(6) states that,
the confirming authority may require any person who has made an objection … to state in writing the grounds thereof, and may disregard the objection for the purposes of this paragraph if satisfied that the objection".
§ I should like to say that this should be so except in the case of an owner-occupier. Many of the ordinary people about whom I am thinking are unlikely to have a lawyer to whom they can easily go, and perhaps cannot express themselves very well in writing in an objection, so I ask that they may be given special consideration. However, I must admit that I may have stretched this too widely and I should very much like to support the idea expressed in Amendment No. 59C. I beg to move.
§ Lord PARGITERCould the noble Earl define "owner-occupier" for the purposes of this clause?
The Earl of BALFOURI was thinking very much of the householder. That is perhaps where the Amendment goes too wide, and it is for that reason that I said that I preferred Amendment No. 59C. I feel that it is very much better.
§ Baroness BIRKBefore we get further into this matter, I should like to suggest that if it is convenient to the Committee Amendments Nos. 58, 59C—to which the noble Earl wants to speak—and 59D be debated together, because they are so closely linked. I think that the noble Baroness has agreed in principle to this.
§ The Earl of KINNOULLPerhaps I may speak at this stage, bearing in mind that my Amendment would come next in order. I wish to preface my brief remarks by saying that one of the great difficulties of Schedule 4 is that it is undoubtedly a lawyer's paradise, and for lesser mortals it is somewhat sheer purgatory. For that reason, I should like to add my condolences to the noble Baroness, Lady Birk, and the noble Lord, Lord Melchett, on the fact that the legal wisdom of the noble and learned Lord could not be available today.
The Amendment which I have put down would leave out head (b). The Committee will recall that under this new procedure which we are discussing an objector would be called upon by a local authority to state his reasons within a period of time—28 days or more. These 1798 objections would then be lodged and considered by the Secretary of State. Under head (b) the Secretary of State may disregard objections made on the grounds that the acquisition is unnecessary or inexpedient.
There are two major worries with this new compulsory purchase procedure. The first we briefly discussed under paragraph 2, as regards local authorities not having to specify the purpose for which land was being acquired, and the noble Baroness said that she would look at that. The second worry concerns the rights of objection. It seems to many people that inserting head (b)—that the Minister may disregard the grounds of objection as being unnecessary or inexpedient—is taking away one of the major planks that any individual objector may use. We must remember that when an objector seeks advice—whether from a chartered surveyor, a solicitor or, indeed, a barrister —it becomes progressively more expensive. It would be very unwise to insert into the Bill a provision which is not at all clear, with the result that the professional advisers, who are incurring large costs for the objector, are not themselves certain whether the objections which they would raise are simply disregarded.
We need to consider what are the usual main objections to a compulsory purchase order, and I hope that the noble Baroness may come to this a little later. In my experience, they are that the order is premature, that the local authority does not require the land because sufficient land is already available in its area for development, and that public services are not available, anyway. These are some of the major reasons, but they would all come within sub-paragraph (6)(b), and the Minister may disregard them. It is this worry that he would disregard them that we are now discussing.
In another place, the Government gave a detailed reply to the whole argument about sub-paragraph (6)(b). The first answer that the Government gave was that this is not a new procedure; it came within the new towns procedure of 1965. This was considered unsatisfactory, because consideration of a new town is very different from consideration of existing development within towns. The second reply from the Government, which was more obscure, was that an objector may indeed have his objections 1799 disregarded for the purposes of acquisition, but he may still object on the basis that the development is unnecessary. Again, this was considered to be a little confusing, because when we look at this Bill we see that the whole purpose of acquisition is indeed development.
The noble Baroness will have seen all the Amendments on the Marshalled List. My Amendment is designed simply to leave out sub-paragraph (6)(b). But in looking at the other Amendments, I see the arguments put forward by the noble Viscount, Lord Colville of Culross, and the noble Earl, Lord Balfour. I would certainly advise my noble friend Lady Young, who added her name to this Amendment, to consider those other Amendments which I have mentioned and not necessarily mine.
§ Baroness YOUNGBefore we proceed further, I wish to seek the guidance of the Chairman, and perhaps the noble Baroness, Lady Birk, is in agreement with me on this point. I understood that we were debating Amendment No. 58, with which we were to consider Amendment No. 59C. I think I have understood my noble friend correctly that he was speaking to Amendment No.59A, which is concerned with a rather different point. I should like to be clear exactly where we are, and then I think we could get our proceedings back on the right lines.
§ Baroness BIRKI entirely agree with the noble Baroness. I have been puzzled about this, and I came to the conclusion that the noble Earl was speaking to Amendment No. 59A,which is rather out of the grouping which I suggested to the noble Baroness opposite. It would be better to keep to the grouping agreed, and so deal with Amendments Nos. 58, 59C and 59D. Perhaps the noble Earl would move his Amendment afterwards, if that would suit the Committee.
§ Baroness YOUNGI must apologise to my noble friend for this intervention. To me, as one of the many non-lawyers present, the debate today has been so technical and so fast moving that one is inclined easily to lose one's way with regard to the Marshalled List. I have the advantage of having had notice from the noble Baroness about a proposed grouping of Amendments to which I 1800 had agreed. Therefore I was, as it were, speaking from the same brief as the noble Baroness.
I should like to speak to my Amendment No. 59C, which falls into the same category as Amendment No. 58 put forward by my noble friend Lord Balfour, and is concerned with the owner-occupier. At present the owner-occupier has an absolute right to object to a compulsory purchase order and to an inquiry or hearing, with all the safeguards afforded by the procedure governing inquiries dealing with compulsory purchase by local authorities. The owner-occupier can object not only to the proposed use of his land, subject to the restriction in Section 132(1) of the Town and Country Planning Act 1971, but also because he believes that the acquisition is unnecessary or inexpedient to achieve the object or use. He may also object on personal reasons—if the house has been in his family for a long time, or if he has elderly relatives. There are all sorts of personal reasons why a person might wish to object at an inquiry.
We have had a very long discussion about paragraph 3 of Schedule 4, which was amended in another place on Report, and which takes away this fundamental right in three cases, which are set out in heads (a), (b) and (c). The reason given is the assumption in those three cases that the owner-occupier is entitled to a satisfactory hearing or inquiry at the planning stage, and should therefore have objected at that stage, and it would be duplicating the work to object again.
Sub-paragraph 3(b) of the Schedule enables the Secretary of State to disregard objection made on the grounds that acquisition is unnecessary or inexpedient. The object of the Amendment to which I am now speaking is to negate the restrictions in sub-paragraphs (3) and (6) on the owner-occupiers' right of objection, and to restore his present absolute right under the Act of 1946, but subject to the existing restriction on duplicating an objection which might have been made at the planning stage, as contained in the 1971 Act. My intention is simply to maintain the present owner-occupier's rights and not to alter them in any particular. Sub-paragraphs (2) and (3) of the Amendment are precedented in subparagraphs (2), (3) and (4) of a Government Amendment that has now been 1801 incorporated into the Bill, and which appears as sub-paragraphs (2), (3) and (4) on page 58. Therefore, I hope that the Amendment will be acceptable to the Government.
I hope, furthermore, that when the noble Baroness replies—and I hope she will consider this point very carefully—she will take into consideration what her right honourable friend Mr. Silkin said about owner-occupiers in another place on Wednesday, 25th June, in Standing Committee, at col. 1639 of Hansard. I will not read the entire column, but at the end he says:
I hope that honourable gentlemen opposite and my honourable friends will be prepared to leave that with me"—this was the issue of owner-occupiers—on my undertaking to use my best endeavours, in the fullest possible sense of those words, to see whether we can give the owner-occupier under the Bill the same protection that he has under the existing law.It seems to me that my Amendment does precisely that. No one is taking away anything from the principle of the Bill; that remains intact. The whole principle of positive planning, the whole principle of returning betterment to the community, the whole principle of land acquisition by local authorities—all that remains intact. All that my Amendment does is to seek to restore to the owner-occupier the present rights that he enjoys at a public inquiry, and for that reason —because it would appear that the Minister, Mr. Silkin, was endeavouring to do that—I hope that the noble Baroness will look favourably on this Amendment. I beg to move.
§ Lord GRIDLEYIn rising to support my noble friend on this Amendment, perhaps I may say that I hope the remarks I propose to make on this issue will be considered constructively by the Government. I am quite sure that they wish, as we wish, to get as many houses built in this country in future years as possible. Obviously, there are inequalities; there is a desperate shortage of housing, and the noble Baroness, for her part, and the Government, for their part, obviously want to get houses built. I think that if they consider this Amendment carefully and sympathetically, it will remove a great fear among potential buyers of properties that the powers under this Bill may act in a detractory 1802 way in regard to the purchase of owner-occupied properties. It is on those grounds that I speak to Members of your Lordships' Committee, and I would ask whether the Government can on this occasion take these points into consideration, succeed in restoring confidence to people and would-be purchasers, and give that protection to the owner-occupier concerning those matters about which I feel there is fear in regard to this Bill.
§ Lord LEATHERLANDApparently, we still have before your Lordships' Committee Amendment No. 58, moved by the noble Earl, Lord Balfour. He suggests that this has some relevance to the Amendment moved by the noble Baroness, Lady Young, Amendment No. 59C, but it is couched in different words. For instance, the Amendment of the noble Earl, Lord Balfour, seeks to give certain privileges, if I may put it like that, to an owner-occupier, whereas the Amendment of the noble Baroness, Lady Young, talks about the owner-occupier of a dwelling-house. I wonder whether it might clear the issue, so that we can debate it straightforwardly, if the noble Earl were to withdraw his Amendment, which merely refers to owner-occupiers, because I am sure that that Amendment would go very considerably beyond the terms embodied in Lady Young's Amendment. The term "owner-occupier" not only refers to people, like myself, who own their own houses; it also refers to great property companies, great oil companies, great finance houses and great banks in the City of London who own and occupy these huge skyscraper blocks in the City. I am sure that the noble Earl merely wishes to get some privileges in the Bill for the owner-occupiers of dwelling-houses, and not for great capitalist or financial organisations such as those that I have mentioned.
§ Lord SANDFORDI wonder whether I could apologise to the noble Baroness for not being quite quick enough off the mark in noticing, when she suggested our grouping, that there is an Amendment in the name of my noble friend Lord Ridley, printed on the Supplementary List and numbered 59I, referring to this point on page 58, line 16. It would probably be useful if this additional Amendment were included in our discussion. But I have nothing more to say about it, because it speaks for itself.
The Earl of BALFOURI am terribly sorry, but I do not have Amendment No. 59I. I do apologise. Does it concern my Amendment? May I ask that for a start?
§ Lord SANDFORDNo.
The Earl of BALFOURIn view of what has been said up to now, I should like to withdraw my Amendment No. 58 for the sake of convenience so that we may have further study of Amendment 59C. I beg leave to withdraw the Amendment.
§ Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.
§ The DEPUTY CHAIRMAN of COMMITTEES (Lord Airedale)I have to point out to the Committee that if Amendment No. 59A were agreed to, I should not be able to call Amendments Nos. 59 or 59H.
§
The Earl of KINNOULL moved Amendment No. 59A:
Page 57, leave out lines 17 and 18.
§ The noble Earl said: I have already made an impassioned plea concerning this Amendment, though it was made on the wrong Amendment, and I would not wish to weary your Lordships' Committee with further argument. I would hope, however, that other noble Lords who have other Amendments on this point will come in. I beg to move.
§ Lord MIDDLETONIt may possibly expedite the work of this Committee if, instead of moving my Amendment 59B, which is to do with recreation, I were to use the argument that I would have used in moving that Amendment merely as an illustration of the kind of unfairness which may very well arise owing to the prohibition against making an objection on the ground that an acquisition is unnecessary or inexpedient. The reason why I put down Amendment No. 59B was because of the concern felt by the National Anglers' Council, which represents nearly 3 million anglers, that the Community Land Bill makes it possible for local authorities—
§ Baroness BIRKI am sorry, but I think we are getting rather wide of the mark now. I think it is going to be confusing, not only to me (which may not worry noble Lords opposite) but to the Committee generally, if we now extend what we have tried to tailor into, so 1804 far as we can, a debate on the dwelling of an owner-occupier into one on recreation, because there is still one outstanding Amendment in the same group which has not yet been moved, and that is No. 59D. I think it would help the Committee and the noble Lord's own cause if he dealt with his Amendment separately.
Viscount COLVILLE of CULROSSWe are completely out of order. Surely we cannot discuss Amendment 59D at this stage. We have before the Committee Amendment No. 59A, which is on the subject of what sort of objection you can make to a compulsory purchase order. For one, I am not prepared to speak on my Amendment No. 59H if, with the greatest respect to my noble friend, I am going to get mixed up with fishermen. Can we not discuss one thing at a time, let alone include dwelling-houses as well?
§ Lord MIDDLETONCertainly we can talk about fishermen later. I was trying to expedite matters, but I will certainly leave it until later.
§ Baroness YOUNGIf I may suggest it, we were, as I think the noble Baroness, Lady Birk, has said quite rightly, discussing the issue of owner-occupiers. I think my noble friend Lord Colville was out of the Committee just at that moment, so we had started to discuss Amendment 59C,which I had in fact moved.
§ Baroness YOUNGThis was my understanding, but if I am out of order I will of course sit down.
§ The DEPUTY CHAIRMAN of COMMITTEES (Lord Nugent of Guildford)If I may help the Committee, as I understand it we are on Amendment 59A, moved by the noble Earl, Lord Kinnoull.
§ The Earl of KINNOULLPerhaps I can assist somewhat. The reason that there has been this muddle is that 59C should have been 59B. I do not wish to get mixed up between the owner-occupier argument which was put forward and an important argument that we wish to make under 59B. I am in the hands of the Committee. At the moment we are talking to Amendment No. 59A.
The Earl of BALFOURIf we are on 59A, then the answer would be to move 1805 on to 59B in my own name and in that of Baroness Young and Lord Gridley. I feel that that is the way we should take it; but I will take the advice of the Committee.
§ Lord MELCHETTWe have had a chance to consider it, so perhaps we should stick with Amendment No. 59A for now. I think that Amendment No. 59B covers slightly similar ground, but it may be simpler to take that when it comes. When we reach Amendment No. 59C we can deal with owner-occupiers. If nobody wishes to say anything about 59A then I have a great deal to say about it; but before embarking upon that I should like to ask the noble Lord, Earl Kinnoull, whether he is moving Amendment 59A with the serious intention of eliciting a response from the Government.
§ The Earl of KINNOULLOne of the difficulties is that some of us do not yet know what arrangements the Government have made as to how we are going to discuss these Amendments. I had in mind that 59A, 59 and 59H really cover the same point. It would not make a great deal of difference to stick to that now since I have already moved this Amendment.
§ Lord MELCHETTI am content to adopt that procedure.
§ The DEPUTY CHAIRMAN of COMMITTEES (Lord Nugent of Guildford)If it is to the convenience of the Committee to discuss all three together I shall propose the Amendment to page 57 to leave out lines 17 and 18.
Viscount COLVILLE of CULROSSIn that case I am happy to discuss Amendment 59H. The reason why I put down an Amendment which is rather narrower than that of my noble friend Lord Kinnoull is because I wanted to be as conciliatory as possible to noble Lords opposite. I know that they have had many battles on this subject and I did not wish to strike out altogether the words in their Bill to which they are obviously closely attached. Nevertheless, even as they now stand, the words have caused a great deal of confusion and, as I have done on many occasions on this Bill, I would ask for an explanation.
1806 I know that almost the first thing that any of us are going to be told is that there is a precedent for these words in the New Towns Act. Can I make it abundantly clear to noble Lords opposite not only that I know that but that I have looked at the New Towns Act to see what sort of precedent this produces. The New Towns Act says that an objection to a compulsory purchase order may be disregarded if the acquisition is unnecessary or inexpedient in the way in which it is set out in this part of the paragraph. But the context is entirely different. In the New Towns Act the reason why the Secretary of State may disregard an objection to a compulsory acquisition made on the grounds that the acquisition is unnecessary or inexpedient is that the whole of the area, including the land that is now sought to be compulsorily acquired, has already been designated as part of a new town. The noble Baroness, Lady Stedman, with her particular experience of Peterborough will know this well. The major decision has been taken; the area has been pegged out all the way round; a huge inquiry has been taking place; every possible objection in principle has been aired and re-aired in Peterborough itself and there is no possible doubt that the major decision has been made already that in principle there should be a new town.
For anyone to get up at an individual compulsory purchase order inquiry which relates to a single piece of land within that area and say that there is no necessity for this compulsory acquisition because acquisition for new town purposes is unnecessary and inexpedient should not be heard because they will have missed the bus. That is the reason why the New Towns Act contains that provision; and it contains it rightly.
What I fail to see is why this has anything to do with the provisions in this Bill where the circumstances are wholly different. There has been no previous decision in principle in the case of an individual piece of land which is now sought to be acquired under the provisions of this Bill for the purposes of relevant development by a local authority. There is no major, overwhelming decision of principle that has been taken after a public inquiry, after an airing of all possible views on one side or the other in the locality and a decision taken. The only 1807 decision of principle which has been taken is that there shall be this legislation, and that does not relate to any particular piece of land in any particular locality let alone has it been preceded by a public local inquiry in that area.
Therefore, I hope that we shall not be told that there is a relevant comparison with the New Towns Act because I trust that I have gone some way to destroy any possible parallel that may be relied upon by noble Lords opposite. The noble Lord, Lord Melchett, shakes his head; so that I am sure that we shall have it all over again. I will await patiently the exegesis that we have read five times in the other place and perhaps in this House, too. There is my answer in advance.
The practical problem is that nobody knows on what grounds they may or may not object under these words so as to attract the favourable attention of the Secretary of State and cause him after all to hold a public inquiry whereby they may make objection to this compulsory purchase order. I envisage myself sitting down to draft an objection to a compulsory purchase made under Section 15 of the Community Land Act. I am not going to sit down and say that the grounds of this objection is that it is unnecessary and inexpedient. If I do that, first I know that it will be disregarded; secondly, it does not help because it does not give the true reasons for my objection. Nobody will use those exact words in an objection and it would be absurd to suppose they would. Therefore the words must relate to some other more illuminating objection which attempts to spell out what is the true objection of the owner of the land to this compulsory purchase.
At the moment, nobody, so far as I am aware, is clear what form of objection, spelt out in rather more explicit terms, is nevertheless going to be considered and counted by the Secretary of State as falling within the definition of an objection on the grounds that it is unnecessary or inexpedient to buy the land. This is a matter of burning concern up and down the country. I promise the noble Lord that, even if he has not had connections with people who are involved in this activity, his advisers will have done. There is a real concern about what is meant by this.
1808 Will the noble Lord give us some examples of objections phrased in a way which will be held, or might be held, by the Secretary of State to come within the category of unnecessary and inexpedient? Will he also give us some examples of some occasions where they will not be so held? In some of the literature I have seen, by people who have thought deeply on the matter, I have read that there will be only one objection left, and that is the ground of personal hardship. I believe that is as extreme a view in the wrong direction as is the over-simplistic view with which I started, that only objections phrased in the exact words now in the Schedule will be disregarded. Obviously there is a large area in between—an area which, so far as I am aware, has never been mapped out. For the purposes of dealing with this matter in practice, so that we may get a sensible approach which will be helpful in the Department, which will be helpful to those who are advising clients and which will lead to a sensible assimilation of people's true objections with the way in which the Government wish this to be dealt with, we need more explanation of what these words are going to mean in practice. I look forward to what the noble Lord can tell us on this matter.
§ 3.10 p.m.
§ Lord MELCHETTI still have not heard a great deal about Amendment No. 59A. I am not sure whether I heard that the noble Earl had spoken to this at a time when I was not in the Chamber. For that I sincerely apologise; but as I gather it was his mistake for speaking rather sooner than he should have done, I hope that he will forgive me for speaking to his Amendment without actually having heard what he said about it. I am going to say something about new towns, and I had the benefit of what the noble Viscount had to say in advance of my arguments, so perhaps not having heard the noble Earl on this may not affect me as much as it might have done.
§ The Earl of KINNOULLI did speak on this matter, but all that my noble friend has said was put in a much better way.
§ Lord MELCHETTI am very relieved that I am not in any position to pass judgment on the truth or otherwise of that statement. It is true to say that this 1809 provision of the Bill has caused considerable misunderstanding. I will try, if I can, to remove that, although I accept that I have a difficult job ahead of me in view of the determined views which are held about the provisions.
The Secretary of State is empowered under the Bill to disregard objections only on the ground that the acquisition of the land is unnecessary or inexpedient. It will still be open to the objector to argue that the development for which the land is required is unnecessary or inexpedient, and such an objection cannot be disregarded under this power in the Bill. This misunderstanding is shown clearly by Amendment No. 59B, to which we will come shortly and which it is better to leave until later. I merely use it as an example of this misunderstanding so that noble Lords opposite do not think that I am imagining things.
The reason for taking the power which Amendment 59A seeks to delete from the Bill is as follows. The passing of the Community Land Bill will constitute acceptance by Parliament that virtually all development land is to be taken into public ownership and that ultimately development (other than excepted or exempt development) is to take place only on land which is in, or has passed through, public ownership. This is an example of the point which my noble friend made at the start of the Committee proceedings. I accept that the noble Viscount is raising important matters of procedure in the way this is going to work. But it is vital that we do not lose sight of the underlying political principle which we assert will be accepted by Parliament when the Bill is passed.
Viscount COLVILLE of CULROSSWill the noble Lord accept that the way I have drafted Amendment No. 59H is intended to take account of that point?
§ Lord MELCHETTYes. I will deal with that at the end of my remarks. In our view, after the Bill is passed there will be analogies between the situation over the whole of the country and the situation in new towns. Despite what the noble Viscount has said about having heard this argument before. I would—particularly as he refuted it in advance—at least take this opportunity of setting it out again. In new towns, in accordance with the objectives of securing the 1810 laying out and development of the new town, any land in its area is liable to acquisition by the development corporation. In considering a compulsory purchase order relating to land within the area of a new town, the Secretary of State, if he is satisfied that an objection is made on the ground that the acquisition is unnecessary or inexpedient, may treat the objection as irrelevant for the purpose of making a final decision.
In many ways we feel this Bill might be regarded as creating a nationwide new town. Sub-paragraph (6)(b) follows, as the noble Viscount mentioned, paragraph 4(3)(b) of Schedule 3 to the New Towns Act 1965. Thus it provides that the Secretary of State may disregard—that is to say, treat as irrelevant for the purpose of making a final decision—an objection if he is satisfied that it is made on the ground that the acquisition, as against the development, is unnecessary or inexpedient. The noble Viscount criticised this and said, if I understood him aright, the New Towns Act was not a valid precedent. He thought the New Towns Act was not a valid precedent because there is a prior designation procedure for new towns which affords an opportunity for objections to be heard to the inclusion of land in the new town area. But the Amendments already made to Clause 17 of the Bill, to tie the operation of the land scheme closely to the planning framework in an area, undermines this argument. Under the Bill as is now stands, there will in fact be a prior or simultaneous consideration of the planning case, just as there is when a new town area is designated.
The words "unnecessary and inexpedient" are not intended to rule out all objections. The objective is to rule out the argument that development of land can perfectly well take place without public acquisition. Once Parliament has decided the principle, it would clearly be wrong to allow objections on this ground. Amendment No. 59A would entirely delete the power to disregard such objections and is therefore unacceptable to the Government.
The noble Viscount asked what could be left to object to about acquisition. I accept, and the Government accept, that there will not be a very wide area. I think it is very difficult, and I hope that the noble Viscount will accept this, to say 1811 in advance what will be considered a valid objection; indeed, if I attempted to delineate it any further than is already done in the Bill, we could come across very great difficulties and I might be accused of pre-empting the discretion of the Secretary of State.
Hardship, which the noble Viscount mentioned, certainly would be one area in regard to which people could object to the acquisition itself. Possibly prematurity would be another area where somebody could say that they accepted the need for public acquisition of land but that they needed only 12 months to complete something that they were doing on the land, and they might ask whether it would be possible to delay the acquisition. I would hesitate to be drawn into establishing a number of precedents which might cause difficulties later. It could be said that the objector will not know very clearly what the local authority intend to do with the development. We touched on this earlier. There will be nothing to stop the Secretary of State considering an objection to any development. The Secretary of State could also consider an objection which raised the point that the objector did not know clearly enough what the local authority intended. Of course, as I said earlier, if the planning framework had been settled some time ago and was felt by the objectors to be out of date, once again the Secretary of State could consider that objection. There is nothing in the Bill, as I understand it, to stop this happening.
Turning to Amendments Nos. 59 and 59H, I think it is fair to say that both of them would not attack the principle I have outlined, but would substitute alternative wording for the power to disregard an objection to a compulsory purchase order which is made on the ground that the acquisition is "unnecessary or inexpedient". The two forms of wording are slightly different. In the Committee stage in another place, my right honourable friend indicated that he would be prepared to consider an alternative form of wording to that at present contained in the Bill, provided it contained the spirit of the Government's intention—and I hope that intention has been made clear by myself and my noble colleagues in dealing with all the Amendments put by noble Lords opposite.
1812 The problem in this particular case is to find a form of words which will express the Government's clear intention without leading to evasion. I am advised that this is much more easily said than done, and the present Amendments show this. Both Amendments are in terms of principles. The wording in one concerns the objection to the principle of public acquisition or that development land should not be brought into public ownership. The trouble with both formulations is that they leave it open to an objector to say that he or she is not objecting to the general principle but only to its application in his or her particular case. This is certainly not the spirit behind what is intended by the Government in the Bill. The new towns formulation has worked very well for nearly 30 years, and it is our view that, unless a better form of words can be produced, this is the form of words which should stay in the Bill.
Viscount COLVILLE of CULROSSThat is an extremely helpful answer and it will certainly enable us first of all to see whether we can improve on our present drafting. After all, we have an open invitation to try to produce a substitute form of words if they can be found. It will also go some way to deal with the difficulties that I have suggested may have occurred already in people's minds and practice. Could the noble Lord help me with one further situation which may not be altogether uncommon? The definition of "development land" includes land which has not any planning permission at all. We shall therefore have situations where there will not be a case like the new towns and there will not be a case where the compulsory acquisition has in fact already fitted into a preconceived or pre-determined planning network at all.
To put this into perfectly simple terms, there will be cases where a local authority will wish under this Bill compulsorily to acquire white land, land which is not the subject of any allocation for development purposes in an old type development plan or very probably even in a structure or a local plan. In those circumstances there will be no pre-determined planning network such as the noble Lord very likely relied on in a number of other circumstances. In that case, it will not be possible for a public inquiry to be forgone 1813 on the grounds that there is planning permission. But we shall still have the possibility that an objection wrongly phrased may be disregarded as irrelevant and therefore no inquiry need be held into it because it may be said to be one on the grounds that the acquisition is unnecessary or inexpedient.
In those circumstances, I would expect the noble Lord to be able to reassure me on the grounds that there are substantially wider areas which it would be possible to raise by way of an objection and which the Secretary of State would be prepared to listen to. Would he not in those circumstances be happy to consider whether that land should be developed at all? It would have been put forward for compulsory acquisition only because it is the opinion of the local authority that it is suitable for development. Will not the Secretary of State be prepared to consider the merits of that? He will have, will he not, to decide whether that land should be developed at all? Therefore, since that is the basis of the matter, we shall have a much wider spectrum of matters that can be considered within the framework of a legitimate objection which will not be disregarded under the Bill. It would be helpful to have an answer to that.
§ 3.23 p.m.
Lord HAWKEMay I reinforce what my noble friend has said. It occurs to me that in the circumstances he has spoken of there may well be many cases where there will be a conflict of interest or desire between the extension of a town, perhaps over agricultural land or perhaps over adjoining land of great amenity but no agricultural value. Will it be possible then for the appropriate interests, the farming interests and the nature interests, to call for a public inquiry and to decide whether this town should go into the scrub or whether it should go on the best agricultural land? If I recollect aright, when the town of Bracknell was being planned the site was moved appreciably in one direction because of a debate held in this House, as a result of which the Minister visited the site and decided to alter it. That was almost the equivalent of a public inquiry.
§ Lord MELCHETTI think I am at one with the noble Viscount in what he 1814 said, because of course the contention throughout has been that acquisition is going to be planning based, and that the planning permission or the planning designation of the land to be acquired should be fixed at the time of acquisition if that is possible. The answer to his question in strict terms is of course that it would depend on the terms of the objection. For example, if the objector thought the land should be developed by him and not by the public authority, then of course it might be disregarded. The important thing is that if the authority want to develop the land they will have to obtain planning permission and at that stage there will be an inquiry.
Lord HAWKEWill the noble Lord tell me whether the conflicting needs of agriculture and amenity may also be dealt with by a public inquiry?
§ Lord MELCHETTI understand that those interests will be dealt with in the same way as any other interests are dealt with when there is a public inquiry.
§ Lord SANDFORDIf the noble Lord will look at the remarks of his right honourable friend at Report stage he will see that he went rather further than at Committee stage or Second Reading and described it as his view now that the acquisition must be planning led. We are in the difficulty that we are in now because that view has not been fully reflected in the Bill, and there are later Amendments to make that so. There will be very considerable difficulty if the acquisition of land continues without it being made clear in a properly approved and adopted plan what the land is to be used for when it is acquired.
§ The Earl of KINNOULLThis has been a useful general debate. It seems that the Government have left open the door for the consideration of this matter. However, I am not sure whether they themselves intend to move an Amendment at the next stage or whether they are looking to the Opposition, in the guise of my noble friend, to draft an Amendment. Alternatively, are they suggesting that there should be consultation before the next stage?
§ Lord MELCHETTWhat I said was that the noble Earl's Amendment was totally unacceptable. What I said about 1815 the noble Viscount's Amendment—59—was that unless anybody else could suggest to us a form of words which would express the Government's intention and would not leave loopholes we would prefer to stick to the form of words which appears in the Bill since they have worked very well for many years.
§ The Earl of KINNOULLThat is not quite what the noble Lord said in reply to my noble friend. The argument of the noble Lord was that you cannot use the argument that you are against the acquisition of land as being inexpedient or unnecessary but that you can use the word "development". If we then look at the previous part of this clause, we find that we do not necessarily know what the development is.
§ Lord MELCHETTI stated quite clearly that that would be a valid ground for objection and that I was perfectly certain that the Secretary of State would consider it sympathetically.
§ Lord SANDFORDYes, it will be a ground for objection but it is a very difficult objection to mount. If the local authority does not need to state the purpose for which the land is required but only the reason why it is being acquired, how can one mount an objection on the ground that the development is unsuitable or inexpedient?
§ Lord MELCHETTI do not want to keep on popping up and down but the noble Lord has misunderstood what I said. I said that it would be a valid ground for objecting to the Secretary of State that the objector did not know what was the purpose for which the local authority intended to use the land.
§ Baroness BURTON of COVENTRYIf I may speak as an ordinary, ignorant member of the public in this House, I think that the Amendment of the noble Earl, Lord Kinnoull, drives a coach and horses through this Bill. It seems to me that there is not a word to be said for it.
§ The Earl of KINNOULLI am not sure when the noble Baroness came in to this argument which has been going on for some time. Before I beg leave to withdraw this Amendment, may I make a final point to the noble Lord. It is one which I do not think he heard. 1816 When somebody receives a compulsory purchase order he goes for help to professional advisers, which costs a great deal of money. It costs quite a lot to employ a chartered surveyor, even more to employ a solicitor and a great deal more to employ a barrister. It is very unfair if somebody is obliged to waste money. This is a very serious point and I hope that the noble Lord will look at it again before the next stage. I beg leave to withdraw the Amendment.
§ Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.
§ Lord MIDDLETON moved Amendment No. 59B:
§
Pace 57, line 18, at end insert:
Provided that the confirming authority shall not disregard an objection on the ground that the acquisition is unnecessary or expedient where the use of the land is directed wholly or mainly to a use for sport, leisure or recreation and the proposal to acquire the land will involve a material change of use of that land.
§ The noble Lord said: We come now to the fishermen who tried to push in too early, and I apologise for that. They think that the prohibition against making an objection on the ground that the acquisition is unnecessary or inexpedient will be unfair to them. The National Anglers' Council is concerned that this Bill makes it possible for local authorities to acquire recreational waters for development and allows very little redress to the tenant or owner. Many of these recreational waters are owned or leased by angling clubs which provide comparatively inexpensive fishing for their members. In the recent past there have been instances of local authorities taking over angling facilities and dispossessing local clubs. I understand that the development corporation to which the noble Lord, Lord Melchett, referred earlier had been unreasonable and particularly highhanded in this respect. The kind of thing one can visualise happening is a local authority coming along and saying that a piece of water which is owned or tenanted by a club for local anglers who would be dispossessed, is required for, perhaps, a marina. One would have thought that it would have been fair to allow the anglers to object on the grounds that that particular project was unnecessary or inexpedient. It may very well have been both. I beg to move.
§ Baroness BIRKThis provision of the Bill has obviously caused considerable 1817 misunderstanding which should, I feel, be removed right away. If there is something I can say for the Amendment it is that it gives the opportunity to clear up a genuine misunderstanding which has gone right through the Bill. The Secretary of State is empowered by the Bill to disregard objections only on the ground that the acquisition of the land is unnecessary or inexpedient. The Secretary of State is empowered under the Bill to disregard objections only on the ground that the acquisition of the land is unnecessary or inexpedient. It will still be open to the objector to argue that the development for which the land is required is unnecessary or inexpedient and such an objection cannot be disregarded under this power.
Therefore, there would be no power under the Bill to disregard an objection that the proposed development was undesirable and that the land should remain in its present recreational state, which means that under this there would be an absolute right to object if there was a proposed development which was going to take away the land from its recreational or other uses to which the noble Lord drew attention. It is understandable, but it is really a complete misunderstanding of the provision. The important point with which I suggest he must be concerned is the development—the use to which the land is put—and whether, as he pointed out, recreational land is then taken away and developed for some other use; and this is absolutely protected in the Bill.
Lord HAWKEThe noble Baroness has been speaking about land, whereas my noble friend is talking about water. In the light of her explanation, it seems perfectly possible for the local authority to come in and compulsorily acquire a lake belonging to the local angling society and continue to use it as a lake for angling but to confine membership to themselves and their friends.
§ Baroness BIRKThat is done in exactly the same way. It is probably one of these wretched corporeal hereditaments, but it applies in exactly the same way. You develop on water and that is a development, otherwise the acquisition is exactly the same as with land.
§ Lord MIDDLETONThe 3 million anglers who are mostly miners, railway men 1818 and factory workers will be relieved to hear the explanation given by the noble Baroness, and in view of what has been said and also the discussion on Amendment No. 59A, I beg leave to withdraw my Amendment.
§ Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.
§ 3.35 p.m.
§ BARONESS YOUNG moved Amendment No. 59C:
§
Page 57, line 33, at end insert—
( ) Where the land comprised in a compulsory purchase order consists of a dwelling-house and the occupier of the dwelling-house duly objects to the order and that objection is not withdrawn, the Secretary of State shall not rely on the foregoing modifications made by this paragraph.
( ) Where the land comprised in a compulsory purchase order comprises a dwelling-house together with other land and the occupier of the dwelling-house duly objects to the order and that objection is not withdrawn, then, if the Secretary of State relies on the foregoing modifications made by this paragraph, he shall not confirm the compulsory purchase order without excluding the dwelling-house from that order.
( ) Where the land comprised in a compulsory purchase order consists of, or comprises with other land, a dwelling-house, the Secretary of State may disregard for the purpose of Schedule 1 to the Act of 1946 any objection made by the occupier of the dwelling-house which in the opinion of the Secretary of State amounts in substance to an objection to the provisions of the development plan defining the proposed use of the dwelling-house or any other land.
§ The noble Baroness said: I have already spoken to this Amendment, so will not repeat the whole argument. The purpose of the Amendment is to maintain the present position of the right of an owner-occupier at a public inquiry. It does not in any way go against the principle of the Bill or any of the principles, so far as I can see, that have been enunciated this afternoon. It simply maintains at a public inquiry the status quo of an objector in an owner-occupied house. I beg to move.
The Earl of BALFOURMay I intervene for a moment? I am a little confused with Amendment No. 59C, having had a little more time to study it. This Amendment carries exactly the same words as we find in sub-paragraph (2) on page 58. At the top of page 4 of 1819 the Marshalled List, that becomes (3). The second paragraph on the Marshalled List under Amendment No. 59C is not in the Bill. Amendment 59D becomes sub-paragraph (4) on page 58. Then I note that my noble friend wishes to leave out paragraph 4 in the Bill so that she is to some extent transposing. It would be of benefit to us if my noble friend could explain the reasons and the differences. I am sorry to ask her such a horridly awkward question.
§ Baroness YOUNGAs I explained when moving an earlier Amendment, the object of the Amendment is to negate the restrictions which are in paragraphs 3 and 6 of Schedule 4 at present on an owner-occupier's right of objection. The words are taken from this part of the Bill on the basis of an Amendment moved in another place on Report stage. Therefore, I hope that it will meet with what the Government intend over this matter. It is for that reason that I have drafted this in the way that it has been drafted.
§ Baroness BIRKThis Amendment has now become the principal Amendment on which we are discussing the question of the owner-occupier. There are one or two brief points that I feel I should make which are absolutely essential, because this thread has run through the stages of the two Second Reading debates and also the Committee stage of the Bill up to now.
First of all, it is emphatically no part of the Government's land proposals to seek to dispossess residential owner-occupiers. But it is recognised that there will be, as now—and I repeat, as now—circumstances where an owner-occupied house needs to be acquired. In such cases, the owner will continue to receive market value even after the change to current use value, because by definition the current use value of an owner-occupied house is its market value. Nor should the owner be required to pay development land tax on the development value of the house, plus one acre of garden. This exemption was extended from the original one-tenth of a hectare in the White Paper. The Bill will not affect the rate at which land is brought into development, so there is no reason whatever why there should be any more acquisition of owner-occupied housing than at present. There 1820 are already powers to acquire owner-occupied housing under existing legislation. This has been accepted by Governments of both Parties.
The acquisition powers in the Bill go no further in these cases than existing powers. The ultimate power of decision on acquisition opposed by the owner-occupier lies not with the authority, but with the Secretary of State who has to take his decisions on the merits of each case. The changes in the compulsory purchase procedure fall into two categories. First, the authority will have to state the reasons for acquisition rather than the purpose, so there is no question of the owner-occupier or anyone else not knowing why his property is being acquired. Secondly, there will be power for the Secretary of State to disregard certain objections, to dispense with the public inquiry in certain circumstances, and these changes have been, to some extent—and no doubt will be in future—discussed in detail in specified provisions.
But there is nothing to stop objections being considered on the grounds that the proposed development is unnecessary or inexpedient. The only power to disregard, the argument runs, is that public possession is unnecessary to carry out that development. Specific provisions have been included in the reserve powers, to ensure that there will always be a public inquiry where a residential owner is involved. The key point in all this is the powers and these are only powers; there is no obligation on the Secretary of State to use them. It is important to remember that the discussions on the use of these powers, and indeed upon the confirmation of the CPO, can be only on the individual circumstances in each case.
In considering any compulsory purchase order, the Secretary of State must act in a quasi-judicial capacity. He has the duty to consider the CPO scrupulously fairly, as members of the Opposition who have served in Government must be well aware. Thus the Secretary of State will have to consider in each case whether on the basis of the information before him—which would include the depth in which the issues were considered at the planning stage—it would be right for him to exercise his powers, whether to disregard or dispense, and each CPO will have to be considered on its merits. I felt it necessary to say this—and I do not 1821 want to prolong the Committee stage—because there has been so much said about this, and I repeat again, so many bogies spread around about the position of the owner-occupier. I wanted clearly on the record exactly what the position is.
I will go on to say that in case a Secretary of State were even tempted to stray from strict impartiality, not only are there the social pressures, but both Parties are highly committed to the extension of home ownership and have extended it during their periods in Office; under the Labor Government the amount of home ownership has gone up considerably. So it would be politically rather stupid, apart from anything else, deliberately to do anything in a way which would treat residential owner-occupiers harshly. In addition to the protections that there are in the Bill, we now have a Parliamentary Ombudsman who can be approached by an MP. Indeed, I sometimes think that in discussing some of the provisions of this Bill we are apt to look at it in complete isolation, and not take into account the many other safeguards and all the other structures acting in this way in our democracy.
If I may come to the Amendment moved by the noble Baroness, No. 59c, now that the others have been withdrawn, this attempts to disapply the proposed modifications where there is an objection by a residential occupier, but only so far as his dwelling-house is concerned, and the Secretary of State may still disregard an objection which, in his opinion, amounts to an objection to the provisions of the development plan. It is important, first, to dispose of the myth that the Bill contains any new provisions for acquiring owner-occupied houses, or that it will lead to massive acquisition of such houses. I would point out that in very many instances, even before there is any need for a compulsory purchase order, there is a great deal of selling of houses by agreement. It is not always a case of one side wanting to buy and the other side completely refusing to sell; there is a great deal done by agreement. There is no intention for this to be a draconian measure, which it is not.
As the noble Baroness, Lady Young, apparently accepted in the Second Reading debate on 16th October (col. 1125 of 1822 Hansard), Governments have recognised that there can be circumstances in which owner-occupied housing should be acquired, and the present Bill simply follows suit. In the event of an authority making a compulsory purchase order for owner-occupied housing, the Government have recognised that some special treatment should be made to protect the residential occupier. So the reserve provisions in paragraph 4, which allow the Secretary of State by order to rely on draft or informal plans, have been specifically disapplied where there is an outstanding objection by a residential occupier. In other words, in such a case there will always have to be a public inquiry before a compulsory purchase order can be confirmed. But to go further would be contrary to the whole philosophy of the proposed compulsory purchase changes.
There is no reason why a residential occupier should be able to put the same case at two public inquiries rather than one. This is what the whole argument is about. There is no reason why he should be able to object on the grounds that the acquisition, as opposed to the development, is unnecessary or inexpedient. Once the basic philosophy behind the compulsory purchase changes is accepted, then the only special provision that should be made for residential occupiers is that made by the Government in respect of the reserve powers. The Government cannot accept the creation of a preferential situation for the owner-occupier which has never existed before, and which would mean that the whole scheme—and I discussed the philosophy and the basis of this scheme at the beginning of this Committee stage today—would be completely thrown.
We consider that there are sufficient safeguards in the Bill. We consider it is completely fair. We also believe in positive planning, which was part of the purpose of this Bill, which otherwise perhaps could have achieved its objects by taxation as was pointed out. The whole point of the Uthwatt Committee recommendations was that the planning and the ownership should go together. If you accept that, as we do completely, then it would follow that there would be a far better system of planning in the future, there would be a better and more economical and better 1823 arranged dispersal of the way land is used. This, in its turn, should lead to a better support and better amount of housing for people generally.
One cannot defend the sort of system we have at the moment where we have so many people still not housed, and say that to continue a free market system would work. Nor can we accept the view that a development land tax alone will make this work. It is absolutely implicit to this whole scheme that the ownership and the planning should go together. I submit that the Government have done everything that is possible within the scheme to safeguard the position of the owner-occupier. I repeat finally that the idea that any change of property always has to come under a compulsory purchase order is certainly not borne out by the facts.
§ 3.45 p.m.
Baroness WARD of NORTH TYNESIDEThe noble Baroness made a reference to the Parliamentary Commissioner, and that application in particular circumstances would have to be made through a Member of Parliament. Would it not be possible, and fairer, as she is really using the Parliamentary Commissioner system, which I am not complaining about, if an application could also be made through a Member of this Chamber? It seems to me, in all the complications which the noble Baroness has tried quite explicitly to explain, that it would take all the Commons and all the Lords to get the thing put straight. It would, therefore, be more helpful if we could also have representation to the Parliamentary Commissioner through a Member of the House of Lords, as well as through a Member of the House of Commons.
Lord HAWKEThe noble Baroness says that her Bill is not draconian, and I shall leave my noble friends to decide whether or not it is for people who own up to one acre of garden. So far as I can see, anybody who has more than one acre of garden taken from him will suffer very severely indeed, because in purchasing that extra acreage of garden he may have paid up to four figures per acre, and he will have it taken away from him at what may happen to be the agricultural value of the day, which will probably be a great deal lower.
§ Baroness YOUNGI thank the noble Baroness, Lady Birk, for the very full explanation she has given. This is, of course, a central point of disagreement on political philosophy between the two Parties, and it would be a mistake to pretend it is not. I was surprised when the noble Lord, Lord Leatherland, talked about the privileged position of owner-occupiers, because I would have thought everybody agreed that this was a basic and fundamental right of British people; it has, in fact, formally been enshrined in law with their right to object at a public inquiry. I entirely accept what the noble Baroness said about local authorities compulsorily acquiring peoples' houses, but they do so only after the owner-occupier has always had the right to object at a public inquiry; and, of course, in a great many cases selling takes place by negotiation. After all, in a free country if one wishes to sell one's house to a council there is no reason why one should not do so. Nobody is going to object to that.
As for the noble Baroness's reference to the Ombudsman, the local government Commissioner is of course the longstop in all these matters. But as I understand the position, the local government Commissioner, like the national Commissioner, is there to investigate cases of maladministration. But what we are really talking about is the principle of the Bill, and if the principle is wrong somebody could not object, because he did not like it, on the ground that it was maladministration. So I do not know that the local Ombudsman is going to be able to help us in this position.
We come, therefore, to the noble Baroness's final point, which was that it would be quite wrong to take up the time of everybody with two public inquiries. We have been over the ground of sub-paragraph (3), and the three circumstances in which a public inquiry could be dispensed with, and I do not wish to weary the Committee by going over it again. But the fact is that in any of the three cases that are mentioned, the individual, in case (a) the occupier, unless he is the applicant, is not entitled to be heard at the inquiry, though doubtless he would be allowed to do so at the discretion of the inspector; in case (b) the occupier would have the right to be heard at the local planning inquiry if he objected, but the person who will 1825 decide the objection will normally be the local planning authority itself, as my noble friend Lord Colville of Culross pointed out at an earlier stage; and in case (c), in the case of a development plan without a relevant local plan, we are talking about a structure plan and, as everybody who knows about these things appreciates, a structure plan is simply a written statement of policy with only diagrammatic illustrations. Thus, the position is not really the same as that enjoyed by the owner-occupier today.
I have indicated that in seeking to preserve these rights I am not questioning the philosophy of the Bill, either on positive planning or on returning betterment to the community; or, indeed, on public acquisition. We are simply saying that in considering all these matters the rights of the individual should be maintained, and as the noble Baroness has said on more than one occasion, and as her right honourable friend has said in another place, that they, too, believe this is so, I cannot see why she cannot accept my Amendment.
§ Baroness BIRKBefore the noble Baroness, Lady Young, decides whether or not to press her Amendment, I think I should make a further point. I did not intend to delay the Committee by referring to the faults in the Amendment, because we are discussing the principle of the matter. But as the noble Baroness may be considering pressing it, I should perhaps point out that, although the first two paragraphs of the Amendment would disapply all the changes in compulsory purchase procedure where there is an objection by the residential occupiers concerned, the final paragraph would allow the Secretary of State to disregard an objection by a residential occupier. So this just would not work and it is interesting for two reasons.
The first is that it shows that the Opposition accept the precedent in Section 132 of the 1971 Act and the basic principle of disregarding objections and dispensing with an inquiry in certain circumstances; that is, where the planning issues have already been publicly resolved. This would apply not only to residential occupiers but in all cases. Indeed, the position as set out in the Amendment is so little different from what is in the Bill, 1826 which has been accepted by the Council on Tribunals, that frankly I really do not understand what all the fuss is about.
Secondly, the Amendment cuts across Amendment No. 56A which would remove the power to dispense with an inquiry in reliance on an approved local plan or the provisions of a development plan. I do not feel that the Opposition have really decided what they want. Indeed, paragraph 3 of Amendment No. 59C accepts the principle of having only one inquiry. I believe that if the noble Baroness reads through the Amendment again she will find that the points I have made are correct.
§ Lord LEATHERLANDI do not know why the noble Baroness thought it desirable to scurge me for referring to the fact that house owners were in a privileged position. Of course they are and of course they should be. Otherwise, I should have had a grievance for the last 40 or 50 years. However, while we are talking about owner occupiers and compulsory purchase we should remember that compulsory purchase has been part of the law of this land for a century or so. I remember that when I was a local government officer just after the First World War we used to put compulsory purchase orders on owner-occupied houses; I remember when I was a member of an urban district council controlled by the Tories that we used to put compulsory purchase orders on privately occupied houses; I remember that when I was chairman of a county council we used to put compulsory purchase orders on owner-occupied houses. What we are doing is to carry on the law as it used to be and if an owner-occupied house stands in the way of essential development there should be a right for the local authority to put on a compulsory purchase order while giving the owner the right to object through the proper channels.
§ Baroness YOUNGWe have had a very full debate on this matter and I should like to test the feelings of the Committee upon it. I shall therefore not withdraw my Amendment.
Lord HENLEYBefore the Question is put, for my guidance and that of my noble friends because I must say that I 1827 am rather inclined to accept the arguments which have been put forward—can we know whether the co-operation between the noble Baroness, Lady Young, and her noble friend Lord Colville has been quite as close as it ought to be in this respect? I should like guidance
§ Resolved in the affimative, and Amendment agreed to accordingly.
§ Baroness BIRKI think this may be a convenient moment at which to adjourn. I beg to move that the House do now resume.
§ House resumed.
1828§ from both of them as to where I stand, for I am in difficulty on this point.
§ 3.58 p.m.
§ On Question, Whether the said Amendment (No. 59C) shall be agreed to?
§ Their Lordships divided: Contents, 44; Not-Contents, 32
1827CONTENTS | ||
Aberdare, L. | Hailsham of Saint Marylebone. | Rankeillour, L. |
Amory, V. | Hanworth, V. | Reigate, L. |
Balfour, E. | Hawke, L. | Salisbury, M. |
Campbell of Croy, L. | Hereford, V. | Sandford, L. |
Clitheroe, L. | Hornsby-Smith, B. | Sandys, L. |
Cornwallis, L. | Hylton, L. | Sempill, Ly. |
Cowley, E. | Kinnoull, E. | Stanley of Alderley, L. |
de Clifford, L. | Long, V. | Strathclyde, L. |
Denham, L. [Teller.] | Lucas of Chilworth, L. | Stuart of Findhorn, V. |
Drumalbyn, L. | Merrivale, L. | Trefgarne, L. |
Eccles, V. | Mowbray and Stourton, L. [Teller.] | Vickers, B. |
Effingham, E. | Vivian, L. | |
Elles, B. | Northchurch, B. | Ward of North Tyneside, B. |
Gridley, L. | Nugent of Guildford, L. | Young, B. |
Grimston of Westbury, L. | Onslow, E. |
NOT-CONTENTS | ||
Ardwick, L. | Foot, L. | Noel-Buxton, L. |
Balogh, L. | Harris of Greenwich, L. | Pannell, L. |
Beswick, L. | Henley, L. | Shepherd, L. (L. Privy Seal.) |
Birk, B. | Jacques, L. [Teller.] | Stedman, B. |
Brockway, L. | Janner, L. | Strabolgi, L. |
Bruce of Donington, L. | Leatherland, L. | Wallace of Coslany, L. |
Champion, L. | Llewelyn-Davies of Hastoe, B. | Wells-Pestell, L. [Teller.] |
Cooper of Stockton Heath, L. | Lloyd of Hampstead, L. | Wigoder, L. |
Crook, L. | Lovell-Davis, L. | Winterbottom, L. |
Elwyn-Jones, L. (L. Chancellor. | Melchett, L. | Wynne-Jones, L. |
Fisher of Camden, L. | Milford, L. |
Moved accordingly, and, on Question, Motion agreed to.