HL Deb 20 October 1975 vol 364 cc1226-34

6.39 p.m.

Lord BROCKWAY rose to ask Her Majesty's Government for particulars of the contract for the purchase of uranium from Namibia (South West Africa) and of the use to which supplies are directed. The noble Lord said: My Lords, I propose briefly to raise four points. The first is the source of our uranium supplies from Namibia; the second is the series of Government decisions on this subject; the third is the implications of the illegal occupation of Namibia by South Africa; and the fourth is the use of the uranium in this country. I have given notice to the Minister of these intentions and also to the management of the Rio Tinto Zinc Company, which is the British firm involved.

I have done considerable research on the subject and I have met many surprises. To one of these I want to draw immediate attention. I found that the company from which we are buying uranium in Namibia is not only the British based multinational company Rio Tinto Zinc but that the South African Government is involved through its State-owned Industrial Development Corporation. The facts are these: the Rossing mine from which the uranium is to come is situated 30 miles North of Swakomund on the Namibian coast. It will be operated next year. Rio Tinto Zinc obtained rights to its deposits in 1966 and formed a subsidiary company, Rossing Uranium Limited, in 1968. A West German consortium assisted in prospecting Rossing. The Federal Government had 40 per cent. shares in the consortium but they withdrew their financial support in 1972, giving alternative supplies of uranium as the official reason but acknowledging that there was a political background. There is no doubt that that political background was the controversy about South Africa's occupation of Namibia.

Then the South Africans became involved. The German consortium was replaced as Rio Tinto Zinc's prospecting partner by a South African company, the General Federal Mynbou. This was accompanied by South African partners joining the board, including the General Mining and Finance Corporation Limited and the Industrial Development Corporation of South Africa, the State corporation to which I have referred. Rio Tinto Zinc has 48.58 per cent. of the shares and South African companies only have 20 per cent. However, I am told that the South African Government has virtually the power of veto. The Government own all uranium ore in Namibia as well as in South Africa. It is the South African Government which grants the leases and it is the State Industrial Corporation which provides loan finance and is backing the processing plant worth £30 million.

I want to be fair to RTZ. The company is setting a precedent in Southern Africa for labour conditions for its black employees. It does not employ compound or contract migrant labour. It provides housing accommodation in which families can be united and single persons are provided with rooms. At Rossing, the African employees are to be housed in the new town of Arandis. There is to be provision for medical care. My criticism is not based on the company's labour conditions.

My case on this first point is that I believe that British public opinion—and not only Labour opinion but, I feel sure, Liberal and much Conservative opinion—would not countenance, if it were aware of the facts, the reliance on the South African Government for our nuclear power. Our policy should be—and indeed has publicly been—to dissociate ourselves from the apartheid regime rather than becoming dependent upon it. This is a consideration apart from the question of association with the illegal occupation of Namibia to which I shall return. I ask the Government to respond to the desirability of terminating our dependence upon the South African Government.

Secondly, I pass to the attitude of successive British Governments. In 1968, the Labour Government authorised the Atomic Energy Authority to conclude a contract with Rio Algom, a Canadian subsidiary of Rio Tinto Zinc, for the supply of uranium until the 'eighties. In considering subsequent developments, I shall refer only to published statements. I do not want to infringe the Official Secrets Act, though I have other information. When the contract with the Canadian subsidiary of Rio Tinto Zinc was authorised, it was reported that because there was uneasiness that the source of uranium supplies might be transferred, the Government insisted that if any question of purchasing uranium oxide from South Africa arose they should be informed. Despite this, in 1970, the Government agreed that two major contracts should be signed between the Atomic Energy Authority and a South African subsidiary of Rio Tinto Zinc, Riofinex, for the purchase of uranium from the Rossing mine. Accounts have been published of how this change came about. It has been said that officials of the Department of Technology negotiated the deal and that it was, in effect, a fait accompli when the Government considered it. I do not know whether this be true, but I am sure that the decision was made reluctantly.

The Rossing deal became publicly known only after Labour's defeat in the Election of June 1970. It aroused controversy in our Party and its Executive and the Annual Conference expressed the view that Labour would terminate the contract when returned to power. Tony Wedgwood Benn had been the Minister of Technology. According to custom he took responsibility for the decision, though it has been said that he was unaware of the conclusive negotiations. With unusual and commendable frankness he then acknowledged that the deal was a mistake and he wrote to the Guardian as follows: We (the Labour Party) have already decided to terminate the AEA-RTZ contract. That particular case, in which neither the AEA nor RTZ were altogether candid with the last Labour Government, points to the need for even greater vigilance than has been shown in the past. As the Minister responsible at the time, I certainly learned that lesson. Under the Conservative Government of 1970–74 there was no question, of course, of revoking the contract with Rossing Uranium. But now we have a Labour Government. There is still time; the contract does not become active until next year. In June of last year Joan Lestor replied to a Question in another place: No decision has yet been taken. The whole question of our policy towards Namibia is currently under review. In 1970 the Attorney General ruled that there was a force majeure clause in the contract which safeguarded any policy decision by the Government. It could, therefore, be cancelled. It is argued that adequate supplies of uranium are not obtainable elsewhere. What of Australia and Canada, to which I shall revert?

Thirdly, my Lords, I turn to the implications of the occupation of Namibia by South Africa. I can put the issue briefly because it is one of principle. The International Court of Justice and the United Nations have declared that occupation illegal. The British Government have concurred, while acknowledging that it is de facto—

Baroness ELLES

My Lords, would the noble Lord give way? Would he not agree that the British Government had, in fact, said that the decision in the International Court of Justice was not acceptable on legal grounds, and that both the British and the French Governments did not agree with the findings of the International Court of Justice? Perhaps the noble Lord opposite will confirm this.

Lord BROCKWAY

My Lords, what I am saying is that the British Government have repeatedly said, despite their reservations on that issue, that the occupation is illegal, but have gone on to say that it is de facto. I am submitting that the fact of South Africa's power in Namibia does not justify our recognition of its possession of the minerals of that territory, or a contract under which we benefit from the exploitation of those minerals. What right has South Africa to plunder the natural resources of Namibia? What right have we to accept that plunder? Morally, the British Government are acting as a receiver of stolen goods in that respect.

Lastly, my Lords, I ask whether we are using the uranium for peaceful purposes in the creation of energy, or in the production of weapons of war? There are disturbing indications that it is the latter. I referred earlier to the fact that we had cancelled our contract with Canada. Why? The Government are now refraining from accepting uranium from Canada. Why? Is it because the Canadian Government have decided that they will prohibit the export of uranium for the purpose of nuclear war preparations?

In addition to that, under the United Kingdom Atomic Energy (Weapons Group) Act of 1973, the Weapons Group of the Atomic Energy Authority was transferred to the Ministry of Defence. The main task of the Weapons Group —some four-fifths of its total effort—is, according to the AEA journal, not only research development but production work on explosive devices for use in nuclear weapons. I ask the Government whether under this change the contracts with Rossing have been transferred from the AEA to the new corporation for nuclear fuel?

The use of the uranium is the final and fundamental question. The Labour Government are committed by their Manifesto to take the initiative to end our nuclear weapons in an international agreement. What initiative has been taken? The tendancy is for NATO to rely evermore on tactical nuclear weapons. Our nuclear weapons are irrelevant in this world situation. They are a prescription for the suicide of the whole population of Britain. They are insignificant compared with the stocks of the United States of America and of Soviet Russia, and would be insignificant if hostilities broke out. They would invite the destruction of our people.

If the uranium from Rossing is being used for nuclear war preparations, it is the supreme reason, supplementing the more immediate reasons I have given, for ending the contract. I appreciate that this submission involves a decision by the Government in another sphere. But long before the contract terminates one has the hope that mankind will have the sense to repudiate the production of weapons which mean world destruction. My Lords, I ask the Government to fulfil the decision, to which our Party is committed, to end the Rossing contract.

6.59 p.m.

Lord LOVELL-DAVIS

My Lords, I will start by giving the short answer to the Question set down by my noble friend Lord Brockway. It is that the contract for the purchase of uranium from Namibia is with the Rossing Uranium Company, and it provides for the delivery to the United Kingdom of 7,500 short tons of uranium oxide (yellow cake) beginning towards the end of this decade. The material will be further processed in the United Kingdom and converted into fuel elements for use in our civil nuclear power reactors. That is the basic situation. During the course of their review of Southern Africa policy, the Government considered with great care and in great depth the question of whether this contract should be allowed to continue. Her Majesty's Government decided against any interference with this contract, and announced this last December. So far as Britain's interests are concerned, the uranium which will be provided under this contract forms part of our arrangements for fuelling our nuclear power programme.

The noble Lord referred to the transfer of the contract with Rossing from the United Kingdom Atomic Energy Authority to British Nuclear Fuels Limited. As responsibility for the procurement of uranium for the United Kingdom nuclear power programme has since passed to the NFL the Rossing contract has been assigned by the United Kingdom Atomic Energy Authority to British Nuclear Fuels Limited. There is, as noble Lords well know—and the noble Lord, Lord Brockway, referred to this—a world shortage of uranium, and this is particularly true of non-processed uranium ore, which the Rossing mine will supply. If the contract had been cancelled there would have been no prospect in the present world supply position of replacing the material from any of the existing major sources, which, apart from South Africa, are the USSR. Canada—and, in the case of Canada. I should like to stress that there is nothing sinister; the simple fact is that there is none available from that source—Australia, France and the USA.

The current position with this is that, apart from small spot quantities from the USA, no uranium is available today from any of these countries during the period of the Rossing contract. The possibility remains, of course, that small quantities of uranium might be obtained at a later date from one or more of these countries, but to rely on purchases nearer the time of requirement would be exceedingly risky. This would be a serious matter for our nuclear power programme. To emphasise the importance of the Rossing supplies from the point of view of timing, I should also say that our present uranium supply position is that our existing stocks, together with quantities due for delivery under this contract and under another contract with Canada, will provide sufficient material to meet the fuel needs of our nuclear reactors up to the early 1980s. in the present world supply position, we would have no prospect of finding alternative supplies in this time scale if we abandoned the Rossing contract.

My noble friend Lord Brockway mentioned the question of the legality of these contracts for uranium in the light of the UN Resolutions against trade with Namibia and the UN Council for Namibia's decree on the natural resources of Namibia. So far as the UN Resolutions are concerned (and the 1971 Advisory Opinion of the International Court of Justice in respect of them), our position was fully explained in a Statement that my right honourable friend the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary made in another place on 4th December 1974. We shall play our part in the international community to help bring self-determination and independence to Namibia, but in the absence of a determination under Chapter VII of the UN Charter (that a threat to the peace exists) we are opposed to measures which are in the nature of sanctions in relation to Namibia. Only the Security Council can authorise mandatory sanctions. It has, in our view rightly, refused to do so.

My noble friend asked why this Labour Government have not terminated this contract, as they said they would when they were in Opposition. The fact of the matter is that a view on this matter was expressed at the Labour Party Conference in 1973, but I must draw my noble friend's attention to the fact that this was not subsequently adopted in the 1974 Manifesto, as I think he seemed to imply, upon which the last General Election was fought.

So far as the decree on natural resources is concerned, the Government's position was made clear by the then Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State in another place on 5th February 1975. While we are ready to co-operate with the UN Council for Namibia where we can—for example, we are contributing to the UN fund for Namibia, which finances some of its activities—our view of the legal position is such that we cannot accept that the Council is the lawful administration of the territory. We do not agree that the UN General Assembly was competent to confer this status on the Council. Consequently, we do not regard this decree as having any legal effect. But in saying this I would, of course, emphasise that the purchase of uranium from the Bossing Uranium Company by British Nuclear Fuels Limited in pursuance of a commercial contract would not imply any recognition by the British Government of the right of South Africa to continue to administer the territory.

My Lords, the question that we are dealing with is a most complex one. There is no simple solution. The Government decided that unilateral cancellation would not work. The result of cancelling unilaterally would have been that others would benefit from the release of short-term supplies while we would have gone without, with serious implications for our nuclear power programme. My Lords, as the years pass, changing the present situation and bringing, as they must, independence to Namibia, the export value of these uranium mining developments will he of tremendous importance to the future prosperity and stability of that country.

Lord HALE

My Lords, will my noble friend forgive my interrupting him for a moment before he sits down? I have been trying earnestly to follow his argument, and it occurred to me that we complained rather bitterly that it was a breach of the comity of nations and the general agreement when the USA were buying quite innocent chrome from Rhodesia. Surely the buying from Namibia of something which may constitute a deadly poison is a point which cannot be dismissed quite so lightly as that. Secondly, what my noble friend said was that we were receiving stolen goods. I have had to defend quite a number of people on a charge of receiving stolen goods, but I have never been able to put forward, nor do I think I would have the cheek to put forward (and I use that word with respect), the defence that our motives were honourable when we received the stolen goods, because this was rather in the industrial interests of the people we robbed.

Lord LOVELL-DAVIS

My Lords, I think I have fully covered the point of what my noble friend refers to as "stolen goods". I do not think that applies in this case; and the subject of Rhodesia is another matter altogether. I was very nearly at the end of my speech and, if I may, I should like to finish it. The fact is, my Lords, that any successor State in Namibia would, we think, start with a distinct advantage on the basis of arrangements such as those obtaining between Namibia and United Kingdom companies, already firmly in position and capable of extension by mutual agreement.