COMMUNITY LAND BILL

HL Deb 06 November 1975 vol 365 cc1389-473

3.47 p.m.

Further considered on Report.

Schedule 6 [General duties of authorities]:

The Earl of KINNOULL moved Amendment No. 114: Page 74, line 6, leave out from ("authority") to end of line and insert ("shall first afford an opportunity to the applicant, when application has been so made to negotiate")

The noble Earl said: My Lords, on behalf of my noble friend Lady Young, I beg to move this Amendment. This being the last day of the Report stage of this fascinating Bill, I move this first Amendment of the day with some nostalgia because of the recognition that the noble Baroness, Lady Birk, the noble Lord, Lord Melchett, and the noble and learned Lord who sits on the Woolsack have battled with spirit, great wit and consideration against overwhelming numerical odds—though this has not necessarily been the fault of the Opposition—and against the forces of logic. Nevertheless, having said that, I believe that this Amendment has substance. It concerns the prior right disposal arrangements under this Bill where an authority, in purchasing land, decides to resell and let someone else develop it.

I do not think there is any disagreement with the general arrangements of the prior right of disposal. The House will recall that it is intended that the owner of the land shall have the first right of disposal, and then the developer, with the owner's written consent. Failing these two, it will then be put on the open market. Under the Bill, as I understand it, the owner will have to make a prior right application before the completion of the purchase of his land by the authority. If he does not do so, he will lose his right of prior disposal. That is a weakness of the present arrangement.

Paragraph 2(2) of Schedule 6 says that the authority, having received an application of prior right disposal, shall have regard to that application. The point was made in Committee—and supported by, I think, the noble Lord, Lord Foot—that this did not write into the Bill a sufficient duty for any authority to proceed on the general basis of agreement. The purpose of this Amendment is to substitute for the words "shall have regard to the application" the following words, the authority shall first afford an opportunity to the applicant,…"— the applicant being either the owner or another person with the owner's written consent— …when application has been so made to negotiate. The words may not be 100 per cent. correct. However, the purpose and indeed the spirit of this Amendment is to seek Government acceptance of the fact that the words "shall have regard to "are not binding enough in view of what it is generally agreed should be the procedure under this Bill. I beg to move.

Lord MELCHETT

My Lords, the noble Earl is not telling us on this side of the House anything we do not already know when he says that there is a large Tory majority in this House. Whether or not that is logical is, of course, not for me to say now. But maybe I might remind him that what is important is who wins the war, not each individual battle. To turn to the Amendment, paragraph 2 of Schedule 6 provides that where an authority decide that land should be made available for private development they are "to have regard" before disposing or entering into a binding contract to dispose of any material interest in the land to "relevant applications". Relevant applications are, first, those made by either a person who owned a material interest in the land immediately prior to its acquisition by the authority or an applicant, with the former owner's consent, for planning permission for development of the same class as development for which the land is being made available. The applications must be either to negotiate the purchase of a material interest in the land, or to negotiate to carry out the development. In other words, these are both applications to negotiate that is an important point to which I will return. In either case, the terms must be acceptable to the authority.

We have made it perfectly clear that our intention is that the prior right procedure set out in paragraph 2 of the Schedule should in practice lead in the majority of cases to an agreement whereby the land will be made available to the applicant. I can assure the noble Earl that in guidance to authorities their statutory obligation to have regard to these applications will be stressed. However, the "relevant applications" are applications, as I said, only to negotiate and the obligation on authorities is simply to "have regard "to such applications. This is because in exceptional cases the status, qualifications or resources of the prior right applicant might be such that an authority would be justified in not entering into negotiation with him, and in these cases it would be pointless and time-consuming to require the authority to enter into negotiations which they knew before they started would be fruitless.

I know the weight which can be given to "have regard to" was questioned during the Committee stage, as the noble Earl said; but in view of the fact that there may be occasional circumstances when it would be quite wrong to force authorities to negotiate with applicants incapable of, or unsuitable for, carrying out a development, it is our view that "have regard to "bears a strong enough meaning to meet the circumstances in which authorities will need to consider relevant applications but not necessarily to negotiate with the applicants concerned. I hope that that explains to the noble Earl why these words are in the Bill, and why it is necessary to have a degree of flexibility, and that he will feel able to withdraw his Amendment.

Lord FOOT

My Lords, since the noble Earl prayed my name in aid of his Amendment, may I say that I can quite understand what he has in mind and I have some sympathy with it. I think, as he says, I expressed a view to that effect at an earlier stage. But I am afraid I cannot regard the noble Earl's Amendment as being suitable or indeed meaningful. Perhaps I might ask the noble Earl—and he can indicate the reply by either nodding or shaking his head—whether his Amendment should read: Page 74, line 6, leave out from ("authority") to end of line 7…". The noble Earl assents to that. Therefore, there is a small error in the Amendment. If that is the case, the way in which the sub-paragraph would read if the Amendment were carried is as follows: Before disposing, or entering into a binding contract to dispose, of any material interest in the land to any person who has not made an application within sub-paragraph (3) below, the authority shall first afford an opportunity to the applicant, when the application has been so made to negotiate. The words "so made to negotiate" appear to refer back to some earlier words about negotiation. But that is not the case. We do not come to a reference to negotiation until we reach the next sub-paragraph, sub-paragraph (3), so I am afraid that the Amendment is defective. However, if the noble Earl wishes to pursue the matter at a later stage, and if we can devise a form of words which would be satisfactory, I would certainly seek to come to his support.

The Earl of KINNOULL

My Lords, I am always very grateful for the support of the noble Lord, Lord Foot. I hope we might have another look at this point. I do not think one disagrees with the noble Lord, Lord Melchett, on the degree of flexibility. I disagree because the noble Lord said it is the Government's intention that in the majority of cases the authorities will automatically give the owners or the developers who have the owners' written permission, a prior right, but although that may be the Government's intention there seems to he nothing in the Bill which would give this duty to the authorities.

I again raise the question of the weakness of this prior right application, in that the owner or developer has to make the application before the completion of purchase by the authority, and that is before the authority have to say, Yes, or No, they wish to re-sell. I hope this point may be looked at again, because I should have thought it would be only fair that under a prior right arrangement, if the authority decide perhaps six months later after completion that they are now in fact going to re-sell and not develop themselves, they should at least notify the owner or the developer who is interested and has the owner's written approval, of this fact. I hope this is a point which the noble Lord, Lord Melchett, might be prepared to look at before Third Reading. I accept that the words in this Amendment are defective. I personally am not happy as yet that the authorities will have sufficient duty. Nevertheless, I am happy on this occasion to beg leave to withdraw the Amendment.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

The LORD CHANCELLOR (Lord Elwyn-Jones)

Amendment No. 115, the Lord Melchett. I beg your Lordships' pardon—the Baroness Young.

3.57 p.m.

Baroness YOUNG moved Amendment No. 115:

Page 74, line 26, at end insert— (5) Where an authority decide that land should be made available for development by persons other than any authority, they shall in determining what material interest in the land to dispose of to such persons, (a) have regard of the requirement of such persons to obtain finance on the security of the land and (b) shall unless it would be unreasonable in the circumstances to do so, dispose of the freehold interest in the land or a lease for a term of not less than 150 years.

The noble Baroness said: My Lords, in moving my Amendment I must say to the noble and learned Lord that I have often been mistaken for people but I have yet to be mistaken for the noble Lord, Lord Melchett. I beg to move Amendment No. 115. I do not wish at this stage to review all the arguments because I moved a similar Amendment on Committee. The reason why I put down this Amendment on Report is that the noble Lord. Lord Melchett, at col. 253 of the Official Report dated 28th October, said that he might be able to bring us some further information on this extremely important matter by Report stage.

The House, I am certain, will recall that two points were made on the question of disposals of land by local authorities. The first was the urgency of letting local authorities know what was the Government's intention in this matter. My noble friend Lord Ridley instanced a case in his authority where he was unable to take a decision about an overseas firm which wished to set up in Northumberland, because he could not say whether or not they would be able to dispose of the land freehold. This, I have no doubt, is an instance repeated many times up and down the country. My noble friend Lord Kinnoull instanced other examples of private developers and industrialists in this country who are making their plans for some years ahead and must know what is the Government's policy.

The second issue is the length of lease which the Government are likely to recommend. It is widely being talked of that the Government do not want local authorities to let on a longer lease than 60years. This is a very short period of time for industrialists and others. Therefore, we need to know what is the Government's intention. I should be most grateful if we could be told when local authorities are likely to receive this information and whether they are certain to receive it before the first appointed day. I beg to move.

Lord GRIDLEY

My Lords, may I briefly reinforce the arguments of my noble friend Lady Young. When we debated this Amendment at Committee stage I thought that the Government went out of their way to try to be conciliatory towards us. The noble Lord, Lord Melchett, said that he would try to give us as much information as he could on the points that we raised then. If the noble Lord is able to give us information about the discussions which have taken place between the Government and industry on the points raised in Committee, we should be most grateful. I do not want to elaborate on that point. but wish merely to reinforce everything that has been said by my noble friend Lady Young.

Lord HYLTON

My Lords, having raised this hare several times in Committee, may I support my noble friend and say that this is a very important Amendment. Also, the question is very important to any Government which is concerned with industrial investment.

Lord SLATER

My Lords, if this Amendment were to be carried, it would interfere with the obligations that are imposed upon local authorities. For example, if a local authority were to accept the highest tender for a contract to carry out work on its behalf, it would have to give an adequate reason to the Government for doing so instead of accepting the lowest tender. It appears that this Amendment will cut right across the powers that are vested in local authorities when developers put in their contract applications to take over land and develop it for the specific purpose of building houses or whatever it may be.

4.3 p.m.

Baroness BIRK

My Lords, we have had many changes of identity this afternoon! It is true that this Amendment is identical with the Amendment that was moved in Committee by the noble Baroness, Lady Young, and the noble Lord, Lord Gridley. In that discussion the noble Lord, Lord Sandford, also pressed for a better indication of the terms under which the Government think that the material interest should be disposed of in relation to building land for housing, development land for industrial and commercial purposes and the terms on which builders are to carry out the development of land. Because of the interest shown by the noble Lord, Lord Gridley, as well as by the noble Baroness, Lady Young, and the noble Lord, Lord Hylton, perhaps the House will bear with me for a few moments while I try to clarify the situation, for it will take me a little time.

As has been made quite clear, the Amendment is aimed at two distinct situations and it will be helpful to distinguish these in replying. The first relates to the terms on which land is to be disposed of for the building of houses for owner occupation. The Government made it clear in the White Paper that land for this purpose would be disposed of freehold. The freehold would normally be conveyed by local authorities direct to the owner occupier, the land being released to the builder in the first place by means of building agreements. These are agreements between the authority on the one hand and the builder or developer on the other which give the latter, subject to payment of an agreed premium, the right to undertake the agreed development and to have the free-hold of the individual plots conveyed to the house purchasers nominated by the builder. The agreement does not convey a material interest in the land to the builder. It has been suggested—and was implied in the contributions this afternoon—that this will place the builder in a disadvantageous position with regard to the raising of loans to finance the construction of the houses because, unlike the present situation where the builder has to acquire ownership of land before he can build on it, he will not have the freehold of the land to offer as security.

There are two comments to be made on this. The first is that local authorities will be free to provide for the premium to be paid in stages or even at the time at which the individual houses are sold. This would relieve the builder of the need to tie up capital in the land, as he has to do at present, and also reduce his need to raise loan finance. In any event, the right to call for the transfer of the freehold is a valuable one, and that value can be realised at the point at which the house is sold to the owner occupier. The building agreement and the rights conferred by it can therefore serve as security for a loan. Its acceptability to financial institutions will, however, be influenced by the terms of the agreement and the bearing these would have on the ability of a mortgagee to enter in order to complete the development and arrange for the sale of the houses, or to secure the assignment of the agreement to another builder.

These matters are under discussion with financial institutions and the local authority associations. Noble Lords opposite can be assured that the guidance to be given to local authorities on disposal procedures will emphasise the need to ensure that the ability of builders to raise loan finance is not impaired and that the terms of building agreements are formulated with this in mind. I should mention that building agreements are not a new animal. They have been widely and successfully used in new towns and there is no indication that this has caused difficulty in relation to the financing of development.

Although the use of building agreements will be encouraged as a means of releasing land to builders, other methods are not ruled out, as my right honourable friend told the Housebuilders' Federation two weeks ago. Thus, local authorities will have considerable flexibility as to methods of disposal and I hope noble Lords opposite will agree that it is undesirable to rule out a method—that is to say the use of building agreements—which is already extensively tested in practice and which has been found to be advantageous to authorities and builders alike.

I turn now to the second point of the Amendment; the question of the terms on which disposals of land are to be made for commercial or industrial development. The Government's policy is that disposals for these purposes should be on a leasehold basis with provision for rent reviews so that the community can share in future increases in value. It is also important from the point of view of the positive planning objectives of the land scheme that local authorities should in due course be in a position to stimulate and, if necessary, initiate redevelopment in the community interest.

At the same time the Government recognise—as do noble Lords who have participated in the debate today and in Committee—the importance to investing institutions, and others involved, of the length of the leases granted, and in particular the bearing which this has on the ability of pension funds and insurance companies to secure income and to realise assets in appropriate relationship to their maturing obligations. The objective of the Government, like that of all these bodies, is a stable property market which will afford the assurance and confidence which has recently been so obviously lacking.

I do not think that there is any need for me to go over the stages leading up to the announcement I made during the Committee stage about the length of leases. I informed your Lordships during the discussion in Committee that my right honourable friend had decided that local authorities will be given discretion, under general consent to be issued under the provisions of Clause 42 of the Bill, to grant leases of up to 99 years. Further, in appropriate circumstances longer periods would be considered, subject to the specific consent of the Secretary of State in each case. I am afraid this was rather a lengthy reply, but I hope it will set the minds of the noble Baroness and noble Lords at rest on this question.

Lord AVEBURY

My Lords, I should like to ask the Minister one question about the ability to raise finance on residential developments, which she has said is not impaired. She said that the right to transfer to freehold is a negotiable asset on which money can be lent. Has she considered the possibility that, during the course of development, a builder might find himself unable to proceed and the lender of money—the bank or whoever has put up the finance for the building—then has no asset on which he can distrain because the noble Baroness postulated that the money would be lent by the institution on the security of the transfer of the freehold right following completion of the development? I am asking her what would happen to the person who has lent money in case for one reason or another the builder finds it impossible to complete the development. What asset is there then on which he can distrain? If there is no asset, how can the noble Baroness say that the ability to raise money is not impaired?

The Earl of KINNOULL

My Lords, while the noble Baroness is thinking out the reply to that question, I should like to ask two further questions, because I think the whole issue raised by my noble friend is so important both to the house-builders and to the commercial development world.

As regards house-building, as I understood the noble Baroness she said it could be either that the builder would acquire the land, or that he could have it on licence and not acquire the land and not have to produce any capital for the land while he was actually building. Can the noble Baroness say whether, in that situation, the value of the land would be decided before or after the houses were built? Obviously, it would be important to the builder that he should know what overall costs will be involved, both in the building of the house and the value of the land, when he comes to calculate the price at which, at a reasonable profit, he has to sell the land.

The second point I wish to put to the noble Baroness concerns the commercial development. I remember well that we discussed this issue at some length during the Committe stage of the Bill, and it was then that the noble Baroness announced the 99 year period. Since that time I have taken a little advice, and the advice I have been given is that the current market for long leases on which to obtain finance from pension funds or any other market is really 125 years. That is the optimum at the moment, and a term of 99 years is not a particularly attractive period. It may seem strange if one looks at the valuation tables on a single rate; the difference is, I believe 0.001. Nevertheless, I think I am correct in saying that the pension fund and the insurance market all look to 125 years as being the optimum period. Can the noble Baroness say whether, in the consultations that her right honourable friend has had, the pension funds and the insurance companies, and all those who lend money—who after all will be the important factors—have agreed to the 99 years? Have they come down from what the market was saying previously, namely 125 years, or has the Secretary of State told them that this will be the period of time? I hope it is not the latter, because there could well be created a situation where the market could dry up.

Lord FOOT

My Lords, in case the noble Baroness should be in need of further time before she answers my noble friend—which I should very much doubt—may I ask her whether she would agree that the history of the rebuilding of my native city of Plymouth offers an interesting illustration of how this Bill would work out in practice? I dare say the noble Baroness is aware that what happened in Plymouth was that in 1941 the centre of the city was almost completely destroyed by the Nazi raids. During the course of the war there was evolved a plan for the redevelopment of Plymouth—a famous plan evolved by Lord Astor and others. Under that plan the local authority acquired the whole of the centre of the city by the process of compulsory purchase. They then leased out to entrepreneurs the new sites for business premises, and they leased them out on leases of 99 years. Would the noble Baroness agree that the rebuilding of Plymouth has been one of our great successes; that the machinery and the method used on that occasion is precisely the method which now, under this Bill, will be universal throughout the country so far as development land is concerned?

Lord AVEBURY

My Lords, industrial, I think.

Lord FOOT

Yes, my Lords, industrial, not commercial.

Baroness BIRK

My Lords, the point raised by the noble Lord, Lord Avebury, has been, and is at this moment being, considered in consultation with the financial institutions. I do not think there is anything further I can say on that, other than that it is being discussed in an amicable atmosphere.

With regard to the point raised by the noble Earl, Lord Kinnoull, on the value of land, this could be decided beforehand—he gave various alternatives, which are right—or it could be fixed by reference to the selling price of the houses. It would be a matter for the local authority and for negotiation with the developers, and it is perfectly flexible.

I am grateful to the noble Lord, Lord Foot, for making the point he did because it was also in my mind. He is quite right, and there are other similar examples over the country where the local authorities have done the same thing and have leased out the businesses on 99 year leases. But I would remind the noble Earl and any other noble Lords who are concerned about the length of leases, that what I said and what my right honourable friend has said is that it would be up to 99 years by negotiation with the local authorities, and then there would be an opportunity for longer leases, but each case would have to be decided on its merits by the Secretary of State.

I think we must agree that we have progressed a considerable distance from what was said during the debate on Committee stage, before I was able to make that statement. Now we are at the stage of being able to negotiate 99 years as the maximum for local authorities, apart from the special circumstances when each case is decided on merit by the Secretary of State. I should have thought that was perfectly reasonable. Obviously one cannot have the situation where matters go on endlessly, as apparently some noble Lords would like. It is certainly not the object of this Bill, that the lease should phase itself almost into a freehold. That is not part of the community land scheme.

Baroness YOUNG

My Lords, I should like to thank the noble Baroness for that reply. It is certainly the fullest statement that we have had, during the whole passage of the Bill, regarding the intentions of the Government on this most important matter. We are most grateful to the noble Baroness. I think my noble friends have identified a number of difficulties, both with the provision of private houses or houses generally, and also over the whole question of the length of leaseholds. One thing which is readily apparent is that as a consequence of the Bill development is likely to slow up because there will be so many extra procedures for everyone to go through.

I would say to the noble Lord, Lord Foot, that in my view his analogy of Plymouth was not a good one. He began by saying that Plymouth was bombed. That was most tragic, as we know. But I think it is a great mistake to assume that the Bill comprises a scheme which is to apply only to areas like new towns where one is effectively building in the countryside, or places like Plymouth where the whole place has been flattened by bombs. The great problem is that the Bill will apply throughout the country, in built-up areas which are heavily inhabited; so the situation is not the same. That said, I should like to thank the noble Baroness very much for her very full statement, and beg leave to withdraw the Amendment.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

4.20 p.m.

Lord SANDFORD moved Amendment No. 116: Leave out Schedule 6.

The noble Lord said: My Lords, I beg to move Amendment No. 116 to leave out Schedule 6 in case either the noble Baroness or the noble Lord opposite wishes to take this opportunity to deal with one outstanding matter raised at col. 109 of the Official Report, referring back to something said on Committee stage in another place, and which has since been dealt with by a letter from her honourable friend Mr. Oakes to my honourable friend Mr. Sainsbury in another place. My own view is that nothing much more needs to be said, but the noble Baroness may wish to refer to it, or to put something on the Record. I beg to move.

Baroness BIRK

My Lords, I do not think anything further needs be said, unless the noble Lord, Lord Sandford, wants the letter read out, which would take up time rather unnecessarily. So I will follow his lead and will say no more.

Lord SANDFORD

My Lords, I think that is probably right, so I beg leave to withdraw the Amendment.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

Clause 18 [Comprehensive acquisition of development land]:

Lord SANDFORD

My Lords, I beg to move Amendment No. 117.

Amendment moved— Page 17, line 22, leave out ("the area of a county authority") and insert ("a county area").—(Lord Sandford.)

On Question, Amendment agreed to.

Baroness BIRK moved Amendment No. 118:

Page 17, line 27, at end insert— (1A) Before making an order under subsection (1) above, the Secretary of State shall consult all the authorities whose areas include land to which the order applies.

The noble Baroness said: My Lords, this Amendment requires the Secretary of State, before making an order imposing the full duty of an authority under Clause 18, to consult all the authorities whose areas include land to which the order applies. A similiar Amendment was moved in Committee by the noble Lord, Lord Sandford. It was explained at the time that the Government fully accepted the principle that the authorities concerned would need to be consulted before the duties were imposed on them, but that the Amendment, as drafted, was not acceptable. As we promised then, the Government have now put down this Amendment which makes such consultation a statutory requirement. This meets the point made by the Opposition. I beg to move.

Lord SANDFORD

My Lords, I am most grateful to the noble Baroness, Lady Birk. This certainly meets the point we were making.

On Question, Amendment agreed to.

Lord SANDFORD

My Lords, I beg to move Amendment No. 19.

Amendment moved— Page 18, line 17, leave out ("area of the county authority") and insert ("county area")—(Lord Sandford.)

On Question, Amendment agreed to.

Lord SANDFORD

My Lords, I beg to move Amendment No. 122.

Amendment moved— Page 18, line 25, leave out ("authority") and insert ("area")—(Lord Sandford.)

On Question, Amendment agreed to.

Lord SANDFORD moved Amendment No. 123: Leave out Clause 18.

The noble Lord said: My Lords, I beg to move Amendment No. 123 in order to provide an opportunity of saying anything more that needs to be said on the matter raised at col. 274 of the Official Report, at which my noble friend Lord Kinnoull and the noble and learned Lord the Lord Chancellor were in discussion on a rather tricky technical point.

Baroness BIRK

My Lords, I wonder whether the noble Lord, Lord Sandford, could give us a little more guidance, because there is a rather difficult point of geography. The noble and learned Lord is sitting over there and I am sitting here, and to be honest I have not the slightest idea what he is talking about.

The LORD CHANCELLOR

My Lords, I am equally in a state of what I can only call fog.

Lord SANDFORD

My Lords, I do not think it matters too much. Communications between the two Front Benches have done very well so far and I am sorry that a hitch has occurred here. I think we gave noble Lords opposite notice of this, but I will not delay matters in order to press it. I beg leave to withdraw the Amendment.

The LORD CHANCELLOR

My Lords, for this relief, much thanks.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

Clause 19 [Permission before relevant date: applications before first appointed day.]

Lord MELCHETT moved Amendment No. 124:

Page 18, line 36, leave out from beginning to ("is") in line 39 and insert—

1. ("(a) owns a material interest in the whole of the land covered by the planning permission, and
2. (b) as against every other owner (if any) of such an interest.")

The noble Lord said: My Lords, I beg to move Amendment No. 124, and by leave of the House speak at the same time to Amendment No. 126. The intention behind Clause 19(2) is that it should deal only with a person with a material interest in the land; that is, the freehold or a lease with more than seven years un-expired, or a person with a binding contract to acquire all such interests. In both cases the person must be entitled to possession at the time as against another holder of a material interest: only a person with this degree of interest in the land should be able to serve a notice of election on an authority. This is because such a person is the only one in a position to carry out the development covered by the planning permission and is therefore the only person who needs to know where he or she stands.

Conversely, it is necessary to prevent someone who has a material interest in the land but who is not entitled to possession from making an election, thus suspending the planning permission and frustrating the development. The clause as drafted is defective, as it would allow just such a situation to occur. For example, a person who held land on a 99-year lease could find that the freeholder—who would be entitled to possession in, say, 90 years' time—had suspended his planning permission by serving a notice of election under the clause, which would be clearly wrong.

My Lords, these two Amendments correct the error, by requiring both owners of material interest and those under binding contracts to acquire such interests, to be entitled to possession of the land as against every other owner of a material interest. I beg to move.

Baroness YOUNG

My Lords, I should like to thank the noble Lord, Lord Melchett, for his explanation of these two Amendments.

On Question, Amendment agreed to.

Lord MELCHETT moved Amendment No. 125: Page 18, line 42, after ("any") insert ("one").

The noble Lord said: My Lords, Clause 19(1) as drafted provides that an election may be made by a notice served on any of the authorities. The reason is that the notice served on one authority is regarded as being a notice served on all. This might be misinterpreted as meaning that in order to cover all eventualities a person needs to serve a notice on each authority. By inserting "one" after "any" the Amendment puts this right. I beg to move.

On Question, Amendment agreed to.

Lord MELCHETT

My Lords, I beg to move Amendment No. 126.

Amendment moved— Page 19, line 3, leave out from beginning to ("subsection") and insert ("(2A) In subsection (2) above "owner", in relation to a material interest in land, includes a person who has entered into a binding contract for its acquisition and "owns" shall be construed accordingly; and in the application of that").—(Lord Melchett.)

On Question, Amendment agreed to.

Baroness BIRK moved Amendment No. 127: Page 19, line 13, after ("land") insert ("(a)")

The noble Baroness said: My Lords, with the leave of the House I beg to move Amendment No. 127, and to speak to Amendments Nos. 128 and 133. These Amendments provide that where, under the provisions of Clauses 19 and 20 and Schedule 7 an authority are treated as having abandoned their powers to acquire land because they have failed to pursue acquisition, this abandonment should extend not just to their acquisition powers in the Bill, but also to their powers of acquisition under the Planning Acts. This means that an authority will be unable to acquire land in respect of which they have abandoned powers under any of those compulsory powers for a period of five years.

My Lords, the Opposition put down similar Amendments in Committee—Nos. 130 and 153. In moving them, the noble Lord, Lord Sandford, argued that the loss of the compulsory purchase powers of an authority for five years under the Bill, following a notice that they do not intend to acquire land, would not be an adequate safeguard for the owner unless they also lost their similar powers under the Planning Acts. As we made clear on that occasion, the Secretary of State would not normally confirm a compulsory purchase order made under other powers following a loss of powers under the Bill, unless there were exceptionally good reasons. Such reasons would usually be the need to buy under legislation other than the Planning Acts. We undertook therefore, to reconsider the matter with a view to bringing forward suitable Amendments on Report. These Amendments, which vary from the noble Lord's only in drafting, fulfill that undertaking and I hope that they will commend themselves to the House. I beg to move.

Lord SANDFORD

My Lords, we attached considerable importance to this change, and we are, therefore, all the more grateful to the noble Baroness for having achieved it.

On Question, Amendment agreed to.

Baroness BIRK

My Lords, I beg to move Amendment No. 128.

Amendment moved—

Page 19, line 13, after ("Act") insert— ("or (b) under the Act of 1971 or the Scottish Act of 1972.")—(Baroness Birk.)

On Question, Amendment agreed to.

Schedule 7 [Planning permission for relevant development]:

4.33 p.m.

Lord MELCHETT moved Amendment No. 129: Page 77, line 32, leave out ("this paragraph") and insert ("the provisions of this paragraph relating to the service of notice on the applicant").

The noble Lord said: My Lords, paragraph 5(1) of Schedule 7 provides that in cases where Clause 20 applies, each of the authorities concerned must serve a notice stating whether or not they intend to acquire the land, in respect of which an application for planning permission has been made. Such a notice must have been served, first, on the applicant; and, secondly, on those persons to whom the applicant has given notice of his intention to apply for planning permission. Paragraph 1(4) makes it clear that a notice by an authority under Part II of the Schedule, which includes paragraph 5, means a notice served on the planning applicant. Thus so long as the authority have served a notice on him, the fact that they had accidentally omitted to serve a notice on one of the persons mentioned in the second category above should not constitute failure to serve a notice.

However, this conflicts with paragraph 5(4) which, as drafted, would mean that a failure to serve notice on both the applicant and all other persons named in his application would be as if the authority had served a notice of no intention to acquire, with the consequent loss of their compulsory purchase powers. While authorities will usually send all the notices out together, it is possible that they might, in error, fail to send one to one of the persons other than the applicant, and it is wrong that they should thereby be regarded as having failed to serve any notice at all. The Amendment, therefore, cures this defect by making it clear that it is only a failure to send a notice to the applicant—in other words, the paragraph 5(1)(a) situation—which results in the authority being regarded as failing to serve a notice at all. I beg to move.

Baroness YOUNG

My Lords, I am sure that we should all like to thank the noble Lord for that explanation. From our point of view, it is rather a pity that the Government have spotted this defect and put it right, but there it is.

On Question, Amendment agreed to.

The LORD CHANCELLOR moved Amendment No. 130: Page 78, line 38, leave out from ("condition") to end of line 39 and insert ("specified in regulations made by the Secretary of State under this paragraph.")

The noble and learned Lord said: My Lords, this Amendment arises out of a discussion in Committee. Your Lordships will recollect that paragraph 7(1) of Schedule 7 provides that a notice that an authority do not intend to acquire land may be expressed subject to a condition. The kinds of conditions which maybe imposed are set out in paragraph 8, the last condition being "any other condition to which the Secretary of State has given his consent. "The noble Viscount, Lord Colville, perhaps justifiably, thought that was a little wide, and we have sought to meet the spirit of the Amendments that he put down earlier by providing that only such conditions as may he specified by the Secretary of State in regulations may be added. Those regulations would be subject to Parliamentary procedure by way of Negative Resolution, and any new conditions needed would, therefore, be subject to Parliamentary scrutiny. I hope, accordingly, that this Amendment will meet the substance of what was complained of. I beg to move.

Lord SANDFORD

My Lords, on behalf of my noble friend, may I say—

The LORD CHANCELLOR

My Lords, I had better put the Question first. The Question is that Amendment No. 130 be agreed to.

Lord SANDFORD

My Lords, I apologise to the House for my eagerness to express our gratitude to the Government.

On Question, Amendment agreed to.

The LORD CHANCELLOR

My Lords, I beg to move Amendment No. 131. This again is intended to meet the wishes that were expressed during the debate, and it provides for regulations to be subject to the Negative Resolution procedure.

Amendment moved—

Page 79, line 10, at end insert— ("(5A) Regulations under this paragraph shall be subject to annulment in pursuance of a resolution of either House of Parliament.")—(The Lord Chancellor.)

On Question, Amendment agreed to.

Lord SANDFORD moved Amendment No. 132: Leave out Schedule 7.

The noble Lord said: My Lords, I beg to move Amendment No. 132. This is a matter on which we should like to have some further reassurance from the Government. It arises from our discussions in Committee, at cols. 319 and 320 of the Official Report, when noble Lords opposite, and the noble and learned Lord the Lord Chancellor, in particular, were being urged by my noble friends Lord Colville of Cullross, Lord Harmar-Nicholls, Lord Kinnoull and Lady Young, to say that they recognised the need for more power for the local authorities to award costs, and more use of the power which the Secretary of State already has to award costs at inquiries, where the cost of being represented has for one reason or another, fallen unfairly on some of the parties. The noble and learned Lord the Lord Chancellor ended by saying that he would look into it again, and ensure that it was looked into by the Minister. I do not know whether he has anything more to say at this stage, but if not perhaps he could just confirm that assurance, because we set a great deal of importance on progress in this matter.

Lord FOOT

My Lords, might I take the opportunity of raising a very small matter indeed, in regard to paragraph 8(5)? Perhaps I might read the whole of that paragraph: A condition may at any time be relaxed by a subsequent notice served in the same manner as the previous notice, but—

1. (a) the condition as relaxed must he one allowed by this paragraph,
2. (b) a condition cannot be relaxed after a failure to comply with the condition."

Is there any reason why the word "cannot" is used, when I would have expected to find the words "a condition may not be relaxed"?

The Earl of KINNOULL

My Lords, may I raise one point, before the noble and learned Lord replies, on the matter of costs, although it is not specifically relevant to this Schedule? In the past, when a compulsory purchase order was made, the owner of the land could, by right, recover his professional costs, both legal costs and valuers' costs, against the authority which was acquiring. Under this Bill, there will undoubtedly be a lot of areas which one hopes will not necessarily be compulsorily purchased, but will be acquired by agreement, and up to date, the position has been that where an authority make the first move for sale by agreement, they meet the costs of the owner. As the authority will be the one binding the future landlord—the only purchaser in the initial stage—could it be that the present rules on costs being awarded automatically for the current owner could cover not only where a compulsory purchase order is laid, not only where the authority approached the owner, but also where the owner, perhaps inadvertently, triggered off the negotiations?

4.41 p.m.

The LORD CHANCELLOR

My Lords, we had a discussion on these matters at the Committee stage. Dealing first with the generality of the question of costs, I certainly gave an undertaking to consider it at a later stage and consideration has been given to it. It is the case that authorities are sometimes ready to pay a successful qualified objector's costs, but one of the problems is that there seems to be an absence of specific power to do so. This general issue of the award of costs, which would also cover the problem raised by the noble Earl, Lord Kinnoull, has been considered in the context of planning inquiries by the Dobry Committee, and is dealt with in the Dobry Report. That is now being considered by the Government. The same sort of consideration as arises in respect of costs relating to compulsory acquisition procedures and planning inquiries really arises in the circumstances we are dealing with in this context, certainly so far as the objector is concerned. We feel that it is much better to deal generally with this problem of costs. The present situation is admittedly unsatisfactory. I give an assurance that this problem is being actively considered and I hope that we shall be able to have recommendations and proposals to make. I am afraid that I cannot take it any further than that at the moment, but it is certainly a matter of which we are aware.

May I say to the noble Lord, Lord Foot, that we considered at some length in Committee the problem he has raised whereby a condition under the terms of Schedule 7 paragraph 5(b) cannot be relaxed after a failure to comply with a condition. We took the view that, if there was a deliberate failure to comply, it would not be appropriate to relax the condition. We indicated that, if difficulties arose about compliance, those concerned could seek relaxation of the condition and time would be allowed for that to be done, but in the event of a breach of a condition then to say, "Don't worry, the condition will be relaxed" might encourage disregard of conditions with serious consequences. That is the explanation, and it is better to make it an absolute rule rather than a discretionary matter, otherwise difficulties might arise.

Lord SANDFORD

My Lords, I am most grateful to the noble and learned Lord. I hope I speak for my noble friends on this side when I say that we are glad to leave the matter there. I beg leave to withdraw the Amendment.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

Clause 20 [Permission before relevant date: applications on or after first appointed day]:

Baroness BIRK

My Lords, I beg to move Amendment No. 133. I spoke to it on Amendment No. 127.

Amendment moved— Page 19, line 31, after ("Act") insert ("or under the Act of 1971 or the Scottish Act of 1972").—(Baroness Birk.)

On Question, Amendment agreed to.

Clause 21 [Permission granted on or after relevant date]:

4.45 p.m.

The Earl of KINNOULL moved Amendment No. 134:

Page 20, line 15, at end insert— (d) an authority notifies the Secretary of State requesting with reasons not to proceed with the acquisition (with or without a compulsory purchase order) in respect of the land on which the relevant development covered by the permission will be carried out.

The noble Earl said: My Lords, a little earlier the Government were moving an Amendment where the power of the authorities was considered a little too wide under the Bill. This Amendment is to consider where the power of the authorities is perhaps a little too narrow. Clause 21 refers to the position of planning permissions after the relevant date. One hardly dare say what the relevant date is, but I think that it is the first appointed day. What happens is that the authority then have the power to acquire any land where the owner has applied for permission. At that stage under this clause, if the authority feel that in this instance the owner could develop that land far more cheaply and economically and it was not something the authority wished to develop, the authority nevertheless will have to serve a compulsory purchase order on the owner and then apply to the Secretary of State before being allowed to negotiate with the owner not to acquire but let the owner develop. I think that that is correct.

The purpose of this small subparagraph would be to stop the unnecessary and wasteful procedure of the compulsory purchase order and would allow, where the circumstances so demand, the authority to have the flexibility of applying to the Secretary of State for permission not to proceed with the purchase but to allow the owner to develop. I hope that the Government will consider this a helpful Amendment. It has been a matter for much consideration by those outside, and it is meant to be helpful, and indeed as something which could reduce the wasteful costs of an unnecessary compulsory purchase order.

Baroness BIRK

My Lords, it is quite true, as the noble Earl pointed out, that he moved an Amendment in Committee with somewhat the same purpose. As the Lord Chancellor explained in resisting that Amendment, the Amendment did not achieve its objective as it did nothing to remove the automatic suspension of planning permission provided by Clause 21. This Amendment reflects the other side of the coin, but is unacceptable as it still breaches the important principle of the totality of the full duty linked with prohibition, except in a certain narrowly defined case, as was explained on the earlier Amendment in Committee. This is where there has been a CPO made which the Secretary of State has, for example, on hardship grounds, not thought fit to confirm. In these circumstances, we felt that it would be right to provide a way in which development could proceed without acquisition. The new provisions introduced by Government Amendment are enshrined in Clause 21(3).

In Committee the noble Earl and the noble Baroness advanced the suggestion that there may be cases where, for one reason or another, the authority might find it uneconomic to acquire the land, and that in these circumstances they should be able to allow it to be developed without their intervention. As we explained to the Committee on that occasion, given that the full duty (and the associated prohibition) will be carefully phased in—taking full account of the authority's resources and capabilities—and also given the underlying philosophy of the scheme that ultimately all development land should pass through public ownership, it will be very rare indeed, in our view, for development which has been designated under Clause 18 to go ahead without public acquisition.

In such an unlikely event that an. authority, having had the full duty imposed on them, proved to be incapable of carrying it out, the Secretary of State already has the power to vary or revoke the order by virtue of Clause 53(4); but we expect to use this power very rarely, if ever. Apart from the philosophical objections to the Amendment, the drafting is somewhat loose and ambiguous. It appears to enable an authority to lift the suspension merely by notifying the Secretary of State of their reasons for not wishing to acquire and no mention is made of the Secretary of State's permission being required. My resistance to the Amendment is not, of course, based on its drafting, but on the substance of the arguments which I have advanced. For the reasons I have given, the Amendment is not acceptable and I hope that the noble Earl, who explained clearly what was his point in moving it—and remembering, of course, that we went over this matter in Committee—will agree to withdraw it.

The Earl of KINNOULL

My Lords, we certainly did go over this in Committee, and I hope the noble Baroness does not feel that this is totally repetitive. This Amendment was drafted with the aim of meeting the points which the noble and learned Lord the Lord Chancellor made at that stage. I would not wish to press the Amendment. My purpose in moving it was to allow authorities some flexibility. I was not sure whether the Secretary of State would have power in this connection under Clause 53, and what still seems to be in question is whether the authorities will have power to approach the Secretary of State. Here is a case where there is hardship not only to the owner but to ourselves as well if we have to purchase this land. It is in this respect that I hoped there would be some flexibility in the philosophy of the Bill. Having been unable to persuade the noble Baroness, and accepting that the words arc probably wholly defective, because I drafted it personally, I beg leave to withdraw the Amendment.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

4.52 p.m.

Lord MELCHETT moved Amendment No. 135:

Page 20, line 33, leave out from beginning to end of line 2 on page 21 and insert— ("(7) As soon as practicable after issuing the certificate, the authority shall send a copy of the certificate to every other authority whose area includes the land. (8) Subsection (7) above shall not apply if and so far as an authority entitled to receipt of a copy otherwise direct.")

The noble Lord said: My Lords, I will, with the permission of the House, speak at the same time to Amendment No. 137. In the course of the debate in Committee on Clause 21 the noble Lord, Lord Sandford, suggested that in the case of the national parks responsibility for enforcement of planning control rests not with the districts, but with the county councils or the planning boards and that there was therefore a need for a copy of the certificate, which arises under this clause, to be sent to those county councils or boards as well as the district councils, as the Bill now provides. The Government accepted the principle of the argument and agreed to bring forward a suitable Amendment on Report, which I am now doing. These Amend- ments achieve the desired effect by providing that, whichever authority issue the certificate, they must send a copy of it to every other authority concerned. This will then cover not only the two national park boards but also, in those areas where there are national park committees, the county councils whose committees they are.

For the majority of cases, the issuing authority is the district council and there will be no need to send a copy to the other authority; for example where there are no national park boards or committees involved. We are, therefore, making provision for the other authority to direct that it does not wish to receive copies of the certificates. This "blanket" provision is thought to be preferable to specific provisions designed to cover the types of case where the need to see the certificate might arise, especially as it will cover the few cases where responsibility for enforcement rests with county councils; for example, on county matters as defined in the Local Government Act 1972. I hope that these Amendments meet the point which the noble Lord, Lord Sandford, raised.

Lord SANDFORD

My Lords, I am grateful to the noble Lord, Lord Melchett, and I congratulate him and his Department on getting it right, albeit at the third shot. I applaud the extra provision which they have put in, which will enable authorities to call a halt to the flow of certificates if it becomes excessive.

On Question, Amendment agreed to.

Lord MELCHETT

My Lords, I beg to move Amendment No. 137 formally.

Amendment moved— Page 21, leave out lines 5 to 7.—(Lord Melchett.)

On Question, Amendment agreed to.

Clause 22 [Suspension of planning permission: supplemental]:

Lord MELCHETT

My Lords, I beg to move manuscript Amendment No. 137B. This is a purely drafting Amendment.

Amendment moved— Page 21, line 43, after ("181") insert ("(1)")—(Lord Melchett.)

On Question, Amendment agreed to.

Clause 23 [Disposal notification areas]:

Baroness YOUNG moved Amendment No. 141: Page 22, line 29, after ("1971") insert ("or paragraphs (a) to (c) of section 10(1) of the Scottish Act of 1972")

The noble Baroness said: My Lords, I move this Amendment on behalf of my noble friend Lord Balfour, who regrets that he is not able to be here today. He has asked me to move it on his behalf, and tells me that it introduces the corresponding provisions of the Scottish measure to the Amendment to which the Committee agreed last week; that is, applying the provisions of the Town and Country Planning Act 1971 for information and publicity about disposal notification areas.

On Question, Amendment agreed to.

Lord MELCHETT moved Amendments Nos. 142 and 142A en bloc:

Page 22, line 33, leave out ("within whose area") and insert ("whose area includes")

Page 22, line 34, leave out ("is situated")

The noble Baroness said: My Lords, take this opportunity to thank the noble Baroness, Lady Young, for pointing out a printing error in what was Amendment No. 139. She was quite right when she said that the Amendment should have referred to line 34 and not line 24, and the Amendment now appears as No. 142A.

On Question, Amendments agreed to.

4.58 p.m.

Baroness BIRK moved Amendment No. 145: Page 23, line 12, leave out ("or")

The noble Baroness said: My Lords, this Amendment excludes from the requirement to notify disposals in disposal notification areas the requirement to notify a transaction which is not for valuable consideration. When Clause 23 was debated in Committee, the noble Earl, Lord Ferrers, asked whether a gift of property would count as a disposal for the purposes of the clause, and thus have to be notified. The Government have now considered what turned out to be an extremely important point and accept that there is no need for such transactions to he notified. To put the matter beyond doubt, therefore, the Amendment makes specific provision that transactions which are not for valuable consideration, whether to a member of the owner's family or to anyone else, should not be regarded as disposals for the purposes of the clause.

Earl FERRERS

My Lords, I am very grateful to the noble Baroness for what she has said, for the Amendments which she has put down and for accepting the fact that the items in question would not have to be notified. My problem is that I do not believe that the Amendments which the noble Baroness has put down do what she thinks. For example, we agree that if a person who owns a pork butcher's shop in a disposal notification area were to pass that property over to his wife—which he is entitled and encouraged to do under the capital transfer tax system, which enables husband and wife to interchange property—that should not be a notifiable transaction.

To take another example, we agree that, if a person owning a light engineering business passed it over to his son and paid the appropriate tax, that should not be a notifiable transaction. Again, a person who had a flat on which he had a lease, and who might be the beneficiary of a trust, might invite the trust to take over the flat in exchange for a valuable consideration of cash. As I understand it, those properties would all change ownership and, according to the noble Baroness, those transactions would not need to be notified. However, the important point here is what is meant by the words "valuable consideration".

As I understand it, what the noble Baroness means is that these properties would not be sold but, if one looks at the book, Words and Phrases Legally Defined, one finds that a valuable consideration, in the sense of the law, May consist either in some right, interest, profit or benefit accruing to one party". In other words, if one is the wife of the owner of the pork bucher's shop and one is given that shop, one receives benefit, in which case this is valuable consideration; if one is the son who receives the light engineering business, one is receiving valuable consideration; and the same applies to the example which I gave of the flat whose owner may ask his trustees to buy it from him. He is doing that for valuable consideration. If one looks a little further to Jowitt's Dictionary of English Law, marriage is described there as "valuable" as opposed to "good" consideration. So if one makes a piece of land or property over to a child on his marriage, one is giving him valuable consideration.

As I understand the Amendment, subsection (5) shall not apply to a transaction which is not for valuable consideration; in other words, it will apply where the transaction is for valuable consideration. I believe that in all the examples I have given the transactions are for valuable consideration. I hope that the noble Baroness may be able to accept my Amendment on this point, which I believe makes the position clearer. I should add that the drafting is impeccable, because it was taken from the Government's own wording in Clause 4 of the original Bill as it went through the Committee stage in another place. It is almost word for word, and I feel that it may be preferable.

Lord FOOT

My Lords, I was wondering whether the noble Viscount, Lord Colville, intended to give us an opinion on this interpretation of the law but, as he shakes his head, perhaps I may say, with all respect, that I believe the noble Earl has got this completely wrong. When we use the words "transaction for valuable consideration", the question that is posed is. Is a valuable consideration passing to the person who is disposing of the property? That is precisely what it means in law. To take an example, if I give the noble Earl a shilling, it cannot be said that I am engaging in a transaction for valuable consideration simply because he is receiving the shilling. It is only if he gives a shilling to me that that is a transaction for valuable consideration. I believe that if the noble Earl cares to look behind him, he will see that the noble Viscount, Lord Colville, who is the great authority on these matters, is nodding his head.

Lord SANDYS

My Lords, I am sorry that the noble Lord, Lord Foot, will offer only a shilling. It seems rather a mean consideration. I should like to join my noble friend Lord Ferrers in commending to the Government what seems a real point of importance. I am no lawyer, but I support my noble friend on one point; that is, the definition of a member of the owner's family. Surely this is worthy of the Government's consideration. As my noble friend has said, it covers the situation—

Baroness BIRK

My Lords, if the noble Lord, Lord Sandys, will forgive me for interrupting him, I believe he is speaking to the next Amendment. We are on Amendment No. 146 and not on the question of the owner's family, which comes under Amendment No. 147.

Lord SANDYs

My Lords, I apologise to the noble Baroness. The two are closely linked.

Baroness BIRK

My Lords, the noble Lord, Lord Foot, has done most of the ground and foot work for me. The noble Earl, Lord Ferrers, having moved an Amendment to cover his point, has tried to throw a gift horse back into my face, if he will excuse the mixed metaphor. I am sorry to say—though I am sure he will be glad to know this—that he has got this quite wrong. The expression "transactions not for valuable consideration" means that they are gifts, and as they are gifts, they are given over as gifts and all the examples which the noble Earl gave fall to the ground because they are gifts. The question of what happens afterwards if anybody sells what he has received is an entirely different matter. These are gifts, whether it is a question of a shop a house or anything else. So the noble Earl is wrong on that point. The recipient of the shop or the engineering works receives a valuable consideration; therefore, he is not giving it and he is absolutely in the clear. As a postscript to this point, marriage is a good consideration, not a valuable consideration, except of course if one is lucky enough to marry a wealthy man, when one will have the best of both worlds.

Earl FERRERS

My Lords, with the leave of the House, may I say that I am very grateful to the noble Baroness for explaining that point. I knew perfectly well that if a non-legal person started to get tied up in legal definitions it would probably be unwise. But at least I now feel tolerably satisfied that the noble Baroness's point covers the matter which I was anxious about.

On Question, Amendment agreed to.

Baroness BIRK

My Lords, I beg to move Amendment No. 146.

Amendment moved—

Page 23, line 16, leave out ("or") and insert— ("(bb) to a transaction which is not for valuable consideration.")—(Baroness Birk.)

On Question, Amendment agreed to.

Lord MELCHETT

My Lords, I beg to move Amendment No. 147A. This is a minor drafting Amendment.

Amendment moved— Page 23, line 32, after ("181") insert ("(1)").—(Lord Melchett.)

On Question, Amendment agreed to.

Baroness YOUNG moved Amendment No. 148. Page 81, line 28, after ("publish") insert ("in two or more newspapers, circulating in the locality (of which at least one shall if practicable be a local newspaper)").

The noble Baroness said: My Lords, I looked through the Schedule again and I wondered whether the Government would consider doing what they have done in other cases earlier on and would add this further provision for publicity over disposal notification areas. I thought that this might be acceptable to the Government. I do not believe that it is a matter which I need explain further. I beg to move.

Baroness HORNSBY-SMITH

My Lords, I wish to support my noble friend on this issue. I remember so well that in my former constituency the papers had 27 editions in North-West Kent, and four of them operated in my constituency. It was an everlasting bone of contention that local people might by 50 yards miss receiving their own local edition and so not see something which was of vital importance to them. It is immensely important that the local newspaper circulating in the area where the land in question is located should be given an opportunity of knowing what is likely to take place. I say this particularly bearing in mind that many people read their local "rag" more assiduously than they read national or county newspapers. This is an important matter, particularly in Metropolitan London with so many boroughs and with even more constituencies within those boroughs.

Baroness BIRK

My Lords, this Amendment is quite unnecessary because there is already a provision in paragraph 7 of Schedule 8 defining publication in the exact terms of the Amendment, and in addition for publication in the London or Edinburgh Gazettes. Therefore the point made by the noble Baroness, Lady Hornsby-Smith, is covered and we do not consider it necessary to spell this out again elsewhere.

Baroness YOUNG

My Lords, with that assurance I beg leave to withdraw the Amendment.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

5.12 p.m.

Baroness BIRK moved Amendment No. 149: Page 82, leave out lines 5 and 6.

The noble Baroness said: My Lords, I beg to move Amendment No. 149 and to speak at the same time to Amendments Nos. 150 to 153. These Amendments would enable the Secretary of State to revoke all or part of a disposal notification area, declared by an authority, at any time, rather than within the time limits at present specified(28 days from receiving the copy resolution from the authority—or longer if he requires more time). The first Amendment deletes subsection (2), which requires the Secretary of State to acknowledge receipt of the copy resolution, and the rest are as printed.

When Amendment No. 167B was discussed in Committee, it was explained that we did not see any need for publicity or public consultation procedures prior to the declaration of a DNA, as authorities would need to have regard to the planning framework for the area concerned in considering whether a DNA was appropriate. Thus the question of suitability for development (and the attendant public participation) would have taken place at the planning stage.

However there may be instances—for example, where a new or revised local plan is drawn up—where there is a change in the planning strategy for the area, such that the land concerned is no longer allocated for relevant development. In this situation there may be a case for terminating all or part of a DNA which was justified against the earlier planning background. As the Bill is drafted, there is provision (in Schedule 8, paragraph 4) for the authority themselves to terminate a DNA, but none whereby the Secretary of State can initiate such action once the initial right of veto has expired. It seems desirable that there should be control over this situation, and the purpose of the Amendments is to enable the Secretary of State to have a continuing power of revocation instead of just the initial power which is all that is provided at present.

The Amendments achieve this by removing those provisions in paragraph 2 of the Schedule which relate the Secretary of State's functions (that is, his right of veto) to the initial declaration of a DNA. The effect of these changes is to allow the Secretary of State to require all, or part, of a DNA to be terminated at any time. I hope that the Opposition will welcome this practical extension of the Secretary of State's powers in relation to DNA's, as a further expression of our intention that they should operate only within the established planning framework. I beg to move.

Baroness YOUNG

My Lords, I am glad to welcome this Amendment. As the noble Baroness says, it makes for greater clarity and means that the DNAs will be within the planning framework.

On Question, Amendment agreed to.

Baroness BIRK

My Lords, I beg to move Amendment No. 150.

Amendment moved— Page 82, line 8, leave out from ("time") to ("send") in line 9.—(Baroness Birk.)

On Question, Amendment agreed to.

Baroness BIRK

My Lords, I beg to move Amendment No. 152.

Amendment moved— Page 82, line 15, leave out from ("area") to end of line 28.—(Baroness Birk.)

On Question, Amendment agreed to.

Baroness BIRK

My Lords, I beg to move Amendment No. 153.

Amendment moved— Page 82, line 29, leave out from ("above") to ("shall") in line 30.—(Baroness Birk.)

On Question, Amendment agreed to.

Lord MELCHETT

My Lords, I beg to move Amendment No. 154, and at the same time speak to Amendments Nos. 155 and 157. All three are minor drafting Amendments which tidy up provisions in the Bill.

Amendment moved— Page 83, line 28, leave out ("Part of this Schedule") and insert ("paragraph").—(Lord Melchett.)

On Question, Amendment agreed to.

Lord MELCHETT

My Lords, I beg to move Amendment No. 155.

Amendment moved— Page 83, line 31, leave out ("Part of this Schedule") and insert ("paragraph")—(Lord Melchett.)

On Question, Amendment agreed to.

Baroness YOUNG moved Amendment No. 156: Page 83, line 35, after ("entitled") insert ("or permitted").

The noble Baroness said: My Lords, this Amendment deals with a small legal and technical point which I hope I have understood correctly, and I hope the Government will accept it. Schedule 8, subparagraph 2(b) (page 83), as drafted, covers the case of a person entitled of right either to occupy a property or receive the income from a trust. I understand that there are many cases of discretionary trusts where the trustees allow a person for whom the trust was established to occupy the trust property, and the technical way of expressing this is to say that that person is permitted to do so. This is analogous to an owner-occupied house within the meaning of the Amendment. I hope that the Government will regard this as a very small Amendment which they are able to accept. I beg to move.

Lord MELCHETT

My Lords, I am very sorry that I have to tell the noble Baroness that my advice is that her Amendment would widen the provision of paragraph 4 to an unacceptable degree. Under the terms of some trusts persons totally unrelated to the ultimate beneficiary, or beneficiaries, might be permitted to occupy the residence until the sale, and anomalies might easily arise from such arrangements. Furthermore, the terms of the paragraph, if amended in this way, would be at variance with the proposed development land tax proposals as set out in the White Paper. The proposed Clause 12 sets out where development land tax will not be chargeable, and subsection (6) specifies that it will not be chargeable in relation to realised development value accruing to trustees on the disposal of an interest in land held in trust where that land is, or includes, part of a dwelling-house which is the only or main residence of a person entitled under the terms of the trust to the income derived from, or the sale of, the residence in question. I am sorry not to be able to be more helpful to the noble Baroness, but I am advised that her Amendment has slightly wider consequences than perhaps may be appreciated.

Baroness YOUNG

My Lords, I am grateful for that explanation. I certainly had not considered these further consequences that the noble Lord has pointed out. I shall read what he has said in the Official Report and consider this matter further. I beg leave to withdraw the Amendment.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

Lord MELCHETT

My Lords, I beg to move Amendment No. 157.

Amendment moved—

Page 83, leave out line 38, and insert— ("(3) In this paragraph")—(Lord Melehett.)

On Question, Amendment agreed to.

5.21 p.m.

The Earl of KINNOULL moved Amendment No. 157A: Page 84, line 4, at end insert ("or such larger area as may in any particular case be required for the reasonable enjoyment of it as a residence, regard being had to its size and character").

The noble Earl said: My Lords, I beg to move this Amendment on behalf of my noble friend Lady Young. During the Committee stage proceedings, at about eight minutes past two on the Wednesday morning, the noble Baroness, Lady Birk, moved an important Amendment on behalf of the Government, which was to exempt from the DNAs dwelling-houses up to an area of one acre. What it provided was that the owner of a dwelling-house may or may not notify, as he so wished, before deciding to sell his property. It was an important Amendment which I think the whole Committee very much welcomed. When the noble Baroness moved this Amendment the point was raised as to why it was limited to one acre, and the noble Baroness's reply at that time—and I do not blame her for saying what she did at that time—was that it would be in line with the proposed development land tax. If I may refresh her memory, she said: The point about the one acre is that it is linked to the one acre which is free of development land tax".—[Official Report, 28/10/75, col. 375.] That was her argument. In my submission, that linking was erroneous, because one is talking, of course, about a house and garden. One is talking, of course, about the sale of this house and garden as a residential unit, and one is not necessarily talking about the garden being developed. Therefore, I do not think that reply was strictly accurate.

This Amendment is to widen the area of one acre to allow what was recognised in Section 29 of the Finance Act 1965, which speaks of a house with a garden— it does not specify the area—"to its reasonable enjoyment". I think they are the precise words, but I have the section here. In other words, it accepted that you could not limit a house to one acre. You might get, on the one hand, Chatsworth, with perhaps 50 acres of garden, or, on the other hand, you might get a small house with 0.4 of an acre. The practical point, of course, is that in between these two examples there are thousands and thousands of cases where there are gardens which are just over the acre (say, 1.1 or 1.2) or gardens which are just under the acre (for example, 0.8), and it would seem, as the Bill is at present drafted, that those houses which have a garden of 0.8 of an acre would be totally exempt whereas those which have a garden of 1.1 acre would either not be exempt or the owner could sell only the house and one acre, leaving 0.1 of an acre not sold. I am sure that is not the wish of the noble Baroness.

I hope that the noble Baroness will accept the spirit of this Amendment, which seeks to import the words of the 1965 Act and give flexibility to the size of garden, and that she will insert it into the Bill. I am sure it would be widely accepted. I also hope that she will accept my thanks and, I am sure, the thanks of the Committee at the time she introduced her Amendment to provide for this exemption. It is a good exemption, but it does not go far enough. I beg to move.

Baroness BIRK

My Lords, I remember very well, though not especially the time of the morning to which the noble Earl referred, when we discussed this in Committee. The provisions exempting owner occupiers from the requirement to notify intended disposals were at that time inserted in the Bill by way of Government Amendments. I also remember that when it was discussed the noble Baroness and the noble Earl argued that the one acre limitation was somewhat arbitrary and that a more appropriate limitation would be the garden or grounds belonging to the house. I explained then that the one acre limitation was applied because this was the point below which sales of owner occupied houses were to be exempt from development land tax; and as one of the main reasons for having the DNA procedure is to enable authorities to buy land before a new owner establishes a high base value, it made sense (and despite the noble Earl's strictures, I maintain that it still makes sense) to link the exemption with the DLT exemption.

The noble Earl's present Amendment, which is down in his own name and that of the noble Baroness, seems to assume that the limit of one acre denotes a dividing line above which owners will be considerably disadvantaged compared with those below the line; but, as we have already explained, this just is not so. It is only a question whether certain categories of persons will be required or not to notify disposals; it is not whether they will necessarily have their land acquired. There will no doubt be pockets of developed land in DNA's which authorities will have no intention of acquiring, and these may well include houses in grounds exceeding one acre. All we are saying is that one has to draw the line somewhere in order to give certainty to both owners and authorities, and it is both convenient and sensible to link the size of the plot with the proposed DLT exemption. But the link with DLT is certainly not essential in absolute terms.

There will be cases where, for one reason or another, no DLT is payable on sales of larger plots; for example, it could be because a high base value has already been established or because there is an exemption from DLT on some other ground. Whilst there may no advantage to an authority in being notified of such a sale, it is not possible to frame the DNA proposals on such an uncertain and what would be an extremely vague basis. So we have gone for a logical and, we think, reasonable limit of one acre. After all, 1 think the noble Earl ought to appreciate that the vast majority of owner occupied houses stand in plots of well under one acre, and this is our main concern.

My Lords, when the noble Lord referred to the 1965 Act he was referring, I take it, to the capital gains tax legislation in the 1965 Finance Act; but in that case the extention to "such larger area" is within the discretion of the Commissioners of Inland Revenue to determine. The provision is therefore not apt in the context of DNAs, as there will be no way in which the owner can get a determination in relation to his own house. For this reason, in any case, the the Amendment is probably defective, as it leaves open the question as to whose judgment it is that the larger area is required for the "reasonable enjoyment of the residents", the apparent intention being, I imagine, that it is the owner's judgment. For these reasons, I must again explain to the noble Earl that, although he has put down this Amendment in a somewhat different form, it is still unacceptable, and I hope he will withdraw it.

Baroness YOUNG

My Lords, I do not think that from our point of view that is an altogether satisfactory reply. After all, one has to remember that at no stage have we had the area of a disposal notification area identified for us. All we know is that it is unlikely to be the entire area of an authority, but it could cover most of the area of an authority. Although I entirely accept that the vast majority of owner occupied houses have a garden of far less than an acre, we are now talking about a very large part of the country which could become disposal notification areas. It seems wrong, therefore, to exclude what could be far more than just the occasional house here and there.

It may well be that the exact provisions of the 1965 Finance Act do not apply here. What that Act tried to deal with was an entirely different situation from the new one that we are confronted with under this Bill. The fact remains that we were looking for a form of words which would meet the situation. It seemed therefore sensible to take a form of words which had worked well in the past and which has now become an accepted form for describing the garden that is attached to a house without saying what size that has to be.

I do not think it is really satisfactory to say that only some people will have to notify disposals. It is the very uncertainty that all this has created that has made it so difficult for people to know what this whole new concept is to mean. I hope that the Government will think again on this Amendment which is not in any sense meant to be a wrecking Amendment but one put down to help to identify more precisely what we had in mind when we discussed this matter on Committee.

The Earl of KINNOULL

I share the view of my noble friend that the reply of the noble Baroness was not at all satisfactory. Outside this House I have experience of dealing with houses. I accept that the majority of houses do not come within this category; there is no doubt about that. But that argument, that the majority will be covered, is a very weak argument and I do not see why the noble Baroness wishes to resist this. What happens under the 1965 Finance Act is that the district valuer decides (with, probably, the valuer acting for the house owner) whether or not the garden is within the reasonable enjoyment of the house. If there should be, say, a paddock with the house, that paddock probably will not be included. There has not been any doubt about how, in practice, the 1965 Finance Act operates. It operates perfectly well. I do not think that there is any question about that. It may be that that part of this Amendment is a little defective because one should firm up who should decide; but we could put that right. But the principle behind this Amendment is important and I do not think that the Government have really given it sufficient attention.

The noble Baroness talked about Development Land Tax. But that has not been before us; there is no Bill, no Act of Parliament. It may never come to fruition. I think it is a weak argument to base it on the development land tax. What we are dealing with is whether or not an owner of a house with 1.1 acres should be allowed (as the majority of other house owners will be allowed) to sell his house without suffering the gross interference of notifying the local authority who then have three months to decide whether or not they wish to buy. I know from my own experience when trying to sell a house that to have to notify would be a death wish. You may get an immediate offer, perhaps from someone who wants the house and has no home at the moment. He may say, "I must move in within a month." In this case, the owner of the house with 1.1 acres must notify the local authority; he must give three months' notice; yet down the road is a house with only 0.8 of an acre—and there is no difficulty at all. I think it is wholly unfair and I do not intend to withdraw this Amendment.

Baroness BIRK

With the leave of the Committee, may I say that it is perfectly clear that this is a difference of principle and approach to this whole problem. The noble Earl said, fairly, that the DLT Bill has not been introduced, let alone enacted. That I accept. We cannot be certain that the one-acre limit for exemption for owner-occupied houses will stand. But, as I explained, we are not tying our limit rigidly to the DLT exemption; I used it as a convenient benchmark. If the limit were lowered, it would make no effective difference as DLT may not be payable on a sale immediately above the limit because of the exclusion in any case of the first £5,000 of development value realised by an individual in any one year. If it were pushed up, a few more cases might be notified than are strictly necessary from the authority's point of view.

As we must take a line, as we cannot leave uncertainty and vagueness about this, we have taken the view that an acre is a very reasonable (and, in fact, more than reasonable) amount so far as the vast majority of owner-occupied houses are concerned. I have no hesitation in saying that this is the group we are concerned about. We are concerned about the majority of people, those who will be living in this way and not those in the houses with over one acre. Since we have to draw a line we draw it in this way.

5.36 p.m.

On Question, Whether the said Amendment (No. 157A) shall be agreed to?

Resolved in the affirmative, and Amendment agreed to accordingly.

Clause 24 [Revocation of duty to notify]:

5.45 p.m.

Lord MELCHETT

My Lords, I beg to move Amendments Nos. 158 and 159

Their Lordships divided: Contents, 100; Not-Contents, 48.

CONTENTS
Aberdare, L.	Elles, B.	Masham of Ilton, B.
Alport, L.	Elliot of Harwood, B.	Massereene and Ferrard, V.
Amory, V.	Elton, L.	Merrivale, L.
Amulree, L.	Exeter, M.	Middleton, L.
Arran, E.	Falkland, V.	Monck, V.
Auckland, L.	Ferrers, E.	Mowbray and Stourton, L. [Teller.]
Barnby, L.	Ferrier, L.
Barrington, V.	Foot, L.	Newall, L.
Beaumont of Whitley, L.	Gainford, L.	Nugent of Guildford, L.
Belstead, L.	Geoffrey-Lloyd, L.	Ogmore, L.
Bessborough, E.	Gisborough, L.	O'Neill of the Maine, L.
Boothby, L.	Glenkinglass, L.	Onslow, E.
Boyd of Merton, V.	Goschen, V.	Orr-Ewing, L.
Brock, L.	Grenfell, L.	Platt, L.
Burton, L.	Grimston of Westbury, L.	Rankeillour, L.
Byers, L.	Hailsham of Saint Marylebone, L.	Reading, M.
Carrington, L.		Redesdale, L.
Cathcart, E.	Halsbury, E.	Ruthven of Freeland, Ly.
Colville of Culross, V.	Harvington, L.	St. Aldwyn, E.
Colwyn, L.	Home of the Hirsel, L.	St. Davids, V.
Cork and Orrery, E.	Hornsby-Smith, B.	Saint Oswald, L.
Cottesloe, L.	Hylton-Foster, B.	Sandford, L.
Cowley, E.	Killearn, L.	Sandys, L.
Cranbrook, E.	Kinloss, Ly.	Seear, B.
Crawshaw, L.	Kinnaird, L.	Sempill, Ly.
Cullen of Ashbourne, L.	Kinnoull, E.	Somers, L.
Daventry, V.	Long, V.	Stanley of Alderley, L.
de Freyne, L.	Lonsdale, E.	Strathspey, L.
De L'Isle, V.	Lothian, M.	Swansea, L.
Denham, L. [Teller.]	Loudoun, C.	Thurlow, L.
Drumalbyn, L.	Lyell, L.	Tranmire, L.
Dundonald E.	Mancroft, L.	Vernon, L.
Eccles, V.	Mansfield, E.	Ward of North Tyneside, B.
Eilenborough, L.	Margadale, L.	Young. B.

NOT-CONTENTS
Arwyn, L.	Gaitskell, B.	Maelor, L.
Balogh, L.	George-Brown, L.	Melchett, L.
Birk, B.	Gordon-Walker, L.	Paget of Northampton, L.
Blyton, L.	Goronwy-Roberts, L.	Pannell, L.
Brockway, L.	Hale, L.	Peddie, L.
Champion, L.	Henderson, L.	Phillips, B.
Chorley, L.	Houghton of Sowerby, L.	Shackleton, L.
Collison, L.	Hughes, L.	Shinwell, L.
Cooper of Stockton Heath, L.	Jacques, L. [Teller.]	Slater, L.
Crook, L.	Janner, L.	Stedman, B.
Crowther-Hunt, L.	Kirkhill, L.	Stewart of Alvechurch, B.
Douglas of Barloch, L.	Leatherland, L.	Strabolgi, L. [Teller.]
Elwyn-Jones, L. (L. Chancellor.)	Llewelyn-Davies of Hastoe, B.	Taylor of Mansfield, L.
Evans of Hungershall, L.	Lloyd of Hampstead, L.	Wallace of Coslany, L.
Fisher of Camden, L.	Lovell-Davis, L.	Winterbottom, L.
Fisher of Rednal, B.	MacLeod of Fuinary, L.	Wootton of Abinger, B.

together. I spoke to these Amendments with Amendment No. 2.

Amendments moved— Page 24, line 17, leave out ("within whose area") and insert ("whose area includes").

Page 24, line 18, leave out ("is situated").—(Lord Melchett.)

On Question, Amendments agreed to.

Clause 25 [Assumptions as to planning permission on or after second appointed day]:

The DEPUTY SPEAKER (Baroness Wootton of Abinger)

My Lords, Amendment No. 164 will not be put as it has already been agreed to in Committee on recommittal.

Amendment No. 164, agreed to by the House in Committee (on Recommitment) reads as follows:—

Page 25, line 26, leave out from beginning to ("any") in line 27 and insert— ("(3) The assumption in subsection (2)(a) above shall not be made as respects development of any class specified in Schedule 1 to this Act or in Schedule 8 to the Act of 1971 or Schedule 6 to the Scottish Act of 1972 (development which is not new development). (3A) For the purposes of subsection (2)(a) or (3) above no account shall be taken of— (a)").

Lord SANDYS moved Amendment No. 164B: Line 2, after ("in") insert ("paragraph 1 of").

The noble Lord said: My Lords, your Lordships may be surprised with our problem at the moment, and it concerns, first, a matter of re-drafting the Bill. Your Lordships will recollect that two clauses, Nos. 4 and 25, were recommitted and, as your Lordships rightly decided not to reprint the Bill after the recommitment of these two clauses, the words which appear in the Marshalled List are necessary. The Public Bills Office have been under very great pressure, and therefore we must excuse them the small error which has crept in—the figures referred to in the setting out of the alteration are incorrect.

Amendment No. 164B is therefore set out in rather an unusual way. It reads: Line 2, after "in insert" paragraph 1 of". Line 2 refers not to the page but to the setting out of the Amendment which is the few lines above on page 7 of the Marshalled List. The Amendment reads as follows: The assumption in subsection (2)(a) above shall not be made as respects development of any class specified in paragraph 1 of Schedule 1 to this Act or in Schedule 8 to the Act of 1971 or Schedule 6 to the Scottish Act of 1972 (development which is not new development). Then there follows the next sub-paragraph: (3A) for the purposes of subsection (2)(a) or (3) above no account shall he taken of—". That is the Amendment as set out. It is complicated, and I hope I shall have the indulgence of your Lordships if I speak to it in some detail.

In Committee, paragraph 2 of Schedule 1—that is, exempt development—was amended so that all development required for the purposes of agriculture (including specialist horticultural enterprises, market gardens and nursery grounds) would be exempt development under the scheme. Schedule 1, as pointed out by the Government, is however used for the purposes of assessing compensation after the second appointed day (see Clause 25, page 25 subsection (4)(b) in the Bill as printed) as well as for the purposes of Clause 3 (definition of relevant development). Therefore the Government faulted the Amendment to Schedule 1 on the grounds that horticulturalists could in certain circumstances receive greatly increased compensation after the second appointed day.

Amendment No. 163—and that was on the second Marshalled List for the Report stage—sought to help the Government by removing mention of Schedule 1 from Clause 25 and thereby relating Schedule 1 solely to the scope of acquisition rather than the scale of compensation. The Amendment, which it is proposed should replace Amendment163, is necessary to help the Government further and to make good a defect which might otherwise exist.

Schedule 1, as originally drafted by the Government, was very largely a direct quote from Schedule 8 to the 1971 Town and County Planning Act, Part II, paragraphs 4 and 5. The Government had however included paragraph 1 which exempts minor forms of development for which planning permission is assumed to be granted (see Town and County Planning General Development Order 1973 Article 3 and Schedule 1). Because of the direct link between Clause 25 (assumptions as to planning permission), this provision would mean that on acquisition of any land after the second appointed day, the valuation would include the assumption that planning permission would be granted for the various forms of minor development in the general development order.

Inadvertently—and we apologise for this—Amendment No. 163 could have undone the Government's generosity. Therefore the new Amendment is needed. In effect, this Amendment allows the assumptions as to GDO development (see paragraph 1 to Schedule 1 of the Community Land Bill) to be taken into account in assessing compensation after the second appointed day. So far as the rest of Schedule 1 is concerned, there would be no link until Clause 25. The purpose of paragraphs 2, 3 and 4 (dwelling houses as added on Report) would be solely to define exempt development. The more limited definitions of Schedule 8 to the 1971 Act would be needed for the purposes of assessing compensation and in deciding upon assumptions as to the grant of planning permission.

My Lords, this sounds complicated but, in simple terms, the Amendment helps the Government to achieve their original objective—not to alter assumptions as to planning permission, but to exempt from the scope of acquisition under the community land scheme all development required for the purposes of agriculture or forestry, apart from the erection of dwelling houses or non-agricultural buildings. We have to remember that the definition of agriculture includes horticulture. I beg to move.

Lord MIDDLETON

My Lords, I hope the Government will agree that this Amendment is a helpful one. When the Amendment was made in Committee to paragraph (2) of Schedule 1, in order that in the matter of exemption horticulturalists should be treated in the same way as general farmers, it left a situation that might be unsatisfactory, and I remember that the noble Lord, Lord Melchett, referred to this on the first day in Committee. The situation might be unsatisfactory, in that unless an Amendment was made to Clause 25, the compensation clause, it was open to a horticultural to make an unreasonable claim for compensation. If, for example, hi, land was to be acquired, he could claim that he had built acres of glasshouses, even though this was not the case and he had no intention of doing so, and his land was all the more valuable since such a development was a possibility. This Amendment is intended simply to prevent such possible abuse, and I hope that it will be accepted.

Lord MELCHETT

I know that the Amendments put down in the names of the noble Lords, Lord Sandys and Lord Middleton, and the noble Earl, Lord Ferrers, have always been represented to us throughout the long passage of the Bill as being helpful Amendments. I hope the noble Lords will not think me uncharitable if I say that after eight days and nights of discussion I am beginning to learn that there are degrees of helpfulness! However, I agree that this improves the situation which was left after the noble Lords had pressed their original Amendment to a Division. Certainly, I think there would be no point in my resisting this Amendment at this stage, but of course that is without prejudice to what another place might decide to do about the substantive Amendment which was passed earlier.

Lord SANDYS

My Lords, I should like to welcome what the noble Lord, Lord Melchett, has said, because he has acknowledged the degree of helpfulness which we have observed throughout and he has recognised that this Amendment improves the situation which obtained after the Division. I think it would be inappropriate for me to expatiate any further upon this Amendment.

Viscount COLVILLE of CULROSS

My Lords, before the noble and learned Lord puts the Question, may I say that this Amendment has the same effect as my Amendment No. 164A would have had. As that is a separate point, when the Government consider whether to leave the single dwelling-house unit in Schedule 1, would they please consider separately whether it would be right to leave paragraph 4 as it now exists concerning dwelling-houses out of the compensation position?—because that was raised as a different issue and an objection to the Amendment which eventually was put in, I think, on Tuesday. I hope that the horticulturalists will have their own consideration, but I would also ask the Government to consider separately the question of the single dwelling-house plot.

Lord MELCHETT

My Lords, by leave of the House, may I say that if the noble Viscount is asking me to ensure that he is not tarred with the odium which attaches to Amendments pressed to a Division by his noble friends, I shall certainly do my best.

On Question, Amendment agreed to.

Lord MELCHETT

My Lords, this is purely a drafting Amendment. I beg to move Amendment No. 164C.

Amendment moved— Line 5, leave out ("subsection (2)(a) or") and insert ("subsections (2)(a) and").

On Question, Amendment agreed to.

5.54 p.m.

Viscount COLVILLE of CULROSS moved Amendment No. 171: After Clause 25, insert the following new clause—

Further assumptions as to planning permissions on or after the second appointed day

.—(1) The assumptions in subsection (2) of section 25 shall not be made where—

1. (a) during the whole of the period beginning with 12th September 1974 and ending with the date mentioned in section 25(1)(a) or (b) above, the interest in land has been owned by an approved pension scheme, and
2. (b) that period is a period of not more than eleven years.

(2) For the purposes of subsection (1) of this section, the interest in land shall be treated as having been owned by an approved pension scheme at any time if at that time the approved pension scheme has, or had, entered into a binding contract for its acquisition.

(3) In this section "approved pension scheme" means a retirement pension scheme approved by the Commissioner for Inland Revenue under section 222 of the Income and Corporation Taxes Act 1970 or a superannuation fund approved by the Commissioners for Inland Revenue for the purposes of section 208 of the Income and Corporation Taxes Act 1970.

(4) The provisions of this section shall have effect notwithstanding anything in subsections (1) to (6) of section 25 above.

The noble Viscount said: My Lords, I do not think we need to have a major discussion about this again, but I should like to say a word or two in moving this Amendment. First, I should like to explain that it appears in this form as a new clause because there was such a muddle over what was happening to Clause 25—whether the Government Amendment on charities ought to leave out charities or to alter some parts of charities and leave out pension funds, some of which were acceptable and others were not; and there were other Amendments by the right reverend Prelate the Bishop of London to do other things to charities. So we thought it would be more simple for these purposes to put pension funds down as a separate matter.

On Recommitment, your Lordships succeeded in leaving them out, although your Lordships in Committee put them in. I hope that the House will have no hesitation in putting them back in again, but I reserve the right—and I hope my noble friends agree—to consider whether, now that we shall eventually get a print of the text of Clause 25 as it presently stands, it may be proper to re-insert the pension funds as they were originally in the text of Clause 25. Therefore, that may appear on Third Reading. I have been told that the drafting of this Amendment may not take account of the insured pension funds, and we may also have to consider that point when we are looking at how to deal with this text.

There are only two other points which I should like to make about the merits of this Amendment, and they are the result of two comments which were made by the noble Lord, Lord Melchett, as reported at the bottom of column 410 of the Official Report of 28th October 1975. This occurred rather later than my noble friend Lord Kinnoull said—just about four o'clock in the morning—and, if I may say so, the noble Lord had obviously not acquired his second wind and failed properly to understand two of the arguments on which I will now see whether I can correct him. He said: The land scheme will not, as I think has been claimed by noble Lords opposite, cause a sharp drop in the income of the funds. Certainly, I never claimed that. I do not know whether any of my noble friends have done, but if they have I do not think that is the whole point.

The point is this. Although the income continues, what people are interested in as regards pension funds, particularly when there is inflation, is that the pension they receive next year should be greater than the pension they received this year. That can be done only out of the fund's income, and, if they are to have an increased pay-out from the fund. I am told it is proper practice among pension funds—they all do it—to make sure that the capital value of that increased amount paid out is hacked by the assets. If the part of the assets which is represented in property has fallen in value as a result of the introduction of this legislation, it will not be possible to back the increased pension next year by an increase in the asset value or in the capital value of the assets in so far as they represent property. Therefore, as has happened in a number of cases this year, it is not possible to increase the pension in that way and so it can be done only by an increased contribution from the employers. That is the first point, and I am not sure that the noble Lord had entirely grasped it.

Going on to the second point, the noble Lord continued: Existing holdings and the income from them will be unaffected, and they will fall due for redevelopment only at a very gradual rate, while under the proposed excepted development regulations rebuilding within a tolerance of 10 per cent. of the existing floor space will not come within the duty to acquire". Of course, that is quite right, and the noble Lord has pointed out several times that one can assume for the purposes of value a development plus 10 per cent. The trouble about that assumption is that the value of the extra 10 per cent., in terms of the capital value of the rent that will be received from that extra floor space, does not exceed the costs of demolition and rebuilding. Therefore, there is no extra asset value to be derived from that assumption at all, and it does no good whatever to the pension fund assets to be able to take account of that assumption. I do not know whether those points have been made before, and I do not expect the noble Lord to comment upon them today. But I believe it is right that they should go on the Record, because they go absolutely to the heart of the Government's objections to these Amendments. I beg to move.

Lord MELCHETT

My Lords, the noble Viscount said that he hoped the House would have no hesitation in accepting the Amendment. I have no hesitation in finding the Amendment unacceptable. The only points on which I hesitate are these: first, to reopen a debate which we had at great length at Committee stage; and secondly, to ask the House to divide again on a point which, as the noble Viscount says, has already been pressed to a Division. I hope and believe that the matter will be considered sensibly in another place.

On Question, Amendment agreed to.

Clause 27 [Financial hardship tribunals]:

6.3 p.m.

The Earl of KINNOULL moved Amendment No. 173: Page 28, line 17, leave out subsection (9).

The noble Earl said: My Lords, this Amendment was moved at the Committee stage and it concerns the financial hardship tribunals and whether or not there should be a limit on the compensation they can award in any single case. The House will remember that the original limit laid down was £25,000, and then after a certain amount of argument in another place it was raised, I believe on Report stage, to £50,000. The Government's defence on Committee in your Lordships' House as to why the figure should be £50,000 was based on two arguments. One was that the tribunals could be of an informal character and therefore it would be wrong to have an unlimited liability. On this point, I would say to the noble Baroness, who I think may be answering, that we discussed the matter on Committee and it was by no means certain that these tribunals would be of an informal character. In fact, I do not believe it would be unfair if one said that the noble and learned Lord the Lord Chancellor inferred that these tribunals could well come within the scope of the Lands Tribunal although nothing as yet had been decided. So I do not think that was a good argument.

The second argument the noble Baroness used was that possibly a situation would be created where a working farmer, before the second appointed day, could claim a considerable amount of hope value as part of his claim and this might introduce a considerable claim way above a figure tribunals would wish to consider. I do not think that that is a good argument because, as my noble friend said on Committee, what we are concerned about is not only the period between the first and the second appointed days but, particularly, the period between the second appointed day and the future. There is a great deal of uncertainty. A farmer might have purchased a farm—it might have been, say, two months ago—at a figure which showed some hope value; and when his land was acquired after the second appointed day he would not get that hope value and could well suffer a major loss. That is the kind of case the financial hardship tribunals would consider. In that kind of case the £50,000 limit could well prove inequitable to the farmer. I know that this argument has been discussed before and I will not weary the House with any further arguments. The principle I am advocating now is that the financial hardship tribunals should not have a limit within which to work, and any claim should be considered so long as it is fair. My Lords, I beg to move.

Lord STANLEY of ALDERLEY

My Lords, may I support my noble friend in this Amendment. As the Government have conceded there may be cases that should be dealt with by financial hardship tribunals, why they decide that £50,000 is the right limit I am not sure. This brings me once again to the question whether the Government have given much thought to these hardship tribunals. I wonder whether the noble Lord, Lord Melchett—and I wrote to him; I assume the noble Baroness will answer this on his behalf—could answer all, or some, of the questions I raised as dawn was breaking upon your Lordships on Wednesday of last week. The noble Lord will find the relevant passage in Hansard of October 28th, at col. 422. I presume that the noble Baroness does not want me to go through those questions now.

May I make it quite clear that I welcome the Government's action in setting up these hardship tribunals. May I also make it clear that I realise that the Government have had little time to sort themselves out and give me answers to these questions bearing upon the composition and duties of these tribunals. But unfortunately farmers are not concerned with the Government's problems. Indeed, they believe that the Government should make their legislation quite properly complete, preferably tied tightly with little blue bows, I suppose. I hope that these questions will be answered as soon as possible It might help us to stop moaning, though I rather doubt that.

The noble Lord, Lord Melchett, asked me in Committee to look at Clause 27(10)(c) for my answers. Like a good, law-abiding farmer I did this but I fear that, although I found the cupboard, when I opened it it was empty. The noble Lord also said: "Don't panic. There's plenty of time. The second appointed day may be 10 years away." And did I hear the noble Lord say it might not be on the Statute Book then, anyhow? Quite seriously, 10 years is a very short time in farming and, believe it or not, farmers do think ahead. Although, maybe, they should not, they will worry about the constitution of these tribunals now rather than 10 years hence.

Once again, I welcome the Government's action in setting up these hardship tribunals. Please do not spoil the ship for a ha'p'orth of tar, and, preferably now or at Third Reading, let us know the answers. If that is impossible, perhaps we could be told when the Government will let us have the answers. I hope that your Lordships will agree that this is a helpful question.

6.8 p.m.

Baroness BIRK

My Lords, I feel that the noble Lord, Lord Stanley of Alderley, will be very disappointed if he gets his answers too quickly. I hope to be able to give him his answers satisfactorily in a few minutes' time if I may first deal with the general points and then with the specifically farming points. He asked how this position came about. As the relevent Amendment was discussed in Committee at six o'clock in the morning, perhaps I might just go rapidly over the ground. Amendments similar to the one moved by the noble Earl were moved by the Opposition at Committee and Report stages in another place and again at Committee stage in this House, and were withdrawn on all three occasions. The noble Lord, Lord Stanley, asked how the figure was arrived at. At Committee stage in another place the Government accepted an Amendment from Mr. Stephen Ross, Liberal, which increased the maximum from £25,000 to £50,000 on the grounds that there might be cases, especially where working farmers were involved—I think this to some extent covers one of the points made by Lord Stanley—where the original figure of £25,000 would not be adequate.

The Amendment as it stands—I will come to the questions of the noble Lord in a moment—must be resisted once again for the same reasons as were given in Committee. There must be some limit to the amounts that can be awarded by the tribunals if they are not to become a means of preserving substantial amounts of development value for the benefit of individuals instead of the community. It would also be wrong to impose an open-ended liability on public authorities. This would be quite unacceptable in terms of public expenditure and it would also make it impossible for authorities to estimate what their acquisitions of land would cost and to plan accordingly.

There is also the point that the tribunals might—one cannot say for certain at this stage—be relatively informal bodies. I take the point that was made by the noble Earl about whether or not they will be. At this stage I am afraid it is impossible for me to give any information on how they will be constituted. Certainly it would be inappropriate to give such bodies the right to make any award they wish. This would be the case if no limit were imposed. Moreover, there is provision (I feel, as I did when we discussed this in Committee, that this appears to be being overlooked all the time) for the maximum to be increased by regulation—for example, to take account of inflation. There would be cases where people had bought land before the legislation was ever contemplated, and at what was then the going rate, which may or may not have included development value, which they will now have to sell at current use value. They may therefore need quite a substantial award from the tribunal, well in excess of £50,000, simply to recover the money they laid out when they originally bought the land. I remember that this point was made by the noble Viscount, Lord Colville of Culross, in Committee.

The answer to that point is twofold. First, there are a number of ways in which such people can protect their position before the change to current use value on the second appointed day, of which they will get plenty of advance notice. They can, for example, apply for planning permission and sell either privately or to an authority with the benefit of a high last transaction base as regards liability to development land tax. Secondly—I must emphasise this once again; I pointed it out before—even under the existing compensation code there is no guarantee whatsoever that when land is compulsorily acquired a person will get the same price as he originally paid for it. Under the present code he gets the current market value. Since he originally bought the land, prices may have gone up or they may have gone down. To this extent the provision of Clause 25 merely follows the precedent of the existing code. The compensation paid is assessed at current values. If there is genuine hardship the tribunals will be there to deal with it; but they are not intended, and they could not possibly be intended, as a guarantee that an investor will always get all his money back. After all, he has no such guarantee at present.

Another point that has been made is that the limit would be changed only after the event, once it had already been found to be inadequate. This is not necessarily correct. This was another point made by the noble Viscount, Lord Colville of Culross. If, when the time comes to set up the tribunals, inflation has eaten away the £50,000, there is nothing to prevent the Secretary of State from increasing the limit at the same time as he sets them up, with whatever margin he thinks necessary at the then current rate of inflation to ensure that the new limit will be adequate for some time ahead. This is, of course, pure speculation because we cannot predict what conditions will be at the time, but I feel that it is only right to explain the kind of circumstances which may arise and the way they could be dealt with. While the limit can be changed if and when necessary and a firm undertaking given—and I can give that undertaking now—that, in consultation with the Treasury, it will be kept under review, we can make no concession on the principle of doing away with the maximum limit which is there at the moment. It is on those grounds that I must resist the Amendment.

May I deal with the points which were raised by the noble Lord, Lord Stanley of Alderley, of which he gave notice. I think I am right in saying that they can be summarised as follows. The first is the question of legal aid to meet the costs of preliminary assistance before a case is taken to the tribunal. Secondly, when a farmer appears before the tribunal, will consideration be given to any loss or expense that he has suffered? If the compensation code is shown to be inadequate between the first and second appointed day, will authorities be encouraged to use their discretionary powers under Section 22 of the Agriculture (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 1963 to make good the losses? Will the National Farmers' Union and the Country Landowners Association be consulted on the composition of the hardship tribunals, and will the tribunals be given guidance on the kind of agricultural hardship that may arise?

On the first point, of surveyor's costs, as was explained by the noble and learned Lord the Lord Chancellor, the green form scheme for legal aid applies only to the taking of advice from solicitors, but there is nothing in Clause 27 to prevent a tribunal from including in an award an amount representing the reasonable costs of the applicant in connection with the claim, including valuation costs Indeed, it is normal practice under the compensation code for such costs to be included in the compensation payable on compulsory acquisition. However, the Minister gave an undertaking in another place that if there was any doubt about this the guidance that the Secretary of State would give to the tribunals would ensure that such costs were payable.

On the noble Lord's second point, about the losses of dispossessed farmers, may I first make the point that nothing in Clause 25 will in any way affect the compensation for disturbance which the farmer can get under the existing provisions of the compensation code, on top of the agricultural value of the land acquired from him, together with compensation for severance or injurious affection if the circumstances are such that those provisions apply. Therefore, he will continue to be compensated for disturbance even after the second appointed day. If then there is any outstanding loss which he claims he has suffered because of the change to current use value, he can certainly raise it before the tribunal.

The noble Lord's third point concerned the use of discretionary powers to top up compensation. May I say that this point is not strictly relevant to the Bill. We have no evidence that the existing compensation code, which was recently extended by the Opposition's own Land Compensation Act 1973, is inadequate as regards farming interests. Although the code is always subject to review, we cannot undertake further additions to its provisions until we are satisfied that they are fully justified.

So far as Section 22 of the 1963 Act is concerned, we have no power to direct authorities how they should use these powers, but I must point out that the powers in Section 22 were originally intended to provide disturbance payments to certain limited categories of agricultural tenants—mainly licensees and 364-day tenants who had no statutory right to compensation. The power was never intended to be used to provide compensation on the basis of equivalent reinstatement to those farmers who already have a statutory right to compensation by virtue of their interest in the land, nor would it be right for us to encourage authorities to use it in this way. So far as consultation is concerned, I can give an undertaking that the NFU and the CLA will be consulted before the necessary regulations are laid before Parliament.

Finally, I turn to the noble Lord's point about guidance to tribunals on hardship to farmers and agricultural assesors. At this stage it is premature to attempt to predict what kind of advice should be given to the tribunals. We do not yet know how and whether hardship will arise or, in particular, how it will affect working farmers. When the consultations on the regulations take place the tribunals will be able to receive such suggestions as they think are appropriate on these points and also on the question of agricultural assessors. The Council on Tribunals will also be consulted, which is a very important point, and as the regulations are subject to Affirmative Resolution, Parliament will have the opportunity to debate them.

In order to answer the points which have been raised by the noble Lord, Lord Stanley of Alderley, I have had to digress from the original Amendment which was moved by the noble Earl, Lord Kinnoull. I ought, therefore, to bring the House back to my reply on that Amendment and say that it is unacceptable and that I hope the noble Earl will withdraw it.

6.20 p.m.

Viscount COLVILLE of CULROSS

My Lords, the noble Baroness was good enough to deal with two of the points that I made in the debate on this matter in Committee. I do not want to go into the details of the arguments now. She has gone about half-way towards meeting one of them and perhaps a little further towards meeting the other, and although I do not wish to explain in detail now, I think she must concede that she has not met the whole of either of them.

The criteria for assessing hardship will be one of the things that appear in the regulations. I do not suppose anybody now has any idea what the criteria will be, but it will be absolutely necessary, will it not—and will the noble Baroness please bear this in mind—to correlate the criteria with the upper limit of compensation that is available to be awarded by the tribunal? It is no use telling them that they can consider one set of circumstances and that is to count as hardship within their jurisdiction and provide for so limited an area of financial jurisdiction that they cannot do justice to that very criterion that they are told to take account of. The noble Barones will see that when the criterion is chosen, the financial limits must be set accordingly so that they will be able to deal with that hardship according to that criterion. I have no doubt that the noble Baroness will instantly tell us that the tribunals will be made up of the most distinguished and careful people who will do their very best to interpret the criteria which are approved by Parliament in such a way as properly to fulfill the job for which they are set up.

In those circumstances, when it comes to a question of setting the financial limit, I hope that the noble Baroness will see that the Department is generous because if we have chosen certain criteria which are to count as hardship, and if we have a responsible tribunal assessing those criteria and assessing the facts and fitting them into the criteria, it will be quite wrong if they are then limited in the amount they can award so that they cannot do justice to the very criteria which appear in the regulations.

Baroness BIRK

My Lords, with the leave of the House I will reply briefly to the noble Viscount. He is always so very kind: he puts his questions and then gives the answers which he thinks I should give back to him and goes on from there. But I am not going to answer him like that at all; I am not going to say that it depends on the distinguished members of the tribunal. I shall put it quite differently. Once criteria are laid down, those are the principles on which the awards will be made. The maximum at the moment is £50,000. As I have explained in some detail, that figure can be altered if there is greater inflation. At the moment we take it that the £50,000 is the maximum limit so that the financial criteria then fit in with the basic criteria that will be laid down. I do not think there is a problem here because the criteria will be the principles upon which the tribunals will act. If we alter the maximum at today's prices then the scale alters, but in my view the scale is not the same as criteria.

Lord STANLEY of ALDERLEY

My Lords, with the leave of the House, may I thank the noble Baroness for a really detailed reply. The fact that she took so much trouble will be appreciated, although I cannot guarantee that we shall not continue to ask for more.

The Earl of KINNOULL

My Lords, the benefit of going over the same ground on this Bill four times is that one learns a little more on each occasion, and I would join with my noble friend in thanking the noble Baroness. We have learned a good deal from moving this Amendment. My worry in connection with tribunals is of whether they should be informal. It strikes one that the compensation could be quite large, and if I were the subject of such compensation I would not trust myself to present my own case. If I could afford him I would ask my noble friend in front of me to do it for me.

As the noble Baroness said, I think we have been consistent in our Amendments on this issue, but we see that the noble Baroness and indeed the Government have hearts which still resemble stone. Nevertheless, one appreciates that they have powers to increase the maximum compensation, if required, and for that reason I beg leave to withdraw the Amendment.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

Clause 28 [Power to acquire unoccupied office premises]:

6.25 p.m.

Viscount COLVILLE of CULROSS moved Amendment No. 173B:

Page 30, line 21, at end insert£ ( ) In this section "floor space" means gross floor space, and the amount of any such space shall be ascertained by external measurement of that space whether the office accommodation in question is or is slot bounded (wholly or partly) by external walls of the office building.

The noble Viscount said: My Lords, I think it was my noble friend Lord Balfour who, at the Committee stage, asked what was the definition of "office floor space" for the purposes of Part IV of the Bill, and answer came there none. I ventured to suggest that there was a well-tried formula to be found in the Town and Country Planning Acts, related to the question of office development plans. I ran it to earth: I have had three shots at drafting this Amendment so that it may be adapted to the phraseology of the Bill, and I am grateful for a certain amount of professional assistance in this respect.

I think it would be right to include a definition because, if there is none in this Bill, so closely linked as it is to the Town and Country Planning Acts, it might be thought that Parliament intended there to be a difference between the interpretation in this Bill and in that Act. Accordingly, I suggest to the House that it would be wise to answer the question posed by my noble friend Lord Balfour by inserting a new subsection which adopts the familiar definition and formula that we find in the 1971 Act. I beg to move.

The LORD CHANCELLOR

My Lords, I entirely agree that it is advantageous to have a definition of "floor space" in Clause 28. I do not know what the layman will make of the language: …the amount of any such space shall be ascertained by external measurement of that space whether the office accommodation in question is or is not bounded (wholly or partly) by external walls of the office building". If it is read very slowly, I think it enters into the realms of comprehension. It is clearly an accurate and acceptable description and I am most grateful to the noble Viscount for having devised it and added it to "his" Bill. It will not make it known as the "Colville Bill", but it will be an important addition to it.

Viscount COLVILLE of CULROSS

My Lords, I am grateful to the noble and learned Lord. I can only say in mitigation of my drafting that I had to use the Socialist Government's formula in their own 1965 Act. That is where it comes from in the first place, but I am delighted that the noble and learned Lord finds it so easy to understand.

On Question, Amendment agreed to.

Clause 34 [Power to obtain information]:

Viscount COLVILLE of CULROSS moved Amendment No. 174A: Page 35, line 36, leave out from ("may") to ("of") in line 37 and insert ("require that the officer of the Secretary of State be permitted to make extracts from, or take copies").

The noble Viscount said: My Lords, here again this is a small point, but I was a little anxious that the facilities which would be demanded for copying and taking extracts of documents might extend to something rather more substantial than perhaps the Government intended. I mentioned this in Committee and I have attempted to follow it up by a drafting Amendment which I think represents what is intended. I beg to move.

The LORD CHANCELLOR

My Lords, again I thank the noble Viscount for his contribution. We find this wholly acceptable and I do not think I need say anything further.

On Question, Amendment agreed to.

Clause 41 [Exclusion of special Parliamentary procedure]:

6.30 p.m.

Lord SANDYS moved Amendment No. 176: Page 41, line 2, after ("except") insert ("(i)")

The noble Lord said: My Lords, I should like, with your Lordships' permission, to move Amendments Nos. 176 and 177 together, No. 176 being, of course, a paving Amendment for No. 177. When, with my noble friend Lord Kinnoull, I last moved these two Amendments which affect local councils in England and community councils in Wales, it was at about 6.30 in the morning. I see that now it is about the same hour but in the afternoon. On that occasion, the noble and learned Lord the Lord Chancellor, if I may remind him of his remarks, said: The effect of these Amendments, as I understand it, would be that the exclusion of the special Parliamentary procedure provided for in Clause 40 would not apply; that is to say, the procedure would continue to apply to the compulsory purchase of interest in land belonging to parish or community councils in the circumstances set out in the Amendments. However, the noble and learned Lord went on to say, and I quote his words: Having said that, I wonder whether that remains true after withdrawal."—[Official Report, 28th October 1975; cols. 460–461.] We were in some difficulty at that hour of the morning, and came to the conclusion that it would be for the benefit of the discussions in your Lordships' Committee if the Amendments were withdrawn, in addition to two previous Amendments introduced by my noble friend Lord Sandford.

We return to this subject refreshed and reinvigorated by further examination of other documents, and greatly reinforced by the enthusiasm of the National Association of Local Councils for this Amendment. It is apparent there are no less than 8,000 local councils who are affected in the present circumstances. They will suffer, unless these Amendments are applied to the Bill, from a potential—and I stress that word—threat of expropriation of property which they administer on behalf of the general public.

However, this is a matter which the Government have examined in some detail. Perhaps I may be allowed to remind the noble Baroness of what was said by her right honourable friend Mr. John Silk in on 14th October 1975 in another place at column 1245 of Hansard. He said: This matter cannot be lightly set aside and the honourable Gentleman was right to bring it to our attention. The approach of the amendments is much respected. They are recognised as being aimed at restoring to parish councils, and on a formal basis, some of the protection lost by the general exclusion of the special Parliamentary procedure. As this fact is recognised by the Government, and as we are now at a more convenient hour to discuss these important Amendments, I think they ought to be self-explanatory, having introduced them at an early stage. I hope that the Government are prepared to accept them. I beg to move.

The LORD CHANCELLOR

My Lords, the content of these Amendments was discussed in another place, as the noble Lord, Lord Sandys, has just indicated, and the Amendments there moved were withdrawn after my right honourable friend the Minister gave a firm assurance that the Government would not confirm compulsory purchase orders under the community land scheme, unless there were good planning reasons for doing so which override the reasons for which the local council wished to retain the land, and that the attention of the land scheme authorities would be drawn to this policy in an appropriate circular of guidance.

On the occasion on which my right honourable friend made the references which the noble Lord has read, he concluded examination of this matter by saying: The better course is that the Government should state clearly their attitude towards compulsory acquisition of local councils' land under the community land scheme. This is that the Government will not accept compulsory purchase orders for such land to be confirmed unless there are good planning reasons for doing so which override the reasons for which the local council wishes to retain the land. The attention of the land scheme authorities, I can promise the honourable Gentleman, will be drawn to this policy in an appropriate circular of guidance."—[Official Report, Commons, 14/10/75; col. 1246.] My Lords, the general approach of the Government towards local councils may be illustrated when I remind your Lordships of the features of the Bill which have a bearing on the effect of the community land scheme on land belonging to those councils. First, we have provided under Clause 4 that a material interest owned by a parish council, which includes parish meetings and the trustees of a parish, or by a community council in Wales, is not to be treated as outstanding for the purposes of the Bill, and will not therefore come within the acquisition duty imposed by orders under Clause 18; nor will local councils' development proposals for land they own be subject to the machinery for the suspension of planning permission or the prohibition of development.

Secondly, we provided in Schedule 6 that in exercising their functions under the Bill, authorities must have regard to the needs and obligations of parish and community councils. Thirdly, on the negative side, we have not sought by Clause 41 to exclude from special Parliamentary procedure compulsory purchase orders under any enactment relating to commons—which include town or village greens—oropen spaces, which cover any land use for the purpose of public recreation.

Clause 41 does not touch paragraph 11 of Schedule 1 to the Acquisition of Land Act, which generally provides that a compulsory purchase order on such land is subject to special Parliamentary procedure, unless the Secretary of State certifies that other land, not less in area and equally advantageous to the public, has been, or will be, provided in exchange for the land proposed to be taken. If there is no certificate, then in these cases the special procedure applies if no-one objects to the compulsory purchase order. The Government's view is that, apart from the special categories of land to which the special Parliamentary procedure, as I have indicated, will continue to apply, whether it belongs to a parish or community council or not, all local authority land should be excluded from the procedure, and that it would not be right that it should continue to apply to local councils' land by virtue of their ownership, but not to other local authority land. It would be odd if parish council land were protected in this way, whereas the land of the main operators of the scheme—county and district councils—was not.

The Government maintain that a clear statement of their attitude towards the compulsory purchase of local councils' land is the best assurance the councils could possibly have that Clause 41 will not demolish their defences against unjustified compulsory acquisition under the land scheme. I hope that in the light of this assurance this Amendment will be withdrawn.

The Earl of KINNOULL

My Lords, in supporting my noble friend Lord Sandys, may I raise one point for clarify- cation? I apologise for not raising it before, but I wanted to hear what the noble and learned Lord the Lord Chancellor would say. As I understand it, the whole purpose of the Amendment is that the Parish Councils Association—now known as the National Local Councils Association—are anxious that not only will they lose their previous exemption under the special Parliamentary procedure under this Bill, but, inadvertently, they will also lose it under 29 other Acts. I know the noble and learned Lord mentioned that there would be exemption, for example, for parish halls, but the 29 other Acts—copies of which I have with me—mention caravan sites, parking places, picnic sites, coastal protection work, slaughterhouses, playing fields, and so on. Purely for clarification, can the noble and learned Lord advise me whether this national body, which at present has an exemption under these 29 Acts, will lose it?

The LORD CHANCELLOR

My Lords, the advice that I have received is that they, like local authorities in general, will lose the protection of special Parliamentary procedure on acquisition under all Acts. This is the information I have, and was happy to receive. At any rate it enabled me to answer the question. I hope it gave satisfaction as well.

Lord SANDYS

My Lords, after listening to the noble and learned Lord on the Woolsack, I cannot say that it is a very reassuring reply. My noble friend Lord Kinnoull has placed his finger on a very important point. There are these 29 Acts, which it would be wearisome to recite to your Lordships. The noble and learned Lord has referred to protections against compulsory purchase orders which were given by his right honourable friend in another place; and he has given us assurances here. At this stage it would not be our wish to press the Amendment, in view of the assurances given. However, there is a remaining doubt in our minds, and should it be necessary to bring an Amendment before your Lordships at Third Reading, I hope the noble and learned Lord will understand our quandary. I beg leave to withdraw the Amendment.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

Clause 42 [Consent for disposals]:

Viscount COLVILLE of CULROSS: moved Amendment No. 177A:

Page 41, line 9, at end insert— ( ) This section shall not apply to a disposal of land under section 123(3) above".

The noble Viscount said: My Lords, I beg to move Amendment No. 177A. The noble and learned Lord wrote me a most helpful letter about this. The point is the question whether it should be necessary to get the consent of the Secretary of State for the very small disposals of land under Section 123(3) of the Local Government Act. He gave me an assurance that general consents which will be issued under the clause of the Bill where this arises will cover disposals of the sort which I have mentioned. He then went on to acid some extra points about the unlikelihood of there being any attempt to withdraw the consent in a given case, and he made other remarks as well.

For the purpose of this exercise, which is an administrative one and will be a matter of discussion between local authorities and the Government, what appears in the official record is no doubt of considerable use. It is not like the courts; everybody can refer to it. I would be grateful if the noble and learned Lord could mention, for the purpose of the record, some of the points he put in his letter to me. I believe that will be widely welcomed. I beg to move.

The LORD CHANCELLOR

My Lords, it is the case as the noble Viscount has said, that this matter was raised during the Committee stage, and I undertook to give further consideration to the objectives underlying the Amendments then moved, to exclude from the scope of Clause 41 (which is now Clause 42) of the Bill disposals of small areas of public trust land which local authorities currently have discretion to make, subject to satisfying the requirements of the Local Government Act 1972. As I made clear during the discussion. I have every sympathy with the aim of avoiding delays and introducing unnecessary complications into the de minimis cases of the kind we are considering.

As I indicated in my letter to the noble Viscount. I can certainly give an assur- ance that the general consents to be issued under Section 123(3) of the 1972 Act, as amended by Clause 42 of the Land Bill, will cover such disposals. There were some reservations expressed about that way of proceeding, and it is true that it would be theoretically open to the Secretary of State to revoke or modify the terms of the general consent once granted. But this would be a drastic step to take and I cannot see it being done in order to subject to specific consent a disposal of fewer than 250 square yards of land. The possibility is therefore more theoretical than real. The intention is to issue wide-ranging general consents which will ensure that only in exceptional cases, where an authority wishes to depart from the Government's general policy on the basis on which land should be disposed of, will they need to come to the Secretary of State for consent. The aim will be to give authorities a completely free hand in relation to small disposals of a number of kinds where it would serve no useful purpose to subject these to individual control. The type of case the noble Viscount was concerned with is only one of numerous candidates for such treatment, and there is no obvious case for singling this one out for special treatment within the Bill. Operating through the general consents would allow for greater flexibility and a more comprehensive approach. I have been glad to hear from the noble Viscount that, in the light of those assurances, he is reasonably satisfied with what is proposed.

Viscount COLVILLE of CULROSS

My Lords, I am very grateful to the noble and learned Lord. I beg leave to withdraw the Amendment.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

Baroness YOUNG moved Amendment No. 178:

Leave out Clause 42 and insert the following new clause— (". —(1) The Principal Council shall not dispose of any material interest acquired in any land under the terms of this Act, except as prescribed by the Secretary of State regulations. (2) These regulations shall not be made unless a draft of the regulations has been approved by resolution of each House of Parliament.")

The noble Baroness said: My Lords, I was very glad to hear what the noble and learned Lord had to say on the previous Amendment, because it was in a sense a narrower point on the Amendment that I wish to move now, Amendment No. 178. We discussed this matter in Committee, and I have raised it again because it is an issue of such enormous importance to all local authorities; they feel that they ought to have a greater freedom to dispose of land under the community land scheme than they would appear to have under Clause 42.

My Amendment would, in the first place, limit the power of the Secretary of State to land acquired under the Act, and, therefore, would give freedom to local authorities to dispose of land which they now hold as they think best. This is important for local authorities, because, of course, they have acquired the land which they now hold for allsorts of purposes which they believe to be good. Almost all of it will be used for such purposes as school buildings, road works, buildings for social services, or for some other statutory purpose. Almost certainly there would be very little left over, but local authorities feel that they ought to be free to dispose of what there is as they think best.

Secondly, my Amendment, rather than, as proposed in the Bill, making it essential for the Secretary of State to approve every disposal, would give the Secretary of State the power to lay down regulations defining the limits under which local authorities could dispose of land. I think everyone accepts that there must be the right of the Secretary of State to consider the limits of disposals, and what the local authorities are quite content with is that this should be subject to Parliamentary approval. This puts it into a very different category from just saying that the Secretary of State himself must approve of every disposal. Furthermore, the local authorities are concerned at what the Government have already said about the nature of disposals; namely, that for commercial and industrial buildings disposals will be leasehold only for 99 years unless the Secretary of State allows under some special circumstances a longer leasehold. The leasehold will be subject to regular rent reviews, and in this way they would be very restricted in what they might be able to do.

This is an important matter not only for the freedom of local authorities but equally in making the financing of the Bill work. It is based on local authorities ultimately making money out of land sale and development, and if they do not have the freedom to do it as they believe to be best there is a possibility that one of the objectives of the Bill, which is returning to the community the increased value of the land, will not be achieved. I beg to move.

The LORD CHANCELLOR

My Lords, it is always a little dreary to say that an Amendment is technically defective, but this is the case with this Amendment. It does not define the term "Principal Council", although that is defined in Clause 42, which it is now proposed to delete, as defined in the Local Government Act 1972. Nor does it extend to Scotland, which has its own local government Act and which does not use the term "Principal Council". However, those are minimal matters which are capable of correction.

On the substance of the matter, as I have indicated, the intention is to provide a general consent to disposals under the scheme. It is considered that this will provide a framework on which authorities will be able to operate with the maximum of flexibility—and I agree that that is the desire—and will be able to do so in a more effective way than could be achieved under regulations. It is certainly not the intention that authorities should need to obtain the Secretary of State's consent in each individual case. They will need to seek specific consent only in cases which fall outside the guidelines of the general consent.

The basic principles of the general consent will be that authorities will be able to dispose of land freehold to owner-occupiers, and leasehold probably up to 99 years for industrial and commercial development. I should add that the Amendment is also unacceptable in that it attempts to distinguish between land acquired under the Bill and land acquired under other statutory provisions. I submit that this is wrong in principle as authorities will continue to be able to use their existing powers, for example under the Housing and Planning Acts, to acquire land for private development, and so any distinction based on the powers used to acquire land is meaningless. For these reasons, the Government reject the proposed Amendment.

Baroness YOUNG

My Lords, we have been over this ground before. I quite accept that my Amendment is technically deficient—any Amendment which I put down is almost by definition technically deficient—but these are matters which could be put right on Third Reading. This is not the last opportunity. I thank the noble and learned Lord for pointing out what ought to be put right in order that the matter may be settled.

I am not at all satisfied by the answer that I have had. I do not think that the provisions being made will be helpful to local authorities. As I indicated earlier, it may in the end defeat the purpose of the Bill. That said, I do not think that this is a matter that I am prepared to pursue tonight, and I only regret that the Government have not been more forthcoming now. I shall consider whether to raise the matter on Third Reading. I beg leave to withdraw the Amendment.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

Clause 45 [Disposal of land at direction of Secretary of State]:

6.55 p.m.

Lord SANDYS moved Amendment No. 184A:

Page 44, line 24, at end insert— ( ) In disposing of land under this section, the Secretary of State and any local authority shall have regard to existing provisions for the offer back of agricultural land to former agricultural owners.

The noble Lord said: My Lords, this Amendment concerns the disposal of land by authorities who have acquired it. This is an important matter, because we believe that many authorities in carrying out their duties will inevitably acquire more land than they will in fact use in the course of their activities, and this provision in Amendment No. 184A will allow for the return and disposal of the land to its former agricultural owners. A very famous case in the early 1950s was well known to all your Lordships as the Crichel Down case. I feel sure that it is unnecessary to expand upon that case. Nevertheless, upon that case developed what was known as the Crichel Down procedure which was, as a matter of normal practice, that Government Departments and other statutory bodies were bound to follow a procedure which was set out in Circulars 166 and 167 from the Treasury. While the Minister, in Standing Committee on this Bill, gave assurances that where land was shown to be surplus to development requirements it would indeed be offered back according to current administrative procedure, it seems that this may need some further statutory footing.

This is an important matter, and I should like to refer your Lordships to the views of some of our European colleagues in this regard, because in the whole of its remit it relates to the question of land use. On 14th March this year, a statement was issued by COPA—and COPA is the Committee of Professional Agricultural Organisations in Europe. A copy of this statement was duly given to the Secretary of State for the Environment. It may not have escaped your Lordships' attention, but perhaps I may remind you that it said this:

1. "1. That agricultural land, especially good agricultural land, must never be squandered just because urban planners feel that on day it might be convenient for their authorities to own some extra land for some nebulous planning purpose which may never be achieved in practice. To take land far in advance of need is folly. Agricultural blight would descend on large areas around our towns. Production would suffer at a time when the highest priority should be given to maintaining and expanding it.
2. 2. That the responsible authorities should seek to identify poorer quality agricultural land when allocating land for development and, if necessary, should give industry a subsidy to set up on poorer land, care being taken to ensure that industry conforms with certain anti-pollution standards, to be drawn up in consultation with farming interests.
3. 3. That land should be withdrawn from agricultural use for new buildings and development only when it is essential for that purpose."

I could continue with this, but I am quite sure that your Lordships will see that our European colleagues place the land use, and especially good agricultural land use, in the very highest category of priority. Further, they point out that it is a great waste if urban planners reserve it for some possible nebulous future use, and do not return it for the essential purpose. To set the COPA arguments on one side would be a dereliction of a very important duty, and I have no doubt that the Secretary of State has acknowledged what COPA said in this important Circular of 14th March. We believe that the Bill would be deficient if it did not express clearly the points set out in this Amendment.

Baroness BIRK

My Lords, I apologise to the noble Lord, Lord Sandys, for not being in my place when he began to move this Amendment; matters have been going at quite a pace today, and I did not think that this Amendment would be called at this point. As the noble Lord explained clearly and in some detail the effect of the Amendment, I need not go over that ground again.

The existing "provisions" to which the Amendment refers are no doubt the administrative arrangements made under the policy adopted following the Crichel Down case in 1954. Under these arrangements, agricultural land which was acquired by a Government Department compulsorily, or under threat of compulsion, since 1st January 1935, and which becomes surplus to the needs of the holding Department, is normally offered back to the former owner or his successors at market value, where it is not required for development; for example, by any other Government Department or local authority. The most significant change since 1954 took place in 1966 when it was decided, in the context of the proposal to set up the Land Commission, that surplus agricultural land should not be offered back if it was the subject of a planning permission or indication for development. Broadly speaking, therefore, the procedure applies only where land is not needed for development but can be returned to agricultural use.

What is frequently referred to as the Crichel Down procedure applies to Government Departments, not to local authorities. But Ministry of Housing and Local Government Circular 48/59, issued at the time of the Town and Country Planning Act 1959, which relaxed Government control over the disposal of land by local authorities, stated: Local authorities disposing of surplus land are sometimes asked to sell it back to the person from whom they bought it. The Minister hopes that they will give careful consideration to such requests and will comply with them wherever it is reasonably practicable to do so". Neither of these procedures has any statutory basis, so it is inaccurate to call them "provisions", and they do not in any way confer a right of pre-emption in favour of a former owner.

The Amendment appears to be founded on three misapprehensions. The first is that Clause 45 is partly concerned with the disposal of land held by the Secretary of State; for example, the words, In disposing of land under this section the Secretary of State… whereas the clause is solely concerned with directions which the Secretary of State may give to authorities to dispose of land which they hold. Secondly, it assumes that there is some existing statutory arrangement to which local authorities must have regard when disposing of agricultural land; this is when the Amendment refers to "existing provisions". Thirdly, it assumes that the land which the Secretary of State directs shall be disposed of is not required for relevant development. This is unlikely to be the case. The power in Clause 45 is designed to cover the case where authorities are, for one reason or another, holding on to land instead of making it available for development. There has already been criticism that, in some areas, authorities are hanging on to too much land. Without expressing a personal view on whether such criticism of authorities is valid, these powers are being taken to deal with any possible problems of this kind which might arise where local authorities are in the position of monopoly providers of development land.

It is, however, possible that where agricultural land has been acquired by an authority, compulsorily or by agreement, under the powers in the Bill on the basis that it is suitable for relevant development, the planning of the area may change in such a way that the land is no longer needed for development and should return to agriculture. In these circumstances, a bid by the former owner ought certainly to be given sympathetic consideration under the existing arrangement, but it would be inappropriate to enjoin authorities in legislation to implement a policy which does not have statutory force. An identical Amendment was moved by the Opposition in Committee in another place, but was withdrawn on the basis of an undertaking by the Minister. He said: I shall look at the 1959 Circular and see whether, and how, it needs to be updated in the light of the Community Land Bill and the points raised by the hon. Gentleman."—[Official Report, Commons.] We have looked at this again. A further undertaking can now be given—and I now give it—that the Department will definitely issue guidance to authorities on the Crichel Down code (I think we should call it that and stick to it) as operated by Government Departments with a specific request that in cases where the code applies they should be prepared to offer back surplus agricultural land which is not required for development to its former owner. I hope that, with this explanation, which I trust will have clarified the situation and pointed out the difficulties—I know what difficulties are involved in drafting Amendments and I refer not only to the difficulties that have been raised but also the deficiencies of the Amendment—the noble Lord will be prepared to withdraw it. I have explained that the Amendment is defective as drafted, but I have also given, I hope, an adequate assurance that the Government accept and entirely support the underlying principle.

Lord SANDYS

My Lords, my noble friend Lady Young said earlier that her Amendments had already suffered from the same complaint which the Government have made about this one; namely, that they are defective, a term that is used with great frequency by the Government. I acknowledge 'what the noble Baroness, Lady Birk, said about the production of a code and this is to be welcomed and the updating of Circular 48/59 is a step in the right direction, albeit a small one. That Circular was concerned with the disposal of land from statutory bodies as well as from Government Departments. Perhaps the noble Baroness can confirm—or if she cannot, perhaps she will write to me at a later date—that this code will cover disposal by local authorities under this Bill and will reinforce the original provisions of Circular 48/59. I will not delay the House further on this matter. I am glad that we have had an opportunity to receive the assurance which the noble Baroness has given and for which I express gratitude. I beg leave to withdraw the Amendment.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

Clause 47 [Certification of appropriate alternative development]:

Lord MELCHETT moved Amendment No. 186: Page 45, line 35, leave out ("come into force at") and insert ("have effect only in relation to applications, and certificates issued in pursuance of applications, made after").

The noble Lord said: I will, with permission, speak at the same time to Amendments Nos. 194, 195 and 198. These are largely drafting Amendments. As it stands, Clause 47(6) leaves some uncertainty about how the Amendments which the clause makes to the Land Compensation Act 1961 and the Scottish Act of 1963 respectively will affect the way in which applications made one month after Royal Assent, and therefore not made in accordance with the provisions of the clause, are to be dealt with. The Amendment to Clause 47 therefore provides, for the removal of doubt, that the clause shall have effect only in relation to applications, or certificates issued in pursuance of applications, made one month after Royal Assent. The other Amendments to Schedule 10 are purely consequential.

On Question, Amendment agreed to.

7.11 p.m.

Lord O'HAGAN moved Amendment No. 189: Leave out Clause 48.

The noble Lord said: My Lords, your Lordships will have noticed that throughout the Bill there are very many references to the Secretary of State—so many that one might almost say that this looked like the Secretary of State's Land Bill rather than the Community Land Bill if, like myself, one were an uninformed reader of draft legislation. When one comes to the end of the Bill, one observes that Clause 48 states that, The Secretary of State may act under this section in a case where it appears to him expedient… He can discharge an authority from, Any functions under this Act, or…any functions under any other Act, whether passed before this Act or later, being functions concerning the disposal or management of land. That makes one stop to think, because it seems an extraordinarily wide power to give to anybody at any time.

I do not want to detain the House, but I should be grateful if the Government could give us some idea of the sort of situation for which the power is intended and how often it is intended that it should be used. I should also like to know whether Secretaries of State are, in the normal course of events, given powers of this kind when new legislation comes into force. If there is merit in having a Community Land Bill in which the control of development land passes to directly elected local authorities, it should not be possible for the Secretary of State to remove control from them in an apparently unjustifiably wide range of circumstances. I hope that the noble Baroness will be able to reassure me on this point. I beg to move.

Baroness BIRK

My Lords, this clause came up at Committee stage, but it was getting very late in the day, or night, and it was not adequately dealt with. It is important that we should have an opportunity to explain this point. As the noble Lord, Lord O'Hagan, has pointed out, it provides reserve powers for the Secretary of State to transfer the functions of any authority—other than the Land Authority for Wales or a new town authority—to himself, to another authority or to a new body set up under Clause 50. Those reserve powers parallel those available to the Secretary of State under the planning Acts, which include provision for the function of local authorities to be transferred. This was one of the points raised by the noble Lord, who wanted to know whether there were precedents for this. Reserve powers are not needed in relation to the Land Authority in Wales or to new town development corporations as these bodies are appointed by the Secretary of State, so he has adequate powers of direction over them.

In England and Scotland, the operation of the land scheme will depend on the ability and willingness of local authorities to press ahead with the job within available resources. The phasing of the introduction of the scheme—and the phasing is an extremely important part of it—will take account of the ability of, and the resources available to, local authorities. And in view of the planning benefits that will flow from the operation of the scheme, and the fact that it will provide a way in which development values can accrue to the local community, it is to be expected that there will generally be a willingness to acquire land for private development. However—and this is the point of the need for the reserve powers—there could be cases where an individual authority would be genuinely unable or unwilling to acquire land for private development. Reserve powers are therefore necessary to deal with this situation, and also to provide a means of dealing with any case of default once the duty under Clause 18 of the Bill has been imposed in an area.

Just as there are a variety of possible reasons for transferring functions, there are also a variety of financial effects which the Secretary of State might wish to achieve in respect of land account surplusses. They might go to the transferor authority, to the authority to which the functions are transferred to the Secretary of State or to any combination of these in any proportions. The provisions of the Bill allow sufficient flexibility to achieve any of these objectives.

It should be stressed that there is a genuine need for these powers which is not simply based on the wishes of the Government to implement the land scheme. This is that, in the interests of development, there must be a broad uniformity of progress in implementing the land scheme. This is especially necessary, because the second appointed day cannot be brought in until the scheme is operating in all cases. I fervently hope that we shall never have to use Clause 48. Certainly, on present performance, the need to do so seems remote, since our information is that many local authorities are already pressing on with the first stage, which is the preparation of their land acquisition and management schemes. But if the powers are ever needed—and this sort of power is what I would call a "long-stop" power—the clause provides a fair way of making the transfer with full opportunity for an authority's wishes to be considered before an order becomes effective.

To add a further point, I can give further examples of what the noble Lord, Lord O'Hagan, asked me. As I indicated, this type of reserve power is a normal part of this kind of legislation. If I may, I will draw special attention to two specific cases. First, there is Section 17 of the Town and Country Planning Act 1971, which empowers the Secretary of State to take over, or to transfer to another local planning authority, the functions of a local planning authority to prepare structure or local plans, either where such plans have not been submitted or adopted within the specified time, or at any time when he is satisfied, after a public inquiry or hearing, that the authority are not proceeding reasonably with preparing their plans.

This is clearly a very significant power, because it can effectively take away from a local planning authority the whole of its plan-making functions under the Planning Act. Yet it is a necessary power, and has clearly been considered so by Governments of both political complexions (the previous Conservative Administration amended the section slightly in the 1972 Local Government Act: they did not take the opportunity to repeal these powers). It is true that we have taken Section 17 as the broad model for our reserve powers. But in one respect we think Section 17 goes too far. It allows the Secretary of State, in certain circumstances, to take powers away from a local planning authority without the authority having the right to put its case at an inquiry, or even a hearing. Under Clause 48(4), any authority which objects to the transfer of functions will have the right to a public inquiry. Nor does Section 17 provide for any Parliamentary procedure; but Clause 48(4) does, where there has been a public inquiry.

Clause 48 is a necessary provision for the reasons I have given. We must have what I have described as a "long-stop" provision, but I repeat that the Government hope that it will never have to be used. But, if it does have to be used, at least its provisions ensure that any authority will have a fair chance to argue its case before any transfer is made or any action is taken.

Lord O'HAGAN

My Lords, I am very grateful for that explanation. I am not wholly sure that parallels in planning legislation are entirely relevant to a Bill to deal with both the planning and acquisition of land, and I do not believe that the parallel is complete but, in view of the reassuring nature of what we have been told today, I beg leave to withdraw the Amendment.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

Lord MELCHETT

My Lords, I beg to move Amendment No. 193.

Amendment moved— After Clause 53 insert the following new clause—

Directions and consents

Any direction or consent given by the Secretary of State under this Act may be—

1. (a) either general or limited to any particular case or class of case,
2. (b) addressed to any particular authority or class of authority, or
3. (c) unconditional or subject to conditions.—(Lord Melchett.)

On Question, Amendment agreed to.

Schedule 10 [Minor and consequential amendments.]

Lord MELCHETT

My Lords, I beg to move Amendment No. 194.

Amendment moved—

Page 91, line 27, at end insert— ("(5) Sub-paragraphs (2) and (3) above shall have effect only in relation to applications, or certificates issued in pursuance of applications, made after the expiration of a period of one month beginning with the passing of this Act.")—(Lord Melchett.)

On Question, Amendment agreed to.

Lord MELCHETT

My Lords, I beg to move Amendment No. 195.

Amendment moved—

Page 92, line 5, at end insert— ("(5) Sub-paragraphs (2) and (3) above shall have effect only in relation to applications, or certificates issued in pursuance of applications, made after the expiration of a period of one month beginning with the passing of this Act.")—(Lord Melchett.)

On Question, Amendment agreed to.

Lord SANDFORD moved Amendment No. 196: Page 92, line 14, after (" "relates",") insert ("in subsection (1)(b) for the words "given the requisite notice of the application to" there shall be substituted the words "obtained consent for the making of the application from" and for the words "service of each such notice" there shall be substituted the words "each such consent",")

The noble Lord said: My Lords, I beg to move Amendment No. 196, and at the same time, speak to Amendment No. 197. These are little more than consequential Amendments. Earlier when we were discussing Schedule 6, we recognised that because of the effect of a planning application and the approval of a planning application under this Bill, it would now be necessary to move to a situation where an application for planning permission by anyone other than the owner would have to be accompanied not just by a certificate to the effect that notice had been served on the owner, but that the written consent of the owner had been obtained. As the Bill comes into operation and all development proceeds through the process of acquisition by the public authorities, and disposal from them to others for development, it will be necessary for this rule— about applicants who are not the owners having the consent of the owners before the application can be considered—to become general. In order to achieve that, my noble friend and I propose these Amendments in the repeal Schedule. Amendment No. 196 refers to the English and Welsh Act of 1971 and Amendment No. 197 refers to the Scottish Act. I beg to move.

Baroness BIRK

My Lords, the Government do not see the necessity for these Amendments. The Planning Acts already require anyone applying for planning permission on land which he does not own to serve notice on the owners. There is then an opportunity for the owners to make representations to the local planning authority, who can take them into account in reaching a decision on the application. The Government have recognised that the provisions of the Bill have implications for the situation where there is a planning application from a third party, and there are two specific provisions to deal with this situation.

First, we have recognised that the present provisions of Section 27 of the 1971 Act (and the equivalent Scottish provisions) are not entirely adequate; and paragraphs 6 and 7 of Schedule 10 have the effect of ensuring that any planning application made on, or after, the first appointed day will have to be notified to anyone who has a material interest in the land—and material interest is interpreted in accordance with the definition in Clause 4 of the Bill; that is to say, a freehold or a lease with at least seven years to run.

Secondly, there is a specific protection for an owner's position in the "prior right" provisions in paragraph 2 of Schedule 6. Under these provisions anyone applying for planning permission may have a prior right to negotiate to carry out development on the land if it is acquired by an authority. Paragraph 2(4) of Schedule 6 specifically provides that a person making a planning application shall have the benefit of the prior right provisions only where his applica- tion to carry out development on the land is accompanied by the written consent of all those with a material interest in the land. We believe that the provisions already included in the Bill strike the right balance. Some provision is needed; but the Government see no reason to go as far as these Amendments suggest and to give any owner of a material interest an absolute right of veto over the making of a planning application on the land in which he has an interest.

The difficulties in the approach suggested in the Amendments can be seen by considering the effect that they would have where a person held land on a long lease. Where a long lease has been granted, it is reasonable, I should have thought, that the leaseholder should have freedom to make a planning application for development on the land in question. If the freeholder wants to retain control in these circumstances he can write the necessary provisions into the lease. It would clearly be absurd if the owner of a 999-year lease was required by Statute to get the consent of his freeholder before he could make any planning application for development on the land. Quite apart from the point of principle that these matters can be dealt with in the terms of the lease—it would be absurd for a statutory provision of this kind to govern even applications for very minor development. We therefore accept that there is a need to protect the position of a landowner where there is a planning application—for example, someone with no interest in the land at all. But we think that this can be achieved by means of the provisions already included in the Bill. In particular, the provision that prior right for someone not already owning the land in question depends on getting the consent of owners is the full answer to the allegations and criticisms that have been made. We consider that what is now proposed is unnecessary and I hope the noble Lord will withdraw the Amendments.

Viscount COLVILLE of CULROSS

My Lords, I do not think that it is unnecessary. Let us take the case of one of the farmers whom we have heard about. Someone may choose—perhaps in a bona fide way or, perhaps, even mischievously—to make a planning application to develop a farmer's land, whereas the farmer wishes to get on peacefully farming it and growing food. He is immediately involved in a great number of risks under this Bill and is put to a lot of trouble. The first trouble he will encounter is that while he is given an opportunity, as the noble Baroness rightly says, under existing legislation to ask the local authority not to grant planning permission on the land, the planning authority need pay no attention to him. It is not possible to appeal against the granting of planning permission; only against refusal.

If the planning authority decide to grant a planning application, the farmer has lost that round and there is nothing he can do about it. What flows from that? The person who submitted the planning application no doubt thought that it was an excellent place to build whatever was proposed, and evidently the local planning authority has thought the same. When we come to the stage of there being the full duty, the person concerned w ill have to transfer the land to the local planning authority if he wishes anything to be built. If this cannot be done because the owner objects, there will have to be a compulsory purchase order.

I appreciate that at that stage, as there has not previously been a planning inquiry before the permission was granted, the owner would then have an opportunity to object to the Secretary of State. But my goodness me! it must be far too late by then; the issue has been settled. Planning permission has been granted and the local planning authority has already decided that the land is suitable for that form of development. One is not allowed to object to a compulsory purchase order—as we have been told many a time—on the grounds that it would be better if it was not done through the agency of the public authority, because that is one of the matters to which there is objection on the grounds of unnecessariness or inexpediency. So the poor farmer is really devoid of any remedy. All he can say is that he would rather go on farming the land, but he will not be heard.

Therefore it seems to me that he is put in very grave jeopardy by this unless he is given an opportunity to stop the order in the first place. Why should people have their farm or their other land in effect put in jeopardy by anybody who chooses to come along and put in a planning application for the land? Surely the Government do not go to that extent: that it can be decided against one's wishes by the local planning authority—when one has had nothing to do with it at all—and thus be put in peril of having one's land compulsorily acquired. This is a very serious point, and I hope that my noble friend will not be entirely put off by the smooth words of the noble Baroness.

The Earl of KINNOULL

My Lords, I should like to support both my noble friends. I believe this is a very important point; and, of course, one is touching entirely, in my view, on the mischievous application. Under this Bill, the mischievous application triggers off the whole procedures, as my noble friend Lord Colville has very clearly said, and the owner will have no respite at all if that application proceeds to a consent. I would raise one other point with the noble Baroness. I understand that the professional bodies raised this point about mischievous applications during the consultation period. They are still. I am told, unhappy about this Bill on this point, and my noble friend's Amendment would cover that. I therefore very much hope that the Government will consider this and will accept the principle, if not the wording.

Baroness BIRK

My Lords, perhaps I may try to answer those points, with the leave of the House. I am really rather flummoxed by the noble Viscount's example because, as he knows very well, at the present time anybody can put in a planning application, but that does not mean that they then have the opportunity to get hold of the land. Anybody can put in an application at any time, but that does not mean that they get the land and that the owner cannot object and cannot stop them. They can do that in any case.

Viscount COLVILLE of CULROSS

My Lords, will the noble Baroness allow me to interrupt her? At the moment, the mere granting of a planning application does not set in train the whole course of a compulsory purchase order.

Baroness BIRK

But, my Lords, in the example which the noble Viscount has given there does not seem any point. Why should anybody put in a planning application unless he has a particular case for getting the land for development? Secondly, if there is a problem—I am not sure that I agree that there is one, but even if there were—the Amendment does not seem to me to deal with it, because if the consent provision in the Amendment is intended to protect owners, this objective could be easily circumvented, to take quite a cynical view, because if somebody really meant business he could simply write to an authority and ask them to make a CPO. Indeed, he could do it now. So if the noble Viscount and his noble friends believe that there is a danger of owners being harried, then the Amendments arc ineffective. My argument therefore is, first, that I do not think the danger exists as the noble Viscount has put it—I think that we have covered that sufficiently in the Bill—and, secondly, that if, on the other hand, he believes this, I do not think his Amendments are viable, or will do the job he is trying to make them do or intends them to do.

The Earl of KINNOULL

My Lords, before the noble Baroness sits down can she answer my point about the professional bodies and their views on this matter?

Baroness BIRK

My Lords, I am afraid that I do not know the answer to

that, but I have no doubt that the body with which the noble Earl is connected will probably take the same view as he is taking about it.

Lord SANDFORD

My Lords, as I said when I rose to move this Amendment, because of all the arguments which persuaded the Government to provide in Schedule 6 that henceforward it would be necessary for applicants for planning permission who were not the owners of the land to obtain the written consent of the owners in those cases which were provided for in the Bill, I certainly assumed it would follow that it would be necessary to generalise this by amendments of the two main Acts. I am astonished that the noble Baroness should answer in the sense that she has done, and that she is not entirely convinced by what my noble friend Lord Colville has said. It would be quite intolerable for the farmer in that situation to be faced with all the trouble involved, and to face a compulsory purchase order, because somebody who had nothing whatever to do with his land put in a planning application. I think that much the best course is to press this Amendment to a Division straightaway.

On Question, Whether the said Amendment (No. 196) shall be agreed to?

Their Lordships divided: Contents, 60; Not-Contents, 28.

CONTENTS
Aberdare, L.	Ferrers, E.	Monson, L.
Amory, V.	Ferrier, L.	Mowbray and Stourton, L. [Teller.]
Auckland, L.	Gainford, L.
Belstead, L.	Gisborough, L.	Newall, L.
Brougham and Vaux, L.	Gowrie, E.	Nugent of Guildford, L.
Burton, L.	Greenway, L.	O'Neill of the Maine, L.
Campbell of Croy, L.	Hailsham of Saint Marylebone, L.	Pender, L.
Colville of Culross, V.		Rankeillour, L.
Cork and Orrery, E.	Harvington, L.	Reading, M.
Cottesloe, L.	Hornsby-Smith, B.	Reay, L.
Cowley, E.	Killearn, L.	Ruthven of Freeland, Ly.
Craigavon, V.	Kinloss, Ly.	Sandford, L.
Crawshaw, L.	Kinnaird, L.	Sandys, L. [Teller.]
Cullen of Ashbourne, L.	Kinnoull, E.	Stanley of Alderley, L.
Denham, L.	Lauderdale, E.	Strathclyde, L.
Drumalbyn, L.	Long, V.	Stuart of Findhorn, V.
Elles, B.	Mansfield, E.	Swansea, L.
Elliot of Harwood, B.	Margadale, L.	Vivian, L.
Elton, L.	Massereene and Ferrard, V.	Ward of North Tyneside, B.
Exeter, M.	Monck, V.	Young, B.
Falkland, V.	Monk Bretton, L.
NOT-CONTENTS
Balogh, L.	Collison, L.	Harris of Greenwich, L.
Bernstein, L.	Crook, L.	Jacques, L.
Birk, B.	Elwyn-Jones, L. (L. Chancellor.)	Jacobson, L.
Blyton, L.		Janner, L.
Champion, L.	Hale, L.	Llewelyn-Davies of Hastoe, B.
Lovell-Davis, L. [Teller.]	Pitt of Hampstead, L.	Strabolgi, L. [Teller.]
Maelor, L.	Platt, L.	Taylor of Mansfield, L.
Melchett, L.	Shepherd, L, (L. Privy Seal.)	Wallace of Coslany, L.
Peddie, L.	Stedman, B.	White, B.
Phillips, B.	Stewart of Alvechurch, B.

On Question, Amendment agreed to.

Resolved in the affirmative, and Amendment agreed to accordingly.

Lord SANDFORD

My Lords, I beg to move Amendment No. 197. This achieves the same effect in Scotland.

Amendment moved— Page 92, line 42, after (" "rotates",") insert ("in subsection (1)(b) for the words "given the requisite notice of the application to" there shall be substituted the words "obtain consent for the making of the application from" and for the words "service of each such notice" there shall be substituted the words "each such consent",").—(Lord Sandford.)

Lord MELCHETT

My Lords, I beg to move Amendment No. 198. I spoke to this with Amendment No. 186.

Amendment moved—

Page 93, line 29, at end insert— This sub-paragraph shall have effect only in relation to applications made after the expiration of a period of one month beginning with the passing of this Act."—(Lord Melchett.)