MOBILE HOMES BILL

HL Deb 27 June 1975 vol 361 cc1763-97

2.3 p.m.

Lord ELTON

My Lords, I beg to move that the House do now again resolve itself into Committee on this Bill.

Moved, that the House do again resolve itself into Committee.—(Lord Elton.)

On Question, Motion agreed to.

House in Committee accordingly.

[Lord Maybray-King in the Chair]

Clause 4 [Disputes]:

Lord AVEBURY moved Amendment No. 14:

Page 6, line 42, at end insert— ("; and in determining the annual charge for this purpose, the court shall have regard to all the circumstances other than personal circumstances, including in particular the amenities and locality of the site, and the position on the site offered to the occupier; and for the purposes of the determination it shall be assumed that the number of persons seeking to become occupiers of mobile homes in the locality on the terms other than those relating to the annual charge is not substantially greater than the number of caravans for which residential site licences have been granted by the local authority under the Act of 1960, in respect of which agreements are available on such terms.")

The noble Lord said: I wonder whether it might be for the convenience of the Committee if we were to take with Amendment No. 14 the new clause stand- ing in my name as Amendment No. 18, which is concerned with the question of premiums, bearing in mind that the annual charges which are dealt with in the Amendment, and the premiums which may be levied by the site operator, are intimately connected with one another. Therefore, it might be convenient if we could discuss both at the same time.

Under subsection (3) of Clause 4, an occupier who is dissatisfied with any of the terms which have been offered to him by the owner may apply to the court to have the matter in dispute determined. It will be within the knowledge of your Lordships who concern yourselves with the problems of residents of mobile homes, that one of the most frequent causes of dispute is the amount of the charges and the increases which are imposed from time to time by the operators. Therefore, it may be expected that one of the matters coming most frequently before the courts to be determined will be the increase in charges to be levied at the time of the annual review.

Your Lordships may recall that when the Committee was discussing the question of the frequency of annual reviews—and, indeed, on Second Reading the matter also arose—I said that I did not think the mobile home residents would be disposed to argue against the case for an annual review, bearing in mind that this was connected with the aggregation of charges and the possibility that some element of it might be liable to VAT. They could see that point, but at the same time there was some anxiety about the size of the increases which might be demanded at the annual review and, if they were to be disputed, the lack of any guidance which is given to the courts under the Bill.

If I may give an illustration of what might conceivably happen—I do not suggest that it is going to happen, but it is something which may focus attention on the problem—if a certain site is full, and the site operator has a waiting list of applicants seeking to become occupiers on that site at the charges he is proposing to levy, or which he is already levying on other residents and proposes to levy on a particular occupier who is now coming up to an annual review, then the site operator could argue that he is not charging as much as the traffic could bear. We have not the faintest idea whether such an argument would be accepted by the courts.

I know that this has not been suggested by the site operators themselves. If one looks at the newsletter of the National Federation of Site Operators, one sees that they have proposed that any increases should keep in line with inflation, and they say that that would be preferable to the much larger increases which might take place at three-year intervals. I do not quite know what they mean by this; whether they mean that the increases should be decided by reference to some index of the cost of living as a whole, or the cost of rents or some analogous component of the cost of living index, or whether they are suggesting that we should examine individually what increases in costs have been incurred by site operators in particular.

Some of these were mentioned by the noble Lord, Lord Wakefield of Kendal, when we were discussing this subject last week. He said that increases in land costs, interest charges and so on, might be taken into account in the annual review. I am not disputing that these factors might be relevant. But the point is that the courts are not told which, if any, of the factors have been looked at and, if so, whether it is to be on an individual basis, site by site, or whether they can take some index which is to be looked at over the country as a whole.

Also, there is no mention in the Bill of the tremendous variation in amenities which occurs from one site to another, and which may be presumed to have some bearing on the level of charges which is reasonable. If a site is next to a gasworks or a sewage farm, if it is miles from the nearest public transport, would these factors have any bearing on the charge? Or is it to be assumed by the courts that Parliament did not want them to be taken into account, because there is no specific mention of them in the Bill? We all know that there is not only a great variation between one site and another so far as locality is concerned, some being immensely more preferable than others; there is also a wide variation between one site and another in terms of the amenities provided.

As the noble Lord, Lord Elton, will confirm, at the present moment many hundreds of sites do not conform with the model standards. On the other hand, there are sites which provide surroundings as good as those one would expect to find on a residential housing estate. I am suggesting that variations of this kind ought to be reflected in the level of charges. We should write that into the Bill. My Amendment gives the courts some guidance on these matters, and follows the general shape of the provisions of Section 46 of the Rent Act 1968, which were taken over from the 1965 Act. Instead of the formula in the 1968 Act, "the age, character and locality of the dwelling house ", we have. "the amenities and locality of the site", and the disregard of scarcity provisions in the 1968 Act. I have taken this wording, with minor necessary modifications, to fit the circumstances of a caravan site.

The only argument I could have imagined against the Amendment, until the noble Lord, Lord Melchett, was kind enough to write and disclose to me some of the thinking of the Government on it, was that the disregard of scarcity would lead to charges being lower than they would have been in the absence of such a provision, and thus to a reduction in the amount of such accommodation that would be on offer. This was certainly a point of view expressed to me by the late Lord Garnsworthy with whom I had correspondence in March 1974, when I suggested that a freeze should be imposed on the charges made for caravan sites analogous to those imposed on residential properties.

This argument implies that the site operators would continue in business only as long as they could exploit the monopoly rights they acquired through the restrictive operation of the planning laws, and the licensing requirements of the 1960 Act. What is really being said by those who use the argument is that in a free market with demand and supply in balance, the volume of accommodation being offered would be less than now with the artificial constraints of the economic process. I think that is indeed a bizarre contradiction of the case usually made out by free enterprise, and one which I do not think any reputable economists would accept. The corollary is that in the absence of any provision for disregard of scarcity, the owner of the site is able to make abnormally large profits, with the tacit approval of Parliament. For many years, it has been common ground between all the Parties that as long as there is not yet enough separate housing accommodation for all the families wishing to avail themselves of separate dwellings, the rule?, of the game between land-Lord and tenant should be so adjusted as to prevent exploitation. I would submit that the principle is exactly the same for the residents of mobile homes.

If I may turn now to the new clause, it deals with the widespread practice of charging premiums for the grant, continuance or renewal of a right of occupation on a caravan site. If the owner of a site is charging a fair rent and he is thereby making a reasonable profit on the operation as a whole, then there is no economic justification for allowing him to reap large additional bonus profits whenever a pitch is transferred to a new occupier or whenever agreements with the existing occupier fall to be renewed, when the sums involved are sometimes quite substantial.

To give an example, the Secretary and Solicitor of the North Devon District Council has written to me about the two cases that were reported to him where payments of £300 and £500 were demanded as a precondition of the execution of an agreement, and I think that the noble Lord, Lord Elton, would agree that those sums are not by any means unusual. The Secretary pointed out that these premiums are not a term of the agreement, and therefore they would not appear to be covered by the disputes procedure in Clause 4. It would be only too easy for unscrupulous site operators to make up for any diminution in their income from the annual charges which could arise from the determination in the courts in the case of disputes by simply increasing these premiums still further, and that is the reason why this new clause is very much connected with the Amendment which I moved earlier on.

Apart from the much greater burden that it would impose on persons seeking to become occupiers, it would have the additional effect of making a rapid turnover of occupiers even more lucrative to the site operators. The Rent Acts have contained prohibitions on premiums for many years, and they are now embodied in Section 85 of the 1968 Act. I have always argued—I know that not many people agree with me on this—that whatever protection is given to tenants ought to be paralleled in the legislation for mobile homes, and this is a good example; landlords are not permitted to charge key money for tenancies, and site operators should not be allowed to charge siting fees for the occupation of a pitch, because the nature of the payment and the relationship between the parties are both identical, and there is no logical reason why they should be treated differently in law.

May I just refer to some of the arguments which I think the noble Lord, Lord Melchett, may deploy and of which he has very kindly given me prior notice. He mentions the fact that, in the case law on premiums in relation to tenancies, some unexpected side effects have arisen, in that a payment bona fide made for value received may amount to a premium. He says that in the case of caravan sites if this decision of the courts were read across the site operator might be prevented from recovering reasonable expenditure which he has incurred. I take it that the noble Lord means the siting fees which are normally charged for taking a caravan on to the site and connecting it up to the services.

Obviously one does not want to leave the site operator out of pocket on such expenditure, and I should have thought that, if the principle of my Amendment were accepted, it would not be beyond the wit of the Parliamentary draftsman to take care of that minor point between now and the Report stage. More widely, the noble Lord reminds me that, despite the fact that "premium" is the word used in the 1968 Act, it was never statutorily defined, and other difficulties of interpretation, apart from the one I have mentioned, could possibly arise. It would be desirable to incorporate in this Bill a definition of the word "premium "so that we can limit it to what we know we mean; that is, key money. It is a pity that Parliament at the time of the 1968 Act, and before that in relation to furnished properties—and the word has a very long history—did not give this obviously necessary instruction to the courts.

Secondly, the noble Lord mentions the argument, to which I have already referred, that abolition of premiums could, in the short term, have an adverse effect on site charges. What I should like to know, in this problem, is whether the noble Lord thinks that the converse is true; that is to say, that in a dispute arising about the annual charges and any increases which the site operator demands, the courts will also take into account any premiums that may have been paid by the occupier to get on to the site in the first place. That would seem to be the corollary of the argument; that the two matters are so interconnected.

The noble Lord then mentions the point that if premiums were to be prohibited altogether—I am paraphrasing his letter—the occupier would acquire an equity in his pitch which he would be free to dispose of, and make a profit out of the operation, while the beneficiary would not be the site owner. I can see nothing wrong with a person who has lived in one place for a great many years acquiring some equity in it. To digress, one of the most harmful and divisive forces in our social life is that the tenant in rented property may live in one place for very many years yet never acquire a capital asset, whereas the owner-occupier, by paying slightly more money, finishes up with a stake in the community. Anything we can do—I know this is under discussion in relation to tenanted properties also—to heal the breach between two social classes would in my view be wholly desirable. I am in favour of the caravan dweller, the mobile home dweller, acquiring some equity in the pitch he occupies, though the beneficiary would in part be the site owner because the noble Lord may have overlooked the provision in Clause 3 under which the site operator may levy a reasonable charge on the sale price when an occupier disposes of his mobile home to an incoming resident; if he was then able to charge more than the price that excluded scarcity, then of course the site operator would get some percentage of that increased price.

The noble Lord finally says that if one of these proposals were adopted and not the other, the reaction of site owners is reasonably predictable; if rents were to exclude expressly scarcity, owners in the scarcity areas would be charging larger and larger premiums. I agree with that and I hope the House will think that both Amendments are equally acceptable. However, perhaps I should mention one other factor, and that is the review which was initiated by Mr. Gerald Kaufman in the Department of the Environment and which is now continuing under the leadership of Mr. McCreadie of that Department. I realise that there are many and complex issues that have to be considered by the Government before they can say, "Here is definitive legislation to regulate the situation as between residents of mobile homes and the operators of sites ", but I am afraid that if we do not take this opportunity of dealing with the regulation of charges and the imposition of premiums, we will have a period of many years before another opportunity is given to Parliament to come back to the subject.

When I introduced the 1968 Act in another place, both Mr. James McColl and Mr. Arthur Skeffington, who alas! are now dead, gave me the assurance that legislation would follow, if not in the next Session then in the one after that, and that we were merely involved in a holding operation very similar to that which was being conducted by the Government in the Protection from Eviction Act, which noble Lords will recall was followed very swiftly by the Rent Act 1965. We had to wait for eight years until a very praiseworthy Private Member introduced legislation to follow up the 1968 Act. I hope that the noble Lord, when he speaks about these two proposals, will, if he cannot accept them, at least be able to give us an assurance that we shall not have to wait another eight years before comprehensive legislation is brought forward by the Government. I beg to move.

Lord ELTON

At the outset I wish to thank the noble Lord, Lord Avebury, for expediting the proceedings of the Committee by agreeing to take Amendment No. 18 with Amendment No. 14. While I shall speak to both, as they are in a sense opposite ends of a seesaw, my remarks will be directed principally to the former of the two Amendments, which has been formally moved. We are on difficult and possibly emotive ground. I am confident that this is not the way to get out of the difficulty which the noble Lord sees ahead. The Amendment attempts to introduce a formula adapted from part of the formula on which fair rents are assessed for permanent dwellings—not for caravans or mobile homes—under the rent regulation system, on the basis of which annual charges are to be assessed by the courts to which disputes on the levels of these charges are referred. In particular, it seeks to introduce a requirement analogous to that designed in the fair rent formula, to exclude any artificial value attributable to security of dwellings to let. So much the noble Lord has vouchsafed to us.

This adaptation presents difficult peculiarities. For example, it would not require the court to assume on the supply side the number of pitches available to those seeking pitches—the Bill relates, of course, to contracts for pitches; not for rented accommodation, which is excluded. The court would assume that the conditions which existed, which in a free market would regulate the price, did not exist. Again it does not relate to any number of caravans or pitches available to would-be mobile home dwellers, but to the number for which residential site licences have been granted in the past. This disregards on the one hand the possibility that pitches or caravans are being provided by local authorities, whose sites do not need to have a licence and whose contribution will therefore be excluded from the statistics referred to, and on the other hand the possibility that licences have been issued but are not being used, which would have the countervailing effect.

Far more serious than any objections to the wording is the fact that the Bill is not, in my view, in the present state of knowledge of mobile home living, an appropriate vehicle for statutory regulation of the market. It attempts to introduce to a field not analogous to this principles which will not fit it, and the analogy which springs to mind—since it is taking a piece of a large Act and applying it in a different area—is that of somebody trying to catch a fly by taking a piece of a cobweb. The supporting strands are not there, and I do not think that a small fragment of the legislation will stand on its own. The Kaufman Committee is due to report—one hopes in the not too distant future. The noble Lord, Lord Avebury, has evinced a desire for its completion, and I dare say that a number of your Lordships will hope that his pressure is effect- tive. If we are to enter upon this degree of regulation of rents and of the charge assignments we should do so in a much more complete state of knowledge than we have, and that state of knowledge will be achieved by the publication of the report when it is completed.

I may rise a little later to speak on the second of the Amendments, but I think that at this stage it would be more helpful if we heard what the noble Lord opposite has to say on the matter.

2.35 p.m.

Lord MELCHETT

While I appreciate the motives that have moved the noble Lord, Lord Avebury, to put down this Amendment and the other Amendment to which the Committee is addressing itself at the moment, I hope that he will not press either of these two today for very much the same reasons as Lord Elton has already given and, indeed, for many of the reasons that Lord Avebury outlined, because I have already written him about this in an effort to expedite our proceedings today.

It is the Government's view that to legislate in so sensitive a field as rent assessment is risky unless the formula introduced has been drawn up, and been fully and carefully considered, in the light of adequate knowledge of the field in which the legislation is to operate. The fair rent formula incorporated in the Rent Act 1968, part of which the noble Lord has sought to adapt for mobile homes, was the outcome of months of study and discussion in the light of much fuller information on privately rented dwellings than we have on mobile homes. It is of course an object of the review of mobile home living started by my honourable friend, who is now the Parliamentary Under Secretary to the Department of Industry, to assemble the data needed as a base for informed and sound decisions on, first, the need, and then, if applicable, the scope, nature and operation of any system for the regulation of mobile home living. But for the moment I must advise against any attempt to extend the scope of this Bill beyond that now before us, and certainly I must advise against any introduction of part of a rent assessment formula devised for use in quite different circumstances.

I should make it clear that I do not at this stage want to rule out any option for consideration in the context of comprehensive legislation. It is, after all, conceivable that any number of recommendations may arise from the mobile home review; but at present its findings cannot be anticipated. And I am most reluctant—above all at a time when we have at last the prospect of formulating conclusions on mobile home living in the light of adequate and relevant data—to tie the Government's or Parliament's hands by piecemeal importation of provisions designed for use in an entirely different field.

The noble Lord, Lord Avebury, raised one or two points in introducing the Amendment. He asked whether I thought it likely that a site operator would increase premiums—I think I understood him right—if the court reduces site charges—I assume under Clause 4(2) or (5) of the Bill as it stands. I can give the noble Lord a limited answer. A determination by the court on the site charge at that point would not be able to affect that mobile home residence premium which will presumably have been paid already. I can see that it is possible that a site operator would, nevertheless, charge higher premiums for other incoming residents.

Lord AVEBURY

My point was the opposite. If a person sought the decision of the court under Clause 4(3) when what he considers would be a reasonable increase is imposed at the time of the annual review, would evidence as to premiums which had been charged either to him, or generally speaking on the site, be accepted as evidence by the Court and taken into consideration in deciding what the annual charges should be? Surely, if the courts find that the site operator is making enormous sums out of these £500 premiums and a rapid turnover of residents, that should push them towards limiting the annual charge.

Lord MELCHETT

I was going to come on to the general question of guidance to the courts when making a determination. It is our view that in spite of the problems to which the noble Lord rightly drew our attention, because of the variation in standards of location, and so on, it would be virtually impossible to give general guidance to the courts applicable or appropriate to all sites. It is important that the courts should be free to consider local conditions without strict guidance which might prove to be inflexible in practice.

This comes back to the nub of the Government's opposition to the Amendment because we do not know in practice what the problems will be at the present time. We are not able to foresee what general guidance would be appropriate to the courts or to tell the noble Lord what problems we think will arise. We feel that we do not know, and it would be dangerous and unwise to legislate at a period when our knowledge is unsatisfactory and when we hope very shortly to have more information.

Judges in county courts are experienced at taking into account relevant local factors. We are conscious that the courts will be able to operate Clause 4 more effectively without general guidance, as they have done under Section 4 of the Caravan Sites Act 1968. One other point which the noble Lord made struck a chord with me—his suggestion that at the moment site operators have tacit support for making abnormally large profits, because Parliament has not legislated in this field. Certainly no noble Lord on this side of the House would give tacit support to anybody making abnormally large profits, if by that the noble Lord is meaning unreasonably large profits, which I think he probably was. I dare say that would be another side of the unacceptable face of capitalism of noble Lords opposite.

We have considerable support for the objectives which the noble Lord is seeking to achieve. He has done the Government at least a great service by drawing attention to these problems—not that we were not seized of them already, but he has underlined several things. The correspondence and debate which we have had on the Amendment will be of great assistance to us while we undertake the review. I am loath to give the noble Lord any assurance about future legislation. He has already told the Committee that he had an assurance in the past which has proved to be inoperative. Therefore, even if I gave him an assurance—which I am not in a position to do—it would not be all that convincing. The noble Lord will have to decide whether or not he withdraws the Amend- ment on the basis of the case put forward rather than on any guarantee that legislation will be introduced in the next or any particular Session of Parliament. But as soon as this particular Bill is on the Statute Book the full resources of the Department will be concentrated on undertaking the review which, needless to say, has been held up by work on this Bill, and we will proceed as fast as we can in bringing before Parliament detailed conclusions of that review.

Lord AVEBURY

The noble Lord said that we do not know what factors ought to be taken into account in determining the fair annual charge to be imposed on a caravan site. Then, a moment later, he said that judges are experienced in taking relevant local factors into account.

Lord MELCHETT

The noble Lord has slightly misunderstood me. Because we do not feel that we have full information, we are not in a position to say what problems are likely to arise in different localities on sites with particular problems and differences about which we may not be aware. The courts are much more likely to operate Clause 4 effectively without any general guidance. We feel they have operated a section of the Caravan Sites Act satisfactorily in that respect. I was not saying that because we do not know of all the possibilities that will come up, the courts also will not know. We are saying that because we do not know it is better to leave it to the discretion of the courts looking at the particular case.

Lord AVEBURY

If the noble Lord means the judges have power to look at any of the factors I have mentioned, and if he is saying the judges could study the amenities and the locality of the site, and if they thought those were relevant and they could say, for instance, charges ought to be lower on a particular site because it was next-door to a gas works or sewage farm, then I am very pleased with his reply.

We have dodged round the main question, which is scarcity. We have left it in the air as to whether the judges, in determining disputes on the annual charge list, are to assume that the number of people wishing to be occupiers in that locality is no greater than the number of pitches available, or whether they are to accept the economic factors which enable the site operator to impose an annual rent which is much larger than would be the case if there was equality of demand and supply.

I can see this is an extremely difficult matter for the judges to determine without any guidance from Parliament; but of course I agree with the noble Lord that the formula ought to be fully considered and that a great deal of study went into the original 1965 Act formula, upon which I have modelled this clause. Obviously, one must accept that different factors would be applicable to caravan sites from those which would be applicable to residential properties.

I shall not press the Amendment, but I hope the noble Lord will do everything in his power to ensure that once the Bill is out of the way the Kaufman Committee produces its Report as quickly as possible. The noble Lord, Lord Elton, has mentioned its publication and I hope he is right in assuming that the Report will be available to Parliament. We shall then need to exercise what pressure we can on the Government to bring forward comprehensive legislation as soon as possible. I beg leave to withdraw the Amendment.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

2.42 p.m.

Lord MELCHETT moved Amendment No. 16: Leave out Clause 4 and insert the following new clause:

Disputes

" —(1) If the owner of a protected site on which a mobile home is, or is to be, stationed—

1. (a) fails without reasonable excuse to comply with the provisions of section 1 of this Act; or
2. (b) having in compliance with the said provisions offered to the occupier an agreement on terms and conditions which have been accepted by the occupier, fails without reasonable excuse to enter into a written agreement with the occupier to give effect to the terms and conditions so agreed within the period of one month following the date of such acceptance,

the occupier may apply to the court for the grant of an agreement which complies with section 3 of this Act or which contains the terms and conditions so agreed, as the case may be.

(2) On an application under subsection (1) above the court shall make an order for the grant of an agreement which—

1. (a) in a case falling within paragraph (a) of that subsection, complies with section 3 of this Act and contains such terms and conditions as the court thinks reasonable; or

(b) in a case falling within paragraph (b) of that section—

1. (i) where the court is satisfied that terms and conditions have been agreed between the parties, contains the terms and conditions so agreed; or
2. (ii) where the court is not so satisfied, complies with section 3 of this Act and contains such terms and conditions as the court thinks reasonable.

(3) If an occupier to whom an agreement has been offered by an owner of a protected site in pursuance of a duty under section 1 of this Act fails without reasonable excuse to signify within the period of three months following the date on which the agreement is so offered whether or not the terms and conditions contained in it are acceptable to him, the owner of the protected site may apply to the court for the grant of an agreement which complies with section 3 of this Act.

(4) On an application under subsection (3) above the court shall make an order for the grant of an agreement which complies with section 3 of this Act and contains such terms and conditions as the court thinks reasonable.

(5) An occupier who is dissatisfied with any of the terms or conditions in an agreement offered to him by an owner in pursuance of a duty imposed under section 1 of this Act may, within the period of three months following the date on which the agreement is so offered, apply to the court for the determination of the matter in dispute.

(6) Where an agreement has been entered into in pursuance of section 1 of this Act or has been granted by virtue of an order of the court under this section either party may apply to the court for the determination of any matter in dispute arising under the terms of the agreement.

(7) On an application under subsection (5) or subsection (6) above the court shall determine the matter in dispute and shall make such order as is necessary to give effect to its determination.

(8) Where on an application made under this subsection by the owner of a protected site the court is satisfied that an occupier does not occupy as his only or main residence a mobile home which is stationed on that site by virtue of an agreement entered into in pursuance of section 1 of this Act or granted by virtue of an order of the court under this section, the court may make an order rescinding the agreement on such terms as to payment by or to either party of damages for the non-performance of the agreement, or otherwise, as to the court may seem equitable."

The noble Lord said: This Amendment re-orders and simplifies Clause 4 of the Bill, with the object of making for a better understanding of what is un- doubtedly a very complex clause, as we found to our cost last Friday. There are only two changes of substance in the new, re-ordered Clause 4. First, subsection (4) of this revised version embodies the principle to which I think the noble Lord, Lord Elton, drew the Committee's attention with his Amendment No. 13 which was accepted by the Committee. The clause now states that an agreement shall comply with Clause 3 and contain terms and conditions which the court considers reasonable. The new clause omits from subsection (4) the word "other", which appeared in the noble Lord's Amendment. I think your Lordships will agree, on reflection, that it is better omitted throughout.

Secondly, the new clause no longer includes the provision in the existing Clause 4(6) of the Bill, which would enable an occupier in certain cases to apply for a revocation of an order granting an agreement. On examination, there seems to be no need for this provision. Clause 3(c) enables an occupier to determine an agreement by giving 28 days' notice to the owner. In practice, it is thought that an occupier who is dissatisfied with an agreement granted by the court will find it quicker and less costly to take the course open to him under Clause 3(c) than to seek a revocation of the court's order.

As a consequence of the removal of this procedure, subsection (7) of the clause as it stands is also being deleted. That was the provision that dealt with the court's power to award costs arising from the exercise of the revocation procedure. I hope your Lordships will agree that this is largely a technical and helpful Amendment. I beg to move.

Viscount COLVILLE of COLROSS

May I say on Amendment No. 16 that this entirely meets the tiresome and difficult point that I raised in Committee last week. I am glad to see that, contrary to what was then said, the word "other" has been left out throughout; and I am sure that this is better.

Lord ELTON

The noble Viscount has said what I was about to say.

On Question, Amendment agreed to.

Clause 4, as amended, agreed to.

Clause 5 [Agreements to bind successive owners]:

Lord MELCHETT

Amendment No. 17A is consequential. The present Clause 4(6) provides that an occupier can apply for the revocation of an order by which an agreement is granted by the court. The power to revoke such agreement, as I have said, is unnecessary. I beg to move.

Amendment moved— Page 7, line 25, leave out from (" shall ") to (" be") in line 26.—(Lord Melchor.)

On Question, Amendment agreed to.

Clause 5, as amended, agreed to.

Clause 6 [Orders]:

2.47 p.m.

Viscount COLVILLE of CULROSS: moved Amendment No. 19: Page 8, line 1, leave out paragraph (b).

The noble Viscount said: This is an Amendment to see whether the noble Lord, Lord Melchett, can explain to me something that I do not understand. The Committee will see that in Clause 3(k) there are provisions for discounts and commissions to be put into the agreement between the occupier of the mobile home and the owner of the site, which I believe will come into operation when a mobile home is sold by the occupier to somebody else, or when he is buying a new one to replace it. That is something which is dealt with in Clause 3 and therefore, quite apart from what would happen in most cases in any event, it is something which must be in the agreement that is reached, whether voluntarily or under the procedure for disputes in Clause 4. Therefore, a figure to deal with this circumstance must be in the agreement.

Once this Bill comes into effect, all agreements that are entered into thereafter will cover this matter. They will cover it in the light of what the occupier of the mobile home and the site owner think is reasonable, and there will also be imported, of course, the judgment of the county court if there is any dispute. We shall find, if there is a dispute about this matter, that county court judges up and down the country are going to say that a certain figure for discount and commission is or is not reasonable, and no doubt after a certain length of time some kind of practice will be worked out with the guidance of some of the county court judges who have been seized with this matter to help.

In Clause 6—which I know my noble friend Lady Vickers will move to leave out in a moment—we have order-making powers (this is at the top of page 8) which have one specific purpose. It is picked out in a special paragraph, which is paragraph (b). That is to say, these are order-making powers to alter or to lay down maximum and minimum rates of discount and commission and scales. Why? Is it because the Government do not trust the county court judges to reach a reasonable decision on this matter? We now have the disputes procedure perfectly plain. It will be a matter for the county court judge if anybody is worried about the scale of commission and discount. Do the Government not trust the county court judges to produce a fair and reasonable result in every case?

Secondly, when we are proposing to have legislation, as I understand it, sooner or later anyway—I do not wish to enter into the question of when, although the honourable gentleman Mr. Kaufman was fairly specific in another place; let that be—do we really wish to have power to make orders which will bind, not those whose agreements are going to be dealt with under this Bill immediately it comes into force, and I think that would be the vast majority, but only those who enter into agreements later on, after Regulations and Statutory Instruments have been made to govern this matter? Then there will be, I suppose, two codes operating. There will be the one under the Bill itself—dealt with, sanctioned and examined by the county courts—which will be binding on the vast majority of people who are living in mobile homes. Superimposed upon that—and presumably different, because otherwise there is no point in making Statutory Instruments—will be a new code, or a new series of maximum or minimum scales introduced by the Department of the Environment.

Can the noble Lord tell me—because am genuinely puzzled—why it is that they want these powers? What on earth is wrong with the process first of private bargaining; and, secondly, of supervision by the county courts? The noble Lord has just told us that for a number of years the county courts have been quite satisfactorily carrying out this kind of operation under the 1968 Act. Why do the Government want to superimpose a new code which will apply only to a few people later on, prior to the new legislation coming into force? If the noble Lord can tell me the answer to that question and make out a reasonable case for it—which so far I have not been able to understand—I have no reason to suppose that I shall wish to insist upon this Amendment. However, at the moment I am genuinely puzzled and seek guidance. I beg to move.

Lord WAKEFIELD of KENDAL

I should like to support my noble friend Lord Colville, but I support him on more general grounds. It is generally agreed that this Parliament is overburdened with domestic legislation and its implementation by Statutory Instruments. We are now in the EEC for all time and there will be even more work to be considered by Parliament. By this Bill more work will be given to Ministers, to civil servants and to Parliament, yet again and again we have said that central expenditure must be reduced; that we do not want more and more civil servants; that we do not want to put more and more work on to Ministers. Surely by this Bill we are going to provide extra work, which ought at all costs to be avoided. It is on those general terms that I should like to support the specific point which has been made by my noble friend.

2.53 p.m.

Lord MELCHETT

It would be helpful if I set out as briefly as I can the reasons why the Government want the powers which are provided for in paragraph (b). The need to limit the amount of discount or commission taken at present by site operators has been vigorously advanced by representatives of mobile home residents. Certainly it seems to be the case that the more unscrupulous operators have extorted unreasonable terms, due to their ability to prevent occupiers from selling their mobile home on site. But equally it appears that many owners have maintained pitch charges at a relatively low level by cross-subsidisation from dealings in both new and second-hand caravans and that they have opposed an absolute right to re-sell on site since they want to maintain con- trol over who is to come on to their land. In Clause 3 the Bill attempts to allow site operators to retain a measure of control, but it also takes the first step towards checking present abuses by stipulating that the rates of discount or commission to be charged should be known to both parties in advance; in other words, they should be included in the written agreement to be offered to the occupier. This would at least enable the resident to know what he or she faces.

The various attempts by the Bill's sponsors to arrive at a fair maximum rate of discount or commission have run up against one overriding obstacle, that there is at present no means of settling on an objective figure which would be fair to all operators and occupiers in all parts of the country. For example, an operator at present charging low rents and high discounts might be forced to put up rents steeply if the allowable rate were set too low. Alternatively, a higher rate might too easily be taken as the norm by operators who are at present taking low rates. The basic problem is that not enough is known about charging practices and the effect of writing in specific figures at present—whether one figure or a range would be more appropriate and whether different rates should be applied in different parts of the country. For example, there may be differences in Scotland of which we are not aware.

As more information may come to light as a result of our experience of the working of this Bill and in the course of the review of mobile home living, the reserve power is needed in case the fuller information eventually justifies a more detailed prescription than the Bill has so far been able to attempt. I would say to the noble Lord, Lord Wakefield, that this will not place any greater load on either officials of the Department of the Environment or Government Ministers because we are already undertaking a review. The review is under way and of course part of the review will undoubtedly consist at looking at the workings of the Bill. We cannot ignore that fact. We are saying that the workings of the Bill and the review as it proceeds may provide us with information which would allow a more detailed prescription to be made than is at present possible. So I do not think anybody will be overloaded with any more work, though of course I am grateful to the noble Lord for his consideration. I hope that that explains the noble Viscount's problem and that he will see fit to withdraw the Amendment.

Viscount COLVILLE of CULROSS

No, it does not, because the noble Lord has not dealt with the main point of my argument. Can I put it in another way? I understand what he says about there being a scarcity of information in the Department at the moment, and of course it is right that if something should turn up in the course of the review the Department should, if it can, put right something which is wrong. The noble Lord has not explained to me that as the county court judges (and in Scotland the sheriffs) are going to be dealing with this matter from time to time under the dispute procedure, they will be arriving at figures which they think are reasonable for discount and commission, or somewhere on the scale. They will be doing this in different parts of the country over a period of time until some Statutory Instrument comes to be thought out. The noble Lord has not told the Committee that he does not think the judges will be doing this aright; he has not cast any doubt on their ability to assess what is fair and reasonable. I am glad he has not done that, because I do not suppose that is what he intended to do.

Can the noble Lord answer two questions? If he cannot, it is a matter which perhaps we can go back to another time. First of all, when the county court judge is looking at a particular agreement which contains a figure for discount or commission, is he or is he not going to take account of the pitch charge which the noble Lord himself said sometimes acts as a compensation? I observe a carrier pigeon now setting forth, so I will keep going for a moment until it returns to roost. The noble Lord, Lord Avebury, is also going to speed it on its way.

The other question is this. When the noble Lord and the Department look at the material which they are amassing, are they going to get details of the decisions to which county court judges and sheriffs come? It is no use just getting a copy of the county court order. The county court judge may very well say: "In this particular agreement I vary the rate of commission from 5 per cent. to 7½ per cent. ", or whatever it may be. That will not give the evidence upon which the county court acted. It will not take account of the pitch charge or some other factor which will give full information and upon which alone one can make a proper assessment. Can the noble Lord tell me, first, that the county court is going to take account of fixed charges; and secondly, that the Department will get full details of the adjudications and not just a copy of the order, because these will not be reported anywhere? The Law Reports will not contain them, so no body of evidence can be obtained from that source, and unless the Department is to obtain these, I do not understand how it is that it is to say that their order-making power will be an improvement upon the system whereby the courts have been given jurisdiction to deal with the matter. I will not go on with this today, unless the noble Lord has a very full answer, but I should like to give him an opportunity to comment upon the point, and also my noble friend.

Lord AVEBURY

I want to make only two points to follow the noble Viscount, Lord Colville of Culross. One is that it is a kind of court charge: if it is able to look at pitch charges to determine what should be the rate of discount or commission under paragraph (k), then obviously that would be a good thing. I hope the noble Lord will be able to assure us that it is so, because it carries with it the implication that the converse is true. I never really received an answer to that one, either; when looking at the pitch charges when a dispute arises, the rates of discount and commission would also be relevant.

But there seems to be another point that is worth making and which might help to satisfy the noble Viscount, Lord Colville. The Government obviously will be very interested in the decisions of the county courts and I endorse the hope he has expressed that they would look at the whole circumstances surrounding the cases and not just at the decisions of the judges. But it seems to me that after a period of time has elapsed, and seeing that there are plenty of these cases to look at so one can get a general picture, by imposing maximum rates of discount or commission one will then avoid a lot of unnecessary litigation. But so long as the site operators and the residents are not absolutely certain as to how the judge will view a particular figure in an agreement, then obviously they will be inclined (other things being equal) to seek the arbitration of the Court. But once you have an overall picture covering the whole country and the scales of maximum and minimum rates can be laid down. I do not see any reason why any of those cases should come before the courts at all, and that would mean, perhaps, a large saving in money and time for both the residents and the operators.

Lord MELCHETT

The noble Viscount, Lord Colville, made a very good point when he said that the courts ought to take account of the pitch charge when fixing the level of the commission. I hope that now the matter has been drawn forcefully to the attention of the President of the Mobile Home Residents Association all mobile home residents will make sure that their legal advisers, when presenting their case to the court, will put this before the judges. That will be one factor at least in deciding whether or not the judge is seized of the point. I certainly think that if it is put before the court, it is something that the court can take into account.

The noble Viscount also asked me whether we should be getting full details of the adjudication of county courts. That is something I should like to consider and write to the noble Viscount about, if I may. I am honestly not sure what the procedure is for obtaining the adjudications, let alone whether it is our intention to do it, and now that our attention has been drawn to the problem we would like to consider it and to let the noble Viscount know whether or not we shall be doing it, and if not, what the reasons for not doing so are. I will certainly write to him about that.

On the general point, it is our view that taking powers for the Secretary of State to prescribe when data is to hand is a reasonable compromise between, on the one hand, a statutory proscription which would be very inflexible, and, on the other, not even retaining the power to proscribe a maximum if evidence arises that excessive commissions are being charged. Really this is a matter that will have to be decided, to a certain extent, on general principles. If it is decided that excessive commissions are in general being charged as a result of data which comes to light, then on general principles a maximum would have to be fixed which might well not take into account particular circumstances and might lead to alterations in other charges; but that would be a question of principle as well as obviously taking into account the very great local differences which might come to light. I hope that has helped the noble Viscount a little further and, as I have said, I will write to him on the one point which I have not been able to deal with at the moment.

Viscount COLVILLE of CULROSS

I am obliged to the noble Lord, Lord Melchett. I hope he will write very quickly, because this Bill is going through at some speed and, if I may very respectfully suggest it to him, he may find it not entirely easy to discover the answer. I know that county courts are very well organised and have a certain amount of central information. There are associations of ratepayers and the county court judges can help a little. But the noble Lord, if he is to get a meaningful answer, will have to hurry up in order to get something sensible before the next stage of the Bill. I look forward to that, and I will read it carefully. If I am not satisfied then, I may return to the point. Meanwhile, I beg leave to withdraw the Amendment.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

On Question, Whether Clause 6 shall stand part of the Bill?

Baroness VICKERS

I wish to apologise to the noble Lord, Lord Avebury, for anything I may have done that was not etiquette so far as he was concerned. I did not take up the time of the House last week, because I thought we wanted to get on with the Bill. I should like to refer to the fact that in the original Bill this clause was simpler and easier. Regrettably, the Minister in charge has made it a little difficult. On 30th April 1975, he said: The clause gives certain powers to the Secretary of State to make orders varying the prescribed minimum periods for agreements under Clause 3, and prescribing or regulating certain matters for the purpose of Clause 3(m). It is desired to add to these order-making powers, and it has been found more convenient to do so by substituting a new clause…"— [Official Report, Commons, Standing Committee C; 30/4/75; col. 137.] which he did at a later date.

Personally, I think we have enough powers already. I agree with the noble Lord, Lord Wakefield of Kendal, that we certainly do not want to give any more orders to the Secretary of State. We may not have enough work to do— and I am very glad to hear that—but I am totally against the orders. We have far too many, in both Houses. As I see it, under this clause the Minister will have powers to vary as he thinks fit any of the periods in Clauses 1, 2 and 3. I understand these periods are those which vitally affect the owner's investment planning, security of tenure, review of rent, and site charges. Naturally, there are considerable differences in standards, in the popularity of an area, in renting conditions, in public demand for somewhere as a desirable place of residence. I suggest there is no real uniformity in site charges. Perhaps I am wrong, but I understand that the clause was intended to allow the Minister to make changes in the light of experience gained over the next two years, after the Bill had been in operation for a trial period.

In another place, the Minister said that he is determined to introduce a new Bill in two years, based on his Departmental review of mobile homes. But the orders are not retrospective, and any alteration which he may make now will not apply to existing agreements, or to any new agreements in the Bill. Under this Bill, such agreements would be in force for at least eight years, and since any new Bill will be introduced within two years, there appears to be very little justification for granting the Minister now what I consider to be drastic powers. When the noble Lord replies, perhaps he will deal with that point, because it seems rather unnecessary to put this in this Bill at the present time.

I gather that in past years the income from sales of mobile homes has helped to keep down rents. The owners of mobile homes will have the right to sell, and the site owner will receive commission. However, the income received will he considerably reduced. If I may give an example, I gather that if one has 100 pitches on a level or uncomplicated site and the work is done without employ- ing outside labour, it will cost about £1,150; but with assistance from outside it will cost £2,500. The rent of a pitch at present is about £4, and the owner receives 4 per cent. per annum on his investment. In another place it was acknowledged that rents of £2 might go up to £4 a week, and those of £8 to £12.

I hope it will be agreed to remove Clause 6, because of the uncertainty among site owners. It will increase the present housing shortage, which I thought was the last thing the Minister would want to do, because of the uncertainty about the Minister having new ideas when he has gathered all his information. It might stop further development. I gather that there can be arbitration, and there are numerous estate agents and chartered surveyors who specialise in valuing mobile homes in all parts of the United Kingdom. These people have intimate day to day knowledge and experience which, obviously, a Minister cannot have, and they can nominate independent arbitrators. There is a President of the Royal Institute of Chartered Surveyors, and I gather that he can nominate an arbitrator within a few days. The courts should deal with all questions of possession, but arbitration could be used for other disputes.

I do not want to offend any of the legal lights in this House, but it is a known fact that the general public find it a little intimidating to appear in court, and the less formal arbitration procedure might be preferred. I hope that the Minister—though I suppose I cannot have much hope after his previous answers—might think again. In view of the fact that the Minister is having this review and. we presume, is to produce another all-embracing Bill which will put matters right for ever, I hope he will now withdraw this clause, because it will cause a great deal of hardship and make for a great deal of uncertainty in the years to come before the next Bill is introduced.

3.13 p.m.

Lord MELCHETT

I hope that the Committee will allow Clause 6 to stay in the Bill. The noble Baroness is seeking to remove a clause the present form and content of which are the result of considerable discussion and ultimate agreement between the Bill's sponsors and the Government during its stages in another place. The clause indeed confers certain order-making powers on my right honourable friend the Secretary of State for the Environment, but these are neither particularly extensive nor likely to have a far-reaching effect on the operation of the Bill. They give my right honourable friend the means of altering the various time periods set out in the first three clauses, including the original duration of an agreement and its renewal period. And my right honourable friend can prescribe the rates of discount or commission which we have already discussed at some length. I would say to the noble Baroness that these powers are limited in their effect. As she said, they are not retrospective; that is, they would not affect agreements already entered into.

Quite honestly, with great respect to the noble Baroness, I do not see how she can have it both ways. Either these are draconian order-making powers—undemocratic, I think, was the epithet she applied to them, although I hope they are going to be passed by both Houses of Parliament—which will dramatically upset the finances of the site operators in years to come, or, as she also said, they are limited in their effect, because, as we hope, the Bill will be running for only two years and they are not retrospective.

Baroness VICKERS

Then what is the point?

Lord MELCHETT

The noble Baroness asks: what is the point of having them? I say that she cannot have it both ways. They cannot be draconian and dramatic powers which will upset everyone, and also be minor order-making powers which give the Bill an attractive degree of flexibility, without being anything about which we ought to get very excited. I think she ought first to decide on what line she intends to attack the existence of these order-making powers in the Bill. They add a highly desirable element of flexibility. It might be that the review into mobile homes instituted by my right honourable friend could yield information or reach conclusions which pointed to the desirability of making changes in the length of agreements; or to the need to spell out what rates of commission or discount should be allowable, as we have already discussed; or the working of this measure could itself yield useful experience pointing towards the need for changes of this kind. In either case, the Government would expect to discuss any proposed changes with the organisations which represent operators and residents. But if the Bill is to have any meaning and real usefulness, a means of effecting such changes should be included in it. I hope, therefore, that the noble Baroness will see fit to withdraw her opposition to the clause.

Baroness VICKERS

I do withdraw, but I still have some opposition.

Clause 6 agreed to.

Clause 7 [Power to prescribe minimum standards]:

3.16 p.m.

Lord MELCHETT moved Amendment No. 19A:

Page 8, line 30, leave out subsection (2) and insert: (" (2) An order made under subsection (1) above may apply generally or to a particular area or to protected sites in a particular category and may prescribe different minimum standards in relation to protected sites in different categories.")

The noble Lord said: This Amendment relates to the Secretary of State's power to make orders prescribing minimum standards for protected sites including local authority sites. The Amendment would enable the Secretary of State either to make orders which apply generally or to prescribe minimum standards for particular areas or for particular categories of site. It further enables him to prescribe different minimum standards for different categories. Clause 7(2) as drafted gives him power only to make general orders or to prescribe different standards for different areas. The new provision is designed to cater especially for the particular case of gypsy caravan sites provided by local authorities. The minimum standards appropriate to non-gypsy sites would not necessarily be the right ones for gypsy sites, and an order-making power should be able to differentiate. In addition, it may be desirable at any given time to make an order in respect of non-gypsy sites but not of gypsy ones, or vice versa.

Lord ELTON

I do not wish to delay the Committee in its now pleasingly rapid progress through the remaining stages of this Committee stage. This appears to me to be a reasonable addition to the Bill and we will certainly not oppose it.

On Question, Amendment agreed to.

Clause 7, as amended, agreed to.

Clause 8 [Amendment of Act of 1968]:

3.19 p.m.

Lord MELCHETT moved Amendment No. 20: Leave out Clause S and insert the following new clause:

Extension of Act of 1968 to Scotland

" Part I (relating to the protection of residential occupiers) and Part Ill (miscellaneous) of the Act of 1968 shall apply to Scotland subject to the modifications contained in the Schedule to this Act."

The noble Lord said: With the leave of the Committee, I will speak to Amendments Nos. 22 and 23 with this Amendment. Clause 8 of the Mobile Homes Bill extends some of the provisions of the Caravan Sites Act 1968 to Scotland. These Amendments are purely drafting in character and are designed to clarify the Mobile Homes Bill by removing to a new Schedule the detailed changes which are necessary for the application of the 1968 Act to Scotland and to tidy up the detailed changes by substituting a new Section 5 in the 1968 Act.

Part I of the proposed new Schedule contains the general adaptation of the 1968 Act currently made by Clause 8(1) of the Mobile Homes Bill. Part II of the new Schedule contains the modifications currently made by Clause 8(2)(h), (c) and (d) of the Mobile Homes Bill to sections of the 1968 Act, but is designed to set them out more clearly by substituting a new Section 5 in the 1968 Act. The Amendment to Clause 9, page 10, line 29, is consequential on the deletion from the Bill of the original Clause 7, which was replaced in another place by the existing Clause 7.

Lord AVEBURY

I wish to say how delighted I am that this Bill extends the 1968 Act to Scotland, remembering that my honourable friend Mr. James Davidson (as he then was) on the Second Reading of the Bill in 1968, spoke very strongly in favour of the extension to Scotland. At that time, as reported at column 1986 on the 1st March, the noble Lord, Lord Hughes, said he did not consider it appropriate to extend the provi- sions of the 1968 Bill to Scotland, mainly on the grounds that the County Councils Association there did not consider that it was in any way relevant to the smaller number of people living in mobile homes in Scotland. In fact the Association had not had adequate time for consultation.

Now at last, eight years later, the provisions of the Act are being extended to Scotland. About that I am delighted. This is one minor example of the general principle that Liberals are always seven years ahead of the other two Parties.

On Question, Amendment agreed to.

Clause 8, as amended, agreed to.

3.26 p.m.

Baroness VICKERS moved Amendment No. 21: After Clause 8 insert the following new clause:

Saving for certain rights

(" Nothing in this Act or in any agreement entered into in pursuance of section I of this Act or granted by virtue of an order of the court under section 4 of this Act (including an agreement as varied from time to time by any such order) shall prejudice or derogate from or in any wise alter or affect the rights, powers and title of any person in respect of a mobile home which he owns but of which he is not the occupier.")

The noble Baroness said: The major point in my Amendment is that the statutory agreement would, by virtue of Clause 3(k), give a right to the occupier of the mobile home to sell it. However, he may not be the owner; in fact the owner is probably a finance house, and therefore, the right to sell, as contained in Clause 3(k), will not be allowed, I suggest, so to be exercised as to prejudice the rights or title of the actual owner. The same may be said to apply in respect of the right of the owner of the site to have access under Clause 3(i), and the occupier of the mobile home to assign under Clause 3(j). These rights should not be regarded as prejudicing any existing rights of the owner of the mobile home. Therefore, I suggest to the noble Lord that it is arguable that, as the rights required to be given by this Bill would be statutory rights, they could be said to override the statutory rights of the owner of the mobile home. Many mobile homes are bought by instalment credit agreement, for example, by hire-purchase or conditional sale agreements, and during the currency of such agreements the owner of the mobile home is the finance house.

I understand that the amount of money involved in agreements relating to mobile homes which are being entered into is about £2 million a month. Many of these involve permanent residences. I believe that there are about 100,000 permanent residences, and these will be affected by the Bill. Most of the mobile homes affected by the Bill are not owned by the occupier, but by a third party, a finance house. I wonder, therefore, whether there might not be some confusion, even conflict, between the terms of the Bill and the terms of the instalment credit agreements. For example, Clause 3(k) gives the occupier that right to sell the mobile home, but it might not be his to sell. Clause 3(g) makes provision for repair and maintenance of the mobile home, but I suppose there are in all credit agreements provisions about repair and maintenance.

What happens if the two sets of provisions are different? Clause 3(i) refers to access to, and movement of, the mobile home. If it belongs to a third party, should the third party not be involved in the right to have access to, and to move, his own property? Clause 3(j) deals with assignment of the agreement introduced by the Bill, and there may be some confusion if the occupier can assign the agreement, but not the mobile home. Clause 4 deals with application to the courts. If the mobile home is owned by a third party, it may be felt—I think quite rightly—that he should have the right to be heard at such proceedings.

I do not want in any way to challenge the object of the Bill, but I hone to have eliminated some of the difficulties caused by the assumption, as appears in the Bill, that the occupier is the owner. It might be relevant to quote the Caravan Site Act 1968, since this Act had an objective not dissimilar from the objective of this Bill and similar to the point taken in debate. The Act in Section 3(5) says: The court may from time to time, on the application of either party, extend, reduce or terminate the period of suspension ordered by virtue of this section, or vary any terms or conditions imposed thereunder, but shall not extend the period of suspension for more than twelve months at a time.

I would suggest that my Amendment will help on this point, and I should be grate- ful if the noble Lord would consider it. I beg to move.

Lord MELCHETT

The Amendment tabled by the noble Baroness provides me with an opportunity to state the Government's views on points which the Finance Houses Association first brought to the attention of members of the Standing Committee considering this Bill in another place and to my Department. My honourable friend the then Parliamentary Under-Secretary in fact sought legal advice on these points, and I have done so again. It may therefore be helpful if I place this opinion on record and at the same time explain why I do not see this new clause as necessary.

The Association's main concern, as I understand it, is to remove any doubt that the benefits conferred on an occupier of a mobile home by grant of an agreement in compliance with Clause 3 could conflict with or override the rights of the finance company when the mobile home is being purchased under a hire-purchase agreement. The Association have drawn attention in particular to four areas where they are concerned about possible difficulties.

First, they are worried lest covenants about repair entered into as a result of Clause 3(g) may prove incompatible with an instalment credit contract. The position here is that Clause 3(g) does not stipulate what a repairing covenant should contain and it is for the parties to agree on terms which do not conflict with their obligations under any prior written contract which either of them has previously entered into.

Secondly, the Association are concerned that the right of the owner under Clause 3(i) to have reasonable access to the part of the site occupied by the caravan should be paralleled by a right of access for the finance company either to inspect or if necessary to repossess its goods. The position here is that Clause 3(i) in no way affects the existing rights of a finance company or any other persons with an interest in the mobile home.

Thirdly, the Association have pointed to the confusion which they fear might be caused if (under Clause 3(j)) an occupier were to assign the agreement without the consent of the finance company who own the mobile home and who may even have included an express condition of forbidding assignment of the mobile home in their hire-purchase or conditional sale agreement. The right to assign the agreement does not, of course, carry with it any assignment of the mobile home itself. The provisions concerning the sale of a mobile home are in fact contained in Clause 3(k). The Bill is not conferring a right on the occupier to sell his mobile home as against anyone but the site owner: in other Words, Clause 3(k) is subject to the right of the occupier to sell the mobile home: these provisions of the Bill do not apply if he does not own the mobile home. A caravan occupier cannot legally assign that which he does not own without the consent of the true owner. Accordingly, neither Clause 3(i) nor Clause 3(k) in any way interferes with or overrides the rights in the mobile home of persons other than the occupier.

Briefly, then, the clause which the noble Baroness has moved is not necessary because the Bill does not remove or affect the right of a finance company who are assisting an occupier to purchase a mobile home. I can understand that the Finance Houses Association wish to establish that there is no ambiguity in this matter, but I should be reluctant to see a further and (as it turns out) unnecessary provision added to the Bill, since, on my understanding, there is no element of doubt to be removed.

Baroness VICKERS

I thank the noble Lord for that reply. I should like to have the opportunity of reading it in detail.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

Clause 9 [Interpretation]:

Lord MELCHETT

My Lords, I beg to move Amendment No. 22:

Amendment moved— Page 10, line 29, leave out from (" Scotland ") to (" any ") in line 31.—(Lord Melchett.)

On Question, Amendment agreed to.

Clause 9, as amended, agreed to.

Clause 10 agreed to.

Lord MELCHETT

I beg to move Amendment No. 23.

Amendment moved—

After Clause 10 insert the following Schedule:

Section—(Extension of Act of 1968 to Scotland)

(" SCHEDULE

MODIFICATIONS OF THE ACT OF 1968 FOR THE PURPOSE OF EXTENDING THAT ACT OF SCOTLAND

c1796
1. PART 1 GENERAL ADAPTATION 63 words
cc1796-7
2. PART II SPECIFIC MODIFICATIONS 325 words