Lords Sitting of 27 June 1975

Preamble
The House met at eleven of the clock: The LORD CHANCELLOR on the Woolsack.
Prayers—Read by the Lord Bishop of Oxford.

NORTH SEA OIL RIGS
Lord CAMPBELL of CROY: My Lords, I beg leave to ask the Question which stands in my name on the Order Paper.
The Question was as follows:
To ask Her Majesty's Government how many exploration rigs are now operating in the North Sea and what was the estimate made in April 1975 by the Government of the number which would be operating there at any one time in this year's drilling season.
Lord LOVELL-DAVIS: My Lords, 26 drilling rigs are now engaged in exploration and appraisal work on the United Kingdom Continental Shelf. The April 1975 Brown Book forecast that the average number of rigs operating at any one time during 1975 would be 30.
Lord CAMPBELL of CROY: My Lords, have not six rigs recently left the British sector, four moving to the Norwegian sector, and the others to the Irish and French sectors? Is the noble Lord aware that the slower tempo than that which had been expected at the height of the summer drilling season is largely due to this Government's policies?
Lord LOVELL-DAVIS: My Lords, there are bound to be variations from week to week in rig movements, for a wide variety of reasons; not least because the majority of rigs are independently operated, moving from company to company, and from block to block, and from time to time they have to return to base for maintenance and refit. The fact remains that the average number of rigs operating during the first six months of the year was little short of 30; in fact, during March and April of this year the average was 31 rigs. In February and May the average was 30, in January it
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was 28, and in June it was 25. That gives an average of over 29 rigs. In answer to the noble Lord's other point, good progress is being made on development and there is nothing to suggest that exploitation of any of the commercial fields is being delayed. It remains the Government's policy to encourage the rapid growth of oil production and to achieve the levels forecast in the Brown Book. Our discussions with the companies on participation take full account of the problems of marginal fields, as did the arrangements announced in February for the petroleum revenue tax.
Lord HAILSHAM of SAINT MARYLEBONE: My Lords, I thank the noble Lord for his comprehensive reply, but I am sure the House would be fascinated to know whether the answer to my noble friend's supplementary question was Yes or No.
Lord LOVELL-DAVIS: The answer is No, my Lords.
Lord CAMPBELL of CROY: My Lords, I too am grateful for the comprehensive reply. But does the noble Lord realise that the information he has given about the average number of rigs operating in recent months, and the fact that there was a greater number in the North Sea than there are now at the height of the drilling season, only confirms the slowing down in the tempo of exploration and activity? Is the noble Lord further aware that the tempo should be increasing rapidly now if we are to become self-sufficient in 1981?
Lord LOVELL-DAVIS: My Lords, the important fact is that development is increasing very rapidly indeed. Exploration and drilling is obviously of crucial importance. But one cannot necessarily assume that the tempo of exploration and the appraisal of drilling should go on at an increasing rate all the time. It is an extremely costly business. It costs £2 million to drill a hole, and a rig costs £20,000 a day to maintain. Companies will not involve themselves in this type of expenditure unless they have very good reasons for doing so.
Lord AVEBURY: My Lords, has the noble Lord refreshed his memory about the comments of the right honourable lady Mrs. Margaret Thatcher, who, when in 1966 was Opposition spokesman

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on energy in the House of Commons, made precisely the same kind of allegations in relation to exploration for gas in the Southern sector of the North Sea as we have heard from noble Lords on the Conservative Front Benches this morning? Bearing in mind that the gas development programme has been extremely successful, and that the targets outlined in the 1965 White Paper have been realised, is it not likely that these fears expressed today will be equally false?
Lord LOVELL-DAVIS: Yes, my Lords. Since our forecasting has been called into question, I should say that we seek to be neither optimistic nor pessimistic. But we wish to keep our feet on the ground and resist being unduly swayed by the ebb and flow of political discussion which sometimes seems to colour the figures one reads. Early last year, there were those of us in the industry who were accused of extreme pessimism. It was suggested that prospects were so dazzling that 50 rigs might be operating on the United Kingdom Shelf, while we were forecasting 25. In the event, the average was 24½. Last winter, the political pendulum swung the other way and stories were circulating of poor prospects, dwindling discovery rates and a general flight of rigs away from British waters. What has followed this year is a remarkable succession of discoveries—17 so far—and a higher number of rigs operating than at any previous time, as we forecast.
Lord WYNNE-JONES: My Lords, would my noble friend not agree that the output in the next 10 years depends upon platforms rather than upon exploration rigs, and that the development of platforms is going ahead extremely satisfactorily?
Lord LOVELL-DAVIS: Yes, my Lords, as I have said.
Lord CAMPBELL OF CROY: My Lords, as it is less than four years since the announcement of the first commercial oilfield in the British sector, ought not an increase in activity to be taking place anyway? That is not an answer. Can the noble Lord agree with us that the activities should be taking place at a much higher rate now, at the height of
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the summer season, if we are be self-sufficient in 1981?
Lord LOVELL-DAVIS: No, my Lords. I think we can go as fast as the job will allow us to go. This is not even like laying out a farm and saying in advance what crops we are going to grow. It is a highly dangerous area and the most unpredictable sea in the world. Development is proceeding at a very satisfactory rate. We are not complacent about this, but the fact is that we are now moving into the first phase of development and we are doing so satisfactorily.
Lord LEATHERLAND: My Lords, can my noble friend say how many gallons of oil have been brought ashore under this Government and how many were brought ashore under the Tory Government?
Lord HAILSHAM of SAINT MARYLEBONE: Is it not well known, my Lords, that all the oil was put there by Mr. Wilson?

ONCHOCERCIASIS FUND AGREEMENT
11.12 a.m.
Lord HALE: My Lords, I beg leave to ask the first Question which stands in my name on the Order Paper.
The Question was as follows:
To ask Her Majesty's Government what was the reason for the delay in presenting to Parliament the Onchocerciasis Fund Agreement 1974, what other countries have now signed the agreement and what information is available as to the first year's working.
The PARLIAMENTARY UNDERSECRETARY OF STATE, FOREIGN AND COMMONWEALTH OFFICE (Lord Goronwy-Roberts): My Lords, the delay was caused by an administrative oversight, which is regretted. The other countries which have now signed the 1974 Agreement are Canada, France, the Netherlands, the United States of America, the Federal Republic of Germany. Iraq and Belgium. A progress report for 1974 has been issued by the World Health Organisation, the Executing Agency. I am arranging for a copy to be sent to the noble Lord.
LORD HALE: My Lords, I am grateful to the noble Lord for that Answer. Will he take note that this is a magnificent international achievement directed to the noblest objectives, and that it involves seven recipient countries and an estimated area very much larger than the whole of the United Kingdom? Would it not be well to see that publicity is given to some of these achievements at a time when the eyes of the world are focussed on the forthcoming Congress of African Peoples, as this involves a very large area of that continent? I am grateful for his promise to send information. I hope it will contain a Report of the first year's achievements.
Lord GORONWY-ROBERTS: My Lords. I am sure that the whole House will agree with my noble friend in everything he said about the splendid work done in this respect in Africa by the United Nations. It is a great encouragement that the preservation of life is one of the preoccupations at the moment in that continent.
Baroness GAITSKELL: May I ask my noble friend to pronounce the name of the Fund?
Lord GORONWY-ROBERTS: if it were spelled "Onkoserkiasis".
Lord DAVIES of LEEK: My Lords, may I ask my noble friend—and I hope that this supplementary question is relevant—whether the Government are in co-operation with the School of Tropical Medicine in regard to this very distressing disease, the clearance of which is like the clearance of flies in Panama and Suez earlier in history, and which will make possible a development in tropical Africa and elsewhere of great importance to the whole of mankind?
Lord GORONWY-ROBERTS: My Lords, I am glad to confirm that a good deal of very promising research in this vital field is being conducted in such British institutions as the one named by my noble friend.
Lord BRUCE of DONINGTON: My Lords, will my noble friend deal with that part of the supplementary question asked by my noble friend Lord Hale which related to the publicity that ought to be given to actions of this kind? Is my noble friend aware that unless pub-
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licity is given these things rarely become known anywhere?
Lord GORONWY-ROBERTS: My Lords, my noble friend Lord Bruce will have noticed that I said that I agreed with everything that my noble friend had said, including the need for publicity of this kind of helpful and humanitarian activity. I will certainly see how it is possible to expand publicity. I agree that we should inform people much more than we do about this kind of activity, and I thank my noble friend for emphasising that point.
Lord WALLACE of COSLANY: My Lords, is my noble friend aware that the Government will find it difficult to get publicity for a constructive achievement of this sort, when the media are usually preoccupied with sex, perversion, rape, murder and other undesirable and antisocial acts?
Lord GORONWY-ROBERTS: My Lords, I doubt whether the media are solely preoccupied with the themes my noble friend named. Judging from a number of documentaries that I have seen, I imagine that they might be interested in an exposé of this project.

PULMONARY DISEASES
Lord HALE: My Lords, I beg leave to ask the second Question which stands in my name on the Order Paper.
The Question was as follows:
To ask Her Majesty's Government what are the "Other Industries" in respect of which figures of deaths from byssinosis are given on Table 6, page 9, of the Department of Energy's Digest of Pneumoconiosis Statistics 1973; whether these figures include cases of asbestosis and byssinosis, and what medical advise has been received on the diminished length of life of those so listed.
Lord WELLS-PESTELL: My Lords, the table referred to gives the number of deaths from pneumoconiosis resulting in the award of industrial death benefits, and includes asbestosis but not byssinosis. With permission, I will circulate the full list of "Other Industries" in the Official Report. All the deaths listed have been adjudged to be due to or

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materially accelerated by pneumoconiosis, though in many cases the reduction of lifespan will have been small. In 1973, 40 per cent. of the deaths occurred in the age group 65–74 and 8 per cent. in the age group 75 and over.
Lord HALE: My Lords, with respect, and while thanking my noble friend for that partial Answer, I should have thought that the figures were such that messengers of Æsculapius would have now been carrying the news from village to village. The first figures, in 1968, showed that in other industries the applicants who have lived to be over 65 are about 25 per cent. (in adjusted proportion) of the applicants in the motor industries. This exemplifies the proposition already accepted in Switzerland that asbestosis is a particularly dangerous disease and has the effect of shortening life. Will my noble friend look at the figures in 1968 and 1973 in his own Table, since he seems not to have realised that in mining and quarrying the death rate of applicants living to be over the age of 75 was 24 per cent. and in the other industries 5½ per cent.? Is this not a massive difference which ought to have resulted in action and research?
Lord WELLS-PESTELL: My Lords, if my noble friend is referring to asbestosis, then the situation as I understand it is that the figures are not available on exactly the same basis as the digest Table. This is my information. But I will take note of what my noble friend has said and look into it. In 1974, the first year for which information is available, about 75 deaths were accepted as due to or materially accelerated by asbestosis.
Lord DAVIES OF LEEK: My Lords, does my noble friend consider this an appropriate moment to pay a small tribute to the technicians of the Coal Board, for their efforts in limiting the avariciousness of modern mechanisms in relation to coaldust underground in the battle against the terrible disease of pneumoconiosis, and will he inform them that many of us watch with interest the progress of their technicians' effort in this battle?
Lord WELLSPESTELL: My Lords, I am sure that the National Coal Board
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will read with some gratification what my noble friend has said.
The table referred to is as follows:
" Awards in 1973 of industrial death benefit under the Industrial Injuries Acts in respect of pneumoconiosis in "Other Industries" analysed according to the Standard Industrial Classification.

Food, drink and tobacco

1

Coal and petroleum products

1

Chemical and allied industries

2

Metal manufacture

21

Mechanical engineering

5

Electrical engineering

4

Shipbuilding and marine engineering

25

Vehicles

1

Metal goods

4

Textiles

28

Bricks, pottery, glass, cement, etc.

30

Construction

7

Gas, electricity, water

7

Transport and Communication

5

Distributive trades

3

Miscellaneous services

1

Public administration and defence

1

Total

146

A corresponding analysis is not available for the 14 awards under the Old Cases and Workmen's Compensation Acts."

CABINET PROCEEDINGS AND CONFIDENTIALITY
11.20 a.m.
Lord WIGG: My Lords, I beg leave to ask the Question which stands in my name on the Order Paper.
The Question was as follows:
To ask Her Majesty's Government whether the Prime Minister, on or about 18th June 1969, authorised Mr. G. Kaufman, M.P., then employed on the political staff of the Prime Minister at 10 Downing Street, to supply Mr. Anthony Howard, editor of the New Statesman, with details of how each member of the Cabinet voted on the issue of whether the proposed Industrial Relations Bill should be proceeded with and whether the receipt of this information by Mr. A. Howard, as acknowledged by him on BBC television in the programme "Meet the Editors" on Sunday 22nd June, constituted a breach of the Official Secrets Act.
The LORD PRIVY SEAL (Lord SHEPHERD): My Lords, Cabinet proceedings are confidential except to the extent that the Cabinet itself approves the issue of a statement. On the occasion

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referred to, no such authorisation was given and no vote was taken.
Lord WIGG: My Lords, would the noble Lord the Lord Privy Seal care to comment on the propriety of Mr. Anthony Howard revealing the source of information in this particular case, which is contrary to every principle by which journalists, who have any reputation to lose, operate? Has he noted that the statements on television by Mr. Anthony Howard were not correct? Has the noble Lord checked what Mr. Howard said against what he wrote on 22nd June 1969, that no vote was taken by the Cabinet on that day, but if a vote had been taken the vote would have been 12 to 11? Is the Minister further aware, if one examines the Press over those three or four days, 17th to 20th June, there was massive guidance, including detailed timetables of how the Cabinet and Cabinet committees operated, and it is perfectly clear, whether done with or without authority, somebody was carrying on what one might describe as an "operation"?
Lord SHEPHERD: My Lords, regarding the first supplementary question of my noble friend, I do not think it is for me to comment upon the activities of this journalist. If he has infringed in any way the relationship between the Press officers and the journalists it is for the journalistic profession to deal with that. In that period there was a great deal of speculation. I would not suggest it was leakage or guidance, but there was speculation. From my short experience in the Cabinet, I have wondered sometimes, When reading the Press reports, whether I had gone to the right Cabinet Committee Room.
Lord WIGG: My Lords, leaving aside the wonderment of the noble Lord as to whether or not he was at the right Cabinet meeting, when speculation reaches the point that it is 100 per cent. correct, can one take it that speculation has passed from that area into an area of certainty? Would the noble Lord be good enough to answer the question as to whether Mr. Kaufman, who was employed in 10 Downing Street, briefed Mr. Anthony Howard?
Lord SHEPHERD: My Lords, Mr. Kaufman informs me that he has no recollection at all of having a conversation
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with Mr. Howard, although one must appreciate this is some six or seven years ago. Regarding speculation and certainty, I am sure my noble friend will agree that because a horse wins a race that does not mean there was certainty it would win when it started.
Lord HARMAR-NICHOLLS: My Lords, would the noble Lord agree, if Mr. Kaufman has been dangerously misrepresented to his disadvantage, this was not a privileged occasion and he has his own rights under civil law if it is thought that this matter should be rectified?
Lord SHEPHERD: My Lords, that is a matter entirely for Mr. Kaufman which I would prefer to leave to him.
Lord WIGG: My Lords, it is not only a question for Mr. Kaufman. The noble Lord the Lord Privy Seal must be aware that, if somebody working in 10 Downing Street signs the Official Secrets Act and devolves information for whatever reason, this constitutes a breach of the law. Surely it constituted a breach of the law by Mr. Anthony Howard to receive information which was improperly disclosed. As there is a conflict of evidence here, and Mr. Kaufman's memory seems to be defective while Mr. Howard's memory seems clear, is this not a case, as it involves not only Ministers but the Cabinet Secretariat, for an inquiry? Surely we are going right to the heart of Government here if an argument can be carried on half under the counter and half above.
Lord SHEPHERD: My Lords, if information of this kind had been disclosed by an official to the Press in the circumstances that have been reported, I believe it would be subject to the Official Secrets Act. But we have no reason to believe this. We have Mr. Kaufman's assurance that this information was not conveyed to the journalist. Therefore I suggest, in these circumstances, one can only question the statement that was made by the journalist on the BBC, taking into account the article he wrote at that time.
Lord HAILSHAM of SAINT MARYLEBONE: My Lords, assuming, as I do, the noble Lord's statement that there was no vote taken on the occasion in question is right, how can there possibly have been an illicit disclosure concerning the voting figures? Have we not spent enough time on this matter?
Lord SHEPHERD: My Lords, I agree with the noble and learned Lord; I was, however, seeking to deal with some difficult questions which my noble friend was putting to me. I am trying to put the matter right. But I agree with the noble and learned Lord—and I find I am more and more in agreement with him—and I suggest that we now move to the next business.
Lord WIGG: My Lords, the fact that there is agreement between the two Front Benches does not alter the fact that there was on this occasion guidance or leaks.
Several NOBLE LORDS: Question!
Lord WIGG: My Lords, I will put my remarks in an interrogative form. I notice that the House always wants interrogative questions from me but not when Ministers or Opposition Front Bench spokesmen are speaking. Does the Minister agree that the fact that there is agreement between him and the noble and learned Lord, Lord Hailsham of Saint Marylebone, increases the probability of both being wrong rather than being right? The noble and learned Lord, Lord Hailsham of Saint Marylebone, has a reputation of never being right on any subject and always managing to laugh at his own jokes. It may be funny to him but not to other people. On this occasion there was unquestionably major leaks or guidance. Mr. Anthony Howard has used a powerful instrument to reveal that; namely, the media. Should it not therefore either be established or refuted in detail, and not just palmed off because it happens to be inconvenient to the noble Lord, Lord Hailsham of Saint Marylebone?
Lord SHEPHERD: My Lords, the only area of agreement between the noble and learned Lord and myself was that we had had enough of this matter and wanted to move to the next business. I think that is the general sense of your Lordships' House. I have to say, in the light of what my noble friend put to me, that there was no question at all of guidance or leakage in this matter.

CRUELTY TO ANIMALS BILL [H.L.]
11.29 a.m.
Baroness PHILLIPS: My Lords, I beg to move that this Bill be now read a second time. This is a short Bill of two clauses and I will not insult your Lordships' intelligence by spelling out exactly which clause is the kernel of the Bill. I must say straight away that I have not enjoyed the kind of research in which I have had to indulge to produce the facts and figures for the Bill. But as we recently had a debate initiated by my noble friend Lord Houghton of Sowerby, his splendid opening speech then has relieved me from harrassing your Lordships with some of the descriptions of the tests on animals reported from very reputable sources of information.
Our attitude to animals in this country has always confused me in that it seems totally contradictory. On the one hand, we see the overfed and under-exercised pets who are allowed to defile our streets and make them unpleasant to walk on and we teach our children to love the soft bunny rabbit, and then we select certain animals for use in some rather undignified experiment. As the noble Lord, Lord Houghton of Sowerby, said during our debate on the abuses of the Cruelty to Animals Act on 14th May (col. 721):
" You name it, … and some animals will have been made to eat it, have injected, put into their eyes, or they have been shaved of hair or fur so that substances may be tried out on their skins."
Because the noble Lord at that time gave us so many details about testing, it is not necessary for me to repeat them today. Bat I would remind your Lordships—I studied the report of the debate very carefully—that nobody at any stage challenged the accuracy of the noble Lord's statements.
Your Lordships will be very familiar with this Act which I am seeking to amend and so I will merely remind your Lordships that the Act says that it is not permissible to perform on a living animal
" … an experiment calculated to give pain "
unless the experiment is performed with a view to the advance by new discovery of
" physiological knowledge or knowledge which will be useful … for saving or prolonging life or alleviating suffering …"

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As your Lordships will know, licences are granted under certain categories, and since certificate A covers drugs, poisons, serum and vaccines, I can see quite clearly that if at this time anyone were to attempt dramatically to change the principal Act, they would run into the counter-attack that this was going to make it impossible for life to be saved or prolonged or the pain of man to be alleviated. Therefore I have been careful not to refer to "non-medical experiments". This Bill clearly states "cosmetic" and it goes on to define what is meant by "cosmetic".
The Research Defence Society in their letter setting out objections to the Bill—a copy was sent to me by courtesy of the noble Earl, Lord Halsbury, and I believe it appeared in The Times yesterday—referred to the National Poison Information Service, which is part of the National Health Service. It states that in their first year they received about 2,000 calls for help and advice. This figure had risen to 20,000 by 1974, and of that figure about 800 referred to cosmetics. There is one point which is slightly confusing to me and that is that they say that two-thirds of the queries related to children. I am not sure whether this means children in relation to cosmetics, or children in relation to other substances.
No one—certainly not I—would dispute the value of this kind of information service, but I should like to know a little more about how the knowledge of antidotes is obtained. For instance, if a child actually gets a bubble bath substance into its eyes, presumably the antidote would be to wash out the eyes or clean them in some way. Could this knowledge not have been obtained by analysis of the bubble bath rather than by rubbing it into the eyes of an animal? Again, if a child eats lipstick, surely there are only two ways in which you can deal with what someone has eaten: either it comes out one way, or goes out the other. What contribution to that sort of knowledge requires the testing of an animal over a period of days with a particular substance, except to establish the rather unnecessary fact that if a living creature takes into its system enough of any substance it will certainly die?
Previous debates on this subject in your Lordships' House, as well as the
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discussion on the Bill of the noble Lord, Lord Willis, seem to show that the reasons advanced for these tests on living animals fall into two main groups. The first is that it is mandatory to test. I have searched through the Medicines Act 1968 and, so far as I can see, it refers throughout to medicinal products. I looked at the Pharmacy and Poisons Act, which refers to pesticides, insecticides and weed-killers. So I have been unable to find reference to compulsory testing for cosmetics.
The second point which is often made—a much more emotive one, my Lords, and one which I suspect will be used today—is that testing must take place to protect the customer. This is always a very strong argument, particularly if we are to be told that children must be protected against a shampoo causing permanent damage to their eyes. In reply to that, I would question whether anyone could ever devise a test which would completely prevent the misuse of a product. In the end, the final test is that given to the product when it is applied, in this connection, to my skin, or, in the case of shampoo, to my hair. I am sure that many lady Members of this House will have heard hairdressers asking careful questions of a customer who has apparently used hair colouring. They ask the customer what brand it was and when it was applied, and so on. If they were so reassured that testing could obviate all difficulties, there would be no need to question customers in this way. Most women have at some time used a soap, bath oil or cream which is not quite right for them. I recently used a beautiful bubble bath substance which was made by a very expensive firm. Unfortunately, it caused a scaliness to appear on my legs and after two applications I ceased to use it. So there is always an answer to a test which, as a person, one is constantly applying.
The history of allergy is a very interesting and largely "hit or miss" business in that, as my doctor son-in-law once explained to me, there are about 1,000 possibilities of allergy, including flowers, animals, dusts of all kinds, rubber, synthetic materials and so on. There is validity in the claims made by certain firms, and I shall quote their names.

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One of them is Yardley, and their letter says:
" I am sure you will be delighted to know that we do not have any animal testing in our factory. All the ingredients are those that have been in use for a long time and there is no need for testing of any kind."
Again, I have a letter from Boots which says:
" The basic materials from which cosmetics are made have been available for a great number of years and one can say that, having thus stood the test of time, they can be considered safe."
That surely is the ultimate test that we should all like to have.
When I see the advertisement of "Beer tried and tested ", I must confess I assume it has been tested by a man and not by an animal. Am I entitled to ask what attempts are being made by this very honourable Society to which I referred earlier to find alternative means of testing? Indeed, do we really need—perhaps this is the worst heresy of all to mention—so many new products? I recognise that I am treading on very dangerous ground because against me are possibly the doctors on the one hand and the scientists on the other—and perhaps the Government as well. But every reformer throughout history has been told, (a) that he does not understand the subject, or (b) that he is a crank or a fanatic, although why persistence in a belief in an idea is a reason for insult, I cannot understand. If I am to be called a crank or a fanatic in a good cause, I can tell your Lordships that I do not regard this as an insult. Human beings have a curious ability to rationalise their behaviour. I am quite unconvinced that the fox likes being hunted, and I should have been equally unconvinced that the "chimney boys" liked being pushed up chimneys. With St. Francis of Assisi, I believe that all living creatures have a dignity, and man should be certain that the uses to which he puts an animal is absolutely essential for his survival.
Moved, That the Bill be now read 2a.—(Baroness Phillips.)
11.40 a.m.
Lord ELTON: My Lords, may I begin my brief address to your Lordships' House on this subject by thanking the noble Baroness, Lady Phillips, for introducing this emotive but important subject in restrained terms, and instantly
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waving aside any intention of suggesting that she either does not understand the subject or is a crank or a fanatic. If those appendages are to be attached to her they will be attached by others of your Lordships' House. Also by way of preamble and apology, I must ask for your Lordships' indulgence, since I am due to take part in all three pieces of legislation going through the House today, if I am absent during part of this debate. Otherwise, I have no reservations.
My Lords, no other nation enjoys such a widespread reputation for kindness to animals as does our country. Your Lordships' interest in this Bill on a fine Friday, to some extent, bears this out. We have reputations also, however, on the one hand for careful legislation and on the other, for a certain unpractical sentimentality in our concern for animals which sometimes acts at the expense of humanity without doing much good to the animals themselves. The noble Baroness referred to one of the anomalies in this realm. I am put in mind of those who say: Don't leave Rover at home when we go shopping ", and one sees the excitement of Rover's ride in the car with his ears streaming in the wind as he sniffs the air out of the window. Then an hour and a half later, after the car has been parked for an hour and a quarter in the parking lot, one sees Rover subjected to something only a little short of torture—in the full noonday sun, in a little tin oven with no windows open. And one wonders how kind it is to keep, for instance, a songbird in a cage 2 ft. square in full sight of the sky and moving clouds, no matter what the quality of the birdseed and cuttlefish bones that one puts through the bars from the side of liberty into the side of captivity.
The answer to this question is of course in part that we must not consider animals as if they were small and oddly shaped and sometimes feathered human beings. For human beings solitary confinement in a cage is solitary confinement in a cage, and remains so even if a mirror is hung up on the wall in which he can see himself. For a human being a reflection is not company; but for a budgerigar it appears it is. It follows therefore that the lesser brain is susceptible to other pressures, and is perhaps more easily protected from some that would be infinitely damaging to human beings. I

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say this at the outset by way of preface since it shows in a small way that animals perceive their environment differently from us and the environment reacts upon them in a manner different from that in which it reacts upon us.
Pain is one of those reactions and it is next to impossible to measure the intensity of pain in any human being other than oneself. How very much more definitely impossible is it to measure it in animals. One can I think say that as the life span of an animal is shorter than that of a human being, so the span of the passage of time in which the animal is acutely perceptive, whether pleasurably or painfully, whether hunting or hunted, must seem proportionately greater as well. The animal's intensity of perception, therefore, is to that extent and in those terms perhaps greater than in human beings. With this limited understanding of the nature of pain in animals, we have then the welfare of these animals given to us in trust.
Let us not forget that we have also the welfare of human beings in trust. And this is where the difficulties begin. If I might briefly touch on the difficult areas encompassed by this Bill, they are as follows. There is first the difficulty, which the noble Baroness has sought to overcome in the wording of her Bill, of deciding exactly what a cosmetic is. I feel that there are borderline cases, inevitably, within the definition she has placed in the Bill. If a soap is sold as a beauty soap it is a cosmetic, and presumably if it is sold as a medicated soap it is a medical preparation. What about the medicated beauty soap? What about anti-dandruff shampoos? Is curing dandruff, which normally is not in any way dangerous or even undignified but perhaps socially embarrassing, a cosmetic or a medical operation? So the first difficulty (and I do not want to delay your Lordships because many of you wish to discuss this Bill now and we presumably have a Committee stage ahead of us) is the difficulty of definition.
The next difficulty, which the noble Baroness touched on, is what are the properties of a cosmetic when it is misused by accident? I suggest there is a third outcome to the minor accident which she presented to your Lordships—the unlikely event of a small child (and these events, though unlikely, are con-
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stantly happening) eating a large quantity of lipstick. It can, she said, either come up or go through in the normal manner; I think that that is how she expressed it. What concerns me is that the lipstick might be allowed to be digested in the normal manner by parents who think that it is totally harmless because they bought it as a cosmetic sold under the pharmaceutical regulations which this Bill impinges upon, and they may not know that shortly or long after the digestive process had been completed the signs of damage will begin to be seen. I shall refer shortly to a parallel and frightening instance, but I do not want to anticipate what I have to say. I think we wish to know that, if baby sees mother's complexion milk and confuses it with ordinary dairy milk and drinks it, baby is not going to be seriously at risk. If we are not sure of that then of course cosmetics as well as medicines must be kept on that already overcrowded shelf out of baby's reach—and it is extraordinary how high babies can climb.
I take the noble Baroness's point that there are long-established firms with a tradition of producing harmless and even beneficial cosmetic preparations which are convinced that nothing they sell can possibly be harmful. I am sure that, if they continue to use the present ingredients, that will continue to be the case. But are Messrs. Boots and Messrs. Yardley's (since the noble Baroness mentions them) committed irretrievably to a policy of never expanding the range of their products, never using new ingredients? And what about other firms? Are they to produce only preparations that are constantly in use? I am informed that there is a constant difficulty in the cosmetic industry in the selection of colourants. Substances put into cosmetics in order to change and improve tone, reflectivity or colour, are constantly being brought on to their specialised market and their effects on the users cannot be known until some tests are carried out.
If your Lordships feel so strongly that these tests should not be carried out on animals—I am thinking more of tests for involuntary ingestion than the application of creams and unguents—I wonder whether your Lordships feel strongly enough to drink the stuff yourselves, because the principal alternative to the

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guinea-pig is a human being. Noble Lords are human beings and this would be a demonstration of the strength of their convictions. I would further say that of course until there is harmonisation internationally among all countries in the world which produce these preparations, we shall simply be saying to importers and sellers of cosmetics: "If you sell something which is produced in the United Kingdom (and not by a subsidiary of a company abroad, which so many companies are), you are buying something which may not be safe, and selling something which may not be safe. You are selling something for the selling of which you may be at risk in law. Whereas, if you buy it from the United States of America, or any other country with a statutory system of testing of cosmetics, then you are buying something which is safe and you will not be prosecuted." This is an aspect of the Bill at which the noble Baroness should look closely.
I do not want to expand at great length. Your Lordships should consider also the fact that cosmetic preparations are used for a great length of time. I am not very familiar with these matters, but I have the impression that noble Baronesses tend to fix fairly early in life on a favoured product and continue to apply it to the human body or any part thereof which they feel will be benefited by it. Therefore, the argument that because something has been on the market for two or three years it must be safe does not hold good. Here may I refer to the case I talked about earlier—to the substance known as hexachlorophane, which was developed in the United States and subsequently used world-wide. This is not a perfect analogy, because it was developed as a clinical aid. It was developed as a bactericide for surgical scrubbing. Therefore, the users came under the protection of legislation in the United States and elsewhere, which meant that these things had to be tested. I understand it was so effective that it was incorporated in other preparations, and among them was a baby care preparation which was used in France. Owing to a mistake in the factory, the very small proportion—I think it amounted to 3 per cent.—of the hexachlorophane which should have been used in this preparation was drastically in-
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creased. The result was that through neurological indications it became clear that the babies who had been cared for with this preparation were suffering damage to the white cells of the brain.
If this cleaning agent had not originated as a bactericide and some analogous substance—such as a cosmetic claiming no medical benefit whatever to users and going into beauty soap, and falling, therefore, into the channel from which the noble Baroness wishes to remove this kind of protection—was put on the market, the first indication one would get of its harmfulness in small quantities would be in the results upon the users, be they children born or unborn. It is possible for substances—and hexachlorophane is one of them—to be absorbed through the skin into the system and to affect the unborn child. I feel, therefore, that the noble Baroness must consider very carefully the responsibilities that the passage of this Bill will place upon your Lordships if it is given the effect of a Statute.
In conclusion, may I echo what has been said in the earlier debate, and remind your Lordships of the Littlewood Committee Report which has been with us now for 10 years. There were 83 specific recommendations, 49 of which required legislation but only two of which have been put into effect—and those through administrative means. I believe that the Committee was right to recommend that if this network is to be altered it should be altered not piecemeal but intact. I foresee the occasion when I shall have to use the same analogy in another debate which is to take place later in this Chamber, but I do not think you can catch a fly by using part of a web. To take a little piece of the existing Statute and alter it to give a different effect will in this case have unforeseen consequences, not all of them beneficial.
At the moment, we should be asking Her Majesty's Government two pertinent questions. The first is: what steps have they taken and what plans have they now, in the light of the Report which was made 10 years ago, for altering the legislation? The second question is: have the Government attended to the remarks of my noble friend Lord Sandys at this Dispatch Box in the earlier debate, drawing their attention to the growing volume of information on the availability of tissue

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culture experiments to replace experiments on living animals? This is a fruitful field in which eventually—and in the not too distant future—it may be possible to remove from the admittedly grotesquely unpleasant field of experimentation the animals which are at present sacrificed, your Lordships may feel, upon the altar of human vanity.
However, I believe that the improvements which can legitimately be pursued by the noble Baroness—that is, the improvements which do not expose human beings to risk; and we must recall that in the last analysis human beings are more precious and important than animals—can be as well pursued under existing legislation. And if she wishes to hammer on the door, whichever door it is, which on being opened can release new legislation to update that which we have and which she at present seeks to amend piecemeal, she will have many willing and well justified supporters. In the meantime, however, while profoundly in sympathy with the aims of this Bill, I would wish to see it in a form very different from that in which it now is, before I could recommend your Lordships to accept its final version.
Baroness GAITSKELL: My Lords, before the noble Lord sits down, may I ask him two short questions? When he says that animals react differently from human beings to captivity or to pain, am I to understand that he is putting these points forward as assumptions or as scientific fact?
Lord ELTON: No, my Lords. As I think I made clear, I said that these are assumptions. I said that the measurement of pain, even in human beings, is almost impossibly difficult, and in animals which cannot speak it is worse. One can measure reactions, but that does not mean that one is measuring feeling. I was trying to avoid being drawn into the anthropomorphism which we are so fond of, where we think that the animal which is being pursued is thinking about its insurance policy and whether the mortgage is paid up, immediately before the wolf snaps upon its back.
Lord PLATT: My Lords, may I ask the noble Lord for clarification of one matter? In the case of hexachlorophane,
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I thought his argument was that it had been tested because it was introduced as a bactericide in America. This did not prevent the accident from happening. What inference does he draw from that, if it is not that the testing was quite irrelevant or ineffective?
Lord ELTON: My Lords, I am grateful to the noble Lord for his helpful intervention, because I telescoped the story somewhat. I understand that the substance was originally introduced around 1930 when the structure of statutory testing was not complete. Also, I tried to say that it was only a partial analogy. However, it clearly shows the kind of dangers which can arise. The testing system was not then complete. However, I understand from reliable conversational sources that tests have been carried out relatively recently on the substance in the United States, that the danger was known in the United States, but that that knowledge had not penetrated to France at the time when the accident occurred. I do not wish to build a great complicated structure of argument on a particular case. All I wish to do is adduce the principle, and what I have said is, I think, sufficient to do that.
11.58 a.m.
The MINISTER of STATE, HOME OFFICE (Lord Harris of Greenwich): My Lords, I feel that I should begin with an apology to the noble Lord, Lord Elton, who has been conducting Question Time for the last few moments so well! If I may first deal with a point he himself raised about the use of tissue cultures, I am advised that there are still many areas where these will not serve, but where they can serve they are preferred. If I may deal first with the speech which has been made by my noble friend Lady Phillips, as she said this is the second occasion in only seven weeks when your Lordships have debated the subject of experiments on living animals. The last occasion was when we had a debate initiated by my noble friend Lord Houghton of Sowerby, calling attention to abuses of the Cruelty to Animals Act 1876. We are in debt to my noble friend for having given us another opportunity to debate this important topic this morning. I should like to say at the outset that the Government recognise that the

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motives of my noble friend are wholly laudable. There is no question of anyone attempting to label her as a crank. Where we differ from her—and I am afraid that we do—is on the question of whether the experiments on animals to which her Bill applies are so objectionable that they should be outlawed entirely from the field of legitimate scientific research, or whether there exists a sound justification for such experiments.
Section 3 of the Cruelty to Animals Act 1876 limits the experiments which may be licensed under that Act to those performed with a view to the advancement by new discovery of physiological knowledge or knowledge which will be useful for saving or prolonging life, or alleviating suffering, or for testing such a discovery. The intention of this Bill is to exclude from the scope of that Act experiments which are performed solely in the course of the development or testing of a cosmetic preparation as defined in the Bill.
At first sight there might seem to be much to commend this. We have heard a good deal about experiments involving the subjection of substantial numbers of animals to indignity and death for the development of a new lipstick or face cream. The use of cosmetics, it is argued, is an entirely voluntary act of mankind. Why, it is asked, should animals pay a penalty for this use? If mankind, or womankind, is not prepared to exercise restraint in the use of cosmetics, then let him, or her, take the risk. So runs the argument. But I am afraid there is more to it than that. This Bill is based on two assumptions. The first of these is that it is really possible to identify certain substances which are cosmetic preparations having no medical purpose, and to draw a distinction between these substances and all others. The second assumption is that experiments involving the use of animals can properly be outlawed in the case of certain substances, in this case cosmetic preparations having no medical value.
The Government's view is that both of these assumptions are mistaken. It is easy enough to compare the great life-giving drugs, which have alleviated so much human pain and suffering, with the frivolities of a beautician's parlour. But there is a borderline where the distinc-
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tion is much harder to make, and the noble Lord, Lord Elton, referred to this. Take the case of medical shampoos and dental preparations, where the cosmetic and medical functions overlap. Or the case of disfigurement, where the use of a wide range of cosmetics is the only means of enabling the sufferer to lead a normal life without crippling psychological stress. The noble Baroness may say that her Bill is expressly confined to the preparations which have no medical purpose. But how is that to be determined? A Bill of this kind must be drafted without ambiguity, and I think it is clear from the examples I have already given that any attempt to define these preparations by reference to the purposes they may serve is calculated to lead to unpredictable results and endless anomalies.
But there is a greater danger to this aspect of the Bill. I feel bound to point out to your Lordships that the Bill would put both experimenters and those concerned with the administration of this branch of the law in an extremely invidious position. Experimenters would constantly be tempted to advance some medical function for the substance being developed or tested. Administrators would be faced with the new and difficult task of assessing the justification of such a claim. The Bill is objectionable, therefore, in that the attempt to define "cosmetic preparation" by reference to functions will not only produce anomalies but will also open the door to widespread evasion. As a result, the effect of the Bill is likely to differ considerably from the promoter's intentions.
A more serious objection to the Bill is its assumption that it is the supposed medical purpose of a substance being tested which justifies an experiment. The acceptance of such an assumption would lead to a damaging restriction on the advancement of an important branch of public medicine. One of the great developments in medicine over the last century or so has been the emergence of preventive medicine, on which our public health procedures are based. The most recent feature of this development is in the field of consumer protection. All countries are now insisting that new products should be properly tested for safety in various ways before they are released to the public. This extends to other substances as well as new drugs

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and we can expect these requirements to grow stricter, not only in this country but internationally.
The philosophy of this Bill is that if manufacturers develop new cosmetics and the public want to buy them they must jointly share the risk. They are to be deprived of the best method of ensuring that a product will not cause harm. I find it difficult to believe that your Lordships will allow the possibility of exposing the public to such a risk when the means of preventing it exist. The risk will not, of course, be confined to those who use the product in full knowledge of the risks involved. The fact is that even among users there will be no knowledge of the risk until, as the noble Lord indicated, it is too late.
Even more important—and my noble friend Lady Phillips has attempted to anticipate this point being made—we have to remember the potential danger to children that a wide range of household products, including cosmetics, may present. I can best illustrate this by making reference, as my noble friend did in her speech, to the work of the National Poisons Information Service. The service began operating in 1963. In the first year of its existence it dealt with about 2,000 calls for information about the nature and treatment of incidents of poisoning. By 1974 this figure had risen to 20,000. Approximately two-thirds of these inquiries originated from incidents with children and about 800 of these referred to cosmetics. Fortunately, with this group of products there were no serious consequences. But we could not be sure that this happy outcome would continue if appropriate tests were made unlawful.
While the majority of the inquiries to the National Poisons Information Service arose from misplaced and accidental use of cosmetics—as when small children swallow face creams, lipsticks, mascara, hair dressings and skin lotions and so on—there remain other potential hazards from repeated use, ranging from irritation to the risk of creating allergies to those of precipitating cancer, hazards against which precautions must be taken by appropriate tests in animals. If we are not prepared to legislate to forbid the use of cosmetics, then we cannot deprive the manufacturers and the general public of the best safeguards against possible
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hazards that are known. Indeed, it goes further than that. If harmful substances get on to the market they will, at the very least, give rise to skin conditions and possibly more serious consequences. The development of medical preparations to remedy these conditions may well involve experiments using animals. What can be the logic of permitting animals to be experimented on for the purpose of producing a cure, but forbidding them being experimented on to prevent the circulation of the substance which causes the disease?
My Lords, I am not advancing a new argument. The Littlewood Committee on Experiments on Animals, which sat from 1963 to 1965, also considered this subject and reached precisely the same conclusion. In paragraph 266 of their Report, the Committee expressed the general view that,
"… we think that it is in any case undesirable as a general principle arbitrarily to determine that particular kinds of purpose should never be served by animal experiments whether or not they involve stress or pain ".
My Lords, our debate today is about restricting the use of animals to test and develop cosmetic preparations. But if the only justification for using animals in research is the serving of a direct medical purpose, then we shall be faced with a series of Bills excluding animal experiments in such fields as pesticides and food additives. One of the more encouraging recent developments is the readiness of authorities throughout the world to insist on higher standards of consumer protection. This Bill runs directly counter to that development. It would have the effect of putting this country in the rear, instead of in the van, of progress. This Bill will not halt the research at which it is aimed. It will merely drive it, and the business based on it, abroad, so that the rigorous tests for consumer protection, involving the use of animals, as the noble Lord pointed out, which other countries require can be complied with. The experiments will then be taking place in countries where the standards for the protection of animals from pain and suffering are often a great deal lower than our own.
The Government of course share the concern of the noble Baroness and those who support this Bill for the welfare of

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animals. But we believe that the principles outlined in the Cruelty to Animals Act 1876 strike the right balance between the needs of man and the prevention of unnecessary suffering to animals. In our view it would be a retrograde step to narrow the scope of the existing law in the way proposed by this Bill. For the reasons I have given, I am afraid that the Government will be unable to assist in any way with further progress on this Bill.
12.10 p.m.
Lord HALE: My Lords, I did give notice to the noble Baroness that I would have a word on her speech. I had not realised that the noble Lord was rising to close the debate.
Several Noble Lords: No.
Lord HALE: Frankly, my Lords, he did not give me much time. I am a little slow in getting up and—
Several Noble Lords: He was not closing the debate.
Lord HALE: Well, winding up, then.
Lord ST. JUST: That is not so.
Lord HALE: Well, he seemed to me to be giving a judgment of death: no assistance, no help, no anything. I had intended to go over one or two matters that were concerning me. I think one of them was mentioned by the noble Lord on the Benches opposite; that is, the question of surgical cosmetics, and cosmetics used in aid of surgery, of which I had some experience and knowledge at Roehampton, which dealt with some of the most suffering and noblest victims of the Great War. That is only a matter of flailing words and indeed must of the criticism that I have heard up to now is a matter of flailing words. I have some concern for an increasingly rare animal which is to be found only in Chancery Lane and which used to be called a Solicitor and which now faces Bills passing through this House—and indeed animals Bills passing through this House.
We have had a salmon Bill almost every year in the 30 years that I have been in Parliament, and every year my tin of salmon has cost more. At this moment we have a wild creatures Bill and a wild flowers Bill, and so on. We are
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going to have policemen searching for the blue butterfly in the Highlands and the natterjack toad in the suburbs—surely to the detriment of people who are liable to be mugged. One has to draw a balance. Even now on the television screen we can see dreadful crimes being perpetrated, like walking behind the bowler's arm, with complete impunity and apparently without any interference from the people who are present.
Lord PLATT: My Lords—
Lord HALE: My Lords, this is not a matter to be facetious about, The noble Lord on our Front Bench has treated it as a matter of great gravity and great danger.
Several Noble Lords: Order!
Lord ELTON: My Lords, I wonder whether I might intervene? Will the noble Lord give way? There has already been an attempt to intervene. I think the noble Lord is under a misapprehension. I think the noble Lord believes that he has leapt into the gap that exists between the noble Lord, Lord Platt, and the noble Baroness Lady Phillips, at the end of this debate. He is in fact speaking third in the debate and there are nine other people waiting to speak after him. Therefore I hope the noble Lord, perhaps with the leave of the House, would come in later at the gap or would conclude his address to this Chamber very briefly because he is in fact entirely out of order.
Lord HALE: My Lords, I am not aware of the Order under which it is out of order, but I have listened to a lot of out of order matters going on today and indeed a very grave offence by the Leader of the House.
Lord PLATT: My Lords—
Lord HALE: My Lords, I only rose, to conclude briefly—
Lord LOVELL-DAVIS: My Lords, will the noble Lord be so kind as to give way for a moment? I think the suggestion made by the noble Lord, Lord Elton, is a very reasonable one, and I would seriously ask my noble friend Lord Hale if he would allow the debate to proceed. He does not have to forgo his opportunity to intervene in the debate; he can certainly join in, but I

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would suggest that instead of continuing with his speech now he waits until the last speaker before my noble friend Lady Phillips sums up and then makes his contribution. I should be very grateful if he would accept this suggestion.
Lord HALE: My Lords, I was just saying that I was doing that.
Lord LOVELL-DAVIS: I am very grateful to the noble Lord.
12.14 p.m.
The Lord Bishop of MANCHESTER: My Lords, I claim no special knowledge of the subject of experiments upon animals, but am emboldened by the opinion of the Littlewood Committee that:
" animal experiment is a moral and social problem which does not exclusively concern the expert ".
Therefore, it may not be inappropriate for someone from this Bench to express support for the Bill introduced by the noble Baroness, Lady Phillips. Indeed, it may be that there is a note of reparation implicit in such an intervention by a Churchman—although not, I may say, a personal reparation—for it has been said that in the past cruelty to animals has been, if not encouraged, at least condoned by the teaching that whereas human beings have souls animals do not, and are therefore, so to say, entirely subservient to or expendable for human use. Your Lordships will not wish me to become involved in a theological argument, but it seems to me a more Christian temper in our own age that stresses human solidarity with other living creatures, and indeed with creation as a whole, than our division from them. Did not some earlier thinkers overlook the fact that inhumanity towards what were called "the lower animals" could have a brutalising effect upon human nature itself and thus encourage inhumanity to man?
At any rate, while gladly acknowledging that many medical benefits have accrued to us from animal experiments, I also note that in the century since the Cruelty to Animals Act 1876, two things have occurred: experiments on animals have multiplied tenfold—and for many different purposes, by no means all therapeutic—and at the same time our capacity for maiming and killing human beings has likewise grown on a scale which defeats imagination. If "reverence for
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life" is to be a saving slogan in our generation, it may have to begin with quite modest yet definite steps, such as the banning of animal experiments simply designed to test cosmetics.
The noble Lord, Lord Elton, has reminded us that interest in animals and concern for their welfare is a particularly British characteristic, and we are rightly warned against accompanying sentimentality about animals which might remain indifferent to human suffering. But, my Lords, unnecessary cruelty is sometimes the other side of the coin to sentimentality, and where that is so we have the worst of both worlds. To read some of the details of the "Draize" methods of testing—eye damage, skin damage and forced feeding of animals—suggests to me that either the majority of people in this country are quite unaware of what is being done ostensibly for their benefit, or if they are aware then they are not willing the means to bring about the end they desire. For public opinion surveys made last year indicated that 73 per cent. of the electorate disapproved of cosmetics and toilet preparations being tested on animals. Ought there not then to be legislation that would give some shape to this no doubt vague disapproval?
I feel sure that some of your Lordships occasionally watch, as I do, those glamorous moments on television which advertise this or that brand of cosmetics—as often for men as for women, be it said. Without looking for unreliable atrocity stories, might it not sometimes be beneficial if the viewers could see, instead of those delightful and usually irrelevant fantasies, some of the actual processes involving monkeys, rabbits or rats by which the product has been tested? If such a note of realism were injected into our consciousness, even for a few days, I feel reasonably confident that questions would at least be asked about present practices that are taken for granted. Would there not be a considerable volume of opinion in favour of asking the Government for more information about the extent to which they have commissioned research on the development of alternative methods of testing cosmetics, which do not involve the infliction of pain on animals? The human ingenuity which can devise so many ways of flattering our vanity could (it may be argued) equally well be devoted to ways in which we ourselves were

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able to test these products safely and reliably, without recourse to the suffering or death of other living creatures.
My Lords, I once heard it said—and the saying has haunted me ever since—that if animals believed in the devil he would look remarkably like a human being. Far be it from me to impute diabolical motives or methods to those who take part in animal experiments today. Nevertheless, the use on a very large scale of other creatures, not for our necessary health but simply for our supposed adornment, seems to me closer, if I may say so, to the diabolical than to the divine. I hope the passing of this Bill might strike a blow for the awakening of our consciences to that idea.
12.20 p.m.
Lord HOUGHTON of SOWERBY: My Lords, I can scarcely express my pleasure at listening to the speech made just now by the right reverend Prelate the Bishop of Manchester. How infrequently the ethical or moral issues are dealt with in debates on this subject. It is extraordinary that on other moral issues—marriage, divorce, sex, abortion, capital punishment—the theological arguments are listened to with great care, and are expressed frequently and at length. But on this question, if one dares to express the kind of feeling expressed by the right reverend Prelate, it is called sentiment. We are told we must not be sentimental. Underlying the whole debate is the harsh reality of human selfishness and commercial profit. I shall dwell on this a little later.
But, first of all, with great deference, I wish to comment on our procedure. I should have thought it would be customary, when a Private Member introduces a Bill into your Lordships' House, that the official spokesman for the Opposition and the Minister on the Government side would listen to some of the arguments about the Bill before coming in with an ohiter dicta from the Opposition, and the Home Office brief from the Government Front Bench. My noble friend Lord Hale was obviously under a misapprehension a moment or two ago. He thought that when the Opposition spokesman had finished and the Minister had spoken, that this was in the custom of the matter to wind up the debate, but in your Lordships' House it appears
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to open the debate, leaving those of us who follow with little opportunity to influence the minds of those who are in possession of greater influence and authority.
My noble friend Lord Harris of Greenwich, for whom I have the highest regard, has now spoken. It just does not matter what we say; he has spoken. He is not, in fact, asking the permission of the House to speak again. The final speeches in this debate are being made from the Back-Benches, where in fact the debate began.
Lord ELTON: My Lords, it might be appropriate for me to intervene yet again to justify the arrangement made on this side of the House. I hope that the noble Lord, Lord Houghton of Sowerby, listened with sufficient attention to notice that in conclusion I said something slightly ambivalent, to the effect that I would not recommend the Bill to go forward in its present form, but considerably altered. I thought it better to have an open mind, and to criticise this at the Committee stage, than to come to a hasty conclusion on an open question immediately after hearing a series of complicated arguments. I made this decision deliberately. I have advanced the reasons for doing it, although, of course, the noble Lord may not find them sufficient.
Lord HOUGHTON of SOWERBY: My Lords, I am obliged to the noble Lord, Lord Elton, but if I may say so with respect, it would have been better to have heard about his open mind a little later in the debate, so that those of us who are hoping against hope to influence the minds of those in a position to do something, could have had the opportunity of putting forward our views in the first place. However, that is all I want to say on that.
My Lords, no matter what is said against it, I shall support the Second Reading of this Bill on the well-established practice in your Lordships' House of supporting the Second Reading of a Bill one does not wholly agree with. This seems to be the form in your Lordships' House. One can come to the practical details of a Bill after the principle has been accepted. In any case, I think it is desirable for this House to register a positive view on this aspect of the

1735
matter, and the only way of doing so is to give this Bill a Second Reading.
As has already been explained, this Bill takes certain experiments and procedures out of the cover and the licence of the Cruelty to Animals Act 1876. If they are taken out of the disciplines and conditions of that Act, where do they go? As I understand it, they would then be matters to be dealt with in the normal courts of law relating to cruelty to animals, which presumably would be under the Protection of Animals Act 1911. I am not at all sure that that would be satisfactory. I would wish to see this sector of experimentation on living animals taken out of the 1876 Act but put under new disciplines, or alternatively, the 1876 Act amended or enlarged to put this sector of experiments under new controls and disciplines. Surely by now we are willing to accept that much that is done in the field of cosmetics, toiletries and substances in efficacy testing and quality testing does not really come within Section 3 of the 1876 Act.
My Lords, the 1876 Act has been quoted frequently, yet since it is the text under which the whole debate is to take place, it is worth while reminding your Lordships that Section 3 of the 1876 Act provides that:
" … certain restrictions are imposed by this Act with respect to the performance on any living animal of an experiment calculated to give pain, that is to say, an experiment must be performed with a view to the advancement by new discovery of physiological knowledge or knowledge which will be useful … for saving or prolonging life or alleviating suffering …".
Many sins have been committed against animals under the provisions of that section of the Act of 1876. It has been said more than once that in the whole century of the operation of this Act, there has never been any test of that construction of words taken to a court of law. No judge has ever had to construe those words, because no case has ever gone to the courts for that to be done. Under this Act, one cannot take proceedings against another person who is undertaking research, except by permission of the Secretary of State. He has not permitted any prosecution, so far as I can trace, to be taken against a person licensed under the 1876 Act.
I do not mention that as a reproach, but state it as a fact because it has been
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believed by successive Secretaries of State that other disciplines can be imposed on those who operate under this Act, which probably would be more effective than taking proceedings. Licences can be withdrawn, and licences have been withdrawn. But the fact remains that if this goes on—and many of us object deeply —under the cover of what I believe to be a misconstruction of the terms of the Act, then there is only one course of action left; that is, to proceed against the Home Secretary. Many of us would be reluctant to make this a conflict between the citizen and the Minister, and I am not uttering any threats in this connection at all. I am merely indicating that, short of that kind of proceeding against the Home Secretary, there is no means by which we can seek reforms within the machinery of the 1876 Act, and we are feeling rather helpless in connection with it.
We know that the Home Secretary has granted licences and certificates for many of these experiments to be conducted, although, on the construction of the Act, I think some doubt could be held as to whether they were within the terms of the Act. We also know that under various Acts of Parliament some substances have to be tested by law. One is the Therapeutic Substances Act 1956, and another the Medicines Act 1968. But only if therapeutic or medicinal qualities are claimed for a substance is mandatory testing required, and then we come to this problem of definition.
I agree with my noble friend Lord Harris that an Act of Parliament must be precise, and I doubt whether the definition in this Bill is precise enough. I do not, however, accept the conventional argument that is put forward ad nauseam in Ministerial letters, that it is impossible to distinguish between a cosmetic and a therapeutic substance. The law has to attempt very difficult definitions in many different circumstances. Consider, for example, the definitions under purchase tax; consider definitions under selective employment tax, value-added tax, and, let me say definitions under the Medicines Act 1968.
Under the Medicines (Exemption from Licences) Food and Cosmetic Order 1971, foods and cosmetics not used wholly or mainly for medicinal purposes are exempted from the Act, and therefore

1737
manufacturers of exempted products are under no statutory obligation to test products on animals. So there you have a definition to start with. That is, in a sense, a negative definition. If one is looking for a positive definition then I believe that the Department of Health and Social Security has had a shot at this, as follows:
"' Cosmetic' means any substance or preparation intended to be applied to the various surfaces of the human body including epidermis, pilary system, and hair, lips and external genital organs, or the teeth and buccal mucosa wholly or mainly for the purpose of perfuming them, cleansing them, protecting them, caring for them or keeping them in condition, modifying their appearance (whether for aesthetic purposes or otherwise, or combating body odours or normal body perspiration."
That is a fuller definition of "cosmetic" than appears in my noble friend's Bill, but it is an official one. It is not an amateurish effort to define a cosmetic.
There is, in addition, the fact that cosmetics, as defined, are not exempted from the requirements of the Act if curative or remedial claims in relation to a disease are made. This has a bearing on what was said by the noble Lord, Lord Elton, namely, "How do you distinguish between a shampoo which is a cleanser, and a shampoo which is a dandruff cure or preventative? "This all goes into the detail, and this definition says:
" Cosmetics, as defined, are not exempted from the requirements of the Act if curative or remedial claims in relation to a disease are made, or if they contain any antibiotics or proportionately more than 0·004 per cent. of any hormone, or more than 1 per cent. of resoroinol."
Yet my brief—and I do not despise briefs; it depends where they come from and whether you like the look of them—goes on to say:
" The Home Office are totally unable and unwilling to distinguish between cosmetics and therapeutic substances."
In the light of what I have just read out, I am surprised that they are in such difficulty. They are not in difficulty when it comes to taxation, and other legislation, where they are required to have a definition so that a distinction may be made between one thing and another.
Nevertheless, we can leave the question of mandatory testing for the moment, and perhaps leave the definition of a cosmetic
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for the moment, because I think, being realists, we will agree that for his own sake, as well as that of the public, the wise merchant tests his wares as carefully as possible. He is open to civil action for damages if he places on sale a substance which causes harm to people, and as a result of some alleged negligence on his part he may inflict harm on someone who could claim compensation. But the question before the House this morning is not whether these substances should be tested, but how they should be tested; on what and on whom they should be tested.
It is gratifying to hear from various cosmetic manufacturers that increasingly they are turning away from testing their products on live animals, and are content to do it on human beings who volunteer in their laboratories for the purpose. This is a welcome sign. I mentioned in my speech to this House on 14th May that some manufacturers of cosmetics, well known brands and names in this country, would dispense with animals altogether were it not for the requirement in other countries, particularly the United States, who require certificates of testing on animals for various products before they will accept them as imports into their country. I mentioned that probably this is a question for consideration between Governments. In the American market alone it is said that 100 new substances, cosmetic products, are marketed every week.
Here I want to refer to the commercial aspect of this matter. There may be some substances which go in compounds, or in formulae, which have basic qualities or dangers. They may have elements of toxicity which will show themselves in whatever form, and in whatever compound, they are put. After all this time it should surely be known what are the danger substances, and what are not. Messrs. Boots, who manufacture very large quantities of cosmetics, have said that there is really nothing new in the basic substances of cosmetics used for human adornment, and so on, and that it is only a matter of the way in which they are put together and the qualities claimed for them when that is done.
I complain bitterly that there is no discipline here over what people are doing, and each firm pursues its own research. One finds this in the most

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obvious way in connection with the testing of tobacco which is going on at the present time. There is not one place or one agreed basis on which the tests should be done; they all want to have their own because they all want to come out in front. Gallahers and the Imperial Tobacco Group have their own separate researches going on in separate establishments on separate fees paid to separate commercial research stations.
All this is being duplicated so much because of the commercial and competitive element in what these companies are doing and your Lordships can imagine how one of these enormously rich tobacco groups wishes one day to be able to say, "We have the answer. We are in front," and this is sheer commercial competition. But on such a grave matter as an addiction, which is killing so many thousands of people every year in this country, one would have thought that central discipline, Government control, over research should be undertaken so that the whole community knows what is happening and work may be undertaken on behalf of the whole community and not get mixed up with competitive enterprise.
I do not want to dwell on this for too long, but one must consider the commercial nature of the research stations, which are growing in number and size. There is one research station I know of which has a turnover of about £3 million a year. It has a board of directors, the chairman of which gets £15,500 a year, and five other directors get £10,000 a year. They employ 900 people, and while it is an English company it is American-owned. This example can be repeated a number of times. I am going into this most carefully to see who is involved, who is running these organisations, and who is profiting by them, and I am sure that it will be interesting to see the results.
It is repugnant that these experiments should be conducted on living animals in the name of research, in the name of experiment, in the name of the discovery of new physiological knowledge and wholly for commercial purposes. When I see a letter from the Home Office on this subject I learn that this research is being undertaken" to meet a public demand "and to" contribute to a public benefit ". Bear in mind, my Lords, that a great deal of this public demand is
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generated by promotional, advertising and the other means which are adopted by the advertisers and promoters of commercial products. They wish to create the demand, and when they have created it they then wish to experiment more and more on animals in order to bring out more substances for this kind of commercial enterprise. I am not deriding this. I am simply saying that I do not think we are morally justified in putting so many animals through so much agony, or at least discomfort, for the purpose of human pride or consumer expenditure
I will not weary the House by detailing the enormous amount of material that is available in the several fields of toxicity testing. There is oral toxicity, skin irritancy, skin sensitisation, eye irritancy and inhalation toxicity of aerosols. Are we not moved by the fact that some animals are obliged compulsorily for periods on end to inhale hairspr y. and the Americans, we now learn, are about to ban the aerosol? Yet this is used in our laboratories. Eye irritation is a particularly distasteful form of experiment. I have particulars with me of mice which are fed with sucrose-rich powdered diets which tend to induce dental caries. These are Beecham's tests. The test toothpaste is brushed on to the animals' teeth. The brushing procedure consists of gently rotating a cotton bud coated with toothpaste in the animals' mouths. The animals are held in the hand during brushing, which takes three or four seconds, and this is repeated daily, and after three weeks on test the animals are killed with Co2 and small caries are detected microscopically.
I am told that the caries are not large enough "to cause any discomfort "to the living animal, and I gather that toothpastes are tested on human teeth but that the results are not as satisfactory as using live animals before an expensive clinical trial. Rats are injected with pilocarpine, a sweat-inducing compound, and beads of sweat are visualised under the microscope. To test the efficiency of antiperspirants, rats under nembutal anaesthesia are coated with a test anti-perspirant on one hind foot three, five and 24 hours after treatment. The rats are injected with pilocarpine and observed, and the difference in the mean sweating time between treated and untreated hind feet

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is measured to gather the antiperspirant efficiency. One could go on giving other examples.
I have occupied a much longer period that is justified, my Lords, and I now come to my own practical approach to this matter. I do not believe that this range of so-called experiments outside therapeutic and medicinal substances comes within the provisions of the 1876 Act. I do not think that they should be cast out of the 1876 Act, and left to find their own destination. I can think of many new problems which would arise if the disciplines of the 1876 Act were entirely removed.
A new approach should be made to this question within or outside the 1876 Act. These experiments are growing all the time. Noble Lords must realise that we will never be finished with these experiments, because even when substances have been tested and tested, they are still put down the throats of animals or are injected into their stomachs to prove efficacy or quality. It is a continuing process and the millions of animals used for this purpose will continue to be so used. What is needed is a reappraisal of what is happening here. How much of it is really necessary? How much of it can be co-ordinated? How much of it can be taken out of the field of commercial and competitive enterprise? I do not think that animals should be subjected to this treatment for the purpose of commercial profit. I recognise that substances will be manufactured for profit, but I do not agree that new substances should be invented, promoted and advertised for human consumption in the knowledge that they can go on being tested on animals until the end of time. Therefore a reappraisal of this activity is now overdue.
A few minutes ago the right reverend Prelate said that when people were asked in the street whether they were in favour of using animals for the testing of cosmetics, 73 per cent. said, "No ". Probably they do not fully realise how right they are. There is a feeling of increasing disquiet which we are entitled to have investigated. It is suggested that there may be difficulties in having fresh legislation. All Governments have very crowded legislative programmes, and
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many Governments wish to leave these difficult and delicate matters to Private Member's Bills, because they do not have the courage to promote such legislation themselves. They also know that it is much easier to knock down the inadequate drafting or the unsatisfactory content in a Private Member's Bill, as they have done this morning, rather than produce one themselves. They will say that a Private Member's Bill is badly drafted, that it does not do this, hut does that, and that it leaves out something else. It is as easy as anything to criticise Bills of this kind.
Therefore, if there is difficulty about getting legislation, can we not have the advisory committee more fully utilised than it is at present? It is within the province of the Home Secretary; he does not need an Act of Parliament to do this. He has enlarged the membership of the advisory committee and he has referred more matters to it. But he could refer many more, and he could reconstitute it and give it a properly serviced secretariat. He could provide expert assessors, and he could make the advisory committee a valuable instrument of advice to him in guiding his own actions under the 1876 Act. That is something which we can at least press upon the Home Secretary. In the meantime, the message I want to convey is in the Bill and I shall vote for it.
12.53 p.m.
Viscount MASSEREENE and FERRARD: My Lords. I heartily support everything said by the noble Lord who has just sat down. I also support the right reverend Prelate who spoke before him and I congratulate the noble Baroness, Lady Phillips, in being so courageous as to introduce this Bill. As the noble Lord, Lord Houghton of Sowerby, said, very great commercial interests are involved in this matter. I understand that the cosmetic trade in this country amounts to an annual income of about £300 million, which is no small sum. I repeat the question posed by the noble Lord. Lord Houghton: are we really morally justified in allowing upwards of, I understand. 1 million animals to suffer pain, distress and death in order to support the cosmetic market in this country? My noble friend Lord Elton has had to leave the Chamber. He told

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me that he would have to leave, and I quite understand that. He said that he thought the noble Baroness was wrong in trying to amend the law piecemeal. But if the noble Baroness had to include in her Bill all the medical and non-medical experiments carried out on animals, I suppose it could take 30, 40 or perhaps even 50 years before such experiments were done away with. Mention has also been made this morning of tissue culture, and that will grow and grow. I have no doubt that one day—it is probably a long time ahead—vivisection carried out for medical purposes may be done away with.
My Lords, I agree with the noble Lord, Lord Houghton, that it is nonsense on the part of the Home Office to say that you cannot define medical and non-medical experiments. The noble Baroness has been very mild in her approach to this matter. She has not included, for instance, floor polishes, detergents, weed killers, and many other non-medical substances, such as food dyes, et cetera. I understand that of all the experiments carried out on animals two-thirds are non-medical. That involves a great number of animals—I understand between 6 million and 7 million yearly. Such experiments are helping to create a market for cosmetics. The noble Lord, Lord Houghton, said that every week 100 cosmetic preparations come on to the market in this country. Of course they are not all manufactured in this country; some are imported, no doubt from America. But this trade is to satisfy, I believe, 21 million female customers. There is also the question of cosmetics for men. I understand that here there is a growing market in such things as aftershave lotions and other preparations. I do not use such preparations personally, apart perhaps from a little something sometimes to keep my hair in place when I am in your Lordships' House; although I do not know whether my hair is in place at the moment. I am told that cosmetics for men is a rapidly growing market.
Government bodies have admitted that many animals are force-fed with these cosmetic preparations. What I object to—and I have raised this in previous debates—is the test which goes under the scientific term LD 50, which stands for lethal dose, with 50 per cent, of the
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animals killed within 14 days. I cannot understand why, if one wishes to test the toxicity of a cosmetic, one has eventually to give such a big dose that the animal is killed. Surely all that is required is an adverse effect. I cannot understand why an animal has to be forcibly fed until either it is killed or, if it survives, suffers great pain and then is presumably killed in any case by other means.
Another nasty aspect is that during these test animals are subjected to other unpleasant tests relating to their blood, their brain fluid and other similar matters. The only objects that I can see, of forcibly feeding animals with these substances to ensure that they will die, is to discover how much of these substances is required to commit suicide. But if one is intent on committing suicide, then one can do so by drinking enough of almost anything. One can commit suicide in many ways. If one drinks enough whisky one can presumably commit suicide by getting alcholic poisoning. I think that there is some illogicality here.
It was the noble Lord, Lord Harris, who said that for cosmetics it is absolutely essential to experiment on animals. I agree that what I am about to say has nothing to do with cosmetics, but thalidomide proved to be perfectly safe with animals, but we all know what happened when it was applied to human beings. We have cases of vice versa reaction. Take insulin and cortisone. When applied to animals they resulted in various deformities, but they appear to be safe in human beings. Therefore, the noble Lord's argument is not 100 per cent. Animals are not always a valid test. I can give plenty of examples. When we come to testing cosmetics in the eyes of animals—cosmetics such as shampoos, mascara and things like that—the Huntingdon Research Centre tried 10 different shampoos and instilled them into rabbit's eyes. One of these shampoos caused some of the rabbits to scream, but they all had convulsions. The interesting point is that they then tried a strong soap solution which was painful to human eyes, but apparently when applied to rabbits' eyes it had a mild effect. Therefore, again, it does not appear that these tests on animals are 100 per cent. accurate when applied to human beings.
I think that rather explodes the brief of the noble Lord, Lord Harris, on this

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subject. I have not had the advantage of any brief, but I should just like to point that out. There are also, of course, very great differences between the various species of animals, and the reactions to tests of various individuals of any species also differ. The noble Lord, Lord Houghton, touched on this point. I believe it is a fact that, on the whole, the manufacturers are not so concerned on the scientific validity of experiments, but are far more concerned with the legal aspect. In other words, they are really concerned, should one of their products damage a human being, to be able to say, "We tried this out on thousands of animals in our laboratories, where it was thought to be quite safe ". We cannot blame the scientists in regard to non-medical cosmetics. If we are to blame anyone, then I think it must be the manufacturers of these products, because I believe the noble Lord also mentioned that there are now alternatives. I understand that there are quite safe methods for testing skin lotions on humans.
I should like also to refer to the recommendations of the Littlewood Report. I have raised this matter in your Lordships' House on countless occasions. Why have the Government done nothing about this Report? It is really quite extraordinary. This excellent Report, produced in 1965, contained 83 recommendations, 40 of which could be implemented and two of which have been implemented—or so the noble Lord, Lord Elton, said. Here we have an extraordinary position. We have the Government giving time for a Hare Coursing Bill which will preserve the life—for a short time perhaps—of 2,000 or 3,000 hares who will probably end up suffering a far worse death from gunshot wounds or snares, while the Government will not have a Bill to save the suffering of a million or more animals. It does not seem logical and I cannot understand their attitude.
My Lords, I should like to say a lot more but I shall not do so because I know that some noble Lords would like to go to lunch. But I should remind noble Lords that we ourselves are mammals, we are human animals, and some of us to a great extent—it depends on our experience of animals and our attitude towards them—may regard an animal just
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as we would regard a motor bicycle. But the noble Lord, Lord Elton—I think it was—stated what appeared to be a matter of fact about pain in animals, and about how much pain they feel, but it can only be an assumption. All I know is that the other day a dog of mine had to have his foot operated on, because he had wrenched a claw out of his toe. When I took him back to have the dressing off, he got to within 200 or 300 yards of the vet's house and started to whine and cry. It may be that he is a particularly sensitive dog, but from my experience of animals they can feel pain every bit as much as we can. Therefore, I will end by saying that though we claim to be the most civilised of the mammals,think that our treatment of animals leaves a great deal to be desired. So I heartily support the Bill of the noble Baroness, as I trust will your Lordships, and I hope that you will give it a Second Reading.
1.9 p.m.
The Earl of HALSBURY: My Lords, I am certainly not going to call the noble Baroness either a crank or a fanatic in a good cause, because it is a good cause. I am certain that my feelings about her attitude are the same as everybody else's. She is a good-hearted, kind-hearted Baroness and would like to see the lot of animals improved—and so would I; and so, too, would the noble Lord, Lord Houghton of Sowerby. But I have to reconcile some very real responsibilities in this matter—responsibilities which your Lordships share only at second-hand through legislation—by being responsible for these (shall I say?) sacrifices of 150,000 animals every year in the Institute of Cancer Research, which is a post-graduate teaching school at London University. You have to reconcile that with the fact that, as a matter of conscience, I will not eat pâté de foie gras because I am certain it inflicts unnecessary suffering on the goose. Having attended City dinners, I have a fellow feeling for it. I cannot commend the Bill because it is in danger of emptying the medical baby out with the cosmetic bathwater—whether bubble or otherwise, does not matter—and I will give my reasons for that later.
May I say I much regret having been unable to be present at the earlier Motion for Papers moved by the noble Lord,

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Lord Houghton of Sowerby. I studied it in detail in Hansard and tried to extract one or two themes from it which are relevant to our business today. There seems to be a climate of opinion developing which I feel I must challenge. One such opinion is that you may not employ animals for experimental purposes unless the results are of scientific value. I do not think the discovery that vinyl chloride monomer is carcinogenic is of great scientific value. Scientifically, it only adds one to an overlong list of carcinogens whose modus operandi we do not understand. But it is of tremendous social value when you think that workers are using vinyl chloride monomer in the course of making polyvinyl chloride plastic. So the fact that the result is not of scientific importance does not mean that it is not if importance generally.
The other trend I detect in the climate of opinion is that animals should not be used for frivolous purposes. I agree with that, if we can agree on what the frivolous purpose is. Two qualifications must be borne in mind: the purpose may be frivolous in some respects, but not in all. The noble Lord, Lord Harris of Greenwich, gave a very good example of the difference between vanity, wishing to beautify one's appearance, and the relief from mental suffering through having had one's appearance marred by disfigurement. He did not enlarge on this, though he might have done so, and I am going to do so. Scar tissue is at best a substitute for normal tissue, and it is more than normally liable to develop into a tumorous condition. It is more sensitive than ordinary tissue to carcinogens. The effect of this Bill if it became law in its present form is simply that if one of my colleagues at the Institute of Cancer Research suspected a cosmetic had a carcinogen in it, we would not be able to find out about it because we would not be allowed to carry out an experiment on an animal with a cosmetic. That would be terribly limiting. That is the main reason that I cannot support the way the noble Baroness has embodied her good intentions in the Bill.
As an example of a process being not always avoidable, if you dig down deep enough you will find at the levels of pre-Dynastic Egypt, 6,000 years ago carved slate pallets on which the beauties of those days mixed their powdered malachite and
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unguents in order to put green shading on the upper eyelids. A habit which has been going on for 6,000 years will not be dropped lightly. I shall not go into the question of whether women should or should not wear makeup. I have heard the matter argued in more than one way—Women's Lib takes a rather different view of the matter from Elizabeth Arden. The animal ethologists say that women wear adornments not to attract men but to intimidate other women. I shall not go into this argument either. All I am concerned with is that if the daughters of Eve have cosmetics on their dressing tables, then her granddaughters under the age of reason are liable to eat them, and we must know what is in these materials.
I would infinitely prefer legislation to require cosmetic manufacturers—I do not know whether they are under the same obligation as pharmaceutical houses—to declare the composition of their materials. I am not the least complacent or pleased at the current state of affairs in the cosmetic field, but I do not believe the proposed cure of the noble Baroness is the right one. On the moral issues raised by the noble Lord, Lord Houghton of Sowerby, I am very much with the noble Lord, Lord Elton, and I am not entirely in accord with the right reverend Prelate. I do not think here we have a choice between what is good and what is bad. We have a conflict of duties: our duty to animals and our duty to fellow human beings. We have made the Home Secretary the keeper of our conscience in this matter, so that what is permissible and what is not permissible is never in the hands of a self-interested party. That is the thought behind the act.
We are all a little uneasy that the keeper of our conscience is not responding as he should to some of the problems which have arisen in recent years. We have had our feelings harrowed by the noble Lord, Lord Houghton, about pilocarpine being put on the feet of rats. But I must tell your Lordships that I have been on a course of pilocarpine eyedrops to relieve a little tension in one of my eyeballs and, so far as I am concerned, what is good enough for my eyes is good enough for a rat's foot. I am not going to have my feelings harrowed by that example. This is an emotive subject, where you can easily

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have your feelings harrowed. I am not happy about some of the experiments which involve tumbling rats in a cage in order to bring out stress syndromes. One of the cruelist things you can do to a mouse is to keep it in solitary confinement. Mice need other mice. This is one curious paradox. Animal lovers, a little boy with a pet mouse, subject it to great hardship by depriving it of the company of other mice. As Bertrand Russell once said, our lives should be inspired by love and guided by knowledge, and we need both if we are going to look after animals properly.
I want to see more protection for animals, not necessarily this kind of protection. I want to see a tougher Home Secretary, who, frankly, takes more interest in using his powers to see that objectionable experiments are if necessary mitigated. We have heard about animals having drops of detergent or shampoo poured in their eyes. If that is to be done to find out whether the contents of the drops have permanent influence, there is no reason why a local anaesthetic should not be added. It is up to the Home Secretary to say, "I am not going to give you a licence to do this unless you mix the material with an anaesthetic so the animal does not suffer ". This means taking more trouble over the job.
The answer is not another Act of Parliament, but more Parliamentary pressure on the Home Office. I believe with our present legislation we can do a lot. I agree with the noble Lord, Lord Elton, that we do not want piecemeal handling of this subject. I want to see the whole matter properly treated. The Cruelty to Animals Act is nearly 100 years old—in fact even the spelling of "curare" has changed since the Act was drafted. Nobody had any idea in those days that the secondmost intelligent animal on the planet is probably the dolphin. The dolphins which your Lordships may be entertained by in a dolphinarium are not the common dolphin of the Mediterranean and general areas, for they do not survive the nervous shock of capture. The dolphins in a dolphinarium are from the Caribbean. Their natural life span is twenty-five years. That is shortened in a dolphinarium to five years because the dolphins are subjected to the pulmonary disorders to which we are subject, against
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which it has no immune system whatsoever. I want to see a lot more done on those lines. The special protection we afford to horses, sheep, goats, dogs and cats ought to be taken off the basis of sentimentality and put on the basis of science; the science of the nervous system: how nervously developed are these animals?
The Home Secretary ought to have the initial list scheduled and ought to have the power to add to it, in terms of new scientific knowledge, and so on. Everything is pinned round the concept of the vertebrate, but in fact since the Act was drafted we have learned that the higher invertebrates, the higher molluscs, the octopuses, and so on, are highly intelligent, with highly developed nervous systems—intelligent enough to recognise the letters of the alphabet. This argues a highly-developed nervous system.
Of course, to some extent, common sense must be brought into the argument. For instance when you are testing something for safety, you do not test arsenic or cyanide of potassium for safety: you know they are deadly poisons. You test for safety on the presumption that what you test is safe, because these tests cost a lot of money. So, if it is safe, as you hope, nothing very much happens. I quite agree with the noble Viscount, Lord Massereene and Ferrard, about the unnecessary provision of the LD 50s on things like cold cream, and so on. I believe this to be quite unnecessary. This, again, is a matter of consumer protection which has to be worked out. But what is the largest dose of cold cream that a child is likely to swallow from its mother's dressing table as a percentage of its own body weight? If you gave that much to a mouse or rat, varying it over the species, and the animal survived, I should have thought you knew as much as you needed to know about the lethal characteristics of cold cream.
However, I must come back to this danger of carcinogenesis. It is part of the essence of things like lipsticks that they are used continuously and regularly, and it is of the essence of carcinogenic materials that it is their regular application which causes a tumour, or what we call cancer, to originate. The freedom of the scientist to test anything that is to come into regular contact with the human skin must be maintained. When we come

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to the question of alternatives, I can only repeat what I have said many times before in your Lordships' House. Alternatives are cheaper and more reliable than the use of animals. The only limitation on the use of alternatives is where the animal is absolutely essential—because, as I think somebody once said, "There is no such thing as a pregnant test-tube." If you want to find out whether a chemical substance is teretogenic, you have to make your test on a pregnant animal—a primate—as closely allied to our species as possible. The terrible thalidomide tragedy was due to the fact that the concept of a non-toxic teratogen—all known teratogens were toxic—was just unimaginable: it was not believed that it could be thalidomide for a long time, for that reason. But now we know this can happen, everything has to be tested and we are demanding, as the noble Lord, Lord Harris, said, more and more of this.
I see that the noble Lord is back again in his place, and I shall now wind up my speech by saying that I do not think either of the two Parties who face each other across this House have shouldered their responsibilities in this matter. The noble Lord, Lord Houghton, said that they were scared, and I think he hit quite close to the gold. This is an emotional subject and nobody, of whatever political complexion, likes applying the Whips on such subjects. For instance, hanging was left to a free vote of the House. A Department with responsibility for implementing an Act is scared of having that Act mutilated in Committee by enthusiasts and then having the responsibility for administering it afterwards. So it does not want to apply the Whips yet it is scared of the consequences if it does not; and so it does nothing. That is why nothing has happened about the Littlewood Report for 10 years. I charge both Parties equally over this omission. They have funked instead of confronted the obviously awkward issues involved if we are to bring up to date our legislation for what I regard as our trusteeship over the animal kingdom.
Lord PLATT: My Lords, may I just ask the noble Earl, whose speech I very much enjoyed, one factual question? He said that a great deal had to be done and then, almost in the same sentence, said:" it does not need legislation ". I think he meant that it does mean legislation on
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a big scale—a new Act—but not legislation on a piecemeal scale. Am I right in that?
The Earl of HALSBURY: The noble Lord is absolutely right.
1.26 p.m.
Lord BURNTWOOD: My Lords, the first part of the Bill does in fact rise against the trend of legislation on the Continent. That in itself is no bad thing because this country has always led the world in legislation, in effect providing the world with an example of the way to go about things and of the way in which we should progress. But the tendency on the Continent is to emphasise the consumer. When we boil things down to their elementals, the consumer is the child. Last year an enormous number of children were the subject of inquiries to doctors, and we feel that doctors themselves need guidance in order to help their patients and those in charge of patients. In America, far from limiting the pre-marketing testing of products, they are increasing testing legislation: so this Bill goes a long way towards reversing what the rest of the world is doing. I do not take the view that other countries—and I am talking chiefly of Continental countries—are more backward than we are in protecting animals, but at the same time we in this country are of a character which needs support from the world and should take into account what the world is thinking. The limitation of experiments on animals may mean an increase in danger to children. Indeed, were we in a better position to protect children regarding drugs which are kept in too many bathrooms, it would be a good thing; but we know that there are many dangerous drugs readily available in homes for children to absorb, and attempts are made from time to time to protect children.
We have here a Bill which is aimed at the very reverse: at least that will be its effect, it seems to me. I view the efforts of the noble Baroness as entirely praiseworthy. She has advanced her case in a modest way, but at the same time surely we should take into account the effect it may have if there is no possible replacement for animal testing, which is attacked by this Bill. Only a woman could move such a Bill, for the simple reason that, by and large, the cosmetic

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trade is largely, if not exclusively these days, one which is of interest to women. Therefore, for a man to attack cosmetics would be self-defeating.
We in this line of country recognise that, whereas the word "manufacture" does not appear in the 1876 Act or the present Bill, nevertheless by implication manufacture is safeguarded and workers are themselves subject to and protected by existing legislation. We are also concerned with the fact that we want to eliminate risk so far as possible. The noble Lord, Lord Houghton of Sowerby, in an admirable speech, largely devoted to a criticism of the interventions at an early stage of both Front Benches, fell into a trap in the sense that he discussed danger but ignored the risk which we aim to eliminate from our lives. If we are to eliminate risk, we must find a replacement of the present system of animal experimentation. Nevertheless, in the present state of science, surely it is fair to assume that we cannot be sure on purely scientific experimentation of products. If we could eliminate animal testing in this way, so much the better, but we cannot.
If the public at large were not so gullible as they are; if people read the caveats on bottles and containers, we should feel happier, but we know that they do not. If for example, a child was capable of seeing the warning caveats on bottles, much of our anxieties would cease, but they cannot. As a result, testing has to be done before a product reaches consumer level. We therefore take the view, those of us who are in support of the noble Baroness in her Bill, that until a replacement of animal experimentation can be found which will eliminate all chance of risk, it must remain. I have always held the view that people who are of the school of thought which denotes or suggests that the public ought to know better are wrong. The public and the child population must be protected; and for this reason I hope that the Bill will not receive its Second Reading.
1.34 p.m.
Lord BROCK: My Lords, although basically I am opposed to any important limitation other than ordinary revision of the provisions of the 1876 Act, I am nevertheless attracted at first glance by
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the proposal that experiments or observations should not be permitted for the testing of cosmetic preparations. I acknowledge the desirable motives that have impelled the noble Baroness to introduce this Bill. I repeat that my own first reaction is towards supporting the Bill because, while animal experimentation employed to lessen human suffering and to advance and extend enjoyment of life and living is acceptable, the use of the law to permit the testing and preparation of cosmetics on the face of it seems unacceptable. This first simple reaction to the problem must affect many people in like manner, and reasonably so. But it is clearly necessary to examine the matter more carefully and to try to ascertain all the facts involved in the Bill, and whether what seems to be a commendable piece of legislation is in fact more complicated and could give rise to an undesirable situation or situations—in fact, whether it is as simple as it appears at first sight. I fear it has certain inherent drawbacks and disadvantages that could give rise to trouble that make it not desirable that it should be enacted.
The first point is that the animal tests of cosmetic substances there can be no from and additional to the 1876 Act, and they spring from later Acts of Parliament that command that certain tests must be done with the sole object of protecting the public. The legislation to effect this is not contained in the 1876 Act but involves later Acts. The requirements under these Acts are strict and precise and arise from the wisdom of Parliament, and that quite recently. We have a generalisation that the experiments, the tests laid down by Parliament, have no medical purposes, and the bedrock of this Bill is the implication that in dealing with cosmetic substances there can be no medical purpose. It is even maintained, and of course repeated in this House this morning, that only one out of three tests used and demanded on animals has any medical purpose, and that the others should be excluded as being non-medical tests. This could be a simple way out of the difficulty if it were feasible. But it cannot be substantiated, because it is difficult to define what is a medical and what a non-medical preparation.
It is surely certain that substances should be tested for any toxic effect they

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may have. It is essential for the protection of the user and of the public in general that any toxic effect should be known. Indeed, if there were no such control, no such protection and no tests to show how toxic or other harmful effects could be recognised and prevented, then there would be a violent public protest and public outcry. It is also important to know what harm can be caused by the misuse of cosmetic substances all of which, for example, seem to exercise a special attraction to children. It is not a sole question of protection of the users of cosmetics, but of the protection of others who use the products casually or inadvertently.
For example, each year produces a large number of calls on the National Poison Information Service, which was established in 1963 as part of the National Health Service. Doctors and others ring up for information on the possible ill-effects on little Tommy or little Mary, who has either used one of mummy's beauty preparations or even swallowed it when this was not intended. The Service can supply information about the poisonous or non-poisonous nature of the substance and what treatment, if any, is required. It has full records it can draw upon for this information. Several noble Lords have emphasised that in the first year of its existence it dealt with 2,000 calls, and by 1974 it was dealing with 20,000, two-thirds from incidents with children, and about 800 of these referred to cosmetics. Although this subject has been mentioned several times in the House today, I have no reticence in re-emphasising it because this Service and its experience are of such importance.
Baroness PHILLIPS: My Lords, would the noble Lord forgive me for interrupting him? But he is such a distinguished expert and this point is very important. Many noble Lords have mentioned this particular Service. What they have not made clear is what kind of test is involved to get the piece of information just mentioned to be given to a doctor when a product contains poisonous substances. Is it necessary to have a test on an animal to determine that piece of information?
Lord BROCK: My Lords, I do not see how we are going to get the information fully and completely unless some
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tests have been made as to the toxic or poisonous nature of the substance.
There is great difficulty also in defining what is a cosmetic. It is in fact almost impossible to define it, and I doubt whether the definition proposed in Clause 1(2) would stand up to searching legal inquiry. It is superficially complete and an apparently successful definition, but it would not stand up to aggressive analysis. Many cosmetic substances are the basis of some kind of medical treatment. For example, many creams for the treatment of skin disorders also serve as the basis of cosmetic substances. Is it suggested that these should not be tested for any harmful effect that they may have? Even toothpaste may be classified as a cosmetic.
In addition to the accidental use or ingestion of cosmetics by small children, there exist other dangers from their use—especially from the repeated use of various cosmetics—such as irritation, the production of allergies and even the development of cancer. Precautions must be taken against these by the use of appropriate tests. If such testing were prohibited by law there would be a violent public outcry that no reasonable and proper precautions were being taken to protect the public from harmful substances.
As has already been mentioned by several noble Lords, it must also be remembered that for British goods to be exported to Europe, research and testing must continue if they are to be acceptable as approved substances. Without this testing they will not be allowed in. Other countries still have laws and regulations which are designed to give their public a degree of protection from harmful substances, and they will not allow the import of substances from Britain and elsewhere that have not been tested. In effect therefore, although at first sight this Bill appears to be acceptable and deserving of support, the true situation is very different. It could be a danger to health, and I maintain that it should not receive support.
1.42 p.m.
Lord de CLIFFORD: My Lords, in rising to address your Lordship's House may I say at once that I am in full support of the Bill of the noble Baroness. Before we arrived we all knew of the showers of chilly water which would be

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poured upon it by both Front Benches and also by noble Lords who are so involved in the actual happenings. In my view, that does not make the introduction of this Bill by the noble Baroness any less praiseworthy, since I feel it must be acceptable. The noble Baroness has done something which many of us should do. She has drawn attention once again to the Report of the Departmental Committee on experiments on animals which has now been outstanding for ten years, although hardly a ripple of interest has been shown in it.
As I ventured to mention in your Lordships' House during the earlier debate, the noble Baroness has drawn attention to the real basis of the matter which is in paragraph 237. I quoted it there in your Lordships' House, and I shall venture to quote it again:
" Who can say whether, if certain biological tests were forbidden, satisfactory chemical or other means of testing would not be developed? Who is responsible for establishing whether modern medical techniques, with emphasis on immunology and drug therapy, both of which are inseparable from animal experimentation, are developing medical practice in the right direction? Who is to take responsibility for moral or ethical judgments on the use of animals for experimental purposes as such? "
Certain noble Lords are prepared to take this decision, but I personally would need to think long and carefully about it. The Bill of the noble Baroness poses such a question. Let us suppose that it was forbidden to make experiments. Would not the industrial concerns—which are so involved in the vast commercial activities of the preparation of cosmetics, however you define them, whether as the noble Baroness has done or in some other way—be prepared to devote some of their vast resources to producing the same product in a different way? I am quite convinced that they would.
We have spent some time discussing this Bill from all kinds of angles and I do not propose to go very much further with it, except to thank the noble Baroness for introducing this Bill. If she and a number of other noble Lords and persons in another place could continually produce Bills like this and stir up the matter, we might get some action on the 82 or 83 recommendations of this Report and it might do some good to the animals
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which in their thousands are now suffering.
1.46 p.m.
Lord PLATT: My Lords, may I add my congratulations to those of other noble Lords to the noble Baroness who has introduced this subject—and also for being able to introduce it in 11 minutes, which was most laudable. We agree on most of the premises; we are all against cruel experiments. But I think we must ask the question point blank: Do we think that cruel experiments are being carried out in the testing of cosmetics? My only answer is, Yes, I think so. If that is so, one must realise that they are being carried out under the shelter of the Act of 1876 which exists to protect persons who are conducting animal experiments. This is just another sign that that Act is out of date. It was made at a time when commercial testing was not being considered. It was a matter of experiments by scientists who were working in medical schools and so on. Therefore, somebody is giving cover to these people.
Does not this at once point to the fact that the initial licensing procedure and the certificates which are given for the performance of certain experiments are being given too freely and are not being considered by any central body which meets regularly to consider, "Do we consider that such-and-such a type of experiment should be allowed under the Act?" I was a member of the Home Office Advisory Committee for 11 years. We met only five times in those 11 years. I do not know how many million experiments were conducted during that period, but we considered 24 cases. Largely these were cases referred to us by the Inspectorate. The Inspectorate is extremely important, but it has only limited power. If a person has a licence and certificates which have been signed by a competent professor and countersigned by the head of the Royal College, he is allowed to do those experiments. The inspector may say, "I would never have allowed you to do them ", but that is not his business. He has no power to do that. What he has the power to do is to say," You are doing experiments which you are not entitled to do under the particular certificate which you hold." That would indeed be a serious matter. I think that the noble

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Lord, Lord Houghton of Sowerby, raised the point, among many others, that no case has ever reached the courts. That is because these experiments are being permitted. The people who are conducting them are not doing so against the law.
To me, therefore, the whole debate—I want to finish in a few minutes, but not just yet, on that note—shows the necessity for a new Act to replace completely the old 1876 Act, good though it was, in order to bring our thinking up to date. Above all, it requires a different kind of committee, which is prepared to sit regularly and, may I say, to be paid for it, if necessary, because the days when many wealthy people had plenty of time to spend on these matters are perhaps not over but are getting fewer and fewer. The committee must meet at regular intervals and, apart from matters referred to it, it should of its own initiative be considering all kinds of cases—how big the cages should be that the monkeys are kept in or, for that matter, beagles; should experiments be conducted for purely cosmetic purposes; can you separate cosmetics from the medicinal in every case?
These are very difficult matters. In spite of the strongly held views which have been declared in what I have been saying, the reason why I cannot give my wholehearted support to this Bill is because it involves definitions which cannot be made. It involves legislating on matters of biology, which is usually an impossible task. The only solution to questions as difficult as these—each and every case is different—is to have a regular meeting of a high-powered committee which can consider every aspect of the case on its own merits. I should hate to reject this Bill, and if it is your Lordships' wish that it goes through its Second Reading and on to the Committee stage, I should be quite happy. Nevertheless, while it is interesting legislation, it does not incorporate one-tenth or even one-hundredth of the things which I think are necessary, and I feel that I should probably abstain from voting.
I would end by pointing out to your Lordships, and above all to the Home Office, that almost every speaker was unanimous, although perhaps the intentions of the noble Lord, Lord Harris, were not quite clear, in wanting new con-
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sideration of the old 1876 Act almost certainly leading to new legislation. A Select Committee or a Royal Commission is not good enough: they would merely be delaying procedures. All the facts are known. Will the Home Office now start its new 1976 Bill to replace the 1876 Act?
1.55 p.m.
Lord DOUGLAS of BARLOCH: My Lords, I would not disagree with the noble Lord, Lord Platt, about the new legislation which he considers necessary for the proper administration of the 1876 Act. But what is contemplated by this Bill would not interfere with that in the least degree. We are considering a much more limited problem; that is, whether experiments of this kind for the purpose of testing cosmetics ought to continue. My noble friend Lord Harris of Greenwich has said that these tests are necessary in order to protect the public, particularly children. Several speakers have emphasised that. He also brought in by way of analogy the fact that testing is required in the case of food additives. I entirely disagree with these propositions. It is not necessary to have these tests in order to protect the public, because the proposition that underlies this is that manufacturers are entitled to put upon the market food additives and cosmetics as they please. If the facilities for making such tests are not available, then the manufacturers are absolved from all evil consequences which may follow. I disagree with that proposition. It is not correct.
We have no need for any more cosmetics to be put on the market. The variety which is already available is enormous, and the constituents which are already known and approved can be recombined in so many different ways, if a slight variety is required. The public will not suffer if one of the results of this Bill is that the number of cosmetics will be diminished. It is not right to suggest that people are entitled to put poisonous substances on the market without taking adequate precautions to protect the public. It is their business to take precautions. It is not the business of the State to provide them with facilities for making tests on living animals, which are intrinsically repugnant to the feelings of all thoughtful and humane people.
1.57 p.m.
Baroness PHILLIPS: My Lords, I should first like to thank all noble Lords who have participated in the debate. At certain stages I began to say a small prayer, "Who needs enemies when you have friends like some ", as noble Lords rose and gave the Bill a welcome and then proceeded to say why they did not like it. But I cordially thank all those who have given it an unreserved welcome, particularly the right reverend Prelate the Bishop of Manchester. As one who also tries to be a Christian, I thought what he said epitomised what we all thought and were talking about—the reverence for life.
The noble Lord, Lord Douglas of Barloch, has so splendidly come in with the very point with which I was going to start. I reject at once the fact that you cannot have a definition. The noble Lord, Lord Houghton of Sowerby, has today produced a splendid definition. I have had a spell in Government, as have many of your Lordships, and I know that if you want to block the passage of any Bill you have all sorts of splendid ways of doing it—by referring it to a Select Committee or a Royal Commission, or saying that it is not needed or is badly drafted. In fact, all Bills appear to be badly drafted, including those which come from the Government; otherwise, we should not need to have so many Amendments moved in the later stages. So I reject all these arguments—I have heard them all before—about ambiguity and bad draftsmanship. If the will is there, all these things can be dealt with. I have been long enough in your Lordships' House to see legislation that goes through in 24 hours when it is felt that there is a need to have it, and there is good will behind it.
I thought that noble Lords on the Front Bench had terrible briefs; there was one of the worst I have ever heard read. The noble Lord gave a very strange and confused example. I still say, in the presence of these eminent scientists, that it must be virtually impossible, by performing an experiment on an animal, to discover whether a woman using a cream will develop an allergy to it. An allergy is a very confused and mystifying subject in itself. It seems to me that you would have to perform experiments on innumerable
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animals, and at the end of the day you still would not have the answer as to whether somebody was going to develop an allergy. May I cite a personal example. I bought some ear rims, to which I was obviously allergic, but how could I claim against anybody? Could they have been put on to a little animal and tested?
The noble Earl said that he did not mind what had happened to the rats happening to him, but I can only suggest that there is one slight difference; he had a choice, the rats did not. This is partly what this sort of experiment is about. The noble Lord, Lord Houghton of Sowerby, produced excellent evidence that it is quite possible to have the regulations, to have the definition and very clearly to decide that a shampoo which is described as a "medicated shampoo" will probably—and almost certainly—be regarded as part of a medical product. I think we are making quite unnecessary difficulties.
The noble Lord, Lord Elton, seemed to me to give what I call a very reserved welcome; and I take the point made by the noble Lord, Lord Houghton, that it is unusual to have a declaration of intent from the Minister early in the progress of the Bill. Probably it has only stimulated some of us to say a little more. I thought the example given by the noble Lord, Lord Elton, of the talcum powder and the babies was not a good one, since he himself said that it was a mistake in the factory. It would have been tested much earlier, so I suggest that the mistake in the factory would not have been discovered by tests on animals. That was a mistake in the factory.
We hear so much about consumer protection and the necessity to protect the public. Is there anybody who can stand up and tell me that there has never been a case in law brought by an individual against a firm making cosmetic products? It would not be true to say that. The products have presumably been tested and I would say that the protection—and one noble Lord has made this point—is purely a legal one. If there is a case they can say that they have done all that it is possible to do and therefore they are absolved from blame.
I appreciate that this is piecemeal legislation. That is another argument which I have heard so often. But as

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was so rightly said, for 10 years nothing has been done. I know that we are in Europe and harmonisation is taking place, but may I say this to your Lordships: Time is not on the side of the little animals. While we sit here and debate and defer, the same tests continue without any real investigation. The noble Lord, Lord Platt, wants something different. May I say to him that if we accept this Bill, what he said about the Committee may well be one of its results. We can change the definitions, we can change the Title. Your Lordships know that we can change anything, except the genesis of the thought behind the Bill. I thank those who have taken part in this debate.
On Question, Bill read 2a, and committed to a Committee of the Whole House

MOBILE HOMES BILL
2.3 p.m.
Lord ELTON: My Lords, I beg to move that the House do now again resolve itself into Committee on this Bill.
Moved, that the House do again resolve itself into Committee.—(Lord Elton.)
On Question, Motion agreed to.
House in Committee accordingly.
[Lord Maybray-King in the Chair]
Clause 4 [Disputes]:
Lord AVEBURY Lord AVEBURY moved Amendment No. 14:
Page 6, line 42, at end insert—
("; and in determining the annual charge for this purpose, the court shall have regard to all the circumstances other than personal circumstances, including in particular the amenities and locality of the site, and the position on the site offered to the occupier; and for the purposes of the determination it shall be assumed that the number of persons seeking to become occupiers of mobile homes in the locality on the terms other than those relating to the annual charge is not substantially greater than the number of caravans for which residential site licences have been granted by the local authority under the Act of 1960, in respect of which agreements are available on such terms.")
The noble Lord said: I wonder whether it might be for the convenience of the Committee if we were to take with Amendment No. 14 the new clause stand-
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ing in my name as Amendment No. 18, which is concerned with the question of premiums, bearing in mind that the annual charges which are dealt with in the Amendment, and the premiums which may be levied by the site operator, are intimately connected with one another. Therefore, it might be convenient if we could discuss both at the same time.
Under subsection (3) of Clause 4, an occupier who is dissatisfied with any of the terms which have been offered to him by the owner may apply to the court to have the matter in dispute determined. It will be within the knowledge of your Lordships who concern yourselves with the problems of residents of mobile homes, that one of the most frequent causes of dispute is the amount of the charges and the increases which are imposed from time to time by the operators. Therefore, it may be expected that one of the matters coming most frequently before the courts to be determined will be the increase in charges to be levied at the time of the annual review.
Your Lordships may recall that when the Committee was discussing the question of the frequency of annual reviews—and, indeed, on Second Reading the matter also arose—I said that I did not think the mobile home residents would be disposed to argue against the case for an annual review, bearing in mind that this was connected with the aggregation of charges and the possibility that some element of it might be liable to VAT. They could see that point, but at the same time there was some anxiety about the size of the increases which might be demanded at the annual review and, if they were to be disputed, the lack of any guidance which is given to the courts under the Bill.
If I may give an illustration of what might conceivably happen—I do not suggest that it is going to happen, but it is something which may focus attention on the problem—if a certain site is full, and the site operator has a waiting list of applicants seeking to become occupiers on that site at the charges he is proposing to levy, or which he is already levying on other residents and proposes to levy on a particular occupier who is now coming up to an annual review, then the site operator could argue that he is not charging as much as the traffic could bear. We have not the faintest idea whether such

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an argument would be accepted by the courts.
I know that this has not been suggested by the site operators themselves. If one looks at the newsletter of the National Federation of Site Operators, one sees that they have proposed that any increases should keep in line with inflation, and they say that that would be preferable to the much larger increases which might take place at three-year intervals. I do not quite know what they mean by this; whether they mean that the increases should be decided by reference to some index of the cost of living as a whole, or the cost of rents or some analogous component of the cost of living index, or whether they are suggesting that we should examine individually what increases in costs have been incurred by site operators in particular.
Some of these were mentioned by the noble Lord, Lord Wakefield of Kendal, when we were discussing this subject last week. He said that increases in land costs, interest charges and so on, might be taken into account in the annual review. I am not disputing that these factors might be relevant. But the point is that the courts are not told which, if any, of the factors have been looked at and, if so, whether it is to be on an individual basis, site by site, or whether they can take some index which is to be looked at over the country as a whole.
Also, there is no mention in the Bill of the tremendous variation in amenities which occurs from one site to another, and which may be presumed to have some bearing on the level of charges which is reasonable. If a site is next to a gasworks or a sewage farm, if it is miles from the nearest public transport, would these factors have any bearing on the charge? Or is it to be assumed by the courts that Parliament did not want them to be taken into account, because there is no specific mention of them in the Bill? We all know that there is not only a great variation between one site and another so far as locality is concerned, some being immensely more preferable than others; there is also a wide variation between one site and another in terms of the amenities provided.
As the noble Lord, Lord Elton, will confirm, at the present moment many
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hundreds of sites do not conform with the model standards. On the other hand, there are sites which provide surroundings as good as those one would expect to find on a residential housing estate. I am suggesting that variations of this kind ought to be reflected in the level of charges. We should write that into the Bill. My Amendment gives the courts some guidance on these matters, and follows the general shape of the provisions of Section 46 of the Rent Act 1968, which were taken over from the 1965 Act. Instead of the formula in the 1968 Act, "the age, character and locality of the dwelling house ", we have. "the amenities and locality of the site", and the disregard of scarcity provisions in the 1968 Act. I have taken this wording, with minor necessary modifications, to fit the circumstances of a caravan site.
The only argument I could have imagined against the Amendment, until the noble Lord, Lord Melchett, was kind enough to write and disclose to me some of the thinking of the Government on it, was that the disregard of scarcity would lead to charges being lower than they would have been in the absence of such a provision, and thus to a reduction in the amount of such accommodation that would be on offer. This was certainly a point of view expressed to me by the late Lord Garnsworthy with whom I had correspondence in March 1974, when I suggested that a freeze should be imposed on the charges made for caravan sites analogous to those imposed on residential properties.
This argument implies that the site operators would continue in business only as long as they could exploit the monopoly rights they acquired through the restrictive operation of the planning laws, and the licensing requirements of the 1960 Act. What is really being said by those who use the argument is that in a free market with demand and supply in balance, the volume of accommodation being offered would be less than now with the artificial constraints of the economic process. I think that is indeed a bizarre contradiction of the case usually made out by free enterprise, and one which I do not think any reputable economists would accept. The corollary is that in the absence of any provision for disregard of scarcity, the owner of the site is able to make abnormally large profits, with

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the tacit approval of Parliament. For many years, it has been common ground between all the Parties that as long as there is not yet enough separate housing accommodation for all the families wishing to avail themselves of separate dwellings, the rule?, of the game between land-Lord and tenant should be so adjusted as to prevent exploitation. I would submit that the principle is exactly the same for the residents of mobile homes.
If I may turn now to the new clause, it deals with the widespread practice of charging premiums for the grant, continuance or renewal of a right of occupation on a caravan site. If the owner of a site is charging a fair rent and he is thereby making a reasonable profit on the operation as a whole, then there is no economic justification for allowing him to reap large additional bonus profits whenever a pitch is transferred to a new occupier or whenever agreements with the existing occupier fall to be renewed, when the sums involved are sometimes quite substantial.
To give an example, the Secretary and Solicitor of the North Devon District Council has written to me about the two cases that were reported to him where payments of £300 and £500 were demanded as a precondition of the execution of an agreement, and I think that the noble Lord, Lord Elton, would agree that those sums are not by any means unusual. The Secretary pointed out that these premiums are not a term of the agreement, and therefore they would not appear to be covered by the disputes procedure in Clause 4. It would be only too easy for unscrupulous site operators to make up for any diminution in their income from the annual charges which could arise from the determination in the courts in the case of disputes by simply increasing these premiums still further, and that is the reason why this new clause is very much connected with the Amendment which I moved earlier on.
Apart from the much greater burden that it would impose on persons seeking to become occupiers, it would have the additional effect of making a rapid turnover of occupiers even more lucrative to the site operators. The Rent Acts have contained prohibitions on premiums for many years, and they are now embodied in Section 85 of the 1968 Act. I have always argued—I know that not many
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people agree with me on this—that whatever protection is given to tenants ought to be paralleled in the legislation for mobile homes, and this is a good example; landlords are not permitted to charge key money for tenancies, and site operators should not be allowed to charge siting fees for the occupation of a pitch, because the nature of the payment and the relationship between the parties are both identical, and there is no logical reason why they should be treated differently in law.
May I just refer to some of the arguments which I think the noble Lord, Lord Melchett, may deploy and of which he has very kindly given me prior notice. He mentions the fact that, in the case law on premiums in relation to tenancies, some unexpected side effects have arisen, in that a payment bona fide made for value received may amount to a premium. He says that in the case of caravan sites if this decision of the courts were read across the site operator might be prevented from recovering reasonable expenditure which he has incurred. I take it that the noble Lord means the siting fees which are normally charged for taking a caravan on to the site and connecting it up to the services.
Obviously one does not want to leave the site operator out of pocket on such expenditure, and I should have thought that, if the principle of my Amendment were accepted, it would not be beyond the wit of the Parliamentary draftsman to take care of that minor point between now and the Report stage. More widely, the noble Lord reminds me that, despite the fact that "premium" is the word used in the 1968 Act, it was never statutorily defined, and other difficulties of interpretation, apart from the one I have mentioned, could possibly arise. It would be desirable to incorporate in this Bill a definition of the word "premium "so that we can limit it to what we know we mean; that is, key money. It is a pity that Parliament at the time of the 1968 Act, and before that in relation to furnished properties—and the word has a very long history—did not give this obviously necessary instruction to the courts.
Secondly, the noble Lord mentions the argument, to which I have already referred, that abolition of premiums could, in the short term, have an adverse

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effect on site charges. What I should like to know, in this problem, is whether the noble Lord thinks that the converse is true; that is to say, that in a dispute arising about the annual charges and any increases which the site operator demands, the courts will also take into account any premiums that may have been paid by the occupier to get on to the site in the first place. That would seem to be the corollary of the argument; that the two matters are so interconnected.
The noble Lord then mentions the point that if premiums were to be prohibited altogether—I am paraphrasing his letter—the occupier would acquire an equity in his pitch which he would be free to dispose of, and make a profit out of the operation, while the beneficiary would not be the site owner. I can see nothing wrong with a person who has lived in one place for a great many years acquiring some equity in it. To digress, one of the most harmful and divisive forces in our social life is that the tenant in rented property may live in one place for very many years yet never acquire a capital asset, whereas the owner-occupier, by paying slightly more money, finishes up with a stake in the community. Anything we can do—I know this is under discussion in relation to tenanted properties also—to heal the breach between two social classes would in my view be wholly desirable. I am in favour of the caravan dweller, the mobile home dweller, acquiring some equity in the pitch he occupies, though the beneficiary would in part be the site owner because the noble Lord may have overlooked the provision in Clause 3 under which the site operator may levy a reasonable charge on the sale price when an occupier disposes of his mobile home to an incoming resident; if he was then able to charge more than the price that excluded scarcity, then of course the site operator would get some percentage of that increased price.
The noble Lord finally says that if one of these proposals were adopted and not the other, the reaction of site owners is reasonably predictable; if rents were to exclude expressly scarcity, owners in the scarcity areas would be charging larger and larger premiums. I agree with that and I hope the House will think that
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both Amendments are equally acceptable. However, perhaps I should mention one other factor, and that is the review which was initiated by Mr. Gerald Kaufman in the Department of the Environment and which is now continuing under the leadership of Mr. McCreadie of that Department. I realise that there are many and complex issues that have to be considered by the Government before they can say, "Here is definitive legislation to regulate the situation as between residents of mobile homes and the operators of sites ", but I am afraid that if we do not take this opportunity of dealing with the regulation of charges and the imposition of premiums, we will have a period of many years before another opportunity is given to Parliament to come back to the subject.
When I introduced the 1968 Act in another place, both Mr. James McColl and Mr. Arthur Skeffington, who alas! are now dead, gave me the assurance that legislation would follow, if not in the next Session then in the one after that, and that we were merely involved in a holding operation very similar to that which was being conducted by the Government in the Protection from Eviction Act, which noble Lords will recall was followed very swiftly by the Rent Act 1965. We had to wait for eight years until a very praiseworthy Private Member introduced legislation to follow up the 1968 Act. I hope that the noble Lord, when he speaks about these two proposals, will, if he cannot accept them, at least be able to give us an assurance that we shall not have to wait another eight years before comprehensive legislation is brought forward by the Government. I beg to move.
Lord ELTON: At the outset I wish to thank the noble Lord, Lord Avebury, for expediting the proceedings of the Committee by agreeing to take Amendment No. 18 with Amendment No. 14. While I shall speak to both, as they are in a sense opposite ends of a seesaw, my remarks will be directed principally to the former of the two Amendments, which has been formally moved. We are on difficult and possibly emotive ground. I am confident that this is not the way to get out of the difficulty which the noble Lord sees ahead. The Amendment attempts to introduce a formula adapted from part of the formula on

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which fair rents are assessed for permanent dwellings—not for caravans or mobile homes—under the rent regulation system, on the basis of which annual charges are to be assessed by the courts to which disputes on the levels of these charges are referred. In particular, it seeks to introduce a requirement analogous to that designed in the fair rent formula, to exclude any artificial value attributable to security of dwellings to let. So much the noble Lord has vouchsafed to us.
This adaptation presents difficult peculiarities. For example, it would not require the court to assume on the supply side the number of pitches available to those seeking pitches—the Bill relates, of course, to contracts for pitches; not for rented accommodation, which is excluded. The court would assume that the conditions which existed, which in a free market would regulate the price, did not exist. Again it does not relate to any number of caravans or pitches available to would-be mobile home dwellers, but to the number for which residential site licences have been granted in the past. This disregards on the one hand the possibility that pitches or caravans are being provided by local authorities, whose sites do not need to have a licence and whose contribution will therefore be excluded from the statistics referred to, and on the other hand the possibility that licences have been issued but are not being used, which would have the countervailing effect.
Far more serious than any objections to the wording is the fact that the Bill is not, in my view, in the present state of knowledge of mobile home living, an appropriate vehicle for statutory regulation of the market. It attempts to introduce to a field not analogous to this principles which will not fit it, and the analogy which springs to mind—since it is taking a piece of a large Act and applying it in a different area—is that of somebody trying to catch a fly by taking a piece of a cobweb. The supporting strands are not there, and I do not think that a small fragment of the legislation will stand on its own. The Kaufman Committee is due to report—one hopes in the not too distant future. The noble Lord, Lord Avebury, has evinced a desire for its completion, and I dare say that a number of your Lordships will hope that his pressure is effect-
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tive. If we are to enter upon this degree of regulation of rents and of the charge assignments we should do so in a much more complete state of knowledge than we have, and that state of knowledge will be achieved by the publication of the report when it is completed.
I may rise a little later to speak on the second of the Amendments, but I think that at this stage it would be more helpful if we heard what the noble Lord opposite has to say on the matter.
2.35 p.m.
Lord MELCHETT: While I appreciate the motives that have moved the noble Lord, Lord Avebury, to put down this Amendment and the other Amendment to which the Committee is addressing itself at the moment, I hope that he will not press either of these two today for very much the same reasons as Lord Elton has already given and, indeed, for many of the reasons that Lord Avebury outlined, because I have already written him about this in an effort to expedite our proceedings today.
It is the Government's view that to legislate in so sensitive a field as rent assessment is risky unless the formula introduced has been drawn up, and been fully and carefully considered, in the light of adequate knowledge of the field in which the legislation is to operate. The fair rent formula incorporated in the Rent Act 1968, part of which the noble Lord has sought to adapt for mobile homes, was the outcome of months of study and discussion in the light of much fuller information on privately rented dwellings than we have on mobile homes. It is of course an object of the review of mobile home living started by my honourable friend, who is now the Parliamentary Under Secretary to the Department of Industry, to assemble the data needed as a base for informed and sound decisions on, first, the need, and then, if applicable, the scope, nature and operation of any system for the regulation of mobile home living. But for the moment I must advise against any attempt to extend the scope of this Bill beyond that now before us, and certainly I must advise against any introduction of part of a rent assessment formula devised for use in quite different circumstances.
I should make it clear that I do not at this stage want to rule out any option for

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consideration in the context of comprehensive legislation. It is, after all, conceivable that any number of recommendations may arise from the mobile home review; but at present its findings cannot be anticipated. And I am most reluctant—above all at a time when we have at last the prospect of formulating conclusions on mobile home living in the light of adequate and relevant data—to tie the Government's or Parliament's hands by piecemeal importation of provisions designed for use in an entirely different field.
The noble Lord, Lord Avebury, raised one or two points in introducing the Amendment. He asked whether I thought it likely that a site operator would increase premiums—I think I understood him right—if the court reduces site charges—I assume under Clause 4(2) or (5) of the Bill as it stands. I can give the noble Lord a limited answer. A determination by the court on the site charge at that point would not be able to affect that mobile home residence premium which will presumably have been paid already. I can see that it is possible that a site operator would, nevertheless, charge higher premiums for other incoming residents.
Lord AVEBURY: My point was the opposite. If a person sought the decision of the court under Clause 4(3) when what he considers would be a reasonable increase is imposed at the time of the annual review, would evidence as to premiums which had been charged either to him, or generally speaking on the site, be accepted as evidence by the Court and taken into consideration in deciding what the annual charges should be? Surely, if the courts find that the site operator is making enormous sums out of these £500 premiums and a rapid turnover of residents, that should push them towards limiting the annual charge.
Lord MELCHETT: I was going to come on to the general question of guidance to the courts when making a determination. It is our view that in spite of the problems to which the noble Lord rightly drew our attention, because of the variation in standards of location, and so on, it would be virtually impossible to give general guidance to the courts applicable or appropriate to all sites. It is
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important that the courts should be free to consider local conditions without strict guidance which might prove to be inflexible in practice.
This comes back to the nub of the Government's opposition to the Amendment because we do not know in practice what the problems will be at the present time. We are not able to foresee what general guidance would be appropriate to the courts or to tell the noble Lord what problems we think will arise. We feel that we do not know, and it would be dangerous and unwise to legislate at a period when our knowledge is unsatisfactory and when we hope very shortly to have more information.
Judges in county courts are experienced at taking into account relevant local factors. We are conscious that the courts will be able to operate Clause 4 more effectively without general guidance, as they have done under Section 4 of the Caravan Sites Act 1968. One other point which the noble Lord made struck a chord with me—his suggestion that at the moment site operators have tacit support for making abnormally large profits, because Parliament has not legislated in this field. Certainly no noble Lord on this side of the House would give tacit support to anybody making abnormally large profits, if by that the noble Lord is meaning unreasonably large profits, which I think he probably was. I dare say that would be another side of the unacceptable face of capitalism of noble Lords opposite.
We have considerable support for the objectives which the noble Lord is seeking to achieve. He has done the Government at least a great service by drawing attention to these problems—not that we were not seized of them already, but he has underlined several things. The correspondence and debate which we have had on the Amendment will be of great assistance to us while we undertake the review. I am loath to give the noble Lord any assurance about future legislation. He has already told the Committee that he had an assurance in the past which has proved to be inoperative. Therefore, even if I gave him an assurance—which I am not in a position to do—it would not be all that convincing. The noble Lord will have to decide whether or not he withdraws the Amend-

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ment on the basis of the case put forward rather than on any guarantee that legislation will be introduced in the next or any particular Session of Parliament. But as soon as this particular Bill is on the Statute Book the full resources of the Department will be concentrated on undertaking the review which, needless to say, has been held up by work on this Bill, and we will proceed as fast as we can in bringing before Parliament detailed conclusions of that review.
Lord AVEBURY: The noble Lord said that we do not know what factors ought to be taken into account in determining the fair annual charge to be imposed on a caravan site. Then, a moment later, he said that judges are experienced in taking relevant local factors into account.
Lord MELCHETT: The noble Lord has slightly misunderstood me. Because we do not feel that we have full information, we are not in a position to say what problems are likely to arise in different localities on sites with particular problems and differences about which we may not be aware. The courts are much more likely to operate Clause 4 effectively without any general guidance. We feel they have operated a section of the Caravan Sites Act satisfactorily in that respect. I was not saying that because we do not know of all the possibilities that will come up, the courts also will not know. We are saying that because we do not know it is better to leave it to the discretion of the courts looking at the particular case.
Lord AVEBURY: If the noble Lord means the judges have power to look at any of the factors I have mentioned, and if he is saying the judges could study the amenities and the locality of the site, and if they thought those were relevant and they could say, for instance, charges ought to be lower on a particular site because it was next-door to a gas works or sewage farm, then I am very pleased with his reply.
We have dodged round the main question, which is scarcity. We have left it in the air as to whether the judges, in determining disputes on the annual charge list, are to assume that the number of people wishing to be occupiers in that locality is no greater than the number of pitches available, or whether they
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are to accept the economic factors which enable the site operator to impose an annual rent which is much larger than would be the case if there was equality of demand and supply.
I can see this is an extremely difficult matter for the judges to determine without any guidance from Parliament; but of course I agree with the noble Lord that the formula ought to be fully considered and that a great deal of study went into the original 1965 Act formula, upon which I have modelled this clause. Obviously, one must accept that different factors would be applicable to caravan sites from those which would be applicable to residential properties.
I shall not press the Amendment, but I hope the noble Lord will do everything in his power to ensure that once the Bill is out of the way the Kaufman Committee produces its Report as quickly as possible. The noble Lord, Lord Elton, has mentioned its publication and I hope he is right in assuming that the Report will be available to Parliament. We shall then need to exercise what pressure we can on the Government to bring forward comprehensive legislation as soon as possible. I beg leave to withdraw the Amendment.
Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.
2.42 p.m.
Lord MELCHETT Lord MELCHETT moved Amendment No. 16:
Leave out Clause 4 and insert the following new clause:
Disputes
" —(1) If the owner of a protected site on which a mobile home is, or is to be, stationed—

(a) fails without reasonable excuse to comply with the provisions of section 1 of this Act; or

(b) having in compliance with the said provisions offered to the occupier an agreement on terms and conditions which have been accepted by the occupier, fails without reasonable excuse to enter into a written agreement with the occupier to give effect to the terms and conditions so agreed within the period of one month following the date of such acceptance,

the occupier may apply to the court for the grant of an agreement which complies with section 3 of this Act or which contains the terms and conditions so agreed, as the case may be.
(2) On an application under subsection (1) above the court shall make an order for the grant of an agreement which—

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(a) in a case falling within paragraph (a) of that subsection, complies with section 3 of this Act and contains such terms and conditions as the court thinks reasonable; or

(b) in a case falling within paragraph (b) of that section—

(i) where the court is satisfied that terms and conditions have been agreed between the parties, contains the terms and conditions so agreed; or

(ii) where the court is not so satisfied, complies with section 3 of this Act and contains such terms and conditions as the court thinks reasonable.

(3) If an occupier to whom an agreement has been offered by an owner of a protected site in pursuance of a duty under section 1 of this Act fails without reasonable excuse to signify within the period of three months following the date on which the agreement is so offered whether or not the terms and conditions contained in it are acceptable to him, the owner of the protected site may apply to the court for the grant of an agreement which complies with section 3 of this Act.
(4) On an application under subsection (3) above the court shall make an order for the grant of an agreement which complies with section 3 of this Act and contains such terms and conditions as the court thinks reasonable.
(5) An occupier who is dissatisfied with any of the terms or conditions in an agreement offered to him by an owner in pursuance of a duty imposed under section 1 of this Act may, within the period of three months following the date on which the agreement is so offered, apply to the court for the determination of the matter in dispute.
(6) Where an agreement has been entered into in pursuance of section 1 of this Act or has been granted by virtue of an order of the court under this section either party may apply to the court for the determination of any matter in dispute arising under the terms of the agreement.
(7) On an application under subsection (5) or subsection (6) above the court shall determine the matter in dispute and shall make such order as is necessary to give effect to its determination.
(8) Where on an application made under this subsection by the owner of a protected site the court is satisfied that an occupier does not occupy as his only or main residence a mobile home which is stationed on that site by virtue of an agreement entered into in pursuance of section 1 of this Act or granted by virtue of an order of the court under this section, the court may make an order rescinding the agreement on such terms as to payment by or to either party of damages for the non-performance of the agreement, or otherwise, as to the court may seem equitable."
The noble Lord said: This Amendment re-orders and simplifies Clause 4 of the Bill, with the object of making for a better understanding of what is un-
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doubtedly a very complex clause, as we found to our cost last Friday. There are only two changes of substance in the new, re-ordered Clause 4. First, subsection (4) of this revised version embodies the principle to which I think the noble Lord, Lord Elton, drew the Committee's attention with his Amendment No. 13 which was accepted by the Committee. The clause now states that an agreement shall comply with Clause 3 and contain terms and conditions which the court considers reasonable. The new clause omits from subsection (4) the word "other", which appeared in the noble Lord's Amendment. I think your Lordships will agree, on reflection, that it is better omitted throughout.
Secondly, the new clause no longer includes the provision in the existing Clause 4(6) of the Bill, which would enable an occupier in certain cases to apply for a revocation of an order granting an agreement. On examination, there seems to be no need for this provision. Clause 3(c) enables an occupier to determine an agreement by giving 28 days' notice to the owner. In practice, it is thought that an occupier who is dissatisfied with an agreement granted by the court will find it quicker and less costly to take the course open to him under Clause 3(c) than to seek a revocation of the court's order.
As a consequence of the removal of this procedure, subsection (7) of the clause as it stands is also being deleted. That was the provision that dealt with the court's power to award costs arising from the exercise of the revocation procedure. I hope your Lordships will agree that this is largely a technical and helpful Amendment. I beg to move.
Viscount COLVILLE of COLROSS: May I say on Amendment No. 16 that this entirely meets the tiresome and difficult point that I raised in Committee last week. I am glad to see that, contrary to what was then said, the word "other" has been left out throughout; and I am sure that this is better.
Lord ELTON: The noble Viscount has said what I was about to say.
On Question, Amendment agreed to.
Clause 4, as amended, agreed to.
Clause 5 [Agreements to bind successive owners]:
Lord MELCHETT: Amendment No. 17A is consequential. The present Clause 4(6) provides that an occupier can apply for the revocation of an order by which an agreement is granted by the court. The power to revoke such agreement, as I have said, is unnecessary. I beg to move.
Amendment moved—
Page 7, line 25, leave out from (" shall ") to (" be") in line 26.—(Lord Melchor.)
On Question, Amendment agreed to.
Clause 5, as amended, agreed to.
Clause 6 [Orders]:
2.47 p.m.
Viscount COLVILLE of CULROSS Viscount COLVILLE of CULROSS: moved Amendment No. 19:
Page 8, line 1, leave out paragraph (b).
The noble Viscount said: This is an Amendment to see whether the noble Lord, Lord Melchett, can explain to me something that I do not understand. The Committee will see that in Clause 3(k) there are provisions for discounts and commissions to be put into the agreement between the occupier of the mobile home and the owner of the site, which I believe will come into operation when a mobile home is sold by the occupier to somebody else, or when he is buying a new one to replace it. That is something which is dealt with in Clause 3 and therefore, quite apart from what would happen in most cases in any event, it is something which must be in the agreement that is reached, whether voluntarily or under the procedure for disputes in Clause 4. Therefore, a figure to deal with this circumstance must be in the agreement.
Once this Bill comes into effect, all agreements that are entered into thereafter will cover this matter. They will cover it in the light of what the occupier of the mobile home and the site owner think is reasonable, and there will also be imported, of course, the judgment of the county court if there is any dispute. We shall find, if there is a dispute about this matter, that county court judges up and down the country are going to say that a certain figure for discount and commission is or is not reasonable, and no doubt after a certain length of time some kind of practice will be worked out with the guidance of some of the
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county court judges who have been seized with this matter to help.
In Clause 6—which I know my noble friend Lady Vickers will move to leave out in a moment—we have order-making powers (this is at the top of page 8) which have one specific purpose. It is picked out in a special paragraph, which is paragraph (b). That is to say, these are order-making powers to alter or to lay down maximum and minimum rates of discount and commission and scales. Why? Is it because the Government do not trust the county court judges to reach a reasonable decision on this matter? We now have the disputes procedure perfectly plain. It will be a matter for the county court judge if anybody is worried about the scale of commission and discount. Do the Government not trust the county court judges to produce a fair and reasonable result in every case?
Secondly, when we are proposing to have legislation, as I understand it, sooner or later anyway—I do not wish to enter into the question of when, although the honourable gentleman Mr. Kaufman was fairly specific in another place; let that be—do we really wish to have power to make orders which will bind, not those whose agreements are going to be dealt with under this Bill immediately it comes into force, and I think that would be the vast majority, but only those who enter into agreements later on, after Regulations and Statutory Instruments have been made to govern this matter? Then there will be, I suppose, two codes operating. There will be the one under the Bill itself—dealt with, sanctioned and examined by the county courts—which will be binding on the vast majority of people who are living in mobile homes. Superimposed upon that—and presumably different, because otherwise there is no point in making Statutory Instruments—will be a new code, or a new series of maximum or minimum scales introduced by the Department of the Environment.
Can the noble Lord tell me—because am genuinely puzzled—why it is that they want these powers? What on earth is wrong with the process first of private bargaining; and, secondly, of supervision by the county courts? The noble Lord has just told us that for a number of years the county courts have been quite

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satisfactorily carrying out this kind of operation under the 1968 Act. Why do the Government want to superimpose a new code which will apply only to a few people later on, prior to the new legislation coming into force? If the noble Lord can tell me the answer to that question and make out a reasonable case for it—which so far I have not been able to understand—I have no reason to suppose that I shall wish to insist upon this Amendment. However, at the moment I am genuinely puzzled and seek guidance. I beg to move.
Lord WAKEFIELD of KENDAL: I should like to support my noble friend Lord Colville, but I support him on more general grounds. It is generally agreed that this Parliament is overburdened with domestic legislation and its implementation by Statutory Instruments. We are now in the EEC for all time and there will be even more work to be considered by Parliament. By this Bill more work will be given to Ministers, to civil servants and to Parliament, yet again and again we have said that central expenditure must be reduced; that we do not want more and more civil servants; that we do not want to put more and more work on to Ministers. Surely by this Bill we are going to provide extra work, which ought at all costs to be avoided. It is on those general terms that I should like to support the specific point which has been made by my noble friend.
2.53 p.m.
Lord MELCHETT: It would be helpful if I set out as briefly as I can the reasons why the Government want the powers which are provided for in paragraph (b). The need to limit the amount of discount or commission taken at present by site operators has been vigorously advanced by representatives of mobile home residents. Certainly it seems to be the case that the more unscrupulous operators have extorted unreasonable terms, due to their ability to prevent occupiers from selling their mobile home on site. But equally it appears that many owners have maintained pitch charges at a relatively low level by cross-subsidisation from dealings in both new and second-hand caravans and that they have opposed an absolute right to re-sell on site since they want to maintain con-
1782
trol over who is to come on to their land. In Clause 3 the Bill attempts to allow site operators to retain a measure of control, but it also takes the first step towards checking present abuses by stipulating that the rates of discount or commission to be charged should be known to both parties in advance; in other words, they should be included in the written agreement to be offered to the occupier. This would at least enable the resident to know what he or she faces.
The various attempts by the Bill's sponsors to arrive at a fair maximum rate of discount or commission have run up against one overriding obstacle, that there is at present no means of settling on an objective figure which would be fair to all operators and occupiers in all parts of the country. For example, an operator at present charging low rents and high discounts might be forced to put up rents steeply if the allowable rate were set too low. Alternatively, a higher rate might too easily be taken as the norm by operators who are at present taking low rates. The basic problem is that not enough is known about charging practices and the effect of writing in specific figures at present—whether one figure or a range would be more appropriate and whether different rates should be applied in different parts of the country. For example, there may be differences in Scotland of which we are not aware.
As more information may come to light as a result of our experience of the working of this Bill and in the course of the review of mobile home living, the reserve power is needed in case the fuller information eventually justifies a more detailed prescription than the Bill has so far been able to attempt. I would say to the noble Lord, Lord Wakefield, that this will not place any greater load on either officials of the Department of the Environment or Government Ministers because we are already undertaking a review. The review is under way and of course part of the review will undoubtedly consist at looking at the workings of the Bill. We cannot ignore that fact. We are saying that the workings of the Bill and the review as it proceeds may provide us with information which would allow a more detailed prescription to be made than is at present possible. So I do not think anybody will be overloaded with any more work, though of

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course I am grateful to the noble Lord for his consideration. I hope that that explains the noble Viscount's problem and that he will see fit to withdraw the Amendment.
Viscount COLVILLE of CULROSS: No, it does not, because the noble Lord has not dealt with the main point of my argument. Can I put it in another way? I understand what he says about there being a scarcity of information in the Department at the moment, and of course it is right that if something should turn up in the course of the review the Department should, if it can, put right something which is wrong. The noble Lord has not explained to me that as the county court judges (and in Scotland the sheriffs) are going to be dealing with this matter from time to time under the dispute procedure, they will be arriving at figures which they think are reasonable for discount and commission, or somewhere on the scale. They will be doing this in different parts of the country over a period of time until some Statutory Instrument comes to be thought out. The noble Lord has not told the Committee that he does not think the judges will be doing this aright; he has not cast any doubt on their ability to assess what is fair and reasonable. I am glad he has not done that, because I do not suppose that is what he intended to do.
Can the noble Lord answer two questions? If he cannot, it is a matter which perhaps we can go back to another time. First of all, when the county court judge is looking at a particular agreement which contains a figure for discount or commission, is he or is he not going to take account of the pitch charge which the noble Lord himself said sometimes acts as a compensation? I observe a carrier pigeon now setting forth, so I will keep going for a moment until it returns to roost. The noble Lord, Lord Avebury, is also going to speed it on its way.
The other question is this. When the noble Lord and the Department look at the material which they are amassing, are they going to get details of the decisions to which county court judges and sheriffs come? It is no use just getting a copy of the county court order. The county court judge may very well say: "In this particular agreement I vary the rate of commission from 5 per cent. to 7½ per cent. ",
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or whatever it may be. That will not give the evidence upon which the county court acted. It will not take account of the pitch charge or some other factor which will give full information and upon which alone one can make a proper assessment. Can the noble Lord tell me, first, that the county court is going to take account of fixed charges; and secondly, that the Department will get full details of the adjudications and not just a copy of the order, because these will not be reported anywhere? The Law Reports will not contain them, so no body of evidence can be obtained from that source, and unless the Department is to obtain these, I do not understand how it is that it is to say that their order-making power will be an improvement upon the system whereby the courts have been given jurisdiction to deal with the matter. I will not go on with this today, unless the noble Lord has a very full answer, but I should like to give him an opportunity to comment upon the point, and also my noble friend.
Lord AVEBURY: I want to make only two points to follow the noble Viscount, Lord Colville of Culross. One is that it is a kind of court charge: if it is able to look at pitch charges to determine what should be the rate of discount or commission under paragraph (k), then obviously that would be a good thing. I hope the noble Lord will be able to assure us that it is so, because it carries with it the implication that the converse is true. I never really received an answer to that one, either; when looking at the pitch charges when a dispute arises, the rates of discount and commission would also be relevant.
But there seems to be another point that is worth making and which might help to satisfy the noble Viscount, Lord Colville. The Government obviously will be very interested in the decisions of the county courts and I endorse the hope he has expressed that they would look at the whole circumstances surrounding the cases and not just at the decisions of the judges. But it seems to me that after a period of time has elapsed, and seeing that there are plenty of these cases to look at so one can get a general picture, by imposing maximum rates of discount or commission one will then avoid a lot of unnecessary litigation. But so

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long as the site operators and the residents are not absolutely certain as to how the judge will view a particular figure in an agreement, then obviously they will be inclined (other things being equal) to seek the arbitration of the Court. But once you have an overall picture covering the whole country and the scales of maximum and minimum rates can be laid down. I do not see any reason why any of those cases should come before the courts at all, and that would mean, perhaps, a large saving in money and time for both the residents and the operators.
Lord MELCHETT: The noble Viscount, Lord Colville, made a very good point when he said that the courts ought to take account of the pitch charge when fixing the level of the commission. I hope that now the matter has been drawn forcefully to the attention of the President of the Mobile Home Residents Association all mobile home residents will make sure that their legal advisers, when presenting their case to the court, will put this before the judges. That will be one factor at least in deciding whether or not the judge is seized of the point. I certainly think that if it is put before the court, it is something that the court can take into account.
The noble Viscount also asked me whether we should be getting full details of the adjudication of county courts. That is something I should like to consider and write to the noble Viscount about, if I may. I am honestly not sure what the procedure is for obtaining the adjudications, let alone whether it is our intention to do it, and now that our attention has been drawn to the problem we would like to consider it and to let the noble Viscount know whether or not we shall be doing it, and if not, what the reasons for not doing so are. I will certainly write to him about that.
On the general point, it is our view that taking powers for the Secretary of State to prescribe when data is to hand is a reasonable compromise between, on the one hand, a statutory proscription which would be very inflexible, and, on the other, not even retaining the power to proscribe a maximum if evidence arises that excessive commissions are being charged. Really this is a matter that will
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have to be decided, to a certain extent, on general principles. If it is decided that excessive commissions are in general being charged as a result of data which comes to light, then on general principles a maximum would have to be fixed which might well not take into account particular circumstances and might lead to alterations in other charges; but that would be a question of principle as well as obviously taking into account the very great local differences which might come to light. I hope that has helped the noble Viscount a little further and, as I have said, I will write to him on the one point which I have not been able to deal with at the moment.
Viscount COLVILLE of CULROSS: I am obliged to the noble Lord, Lord Melchett. I hope he will write very quickly, because this Bill is going through at some speed and, if I may very respectfully suggest it to him, he may find it not entirely easy to discover the answer. I know that county courts are very well organised and have a certain amount of central information. There are associations of ratepayers and the county court judges can help a little. But the noble Lord, if he is to get a meaningful answer, will have to hurry up in order to get something sensible before the next stage of the Bill. I look forward to that, and I will read it carefully. If I am not satisfied then, I may return to the point. Meanwhile, I beg leave to withdraw the Amendment.
Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.
On Question, Whether Clause 6 shall stand part of the Bill?
Baroness VICKERS: I wish to apologise to the noble Lord, Lord Avebury, for anything I may have done that was not etiquette so far as he was concerned. I did not take up the time of the House last week, because I thought we wanted to get on with the Bill. I should like to refer to the fact that in the original Bill this clause was simpler and easier. Regrettably, the Minister in charge has made it a little difficult. On 30th April 1975, he said:
" The clause gives certain powers to the Secretary of State to make orders varying the prescribed minimum periods for agreements under Clause 3, and prescribing or regulating certain matters for the purpose of Clause 3(m). It is desired to add to these order-making powers, and it has been found more convenient

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to do so by substituting a new clause…"—
[Official Report, Commons, Standing Committee C; 30/4/75; col. 137.]
which he did at a later date.
Personally, I think we have enough powers already. I agree with the noble Lord, Lord Wakefield of Kendal, that we certainly do not want to give any more orders to the Secretary of State. We may not have enough work to do— and I am very glad to hear that—but I am totally against the orders. We have far too many, in both Houses. As I see it, under this clause the Minister will have powers to vary as he thinks fit any of the periods in Clauses 1, 2 and 3. I understand these periods are those which vitally affect the owner's investment planning, security of tenure, review of rent, and site charges. Naturally, there are considerable differences in standards, in the popularity of an area, in renting conditions, in public demand for somewhere as a desirable place of residence. I suggest there is no real uniformity in site charges. Perhaps I am wrong, but I understand that the clause was intended to allow the Minister to make changes in the light of experience gained over the next two years, after the Bill had been in operation for a trial period.
In another place, the Minister said that he is determined to introduce a new Bill in two years, based on his Departmental review of mobile homes. But the orders are not retrospective, and any alteration which he may make now will not apply to existing agreements, or to any new agreements in the Bill. Under this Bill, such agreements would be in force for at least eight years, and since any new Bill will be introduced within two years, there appears to be very little justification for granting the Minister now what I consider to be drastic powers. When the noble Lord replies, perhaps he will deal with that point, because it seems rather unnecessary to put this in this Bill at the present time.
I gather that in past years the income from sales of mobile homes has helped to keep down rents. The owners of mobile homes will have the right to sell, and the site owner will receive commission. However, the income received will he considerably reduced. If I may give an example, I gather that if one has 100 pitches on a level or uncomplicated site and the work is done without employ-
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ing outside labour, it will cost about £1,150; but with assistance from outside it will cost £2,500. The rent of a pitch at present is about £4, and the owner receives 4 per cent. per annum on his investment. In another place it was acknowledged that rents of £2 might go up to £4 a week, and those of £8 to £12.
I hope it will be agreed to remove Clause 6, because of the uncertainty among site owners. It will increase the present housing shortage, which I thought was the last thing the Minister would want to do, because of the uncertainty about the Minister having new ideas when he has gathered all his information. It might stop further development. I gather that there can be arbitration, and there are numerous estate agents and chartered surveyors who specialise in valuing mobile homes in all parts of the United Kingdom. These people have intimate day to day knowledge and experience which, obviously, a Minister cannot have, and they can nominate independent arbitrators. There is a President of the Royal Institute of Chartered Surveyors, and I gather that he can nominate an arbitrator within a few days. The courts should deal with all questions of possession, but arbitration could be used for other disputes.
I do not want to offend any of the legal lights in this House, but it is a known fact that the general public find it a little intimidating to appear in court, and the less formal arbitration procedure might be preferred. I hope that the Minister—though I suppose I cannot have much hope after his previous answers—might think again. In view of the fact that the Minister is having this review and. we presume, is to produce another all-embracing Bill which will put matters right for ever, I hope he will now withdraw this clause, because it will cause a great deal of hardship and make for a great deal of uncertainty in the years to come before the next Bill is introduced.
3.13 p.m.
Lord MELCHETT: I hope that the Committee will allow Clause 6 to stay in the Bill. The noble Baroness is seeking to remove a clause the present form and content of which are the result of considerable discussion and ultimate agreement between the Bill's sponsors and the Government during its stages in

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another place. The clause indeed confers certain order-making powers on my right honourable friend the Secretary of State for the Environment, but these are neither particularly extensive nor likely to have a far-reaching effect on the operation of the Bill. They give my right honourable friend the means of altering the various time periods set out in the first three clauses, including the original duration of an agreement and its renewal period. And my right honourable friend can prescribe the rates of discount or commission which we have already discussed at some length. I would say to the noble Baroness that these powers are limited in their effect. As she said, they are not retrospective; that is, they would not affect agreements already entered into.
Quite honestly, with great respect to the noble Baroness, I do not see how she can have it both ways. Either these are draconian order-making powers—undemocratic, I think, was the epithet she applied to them, although I hope they are going to be passed by both Houses of Parliament—which will dramatically upset the finances of the site operators in years to come, or, as she also said, they are limited in their effect, because, as we hope, the Bill will be running for only two years and they are not retrospective.
Baroness VICKERS: Then what is the point?
Lord MELCHETT: The noble Baroness asks: what is the point of having them? I say that she cannot have it both ways. They cannot be draconian and dramatic powers which will upset everyone, and also be minor order-making powers which give the Bill an attractive degree of flexibility, without being anything about which we ought to get very excited. I think she ought first to decide on what line she intends to attack the existence of these order-making powers in the Bill. They add a highly desirable element of flexibility. It might be that the review into mobile homes instituted by my right honourable friend could yield information or reach conclusions which pointed to the desirability of making changes in the length of agreements; or to the need to spell out what rates of commission or discount should be allowable, as we have
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already discussed; or the working of this measure could itself yield useful experience pointing towards the need for changes of this kind. In either case, the Government would expect to discuss any proposed changes with the organisations which represent operators and residents. But if the Bill is to have any meaning and real usefulness, a means of effecting such changes should be included in it. I hope, therefore, that the noble Baroness will see fit to withdraw her opposition to the clause.
Baroness VICKERS: I do withdraw, but I still have some opposition.
Clause 6 agreed to.
Clause 7 [Power to prescribe minimum standards]:
3.16 p.m.
Lord MELCHETT Lord MELCHETT moved Amendment No. 19A:
Page 8, line 30, leave out subsection (2) and insert:
(" (2) An order made under subsection (1) above may apply generally or to a particular area or to protected sites in a particular category and may prescribe different minimum standards in relation to protected sites in different categories.")
The noble Lord said: This Amendment relates to the Secretary of State's power to make orders prescribing minimum standards for protected sites including local authority sites. The Amendment would enable the Secretary of State either to make orders which apply generally or to prescribe minimum standards for particular areas or for particular categories of site. It further enables him to prescribe different minimum standards for different categories. Clause 7(2) as drafted gives him power only to make general orders or to prescribe different standards for different areas. The new provision is designed to cater especially for the particular case of gypsy caravan sites provided by local authorities. The minimum standards appropriate to non-gypsy sites would not necessarily be the right ones for gypsy sites, and an order-making power should be able to differentiate. In addition, it may be desirable at any given time to make an order in respect of non-gypsy sites but not of gypsy ones, or vice versa.
Lord ELTON: I do not wish to delay the Committee in its now pleasingly rapid progress through the remaining

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stages of this Committee stage. This appears to me to be a reasonable addition to the Bill and we will certainly not oppose it.
On Question, Amendment agreed to.
Clause 7, as amended, agreed to.
Clause 8 [Amendment of Act of 1968]:
3.19 p.m.
Lord MELCHETT Lord MELCHETT moved Amendment No. 20:
Leave out Clause S and insert the following new clause:
Extension of Act of 1968 to Scotland
" Part I (relating to the protection of residential occupiers) and Part Ill (miscellaneous) of the Act of 1968 shall apply to Scotland subject to the modifications contained in the Schedule to this Act."
The noble Lord said: With the leave of the Committee, I will speak to Amendments Nos. 22 and 23 with this Amendment. Clause 8 of the Mobile Homes Bill extends some of the provisions of the Caravan Sites Act 1968 to Scotland. These Amendments are purely drafting in character and are designed to clarify the Mobile Homes Bill by removing to a new Schedule the detailed changes which are necessary for the application of the 1968 Act to Scotland and to tidy up the detailed changes by substituting a new Section 5 in the 1968 Act.
Part I of the proposed new Schedule contains the general adaptation of the 1968 Act currently made by Clause 8(1) of the Mobile Homes Bill. Part II of the new Schedule contains the modifications currently made by Clause 8(2)(h), (c) and (d) of the Mobile Homes Bill to sections of the 1968 Act, but is designed to set them out more clearly by substituting a new Section 5 in the 1968 Act. The Amendment to Clause 9, page 10, line 29, is consequential on the deletion from the Bill of the original Clause 7, which was replaced in another place by the existing Clause 7.
Lord AVEBURY: I wish to say how delighted I am that this Bill extends the 1968 Act to Scotland, remembering that my honourable friend Mr. James Davidson (as he then was) on the Second Reading of the Bill in 1968, spoke very strongly in favour of the extension to Scotland. At that time, as reported at column 1986 on the 1st March, the noble Lord, Lord Hughes, said he did not consider it appropriate to extend the provi-
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sions of the 1968 Bill to Scotland, mainly on the grounds that the County Councils Association there did not consider that it was in any way relevant to the smaller number of people living in mobile homes in Scotland. In fact the Association had not had adequate time for consultation.
Now at last, eight years later, the provisions of the Act are being extended to Scotland. About that I am delighted. This is one minor example of the general principle that Liberals are always seven years ahead of the other two Parties.
On Question, Amendment agreed to.
Clause 8, as amended, agreed to.
3.26 p.m.
Baroness VICKERS Baroness VICKERS moved Amendment No. 21:
After Clause 8 insert the following new clause:
Saving for certain rights
(" Nothing in this Act or in any agreement entered into in pursuance of section I of this Act or granted by virtue of an order of the court under section 4 of this Act (including an agreement as varied from time to time by any such order) shall prejudice or derogate from or in any wise alter or affect the rights, powers and title of any person in respect of a mobile home which he owns but of which he is not the occupier.")
The noble Baroness said: The major point in my Amendment is that the statutory agreement would, by virtue of Clause 3(k), give a right to the occupier of the mobile home to sell it. However, he may not be the owner; in fact the owner is probably a finance house, and therefore, the right to sell, as contained in Clause 3(k), will not be allowed, I suggest, so to be exercised as to prejudice the rights or title of the actual owner. The same may be said to apply in respect of the right of the owner of the site to have access under Clause 3(i), and the occupier of the mobile home to assign under Clause 3(j). These rights should not be regarded as prejudicing any existing rights of the owner of the mobile home. Therefore, I suggest to the noble Lord that it is arguable that, as the rights required to be given by this Bill would be statutory rights, they could be said to override the statutory rights of the owner of the mobile home. Many mobile homes are bought by instalment credit agreement, for example, by hire-purchase or conditional sale agreements, and during the currency of such agreements the owner of the mobile home is the finance house.
I understand that the amount of money involved in agreements relating to mobile homes which are being entered into is about £2 million a month. Many of these involve permanent residences. I believe that there are about 100,000 permanent residences, and these will be affected by the Bill. Most of the mobile homes affected by the Bill are not owned by the occupier, but by a third party, a finance house. I wonder, therefore, whether there might not be some confusion, even conflict, between the terms of the Bill and the terms of the instalment credit agreements. For example, Clause 3(k) gives the occupier that right to sell the mobile home, but it might not be his to sell. Clause 3(g) makes provision for repair and maintenance of the mobile home, but I suppose there are in all credit agreements provisions about repair and maintenance.
What happens if the two sets of provisions are different? Clause 3(i) refers to access to, and movement of, the mobile home. If it belongs to a third party, should the third party not be involved in the right to have access to, and to move, his own property? Clause 3(j) deals with assignment of the agreement introduced by the Bill, and there may be some confusion if the occupier can assign the agreement, but not the mobile home. Clause 4 deals with application to the courts. If the mobile home is owned by a third party, it may be felt—I think quite rightly—that he should have the right to be heard at such proceedings.
I do not want in any way to challenge the object of the Bill, but I hone to have eliminated some of the difficulties caused by the assumption, as appears in the Bill, that the occupier is the owner. It might be relevant to quote the Caravan Site Act 1968, since this Act had an objective not dissimilar from the objective of this Bill and similar to the point taken in debate. The Act in Section 3(5) says:
"The court may from time to time, on the application of either party, extend, reduce or terminate the period of suspension ordered by virtue of this section, or vary any terms or conditions imposed thereunder, but shall not extend the period of suspension for more than twelve months at a time."
I would suggest that my Amendment will help on this point, and I should be grate-
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ful if the noble Lord would consider it. I beg to move.
Lord MELCHETT: The Amendment tabled by the noble Baroness provides me with an opportunity to state the Government's views on points which the Finance Houses Association first brought to the attention of members of the Standing Committee considering this Bill in another place and to my Department. My honourable friend the then Parliamentary Under-Secretary in fact sought legal advice on these points, and I have done so again. It may therefore be helpful if I place this opinion on record and at the same time explain why I do not see this new clause as necessary.
The Association's main concern, as I understand it, is to remove any doubt that the benefits conferred on an occupier of a mobile home by grant of an agreement in compliance with Clause 3 could conflict with or override the rights of the finance company when the mobile home is being purchased under a hire-purchase agreement. The Association have drawn attention in particular to four areas where they are concerned about possible difficulties.
First, they are worried lest covenants about repair entered into as a result of Clause 3(g) may prove incompatible with an instalment credit contract. The position here is that Clause 3(g) does not stipulate what a repairing covenant should contain and it is for the parties to agree on terms which do not conflict with their obligations under any prior written contract which either of them has previously entered into.
Secondly, the Association are concerned that the right of the owner under Clause 3(i) to have reasonable access to the part of the site occupied by the caravan should be paralleled by a right of access for the finance company either to inspect or if necessary to repossess its goods. The position here is that Clause 3(i) in no way affects the existing rights of a finance company or any other persons with an interest in the mobile home.
Thirdly, the Association have pointed to the confusion which they fear might be caused if (under Clause 3(j)) an occupier were to assign the agreement without the consent of the finance company who own the mobile home and who may

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even have included an express condition of forbidding assignment of the mobile home in their hire-purchase or conditional sale agreement. The right to assign the agreement does not, of course, carry with it any assignment of the mobile home itself. The provisions concerning the sale of a mobile home are in fact contained in Clause 3(k). The Bill is not conferring a right on the occupier to sell his mobile home as against anyone but the site owner: in other Words, Clause 3(k) is subject to the right of the occupier to sell the mobile home: these provisions of the Bill do not apply if he does not own the mobile home. A caravan occupier cannot legally assign that which he does not own without the consent of the true owner. Accordingly, neither Clause 3(i) nor Clause 3(k) in any way interferes with or overrides the rights in the mobile home of persons other than the occupier.
Briefly, then, the clause which the noble Baroness has moved is not necessary because the Bill does not remove or affect the right of a finance company who are assisting an occupier to purchase a mobile home. I can understand that the Finance Houses Association wish to establish that there is no ambiguity in this matter, but I should be reluctant to see a further and (as it turns out) unnecessary provision added to the Bill, since, on my understanding, there is no element of doubt to be removed.
Baroness VICKERS: I thank the noble Lord for that reply. I should like to have the opportunity of reading it in detail.
Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.
Clause 9 [Interpretation]:
Lord MELCHETT: My Lords, I beg to move Amendment No. 22:
Amendment moved—
Page 10, line 29, leave out from (" Scotland ") to (" any ") in line 31.—(Lord Melchett.)
On Question, Amendment agreed to.
Clause 9, as amended, agreed to.
Clause 10 agreed to.
Lord MELCHETT: I beg to move Amendment No. 23.
Amendment moved—
After Clause 10 insert the following Schedule:
Section—(Extension of Act of 1968 to Scotland)
(" SCHEDULE
MODIFICATIONS OF THE ACT OF 1968 FOR THE PURPOSE OF EXTENDING THAT ACT OF SCOTLAND

MOBILE HOMES BILL

  PART 1 GENERAL ADAPTATION
  1. For subsection 17(3) (extent) of the Act of 1968 there shall be substituted the following subsection—
  " (3) Part I and sections 13, 14(1), 16, subsection (1) above and this subsection shall extend to Scotland as read with section 8 of and the Schedule to the Mobile Homes Act 1975, but otherwise this Act does not extend to Scotland or Northern Ireland.".

  PART II SPECIFIC MODIFICATIONS
  2. For section 5 of the Act of 1968 there shall be substituted the following section—
  "5.—(1) In this Part of this Act, any reference to "the court" shall be construed as a reference to the sheriff having jurisdiction in the place where the protected site is situated.
  (2) The power of the court under section 4 of this Act to suspend the enforcement of an order shall extend to any order made but not executed before the commencement of this Part of this Act.
  (3) Nothing in this Part of this Act shall affect the operation of section 89 of the Lands Clauses Consolidation (Scotland) Act 1845.
  (4) Subsection (1) of section 12 of the Caravan Sites and Control of Development Act 1960 (power of site occupier to take possession and terminate a licence or tenancy in case of contravention of section 1 of that Act), when read with section 32(1)(d) of that Act, shall have effect subject to the foregoing provisions of this Part of this Act.
  (5) Part III of the Rent Act 1965 (protection against harassment and eviction without due process of law) shall not apply to any premises being a caravan stationed on a protected site.".
  3. For section 16 of the Act of 1968 there shall be substituted the following section—
  " 16. In this Act, unless the context otherwise requires—
  "caravan" has the same meaning as in Part I of the Caravan Sites and Control of Development Act 19960, as amended by this Act;
  " local authority "means a local authority within the meaning of the Local Government (Scotland) Act 1973 and the regional or district planning authority within the meaning of Part IX of that Act;

  1797
  " the Minister "means the Secretary of State;
  " planning permission "means permission under Part III of the Town and Country Planning (Scotland) Act 1972.".")—(Lord Melchett.)
  On Question, Amendment agreed to.
  House resumed: Bill reported with the Amendments.

LITIGANTS IN PERSON (COSTS AND EXPENSES) BILL
3.32 p.m.
Lord DARLING of HILLSBOROUGH: My Lords, I beg to move that the House do now resolve itself into Committee on this Bill.
Moved, That the House do now resolve itself into Committee.—(Lord Darling of Hillsborough.)
On Question, Motion agreed to.
House in Committee accordingly.
[The Lord MAYBRAY-KING in the Chair.]
Clause 1 [Costs or expenses recoverable by litigants in person]:
LORD CHANCELLOR (Lord Elwyn-Jones)The LORD CHANCELLOR (Lord Elwyn-Jones) moved Amendment No. 1:
Page 1, line 12, leave out (" to proceedings in a county court and ")
The noble and learned Lord said: It may be convenient for the Committee to consider along with this Amendment, Amendments Nos. 2 and 3. The effect of these Amendments is to extend the provisions of the Bill to the Lands Tribunal in England and Wales and the Lands Tribunal for Northern Ireland, and to give power to the Lord Chancellor to extend the Bill by order to any other court or tribunal. I undertook on Second Reading to consider a suggestion by my noble friend Lord Darling of Hillsborough, the author and promoter of the Bill, that it should be extended to the Lands Tribunal, and I am now satisfied that it is now right and proper to do that. In its specialised field, the Lands Tribunal deals with a wide range of cases, the weight of which may well be equivalent to matters dealt with not only in county courts but also the High Court. It is a tribunal in which legal aid is available, but cases
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of substance are often conducted on one side or the other by litigants in person.
The Lands Tribunal has power under its rules to direct that the costs of a party to any proceedings shall be paid by another party, and the Tribunal may settle the amount of the costs by fixing a lump sum or ordering them to be taxed on one of the county courts scales or the High Court scale. It therefore seems appropriate that a litigant in person should be able to recover costs in accordance with the provisions of the Bill. It is possible that in future new courts or tribunals may be created to which it would be desirable to extend the provisions of this Bill. Similarly, changes may be made in the Constitution or method of working of existing courts or tribunals, which might be thought to qualify them also for inclusion. Clearly, the court or tribunal would have to have powers to award costs before the Bill could be extended to it. The draft Amendments cater for this situation by giving the Lord Chancellor power by order to extend the Bill to any other court or tribunal so that each case may be considered on its merits.
On the face of it, the Amendments look highly complicated, but I am happy to say that when they have been translated into the terms of the clause, they at quite happily into a tolerable picture. I beg to move.
Lord ELTON: I do not wish to delay the proceedings of the Committee, which are now rapidly accelerating—and which we all welcome—except to say that we approve of the principles of this Bill. Their extension seems a logical step to follow and I entirely endorse the noble and learned Lord's description of the way they fit into the clause.
Lord DARLING of HILLSBOROUGH: This first group of Amendments are the substance of the Amendments which my noble and learned friend the Lord Chancellor is moving to extend the provisions of the Bill, first, specifically to lands tribunals and then by order to other tribunals, as need arises. I am sure the Amendments will be warmly welcomed by the sponsors and supporters of the Bill in both Houses, and will be approved by your Lordships today. I

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merely wish to say that we are extremely grateful to my noble and learned friend the Lord Chancellor for the Amendments he has moved.
On Question, Amendment agreed to.
The LORD CHANCELLOR: I beg to move Amendment No. 2.
Amendment moved—
Page 1, line 13, after (" proceedings") insert—
(" (a) in a county court ").—(The Lord Chancellor.)
On Question, Amendment agreed to.
The LORD CHANCELLOR: I beg to move Amendment No. 3.
Amendment moved—
Page 1, line 14, at end insert—
(" (b) before the Lands Tribunal or the Lands Tribunal for Northern Ireland, or
(c) in or before any other court or tribunal specified in an order made under this subsection by the Lord Chancellor.")—(The Lord Chancellor.)
On Question, Amendment agreed to.
The LORD CHANCELLOR The LORD CHANCELLOR moved Amendment No. 4:
Page 1, line 23, after (" proceedings ") insert—
(" (a)")
The noble and learned Lord said: It may be convenient if I ask the Committee to consider this Amendment together with Amendment No. 5 and the first part of Amendment No. 6, which adds two new paragraphs, (b) and (c), to Clause 1(2). The purpose of these Amendments is to extend the Bill to the Scottish Land Court and the Lands Tribunal for Scotland, and also to give the Lord Advocate power to extend the Bill by order to any other court or tribunal in Scotland. One is always apprehensive about embarking on the territory of Scotland, but I have full authority for saying that these Amendments will be well received North of the Border—and I am very comforted to receive support from my noble friend who hails from those parts. The Scottish Land Court, which is an institution peculiar to Scotland, as indeed its description indicates, is primarily concerned with disputes between landlords and crofters under the Crofters (Scotland) Acts of 1955 and 1961. It also deals with disputes between
1800
landlords and agricultural tenants other than crofters under the Agricultural Holdings (Scotland) Acts.
It is very similar in both its procedure and its organisation to the Lands Tribunal for Scotland. The court has power to award costs and it is designed to enable crofters and tenants to defend their interests without necessarily being legally represented. It is appropriate therefore that where a party in person wins his case, he should be in a similar position as regards costs to a party before the sheriff court or the Court of Session. The Lands Tribunal for Scotland has similar jurisdiction to the Lands Tribunal for England and Wales and should be brought within the Bill for the same reason. It is clearly desirable also that there should be power to extend the Bill to other courts or tribunals in Scotland, although the order for this purpose would of course be made by the Lord Advocate. I beg to move.
On Question, Amendment agreed to.
The LORD CHANCELLOR: I beg to move Amendment No. 5.
Amendment moved—
Page 1, line 23, at end insert (" the Scottish Land Court ").—(The Lord Chancellor.)
On Question, Amendment agreed to.
The LORD CHANCELLOR The LORD CHANCELLOR moved Amendment No. 6:
Page 1, line 25, at end insert—
(" (b) before the Lands Tribunal for Scotland, or
(c) in or before any other court or tribunal specified in an order made under this subsection by the Lord Advocate.
(2A) An order under subsection (1) or (2) above shall be made by statutory instrument and shall be subject to annulment in pursuance of a resolution of either House of Parliament.
(2B) In this section "rules of court "—

(a) in relation to the Lands Tribunal or the Lands Tribunal for Scotland, means rules made under section 3 of the Lands Tribunal Act 1949,

(b) in relation to the Lands Tribunal for Northern Ireland, means rules made under section 9 of the Lands Tribunal and Compensation Act (Northern Ireland) 1964, and

(c) in relation to any other tribunal specified in an order made under subsections (1) or (2) above, shall have the meaning given by the order as respects that tribunal.").

The noble and learned Lord said: I have already explained the effect of the

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first part of this Amendment when dealing with Amendments Nos. 4 and 5. The Amendment also inserts in Clause 1 new subsections (2A) and (2B) to provide for any order made by the Lord Chancellor or the Lord Advocate extending the provisions of the Bill to be subject to anulment by a Resolution of either House of Parliament, and to assign the appropriate meaning to the term "rules of court" in relation to the Lands Tribunals and any other tribunals specified in an order extending the Bill.
In the case of a newly created court or tribunal, there will be an opportunity for a full debate on its constitution when the Bill establishing it is before Parliament. In the case of an existing court or tribunal to which the Bill is extended, there will have been full consultation with all interested parties before the order is made. Therefore, it is thought that the Negative Resolution procedure would be sufficient in the circumstances, and it is not necessary to provide for an order extending the Bill to require an Affirmative Resolution.
The term "rules of court" needs no further explanation in the Bill in its
1802
application to courts as such. But the Lands Tribunal is not a court and it is necessary to provide for the meaning of "rules of court" in relation to that Tribunal or any other tribunal to which the Bill may be extended. This is done by providing that in the case of the Lands Tribunal it means rules made under Section 3 of the Lands Tribunal Act 1949 or the corresponding Northern Ireland Act, and in the case of any other tribunal it has the meaning given to it by the order extending the Bill to that tribunal. So a litigant in person entitled under subsections (1) and (2) to his costs and expenses subject to rules of court would in the case of the tribunal be subject to provisions made by the designated rule-making authority. I beg to move.
On Question, Amendment agreed to.
Clause 1, as amended, agreed to.
Remaining clause agreed to.
House resumed: Bill reported with the Amendments.
House adjourned at fourteen minutes before four o'clock.