Lords Sitting of 29 January 1974

Preamble
The House met at half past two of the clock: The LORD CHANCELLOR on the Woolsack.
Prayers—Read by the Lord Bishop of London.

WALES AND THE GOVERNMENT STATISTICAL SERVICE
LORD LLOYD OF KILGERRAN: My Lords, I beg leave to ask the Question which stands in my name on the Order Paper.
The Question was as follows:
To ask Her Majesty's Government whether they will arrange for all Governmental statistics relating to Wales to be issued as a separate item whenever they issue statistics of any kind relating compendiously to England and Wales.
THE MINISTER WITHOUT PORTFOLIO (LORD ABERDARE): My Lords, the Government Statistical Service is extending its provision of statistics for Wales and will increasingly publish separate Welsh totals whenever possible.
LORD LLOYD OF KILGERRAN: My Lords, I should like to thank the noble Lord for that helpful Answer and to say how much it will be appreciated in Wales. Without wishing to embarrass the Minister, may I ask whether it might be possible for him to press that the elegant title which he now has of "Minister Without Portfolio", might soon have added to it some such words as "and Minister of State for Wales"?
LORD ABERDARE: My Lords, we have a very good Minister of State for Wales; I do not think I need to occupy that position.
LORD LLOYD OF KILGERRAN: Yes, my Lords, but he does not sit in this House.

EMERGENCY SPEED LIMITS
2.45 p.m.
BARONESS MACLEOD OF BORVE: My Lords, I beg leave to ask the Question which stands in my name on the Order Paper.
The Question was as follows:
To ask Her Majesty' Government whether they are now prepared to remove the emergency speed limits.
LORD MOWBRAY AND STOURTON: No, my Lords. The 50 m.p.h. limit was introduced as a fuel economy measure and my right honourable friend considers that it should continue for the time being.
BARONESS MACLEOD OF BORVE: My Lords, while thanking the noble Lord for his reply, may I ask him whether he would agree that although a majority of motorists are complying with the restrictions, either for reasons of patriotism or because the increased price is a deterrent to unnecessary motoring, there are many motorists who have to get from point A to point B as speedily as possible in the interests of their job, their employers, and often of their country?
LORD MOWBRAY AND STOURTON: My Lords, I fully appreciate that the limit may be inconvenient to many motorists who cannot use other means of transport, but this is a measure to conserve fuel during a time of shortage.
LORD MOYNE: My Lords, may I ask the noble Lord whether there may not be a case for continuing this speed limit, which has proved very popular with less nimble pedestrians and less impetuous motorists alike, and also whether there are as yet any significant figures to show any fall in the number of fatal accidents since the 50 m.p.h. limit was imposed?
LORD MOWBRAY AND STOURTON: My Lords, it is too early for us to have figures which are accurate and statistically proper so I cannot give those to my noble friend. With regard to his first and major question, the answer is that it would be wrong to continue for other reasons something which was introduced for a specific purpose, which I think motorists understand. To try to continue it for other reasons would probably not meet with

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their consent and we should be encouraging them to break the law.
LORD AVEBURY: My Lords, surely it would not be wrong to continue with a measure which has already resulted in the saving of a great many human lives and has reduced the number of casualties on our roads significantly, according to figures which have already been published and are available to the House. Before the noble Lord makes a final decision on this matter, will he call for the most up-to-date and accurate statistics that are available and then make a Statement to the House on those figures, so that we may judge accordingly whether the limit should be maintained?
LORD MOWBRAY AND STOURTON: My Lords, as I told my noble friend a moment ago, there are no figures which are at all accurate. I think we should all agree that because there are fewer cars, and because people are travelling more slowly, there are probably fewer accidents. But there are other points to be taken into account, such as that mentioned by my noble friend Lady Macleod of Borve. The 50 m.p.h. limit is inconvenient to many people; people's time is money; money is trade, and we are a trading nation. Safer driving does not necessarily have to coincide with one speed: it may be that over 70 m.p.h. is not a safe speed but that in the long run 50 m.p.h. is too slow.
VISCOUNT HANWORTH: My Lords, would not the Minister agree that it might be more effective in reducing accidents if we imposed a universal 20 m.p.h. speed limit?
LORD MOWBRAY AND STOURTON: My Lords, the noble Viscount might well suggest that we should go back to horses: that would be safer still.
BARONESS SUMMERSKILL: My Lords, is it not a fact that there have been reports from hospitals that the number of motoring accidents has been reduced?
LORD MOWBRAY AND STOURTON: My Lords, I think there is a general indication to that effect, but whether the reduction is because of the lower speed or because fewer people are motoring we do not know. However, there are other aspects to this question, as I have pointed out.
LORD SEGAL: My Lords, would the noble Lord agree that it is better to travel hopefully than to arrive, as this Government have so repeatedly demonstrated?
LORD MOWBRAY AND STOURTON: My Lords, I thank the noble Lord.
LORD CROOK: My Lords, would not the noble Lord agree that it is fortunate for some people that they are able to travel by car, while others have all the trouble of trying to travel by rail?
LORD BLYTON: My Lords, does not the noble Lord consider that if the Government were to travel at the maximum speed limit to settle the miners' dispute the roads of our country could become racing tracks?
LORD MOWBRAY AND STOURTON: My Lords, I think the noble Lord, Lord Blyton, would agree that that is another question.
LORD ALLERTON: My Lords, would not my noble friend agree that petrol consumption—and presumably the object of this legislation is to reduce the consumption of petrol—is dependent much more upon the width of the throttle opening than on the actual speed of the vehicle? Would not he agree that once the vehicle has gained momentum there can be very little difference between the amounts of petrol consumed at 50 m.p.h. and at 70 m.p.h.
LORD MOWBRAY AND STOURTON: My Lords, I should not like to bandy words with my noble friend on the technicalities, but the general indication is that with the average family car—which is what we are talking about, although it may not be what my noble friend drives—the saving is of the order of some 8 miles per gallon.
LORD POPPLEWELL: My Lords, will the noble Lord publish figures of the road accidents which have taken place since the imposition of the 50 m.p.h. limit as compared with a similar period before the imposition of this limit?
LORD MOWBRAY AND STOURTON: My Lords, I can assure the noble Lord, Lord Popplewell, that I am not trying to dodge the question. As I have already said twice before, the figures are not available at the moment. This exercise has been introduced primarily not to reduce accidents but to conserve fuel.
LORD POPPLEWELL: My Lords, when the noble Lord says that the figures are not available, is he aware that we look with grave suspicion on that statement? Although the publication of these figures was stopped some two years ago, we hear from various chief constables and safety authorities in various parts of the country that the accident rate has been reduced in consequence of the reduced speed limit.
LORD MOWBRAY AND STOURTON: My Lords, I told the noble Baroness, Lady Summerskill, just now that there are indications of a reduction in accidents; but I am speaking on behalf of the Government, and official statistics are not yet available to the Government. I repeat that this is not the object of the exercise.
BARONESS EMMET OF AMBERLEY: My Lords, may I ask the Minister whether he thinks this is the right moment to discuss this particular question, which is only a temporary measure introduced in an emergency?
LORD MOWBRAY AND STOURTON: My Lords, I think my noble friend Lady Emmet of Amberley has hit the nail on the head. This is a temporary measure, to conserve fuel during a emergency.
LORD CROOK: My Lords, when the noble Lord talks about statistics, does he mean that the Government have not troubled to look at the figures issued by the Royal Society for the Prevention of Accidents?
LORD MOWBRAY AND STOURTON: My Lords, the 50 m.p.h. speed limit has been in force only since December 8, and we are now at the end of January. To obtain meaningful statistics takes a longer period than that.
VISCOUNT ST. DAVIDS: My Lords, has the noble Lord been surprised, as I have, having done a journey at a speed limit of 70 m.p.h. and then later having done that journey at the limit of 50 m.p.h. at the small amount of time lost when travelling at the slower speed?
LORD MOWBRAY AND STOURTON: My Lords, what the noble Viscount says might well be the case. I am not prepared
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to answer whether it is or not. It depends on the type of road and on many other things. On the M roads the journey is going to be slower, on the ordinary roads there is not much difference.
LORD LEATHERLAND: My Lords, when the noble Lord issues these statistics will he take care to see they are more accurate than those of the coal stocks which have been issued by the Govern ment in the last year?
LORD MOWBRAY AND STOURTON: My Lords, I can assure the noble Lord, Lord Leatherland, that Her Majesty's Government never intentionally issue false figures.
BARONESS MACLEOD OF BORVE: My Lords, is the noble Lord aware that motorists are grateful to this Government for not implementing the possibility of petrol rationing?
EARL HOWE: My Lords, is my noble friend aware that a high compression engine can be seriously damaged by a speed of 50 m.p.h.? Is he further aware that consumption of petrol at 50 m.p.h. in some motor cars can be greater than that at 70 m.p.h.? Is he also aware that the difference in consumption between a speed of 50 m.p.h. and 60 m.p.h. is almost negligible? Would he take this point into consideration when the Government come to review this speed limit?
LORD MOWBRAY AND STOURTON: My Lords, I must tell the noble Earl, Lord Howe, that I answered this question a moment ago. We are aware of the fact and are legislating for the majority. I accept from him that there may be the odd car which gets caught out, as my noble friend said.
EARL HOWE: My Lords, it is not the odd car.
LORD THOMAS: My Lords, when considering time saving, would the noble Lord agree that much more time could be saved by better traffic planning on suburban roads than in wide open motorways?
LORD MOWBRAY AND STOURTON: Yes, my Lords, but I think that is another question, too.

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY AND THE UNITED KINGDOM
2.49 p.m.
LORD BROCKWAY: My Lords, I beg leave to ask the Question which stands in my name on the Order Paper.
The Question was as follows:
To ask Her Majesty's Government whether they have any knowledge of the alleged establishment of branches in the United Kingdom of the Central Intelligence Agency of the U.S.A. for the purpose of checking so-called "Subversive elements" within our trade unions and elsewhere, and including the maintenance of headquarters for the penetration of Commonwealth countries in Africa; and, if so, whether such activity is with their consent.
THE LORD PRIVY SEAL (LORD WINDLESHAM): My Lords, as my right honourable friend the Home Secretary said in a Written Answer in another place on January 24, it is a long-established practice that security matters are not discussed in public. He stated, however, that any activities of foreign intelligence agents in this country are kept under close scrutiny. Any evidence of improper activities is followed up at once.
LORD BROCKWAY: My Lords, while thanking the Leader of the House for that answer, may I ask him this question. Is not one of the difficulties of this problem that Governments and Embassies always deny knowledge of intelligence services? Is this not a matter which is of deep interest to our people? Is the noble Lord aware of the reservations which The Times expressed in its article on January 19, and its quite responsible correspondence since, about the validity of the denial which the American Embassy issued?
LORD WINDLESHAM: My Lords, the noble Lord referred to the statement made by the American Embassy—I have seen a copy of it—on January 18. The Home Secretary has already said that the Government fully accept the statement made by the United States Embassy that there is no truth in recently published allegations.
LORD BROCKWAY: My Lords, arising from the second part of the Question,
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while many of us have not been convinced by the public appearance of Mr. Copeland which gave rise to the article in The Times, may I ask whether the Minister has seen the much more serious statement by Simon Winchester, the correspondent of the Guardian on January 14, and the quotations from the book, which are much more responsible, by Victor Marchetti who was in the C.I.A. until 1969, about the C.I.A. headquarters in London to discover subversion in Africa? Even if the Government are not prepared to say that that exists, will they look very carefully into any allegations that there is such a headquarters in London applying to the internal affairs of Commonwealth countries in Africa?
LORD WINDLESHAM: My Lords, I have seen the report in the Guardian, as well as the one in The Times to which the noble Lord referred earlier. All I would say about it is that it appears to relate to events which may have taken place several years ago.
LORD HALE: My Lords, is the noble Lord aware that this was a front page attributed article in The Times giving a large number of details? In view of the fact that the Civil Service has increased, is increasing and ought to be diminished, could not some detailed dementi have been given to The Times, and indeed to the Guardian, as well as to the Sunday Telegraph, which also made further allegations last Sunday?
LORD WINDLESHAM: My Lords, the United States Embassy made a specific statement on January 18 in the course of which they said:
"There is absolutely no truth in the allegations that there has been an influx of American intelligence men into Britain in recent weeks or months. Furthermore, there are no American agents in the United Kingdom gathering information on activities of the British trade union movement."
As I have said, both the Prime Minister and the Home Secretary have fully accepted that statement.
LORD HALE: My Lords, now that we are all working happily together in the Bon Marché could the noble Lord say whether any special facilities are being given to M. Herculé Poirot or Inspector Maigret?
LORD WINDLESHAM: My Lords, the noble Lord has made his point. We must leave it there.
LORD BROCKWAY: My Lords, the Minister said that these events occurred several years ago. Is that quite true? Is it not the case that Mr. Marchetti has said quite recently that these activities have been going on regarding African countries—and I quote:
"winning over black African skins, financing newspapers, stirring up trouble of one sort and another in Africa, and the British let them."?
Does not that refer to incidents much more recent than several years ago to which the Minister referred?
LORD WINDLESHAM: My Lords, I understand these are allegations made in a book by a former member of the C.I.A. which is now the subject of court proceedings in the United States. I do not think it would be proper to discuss it in this connection.
LORD DOUGLASS OF CLEVELAND: My Lords, as these subversive elements are on an international basis, is it possible to counter them without some international organisation?
LORD WINDLESHAM: My Lords, that is an extremely important point, of course, and I am grateful to the noble Lord for raising it. So many international terrorism and guerrilla operations are now conducted on an international basis that they need to be countered by international action and co-operation in the intelligence field.

FRENCH MULTI-ROLE COMBAT AIRCRAFT
2.54 p.m.
LORD SHINWELL: My Lords, I beg leave to ask the Question which stands in my name on the Order Paper.
The Question was as follows:
To ask Her Majesty's Government whether the French Government advised them of their intention to produce the multi-role combat aircraft; and whether NATO was informed despite the statement by M. Jobert on behalf of the French Government in November last that defence matters must be based on co-operation between the Nine countries.
THE PARLIAMENTARY UNDER-SECRETARY OF STATE FOR DEFENCE FOR THE ROYAL AIR FORCE (LORD STRATHCONA AND MOUNT ROYAL): My Lords, we have close relations with the French Government over defence equipment matters and we have known for some time of their intention to develop their Avion de Combat Futur. I do not know what information the French Government may have given to their other NATO allies.
LORD SHINWELL: My Lords, is not that an astonishing reply, in view of all the euphoria about European unity? Does it mean that each of the countries associated with NATO can manufacture potentially destructive weapons without consultation with NATO or with each of the other countries?
LORD STRATHCONA AND MOUNT ROYAL: My Lords, I do not think it is an astonishing reply. The agreed NATO guidelines require us all to exchange information about our requirements and intentions, and to examine the possibility of collaboration before starting national development of important items of equipment. But the final decision on whether national requirements are compatible with co-operative procurement must rest with the Government concerned.
LORD SHINWELL: My Lords, could we then have an explanation of the speech made in November last by M. Jobert, the French Foreign Minister, in which he said that co-operation in defence matters in the E.E.C. was essential? What was the meaning of that statement in view of what the noble Lord has just said about the prerogative of each nation to produce weapons of destructive use?
LORD STRATHCONA AND MOUNT ROYAL: My Lords, I think I should emphasise that there are in fact a number of co-operative projects going on at the present time. There are three helicopters, there is Martel and there is also the Jaguar aeroplane. M. Jobert in fact made two speeches. We welcome the emphasis of those speeches on the importance of the Atlantic alliance for our common defence, and we share his concern about the problems which face us as Europeans in our future. We believe we must reflect on these pronouncements and act on them, and we hope the French will co-operate with us in the future.
LORD SHACKLETON: My Lords, while the noble Lord's reply may not be surprising, would he not agree that the situation is really quite deplorable? Does he recall that when the French withdrew from the M.R.C.A. project there was an understanding, to the best of my recollection, that they would not develop an aircraft in competition? Is not the A.C.F. in fact in direct competition? It is another swing-wing aircraft. Was it not agreed to be the most important single project? Indeed, I think my right honourable friend Mr. Healey described it as the heart of our aircraft programme. Now the French are going ahead with their own. Will not the Government make some representations with a view to trying to achieve some co-operation so that this damage which is being done to NATO will at least be appreciated by the French?
LORD STRATHCONA AND MOUNT ROYAL: My Lords, I think I ought to correct one statement of the noble Lord, I believe the A.C.F. is not in fact a swing-wing aircraft. There is rather a long history here, which I do not think I should go into at the present time. The aircraft would unquestionably do some of the same jobs as the M.R.C.A. is intended to do, but it does not by any means cover all the areas where the M.R.C.A. would operate. The noble Lord also raised the question about the future development of projects of this kind. We do pass to our allies information as to how development is proceeding, in the hope that they may collaborate with us at any time as the development proceeds.
LORD SHINWELL: My Lords, are we to understand from the noble Lord's replies that the definition of "common defence" means that each of the countries associated with NATO can produce whichever weapons it desires to produce and merely contents itself with conveying information to each of the other countries? Is that the definition of "common defence". Is that the definition of "common unity" in the E.E.C.?
LORD STRATHCONA AND MOUNT ROYAL: My Lords, if we get into defining exactly what is meant I think that we run into fairly sticky problems. In practice what we hope to do is to find the areas where we have common
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interest, but ultimately these must be the decision of the national Governments. All I can say is that we hope to leave the door open, and hope that some of our allies will walk through it.
LORD SLATER: My Lords, in view of the Government's constant attitude of mind with regard to greater European unity, would the noble Lord state whether there is any possibility of the French Government applying to re-join NATO?
LORD STRATHCONA AND MOUNT ROYAL: My Lords, I think we are straying rather wide of the original Question there.

INSURANCE COMPANIES BILL [H.L.]
THE LORD CHANCELLOR (LORD HAILSHAM OF SAINT MARYLEBONE): My Lords, I beg to introduce a Bill to consolidate, with certain exceptions, the provisions of the Insurance Companies Acts 1958 to 1973. I beg to move that this Bill be now read a first time.
Moved, That the Bill be now read 1a.—(The Lord Chancellor.)
On Question, Bill read 1a, and to be printed.

HORTICULTURE (SPECIAL PAYMENTS) BILL
THE PARLIAMENTARY SECRETARY, MINISTRY OF AGRICULTURE, FISHERIES AND FOOD (EARL FERRERS): My Lords, I understand that no Amendments have been set down to this Bill and that no noble Lord has indicated a wish to move a manuscript Amendment or to speak in Committee. Therefore, unless any noble Lord objects, I beg to move, pursuant to Standing Order No. 45(2), that the Order of Commitment be discharged.
Moved, That the Order of Commitment be discharged.—(Earl Ferrers.)
On Question, Motion agreed to.

DUMPING AT SEA BILL [H.L.]
3.1 p.m.
LORD ABERDARE: My Lords, I have it in command from Her Majesty the Queen and his Royal Highness the Prince

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of Wales that they, having been informed of the purport of the Dumping at Sea Bill, have consented to place their prerogative and interests, so far as they are concerned on behalf of the Crown, the Duchy of Lancaster and the Duchy of Cornwall, at the disposal of Parliament for the purposes of the Bill.
EARL FERRERS: My Lords, I beg to move that this Bill be now read a third time.
Moved, That the Bill be now read 3a.—(Earl Ferrers.)
On Question, Bill read 3a.
Clause 2 [Licences]:
BARONESS WHITE BARONESS WHITE moved as an Amendment:
Page 3, line 9, at end insert—
("( ) Where a licence granted in pursuance of this section permits dumping within United Kingdom waters, before issuing it the licensing authority shall inform any relevant regional water authority or the Welsh National Water Development Authority, as the case may be, and allow reasonable time for any representations to be made.")
The noble Baroness said: My Lords, I beg to move the Amendment standing in my name. On the Report stage of this Bill I moved a somewhat similar Amendment, but it was an Amendment which went a good deal further. I was not altogether surprised that the noble Earl, Lord Ferrers, resisted it, because in my earlier Amendment I proposed that there should be agreement between the licensing authority under the Dumping at Sea Bill and the relevant water authorities.
The Amendment now before your Lordships' House is much more modest, because this requires only that where a licensing authority (which in fact is the Minister), grants permission for dumping within a tidal estuary or a territorial water—and only in those circumstances, and not in the open sea—and where there is a licence granted for such dumping, then the parallel authority, which is either the regional water authority or the Welsh authority, should at least be informed that this dumping is to take place; because it is they who are responsible for effluent, which we are discussing under the environment Bill that will come before us again in a few minutes' time. It seems to me that it is only proper that they should at least have the right to be informed as to what noxious or
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objectionable matter is to be dumped in the waters for which they have this responsibility.
When we discussed this matter on Report stage, the noble Earl tried to resist that Amendment by suggesting that if one made it obligatory either to agree with or to consult—I have now watered it down to "inform"—the relevant water authorities, one would then have to bring in other people. The noble Earl even stretched it to the Crown Estates Commissioners. I do not think that he was making an altogether sound point, because those of us who have been working on the Protection of the Environment Bill are well aware of the responsibilities of the new water authorities which are to take effect in April, for the regimen of the tidal estuaries, and they also have responsibilities in the coastal waters. It seems to me, therefore, that it is most desirable that they should know exactly what is happening.
The noble Earl suggested that one wanted, as he put it, not so much statutory provision but a flexible administrative arrangement; but these arrangements do not always work. My advice is that at the present time there is a degree of dumping—not much, and not often, and I do not wish to exaggerate it—in tidal estuaries under the voluntary arrangements, and that the present river authorities, who will be superseded in due course by the water authorities, do not know in certain instances, what is being put into particularly the tidal estuaries. It appears to me that we should be quite certain that the authority that comes under the Ministry of Agriculture, Fisheries and Food, namely, the licensing authority under the Bill before us now, and the water authorities that come under the Department of the Environment and therefore have different Ministerial responsibilities and chains of communication, should each know what the other is doing.
When we were discussing the Protection of the Environment Bill last night the noble Lord, Lord Aberdare, moved a Government Amendment bringing in the Secretary of State for the Environment, with the Ministry of Agriculture, Fisheries and Food, into a clause in that Bill dealing precisely with the waters that we are discussing under this Part of this Bill; namely, coastal waters and the tidal

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estuaries. What is sauce for the goose in the Protection of the Environment Bill is surely to be sauce for the gander in the Dumping at Sea Bill. Therefore, it appears to me that it is right and proper that we should provide for what I think is reasonable and practicable; namely, information. All I am asking is that there should be a duty to inform, and then reasonable time allowed for any representations to be made.
I believe that there will not be many instances of dumping being permitted under the Dumping at Sea Bill in the tidal estuaries or coastal waters. I do not think that this is going to be a frequent occurrence. However, when it does happen, in the nature of the case the matter that is to be deposited has something wrong with it, otherwise there would not be any need for this legislation before us. Therefore, I repeat that where you have two different authorities answerable to two different Ministers, it is desirable that one should know what the other is doing. I beg to move.
3.8 p.m.
EARL FERRERS: My Lords, I am grateful to the noble Baroness, Lady White, for explaining her Amendment. I would congratulate her on her persistency and constancy because, as she indicated, she tried to move something into this Bill on Report stage, and indeed we have been in some correspondence over it. I am bound to tell her that when I saw this Amendment I was much attracted to it because it seemed to be a harmless Amendment. But on looking into it further, I found that there are other factors that should be taken into account. Also, I think that there could be an element of misunderstanding about this. I should like to try to persuade the noble Baroness of the situation as we see it.
In this Bill we are talking entirely about pollution. As she knows, the water authorities will have control over what is put into rivers—that is, fresh water—and the licensing authorities will have control over what is put into the sea—in other words, into salt water. There is a definite difference. Because what is put into the rivers eventually ends up in the sea, it has been decided, under the Protection of the Environment Bill, that
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the Ministry of Agriculture should be consulted in advance of such licences being issued, or such agreement being given, by water authorities to anyone proposing to dump in a river.
The noble Baroness said that what is sauce for the goose is sauce for the gander, and therefore when a licence is to be granted by the Ministry of Agriculture for what goes into the sea, the water authorities should be consulted. I would draw to her attention that in fact from a pollution point of view the water authorities do not have any control over what is put into the sea apart from that which extends up to the three-mile limit. But, of course, anything which goes in below high water mark is the responsibility of the Ministry of Agriculture, for this reason: all the expertise of knowing what happens to the tides, to the currents, to the winds and flows of sea is all held under their brief in the Ministry of Agriculture. They have fisheries laboratories which advise them on these things, and they have the responsibility of issuing a licence for anything that is dumped into the sea below high water mark. Therefore it would seem unreasonable in this case that the water authorities, who control what goes into the rivers, should be affected by what is put into the sea. If the noble Baroness is saying that it is going to affect their estuaries or rivers I would point out that it will be as a result of the tides; and the knowledge of what happens to the material which is dumped into the sea must and does rest with the Ministry of Agriculture. That is where their expertise lies.
I go further and say that one of the responsibilities of the Ministry of Agriculture is looking after the conservation of Fish and fish stocks. A very great proportion of this work is done within the three-mile limit, and indeed the majority of shellfish catches comes close to the shore. Again, this is one of the reasons why it is essential that the Ministry should be the licensing authority for anything which is going to be dumped into the sea and which could have a noxious affect. I have told the noble Baroness before, and I will tell her again, that while I understand her concern about this matter, I think, and indeed the Government feel, that it would be inadvisable to put this particular Amendment into the Bill. If there is any situation where a water authority's interests will be

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affected of course there will be consultation beforehand.
The noble Baroness will, I know, accept the fact that where the river authorities fundamentally deal with what is put into the rivers and into fresh water, the correct people for the grant of licences under this Bill should be the Ministry of Agriculture, where the expertise rests. But I again give the noble Baroness the assurance that where a water authority's interests are likely to be affected, there will be consultation beforehand. I hope that I have been able to allay what may be the fears of the noble Baroness. There is I think the possibility of a misunderstanding as to exactly where the separation between the duties of a water authority and the duties of the licensing authorities under this Bill occur.
3.14 p.m.
BARONESS WHITE: My Lords, with great respect, I do not think there is this difficulty. I was not for one moment arguing that one should diminish the authority of the Ministry of Agriculture, Fisheries and Food in this matter. I was merely pointing out that, especially where the great tidal estuaries are concerned, which include the Severn, the Bristol Channel, the Thames (which is tidal, as we are often told, up to Teddington), the Humber and the other great rivers which are tidal for a considerable distance, there is an intermingling both of the water and of the responsibility. It is for this reason that it still seems to me—I think the word "obdurate" was used in a recent debate—that where you have a mingling of the waters as in the great tidal estuaries, each authority ought to be at least aware of what is going on.
The responsibility, of course, rests with the Ministry of Agriculture, Fisheries and Food. I do not deny that for one moment, and the Amendment does not seek in any way to derogate from their responsibility. I cannot see that anybody reading the Amendment in its present form could be in any doubt about that. All it asks for is information, an opportunity to make representations if desired—there is not even an obligation to consult. It is simply a matter of letting the water authorities know that a licence is about to be issued, so that if by any chance they have some point of difficulty they will have an opportunity of making it known. The noble Earl says that of course they will be consulted, but when there are two quite different Ministries this does not always happen in practice. I have been given instances where, under the non-stautory arrangements which are in practice at the moment, it does not happen. Therefore, I am sorry but I have no desire to withdraw this Amendment. I think it is a sensible one. I have altered it considerably from an earlier stage. I cannot see that it can do any harm to either set of authorities. It would really take effect significantly in the great tidal estuaries where, because of their very nature, the fresh and the salt water mingle and therefore in my view the responsibilities also. To ask for information in these circumstances seems to me perfectly reasonable and practicable.
3.17 p.m.
On Question, Whether the said Amendment shall be agreed to?
Their Lordships divided: Contents, 61; Not-Contents, 78.

CONTENTS

Airedale, L.

Davies of Leek, L.

Henderson, L.

Amherst, E.

De Ramsey, L.

Henley, L.

Archibald, L.

Diamond, L.

Hoy, L.

Arwyn, L.

Donaldson of Kingsbridge, L.

Jacques, L.

Ashby, L.

Douglas of Barloch, L.

Janner, L.

Avebury, L.

Douglass of Cleveland, L.

Leatherland, L.

Birk, B.

Energlyn, L.

Llewelyn-Davies of Hastoe, B

Blackett, L.

Foot, L.

Lloyd of Kilgerran, L.

Blyton, L.

Gaitskell, B.

Popplewell, L.

Brockway, L.

Gardiner, L.

Redcliffe-Maud, L.

Buckinghamshire, E.

Garnsworthy, L. [Teller.]

Rochester, L.

Byers, L.

Geddes of Epsom, L.

Royle, L.

Chalfont, L.

Grantchester, L.

Rusholme, L.

Champion, L.

Greenwood of Rossendale, L.

St. Davids, V.

Chorley, L.

Hacking, L.

Segal, L.

Clifton of Chudleigh, L.

Hale, L.

Shackleton, L.

Craigton, L.

Hall, V.

Shannon, E.

Shinwell, L.

Wells-Pestell, L. [Teller.]

Willis, L.

Slater, L.

White, B.

Winterbottom, L.

Summerskill, B.

Williamson, L.

Wynne-Jones, L.

Taylor of Mansfield, L.

NOT-CONTENTS

Aberdare, L.

Ebbisham, L.

Macleod of Borve, B.

Alexander of Tunis, E.

Effingham, E.

Macpherson of Drumochter, L.

Amory, V.

Elles, B.

Mansfield, E.

Auckland, L.

Emmet of Amberley, B.

Margadale, L.

Balerno, L.

Erskine of Rerrick, L.

Middleton, L.

Balfour of Inchrye, L.

Ferrers, E.

Mowbray and Stourton, L [Teller.]

Belhaven and Stenton, L.

Fortescue, E.

Berkeley, B.

Goschen, V.

Northchurch, B.

Bessborough, E.

Gowrie, E.

Nugent of Guildford, L.

Bledisloe, V.

Grenfell, L.

Rankeillour, L.

Boothby, L.

Gridley, L.

Redesdale, L.

Brooke of Cumnor, L.

Grimston of Westbury, L.

Reigate, L.

Clancarty, E.

Hailsham of Saint Marylebone, L. (L. Chancellor.)

Sandford, L.

Clwyd, L.

Sandys, L.

Cole, L.

Hanworth, V.

Selkirk, E.

Coleraine, L.

Hawke, L.

Sherfield, L.

Colville of Culross, V.

Howe, E.

Strathclyde, L.

Conesford, L.

Hylton-Foster, B.

Strathspey, L.

Courtown, E.

Inglewood, L.

Thomas, L.

Cowley, E.

Ironside, L.

Trefgarne, L.

Craigavon, V.

Kinloss, Ly.

Tweedsmuir of Belhelvie, B.

Cromartie, E.

Lauderdale, E.

Vivian, L.

Daventry, V.

Lindsey and Abingdon, E.

Wakefield of Kendal, L.

de Clifford, L.

Long, V.

Windlesham, L. (L. Privy Seal.)

De La Warr, E.

Loudoun, C.

Wise, L.

Denham, L. [Teller.]

Lyell, L.

Young, B.

Drumalbyn, L.

McFadzean, L.

On Question, Amendment agreed to.

EARL FERRERS: My Lords, I beg to move the privilege Amendment.
Moved, That the privilege Amendment be agreed to,—(Earl Ferrers.)
On Question, an Amendment (privilege) made.
Bill passed, and sent to the Commons.

PROTECTION OF THE ENVIRONMENT BILL [H.L.]
3.26 p.m.
LORD ABERDARE: My Lords, I beg to move that the House do now again resolve itself into Committee on this Bill.
Moved, That the House do now again resolve itself into Committee.—(Lord Aberdare.)
House in Committee accordingly.
[The EARL OF LISTOWEL in the Chair.]
Clause 33 [Transitional provisions relating to consents]:
LORD ABERDARE LORD ABERDARE moved Amendment No. 156D:
Page 46, line 3, after ("this") insert ("Part of this").
The noble Lord said: This is a purely drafting Amendment. The provisions dealing with appeals connected with applications for consent, revocation or modification of consents and so on are to be found in Clause 32. Other provisions dealing with appeals about other matters—for example, site licences for waste disposal under Clause 8—are to be found in other Parts of the Bill, and it is appropriate to make clear in Clause 33 that the appeal provisions in Part II of the Bill are those which are referred to. I beg to move.
On Question, Whether Clause 33, as amended, shall stand part of the Bill?
THE EARL OF COURTOWN: I should like to ask the Government why they are proposing in this clause to make transitional arrangements by regulation, rather than by putting a general provision in the Bill. The fact that the Government propose to deal with transitional arrangements in this way causes additional uncertainty among those who have consents to discharge under existing legislation. I shall be grateful if the noble Lord will consider this point in order to make sure that this uncertainty is set at rest.
LORD ABERDARE: I certainly undertake to do that. The clause provides for transitional arrangements for consents that have been granted by river authorities
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or by water authorities after April 1, 1974, under powers contained in the Rivers (Prevention of Pollution) Acts 1951 and 1961, or Section 72 of the Water Resources Act 1963 or, in Scotland, the Rivers (Prevention of Pollution) (Scotland) Acts 1951 and 1965. I hope that there is no cause for concern here, but I certainly undertake to look at the point and will take into account what my noble friend has said.
BARONESS WHITE: I should like to ask a question about subsection (3), which states that consents,
"… pending immediately before the relevant day shall be treated on and after that day as an application for consent in pursuance of section 27 of this Act."
They will presumably be consents under the 1961 Act, or perhaps under other legislation. Can the Minister indicate how many such applications are likely to be outstanding because I am told that there is a considerable backlog? I wonder whether leaving the provision open like this, without any limit on the time that that they should be regarded as applications for consent under this Bill, would be sensible or good administration. Can the noble Lord tell the Committee whether the difficulty which has been drawn to my notice is as significant as I am led to believe it may be?
LORD ABERDARE: I am afraid I am not informed on that point, but I do take the point. Perhaps I could go into it and let the noble Baroness know what the answer is. Then, if she wishes, we can return to it on Report stage.
BARONESS WHITE: I am much obliged to the noble Lord.
Clause 33, as amended, agreed to.
Clause 34 [Registers]:
3.30 p.m.
BARONESS WHITE BARONESS WHITE moved Amendment No. 156B:
Page 46, line 7, leave out ("may") and insert ("shall")
The noble Baroness said: This is a very important clause because, as your Lordships will be aware, it provides for registers which are to be maintained by the authorities, and for them to be open to public inspection. But the curious thing about it—and I have had a considerable

187
number of letters about this from interested parties—is that the opening sentence of this clause says:
"Provision may be made by regulations for the maintenance by water authorities of registers containing particulars",
and then the details of the various particulars follow. This has induced an impression, which seems to be extraordinarily widespread, that the Government are not really firm in their intention in this matter. There seems to be a discrepancy between that first phrase,
Provision may be made by regulations",
and that in subsection (2) of this clause, where it says categorically,
"It shall be the duty of a water authority … to secure that registers maintained are open to inspection",
and so forth. This is leading to a considerable degree of misunderstanding. I would therefore suggest that there should be a redrafting of the first part of this clause so that it will be perfectly plain that the Government have every intention to make such regulations.
How far the regulations should include all the matters appended to this opening phrase could be considered. It may be necessary to have a further rephrasing; this particular Amendment goes possibly only part of the way. But it seems to me that if so much misunderstanding has already arisen as to the genuineness of the Government's intentions in regard to this clause it would be desirable to draft the Bill in such a way that there could be no doubt. I myself have every confidence that the Government intend to activate this clause, but I am sure the noble Lord will appreciate that there is an apparent discrepancy between the permissiveness of the first part of it and the mandatory nature of the second part of it. It was for that reason that it seemed desirable to put down this Amendment in order to draw attention to the situation. I beg to move.
LORD ABERDARE: I can give the noble Baroness an absolute assurance that the Secretary of State will be making these regulations. It is really only a matter of drafting. I understand—and it is so in other parts of the Bill—that it is normal phraseology to use the word "shall" (for example, in subsection (2),
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to which the noble Baroness drew attention) where an immediate duty is imposed; whereas "may" is not necessarily as strong, but it leaves a little bit of flexibility, for example on the question of timing. If one were to say that the provisions "shall" be made by regulations, then for a short period after the Bill was passed and before the regulations were in effect it could be held that the Secretary of State was in default. This is so right through the Bill. Wherever it is a question of regulations, the word "may" is used in various other clauses—Clauses 16, 17, 44 and 45—and this is so in other legislation, too. So I hope the noble Baroness will be satisfied with my absolute assurance that these regulations will be made, rather than changing this word here, which would entail a great many other changes in this Bill and conceivably in other Bills, too. I assure her that regulations will be made by the Secretary of State and that they will be made as soon as possible.
BARONESS WHITE: I am still not quite convinced that consistency is as essential as all that when people are going to misunderstand the proposed legislation. I should have thought one could say,
"Provision shall be made by regulations for the maintenance by water authorities of registers which may contain particulars"—
putting the permissive part of it at the end of the phrase rather than at the beginning. Of course, timing does not really matter in this particular Bill because, as I am sure the noble Lord is well aware, the very last clause, Clause 97, provides:
"This Act shall come into force on such day as the Secretary of State may by order appoint; and … different days may be appointed … for different provisions of this Act and for such different purposes of the same provision as may be specified in the order".
Therefore, if the Secretary of State is not ready to make his regulations he does not need to activate this particular clause. But that he must do it at some point of time is what people want to be assured about.
I do not propose to press this Amendment at this stage because I recognise that it may be incomplete. I had hoped that the Government might have looked at it again and had their own form of

189
words properly vetted by their draftsman, in which case I do not intend to take the Amendment any further. This is a point which, as I say, is causing a great deal of misunderstanding. I have had more letters on this particular Amendment, I think, than on almost any other in the entire Bill, because people cannot understand why it should look as though this was purely permissive and not a firm intention. I will not press the Amendment at this moment, but I should be grateful if the Minister would look at it again because in its intent, at any rate, it is a serious Amendment. In the circumstances, unless other Members wish to say anything—
VISCOUNT DILHORNE: I would hope that the Minister would not alter this language, which is common form in a very large number of Acts. The argument is put forward that people misunderstand it by reading it with "shall" in subsection (2) and by contrasting the two. One imposes a duty, and where you impose a duty you must use the word "shall". But here, in the first part of this clause Parliament is giving the Secretary of State power by regulations to do certain things. It would be inconceivable that the Secretary of State should ask for those powers unless he intends to exercise them. I feel it is really hopeless to seek to achieve the avoidance of all misunderstandings of a Bill by all people, and that that really is not a very good argument for making this change. I would take it as absolutely clear that in any Act where there is a provision that regulations may be made the intention is to make regulations dealing with the matters in respect of which power is given to make them. I think that that has been common form for a very long time indeed, and I myself certainly am not aware of any case where a power has been taken and not exercised. Therefore, I hope the Minister will stick to the form which has been recognised for so long.
BARONESS WHITE: If I may say so, that is a good legal argument, which is one of the reasons why the public so much distrust laws and lawyers. It goes against all common sense. In the circumstances, I beg leave to withdraw the Amendment.
Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.
3.39 p.m.
BARONESS WHITE BARONESS WHITE moved Amendment No. 156 C:
Page 46, line 13, leave out ("(except section 33(4))").
The noble Baroness said: This Amendment concerns the exemption of consents given under Clause 33(4), the preceding clause, from the regulations regarding registers. It is quite true, of course, that under Clause 33(4) the discharges concerned are such that one might regard them as being of not very great importance. But, nevertheless, they are discharges, and it appears to those of us who are very much interested in this question of registers that if you are to have a register at all it should be a complete register, and that one should therefore know that authority has been given for discharges whether they are under the other provisions of the Bill or of the particular kind which are described in Clause 33(4). It is really to ensure that there is a comprehensive register, so that one can have a full picture of the watercourse concerned, that one is very hesitant to agree to the exception made in Clause 34(1)(b). I should be grateful to have the Minister's comments on that matter.
LORD ABERDARE: I am grateful to the noble Baroness for drawing attention to this point which is one we should like to consider. The deemed consents in Clause 33(4), as she has pointed out, are deemed to have been given to existing discharges which, before the coming into force of the consent provision in the Bill, did not require consent. These provisions are purely transitional. In order to obtain a deemed consent the discharger has to put in an application giving details of the discharge before the new controls come into force. If he does so he gets deemed consent to continue the discharge unaltered until the notice of the application has been published and finally determined. The details of the application will be entered in the register by virtue of Clause 31(1)(a). Deemed consents are not really proper consents and we do not think it appropriate that they should be entered in the register as consents.
My right honourable friend accepts, however, that it is right that details of applications under Clause 33(4), which automatically engender deemed consents, should be kept separately. This would

191
have the merit of identifying applications in respect of existing discharges, drawing attention to the deemed consents covering those discharges until the applications have been fully examined and a considered consent, issued, and maintaining a running record of the water authorities' backlog of cases. I think that this will meet the noble Baroness's point. Certainly we should like to have a look at it. We believe that what I have suggested can be achieved simply by drafting the regulations to be made prescribing the forms of the registers so as to provide for applications having deemed consent to be kept separately from other applications. If that is so, I will let the noble Baroness know. If we do need an Amendment, I will undertake to introduce it at the next stage.
BARONESS WHITE: I am most grateful. Can the noble Lord reassure me entirely, as I am not quite clear about how many existing discharges are covered by Clause 33(4), whether any existing discharges escape this registered provision? It is plain that applications for consent made in pursuance of this part of the Act are caught. The noble Lord has explained deemed consents under Clause 33(4). Are there any other discharges now going on which would escape this register, or are they all included?
LORD ABERDARE: So far as I know they are all included, but I should like to check that to make absolutely certain, and to reassure the noble Baroness.
BARONESS WHITE: That being so—and, of course, I rely on the noble Lord to tell us whether further consideration indicates the need for other Amendments—I ask leave to withdraw the Amendment.
Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.
LORD ABERDARE LORD ABERDARE moved Amendment No. 157:
Page 46, line 14, leave out from ("conditions") to end of line and insert ("to which the consents are subject").
The noble Lord said: Clause 34(1)(b) requires particular consents to discharges to be entered in the water authority's register together with any conditions subject to which consent was given. As it is drafted at present, there is no requirement for any modification of the conditions to be entered. What we want in the
192
registers is an account of the current conditions of consent and, if amended as suggested, that is what the paragraph will require. I beg to move.
BARONESS WHITE: This is an Amendment which we all warmly welcome.
3.45 p.m.
LORD CRAIGTON LORD CRAIGTON moved Amendment No. 157D:
Page 46, line 24, at end insert—
("(e) certificates issued by the Secretary of State under section 35 of this Act.").
The noble Lord said: In moving Amendment 156C the noble Baroness, Lady White, said that if you are to have a register, it should be a complete register. This Amendment adds to the particulars recorded in the water authority's register a certificate issued by the Secretary of State under Clause 35 which gives power to the Secretary of State to exempt applications, consents and conditions, et cetera, from publicity. While the security of the Realm and trade secrets must be protected, it seems desirable that some publicity should be given at least to the fact that the Secretary of State has issued a number of such certificates and, where appropriate, the names of the persons and places concerned.
LORD ABERDARE: The noble Baroness, Lady White, has down two Amendments which cover very much the same point; they are Nos. 157C and 159A. There she suggests that the name of the applicant and the place of discharge should be entered in the register in cases where a certificate has been issued by the Secretary of State under Clause 35 and, therefore, the discharger is exempt from publicity requirement. We agree that this is a sensible requirement and the sort of information that should be made available. Therefore, I am prepared to accept these Amendments when we come to them. I am not sure whether the drafting is absolutely right, but I will accept the Amendments which seem to me to meet the point made by my noble friend. I hope that in those circumstances my noble friend will withdraw his Amendment.
LORD CRAIGTON: I am grateful to the noble Lord, Lord Aberdare, and I ask leave to withdraw the Amendment.
Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.
3.48 p.m.
BARONESS WHITE BARONESS WHITE moved Amendment No. 157A:
Page 46, line 29, after ("charge") insert ("at its own offices and those of the relevant county council").
The noble Baroness said: The point about this Amendment is that, welcome as these registers are—being open to the public free of charge at all reasonable hours—the use which may be made of this provision will for many people depend on how far they may have to travel in order to inspect the register. If I may take the position in the Principality, with which I am closely familiar, the office of the Welsh National Water Development Authority will be at Brecon. There are no trains of any kind to Brecon from any direction. There are buses, of course, but they are not always convenient, and we do not know what is going to happen to our petrol. Unless some arrangement is made for these registers to be available in certain other places, it seems to me that there will be considerable hardship for people who wish to inspect them.
For example, so far as I know, there will be no register on public view in the capital City of Cardiff. It would be improbable that the water authority will have an office at Cardiff as well as at Brecon. There are those in North Wales, but I do not know what offices will be established in North Wales. There may be some, but again they may not be in very convenient places because the counties, and the river authorities now existing, cover wide areas. In Wales we have the peculiar situation that the whole of the Severn catchment comes under the Severn-Trent authority and the headquarters, I would suppose, would be at Stoke, or some such place. This is not very convenient, Therefore, it appears to me that there is some sense at least in looking at the proposition that there should be copies of these registers available. It is purely a matter of inspecting them at the county council offices as well as at the offices of the water authorities. I would not press this Amendment in its present form, if the Minister feels that some slightly different arrangement is desirable. But I am sure he will appreciate that it may be very difficult to take advantage of the registers if they are confined to the offices of the water authorities.
VISCOUNT DILHORNE: Despite what the noble Baroness said a moment ago, on this occasion I should like to support her Amendment which has all the sense that her last Amendment lacked! What is the point of having a complete register—and it is very desirable that there should be a complete register—if it is really inaccessible to the people who want to see it? There are to be only eight water authorities. It is quite unreasonable to expect that a complete register kept by a water authority should have copies in every office of every county council, but it should be possible for persons interested to find out what is in the register relating to a particular area.
In order to meet the request of the noble Baroness, I would ask the noble Lord to suggest that the part of the register which relates to the area of a county council should be available for inspection in the county council's offices. That would meet the point the noble Baroness has made, and it is a very valid point. However, I certainly do not think it is necessary, or indeed desirable—and the cost would be very high—to have a complete copy of the register covering the whole area of the water authority in all water authorities' offices and in all county council offices. I do not think this Amendment would provide for copies of the relevant parts being kept in the offices of the county council, but I hope that the Minister will give an assurance that he will consider introducing an Amendment to bring that about. Unless something of that sort is done, keeping a complete register will serve little useful purpose.
VISCOUNT STONEHAVEN: When the Minister considers this matter, will be also consider that there is a country, with which I am slightly connected, called Scotland? We are about to abolish counties altogether. I would imagine that the appropriate wording in our case would be "district councils".
LORD HAWKE: May I put this point to the Minister? It is very important that if registers are to be kept they should be complete; in fact, registers of all samples. All too often nowadays we have cases of recurrent intestinal disorders. The general public ought to have access to the registers to see what is shown in the samples which have been

195
taken. In fact, the general public do not altogether trust the authorities not to suppress samples which show some deleterious microbes and other things. They want to be sure that all the samples are listed in the register.
LORD ABERDARE: This is an Amendment with which we have great sympathy and I am very grateful to your Lordships who have contributed to the short debate we have had on it. I can assure your Lordships that the points which have been made will be taken into consideration. We do not think it right to require copies to be kept at the county council's offices for the reason which has been given by my noble friend Lord Hawke—that these registers are of no value unless they are kept absolutely up to date. The county councils have no direct responsibility for keeping them up to date; nor do we think that they should be given this responsibility. But that does not detract from the importance of having information from the registers available at the point where the public can conveniently see it. But there is still a good deal of work to be done on the way in which these registers should be kept. For example, it will clearly be desirable to relate new applications to discharges already taking place in the particular river or stretch of river; to relate samples and their analysis to the relevant consent, and so on.
Much of the work done in connection with the organisation of the River Pollution Survey should help in this respect. The old forms of date-order "book" registration may serve for registering applications, but consent would better be kept in some geographical order in relation to the receiving water. It may be, for example, that the solution will be to have two sets of registers, both in the hands of the water authority, one complete and kept at a single location; and the other split, say, into river catchments, with each part kept at the water authority office most conveniently central to that particular catchment.
These are really only ideas. I am only thinking aloud, because the water authorities have only recently been established and they have not yet had time to consider this extremely important organisational arrangement. I am grateful, therefore, to the noble Baroness for drawing
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attention to it. I can give her the assurance that I will certainly take note of her views and those of the noble and learned Viscount and others of your Lordships who have spoken. We shall pursue the issues she has raised when we join in discussions with the water authorities in order to make administrative arrangements which will ensure that the correct and relevant part of the register is available to those people who wish to consult it.
BARONESS WHITE: This brief debate has been worth while because it has drawn attention to something which is of importance in making the clause really effective. In view of what the noble Lord has said, it may be that it is not necessary to insert anything into the Bill itself. I can appreciate the position of the water authorities. They are still not fully operative. It is obviously desirable that there should be some consultation with them. Therefore, my own feeling about, this matter, having drawn attention to it and it having received support from all quarters of the Committee, is that I should now beg leave to withdraw the Amendment.
Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.
Clause 34, as amended, agreed to.
Clause 35 [Power of Secretary of State to exempt applications, consents and conditions etc. from publicity]:
3.55 p.m.
BARONESS WHITE BARONESS WHITE moved Amendment No. 157B:
Page 47, line 6, leave out from ("be") to ("contrary") in line 8.
The noble Baroness said: I have no expectation whatsoever that the Government will accept this Amendment, but I put it down because, as one noble Lord said yesterday—I think it was the noble Viscount. Lord Bledisloe—one has the feeling that the interests of the polluter are being carefully looked after in this Bill. There is no suggestion anywhere in the Bill that there are instances where it would be in the public interest to publish certain information even though it might on occasion be held to be damaging to the interests of a person or an enterprise. I do not propose to press this Amendment, but simply again to give voice to letters which I have received, particularly from organisations

197
of which young people are very enthusiastic members, in which they say it is all very well to protect something because it would be contrary to the public interests if it were published; that is understandable but there is no provision in the Bill for saying "Look, it really is in the public interest that this should be published."
There is quite a strong feeling among young people who are intensely interested in environmental and conservation matters. I have been very impressed by some of the organisations that I have dealt with since I became interested in this Bill. It is partly because of that feeling that I felt it was only right to draw your Lordships' attention to this matter. I am speaking of people who are not what one might call "cranks", or anything of that kind, but who spend a tremendous amount of their time and energy—some of them giving up very good jobs in order to do so, I may say—because of their intense concern with these environmental matters. They feel that this Bill as a whole, while it has many good things in it, tends towards protecting the private interest rather than putting the public interest first. That is why I put down this Amendment, though I repeat that I have no great expectation that the Government's attitude to society will make them likely to accept it.
4.0 p.m.
VISCOUNT DILHORNE: I gave notice as is shown on the Marshalled List, that I intended to move to leave out this clause. I put down that Amendment for much the same reasons as prompted the noble Baroness to move this Amendment. I think I can say on this Amendment—and it will probably save time—all that I desired to say on the Motion, That the clause stand part without getting out of order. I am very puzzled by this clause because I cannot find in the Rivers (Prevention of Pollution Acts of 1951 and 1961 any corresponding clause entitling discharges to which a consent has been given under those Acts to be kept secret. It rather astonishes me to find, after those Acts have been in force for so long, that this is thought to be required. I have made some search, and although I may have missed it I cannot find a provision in the earlier Acts which is being replaced by this clause. If I am right, I ask: what are the grounds for such a provision?
198
I have criticised this Bill during our earlier discussions because it seems to me to make inadequate provisions for notifying persons likely to be affected by a consent given to a pollutant discharge and to give inadequate rights to such persons to object to and prevent such discharges. Under this Bill, despite the clauses we have considered for advertisements to be inserted in the London Gazette, and so on, we find that power is being taken to keep applications for consent to discharge secret, to keep the consents secret and to keep the samples secret. Why? If disclosure is unreasonably damaging", as the clause provides, "to the interests of the person aforesaid"—and "the person aforesaid" is the person concerned with the discharge—the Secretary of State may issue a certificate. What is meant in this context by "unreasonably damaging"? It always will be damaging to the interests of the polluter to have to incur expense in order to try to cure the pollution in every single case.
I wonder therefore what content can be given in this context to the word "unreasonably", particularly as the clause does not require the Secretary of State to consider what unreasonable damage that discharge will cause to those whose legal interests and rights will be affected by the discharge. It has no regard to the other side of the coin at all. The words "contrary to the public interest" are of the widest possible context, and if this provision is new I wonder very much on what occasions it can be said that the publication of the sample of water is contrary to the public interest. Is there any prohibition on other people, if they wish, to take a sample and have it analysed? If that is so, how can it be in the public interest to try to keep secret something which anyone is free to find out for himself?
Again, how can it be contrary to the public interest—I am very puzzled about this—to keep secret the fact or the character of a discharge? Are you going to be able to find out that a particular discharge is taking place or that any particular activity is going on—or an activity which it would be contrary to the public interest to reveal? Are you going to be able to ascertain the content of trade secrets by examining the effluent from a factory? That does not seem to me in the least likely. So I do press the noble Lord in his

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reply to give the justification for this provision if, as I think, after looking at those two earlier Acts to which I have referred, this is an entirely novel provision.
LORD HAWKE: I would go a very long way with the noble and learned Viscount but I would not go quite so far as he does regarding the public interest. Having been brought up on a diet of Bulldog Drummond, James Bond and so on, one realises that some extraordinary things can go on in this world and that the clue to them may well lie in the examination of effluent coming from places like this. I can well imagine that there may be defence establishments in respect of which it might be highly inconvenient to publish to the world that a certain type of pollution was occurring, and giving, moreover, details of the analysis. But I should like to ask my noble friend to tell us how he can justify the protection of the private individual. If the private individual is engaged in defence matters and so on, he will obviously be covered by questions of the public interest, but I cannot conceive of any other form of interest which it would be advisable to cloak in the way the Bill seeks to do. Undoubtedly if people hear of certain types of effluent being put into a stream it could stir up the "anti-effluent society", if I may so call them. That would be highly inconvenient to an individual, but I do not think it would be highly undesirable.
THE EARL OF COURTOWN: Quite often it is not the inconvenience of the private individual that is intended to be referred to this clause, as I understand it. The Royal Commission, in paragraph 8 of their Second Report, say that there will be instances, though comparatively few, where genuine confidential or trade secrets should be protected by not disclosing information about an industrial discharge, which is covered by this clause. I have some examples of these, but they are highly technical and I hope it will not be necessary to give them to the Committee. However, there is nothing particularly secret about the ones that I have.
LORD ROBBINS: Could the noble Earl be induced to specify the sort of cases he is referring to, because to the lay ear it seems to be almost incredible that these cases should be actually occurring?
4.9 p.m.
LORD ABERDARE: I can certainly justify this Clause 35, though I am afraid I could not recommend to the Committee that they accept the Amendment of the noble Baroness on this occasion. The very short answer, as my noble friend Lord Courtown has explained, is that first of all there is nothing new in the effect, at any rate, of this provision. Secondly, it is based firmly on paragraph 5 of the Second Report of the Royal Commission—I believe my noble friend referred to "paragraph 8", but it is actually paragraph 5 of the Second Report of the Royal Commission on Environmental Pollution.
Clauses 29 and 34 of the Bill contain entirely new arrangements for advertising discharges, and for public registers to be kept of details of all consents to discharges and all samples taken of discharges. This provision for publicity is completely new. Under existing legislation—and I think this is the answer to the noble and learned Viscount—it is a criminal offence to disclose, without permission from the applicant, information obtained in connection with an application for consent. Registers of consents are open only to a person appearing to the river authority to be interested in the land, premises or outlet concerned. The reference is in Section 7(7)(a) of the Rivers (Prevention of Pollution) Act 1951, and on applications and results of samples, et cetera, being confidential, the reference is in Section 12 of the 1961 Act. So the difference is that now there will be publicity for applications, consents and for samples. These provisions follow the Second Report of the Royal Commission on Environmental Pollution. Unless there are strong arguments to the contrary, the intention is that information about applications and consents for discharges made to rivers, estuaries and the sea, should be available to anyone who wants it. We think it is necessary to make provision for the very exceptional case, and this is the point of Clause 35.
The Royal Commission were of the opinion that as a rule the legislation which protects secrecy over industrial effluents and wastes no longer safeguards genuine trade secrets; that is, operations and knowledge which have a real financial value in that they give an advantage over a competitor or could be licensed for royalties. They felt that, whatever

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reasons of this kind existed in the past they were less valid now because in large industrial complexes effluents from many processes are mixed. Even so, this is simply the general rule, and the Commission go on to say—and I think this is the answer to the noble Lord, Lord Robbins—that of course this is not always so and that confidentiality may sometimes be important where there is a single chemical operation on a single site, but nowadays such cases are relatively uncommon.
LORD ROBBINS: Would the noble Lord enlighten us on his attitude concerning what I thought was ultimately the telling point made by the noble and learned Viscount concerning the accessibility of this information? The noble and learned Viscount said that it was open to anybody to take samples of the water in question. Is not that a conclusive argument in his favour?
VISCOUNT BLEDISLOE: Supposing there is a secret discharge into my river, am I or am I not entitled to take a sample to find out what it is and to tell the world what it is? So far as I can see I am not prevented from doing that.
LORD ABERDARE: If I may answer my noble friend's question first, certainly his legal rights are unchanged. Under Clause 36 he can apply for an injunction or damages, or anything of that kind.
VISCOUNT BLEDISLOE: That was not my point. If I take the sample and discover what the secret effluent is, I can have it analysed and publish the answer, can I not? Then the secrecy has gone.
LORD ABERDARE: I should have thought that by the time the sample had been taken from the river it would have been altered from what it was when it went into the river. I do not want to go into too much detail here because these are very exceptional cases; there may be none of them at all. All one is saying—and this is following exactly the Report of the Royal Commission—is that it is conceivable that there could be a case, either of a defence contract, which was mentioned by my noble friend Lord Courtown, or of a specific operation where a secret process was involved. There we think there should be an exception available.
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Even if the Secretary of State is satisfied that confidentiality is justified in a particular case, the discharge will still be subject to the full measure of control by the water authority, and the exemption from the publicity clauses also carries with it the fact that the, discharger would not have the benefit of Clause 36 as it is at present restraining the issue of an injunction. These will be very exceptional cases; they will be fully controlled by the water authority; riparian owners and others will have their full legal rights. I hope that your Lordships will agree that this is a wise provision to make in view of the recommendation of the Royal Commission.
VISCOUNT DILHORNE: In view of what the Minister has said, I would not seek to challenge the view of the Royal Commission. But the provisions of this clause are unnecessarily wide. He says there may be exceptional cases. I hope that it will only be in exceptional cases that this clause will operate. The clause as such does not provide that it shall be only in exceptional cases; it indicates that it can be operated when it is unreasonably damaging to the interests of a person. I do not know what those words are meant to mean, what they are intended to signify. If the noble Lord means that in cases where disclosure would reveal, or be likely to reveal, an important trade secret this clause should spell it out and not use vague language. Every person engaged in trade who wants to keep his discharge secret will say (and there may be some substance for doing so) that disclosure would be unreasonably damaging to him. That is not the test in accordance with the argument we have listened to from the Minister.
The point put by my noble friend Lord Bledisloe indicates to the Committee that this is a rather pointless clause, because any riparian owner is at liberty to take a sample at the actual point of discharge of effluent into his river if the point of discharge is on his property. That being so, he will get the sample without any dilution to speak of; he may be able to discover the alleged trade secret from analysis of the sample and he will be free to publish it to the world, or give the information to anyone who desires it.
I do not think there is very much to this clause, but I should like to ask the

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noble Lord to look at the wording again and to narrow it, and make the wording conform more precisely than it does at the present moment to the intention which he says lies behind the clause.
LORD ABERDARE: I am very ready to do that. At Second Reading there was a good deal of discussion on this clause. A number of noble Lords suggested that Clause 71, to which we shall be coming later, should be brought more into line with Clause 35. We looked at this after the Second Reading debate. We are of the opinion, as the noble Viscount pointed out, that perhaps Clause 71 is rather more tightly drawn than Clause 35. Clause 71 refers to prejudicing to some unreasonable degree some private interest by disclosing information about a manufacturing process or trade secret. This might be a better expression to use in Clause 35, as it is much more tightly drawn. I should like to consider this further. If, by making it tighter, that seems a better alternative, I will undertake to do so.
BARONESS WHITE: I am afraid that if the noble Lord is going to put into Clause 35 information about the manufacturing process, we shall be much more unhappy than we are, because virtually any information about effluents or emissions from a place of manufacture could be taken to refer to some manufacturing process. I can see the point made by the noble and learned Lord about the difficulty of interpreting what could be regarded as "unreasonably damaging to the interests of the person aforesaid" in Clause 35. However, if he wishes to have it tied to a manufacturing process—
VISCOUNT DILHORNE: I was not suggesting any form of words. I would be content with the emphasis being placed on "trade secrets," and having that put in. I did not put forward the words, "the manufacturing process. "What I suggested was that the present words in Clause 35 are far too wide and too ill-defined.
BARONESS WHITE: I am glad to have that assurance, because this reference to the manufacturing process" I found entirely unacceptable. I am not sure whether, when we reach it, the noble and learned Lord is going to move to
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leave out the entire clause. If he is, I shall be most happy to support him.
VISCOUNT DILHORNE: I say straightaway that I have said what I have to say in this debate. I put down "leave out Clause 35" to indicate that I was going to raise questions in regard to it. I have no intention of dividing upon it despite the encouragement, on this occasion, that the noble Baroness has given me.
BARONESS WHITE: For once I might have been very happy to have marched into the same Lobby as the noble and learned Lord. However, as he is not prepared to lead the troops on this occasion, perhaps that is a rather empty gesture.
I can see that one may not be able to press this particular Amendment, but I am unhappy about it. I am glad to learn from the noble Lord, Lord Aberdare, that it is the intention of the Government that such exemptions should be very few and far between. I think I have some of the same information as the noble Earl, Lord Courtown. It refers to trace elements and things of that nature which are said to be insignificant in relation to the quality of the water, but they might possibly be of some use to rivals in the same field of manufacture. I am prepared to ask leave to withdraw this particular Amendment, although with very great reluctance because I take the same attitude towards this entire clause as the noble and learned Viscount, Lord Dilhorne, and wish that it were not in the Bill. However, for the moment, I beg leave to withdraw this Amendment.
Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.
4.23 p.m.
BARONESS WHITE BARONESS WHITE moved Amendment No. 157C:
Page 47, line 14, at end insert—
("Provided that the name of the applicant and the place of the proposed discharge shall in all cases be made public in the register referred to in subsection (2) of the preceding section.")
The noble Baroness said: I think it would be for the general convenience if the Committee considered this Amendment and Amendment No. 159A, which makes exactly the same point. I understood from what the Minister said that the Government are prepared, in principle at any rate, to accept these Amendments

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which simply secure that if this clause is maintained in the Bill the register shall include reference to these reserved discharges, or whatever they might be called, so that they cannot be entirely shrouded in secrecy. At least the world will know that a secret discharge is being made at a certain place and by a certain person or enterprise. That will at least get them a little nearer to what I believe is the general intention of the Royal Commission on Environment and Pollution. I beg to move.
LORD ABERDARE: I am prepared to accept these two Amendments in principle. I agree with the noble Baroness that where there is a discharge that the Secretary of State has seen fit to allow to be on the register without full details because it would either be to the detriment of the discharger giving some trade secret away, or not in the public interest, that nevertheless the discharge should be entered on the register. I think that the name of the applicant and the place of the proposed discharge are the two matters that should be listed. I accept the noble Baroness's Amendments. I would like to be able to look at the drafting, because we are not quite certain whether the name of the applicant concerned with the discharge may not be the right one to put in the register. But I will certainly accept it at the moment. We can always make alterations later on.
BARONESS WHITE: I am very much obliged to the noble Lord. However, when he is considering re-drafting this clause, I wonder whether he could also take this point. What he has said about the discharges being subject to the control (which applies to all discharges) is perfectly accurate, but nevertheless I am still concerned about public opinion in these matters. I think it would be very helpful if, when the Secretary of State agrees that there should not be disclosure of these details, it should be regarded at any rate as common form that there should be some indication that the discharge is regarded as not inimical to health or something of that sort. There is an intense suspicion that, for reasons of private gain which could be to the detriment of the public people will escape the provisions which this part of the Bill seeks to provide. I assume that the Secretary of State would not in fact agree
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if he thought there was any serious danger or detriment to the public. In any case, the water authority would have the information and would have to take steps, presumably, of seeing that the right thing is done in such a way that so far as possible the public would understand that this is so. If there is any method whereby that could be secured, that would help us with this awkward and difficult clause. But since the noble Lord wishes to look again at the drafting, I beg leave to withdraw the Amendment.
Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.
4.27 p.m.
LORD ABERDARE LORD ABERDARE moved Amendment No. 158:
Page 47, line 22, leave out ("(a)") and insert ("(b) or (c)").
The noble Lord said, With the Committee's consent, I will speak to Amendments Nos. 158 and 159 together. After the passing of the present Bill, there will be no more applications under existing Acts. For that reason, the reference to subsection (1)(a) of Clause 34 is incorrect. The references should be to (1)(b) and (1)(c) which deal with information about consents, with conditions attached to them, and about samples which it may be appropriate to exempt from publicity. The Amendment makes this correction.
I beg to move Amendment No. 158.
LORD ABERDARE: I beg to move Amendment No. 159.
Amendment moved—
Page 47, line 24, after ("subject") insert ("or any sample of effluent taken from a discharge to which the consent relates or any information produced by analysis of such a sample ").—(Lord Aberdare.)
Clause 35, as amended, agreed to.
Clause 36 [Publicised discharges not to be restrained]:
4.30 p.m.
LORD ABERDARE LORD ABERDARE moved Amendment No. 160:
Page 47, line 41, leave out ("contract or agreement") and insert ("agreement or undertaking").
The noble Lord said: Clause 36 provides that publicised discharges which are made in accordance with consent and any

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conditions attached to the consent may not be restrained by injunction, or in Scotland by interdict. Subsection (2) goes on to say that this shall not affect any remedy in respect of a breach of a covenant, contract or agreement. The deletion of the word "contract" is a drafting Amendment since the terms "covenant" and "agreement" will subsume all cases of contracts; while the insertion of the word "undertaking" provides in effect for a unilateral promise as well as for the bilateral agreements that are already covered. I beg to move.
On Question, Whether Clause 36, as amended, shall stand part of the Bill?
VISCOUNT BLEDISLOE: Some years ago I had the honour of being appointed by the then Minister of Agriculture, my noble friend Lord Amory, to be Chairman of a Government Committee to advise on fishery legislation. That Committee reported on March 1, 1961. The Report was unanimous, and I think I can say that it was very well received by the fishing community. By far the most important problem which that Committee had to consider was the question of river pollution, and with your Lordships' leave I propose to refer to certain parts of the Report. It is the Report of the Committee on Salmon and Freshwater Fisheries (Cmnd. 1350).
We dealt with pollution at page 41, paragraph 149. We said—and I quote:
"It became increasingly evident to us, when we received and heard evidence from organisations and individuals concerned with the preservation and improvement of our inland fisheries, that the pollution of our rivers, streams and estuarial waters was, together with the allied problem of water abstraction, the most serious question affecting fisheries. We have been told that for general purposes the term 'pollution' is very hard to define though the condition itself is easily recognisable. Fortunately a criterion to meet our needs is readily available in Section 8 of the Salmon and Freshwater Fisheries Act, 1923, which reads as follows:
'8. (1) No person shall cause or knowingly permit to flow, or put or knowingly permit to be put, into any waters containtaining fish, or into any tributaries thereof, any liquid or solid matter' "—
this is the important point—
"'to such an extent as to cause the waters to be poisonous or injurious to fish or the spawning grounds, spawn or food of fish, and if any person contravenes this subsection
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he shall be guilty of an offence against this Act'."
On page 42 of the Report, we continued:
"When, therefore, in this report we use the term 'pollution' we mean the putting into any waters of any matter to such an extent as to cause the waters to be poisonous or injurious to fish or the spawning grounds, spawn or food of fish.
150. It was pointed out to us that it would be largely a waste of time to consider such problems as close seasons for fishing, provision of fish passes and penalties for poaching, unless and until the dual threat to our inland fisheries caused by pollution and water abstraction was brought under effective control.
151. In view of the wider aspects of the problem we were fortunate in that a review of legislation affecting pollution was undertaken by a sub-committee (the Armer Committee) of the Central Advisory Water Committee, which began work under the chairmanship of Sir Frederick Armer, K.B.E.. C.B. M.C. shortly before our Committee was set up. Their report was published in January, 1960. We consider that if the recommendations of that committee are implemented the reduction of pollution, which has been in progress ever since the setting up of river boards, will be accelerated, and this must clearly be for the benefit of the fisheries of the country. We welcome the report whole-heartedly.
Remedies Available
152. The remedies available against the polluter are two, namely:

(i) the ancient common law rights available to riparian owners and others with proprietary rights in the fisheries concerned, and

(ii) the statutory powers conferred on river boards and others.

It is, we think, essential to distinguish clearly between these two separate and distinct classes of remedy. The former is a civil remedy available to persons with proprietary rights and enforceable in the civil courts by the granting of injunctions and the award of damages, whilst the latter is a criminal remedy depending on the commission of a statutory offence punishable by fine or imprisonment."
Then comes our recommendation:
"In our view these remedies are, and ought to remain, complementary to each other."
We continued, at paragraph 153:
"Whilst we would agree with the members of the Armer Committee that there is a general desire amongst those discharging effluent into rivers to co-operate in securing their improvement' … we apprehend that there are some who would not hesitate to take advantage of any relaxation or loophole in the law relating to the prevention of pollution, or who might be careless when introducing a new process or when modifying their plant.
154. In this connection we recall the words of Lord Evershed, M.R., in the case of Pride

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of Derby and Derbyshire Angling Association Ltd., and another—v.—British Celanese, Ltd. and the Derby Corporation and another, 1953, Ch. 149 in which case at page 162 he said:
'But Sir Andrew Clark (who appeared for the Derby Corporation) … went to the length of arguing, if it were necessary, that no injunction ought ever to be granted against a local authority in any circumstances, at any rate in regard to its sewage works. He argued further that an injunction, though negative in form, being mandatory in substance was a means of bringing, as I understand him, some sort of improper pressure to bear upon the Minister in the exercise of his duties in granting licences and so forth, and further it was a wrongful interference with the Corporation's own right to deal with their own problems in such order as they thought fit'.
That argument did not commend itself to the Court of Appeal and an injunction was granted against the Derby Corporation who were discharging, and arguing that they were entitled to continue to discharge, inadequately treated sewage into the River Derwent.
155. In the case of Martell and others—v.— Consett Iron Co. Ltd., 1955, Ch. 363, the Defendants were seriously polluting the waters of another River Derwent. Rather than take steps to cease polluting the river the Defendants attempted to stifle the proceedings by arguing at great length both before Danckwerts J. and the Court of Appeal a highly technical legal point. It was only when this very artificial plea had failed that the Consett Iron Co. Ltd. gave an undertaking to the Court to cease polluting the river and paid substantial damages to the Plaintiffs. In fact the Consett Iron Co. Ltd. ceased polluting immediately thereafter and installed a closed circuit system.
156. That bodies will still exist who would welcome and presumably use any relaxation in the law relating to pollution became evident to us during the examination of witnesses who gave evidence before us, for example:

(i) The British Iron and Steel Federation advanced the view that both the common law and the provisions of Section 8 of the Act of 1923 ought to be relaxed in view of the Act of 1951.

(ii) The National Coal Board also wished to modify both the common law and Section 8 of the Act of 1923 for the same reason.

(iii) The Federation of British Industries wished to see Section 8(1) of the Act of 1923 repealed for the same reason.

(iv) The Gas Board also wished to modify both the common law and Section 8 of the Act of 1923. In addition they asked that the provisions of paragraph 32 of the Third Schedule to the Gas Act, 1948, re-enacting the Gas Works Clauses Act of 1847, should be modified in favour of the particular type of discharge involved in the manufacture of gas.

157. Whilst calling attention to the above evidence it is only fair to record that, generally
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speaking, we formed the view that industry and many local authorities were anxious to co-operate in lessening the pollution of our rivers, streams and estuarial waters, and we acknowledge that very large sums of money have been expended to that end.
Paragraph 158 reads:
"The majority of the witnesses who gave evidence (either written or oral) before us, however, were unanimous in considering that it was of fundamental importance that the common law remedies should be preserved intact, not least because the right of a fishery owner or riparian owner is a right of property and it would be unusual if this particular kind of right were not protected by the civil courts."
Paragraph 159—and this is our recommendation—reads:
"We would unhesitatingly endorse the recommendations of the majority of the Armer Committee (to the same effect as the recommendations of the Hobday Committee embodied in Section 11(6) of the Rivers (Prevention of Pollution) Act, 1951), namely, that no alteration should be made in the common law relating to river pollution.
We go on to say:
160. Generally speaking it is, we think, a sound principle to keep civil and criminal remedies and punishments in their own separate and distinct categories. If, for example, one's car is damaged owing to the action of a dangerous driver of another car, damages are recoverable in the civil courts and the dangerous driver can be prosecuted in the criminal courts, and in that way the individual's rights are protected and the dangerous driver is punished for his offence in the interests of public safety. Valuable as the common law remedies against the polluter undoubtedly are they are not, and cannot, constitute the sole remedy. In this connection we would quote from the speech† of Lord Forbes during the debate in the House of Lords on 3rd December, 1959 on the Pollution of Rivers and Estuaries when he said: "From time to time some riparian owners have brought actions against polluters in an attempt to clean up our rivers. Surely, however, the battle of the rivers should be fought not by a few riparian owners, but by the nation". We unanimously endorse this viewpoint. Whilst we welcome wholeheartedly the part played by riparian owners, the duty of protecting our inland fisheries from the activities of the polluter must in the long run rest squarely on the shoulders of the river boards.
161. The common law remedies against the polluter suffer from the following limitations:

(i) They are only available if and when a riparian owner or other person with proprietary rights sees fit to institute what may well be very expensive proceedings, and, even if he does so, he may be content to accept damages and allow the pollution to continue.

(ii) The common law remedy of an injunction is more appropriate to a continuing than to an isolated or temporary pollution.

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(iii) The common law remedy is not available to protect public rights such as exist in most estuaries.

It would, in our view, be equally erroneous to say that the statutory remedies could safely be relaxed owing to the existence of the common law remedies, as it would be to say that the common law remedies could safely be relaxed owing to the existence of the statutory remedies.
I apologise for reading at some length from that Report, but your Lordships will see that three separate Committees—my Committee, the Hobday Committee and the Antler Committee—reached the same conclusion; namely, that no alteration in any circumstances should be made in the common law relating to river pollution.
This Bill is entitled, somewhat cynically, I think, the Protection of the Environment Bill, and Clause 36 is designed to do away with the right of a fishery owner to obtain an injunction to stop pollution, in direct conflict with the recommendations of all three of those Committees. A curious feature of Clause 36 is that while its purpose is to do away with the right of a fisherman to obtain an injunction (or interdict in Scotland), it purports to preserve the rights to damages. That appears to contemplate a situation in which legalised pollution destroys fish and allows the fishery owner or members of a fishery club to obtain damages. But the truth of the matter is that fishermen do not want damages; they want to catch fish. I suggest to your Lordships that fishing is a healthy recreation, and it is one enjoyed not only by the salmon and trout anglers but by our coarse fishermen; and I am told that they number over 2 million. Their interests are well looked after by the National Federation of Anglers, who gave most useful evidence before my Committee.
These common law rights to obtain injunctions (or interdict in Scotland) have in the past been by far the largest factor in cleaning up our rivers. In the majority of cases that have come before the courts an injunction has been granted against a polluter, but he has always been given time—and plenty of time—to treat his effluent so as to render it harmless. What happens—and I have been engaged in many of these cases—is that the court grants the injunction and gives the polluter anything up to a year or more to put things right.
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What this Bill appears to contemplate is that pollution which damages a fishery (otherwise why preserve the right to damages?) should be permitted. Generally speaking, I think it is true to say that there are two types of polluters: there are the industrial undertakings and factories, and there are local authorities who are discharging untreated or semi-treated sewage into the rivers. Why should our rivers be polluted so as to enable industrialists to save money for themselves and their shareholders by not treating their effluent properly, or to allow the local authorities to refrain from installing proper sewage treatment plants?
But there is another way of looking at this matter. This right of a fishery owner to obtain an injunction to prevent pollution is simply one example of the ancient common law right belonging to every individual to prevent a nuisance. Let me give an example. If you like in a flat and somebody in the flat above plays loud "pop" music all night, you can get an injunction to stop him. You want a night's sleep: the award of damages is no good to you. Similarly, a fisherman or fishing club or riparian owner wants to catch fish; it is no consolation to him, when he gets no fish, that the fishery owner gets damages. Take, for example, the coarse fishermen. What comfort is it to them if some riparian owner who has let the fishing to them gets maybe a considerable sum in damages? The fishing is ruined; no more fish, no more sport; and, incidentally, the owner cannot get any more damages because once the damage is done there are no fish and there is no more damage. Why should the normal common law rights—very ancient rights—to obtain injunctions against nuisances, against torts, be taken away in the special case of polluted rivers? In my submission this is a very serious inroad into our ancient and well-established common law rights, and I cannot believe that it would commend itself to our judges and lawyers.
In this connection I have a letter from the Lord Chief Justice, who unfortunately cannot be here this afternoon. What he says is this:
"I doubt if I shall be able to get down to the House of Lords … but I shall be with you in spirit.
"I was in one of the Anglers' Co-operative Association cases when I was at the Bar, and I know what good work they did in preventing

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the deterioration of the rivers which was then going on. They established that the private rights of the riparian owner were paramount, and were to be maintained despite arguments to the contrary based on so-called public interest. The present Bill makes it perfectly clear that if a consent to pollute is given by one of the appropriate authorities, the riparian owner will have no right to seek a remedy by injunction, though he can get damages for what they are worth. At a time when our rivers are getting cleaned up and are I believe, very much better than they were when the A.C.A. started their campaign, it seems to me to be a retrograde step to take away one of the most effective weapons which has contributed to the clearing-up. I wish you well."
That is a letter from the Lord Chief Justice, Lord Widgery. I have a similar letter from the Master of the Rolls, Lord Denning, who I rather hoped would be here this evening, but it is difficult for him to get away.
What I say is that Clause 36, if it is allowed to become law, will constitute a serious inroad into our common law. There have been three Committees who have considered this matter, and all three have recommended that on no account should this right be taken away. The Government are flying in the face of the recommendations of all three Committees, and I ask your Lordships to leave out Clause 36.
4.52 p.m.
VISCOUNT DILHORNE: The noble Viscount, Lord Bledisloe, has made a powerful speech in relation to this clause, and with his experience as Chairman of the Committee whose Report he quoted he speaks with authority. Some days ago, in the course of some observation on an earlier Amendment, I ventured to express the opinion that this Bill weakens the existing law. At that time I had particularly in mind this provision in Clause 36.
I have already complained of the slanting, as it seems to me, of the Bill against riparian owners and others with legal interests in rivers. In referring to that I have not been thinking only of those with fishery interests because the provision goes far wider than affecting merely those with fishery interests. I am not against the water authority having all the powers it should have and all the duties imposed upon it which this Bill suggests. But this Bill seeks to put a water authority over and above the law in relation to a consent which the water authority, in the exercise of its discretion, has given for the discharge of polluting matter. For that I can
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see no justifiable reason at all. Why should the rights of individuals—and not only of individuals—be restricted because a water authority has given a consent to, say, an industrialist to make a polluting discharge? I can see no reason for it. When I say "not only the rights of individuals", I say it for this reason. I have received communications—I hasten to say that they were entirely unsolicited—from the British Waterways Board severely criticising this decision and saying that if it is carried into effect it will considerably inhibit them in their efforts to keep canal waters clean. They have found—and it is no doubt the case—that an injunction is a very effective weapon.
I have myself had experience on both sides. I remember years ago being in a court where the Thames Conservancy, who are not concerned only with fisheries, were prosecuting in respect of very serious pollution in a river which flows into the Thames. They were prosecuting the local authority in the borough magistrates' court. I am sorry to say that on that occasion—and it is many years ago now—there was a very considerable miscarriage of justice. The Thames Conservancy, although they made two attempts which ought to have succeeded, did not succeed in obtaining a conviction at all. It was then left to a riparian owner to bring proceedings in the civil court for an injunction. The application was strenuously fought. I was in the case, and it lasted, according to my recollection, 31 days. In the end, the injunction was obtained and the pollution, which in those days the Thames Conservancy had failed to achieve, was prevented. I have been on the other side, defending a borough corporation for causing pollution—and on that occasion not unsuccessfully. So I agree with my noble friend that one really ought to have both these remedies.
I think it is true to say that the industrial polluter is more frightened of an injunction than he is of a prosecution. He may be fined as a result of a prosecution, and if he likes, he can run the risk of being fined again. It may be far less expensive for him to pay the fines than it is to put the matter right and stop the pollution. In the same way, he may much prefer to pay damages and go on polluting. This particular clause preserves the right of the riparian owner to obtain damages. But the one thing the

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polluter hates is to be told that what he is doing in polluting our rivers and our waters has got to stop. I really do not understand why this Bill, which is concerned with the protection of the environment, should take away the right of those with proprietary interests to seek to obtain an injunction.
It is not everyone who can go along to the courts and ask for an injunction. It must be requested by someone who has a legal interest, such as the British Waterways Board, or a private individual, or an angling club. That person must be able to show that damage will be suffered by him because of the discharge. So it is not just anyone who can go along and ask for an injunction. Proceedings for an injunction are expensive and are not lightly undertaken. At the end of the day, the granting of an injunction is a discretionary remedy. Even though the court is satisfied that pollution is occurring and has occurred, it does not follow that it will then grant an injunction. The court has discretion as to whether to do so or not, and I venture to think that where a water authority, which I assume will be and is entirely responsible, has been given consent to a discharge of polluting matter it will need a strong case to induce one of Her Majesty's judges to the conclusion that it would be right to grant an injunction. But such cases may occur. And the fact that it requires a strong case to bring about that result is no argument for taking away that power from the court, as this clause proposes.
Let us consider what happens. The injunction, if granted, is, in my experience, always suspended to give a polluter time within which to operate and put the matter right. It may be suspended for 12 months. If at the end of the 12 months the polluter has done nothing he may expect very serious consequences. If he shows that he has made a real effort but has not quite completed the task, then I have no doubt—and it has happened—the suspension of the injunction will be continued. I see no reason why the powers of the court in this respect should be limited as this clause proposes. I cannot think why the clause is in the Bill at all. I do not think I need add anything except to say that I hope we shall succeed this afternoon in removing
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it; and if the Minister does not agree to its being removed, I hope that on this occasion the noble Baroness will not feel embarrassed in accompanying me into the Division Lobby.
5.1 p.m.
LORD STOW HILL: My name is down to the Amendment to leave out Clause 36. Had it not been, I would not have presumed to take the time of the Committee by offering any observations after the two most powerful speeches to which we have just listened. I will endeavour to be very brief. This, clause, in my submission, is a most extraordinary clause in principle. I speak in the presence of three extremely distinguished judges. We are to put them in the position of hearing a case, finding on the evidence and the argument that the case is established, that the rights of some private individual or possibly a body like the British Waterways Board have been infringed, that there has been a breach of the law and a civil wrong has been established. Having come to that conclusion they are then to say, "Certainly we can award damages here. Our own view is that justice requires that we should in addition grant an injunction. Damages is not, in our view, in the circumstances of this case a sufficient remedy. But we cannot grant an injunction." They look with some dismay and puzzlement through this Bill to try to discover why, what is behind it. I should have thought that their researches in that regard could only lead to growing bewilderment on their part, as it certainly does on mine.
It seems to me this is a completely topsy-turvy clause without any kind of justification in principle that I can possibly think of. It is not as if learned judges automatically granted injunctions when they found that some civil right had been infringed. As the noble and learned Viscount, Lord Dilhorne, has pointed out, they consider very carefully, in the circumstances of each case, whether in addition to any damages which they feel they ought to award it would be appropriate, and justice would require, that they should grant an injunction. Very often an injunction—and I speak with hesitation before them, in view of their very great experience—is the only really effective remedy which is appropriate to the circumstances of a

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given case; damages would be quite inadequate. Nevertheless, they cannot proceed to do what they think in the circumstances is just. They have to say to themselves, "No, we are to be inhibited by a completely unintelligibly worded clause", or section, as it would be at that time.
I do not want to take up the time of the Committee further, but I very respectfully urge upon your Lordships that in principle and as a matter of justice and common sense this clause cannot conceivably be justified. If the assumed polluter has obtained consent, he is excused from a risk of any criminal proceedings being taken against him so long as he acts within the terms of the consent. But if, besides that, he infringes somebody else's rights, for some reason he cannot be ordered by the courts to do what justice requires and submit to an injunction to stop him from continuing the unlawful action upon which he has been shown to be engaged. I beg to support this Amendment.
THE EARL OF COURTOWN: I speak with diffidence in the face of so much legal eminence. I have no legal training myself, and I speak only with such common sense as I believe I have. This clause has to be looked at in relation to the whole Bill. Here we now have water authorities with great powers to deal with the polluter. The water authority have indeed the main responsibility of seeing that all emissions are of an acceptable standard of purity. The applicant for consent has to make his case, and the water authority can call on various sorts of technical knowledge to help them make a decision. Others who think they may be affected have ample opportunity to make submissions. In my opinion to allow them also to seek injunctions would duplicate the safeguards which the water authority exercise, without deploying the equivalent technical expertise.
If the clause is deleted, a man who is running a business, who has gone through all the procedures of obtaining a consent, has been subject to all the tests which have had to be met, and has put in whatever plant is necessary or is regarded as necessary by the water authority, may find his whole livelihood and those of his employees put at risk—this in spite of the fact that he has taken all these precautions. This seems most
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inequitable. I hope the Government will strongly resist this Amendment.
LORD DENNING: May I say one word? I think it is over twenty years now since we had the Pride of Derby case, and we granted an injunction to prevent the pollution of our rivers by sewage, which was claimed to be justifiable. We gave the particular corporation opportunity, over a period of time, to remedy it, but we did grant an injunction and I think it succeeded. Ever since that time the remedy by injunction has been one of the most powerful remedies for ensuring the cleanliness of our rivers.
As I understand it, the point in this Bill is that the remedy of injunction is to be taken away from our courts. It is said, "Well, all the tests will have been gone through. The consent of the water authority will have been obtained". That is to put the ultimate decision not in the hands of the judges but in the hands of an executive authority. It is not as though the judges would exercise this power unwisely. If the consent is produced, they will certainly take it into account. If it is a case in which damages would be an adequate remedy, the court can certainly take that into account and award damages in lieu of an injunction. But this Bill would go further. It would take away the remedy of the courts in respect of an injunction. I see no necessity for it whatsoever. The consent certainly will be taken into account, the remedy by damages will be taken into account; but ultimately the power of the courts to award an injunction should, and I suggest must, remain in the judges, to maintain the cleanliness of our rivers.
VISCOUNT ST. DAVIDS: I am not a lawyer, nor am I a fisherman. I am a representative, perhaps, of the other users of the waterways, of whom there are many. I myself am a navigator, but there are far more numerous users of the waterways, who are not navigators but who are walkers, campers, all sorts of people who enjoy these waterways in all manners. Over all these years, we have, however, been at a disadvantage compared with the fishermen.
We have not been able to protect our waterways with an injunction because we have had no visible rights for which an injunction could be granted. However,

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we have been perfectly aware that our waterways have been protected by the army of fishermen that we see sitting along the banks. While the fishermen are where they are, we are aware that there are fish, and that the water is therefore of a certain standard of purity. In this manner, the fishermen are in fact the front line fighters. They have the weapon in their hands, and they protect the waterways. More strength to their rods, say I. I will certainly go into the Lobby to remove this clause from the Bill.
5.11 p.m.
LORD ENERGLYN: I should like to support the noble Lords who have placed a very powerful case before the Government. It cannot be too often repeated that this clause has the effect of removing the common law rights of a riparian owner to take proceedings in the courts for an injunction. I am aware that the Report of the Royal Commission on the Environment and Pollution suggests that this might be a safeguard against unwarranted common law actions, but I am very reluctant to see this well based type of attack disappear. As has been said, it was all due to the initiative of the Pride of Derby Anglers Association in taking common law proceedings in 1954 against the Derby Corporation and Celanese that largely cleared up the River Derwent, in spite of the apathy on the part of the local authorities at that time.
At a recent meeting of the Nottingham University Environmental Studies Group, which was founded by generous grants from Allied Breweries, the subject of this clause was discussed in great depth. I was impressed by the evidence that I heard from such professors as Professor Lees and Professor Garner, concerning this very clause. This afternoon all this evidence has been endorsed, and I should like to join with the three noble Lords in pressing their plea to the Government to remove this clause.
VISCOUNT DILHORNE: May I say one word in reply to the noble Earl, Lord Courtown. The industrialist he instanced who has gone to all the trouble of getting in the consents and everything else, runs no risk at all of proceedings for an injunction unless, at the end of the day, he discharges a polluting liquid.
LORD BALFOUR OF INCHRYE: May I plead for one moment, as a practical riparian owner who has had fishing which has been enjoyed by charabancs full of men from Northumberland, Durham, and the Lowlands of Scotland. It is not the riparian owner wanting fishing for himself; it is the riparian owners' wish to preserve the cleanliness of our rivers. The decision Parliament has to come to will affect many millions of ordinary common folk's enjoyment.
I had knowledge of the three committees the noble Lord, Lord Bledisloe, spoke about. I was appalled when I saw this clause in the Bill, because really it is making it the polluters' charter. As a riparian owner, I am not interested in receiving damages once, and then the polluter being able to go on week after week, month after month, year after year; I am interested in the river remaining clean. So long as this clause remains in the Bill, I fear that that remains in doubt.
BARONESS WHITE: The noble Lord, Lord Aberdare, has my sympathy. So far he has had only one articulate friend in the House. I realise that the Government probably have a stronger case than has been admitted in the debate so far, and I suspect that the new clause which is to be substituted for Clause 39 was drafted partly with a view to meeting the kind of criticism which the Government were well aware was going to come on Clause 36.
It is not customary from this side of the House to support landowners of any description, and normally I should be one of the last persons to do so. However, I have been impressed by the arguments put forward on two counts. First is the undoubted record of the riparian owners, whether acting for themselves or on behalf of others, in the sense of persons who have interests in the fishing, and the undoubted success of their activity in the past few years in cleaning up the rivers. This is an historic fact, and no one would wish for one moment to dispute it. The other aspect which moves me is that, although the Government in the other provisions of the Bill have very significantly altered the context in which all these matters must be considered, nevertheless they are seeking to take from a citizen a right which has subsisted not quite from

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time immemorial but for a very long time.
It may seem a little odd that from this Bench we should take a rather unradical view of the law, but it appeals to me that here is the right of an individual to seek an injunction which the courts can, in their discretion, grant or not grant according to the circumstances, as has been eloquently explained to us. It seems to me contrary to the whole spirit of the rule of law in this country, that in this instance we should, even for quite good administrative reasons, which I grant, remove from the citizen a right which he now enjoys. It is for those reasons that, unless in their wisdom the Government recognise the feeling that has been abundantly displayed in the House and accept the proposition put before them, I should certainly advise my noble friends to support the noble Lords who have moved that this clause be deleted from the Bill.
5.18 p.m.
LORD ABERDARE: I have listened with great attention and interest to all that has been said in this short debate on Clause 36. To begin with I should like to give your Lordships the reasons for this clause being included in the Bill. It is impossible to do so without considering other provisions in Part II of the Bill and the whole range of new proposals for the control of water pollution contained in the Bill. That is the reason why I do not think that it is a valid argument for my noble friend Lord Bledisloe to bring up as a complete answer that three committees have recommended in a certain direction, because in fact the situation is completely altered by this Bill, and the new situation will be quite different from that which obtained when those committees were sitting.
I shall not detain your Lordships very long. May I summarise the control measures which were put in the Bill to control pollution and to replace the injunction power which has existed hitherto. In the first place, anyone seeking consent to discharge will have to advertise the fact, and will have to give other interested persons the right to object. This is a completely new provision. Secondly, a consent once given will be registered by the regional water authority and will be available to the general public together with details of any conditions attached to the consent and
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analyses of samples of effluent discharged. As we have already mentioned this afternoon, all that information has hitherto been confidential and the task of the plaintiff in a civil action under common law has been made more difficult as a result. In future, full information will be available on the registers and this will be of substantial help to any plaintiff.
In the third place, should any third party have cause for complaint about a particular discharge they can, of course, approach the regional water authority who have a statutory duty to ensure the wholesomeness of their waters. If they agree with the complaint, then they have ample powers under Clauses 30 and 31 to revoke their consent or to alter the conditions of their consent. A fourth provision is that a third party also has legal remedies even if Clause 36 remains in the Bill. In the first place, they could seek an injunction against anyone discharging without consent or discharging in breach of the conditions of consent. In the second place, there is no change whatever in their right to apply to the court for damages caused by a discharge. However, it would clearly be undesirable that someone with a valid consent could go on causing pollution even if he is paying periodically for the damage caused. That is the reason why, as the noble Baroness, Lady White, correctly stated, we are proposing to amend the Bill by the new Clause 39 which will give a regional water authority powers to forestall and remedy pollution of water. This, I think, is the answer to my noble friend Lord Bledisloe that the pollution would not be allowed to continue because the regional water authority would have a duty to remedy it.
Finally, the sixth provision in this Bill that I would mention as a longstop, is Clause 30(2) by which the Secretary of State has powers to direct the regional water authority to vary or revoke a consent, and he has default powers under Clause 86. We felt that here was a formidable armoury of new weapons against water pollution but—and I have listened with great interest—a number of your Lordships who are very experienced in the law have argued that this is still not right and sufficient and that the right to an injunction should remain in the judges' hands, as the noble and learned Lord, Lord Denning, put it. The difficulty is that there are two sides to the equation in Part II of the Bill. The first side is

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the need for strong action to curb pollution; the second, as mentioned by my noble friend Lord Courtown, is the need for industry and others to use our waterways to discharge their effluent. Much as we may deplore it, the second requirement is essential and it is important that we should recognise it. Already the Bill lays strict conditions on industrial discharges. Is it really fair to go further and say that even though he has to reveal publicly the exact nature of his discharge, even though he gets consent from the regional water authority, even though he abides rigidly by the terms of that consent, he may yet find that his discharge will be halted by an injunction in the courts?
The Second Report of the Royal Commission on Environmental Pollution recognised that confidentiality as it exists at present protects industry,
"against the risk of common law actions of against misconceived or ill-formed allegations that the environment is being dangerously polluted. We fully agree that those industrialists who are concerned to abate pollution are justified in wanting some safeguard against risks of this sort",
and it suggests that one safeguard would be for the courts to accept the defence that a water authority has given consent for the discharge to be made. That is how the present Bill is drafted and that is the reason why we included Clause 36. We followed the recommendation in this respect of the Royal Commission.
Having said that, I must recognise the force and the weight of the opinions that have been expressed in this House this evening, that it would be wrong to remove this common law right from the individual. At the same time, we are concerned to protect industry against unnecessary interference with a consent which has once been granted—and I took note of what was said by the noble and learned Viscount on that point, that if a consent had already been given by a regional water authority this could well influence the courts in deciding whether or not to grant an injunction. In these circumstances, I am prepared to advise the Committee to omit Clause 36 on the understanding that we shall be allowed to look at it very closely again, and perhaps to amend the Bill when it goes to another place in order to see whether it is necessary to introduce some restriction on those who might seek an injunction
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for this purpose. We would only wish to be sure that there is no loophole, no chance of a frivolous application for an injunction being granted. I do not know whether perhaps it could be limited to a person who can show that he has suffered damage as a result of the discharge. I am only asking your Lordships, if we take the clause out here, to reconsider it to see whether, in order to reassure those industrialists who have real worries about this matter, we could draw it a little tighter. In general, and subject to that proviso, I am convinced by what your Lordships have said to-night that it would not be right to continue with this clause.
VISCOUNT DILHORNE: I would say thank you to the noble Lord for what he has said. I have no objection at all to his saying that he would like to consider the matter to see whether it is necessary to insert a provision to stop frivolous applications for injunctions and to stop injunctions being granted almost automatically. I am perfectly certain that when he takes proper legal advice as to the situation he will find that there is not the slightest possibility of what he might call a frivolous application for an injunction being granted by the courts. The only persons who can apply are people who rightly think that their legal interests will be damaged or who have suffered damage and then, as I said before, it is a discretionary remedy which the court is not bound to grant. I know that there are fears by industrialists that this will be abused, but I think those fears are totally unfounded and I am grateful to the noble Lord for what he has said.
VISCOUNT BLEDISLOE: I should like to endorse what my noble and learned friend Lord Dilhorne has said. As I understand the Government's attitude, it is this: that with all the powers given to the river authorities there will be no need for civil actions or injunctions. That may or may not be so, but if that is so nobody would be more pleased than the fishing community, but it is one thing to say that actions by people with interests in fisheries will not be necessary because certain statutory bodies will look after things. All the better if they are not necessary. It is quite another thing to take away an old-established common law right to get an injunction against

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a nuisance unless there is some overriding reason to take it away. There is no reason to take it away. It may simply be a long-stop, but to take away an old-established principle of our common law without any overriding reason would be disgraceful.
But having heard what my noble friend Lord Aberdare has said, I think we can leave the matter where it is. As I have always understood the law, no court will grant an injunction unless some harm is done to a river. Let me take the case of Pride of Derby, to which my noble and learned friend Lord Denning has referred. They were polluting a river with sewage, and an injunction was granted which was upheld in the Court of Appeal. They were then given time to put the matter right. What they were putting back into the river was still a foreign substance, but it was doing no damage so the injunction did not bite at all. An injunction is meant to prevent harm being done to a river. That is all it does, and it will not be granted when no harm is being done. So if that is what my noble and learned friend is worried about, I do not think he has any cause for concern.
Clause 36, as amended, disagreed to.
Clause 37 [Control of discharges into sewers]:
5.32 p.m.
THE PARLIAMENTARY UNDER-SECRETARY OF STATE, DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION AND SCIENCE (LORD SANDFORD)THE PARLIAMENTARY UNDER-SECRETARY OF STATE, DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION AND SCIENCE (LORD SANDFORD) moved Amendment No. 161:
Page 48, line 26, after ("and") insert ("to").
The noble Lord said: This is no more than a drafting Amendment. Section 55 of the Public Health Act 1961 relates to charges which may be made for certain discharges into public sewers, and Section 59 relates to conditions which may be imposed as to the permitted temperature of the effluent and other matters. "Charges" and "conditions" are distinct subjects and each is entitled to its own proposition. I beg to move.
LORD SANDFORD LORD SANDFORD moved Amendment No. 162:
Page 48, line 28, leave out ("date aforesaid") and insert ("appointed day").
The noble Lord said: This Amendment makes a small change to Clause 37(2). As subsection (2) is drafted, deemed consent is given on the appointed day for the discharge in the form in which it was lawfully made immediately before the date of passing of the Act, and subject to the conditions, if any, then in force. The result is that an interval is left between the date of passing of the Act and the appointed day, during which charges and conditions could not effectively be imposed or varied under the powers of Sections 55 and 57 of the Public Health Act 1961. By substituting "appointed day" for "date aforesaid" in line 28, the Amendment ensures that the clause remains subject to the relevant 1961 Act provision up to the appointed day. I beg to move.
5.34 p.m.
LORD CRAIGTON LORD CRAIGTON moved Amendment No. 162A:
Page 50, line 1, leave out ("such") and insert ("the").
The noble Lord said: Under subsection (10) of Clause 37 the appointed day could be delayed indefinitely. This clause is only a machinery clause, but its effect is that the longer the appointed day is delayed the longer it is before records of discharges are kept. I see no reason for delaying the implementation of this provision, and I shall be glad to hear what the Minister has to say, I beg to move.
LORD SANDFORD: I am glad to respond to my noble friend, and to explain why this subsection needs to be related in this way to the appointed day for the coming into force of the whole Act. The Committee will see that the Royal Assent to this Bill will start the whole process of the serving of the notices concerned in relation to those discharges which have hitherto been exempted since 1937. But the Royal Assent does not govern the coming into force of the Act itself, the timing of which is left to the judgment of the Secretary of State through the operation of Clause 97(2); and I notice that my noble friend Lord Craigton is not objecting to that aspect. From the point of view of the water authorities, the process of taking action under Clause 37 and converting the deemed consents into actual consents, in respect of the discharges which have been exempted

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since 1937, must be phased in relation to all the other duties under this Bill; that is, in relation to the date of the coming into force of the Act as decided by the Secretary of State, rather than in relation to the fixed date of the Royal Assent. It is for that reason that the subsection has to be related in this way to the appointed day.
LORD CRAIGTON: The Committee will realise that I put down this Amendment because some concern has been expressed in some quarters. I am grateful to my noble friend for his explanation. I beg leave to withdraw the Amendment.
Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.
On Question, Whether Clause 37, as amended, shall stand part of the Bill?
5.36 p.m.
BARONESS WHITE: I should like to ask the noble Lord, Lord Sandford, to enlighten us on the question of Private Acts. I gave notice of this question earlier when we discussed Clause 23. I am sorry if the noble Lord has not been briefed on this subject, but I referred specifically to it and to the clause on which I proposed to raise it again. I do so because it has been brought to my notice that there are Private Acts which deal with discharges of trade effluent into public sewers, and it appears to me that under the Bill the position will remain just as it is to-day. If the control of discharges of trade effluent into a public sewer is subject to the provisions of a Private Act, it will be possible for it to continue and this Bill will make no difference. If I am wrong, I shall be glad to be told so, and told precisely what will happen.
Under a Private Act, industrial effluent in the very important industrial city of Huddersfield can be discharged into the public sewers, and the present authorities have no control over toxic waste that may enter the sewers. Equally, so far as they can see, the new regional water authority will have no control over toxic waste, because the dischargers will be able to say, "We are doing this under Private Act legislation." The Huddersfield Act was passed in 1906 and it allows industry in Huddersfield virtually unrestricted access to the sewers for the disposal of their trade wastes. It is suggested by my correspondent that this is likely to be a major problem in the
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control and treatment of the sewage of Huddersfield, and he queries whether anything in the proposed legislation is likely to affect such a Private Act.
I understand that a similar situation has arisen in neighbouring industrial areas. There was an occasion last year, in 1973, when Spenborough fought a court case. Also I think there was a separate action by Beverley, about a tannery effluent, where they fought the action and won. In our earlier discussions it appeared to us that the Government had not given much thought to the problem of these Private Acts and did not seem to have any scheme for dealing with them. As we said at the time, they are, of course, a very difficult area of legislation, because some of them are of very long standing, many of them cover many subjects other than sewers and sewerage, and to have to go through every one of them to see whether by any chance it said anything about trade effluent being discharged to sewers would be a most laborious job. But it does not seem to me beyond the wit of man, nevertheless, that in legislation we should find some method to ensure that those who wish to discharge into the public sewers, even if they are covered by private legislation at the moment, are brought into the general system of consents; because it really is nonsense to have a Bill of this sort, which purports to control pollution of this kind, and to leave certain places—I have given a couple of examples of really very important towns with a good deal of industrial activity—outwith the legislation.
I am told that the matter of charges, which was referred to, can be altered, that there are arrangements for dealing with that, but that the quality of the discharge is not at present amenable to regulation by the authorities concerned Therefore, before we add this clause to the Bill I think this is the appropriate place to inquire just what the Government think they are going to do to meet the situation I have described.
LORD SANDFORD: I am glad to have this opportunity. The noble Baroness is quite right when she says that this is not covered in Clause 37, but there is provision which will enable what she wants done to be done by the Secretary of State under Clause 96(3). I apologise to the noble Baroness and the Committee,

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because I could perhaps have made this clear when I referred to this same clause and subsection when dealing with her Amendment No. 136B. She raised a query then about how local Acts were to be dealt with, and it is this same clause which is operative in both cases.
BARONESS WHITE: Is the noble Lord satisfied that there will be adequate information available for the Secretary of State to take action? I think the noble Lord said on the previous occasion that he thought that probably the water authority could cope with it.
LORD SANDFORD: Of course, it is perfectly true, as the noble Baroness herself said—and I think I said it on the previous occasion—that there is an enormous number of these Acts, and it is because of the uncertainty about which ones allow what effluents that it is not possible to go into more detail than we have here; but there is sufficient power here to deal with the problem that the noble Baroness has outlined. When it is found that there is some discharge of polluting matter going on and that the explanation for it is that it has been authorised by some earlier local Act which is still in force, that is the point at which the Secretary of State can take the action which he is empowered to take. I should be glad to go into the particular cases which the noble Baroness has mentioned and to reassure her that this provision would be adequate to deal with those cases, if that would help.
BARONESS WHITE: But I am sure the noble Lord will appreciate that what he is saying is that action can be taken after the event. As I understand it, there is no need for notification by persons who are relying on the local Act. I quite appreciate that the knowledge that Clause 96 is in the Bill would have some deterrent force, but it seems to me to be unsatisfactory that no notification whatever need be given of a new effluent. It will presumably be left for somebody to complain about it before the regional water authority find out about it; but, meanwhile, the effluent will have occurred and will be able to go on until the Secretary of State takes action under Clause 96. I must apologise; perhaps I did not make
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myself clear enough, because we have discussed this before and I should have mentioned Clause 96, to which the noble Lord had drawn my attention on the previous occasion.
It is this element about it that it must be retroactive which worries me; and what I should have made plainer is that I would hope that nevertheless the Government might be able to find some way to make it necessary for anyone who wished to introduce any fresh discharges, at any rate under private legislation, to notify the appropriate authority that it is going to do so. I should have thought that something on those lines would at least make certain that we would not get any new discharges. The old ones are presumably rather well known already, but there is this loophole, that some kind of noxious waste could be discharged and it might take quite a little while before it could be dealt with. So I should be grateful if the noble Lord would look at that aspect again.
LORD SANDFORD: Yes, I will look at it. I do not think the problem lies with the new discharges. There will be ample opportunity for my right honourable friend to look at local Acts in the course of their passage through Parliament and to object if there is not a sufficiently stringent provision to bring any discharges there might be relating to them under control. But I agree with the noble Baroness that the problem is the existing, old local Acts under which fresh discharges may be made under authority which has been given in the past. I assure her that this is a problem which we are not satisfied we have satisfactorily concluded. The problem remains in the case of these older Acts in a way that it does not remain in the case of the discharges exempted by the 1937 Act. The noble Baroness is perfectly right: there is a problem here which will run on until the authority to make these discharges has been discovered. How we can make further progress meanwhile is a matter on which we are still working, and if I have any more information to give the noble Baroness during the course of the passage of the Bill I will see that that is done.
Clause 37, as amended, agreed to.
Clause 38 [Early variation of conditions of discharges]:
LORD SANDFORD LORD SANDFORD moved Amendment No. 163:
Page 50, line 25, after ("required") insert ("—(a)").
The noble Lord said: I beg to move Amendment No. 163 and I should like at the same time to speak to Nos. 164, 165 and 166, which are all linked. This group of four drafting Amendments merely matches the drafting provisions in Clause 38, dealing with the obligations on a water authority, with similar provisions in Clause 31, dealing with another lot of consents to discharge to relevant waters. This is purely a matter of drafting, and I beg to move Amendment No. 163.
LORD SANDFORD: I beg to move Amendment No. 164.
Amendment moved—
Page 50, line 26, leave out ("including") and insert ("which may include").—(Lord Sandford.)
LORD SANDFORD: I beg to move Amendment No. 165.
Amendment moved—
Page 50, line 30, leave out ("which").(Lord Sandford.)
LORD SANDFORD: I beg to move Amendment No. 166:
Amendment moved—
Page 50, line 31, at end insert ("and
(b) otherwise than in consequence of consents for discharges given after the beginning of that period;").—(Lord Sandford.)
Clause 38, as amended, agreed to.
Clause 39 [Powers of water authorities to forestall and remedy pollution of water]:
5.50 p.m.
THE EARL OF COURTOWN THE EARL OF COURTOWN moved Amendment No. 166A:
Page 51, line 26, leave out ("that person satisfies") and insert ("the water authority fails to satisfy").
The noble Earl said: I beg to move Amendment No. 166A and, with the leave of the Committee, I will speak also to
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Amendment No. 166B. The Government have down a replacement clause for Clause 39, but the same general point emerges as in the old Clause 39. I am not quarrelling to any material extent with the content of this clause, but to exercise its functions under Clause 39(1) the water authority needs to compile information on what operations to stop any pollution which is going on were necessary and the costs. The object of these two Amendments is to place on the water authority the onus to justify its action and the cost thereof. At present, it is placed on the person. That person has to satisfy the county court that the operations were unnecessary for the purpose for which they were carried out.
The water authority must have gathered together all the information necessary for it to take the action which it decided was required. Therefore there is no great difficulty in the authority coming to the county court and stating the reasons for that action. It is much more difficult for the person affected to find out what were the reasons and to try to assess whether or not the action was necessary. I would add that the person affected is much more likely to be a small firm than a larger firm with greater resources. The effect of the Amendment would be that the water authority, having compiled all the information, would go to the county court to claim on the person affected for the cost of the operations that it had decided were necessary to be carried out. This seems to me much more sensible and fair.
BARONESS WHITE: I am afraid that I do not feel entirely convinced, at any rate so far, about the merits of this Amendment which, as the noble Earl has rightly pointed out, would apply equally to subsection (6)(a) of the substituted clause. As I understand it in the circumstances described at somewhat greater length in the proposed substituted clause, it would be regarded as the normal thing that costs should be recovered. Therefore it seems to me that the Bill has got it right: that the normal thing is that the person should pay the costs and if he contests them as being unjustified, because the expenditure incurred was unnecessary, surely it is up to the person appealing against the normal procedure to make his case. The fact that the water authority may have fuller information

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would not necessarily affect the position of the person putting his point of view to the county court, because the court would appreciate that it might not get such full technical details from the person appealing as from the water authority. But that does not seem to me to alter the balance of the intention of the clause. I do not know what is the Government's view, but my view is not in favour of the Amendment.
LORD ABERDARE: That is my view, too. This Amendment is not one that I could recommend the Committee to accept. As the two Amendments stand, they would have the effect—which I am sure is unintended by my noble friend—of obliging the water authority to go to the county court every time it wished to recover casts, whether the person concerned was contesting liability or not. That is only a matter of drafting, I admit. But there would still remain the human difficulty. If you say to a man, who knows that he is liable for some pollution damage which the water authority has put right, that he need not pay the costs, unless he wishes, unless the water authority goes to the county court and proves to the court's satisfaction that all the operations it had undertaken were necessary, you are almost inviting the man to postpone payment in the slight hope that the water authority will not perhaps trouble to go to the court. I do not think we should go so far as that to help someone who has caused pollution. We do not expect the water authority to invoke this provision except in an emergency. We think it right that when authorities do invoke it there should be the presumption that their costs would be met by the person causing the pollution, unless he can show that an authority has carried out work unnecessarily. This seems fair and right to me. I am sure that it is something which would happen only on rare occasions, but when it does I think that we should stick to the general principle that the polluter pays.
THE EARL OF COURTOWN: I am sorry to hear that the Government will not accept this Amendment, and that it does not receive any support from noble Lords opposite. I would not in any way quarrel with the idea that the polluter pays. The question is really, what is the most convenient way to collect the money from him. I would have thought
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that it would be much easier for the water authority to put the information before the county court. Indeed, it is not at all clear how the person affected would gain the information why the water authority had taken the action that it took. There is no obligation put on the authority, so far as I can see, to give this information to the person affected. But having made that point, and after hearing the remarks of the Government spokesman, I beg leave to withdraw the Amendment.
Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.
6.0 p.m.
LORD MOLSON LORD MOLSON moved Amendment No. 166E:
Page 51, line 29, leave out paragraph (b).
The noble Lord said: We have had a discussion about polluting water which may come from an abandoned mine. My noble friend Lord Sandford explained to us, in what I thought was quite a convincing speech, that the extremely difficult problem of a mine abandoned in the past, for which there might be no obvious owner at the present time, made it impossible for him to accept the Amendment on the subject moved by the noble Baroness, Lady White. He undertook that there would be further consideration of this general problem. I see no reason, however, why we should have postponed indefinitely the right of a water authority to obtain from any ascertainable owner of an abandoned mine the cost of carrying out necessary works for dealing with the effluent from that abandoned mine.
For the sake of simplicity, I have written out the words that would be operative if this Amendment of mine were accepted:
"Where it appears to a water authority that any poisonous, noxious or polluting matter is likely to enter … any relevant waters in the area of the authority, the authority may

(a) carry out such operations … and

(b) recover the cost of carrying out the operations from any person who caused or knowingly permitted the matter … to enter the relevant waters.

Any dispute as to the liability of the persons to pay … shall be determined by the county court."
My noble friend Lord Sandford pointed out that in the case of a long-abandoned mine the only person apparently in possession of it might be a farmer who was running sheep, and there would be no justification whatsoever for trying to

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make him liable for the cost of dealing with polluting water.
This Amendment avoids that difficulty because any dispute as to liability of the person to pay shall be determined by the county court, and also it is covered by the earlier provisison
"who caused or knowingly permitted the matter … to enter the relevant waters".
I see no reason why we should indefinitely delay requiring those who are ascertain-ably responsible for polluting water coming from an abandoned mine—after the county court have tried the case—to pay to the water authority for those works which are necessarily carried out to deal with this continuing nuisance.
LORD ABERDARE: I am grateful to my noble friend for drawing attention to this problem. I will certainly study what he has said. He did mention that he found convincing the speech of my noble friend Lord Sandford. I am afraid that my speech is really modelled on the same lines as that my noble friend, and that we find a point of considerable difficulty here although we realise that water overflowing from disused mines may cause considerable pollution. Indeed, the cost of preventing it can be heavy. We are up against this difficulty, which my noble friend has mentioned, that the person now owning the disused mine may have bought it for quite another purpose and may be using it for grazing sheep or for some other agricultural object. It really would not be right to saddle him with the cost of taking whatever measures are necessary to prevent the pollution. I realise that this is an extremely difficult problem, and of course the Bill takes the first step of enabling the water authorities to investigate these problems in Clause 42.
I would suggest to my noble friend that it is better to leave the Bill as it stands, and when we have a better idea of what can be done, what the likely costs will be and what the benefit will be, we can then decide what arrangements should be made and who should pay for this remedial work. Meanwhile, we think it right to leave water authorities with the power under Clause 39(1) to prevent or remedy pollution from this source if they see an urgent need in a particular case to anticipate any general arrangements
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that may in due course be made. It would not, in our view, be right to expose the owner or occupier for the time being of disused workings to the liability to meet the cost of such operations, but I should like to have a further look at what my noble friend said about the possibility of being able to charge a person, if one could find him, who had been responsible for that mine when it was in operation.
BARONESS WHITE: I have listened with interest to the speeches by both noble Lords. I wonder whether the Government would look at this in a wider context altogether than simply the prevention of pollution under this Bill. As the noble Lord, Lord Aberdare, said, in most instances any remedial action is likely to be very costly indeed, whoever pays for it. That is what worries me, because one has the problem which we discussed on my Amendment where, as noble Lords may recollect, I tried to limit the exemptions from payment to mines which had been abandoned before the coming into force of this Bill. That was not acceptable to the Government, but in all circumstances, whoever has to pay for an abandoned mine is, as I say, going to have to meet a very heavy bill.
Is it sensible, therefore, in the conditions in the mining areas to adopt this approach? I am sorry, I really do not feel sympathetic this time to the noble Lord, Lord Molson, because I do not think it is practical. The people who have abandoned mines, other than the National Coal Board in fairly recent times, are probably not in a position to meet the sort of costs that might well be involved, because at the time when they may have owned the mines—I am thinking of a number of South Wales mines which have been abandoned over the years—they were a great deal less profitable than they have now become. Anyway, with the change in the value of money and the lapse of time this approach would be quite impracticable.
When one looks to the water authorities, are they going to be any better placed to meet this kind of cost? And will they not hesitate to take action, except in the most dangerous situations, to deal with effluent which might still be damaging because they would say it is going to cost them too much and that they have to

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balance their books? The water authorities will have to pay their way. Therefore it seems to me that there will be a strong temptation for them to leave as long as possible any matter of an abandoned mine, because they would say that this was something which was not positively going to improve the water supply. It would limit the damage, but if it was not too bad the chances are that they will let it go on until they have to do something about it; but it would be nowhere near the top of their priorities. This affects us in the mining areas; and it is causing a good deal of concern, as I know, to scientific advisers and other similar people in the area.
Among the interesting suggestions in the report—not a public report, of course—of the investigations by the noble Lord, Lord Zuckerman, into propositions for possible mining in North Wales, in Snowdonia, was the suggestion that problems of this kind should be dealt with on a national basis. We have the Derelict Land Unit in the Welsh Office, for example, which is financed directly out of general taxation. It is not financed by the National Coal Board because mostly the dereliction happened before the Board came into being, although not exclusively so. Ought we not to treat this business of pollution from abandoned mines on a similar basis? Ought it not to be dealt with under national financing, as something for which we really cannot now pin the responsibility sensibly on anyone?
I would seriously ask the Government to look at this point. Noble Lords will know that I have a special interest in these areas. I have had representations made to me by those who are working there. I would suggest that this business of abandoned mines as dealt with in the Bill is not likely to lead to satisfactory results. I do not know what the noble Lord, Lord Molson, proposes to do with his Amendment, but I would plead with anyone concerned with this matter to look at it again, to see whether it cannot be raised to a national level rather than trying to deal with it under the normal arrangements provided under the Bill.
LORD ABERDARE: I shall do what the noble Baroness has suggested. I have great sympathy—
BARONESS WHITE: The noble Lord might even have to pay!
LORD ABERDARE: I was thinking about that, because in fact the landowner has to pay for the capping of a shaft of a disused mine, as I found to my cost recently; so I have every sympathy with what the noble Baroness says. In these circumstances I hope that the Committee will leave the Bill as it stands and that my noble friend will be prepared to withdraw his Amendment.
LORD MOLSON: I think that the proposal made by the noble Baroness, that derelict mines should be dealt with under the same system as for derelict land, is of great interest and I hope that my noble friend will see that it is considered in the context of this Bill. Having said that, and having heard the reply of my noble friend, I ask leave to withdraw the Amendment.
Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.
6.12 p.m.
LORD ABERDARE LORD ABERDARE moved Amendment No. 166F:
Leave out Clause 39 and insert the following new clause:
Operations by water authorities to remedy or forestall pollution of water
(".—(1) Where it appears to a water authority that pollution injurious to the fauna or flora of a stream in its area has been caused in consequence of discharges made by virtue of a consent given by the authority in pursuance of section 27 of this Act after the date when this section comes into force or discharges made by virtue of a variation of a consent in pursuance of that section which was made by the authority after that date, then, subject to the following subsection, it shall be the duty of the authority—

(a) to exercise the powers conferred on it by section 30(1) of this Act with a view to ensuring that further discharges of a kind which caused the injurious pollution in question are not made by virtue of the consent or variation or are not so made after such a period as the authority considers necessary for the purpose of allowing a person making discharges by virtue of the consent or variation to secure that the discharges are not of such a kind or to make arrangements for discontinuing the discharges; and

(b) in a case where the authority considers that a period is necessary for the purpose aforesaid, to carry out as soon as reasonably practicable such operations as the authority considers appropriate with a view to remedying or mitigating the injurious pollution in question; and

(c) to carry out, as soon as reasonably practicable or after the expiration of the said

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period, such operations as are necessary for the purpose of restoring the fauna and flora of the stream, so far as it is reasonably practicable to do so, to the state in which they were before discharges were made by virtue of the consent or variation.

(2) If it appears to a water authority that injurious pollution of a stream in its area has been caused in consequence of discharges made as mentioned in the preceding subsection but that further discharges so made after such a period as the authority considers reasonable in the circumstances will, after the carrying out of such operations as are mentioned in paragraph (c) of that subsection, not cause injurious pollution of the stream, then—

(a) the authority shall not be required by virtue of paragraph (a) of the preceding subsection to exercise the powers there mentioned; but

(b) it shall be the duty of the authority—

(i) to carry out as soon as reasonably practicable such operations as are mentioned in paragraph (b) of the preceding subsection, and

(ii) to carry out, after the expiration of the period mentioned in the preceding provisions of this subsection, such operations as are mentioned in paragraph (c) of the preceding subsection.

(3) The duty imposed on a water authority by virtue of subsection (1)(a) of this section shall be performed notwithstanding anything in section 31 of this Act but no compensation shall be payable by a water authority in pursuance of that section in consequence of the performance of that duty; and nothing in this section shall be construed as restricting the powers conferred on the Secretary of State by section 30(2) of this Act.
(4) Where it appears to a water authority that any poisonous, noxious or polluting matter is likely to enter, or is or was present in, any relevant waters in its area, the authority may, without prejudice to any duty imposed on it by virtue of the preceding provisions of this section, carry out in its area or elsewhere such operations as it considers appropriate—

(a) in a case where the matter appears likely to enter such waters, for the purpose of preventing it from doing so; and

(b) in a case where the matter appears to be or to have been present in such waters, for the purpose of removing or disposing of the matter or of remedying or mitigating any pollution caused by its presence in the waters or of restoring the waters (including the fauna and flora in them), so far as it is reasonably practicable to do so, to the state in which they were before the matter became present in the waters;

but nothing in this subsection empowers a water authority to impeded or prevent the making of any discharge in pursuance of a consent given by any authority by virtue of section 27 of this Act.
(5) Where a water authority carries out any operations in pursuance of this section the authority shall, subject to the following subsection, be entitled to recover the costs of doing so—
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(a) in the case of operations in pursuance of subsection (1) or (2) of this section, from the persons who made the discharges in question; and

(b) in the case of operations in pursuance of the preceding subsection, from any persons who caused or knowingly permitted the matter in question to be present at the place from which it was likely in the opinion of the authority to enter the relevant waters or, as the case may be, to be present in the relevant waters.

(6) Any dispute as to the liability of a person to pay costs to a water authority in pursuance of the preceding subsection or as to the amount of the costs shall be determined by the county court; bu tno such costs shall be payable by a person—

(a) in so far as he satisfies the county court that the costs were incurred unnecessarily; or

(b) for any operations in respect of water from an abandoned mine which that person permitted to reach such a place as is mentioned in paragraph (b) of the preceding subsection or to enter relevant waters.

(7) In determining the damage which a person has suffered in consequence of pollution in respect of which operations have been or may be carried out in pursuance of this section, account shall be taken of the extent to which it is shown that the damage has been reduced by operations in pursuance of this section and of the extent to which it is shown that the damage is likely to be so reduced.
(8) In this section—

"injurious pollution", in relation to a stream, means pollution injurious to the fauna or flora of the stream; and

"variation", in relation to a consent, means a modification in pursuance of subsection (1) of section 30 of this Act of the conditions to which the consent is subject or, in the case of an unconditional consent, the subjection of the consent to conditions in pursuance of that subsection;

and in the application of subsection (6) of this section to Scotland for the references to the county court there shall be substituted references to the sheriff.").
The noble Lord said: I beg to move this Amendment: it is the new Clause 39 which we have been referring to on and off throughout the afternoon. I should like to apologise, as I did yesterday for other Amendments that had been put down at fairly short notice. This was put down only on Friday. It is a large new clause, although it contains much of the content of the previous Clause 39. In this case we thought it of great importance that your Lordships should have in front of you the new clause when discussing earlier clauses such as Clause 36.
It has always been our intention to include these sort of provisions in the Bill

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because we recognised—or at least we recognised at the time when we thought Clause 36 was going to stand—that if there are to be restraints against publicised legal discharges, then there must be corresponding duties placed on water authorities to take action themselves to make sure that where a legal discharge causes damage it is stopped as soon as reasonably practical and the damage made good. These provisions have been difficult to draft satisfactorily, however, and I am sorry that the Amendment has been put down at a fairly late stage.
What the new Clause 39 proposes in relation to the powers already contained in the Bill is that where consent to a new discharge or a variation of an existing discharge results in a discharge which causes pollution and injures the flora or fauna or the stream, then the authority has a duty immediately to serve notice that the consent has to be varied or, if necessary, revoked so that the injury will cease. As soon as favourable conditions are re-established the authority will have to restore the flora and fauna, so far as is practicable, to the state they were in before the pollution occurred. It will not always be practicable or reasonable to stop or vary the polluting discharge immediately. It may be that new equipment would be needed, or alternative arrangements need to be made to dispose of the effluent. In these cases the authority will specify a period before the variation or revocation takes place, in order to give time for these works to be carried out or for alternative arrangements to be made. In the meantime, the authority must take such action as it considers appropriate to mitigate the effect of the discharge. For example, this could entail pumping oxygen into the water.
Subsection (2) of the clause makes similar arrangements to those in subsection (1) but deals with the rather special situation where a two-stage consent has been granted. Two-stage consents are given where a discharge is expected initially to reach a certain standard but later, when the necessary bacteria are present to digest the effluent, to meet higher standards. Even the first, inferior, stage should still not cause damage to flora or fauna but, if it does, it still should not be necessary to vary the consent because it already contains
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its own variation in the second stage. A duty to vary as provided in subsection (1) would therefore be inappropriate. The authority would still have the same duties to mitigate the pollution while it continues and to restore the stream when it ceases. The cost of these operations under subsections (1) and (2)—as under subsection (4) which replaces the first part of the present Clause 39—are recoverable from the discharger or polluter.
We believe that this is a useful new clause and that it will add to the colourful armoury (as I believe I described it in connection with Clause 36) of weapons in the fight against water pollution.
LORD CRAIGTON: I should like to give an unqualified welcome to this new clause, not from a legal point of view but because of everything implied in the words
"restoring the flora and fauna of the stream."
This is something to be welcomed by people all over the country. If I ask some questions now, they arise because it is difficult to put down Amendments, so I hope that my noble friend will note the few points that I have to make and, if anything needs to be done, to take the necessary action. First of all, as to restoring the flora and fauna, nothing is said about the natural flora and fauna. If one looks at the first three lines at the bottom of page 6—I should like it to read there, though I am sure it cannot—
"… where it appears to the water authority that pollution injurious to the natural flora or fauna of the stream and its area has been caused by or built up to such a degree that in consequence of the discharge …".
There are two points there. The stream will almost certainly be, as nearly every stream is, polluted to a certain extent. Pollution is cumulative: we are not going to have an absolutely pure stream suddenly polluted. When the pollution has reached the stage in a cumulative manner when damage is being done, or is beginning to be done, to flora or fauna, there may be other people who are guilty of discharges which, but for the final discharge, would not have done a great deal of damage. It may be that the final discharge did no more than break the camel's back. This is a very difficult problem, but it is going to be there and it may be necessary, in restoring the flora and fauna, for people other than

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the last discharger to have to take some action—and of course all this has to be found out as having happened after the consent has been given in Clause 27.
Another problem is the flora and fauna on beaches. It is a problem which arises in connection with oil on the beaches. It is grand to say to the oil companies: "You are the polluter and you must pay to restore the natural conditions of the beach." But nobody knows what the natural condition of the beach was before it was polluted. So the problem is to know what was the natural state before the pollution took place. Should, for instance, Clause 27 impose on the applicant the necessity for a survey—perhaps a scientific one—of the water that is to receive the discharge, or should the water authority do it? Unless someone can take some reasonably intelligent record of what the water was like before it was polluted then no one will know what flora and fauna to restore.
Finally, may I mention one small point. Under the clause, as I read it, the authority alone can carry out any work of cleaning up and restoration, though the offender, quite rightly, has to pay the bill. Is it implied that the authority can, if they want to, require the offender to clear this up himself or to contract with the offender to do it, provided the offender does the work to the authority's satisfaction? I understand that it is only the authority who can do the work. With those few words, I welcome the clause.
BARONESS WHITE: I am sure we are all extremely grateful to the noble Lord, Lord Craigton, for his helpful analysis of certain points in this new clause. I was particularly interested in what he rightly said about the need to know the original state of the water. This is something which has very much exercised us in Wales. I referred in our recent discussion to the proposals at one time which Rio Tinto Zinc made to mine in the Snowdonia National Park. Had it been decided to carry out this operation, this would undoubtedly have resulted in the pollution of streams and of the Mawddach Estuary. Efforts have been made, but on a relatively modest scale, to prepare for any such eventuality by studying the nature of the waters as they are now and various academic exercises have been going on with that in mind.
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But if one takes the country as a whole this is a big problem, and although it is incumbent upon the water authorities to do all this it may take them a very long time: it may be impossible for them to do it adequately before some of the provisions of this new clause are due to come into effect. This is largely a matter of directing and co-ordinating research and paying for it. If we are serious about this new clause it will not be effective unless, as the noble Lord, Lord Craigton, pointed out, money is spent quickly in the early stages of the responsibility of the water authorities in studying the waterways which are under their control. We do not have the current levels for many possible pollutants. Such research has to be carried out over a period. It is not something which one can do in a few weeks or months because of varying conditions, water flows, and so on.
One would be reassured if one had some feeling that the Government have not only put down what I freely grant is an attractive new Clause 39, but that they were prepared again to regard this as something which it might be difficult for water authorities to do adequately with the kind of money that might be available to them in the early years. One would expect them to be able to plan their financial arrangements as time went on to take matters of this kind into account. I speak subject to correction, but I suppose in the areas of a good many of them there are considerable gaps in the scientific knowledge available.
I do not like crash research programmes because they can go badly wrong, but at least there should be an energetic attempt to deal with these problems. I hope that this could be supported by Government, not necessarily by grants to the water authorities themselves, but to the Science Research Council or the Natural Environment Research Council, as might be appropriate. I should like to suggest to the noble Lord. Lord Aberdare, that it would be helpful if he could make some comment on that aspect. Otherwise we, so far as we can understand it, welcome the new clause.
LORD MOLSON: I am sure we welcome this clause, so far as we understand it, for what it does. I do not think I have ever seen a clause which is so verbose

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and where so many words are used to convey so little and with such an obscure meaning. But I am sure we welcome the clause for what it does. The first point that I should like to make to my noble friend is this: in the Second Reading debate my noble friend Lord Nugent of Guildford (the Chairman Designate of the National Water Council) mentioned a extraordinarily interesting case of damage done to a crop by the use of water for which consent had been given. That is extremely important. If I had spoken in the debate on Clause 36 I should have given that as a classic example of where it was important to retain the power of an injunction.
My noble friend spoke of the interesting incident which occurred this year of the heavy mortality of the tomato crop in Essex. An intensive horticulturist in Essex, with his tomatoes being grown under glass and entirely dependent for their irrigation on the main water supply, suddenly found that the tomato crops were stricken and were dying at a terrifying rate. Nobody could discover the cause. After intensive investigation, which lasted for months, it was eventually discovered that the source of the mortality of the tomato plants came not from a river in Essex, but from the Great Ouse near Cambridge. There was a factory manufacturing plant herbicides and discharging effluent into the Great Ouse which was acceptable to the river authority there.
The Great Ouse has a magnificent water transfer scheme to Essex (which is a very dry county), and the Great Ouse water had been transferred into the Essex rivers and then into the pipe system and it then went off to supply the horticulturist. Because his tomatoes were entirely dependent on the piped supply, there was just enough of this dangerous chemical in the water—although it was in infinitesimal amounts—to cause destruction of the crop. I should like to know whether a case of that kind is covered by this new clause and who would have to pay for carrying out any necessary works which might be extremely expensive in this case under the provisions of this clause?
My second point is this. I was asked to put a question to the Government by the noble and learned Viscount, Lord Dilhorne, who is not able to be in his place. He wished to know why subsection
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(7) has been put into this Amendment:
"In determining the damage which a person has suffered in consequence of pollution …"
Then it goes on to say how the damages are to be assessed. The noble and learned Viscount says that this is only a repetition of the existing law upon the subject and he wonders whether it is either necessary or desirable to incorporate it in this Amendment.
6.30 p.m.
LORD ABERDARE: I am grateful for the general welcome that has been given to this new clause. It has been extremely difficult to draft, and it is no doubt for that reason that your Lordships have raised various points about it. My noble friend Lord Craigton suggested that the word "natural" should be inserted before "flora or fauna". I was not clear why he wished to put that word in. It might be slightly more limiting than an unqualified use of the words "flora or fauna". I am not sure what "natural" really adds to the words, if anything. It could mean the flora or fauna that existed at the creation of the world.
LORD CRAIGTON: I should put my noble friend right. I meant flora and fauna that were there before the pollution started.
LORD ABERDARE: That is covered by the clause as it stands. Going on to that point, it is a difficult one because there are considerable gaps in our knowledge of the biology of individual streams. It is doubtful whether a central research effort would help very much because each stream needs separate consideration. A start was made in the River Pollution Survey of 1970 and 1972. We shall certainly continue to encourage the development of biological classification of streams. On the whole I think we shall have to rely on the regional water authority to determine what the state of the river was before the action took place which triggered off this Clause 39. I should like to have a look at what he said about whether the water authority could contract with a person who had caused the pollution. I should hope that this was so, but I should like to check the actual legal wording of it.
The noble Baroness, Lady White, also asked me about the state of the streams.

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I have done all that I can to answer her. I will see whether I can go any further later. For the moment, I have said all that I can.
My noble friend Lord Molson asked me two questions, to which I should like to give him the answers later. So far as his first question is concerned, the case that Lord Nugent of Guildford mentioned on Second Reading, I doubt whether Clause 39 would cover this matter because it begins:
"Where it appears to a water authority that pollution injurious to the flora or fauna of a stream in its area …".
I very much doubt whether it would cover that case.
LORD MOLSON: So do I.
LORD ABERDARE: On the other hand, Clause 30(1) gives the water authority and the Secretary of State power to revoke consents and to impose conditions. If there was a factory which was causing a difficulty, as in the case mentioned by my noble friend, I should have thought that the local water authority had ample powers to revoke or alter the consent in that fashion.
BARONESS WHITE: May I intervene for a moment before the noble Lord leaves that point? It had not occurred to me until the noble Lord, Lord Molson, raised it. We are dealing with charges (are we not?) in the new Clause 39. Though there may be a change or revocation of a consent, who pays to put that damage right? It does not seem to me that the people who made the pesticides which killed the tomatoes would be caught. This situation is surely going to arise more frequently if we are going to have these fantastic transfers of water from one part of the country to another. One would hope that this situation might never arise, but it is conceivable. I have not had time, I admit, to read the Final Report of the Water Resources Board. However, in its strategy for water supply in future it does make suggestions for a water grid. I would suppose that that principle will be carried out on a smaller scale in many parts of the country, as indeed it is between the Great Ouse and the Essex rivers. But this whole point of who pays seems to me to be a very important one. If polluting effluent happens to go into
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your neighbouring stream, you pay: but if the effluent from your enterprise finds itself travelling many miles throughout the country, though it may be just as damaging and noxious you escape payment. I am not at all clear how we are going to deal with this situation.
LORD ABERDARE: Are the two cases similar? What happens under this clause is that pollution is caused by a discharger, and the water authority move in and put it right. They charge the cost of putting it right to the person who was causing the pollution. This is quite a distinct matter from that which the noble Baroness is talking about, which, as I understand it, is damages to the person who suffered from the pollution. Nothing in this Bill prevents anybody who has suffered damage from going to the court and seeking to recover from the person who caused the damage. That, I would think is the answer. But if the noble Baroness is not satisfied with that answer, we can look at it again.
On subsection (7), which my noble friend mentioned, the intention is clear that when a riparian owner seeks damages at common law the subsection requires the court to take account of the restoration undertaken, or to be undertaken, by the water authority under the new clause. Otherwise, the riparian owner might, in effect, be given compensation twice over. I will, if I may, write to the noble and learned Viscount who asked this question, I understand, when I have had a chance to go into the legal side of it.
Clause 40 [Duty of water authorities to deal with waste from vessels etc.]:
6.38 p.m.
VISCOUNT ST. DAVIDS VISCOUNT ST. DAVIDS moved Amendment No. 166C:
Page 51, line 38, leave out from ("which") to ("collection") in line 39 and insert ("needs").
The noble Viscount said: This Amendment concerns quite a simple matter. It is a matter of adding a little more weight to the requirement on the water authority to provide facilities to collect waste. It is very important that these facilities should be provided all over the place, and quickly, if this Bill is to be effective as regards waste collected from boats. I

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have been concerned with this particular matter for quite a number of years. Long before anybody thought that wastes should be collected from boats, I wrote a textbook on how to navigate the inland waterways. Among other things, I put in my textbook quite a long passage on what one should do with one's wastes—there being at that time no collecting points whatever. It is true that at that moment there was no legal responsibility for anybody to do anything with the wastes other than dump them in the water. However, as a good boy scout, I did not consider that adequate. I included what I thought should be done.
Nevertheless, it is intensely difficult to get rid of wastes from boats unless there are regular collecting points, well spaced and not too far apart; and they must be there before it is possible to start carrying out the requirements we are now considering—and "there" means not merely at one or two spots, but at regular intervals all along the various waterways. If the collecting points are not at any one place that will be just the place where a boat has to get rid of something, or it overflows, and we shall be back in the old state of affairs, with the water being treated in the way most people treated it—which was rather roughly. My own method of dealing with the problem—taking out the residues and burying them some way from the waterway—while better than standard practice, was not very good practice. Unless there are not merely places where somebody thinks that some stuff ought to be collected, but regular places along all the navigable waterways, the law will simply not be obeyed. There will be no possible way of obeying it. It is a small point. The Amendment is put up simply because one would like to hear a little more about what the proposals are. I beg to move.
LORD CRAIGTON: I have sympathy with the noble Viscount's Amendment. I am not sure he is quite right in saying it is a good idea to bury waste anywhere, but that concerns another Amendment altogether. I was going to ask him and the Minister this question. The noble Viscount referred to wastes, but of course the way this Bill is drafted, as I read it, means that the waste is really only sanitary waste. I wonder whether he and the Minister are satisfied, and whether we ought to be satisfied, that there is no provision for an adequate
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number or positioning at regular points of dustbins. Cartons, cans and bottles are from the æsthetic point of view the worst waste on any enclosed water. There should be dustbins, and separate dustbins for bottles, adjacent to sanitary facilities and at public moorings where people tend to stop and shop. This is perhaps something upon which we should have put down an Amendment. It is not too late to raise the matter, and so I support the noble Viscount in what he has said.
LORD SANDFORD: In response to the noble Viscount I would make a few preliminary remarks and remind the Committee of something we were doing when we were enacting the Water Bill, in which it was provided that the water authorities—the same water authorities as we are dealing with to-day—had among their duties the duty of making plans for the recreational use of their waterspace and the development of the waterspace for recreational purposes. It will fall to them in doing that to decide where this kind of provision should be made: to consider the kind of points the noble Viscount has just been putting before us—that these waste disposal points should be properly spaced—say, down a canal or along a river bank—and to decide who is going to provide what; because in the towns there may already be conveniences provided by the urban district council. There may in other places be marinas with these facilities provided by private boat hirers or boat builders. All this is taken into account in drawing up these plans, and particularly the recreational plans.
I understood from what the noble Viscount said that he is not proposing to press his Amendment and is just probing the Government's intentions. Against that background, it is obviously necessary for the discretion as to where these facilities should be, and from what points it is necessary to collect waste, to rest with the water authority. If this Amendment were to be imported into the Bill, then the question of which waste needs to be collected from what vessels, and where, would be, in the last resort, a matter for the courts. I think the noble Viscount and the Committee will agree that that would be going too far. As the matter stands, the discretion rests with the water authority as to precisely what provision they make, which areas vessels are likely

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to congregate in, and, for considerations of that kind, from what points the waste should be collected. Everything that I am saying applies of course to sanitary waste—waste which would be emptied from Elsans, for instance—and solid waste, though the solid waste is a matter dealt with in the first Part of the Bill. The same considerations as I have just been mentioning apply in both cases. I hope that that explanation satisfies the noble Viscount.
VISCOUNT ST. DAVIDS: I am glad to have that further statement from the noble Lord. It is the kind of information we want. In answer to the noble Lord, Lord Craigton, I quite agree with him that rubbish and such things as he mentioned are waste which most urgently needs collecting. The sheer mess which was collecting along some of the waterways was terrible. One of the difficulties with rubbish, if it is not adequately collected, is that it tends to attract animals who injure themselves on it. Cows that swallow plastic bags are not improved. Creatures get these things on their hooves or cut their mouths on tins—all sorts of trouble occurs. I quite agree with him that burying is not the best that can be done. The best would undoubtedly be what this Bill provides for. One of the troubles in burying was that the animals came and dug up the stuff again. My remedy for that, given in my book, was that one first of all buried the solid waste and then put the lavatory waste on top of it; that kept the animals from doing it. But undoubtedly this is only a second best, and one can only welcome with joy all the splendid facilities we are now to have. I beg leave to withdraw the Amendment.
Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.
6.48 p.m.
VISCOUNT ST. DAVIDS VISCOUNT ST. DAVIDS moved Amendment No. 166D:
Page 51, line 40, at end insert—
("(1A) A water authority shall reimburse any navigation authority or other person or body the reasonable cost incurred by that authority, person or body in providing and maintaining facilities (including the cost of maintaining facilities provided before the coming into force of this section) for the collection and disposal of waste from vessels being facilities which it is or would (had they not been otherwise so provided) have been the duty of the water authority to provide under subsection (1) of this section; and any dispute as to
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whether or on what terms of reimbursement is to be made under this section shall be determined by the Secretary of State.")
The noble Viscount said: This is a matter to which the noble Lord referred a moment ago. The new authorities are going to provide a number of places to collect waste of all kinds. The question then arises: Who is going to pay for those places? Where the water authorities provide them themselves, naturally they are paying for them. But there are already a great many such places which have been provided because various private and public bodies have found themselves compelled to provide them. Under previous legislation there was power to make rules (which were made) by various water authorities preventing rubbish and lavatory wastes and other things from going into waterways. But although these rules were made, there was no provision in many cases for these waterway authorities to have power to provide anywhere to collect this stuff. The result was that numbers of boatyards had to provide places to protect themselves. On the British Waterways Board's waterways of course the Board has had power to erect sanitary stations, and so on, and has done so, and it has also appointed rubbish collection points. All these are in existence.
The question is: If the duty falls on the new water authorities to do this job, what is going to happen to the existing rubbish and sanitary collecting stations? Are they going to be paid for by the new water authorities? They have a duty to do this job. If somebody is doing the duties for them should these stations be handed over to the new water authorities? The British Waterways Board is now to continue in existence, but will the water authorities pay the British Waterways Board for running the existing sanitary stations which it is now the duty of the authorities to run? Supposing the British Waterways Board closed its stations, would the water authorities under this Bill have the duty to provide them? Would they be compelled to buy them from the British Waterways Board? What is the position?
The same applies to the number of privately owned rubbish and sanitary stations in the hands of boatyards and similar places. These also are performing a function which it is now the duty of the water authorities to perform. Should the water authorities be paying

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for these? What is the position there? We have tabled this Amendment for the simple purpose of finding out. I beg to move.
LORD STOW HILL: May I add just one word to what my noble friend has put before the Committee in his full and clear speech? It is simply this: it is anticipated that it is probably the intention of the Government that there should not be, as it were, duplication; that the water authority should be in a position to avail itself of existing facilities which have already been provided. I gather that the British Waterways Board has already provided something like 150 such stations, or is in course of providing them. I infer that from the wording of subsection (2) of Clause 40, namely,
"arrange for the provision of facilities by way of water closets,"
and so on. Clearly, therefore, the Government intend that what is already on the scene should be incorporated into the general programme and be made use of, and if I may respectfully say so that would seem to be an eminently sensible approach.
What is rather in the minds of those who have already arranged for these facilities and have gone to considerable expense over the years, not only in installing them but in maintaining them so that they are now in use and usable, is that the words
"arrange for the provision of facilities"
leave very uncertain the financial implications as between a water authority and those who have provided the facilities. I hope that it would be the intention of the Government by those words to give power to the water authorities to make reasonable financial payments to those who have installed existing facilities. I suppose that in the first place there is the original capital cost of installing them. Then, over the years, there is the cost of maintaining them and improving them or extending them from time to time. It is submitted that it would be a matter of fairness that the water authority, being relieved of the obligation pro tanto themselves to provide these facilities because of the fact that they are already there, should make some fair reimbursement to both public authorities, like the British Waterways Board, and private individuals like those who hire boats on the Norfolk Broads, to recompense
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them for what they have done and, by so doing, lightening the burden which this clause rightly puts upon the water authority.
In moving this Amendment I think my noble friend largely had the purpose of probing the Government and ascertaining from them in somewhat more precise terms what their intentions are in this particular regard. I would respectfully submit to the Minister that it is desirable in terms to spell out that there is to be a duty on the water authority to pay reasonable compensation, and that duty should be supplemented by a right for any claimant to ask that the decision of the Secretary of State should be invoked in the event of a difference between the water authority and the person who has installed the facilities. Your Lordships will see that this Amendment provides that right. In those circumstances, I hope the Government will be able to indicate that their intention goes the full length of the proposal put forward by my noble friend, and that they will be able to say that they will either accept in terms this Amendment or at least put something in the clause which makes it perfectly clear that the measure of responsibility on the water authority is no less than I have sought to spell out.
6.56 p.m.
LORD SANDFORD: I am glad to respond to another probe, first, by saying that if the Amendment was thought to be necessary in order to enable water authorities to pay someone else to collect waste I can assure the Committee that it is not necessary because they can do that; but I would suggest that if the Amendment was intended to oblige the water authorities to pay everyone who makes provision for waste disposal, that is not reasonable and what in fact will happen will lie somewhere between those two. I do not myself believe it is practicable—as the noble and learned Lord, Lord Stow Hill, was perhaps tempting me to try to do—to spell out in the Bill the co-operative arrangements which need to be made by the various authorities concerned in this particular field. If the total range of facilities for individual boat owners is sensible and effective and sufficient, that is really all that is needed. Our object in the Bill has been to make the provision sufficiently flexible to permit such sensible arrangements to be

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made, and that is exactly what the noble and learned Lord, Lord Stow Hill, surmised. It will be for the water authorities, the British Waterways Board, the boat yard owners and any other bodies concerned to get together and to make sure that sufficiently comprehensive facilities are available on appropriate terms and at appropriate stages along the river which is being used for recreation.
Going back to where I began, this cooperative action is something on which the water authorities have a duty to take the initiative and to prepare plans under duties laid upon them by the Water Act which we enacted last Session. I hope with that assurance about what the water authorities can and will do, and what it would not be reasonable to expect them to do, the noble Viscount will be content to accept my assurances and will not press his Amendment.
LORD STOW HILL: I should like to add one word which arises out of what the Minister has just said. He has indicated the broad intention of the Government. Would it be his view—because I would submit that there may be some doubt about it—that the water authority, if it thought it appropriate and fair, would be able, in the compensation that it provides under the powers given to it by the wording "arranges for the provision of facilities", to include some measure of reimbursement for the actual capital cost that has been incurred? A number of those who have already provided the facilities, as I have said, have put them there on the ground and they are now in operation. If they had not done so, it would mean that the water authority would be under a duty to incur the capital cost of now doing so. They are relieved from that obligation, and I would submit to the Committee that the justice of the case requires, in such circumstances, that the water authority should at least have power, if it seemed fair in the circumstances, to reimburse to some extent the actual capital cost which may have been incurred a considerable time ago by those who installed the facilities, measured against relieving the water authority of incurring a capital cost not necessarily commensurate, I agree at once, in restoring new facilities.
I submit that is fair, and I also submit to the noble Lord the Minister, that it is
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somewhat doubtful as to whether the words "arrange for the provision of facilities" would confer the power to pay such compensation. I submit that the words "arrange for the provision of facilities" seem to look to the future. They do not seem to apply to an existing situation. They seem only to empower the water authority to enter into a new arrangement with some outside person to install and provide, in the very near future, the relevant facilities. If that is all they do provide, I submit that is not quite a fair result. The water authority should be able to go further and make some reimbursement provision for the capital cost already incurred, the incurring of which relieves them of the obligation of incurring a capital cost on their account. I ask the Minister to be so good as to say that he will look at these words, to see whether he is satisfied that they are wide enough in scope to encompass the Government's intention.
LORD SANDFORD: I can certainly confirm that the power provided in the clause as drafted, to arrange for the collection and disposal of this waste, does include the power to pay for it, but it does not go so far as to lay a duty upon a water authority to pay everyone who is collecting and disposing of waste, in every case, their full expenses for doing what the water authority would otherwise have to do. But clearly, in so far as the work that other people are already doing, or intend to do in the future, relieves the water authority of the duty of doing it, there is scope for negotiation and adjustment on a financial basis between the two parties. But I fall back on what I was saying in my first remarks. I do not believe it is feasible or even desirable to go further than that in the terms of the Bill itself.
VISCOUNT ST. DAVIDS: I am sure the Committee would not wish me to press this Amendment, but nevertheless I think one should make some remarks on what has been said. In the matter of the capital costs I cannot say (because I am not a lawyer) whether my noble and learned friend Lord Stow Hill is right. But one point I am sure of is that the running costs of clearing the waste are a considerable burden either on a boatyard or, even more so, on the British Waterways Board. If the water authority

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is compelled by law to provide these facilities, and if these various people already providing facilities are not paid for the work they are doing, then they are quite likely to stop doing it because they are under no legal obligation to collect this waste. If they do stop collecting it, then the cost of collecting the waste will inevitably fall on the water authority, whether they like it or not.
Indeed, I conceive that those people who are collecting waste may even get back part of their capital cost simply by saying that they do not see why they should do this work. As the Bill stands they may indeed be in a position largely to compel the water authority to pay them part of their capital cost. I do not know whether this is right or wrong, but that seems to me to be the position. It looks as if the water authority may find themselves, whether the noble Lord thinks it right or wrong, in a position where they have to do it. We cannot take this matter further to-day, but it seems to me that this is a point where some further amendment ought to be made to the Bill, though in quite what sense I am not sure. It needs looking at further, but for the moment, I beg leave to withdraw the Amendment.
Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.
LORD SANDFORD: May I intervene to move that the House do now resume for other business. I beg to move that the House do now resume.
House resumed.

BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS BILL
7.6 p.m.
THE MINISTER OF STATE, FOREIGN AND COMMONWEALTH OFFICE (BARONESS TWEEDSMUIR OF BELHELVIE): My Lords, I beg to move that this Bill be read a second time. As noble Lords will know, the Bill before us is a consequence of the United Kingdom's signature in 1972 of the Biological Weapons Convention. The Convention imposes certain obligations upon us; before we can ratify it, we must make the necessary legal provisions to enable us to fulfil these obligations.
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In 1968, the United Kingdom tabled a Working Paper at the Eighteen Nation Disarmament Conference in Geneva, calling for the early conclusion of a new Convention to prohibit biological methods of warfare—"germ warfare". The Geneva Protocol of 1925 had already prohibited the use of biological weapons, as well as of gases, in war. Our proposal in 1968 was intended to supplement this prohibition in two ways: by banning the production and possession, as well as the use of biological agents; and by banning them in all circumstances, not only in war.
In July, 1969, the United Kingdom formally tabled in Geneva a draft Convention for the prohibition of biological methods of warfare, and negotiations on a new version of the draft began in the early part of 1971. They resulted in agreement on the text of the Biological Weapons Convention, which was opened for signature in London, Moscow and Washington in July, 1972. The United Kingdom is a Depositary Power. We and the other Depositary Powers, the U.S.A. and the U.S.S.R., all signed on that day. Up to the present time 110 States have signed the Convention and 30 have ratified it. However, it will not come into force until it has been ratified by all three Depositary Powers. We, for our part, cannot ratify the Convention until provisions have been enacted in the form of this Bill and the Act has been extended to Dependent Territories.
The purpose of the Convention is to ban the production and possession for hostile purposes of biological and toxin weapons. Biological agents and toxins are defined both in the Convention and in the Bill in wide terms. Although we recognise that there are problems in such a wide definition, it is not thought possible to devise a better one for the purpose intended. Any narrower definition would risk excluding agents which the Convention and the Bill should include; and any list of prohibited substances would quickly become obsolete. For a biological agent is a micro-organism which causes death or disease by multiplying in man, animals or plants. A toxin is a poison which is produced by a biological agent, but is not capable of reproducing itself.
The Convention is directed primarily towards States. However, each State

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Party is also obliged, under Article IV, to take any necessary measures to prevent people from engaging in activities forbidden by the Convention,
"within the territories of such State, under its jurisdiction or under its control anywhere".
The Biological Weapons Bill will give us the legal means to carry out this obligation.
The Convention was not intended to prohibit States from developing "passive" defensive measures against the possibility of an attack using biological agents or toxins. During the negotiations on the Convention it was recognised that even when it comes into force States may still need to hold some stock of protective masks, clothing and warning devices, as well as laboratory quantities of certain agents and toxins. On the other hand, there is no doubt that the development of biological weapons for "defensive" warfare is prohibited. Her Majesty's Government and all Government agencies will of course be bound by the terms of the Convention.
I will now turn to the Bill, which is largely self-explanatory. Clause 1 defines the new offences that are created, and it provides for a maximum sentence of life imprisonment. Its wording closely follows that of the Convention. Clause 2 makes the institution of proceedings subject to the consent of the Attorney General, but with no risk that vital steps to obtain warrants or arrest suspects may be delayed by this requirement. It also removes the offence from the jurisdiction of the county courts in Northern Ireland. Clause 3 deals with offences by officers of bodies corporate. Clause 4 gives the police powers to search premises and seize suspect material. This is important, because it could be difficult to decide on the spot whether such material was likely to be covered by the Act. The clause also provides that the police may be accompanied by experts, who could give them advice about any material found. Clause 5 excludes the new offence from the jurisdiction of courts-martial. Clause 6 extends the effects of the Bill to Northern Ireland, and permits its extension by Order in Council to other territories, so that it can be applied in any territory under United Kingdom jurisdiction or control, as required by the Convention.
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We remain committed, by Article IX of the Convention, to carrying on further negotiations on chemical weapons, and this we are doing. But meanwhile we believe that the present Convention is an important and useful measure which forbids the possession of so-called "germ" weapons, not only by States but by criminals and by terrorists. The weapons which this Bill seeks to ban are, I think, especially abhorred by all. It is for this reason that I commend this Bill to the House. I beg to move.
Moved, That the Bill be now read 2a. —(Baroness Tweedsmuir of Belhelvie.)
7.13 p.m.
LORD GREENWOOD OF ROSSENDALE: My Lords, a few minutes ago my noble friend Lord St. Davids confessed that he was not a lawyer. I think I should confess than I am not a scientist, and comprehension of this Bill does not come easily to me. I intend no discourtesy to the noble Baroness when I say that even her lucid explanation would not have been readily intelligible to me if I had not done a good deal of homework on the Bill. But such homework as I have been able to do leads me to the conclusion that the Bill is non-controversial and one which all of us ought to welcome. I think, too, it is of interest because it is an example of how some measure of disarmament can be achieved. The noble Baroness has told your Lordships that it arises from the negotiation of the Convention on Biological Weapons. I congratulate the Government on their part in these negotiations, but I think noble Lords will agree that praise is also due to the last Government; indeed the noble Baroness herself referred to the initiative taken by the Labour Government on August 6, 1968. It was that which really opened the way to this important Agreement.
The initiative was the suggestion that biological weaponry should be separated from chemical weaponry. I think the traditional link between the two was clearly a mistake. It is much easier to ban biological weaponry than chemical weaponry. In fact I believe that many military men wish to retain chemical weaponry until general and complete disarmament is achieved, but they have seen little use for the uncontrollable biological weaponry. If my understanding is correct, it was for that reason that the

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suggestion was made that the two should be separated. The Soviet Union accepted the British idea in principle in the spring of 1971, and thus opened the way for the present Convention. The Labour Government was out of office by that time, but both the Labour Government and the present Government, I think, deserve the part of the credit which is due to them for what they have achieved.
I think most of us will agree that in some respects it might have been better if the Convention could have been stronger, but any strengthening would no doubt have made it correspondingly more difficult to negotiate. I believe, for example, that the provision for withdrawal on three months' notice is a pity. Permanent renunciation would have been better. And unless I have misread it, the Convention does not specifically contain a provision banning the use of biological weapons, as was suggested in the last Government's initial plan. I recognise, however, that it can be argued that a ban on development, production and stockpiling, if effective, would seem to make use impossible.
I appreciate, too, that the first use of biological weapons, like chemical weapons, is already covered by the Geneva Protocol of 1925. Even so, it is difficult, it seems to me, to rely exclusively on the Geneva Protocol as an instrument for preventing the use of biological weaponry, because the British, in particular, have recently caused a good deal of controversy as to the exact scope of the Protocol. I am referring to the decision of the Labour Government in 1970 to redefine the British attitude to the use of CS gas in warfare. If I understand the noble Baroness correctly, the present Government have been giving careful consideration to this redefinition, and I should like the noble Viscount who is to conclude this discussion to tell us whether in his view the Bill makes this clear, at least by implication. I think from what the noble Baroness said that this is the case, but if the noble Viscount is able to answer this point I shall be grateful. I apologise for not having been able to give him advance notice.
BARONESS TWEEDSMUTR OF BELHELVIE: My Lords, I wonder whether it would help the noble Lord if I answered that question at once. I think my noble friend the Minister of State
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at the Home Office would like particularly to reply on the body of the Bill which deals very much with Home Office matters. On the specific question of CS gas, we are giving careful consideration to it; but we have taken no decision yet on whether to follow the previous Government's ruling in 1970 that CS gas is not covered by the Geneva Protocol.
LORD GREENWOOD OF ROSSENDALE: My Lords, I am most grateful to the noble Baroness for having made that clear. It was a point on which I was far from clear in my own mind, and I appreciate the trouble she has taken to elucidate it. I would only add that a decision by Great Britain to reduce the use of CS gas in warfare, as distinct from domestic riot control, would greatly strengthen international confidence in the Geneva Protocol, and therefore increase the likelihood that biological weaponry will never be used, thus complementing the measure before the House to-day.
Finally, I should like to comment on the precedent which the present Bill constitutes by introducing for the first time in multilateral arms control history the domestic legal aspect. If this became general practice in many countries in all treaties of this type—I mean, of course, partial nuclear test bans and nonproliferation treaties—it might be of great value to the human race. I say that for two reasons. First, it would lessen the chances of lethal weapons falling into the hands of guerrillas, or even common criminals. So many of us have been preoccupied with the risks of war between the States that we have until recently overlooked the great danger that hijacking, urban violence, and the like, may become the great curse of mankind in the last decades of the 20th century, in the same way that international conflict was in the first half. I heard it said recently, for example, that Professor Rotblat, who originally started me thinking on the ethics of nuclear warfare, believes that it might soon be technically feasible for a group of guerrillas to hold the world up to nuclear blackmail. The principle embodied in this Bill is a step, but only a step, towards preventing that kind of development taking place.
Secondly, the idea of introducing a domestic criminal aspect into international arms control agreements may

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also be of value in helping to overcome the problem of on-site verification by international inspection, which has been such a stumbling block in the post-war period. Even in the harshest dictatorships courageous men might well speak out if they saw officials of their own Government conniving at the breaking of their own laws. I would hope that for many measures of arms control, where vexatious large scale on-site inspection is unacceptable as being likely to involve military or industrial espionage, the passing of domestic laws might be an adequate substitute. In the case of biological weaponry, for example, no international verification is proposed. That is clearly a weakness in the present situation, but we must be satisfied with even small advances. The introduction of domestic legislation is an important step towards getting the development of biological weaponry under control, and I therefore give the Bill a wholehearted welcome and the Government the congratulations of the Opposition.
7.23 p.m.
THE MINISTER OF STATE, HOME OFFICE (VISCOUNT COLVILLE OF CULROSS): My Lords, I not only have to share with the noble Lord, Lord Greenwood of Rossendale, the disadvantage of not being a scientist but a further disadvantage of knowing very little about foreign affairs and conventions, and absolutely nothing at all about the workings of the Ministry of Defence. Nevertheless, the noble Lord is quite right; within the scope of this Bill is the domestic implementation into the criminal law of this country of our obligations under the Convention. He is quite right that this is perhaps only a small step forward when one thinks in terms of verification. As I understand it Article VI of the Convention deals with what States themselves shall do, and the way in which they shall draw attention to each others sins, if any, and of course Article I requires the signatory States not to sin in the first place. I hope, like everybody else, that this will be the preface to other things to come, as my noble friend has said, and will also attract the good will of Governments of States that have these capabilities, so that they will stick to the letter and indeed the spirit of the Convention.
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There is no question of attributing praise here. We recognise the share that the previous Administration had in the preparation of this. Perhaps it has been developed a little in that the toxins have now been included. They may not have been present in the days of the noble Lord's Administration. What the "toxins" are I am not sure, but my noble friend defined them in a fine way. Perhaps that is a small inroad into the area of chemical warfare, at which we are no doubt aiming, and to which my noble friend referred.
For the rest of the Bill itself, it is the result in this country of the obligation laid upon us by Article IV, which makes us, like all other signatories, provide out own internal remedies for anybody who wishes, or thinks that they might like to acquire, or make, or indeed use any of these dreadful things. We think that the machinery that we have invented is as good as can be devised. It provides a very severe penalty for anyone caught. We think that we have done the best we can on the internal detection methods and powers of the police, and the assistance the police might be given. Certainly there is no doubt that if we pass the Bill we shall be able to ratify the Convention. This is a great step forward, because until each of the depository parties have ratified it it cannot come finally into effect.
I was just wondering—and this is the last point that I think I need make in answer to the noble Lord's speech—about the use of weapons of this sort. The noble Lord said that the States that are parties to this Convention undertake that they will not develop, produce, or stockpile any of them; but if he reads on he will see that they cannot acquire or retain them. I should have thought that if you could not acquire them, you would not be able to despatch them; and if you could not retain them you were fairly tied down in what you would be enabled to do. So far as this undertaking is binding in international law, this covers, in its wording, about as wide a spectrum as it is possible to imagine. I hope that at least the wording of the Convention itself is broad enough to cope with that point.
I am really concerned with implementation in the domestic law of this country. I was delighted that the noble

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Lord has no criticism to make of this. I shall not in the least object if he wishes to come back on detailed points at later stages of the Bill. Meanwhile, I am grateful for his welcome, and I should like to repeat our thanks for the preliminary work done by the Administration of which he was a Member. I hope that the House will give a Second Reading to this Bill this evening.
On Question, Bill read 2a, and committed to a Committee of the Whole House.
[The Sitting was suspended at 7.28 p.m. and resumed at 8 p.m.]

PROTECTION OF THE ENVIRONMENT BILL [H.L.]
House again in Committee on Clause 40.
LORD CRAIGTON LORD CRAIGTON moved Amendment No. 168.
Page 51, line 42, after first ("of") insert ("reasonably convenient")
The noble Lord said: The next two Amendments are designed to ensure that an ample number of sanitary stations are provided. I am talking now of the needs mostly of people who use holiday boats. We need, first, to have a good mooring for a fair number of boats; secondly, adequate facilities for carrying and emptying privy buckets or containers—these are very heavy and facilities must be fairly adjacent to the waterside; thirdly, proper facilities for washing the receptacles when they are emptied. None of these essential facilities seem to be included in the Bill, which refers only to what people themselves use, that is, water closets, urinals and wash basins. I should like subsection (2) of this clause to read—
"A water authority may provide or arrange for the provision of reasonably convenient"
and that is very important—
"facilities by way of water closets, urinals and wash basins and arrangements for emptying and washing out other sanitary facilities."
The other point in this Amendment, as I read it, is that the operation of emptying and cleansing is not included in the words
"collection and disposal of waste"
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in subsection (1), and although subsection (1) could refer to pump-out stations the words do not refer to the equally essential work of cleansing and recharging the tank unit of the pump-out station. That must be provided for. With that short speech I hope that the Minister can agree to provide what in fact are sanitary stations, as they are known to people who use boats, and that he will agree to my Amendment. I beg to move.
LORD SANDFORD: I should like to take up my noble friend's offer and consider with this Amendment the one which follows, No. 169, chiefly because it is the latter one that concerns the arrangements for emptying and washing out sanitary facilities such as Elsan buckets, with which I most agree. In fact, I would tend to go a little further than my noble friend and say that wherever the other provisions as set out in subsection (2) are made it should be almost a duty on the authorities to make these other provisions with which my noble friend is concerned. So I can go all the way with him on that; and, in fact, a little further.
However, I am not sure that I can or do agree that anything much would be gained by adding the words, "reasonably convenient", as suggested in his Amendment No. 168. In the last resort the decision as to what is reasonably convenient can rest only with the water authorities and, as I have already described, they will take this decision in the first instance in the course of making the full plans for the recreational development of their waters. If I give an assurance that we will certainly give effect to this, but not precisely in the way proposed in No. 169 and without doing anything to limit or add any further glosses to the responsibility of the water authority for deciding just how convenient and how reasonable their provision of the sanitary stations should be, I hope that my noble friend will not feel it necessary to press this Amendment. We should like to look at it further, and incorporate something very much like it, and, if anything, strengthen Amendment No. 169.
LORD CRAIGTON: I am very glad to hear that from my noble friend, and I beg leave to withdraw my Amendment.
Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.
Clause 40 agreed to.
Clause 41 [Power of water authorities to exclude unregistered vessels from rivers, etc.]:
LORD CRAIGTON LORD CRAIGTON moved Amendment No. 169A:
Page 52, line 10, at end insert:
("( ) Without prejudice to the generality of subsection (1) above, byelaws made in pursuance of that subsection may make provision for prohibiting the registration of any vessel which is not provided with such sanitary facilities as are specified from time to time in the byelaws for that vessel or class of vessel.").
The noble Lord said: if this Amendment is not right as it stands I hope that my noble friend will be able to give effect to it. Once the discharge from the lavatory into the water is illegal, one is left with three possibilities: the boat can have no toilet at all; secondly, it can have a container or bucket which is emptied by hand; thirdly, it can have a tank which is pumped out by a pump on the bank. The first essential is to do everything possible to encourage the vessel user not to foul the water. If there is a bucket it can be so easily emptied overboard when nobody is looking, or it is possible to go to a convenient and wooded bank and use that as a toilet; or, as the noble Viscount opposite said, you can dig a hole and empty the contents of the bucket into that.
The most satisfactory type of toilet is undoubtedly a containment recirculating toilet. Even then this can be pumped out by hand on to the bank, but it is a long and messy arrangement and it is the least likely to be emptied except in the right place. In practice, a recirculating toilet is no more than a closed lavatory. The boat is brought alongside and a pipe which is exited flush on the deck is attached to a pump, and in about a minute the toilet is emptied. As I have said, the tank unit is without question preferable even to the portable container, and some of those are very good—some better than others.
The reason for this Amendment is that there are many types of portable containers, some good, some not good, and many other types of equipment for treating sewage on board in some way. In fact, the list is quite formidable, which shows the necessity for the water authority to be careful to choose the one which suits its water best. There are containment
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recirculating toilets which I have been talking about, there are filtration systems, electrolysis incinerators, chlorinators' aeration by agitation, what are called "magical additive chemicals", and even the sealing of waste matter into an airtight endless plastic sock. With that long list of types of closet, it seems essential that a water authority should have power to do two things: first, to approve the types of toilet that may be used; and secondly—when, for example, adequate riverside pump-out stations have been installed—to phase out certain types of toilet by a specified date. That is why the Amendment includes the words "from time to time". With that explanation, I beg to move.
LORD SANDFORD: I think that the whole Committee are disposed to accept any proposition which helps us to get our rivers cleaner and to keep them cleaner, but I am not sure whether my noble friend is justified in going quite as far as he proposes in this Amendment. Side by side with all the other alternatives open to people to adopt in order not to foul rivers and canals, and places such as the Broads, with sewage discharged from boats, there is the very straight forward alternative of availing themselves of the sanitary facilities on shore. Of course that is not practicable in every case, but it will become increasingly practicable. With that alternative available, and becoming increasingly available, I should not have thought it necessary to be quite so restrictive as my noble friend intends to be, especially when powers to make by-laws controlling boats in the ways laid down in the clause are already there.
LORD CRAIGTON: So long as the powers are already there, I am quite happy. But I must tell my noble friend that his answer will not bring joy to the heart of anybody who knows anything about boats. But with that assurance, I beg leave to withdraw my Amendment.
Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.
8.13 p.m.
LORD CRAIGTON LORD CRAIGTON moved Amendment No. 169B:
Page 52, line 18, leave out ("or by arrangement with").
The noble Lord said: I think that this is really a probing Amendment. I

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am not quite clear what policy is intended in regard to pump-out stations, but apart from that aspect the clause is quite all right. These pump-out stations cost several hundred pounds to install and it is estimated that there is very little profit in charging £1, including V.A.T., for a pump-out and a wash-out. It is highly desirable that pump-out stations should be as numerous as possible, and I am quite sure that eventually every responsible boat hirer will have one for the use of those who hire his boats. But will a boat hirer allow the owner of a private boat to use his equipment if he cannot charge for it, which I do not think he will be able to do under the Bill?
Under a previous Amendment, a water authority might rely on the use of his pump-out station as part of the services on a river, and might reimburse him. But a private boat user could expect to pay £1 to have his re-circulating containment toilet emptied—there is no reason why he should have this service free—and instead of a water authority reimbursing a boat hirer I think that a boat hirer would be perfectly satisfied to provide services free for his own boats and to charge for other boats. That is the reason why I put down this Amendment. I hope that the noble Lord can be helpful on it. I beg to move.
LORD SANDFORD: I agree that the current position is exactly as my noble friend has described it. We are talking about a service which involves boatyard owners in considerable expense, but which they provide free to the people who are using the other services of the boatyard, the economic charge for which might be as high as £1. The position under the Bill is that there is nothing to oblige a boatyard owner to enter into arrangements with a water authority for the provision of facilities, and there is nothing which prevents him from doing so. Nor is there anything in the Bill which prevents a boatyard owner from making his own arrangements, including a scale of charges for people who are not using his boatyard but who want to make use of this service. I hope my noble friend will agree that that is the right framework within which water authorities, on the one hand, who have the duty to collect this waste and the power to pay other people to discharge
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that duty for them, and boatyard owners, on the other, can make sensible arrangements which are mutually convenient to themselves and which provide a satisfactory service for boat users generally.
LORD CRAIGTON: I am grateful to my noble friend. I beg leave to withdraw my Amendment.
Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.
On Question, Whether Clause 41 shall stand part of the Bill?
LORD CRAIGTON: When we discussed Clause 25 I gave my noble friend notice that when we reached this clause I would ask whether the words "keeps or uses" in Clause 25 are right, or whether the words "a person who causes or knowingly permits" in this clause are more advantageous; since the words "keeps or uses" include a person who hires a boat, whereas the words "causes or knowingly permits" exclude—as they should exclude—a person who hires a boat from any liability for infringement of the law under this Bill. I shall be grateful if my noble friend can answer that point.
LORD STOW HILL: Before the Minister replies to that question, may I put a general question to him on which I shall be grateful if he can give some information. I believe I am right in thinking that there have been a great many discussions held between Government Departments and other concerns involved on the question of whether there could be introduced some comprehensive system of registration of vessels, partly to avoid duplication of effort and partly to achieve a number of purely practical objectives. I should like to take an example which is of concern to the Royal Yachting Association. Their concern is that it is very difficult for the owners of pleasure craft to move them up and down the country—for example, by boat trailers attached to motor vehicles—because there are so many local systems of registration.
The broad position, I think, is this—and the Minister will be able to confirm it. The number of authorities involved has in substance been reduced from 29 river authorities to 10 regional water authorities. The river authorities were given a general power to institute registration systems for vessels by means of by-laws made under Section 79(6) of the

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Water Resources Act 1963. Those powers are now transferred to the water authorities under the Water Act 1973. There are the broad powers. In addition, the British Waterways Board operates a registration system of its own in relation to the river waterways which are under its charge for all pleasure craft using them. Other inland navigation authorities operate further registration systems in relation to the inland waterways for which they have a responsibility. There, I believe, is the general picture and I hope that, broadly speaking, I have described it with reasonable accuracy.
One is now dealing with this clause, which confers on the water authorities a power to prescribe by by-laws for the registration of vessels and for the prohibition of their user in streams (which, broadly speaking, means inland waterways) unless they are suitably fitted with the facilities under discussion or are exempted by by-laws from registration. The first subsection speaks of the power to exempt vessels from the necessity to be registered. Subsection (2) confers the power to make charges. The proposition which I would advance is that it is in the public interest that there should be a single, overall system of registration. I gave the reasons. Certain practical objectives can be obtained; and it is surely better for the purpose of avoiding the duplication of labour, expense and inconvenience that there should be one comprehensive system operative throughout the country.
I am told (I am sorry to repeat myself) that these discussions have been continuing between those concerned and Government Departments. The question I should like to put to the Minister and which I should be grateful if he would answer on the Question, Whether the clause shall stand part? is: what is the state of those discussions now? Is there a possibility of a comprehensive system being arranged? What are the prospects? Is the power contained in this clause under discussion—that is, the power to exempt by by-laws vessels (of categories I suppose to be specified in by-laws) from the necessity of registration—designed to fit in with some more general system? Is that the objective of this power to exempt? How do the Government envisage that the general system of registration in the country will
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work? I should be most grateful if the Minister would give us any information he has at his disposal, and I think it would be very much valued by those who are concerned.
VISCOUNT ST. DAVIDS: Perhaps I may add one word to the remarks of my noble friend. There is an absolute necessity to get a unified system of registration in this country as soon as we possibly can, because we are getting small craft capable of being trailered and craft which are moving all over the place. If they have to take out one licence, that is fair enough; most people will do that. If they have to take out five or six licences; or if, having a fistful of licences, they find that they still need another one, then quite likely they will not take out another one and we shall have more of the trouble that we are already deeply involved in in this country. That is the problem of unregistered boats—and once boats are unregistered it is impossible to control them in any way. Already on the British Waterways Board's waterways we are having a great deal of trouble with these craft which appear from nowhere, break a large number of rules and then vanish—simply because there is no unified system in this country. It is highly important that we get this unified registration as soon as we can. This should be one of the main objectives of this Bill, because unless we have a unified system of registration we shall not have the provisions of this Bill properly carried out.
LORD SANDFORD: Perhaps I may start by answering my noble friend Lord Craigton. It is the intention that both the hirer of a boat and the person to whom the boat is hired should be at risk if offences are committed under this clause and under Clause 25, and I think I shall be able to show that there are circumstances in which either party may be at fault. We do not agree that the phrase in Clause 41, "causes or knowingly permits", can apply only to the person to whom a boat is hired. For example, if a hirer owns craft which are normally on a stream and are in contravention of bylaws, he must be causing or knowingly permitting by the act of hiring the boat in that condition. However, we are equally prepared to acknowledge that there are many occasions when the person to whom the boat is hired will be at

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fault—where, for example, a boat is hired on tidal waters and is taken by the person to whom the boat is hired into an area where by-law limitations apply. In such a case he will be at fault. So the intention is to meet both those sorts of circumstances and for both the hirer and the person to whom the boat is hired to be at risk.
In answer to the noble Lord, Lord Stow Hill, and to the noble Viscount, I would confirm that it is the intention to go for a system of comprehensive registration covering, so far as may be, the inland waters of the whole country. But it is not possible to give many or, really, any further details yet because the extensive discussions which are an essential preliminary to working all this out cannot make very much progress until the water authorities are fully staffed and fully active, which they are not at the moment. When that time comes, and when they are able to address their minds to this matter, then substantive discussions will begin. At the present moment, not very much progress is being made because there are not the people to conduct the necessary discussions.
LORD CRAIGTON: I cannot really believe that my noble friend, on reading what he has said, will find it entirely satisfactory. If, after the operative date, somebody who does not know anything about boats comes along to a small-boat hirer and hires a boat, and the man hiring the boat has not had the boat sealed off, is the person taking the boat going to be blamed? Is he going to be held responsible for fouling the water when he has hired a boat from a man who has not sealed off the exit? Surely that is not the intention of this Bill.
LORD SANDFORD: I think that it depends on the circumstances. If the boat is in an area where it should be sealed but is not, then the person who hires out the boat in that condition has caused or knowingly permitted an offence to take place. If, on the other hand, the boat is in tidal waters, or in some other situation where it is not necessary for it to be sealed, and it is explained to the person to whom the boat is hired in that condition that it must not go beyond point X, if he then takes it beyond point X, it is he who commits the offence.
LORD CRAIGTON: That is not what the Bill says. On page 33 it states:
"A person who, after the end of the year, 1978, keeps or uses on a stream any vessel provided with a sanitary appliance …".
If I hire a boat which has a sanitary appliance, after 1978 I should be using that boat illegally if I used it on a stream. I think it is most improper that the person who hires the boat should be responsible. The person who owns the boat should be responsible.
LORD SANDFORD: Surely the hirer is the person who owns the boat.
LORD STOW HILL: May I thank the Minister for the information that he has just given to me and also ask him this question. If it is the case that the Government are in favour of a general scheme of registration; and if in consequence it is likely that after further negotiation and when the staffs of the water authorities have been assembled and get to work that such a scheme will be brought into being, would it not be desirable to make provision for some such a scheme in the terms of this Bill?
The point I have in mind is that if one looks at Clause 41 which provides for registration of vessels, surely it would be necessary to make a fairly substantial amendment in the terms of that clause to accommodate any general registration scheme. It is likely that if there is a general registration scheme and this Bill becomes an Act within months the scheme would come into operation a year or 18 months from now. It would seem rather a pity if legislation had to be introduced specially for the purpose of causing that general system to supervise the sort of arrangements which seem to be envisaged under Clause 41. Would the Minister consider favourably some Amendment at a later stage of the Bill designed, as it were, to pave the way for some such general scheme?
LORD SANDFORD: Certainly I will consider that. But my advice at the moment is that Clause 41 is drawn with the prospect of comprehensive registration fully in mind. But I will look at it again to make sure that there is no need to amend the Bill and that comprehensive registration when it comes, can be fitted into it. I will look again at the point raised by my noble friend Lord Craigton, and will answer him more

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extensively if I find that I am able to do so.
Clause 41 agreed to.
Clause 42 [Investigation of water pollution problems arising from closure of mines]:
8.35 p.m.
LORD CRAIGTON LORD CRAIGTON moved Amendment No. 169D:
Page 52, line 19, leave out ("power") and insert ("a duty").
The noble Lord said: The investigation of water pollution problems arising from the closure of mines should be mandatory. Is my noble friend satisfied that in every case surveys will be made to establish the extent of the problem and that steps necessary to meet it will be taken in every case? There is a power, but there is no duty. There cannot be all that number of mines closed and we suggest that "duty" rather than "power" would be the right word.
LORD SANDFORD: Of course we are all fully in sympathy with that idea, but I do not think it would be satisfactory to lay a universal duty on all water authorities to undertake studies of this matter, just like that. I think that some will certainly need to put studies fairly high on their list of priorities. Others may not need to do so or may even not have abandoned mines in their area; or, if they have, they may not be causing any great trouble. They may not constitute a pollution hazard to any great extent and there may be many other more important things they should be getting on with. But the intention is that studies of this problem will be undertaken by any water authorities who have to contend with pollution in a large measure and in so far as their other duties and powers permit. Obviously this will be an important matter for quite a number of them, but I should not have thought there was any reason to believe that water authorities will not take up the power under this clause; and under the Water Act of 1973 they will be under a duty to submit programmes for the discharge of their functions for the approval of Ministers. So what the Secretary of State judges to be a failure in any particular case to make proper use of these powers would soon become apparent to him.
LORD MOLSON: Last Thursday, my noble friend persuaded the Committee that an Amendment moved by the noble Baroness, Lady White, was unnecessary because of the assurances that he gave that under Clause 42 studies would be made with a view to action being taken later. I should have thought that it would be entirely appropriate to provide that there should be a duty to carry out these studies. We were told that it was inappropriate to force them to take action at present—the problem is, admittedly, very difficult—and that previous studies were necessary. I should have thought it possible for the Government to agree to this Amendment and that it should be a duty to carry out studies for the purpose of ascertaining what problems might arise, or have arisen. My noble friend has now said that there may be cases where there is no problem. In that case, the study would not result in anything having to be done.
I should have thought that when we are all agreed that the whole problem of pollution of relevant waters from the abandoning of any mine is as serious as it is—and the Government have defended the previous provisions in the Bill by saying how important these matters are and how costly it may be to deal with them—there was nothing unreasonable in asking that there should be a duty on each water authority to carry out the studies. Nothing is obligatory on them. My noble friend says that some of them would have nothing to do; when they had carried out the studies they would find that there was nothing to do. But this is an extremely serious problem in the parts of the country where mining or quarrying has been going on for a long time. I should not have thought that there was any reason at all why the Government should not agree to it being a duty upon all water authorities to study this problem.
BARONESS WHITE: I can of course perfectly appreciate the point made by the noble Lord, Lord Sandford, that if you do not have a mine you cannot study it. But I should have thought that the number of water authorities finding themselves in that situation must be small. It depends partly (does it not?) on the definition of "mine". I assume that this is not confined to a coal mine. I wonder whether it includes china clay, for

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instance, because if so that would bring in an area which might otherwise not enjoy the benefits of coal mining.
My noble friend behind me mentioned tin mining, which might also arise, and we know there is prospecting going on in various parts of the country for mineral mining of one sort or the other. There are iron ore operations in certain parts of the country. I assume that the word "mine" could cover any or all of these. I am racking my brains to think of what water authority would find themselves in a position with no mine of any sort. I cannot think of one, although perhaps there may be one. But if they do have a mine, or more than one—that is the whole point—then I think we feel sufficiently strongly that they ought to have a duty to do something about it.
It may mean a slight amendment to the form of words if one wants to make it abundantly clear that if there is no mine whatever in the area of the water authority, then they are absolved from this duty. I would suppose that the noble Lord who moved this Amendment would make no objection to that. We think that this is sufficiently serious, because these studies will take time. No doubt there will have to be some sort of comparison between one area and another so that they can learn from one another. When they have discovered what the problems are, they have to budget, or at least estimate, what the cost of taking the step will be. This may also be quite a lengthy procedure. One then has to take technical advice as to how best to deal with the problem, not merely to ascertain what the problem is.
Furthermore, I am not at all clear what facilities a water authority would enjoy in undertaking these studies. Would they have a right of entry into workings? I suppose with the National Coal Board one might reasonably assume that there would be no great problem as it is a public authority, but some of the mines I have mentioned are not publicly owned and what guarantee have we that that information would be forthcoming, that entry could be secured?
This is a far less simple clause than appears at first sight. I shall be moving another Amendment in a moment, but it has been put to me that anyone who is seriously undertaking a study of this kind
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in an area which could affect the work of a water authority, but which is not within the jurisdiction of the water authority themselves could come up against all sorts of difficulties. Yet this is a problem of national and public importance. One ought to be quite sure before passing a clause of this kind that what we are saying is not just a pious hope but that we are also willing the necessary means for this kind of investigation to be carried out, both physically on or under land which does not belong to the water authority at all; with records and so forth, all the documentation that might be necessary, studying the workings and also, in certain circumstances, safety precautions to be taken by those who understand safety in mines, which again would not be a matter of expertise for the water authority themselves.
I only mention these in relation to the Amendment moved by the noble Lord opposite because I take this clause very seriously indeed. I want to be quite sure that we know what we are doing, and that the Government are able to assure us that what is purported to be done in this clause will be possible to carry out in practice.
LORD SOMERS: I should have thought that the whole matter could be put simply like this: is it or is it not desirable that the water authorities should carry out this investigation? If it is—and I think we are all quite agreed that it is—why not make it a duty?
LORD HAWKE: I would just remind the Committee that there are not only coal mines and tin mines, but there are arsenic mines and lead mines, and the pollution from them might be very serious indeed.
LORD SANDFORD: It would be easier if we knew exactly what was involved in these studies and what it was we expect the water authorities to do. All we know is that this is the first time the authorities which are being created under the Water Act of last year will be able to grasp and deal with this problem, first by studying it and then by taking whatever action the studies indicate is necessary.
But we have not got past either of those stages yet. The authorities which are for the first time able to address

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themselves to the whole problem of dealing with the pollution hazards of abandoned mines are only now in the process of being assembled. That is the first point. It is quite clear—and the noble Baroness, who knows much more about this than most of us, I think would agree—that the studies themselves are going to take a considerable time and will involve quite a lot of staff effort and resources. Furthermore, the noble Baroness also rightly pointed out that we are not just concerned with one particular type of mine. Some of us might have been thinking particularly of coal mines, but there are tin mines and there are all sorts of open cast and deep mining. They are all involved. Some things are noxious, like lead mines, with arsenic involved as well.
If we are to lay a duty upon each water authority—and it is each water authority that is referred to in Clause 42—the precise nature of that duty would, I am sure all Members of the Committee would agree, need to be much more precisely defined. That could be done if we knew exactly what the duty involved. We do not even know at the moment what the duty of studying this problem involves. It has not been done. I should have thought that it was much more sensible for those authorities for whom this problem is clearly a top priority—some of the authorities, for instance, in the South of Wales where there are a large number of mines and many of them are serious potential pollution hazards—for this study to be tackled perhaps by mining consultants.
When those particular studies have gone far enough, it will be possible to see what is involved for other authorities in other situations, and whether some extrapolation will be possible. Other authorities will then be able to judge how important it is, according to their list of priorities, for them to study this particular problem.
While we are so much in the dark—and it is nobody's fault that we are in the dark—it has not been possible to tackle this problem before and I should have thought it would be wrong to go so far as to lay a precise duty, because duties have to be precise on each water authority to tackle this particular business
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of studying the problems of pollution from abandoned mines. I will certainly take this away and look at it again to see whether it is possible to go some way—I do not think it is possible to go all the way—toward meeting the concern that noble Lords are expressing, that somehow or other this is an important matter which water authorities will be hesitant and reluctant to tackle.
I should have thought there were some water authorities who would see clearly enough that this is something that it is important for them to get on with quickly and to devote resources, time and effort to. I should have thought other authorities would be quite justified in feeling that for them there are other matters which for the time being are more important. The only other point I would make before sitting down is to remind the Committee that this whole business must be seen in this context, that programmes are to be submitted by each water authority to the Secretary of State for approval. He will see from that which authorities are exercising their powers and have an opportunity to exhort those which in his view ought to be doing more. I hope that, with the assurance I have given that I will look at this again to see whether I can go some way towards meeting these points, my noble friend will not feel it necessary to press his Amendment.
LORD MOLSON: There are two points made by my noble friend to which I should like to draw attention. I do not think they strengthen his argument. He spoke about us all being in such complete darkness about this problem. If we are in darkness about this problem then it really is a matter of urgency that the matter should be investigated. Secondly, reference has been made to mines such as arsenic mines, tin mines and so on—and I confess I had not given thought to them before. It seems perfectly clear that if the Amendment is accepted the only obligation upon the water authorities would be to peer into the darkness and find what problems arise and what steps are likely to be appropriate. If there is no need to do anything about the situation, if there are no mines in their area which are likely to cause trouble, then nothing under this Amendment, imposing a duty, would

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result in anything more than their satisfying themselves (and public opinion) that there is no danger of this kind.
So far as I am concerned, in view of the assurance given by my noble friend, I should not wish to pursue the matter any further but I should have thought that the Government might well have accepted the word "duty" and this would be entirely in accordance with the line of reasoning my noble friend has adopted.
LORD CRAIGTON: The impression I get is that the Government do not really know what is involved and that it is all going to be very very difficult and expensive; and I doubt whether anything at all will be done. It is an important point, and I am glad that my noble friend has said he will look at it. I am sure the Committee would wish that he could have gone further than he has gone so far. I beg leave to withdraw my Amendment.
Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.
8.52 p.m.
BARONESS WHITE BARONESS WHITE moved Amendment No. 169C:
Page 52, line 19, after ("carry out") insert ("or commission and publish").
The noble Baroness said: I beg to move this Amendment standing in my name. I gather from a phrase which dropped from the lips of the noble Lord, Lord Sandford, that it is intended that the words "to carry out" should include "commission" —in other words, it is not expected that this work would be done by direct labour or by the staff of the authorities, but that they would have freedom to commission possibly university research teams or other specialists to carry out some of the necessary investigations. I should like that to be confirmed on the Record so that we are perfectly certain about it.
I have also included the word "publish", because there is nothing here to indicate that the water authorities should publish the results of their inquiry. I cannot see why not, because this is a matter of public concern and these are bodies carrying out a duty of that sort. As a matter of fact, in the mining areas I know I do not think it would be possible to keep anything secret anyway, because the people working at various levels in the pits (both physically and
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metaphorically) would know all about the situation between them. They might not know all the scientific facts or the data underlying the condition, but they would have a shrewd idea. So I can see no reason at all why such reports should not be published, and I think it is very much in the public interest that they should be published. Therefore I should like to see at least a reference to publication included in this clause. I beg to move.
LORD SANDFORD: I am glad to be able to confirm that there is nothing in this clause to prevent water authorities from either undertaking these studies with their own staff or commissioning someone else to do them, or combining together to do the studies. I think all those different approaches will be adopted. Certainly there is nothing in the clause to prevent the reports, when completed and submitted, from being published. I do not think the noble Baroness or anyone else in the Committee would wish to lay an obligation on each water authority to publish every part of each report. I think that when and what it publishes ought to be left to its discretion and I am happy to confirm that there is nothing whatever in the clause to prevent it doing that. I am sure it would be a sensible course to adopt.
BARONESS WHITE: Until we are sure what is to happen to the first line of the clause it would perhaps be unwise to press the Amendment. I believe it is worth while spelling out these things, however, because although they may seem self-evident to us here they are not always so to other people, and I should like to reserve my position so far as putting down some comparable Amendment at a later stage is concerned. Meanwhile, I beg leave to withdraw this one.
Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.
LORD SANDFORD LORD SANDFORD moved Amendment No. 170:
Page 52, line 23, after ("area") insert ("or might arise if any such mine were abandoned").
The noble Lord said: On behalf of my noble friend Lady Young, I beg to move this Amendment. This is necessary in order to make it clear that the water authority does not have to identify a particular abandoned mine before carrying

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out studies. It should be able to carry out studies into problems that might arise if mines were abandoned. I am sure the Committee, and in particular the noble Baroness, would agree that is necessary, and I beg to move.
Clause 42, as amended, agreed to.
Clause 43 [Notice to abstain from certain agricultural practices]:
8.58 p.m.
BARONESS WHITE BARONESS WHITE moved Amendment No. 171:
Page 52, line 38, leave out ("requesting") and insert ("directing").
The noble Baroness said: I beg to move this Amendment. We now revert to the question of agricultural practice. I may say, en passant, that I find this Bill very difficult because it jumps about from one thing to another and I think really it might have been drafted more helpfully to those who have to follow it. However, that is by the way.
I put down this Amendment because to me it seemed extremely odd that the Secretary of State should merely "request". I have such veneration for Secretaries of State that I would expect them to direct and not to request, if they thought something should be done. However, I recall that at an earlier stage in our deliberations—I believe the noble Lord, Lord Sandford, pointed this out—the term "request" in this sense was the equivalent of giving prior warning before something rather more drastic might take place. That I can now understand; but from simply reading the clause, I do not think that anyone would have read that meaning into it unless they were very experienced in the ways of legislation and in the ways in which Government Departments work. I would ask that this might be looked at again. I am very much concerned that a Bill of this sort, concerning the environment, should, so far as possible, be clear to interested members of the public. Where those of us who are reasonably experienced in these matters are puzzled, I should have thought we might reasonably suppose that members of the public would also be puzzled. It is not by any means clear what "request" means in this context. I think that I understand it now, but if the noble Lord has anything to add which
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might clarify the matter further I should be interested to hear it.
LORD DE RAMSEY: This is intended to be helpful. It certainly gives a farmer more time to find out in a practicable or scientific way what he has done wrong. Incidentally, the wording confirms to me that this creates a new form of pollution of something which hitherto has been perfectly legal; but as the noble Baroness has pointed out, it will give rise to confusion in the minds of the public. After all a policeman directs the traffic to stop, he does not request it to stop. The Secretary of State should do the same. Good agricultural practice ceases if there is pollution. Unfortunately, unlike in industry, a farmer cannot install purifying plants to the subsoil water from his fields. Therefore, perhaps it is nicer to request him to stop farming than to direct him to get out. The limiting factor to economic crop production, apart from water, is nitrogen. The noble Lord, Lord Sandford, in answer to my Amendment on Clause 23(2)(c), said that the main consideration was not nitrates. If not, what is? Perhaps "request" is the right word to ask for it to stop raining on a farmer's land. In that case someone higher up is the right person to request.
BARONESS WHITE: I remember another reason why I was worried: the word "request" is used in the preceding line where the authority requests the Secretary of State. This adds to the confusion. There "request" is used in the normal way, in that the authority says to the Secretary of State, "Will you please, if it seems good to you, do such and such?" Whereas the Secretary of State, in serving on the occupier a "notice requesting" is using the word "request" in a somewhat different form. This is another instance in the Bill where the drafting could be improved.
LORD STANLEY OF ALDERLEY: If I may interrupt for once, I agree with the noble Baroness. I am a farmer and I am completely lost. I hope that my noble friend will give me an answer to two simple questions regarding the word "request". I have a nasty suspicion—I hope it is entirely unfounded—that this word "request" will involve a farmer in rushing off to a lawyer to ask him what it means. What might be the consequences should the farmer decide to

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ignore this request and continue to put on fertilisers, "muck" and so on? I do not like the idea of farmers having to consult lawyers and, with the greatest respect to any noble and learned Lord here, I suggest that farmers have better things to do. I think the noble Baroness will agree with me on that matter. Let the Secretary of State make up his or her mind on this point and direct if necessary. I do not think it is fair to put the onus on the farmer.
Secondly, I hope my noble friend will answer one other question. My noble friend replied to the noble Lord, Lord De Ramsey, regarding his Amendment No. 140 (and this is at column 1635 of last Thursday's Hansard) and I have to admit to being suspicious that this word "requesting" is used as an escape for the Government from having to pay compensation should the farmer be prohibited from carrying out certain well-established agricultural practices. I hope that my noble friend can assure me that I have a suspicious and evil mind, that I have the wrong end of the stick and that there is no question in this wording of the Government opting out of their moral obligation to pay compensation. I hope they will not threaten me with removing Clause 43 and Clause 23(2)(c) altogether because I and my fellow farmers would think that that was not playing fair.
LORD HAWKE: I wonder whether "request" is related to the reference to the river of chicken manure that I mentioned last week. We did not get a very clear reply from the Government, but I think we were told that it was perfectly legitimate for the farmer to put his chicken manure on his land outside his chicken-houses, but wrong for him to put it into a stream. We never received any real reply to the point about the natural phenomenon whereby the chicken manure was drawn by gravity down the hill into the stream. Presumably, the Government cannot prohibit the farmer from putting chicken manure outside his chicken-house; they can merely request him to do so. But if it eventually finds its way into the stream it becomes, by act of God, an illegal procedure.
LORD SANDFORD: What a fascinating Bill this is! The noble Baroness is perfectly right; her understanding of this part of the Bill is correct. We are not
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dealing with a control system in which it would be inappropriate for the Secretary of State, or anybody else, to be requesting somebody to do this or that but rather to be directing or ordering him. We are dealing with an early warning system. In that context it is perfectly appropriate to use the word "request". I agree it is unfortunate that we have in two consecutive lines the use of the word "request" in its normal sense, and the use of the word "request" in the technical sense of being part of an early warning system. We will look at that and see if the potential confusion can be removed.
I would make one general point about this particular legislation, and legislation in general. The actual practitioners in the field are normally guided by reference to the legislation not in neat form, but as it is distilled to them in the form of circulars and so on. These should normally be enough, perhaps with the help of ordinary professional advisers—not legal advisers—for most farmers' purposes. I hope that it would not normally be necessary for a farmer on receipt of this kind of request—using the word here in the technical sense—to consult his solicitor.
I am grateful to the noble Lord, Lord Hawke, for having reminded us of the chicken manure because this might well be the kind of thing which, if it were deposited in the ordinary way outside the chicken-house and left on the land, would not constitute any great polluting hazard, though if it were carried down to a stream, while still forming part of good agricultural practice, might nevertheless become a polluting hazard and form the subject of a request. In those circumstances, the request is issued as a warning to the farmer that unless he does something about it he will cease to be in the special provision provided for the farmers by the operation of these two clauses, and will be in the normal position of anybody who is about to commit, or is actually committing, a polluting offence. I hope that makes the situation clear.
In answer to the noble Lord, Lord Stanley of Alderley, there is nothing in what I have said here which represents any departure from the undertakings I gave when we were last discussing this matter to consider the various issues that

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were raised by members of the Committee.
BARONESS WHITE: I am so sorry, but would the noble Lord be kind enough to refresh my memory? Where is it that we are told that if the farmer declines the request he then takes himself out of the protection given to him in Clause 23? There must be something in the Bill, somewhere, that says what happens to him if he says, "No, thank you very much, I am not acceding to your request." The noble Lord has not answered very adequately this point about whether this is simply a means of enabling the Government to escape the obligation to pay compensation.
LORD SANDFORD: The last point is one which I have undertaken on previous discussions to look into again. We are actually on the clause now which deals with this very point, the serving of a notice requesting the farmer to prevent a particular act, because the object is to place him, as a result, in exactly the same position as the other person. I am referring to the notice requesting the farmer to abstain from certain agricultural practices which, because they are authorised by the codes which are being proposed, entitles him to this early warning, the first step in which is the request to desist from something which normally is approved by virtue of the code. This is the very clause we are on now.
BARONESS WHITE: I shall have to think about it still further. In the meantime, I beg leave to withdraw this Amendment.
Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.
LORD SANDFORD LORD SANDFORD moved Amendment No. 171A:
Page 53, line 25, at end insert:
("(5) If the Secretary of State considers that a notice served in pursuance of subsection (3) of this section on the occupier of a place should be cancelled he may, after giving notice of his proposal to do so to the water authority on whose application the other notice was served and considering any representations made to him by the authority about the proposal, serve on the occupier of the place a further notice cancelling the other notice at a time specified in the further notice; and where the Secretary of States serves a notice in pursuance of this subsection—

(a) it shall be his duty to serve a copy of it on the authority aforesaid; and

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(b) it shall be the duty of the authority to enter in the said register a statement that the other notice was or is to be cancelled at the time specified as aforesaid.")

The noble Lord said: I beg to move Amendment No. 171A. This was one which we considered along with No. 136A at an earlier stage of the Bill. I do not think there is anything I want to add to what I said then. I beg to move.
Clause 43, as amended, agreed to.
Clause 44 [Charges in respect of certain contents and discharges in England and Wales]:
On Question, Whether Clause 44 shall stand part of the Bill?
9.13 p.m.
BARONESS WHITE: Here we come to one of the most difficult and puzzling clauses of the Bill. This clause, as your Lordships will be aware, deals with the question of charges. We should like to know what the Government's attitude really is. My noble friend Lord Kennet apologises to the House for the fact that he is not able to be present to-night, but he thought the Amendment was going to be reached yesterday. He had originally intended to move this Amendment because, as some of your Lordships may recall, he referred with some emphasis to this matter on Second Reading. As a result of that, he received a letter from the noble Baroness, Lady Young. It is not in any way marked "confidential", and it referred to that debate, so I assume I might quote from it. I found the letter, with great respect, even more confusing than the clause. The penultimate paragraph says:
"Of course, this is an altogether oversimplified view."
LORD SANDFORD: Two pages.
BARONESS WHITE: Two pages of utter confusion. I find this very difficult indeed, but to try to put it as simply as I can, we are not at all clear in our minds (and I fear that the correspondence has not made the position any more lucid) what kind of change is envisaged in this clause. If it is a charge for what might be called "services rendered", in order to cover the cost of treating polluting matter, then of course there could be no possible objection. If there were possibly a charge which included some element for

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the water authority for overheads or administrative costs, I do not think we should worry about that, either. But what worries us is that there appears to be a possibility of paying to pollute: in other words, provided that you pay a certain charge, and provided that your effluent is not too offensive, then you may continue to pollute on payment.
We are worried about this matter because there is an attitude in this direction, we understand, in certain Western European countries—I think I am correct in saying in the Netherlands in particular; I think there is some tendency this way also in the West German Republic. We know that consultations are going on within the context of the E.E.C. But it has never been part of the philosophy of dealing with these matters in this country, so far as I know, that we think it right that one should be allowed to pollute provided that one pays. So one has a real difficulty over this clause. If it were simply to mean that it might be said: "Look ! If we clean up your effluent for you, then we expect you to pay", that I think is perfectly straightforward, although normally, as we all know, an industrialist either does the job himself or gets a contractor to do it for him. But we see no difficulty in principle if he says to the water authority: "Look! I cannot do this. Will you take it on, and I will reimburse you?" The only difficulty about that concept is that the polluting matter might well get into the stream or river and not be treated until it was a good deal further down, after it was abstracted for some other purpose. The result would be that you would be treating the river as a sewer and you would have polluted Walter for the distance between the discharge into the water and the point of abstraction further down at which the water would be cleansed. This we should regard as undesirable, for quite a different reason.
I should very much like to have further clarification on this subject. We have received very strong representations about it. What worries us is that in any case it appears to us that the industrialist responsible for the discharge will have to pay: but in one case he will be paying for something to be done, and the result will be that the effluent will be treated and the river will therefore be cleaner; in the other case he will certainly be paying (if we take what I might call, for
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shorthand, the Continental view), but the effluent, provided it is not too obnoxious, will not be treated and will add to the general pollution of the water. So there is here a very real problem.
In her letter to my noble friend, the noble Baroness, Lady Young, said this—I think I should perhaps quote it. She indicated that studies were going on, and pointed out a number of highly complicated problems that can arise in this business of charging, and then finally said:
"This is why, as I said in winding up, we have an open mind on the question of charging for discharges and feel that we must have the results of the current studies and consult widely about them before reaching any conclusion."
That is a perfectly understandable position, but if you are in that position it does not seem to me that you have any business to put this provision into legislation, because you really do not know what you are doing. It is for that reason that my noble friend Lord Kennet and I (and we are supported by other noble Lords) feel that it is inappropriate at this stage to include in a Bill of this kind the provisions which are contained in Clause 44.
If it is the case that we may be involved in arguments with our partners in the Economic Community, anyone with any knowledge of the kind of consultations that go on there will know that these may go on for years. Therefore if we reach a point where, for quite different reasons, we may feel obligated to adopt a philosophy which I think to many of us would be repugnant, that ought to be considered on its merits at the time when it is really necessary. Our submission is that at this moment of time it is not only not necessary but that nobody has yet determined the proper way of dealing with this problem. Therefore it is quite irresponsible to press for legislation at this time.
I assume that the Department has advised Ministers that they want this as a longstop. Of course that is understandable. Departments have to think ahead and say "Legislation is not always easy to obtain when we need it, so why not pop this into the Bill and we shall have it when we want to use it." My understanding—and I would not put any other interpretation upon it—from the letter written by the noble Baroness, Lady Young, is that the Government have not yet made up their mind whether or not they would use the powers in this clause,

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or how they would use them. I repeat, it would certainly be wholly obnoxious to those of us on this side of the Committee to adopt the philosophy that you may pollute, provided that you pay. That is an interpretation that would certainly be put on the clause as it now stands and I would have thought that was in itself sufficient reason not to accept the clause; but possibly an even stronger reason is that it is perfectly plain that the Government themselves are not sure.
My final submission on this matter is that I am aware, as I am sure are some other noble Lords, that this is one part of the Bill on which the Confederation of British Industry is very much opposed to the view of the Government—so I am told by them—and this is one of the areas in which they have failed to reach an understanding. This seems to me to be an added reinforcement of the view which I have attempted to put before your Lordships.
LORD DE RAMSEY: I have the same fears and was as puzzled as the noble Baroness, Lady White, but perhaps they are unfounded. Perhaps this is intended purely to be an administrative charge for discharging, in which case one's first reaction is relief and to say, as the noble Baroness, Lady White, said, that we are not going to make a fuss about that. But when we come to think of it further we ask ourselves: is this purely an administrative charge that is really necessary or is it just a vexatious imposition? Will it not just add more clerks to the treasurer's department, with supporting staff? I wonder whether the noble Lord thinks that this is an essential provision in the Bill.
THE EARL OF COURTOWN: I too was puzzled by this clause. The present system of abatement of water pollution is based on an assessment of the effluent to the extent that the pollution needs to be acceptable to the receiving waters. The cost of this is borne by the polluter—by the industrial discharger—either by himself or by payment to a contractor or to a local authority, or possibly both. It seems to me that there can be little justification for making, certainly not without much consultation, an additional charge—that is, a charge over and above the cost of improving the emission to the
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proper standard. As I see it, the clause means that the water authority may be entitled to impose charges on a discharger to a river, estuary or coastal water, even if the water that he used has never been polluted, or if he has purified his effluent to the standard required.
Then there is the other point mentioned by the noble Baroness, Lady White. Is a kind of pollution tax intended, by which a polluter will be taxed according to the amount of pollution in his effluent? This seems to me an extremely difficult measure to operate, and in any case it would require a great deal of consideration before being brought in. It seems to me that the whole question requires further study and consultation, and I hope the Government will be able to undertake to do this.
9.26 p.m.
LORD SANDFORD: Perhaps I can deal with that point straight away, and say that that is certainly the intention. Perhaps I should go back, in answering this proposal to delete the clause, to the genesis and reason for it. In including Clause 44 in this Bill, and Clause 45 which is the same thing for Scotland, my right honourable friend is primarily concerned to follow up the Third Report of the Royal Commission on Environmental Pollution, set up by the previous Government, and to follow up the recommendations contained in that Report. Perhaps I may start by reminding the Committee what is set out there.
There was a Minority Report from the noble Lord, Lord Zuckerman and Professor Beckerman, who held the view that there was much to be said for switching from a system of consents, which is what we primarily rely on, although some system of charging is already available in existing legislation; all that is happening there is that the system is being modified and made more effective by this clause. They were in favour of switching from a system of consents for controlling pollution to a system of charging. We are not happy with that, nor were the majority of the Commission. Nor are we happy to contemplate, as the minority were, the introduction of charges straight away, and direct provision for them is not made in the Bill. But the Royal Commission were agreed that a case had been made out to them

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for the possibility of gaining advantages by combining a system of charges with a system of consents, but that nothing should be done until that matter had been studied. Those studies are now under way. Of course, they will be much more effective when the authorities set up under the Water Act of last year—the National Water Council and the various regional water authorities—have been fully established. But it has not been possible to make much progress yet. That is the background. Even at this early stage, one can say that the two things contemplated are, first, the use of charges to buy a licence to pollute. That is clearly not a road which any of us would wish to pursue, and I am glad to be able to say to-day that that is not a proposition which the Government have any intention of accepting.
BARONESS WHITE: If I may interrupt the noble Lord for a moment, of course I accept without hesitation what he says is the intention of the Government. But would it not be possible to incorporate it in this clause as it now stands? The noble Lord cannot bind his successors.
LORD SANDFORD: That is perfectly true. I shall have to deal with the point, and I shall seek to do so.
The other thing which it is not the intention of the Government to pursue is any sort of levying of a general tax on discharges by means of these enabling powers. The question I think we need to ask ourselves is: is it sensible to seek to follow up the Report of this expert Royal Commission, as we are doing, and to pass this Bill into law, seeing that there are possibilities here which have yet to be fully studied, without providing any enabling powers to give effect to the conclusions when they have been reached, in the expectation that they might include some possibility of combining charges with consents to a greater extent than has prevailed hitherto? Notwithstanding, the Committee has a duty to consider whether it is right to give the Government the kind of blank cheque which Parliament is always reluctant to give to any Government, and rightly so.
It is because it is not possible to spell out precisely how these enabling powers are going to be used, because these studies have not been carried very far, that the charges can only be introduced
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by Order, and that that Order is to be subject to Affirmative Resolution. I have explained the origin of these proposals, that some combination of charges and consents should be studied. I put it to the Committee that it would be sensible to put in enabling powers to give effect to these conclusions when they have been reached, and I have confirmed that nothing can be done without Parliament having a further opportunity to see what is proposed before it is introduced. I may not have satisfied the Committee that the Bill ought to be enacted in this form, but I should like to end by putting in more of a plea than anything else that we at least leave these clauses in for the time being so that Parliament can continue to discuss the matter. I will take away the points that have been made so far and see whether there is more that can be said to allay such fears and anxieties as have been expressed. I hope I have dealt with the questions that have been put to me. I would have thought that, the state of investigation being what it is, the sensible thing would be to leave this clause in the Bill so that this House and the other place can discuss the matter. I hope the noble Baroness will not feel that it is necessary to move the clause out at this stage, because that would have the effect of stifling all further discussion of the matter, and I hope she would agree that would be a pity.
BARONESS WHITE: I must admit that in his final plea the noble Lord has put me into a certain difficulty, because as a good Parliamentarian I would be the last one to wish to stifle discussion of what is a highly contentious matter. The difficulty is, of course, that in this House we are more apt—and I speak with experience in both Houses—to judge matters on their merits, and therefore, I am rather reluctant to leave a decision of this kind to the other place. I am being as frank with the noble Lord as I think he is trying to be with us. I would not, therefore, wish to press this Motion now, but I would hope to carry with me other noble Lords who have put their names to the Motion to leave out this clause, so that we could have some further consultations. I should be less than frank, however, if I did not say to the noble Lord—and he put his finger on the point—that this is a blank cheque,

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and to say that it would not be presented until one had had an Affirmative Resolution passed by both Houses is not in itself very satisfactory. We all know what happens even to an Affirmative Resolution; it cannot be amended. As a rule it is not difficult for a Government to get through an Affirmative Resolution if they are determined to do so. It is far more difficult for them to get legislation through by Statute.
I would wish to consult both with my noble friend Lord Kennet, and other noble Lords whose names are associated with this Motion and who have taken part in the discussion, before deciding on our line of action at a subsequent stage, To-night it would probably be wise to accede to the noble Lord's request that we should consider this further. In the entire Bill, this is one of the clauses about which I am most unhappy.
Clause 44 agreed to.
Clause 45 agreed to.
Clause 46 [Exclusion of certain liability in respect of discharges with consent]:
LORD SANDFORD: I beg to move Amendment No. 172, which is purely drafting, and the consent in question would be given under Clause 27.
Amendment moved—
Page 55, line 20, after ("this") insert ("Part of this").—(Lord Sandford.)
Clause 46, as amended, agreed to.
Clause 47 agreed to.
9.37 p.m.
BARONESS WHITE BARONESS WHITE moved Amendment No. 172A:
After Clause 47, insert the following new clause:
Application to Crown Premises
(". This part of this Act shall apply to premises used for and to persons in the public service of the Crown as it applies to other premises and persons provided that the Secretary of State may by regulations provide that this section shall apply subject to any exceptions specified in the regulations.")
The noble Baroness said: I beg to move Amendment No. 172A. The point of this Amendment is consistency, and to inquire from the Government why it is that when we reach Part IV of the Bill
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(which deals with emissions into the atmosphere as opposed to effluents to water) in Clause 70(7) there is an application of Part IV to the Crown but there is not in Part II. It is not plain to us why there should be this discrepancy, other than that we believe that the Parts of the Bill were drafted by different people. There may be some reason which is not apparent, and I should be grateful if the noble Lord could explain what it might be.
LORD SANDFORD: I noticed this discrepancy myself. My advice is that the inconsistency is more apparent than real, because in Clause 70, as we shall find when we get to it, the whole business is to do with providing and publishing information, and it does not involve any departure from normal practice for the Crown to supply that information in respect of its own premises, and so on, along with everybody else, and to legislate accordingly. On the other hand, at this point of the Bill we are dealing with control by water authorities, and I think that the noble Baroness would agree with me that it is not normal for the Crown to be bound in that sort of situation in the same way as everybody else. It appears to be inconsistent, but here we are dealing with control and charges in respect of consents, and so on. In Clause 70 it is only a question of publishing information. I think she will agree that with those differences it is reasonable to deal with the Crown in different ways.
BARONESS WHITE: I am afraid I cannot see it because if we do not say anything about "premises used for and to persons in the public service of the Crown" it will mean, for example, that if the people who print our Parliamentary Papers like to pollute water with whatever is left when they clean the printing machines they can do so. Is there any real reason why Crown premises and Crown servants should be allowed to pollute, when other people are not? As the noble Lord w ill have noticed, there is provision in the Amendment for the Secretary of State to make regulations which would, for example, exempt defence establishments where there might be some real reason for it. But why, in the normal course of events, should public offices and public officials be allowed to pollute water?
LORD SANDFORD: That is a different point, but I am happy to respond to that one, too. The noble Baroness first asked me to explain the apparent inconsistency between the two clauses, which I hope I did. She has now asked why Crown premises should be allowed to pollute the rivers when that is forbidden to everyone else, and of course they cannot be. But that is not to say that it would be right to go to the extreme of binding the Crown by legislation, and it is not normally done. But certainly we are prepared to consider whether it is possible to go further than we have already gone and, for example, to take steps to see that effluents from Crown premises are registered in the same way as other effluents, even though the Crown is not bound by legislation.
This is a situation which prevails under planning law, where applications by the Crown for planning permission to do this, that or the other go over all the same hurdles as any other planning applications, although they are not bound by legislation to do so. That is probably what the noble Baroness is asking for, and I will certainly give an assurance that some such procedure will be considered.
BARONESS WHITE: Naturally, I am much obliged to the noble Lord. I still do not see why you can bind the Crown to give information but cannot bind it not to pollute. It seems to me that you should either not bind the Crown at all or should bind it in both directions. However, perhaps the noble Lord will take this point home and look at it together with all the other points that he is taking home to look at, and will let us have the result of his deliberations. For the time being, I beg leave to withdraw the Amendment.
Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.
BARONESS WHITE BARONESS WHITE moved Amendment No. 172B:
After Clause 47, insert the following new clause:
Duties of water authorities
(". It shall be the duty of a water authority to enforce provisions of this part of this Act in relation to the area of the authority.")
The noble Baroness said: I must freely confess that, with all the papers that I have gathered in order to deal with the various clauses of this Bill, I have mislaid my note on this Amendment. But my
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recollection is that we want to be quite sure that it is the water authority which is the enforcement authority within its own area for the purposes of Part II of the Bill. This point was raised with me by one of our legal advisers and I am sure that he had good reason for doing so. But if the noble Lord cares to comment on this Amendment, so that we can be quite clear about the position of a water authority as an enforcement authority, I shall be grateful. I beg to move.
LORD SANDFORD: Unfortunately, my brief states that the purpose of this new clause is not clear, and if the noble Baroness cannot tell me then I am afraid that we cannot make very much progress. Perhaps she will write to me and we can carry on from there.
BARONESS WHITE: The noble Lord has made a very fair point. It is a question of the blind leading the blind. I beg leave to withdraw the Amendment.
Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.
BARONESS WHITE BARONESS WHITE moved Amendment No. 172C:
After Clause 47 insert the following new clause
Penalties for false statements under Part II
(". Any persons who for the purpose of obtaining the consent of the water authority under this part of this Act knowingly makes a statement which is false in a material particular shall be guilty of an offence and liable:—

(a) on summary conviction, to a fine not exceeding £400 or imprisonment for a term not exceeding three months or both; and

(b) on conviction or indictment to imprisonment for a term not exceeding two years or a fine or both.")

The noble Baroness said: This is rather like Amendment No. 172A in so far as in Part IV there is provision, again in Clause 70 but this time in subsection (8), for penalties for anyone who knowingly makes a statement which is false in a material particular. There may be good reasons why a false statement is more to be deprecated in Part IV, when dealing with emissions to the atmosphere, than in Part II, when dealing with effluents in water. We do not quite understand the moral distinction between the two, but if there are good reasons for making it a criminal offence in one case but not in the other perhaps we could be told. I beg to move.
LORD SANDFORD: I am happy to say in response to this Amendment that

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my right honourable friend thinks it is a rather good one. But, rather than just accepting it and inserting it here, we should like to see whether it cannot be applied in a more general sense and perhaps inserted in other parts of the Bill, or put in the parts of the Bill where it will apply elsewhere. On the assurance that the Amendment will be considered in that light, I hope the noble Baroness will not press me to accept it as it stands.
BARONESS WHITE: I shall of course be entirely satisfied if it is put in as a general provision in some other part of the Bill. In those circumstances, I beg leave to withdraw the Amendment.
Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.
Clause 48 [Interpretation etc of Part II]:
LORD SANDFORD: This is a drafting Amendment. Some reports under the 1963 Act have been prepared; those under the 1973 Act have yet to be prepared. I beg to move.
Amendment moved—
Page 56, line 14, after ("or") insert ("is or was").—(Lord Sandford.)
9.47 p.m.
VISCOUNT ST. DAVIDS VISCOUNT ST. DAVIDS moved Amendment No. 173A:
Page 56, line 26, after (" "tidal waters" ") insert ("means waters which lie seaward of such limits as may be prescribed or (where not so prescribed) seaward of high water mark of ordinary spring tides and").
The noble Viscount said: I am not sure that this is the right Amendment for the purpose, because it is for the purpose of clearing up a piece of confusion which is so confused that nobody quite knows what is right, but no doubt the noble Lord will say what he thinks about it and we will get where we may. The difficulty is this: Boats are not restricted in tidal waters or docks leading off tidal waters. But what are "tidal waters", and what is a dock leading off tidal waters? Presumably, a dock has dock gates. The reason it is included is so as not to have little patches of restricted waters leading off unrestricted waters one quite undestands that. But the difficulty is this: How big is a dock? It is rather like the question, "What is the length of a piece of string?" A dock
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may be quite a small thing. Ramsgate Harbour has an inner harbour, behind which is a dock; that is clear enough. But then you come to something like the Gloucester and Sharpness Canal. The Gloucester and Sharpness Canal has dock gates only at one end: it has no locks along its length. Indeed, it connects with the tidal river further up, near its other end, near Gloucester. So one may say that the whole of the Gloucester and Sharpness Canal is a dock leading off tidal waters. If that is so, presumably you have to exempt from your pollution requirements the whole of the Gloucester and Sharpness Canal, which I should have thought is highly unreasonable.
This sort of thing needs clarifying; otherwise, nobody is going to know precisely whether they fall within these restrictions or not. You have the same sort of thing in many other places. On the waters of the North-East you have a whole lot of canal sections which are one lock up, so to speak, from tidal water, and the question is: is that whole first length of a canal or inland waterway a dock? If it is not, how do you differentiate it from the rest of the docks in the Bill?
The confusion is even worse than that. Take the Thames for example. At the moment the Thames conservancy area is a boundary stone marking a point in tidal waters both sides of the boundary stone below Teddington Lock. The Thames conservancy pollution restrictions on craft apply down as far as that boundary stone, right down into tidal waters. If this Bill became law as it stands, the boundary for restrictions on pollution would be pushed right the way upstream. And not only to Teddington Lock. You could count Teddington Lock as a dock gate, and push the pollution boundary up to Hampton, miles up river. Obviously, whatever the Bill says, that is not what is required. I am not sure what is required. It needs a great deal more thought than has been given to it. We may have to make a special list of exemptions. I do not know what is the answer to this; there are several answers that I would accept. The Government have to do some thinking about it, but meanwhile let us hear what they have to say.
LORD STOW HILL: I support my noble friend's Amendment. He has

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pointed to the practical difficulties and we have had occasion to discuss them on at least two occasions during the passage of this Bill. The immediate difficulty which arises from the expression "tidal waters" can I suppose be crystallised in the way in which it has been crystallised for me, by saying that it poses the problem of determining where the limit of tidal waters and the downstream limit of fresh waters is to be found. That is the issue that one has to try to resolve by the language used.
In his Amendment, my noble friend has tried to resolve that problem in a twofold way, first by providing a regulation-making power. I am not sure that that is altogether satisfactory. "Tidal waters" as an expression should be understood. If one wishes not to use it in any particular context and to substitute some regulation-made concept in place of it, well and good. But when we use the expression we should know what it means. I should have thought that in its second limb my noble friend's Amendment gives an intelligible meaning to that. It reads that tidal waters means:
"waters which lie seaward of … high water mark of ordinary spring tides …"
The result in any given context may or may not be satisfactory. It may not answer the problem that my noble friend posed. But at least one has reached the first stage, and achieved the first objective, which is saying what it means. For that reason I strongly commend at least that part of the Amendment, and hope that Ministers will be able to say that they will give consideration to trying to embody in Clause 48 a definition that is clear in its meaning. Then it would be a matter of policy, when one is looking at other parts of the Bill, whether one wanted to use that definition or whether one would prefer some concept formulated by regulation or as I would prefer it from some actual context of the Bill itself. I hope the Ministers will be able to say that they agree that there is a real problem here which ought to be tackled. It ought to be tackled, and I believe that Clause 48 is the appropriate part of the Bill in which to deal with it. Therefore, I hope that my noble friend's Amendment, if not accepted in terms, will at any rate be viewed favourably.
LORD SANDFORD: I certainly agree that the right place to define tidal waters is in this clause. The normal understanding of the expression tidal waters will probably not suffice here, and the main reason is indicated there already. We need to take into account the issued raised by the noble Viscount at an earlier stage of this Part of the Bill and on which I gave the undertaking to consider whether, and in what way, it would be possible to discriminate in favour of certain ports which are connected to the sea by a short length of canal, the amenity of which it is not necessary to protect to the same high standards as that of other inland waters. All I should like to do, in replying to this Amendment, is to confirm that consideration of that issue will also involve consideration of this definition, and I think that is what the noble Viscount himself was arguing for. I am grateful to him for putting down the Amendment to draw attention to the fact that that definition must embrace the result of our consideraions on the issue which he raised earlier.
VISCOUNT ST. DAVIDS: That is possibly as far as we can take that this evening. I must say that any definition I can think of will have some strange results, for example, on the Thames—some results I should never have imagined. For instance, I never thought of Hampton Court as being on tidal waters. However, possibly the best thing to do is to make a special list and deal with these one by one. I do not think we shall get anything satisfactory in the way of a general definition, try as we will—our efforts so far have got nowhere. So I suggest that we might leave the matter as it is for the present and await the results of further consideration by the Government. I beg leave to withdraw my Amendment.
Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.
LORD SANDFORD LORD SANDFORD moved Amendment No. 174:
Page 56, line 27, at end insert ("and").
The noble Lord said: I beg to move this Amendment and at the same time to speak to Amendment No. 175, which follows, and to Amendments 206 and 207, which come much later in the Bill and refer to Clause 93. They are only

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drafting Amendments, and the effect of them is to transpose the definition of "a vessel" from Clause 48 to Clause 93, so as to apply to the whole of the Bill instead of only to Part II. I beg to move.
LORD SANDFORD: I beg to move Amendment No. 175.
Amendment moved—
Page 56, line 36, leave out from ("trade") to end of line 38.—(Lord Sandford.)
LORD SANDFORD LORD SANDFORD moved Amendment No. 176:
Page 57, line 3, leave out from ("means") to end of line 6 and insert ("such underground water as may be prescribed").
The noble Lord said: I beg to move Amendment No. 176. This Amendment alters the definition of "specified underground water" so that it is in terms of water prescribed in regulations by the Secretary of State for Scotland. It does this by removing the reference to its being water which is used or expected by the Secretary of State to be used for any purpose which is inapplicable in Scotland because the law there is slightly different. I beg to move.
LORD SANDFORD: This is the last Amendment of Part II of the Bill, a mere drafting Amendment. I beg to move Amendment No. 177.
Amendment moved—
Page 57, line 25, leave out ("those Acts") and insert ("the Act in question").—(Lord Sandford.)
Clause 48, as amended, agreed to.
Clause 49 [Periodical inspections by local authorities]:
LORD CRAIGTON LORD CRAIGTON moved Amendment No. 178:
Page 57, line 31, at end insert ("and not less than every two years.")
The noble Lord said: This is the first Amendment in Part III of the Bill. This is a simple matter. I have never liked the phrase "from time to time". Unless
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the local authority enforces this clause the whole of Part III of the Bill falls to the ground. But what exactly do the words "from time to time" mean? I believe that it will be much better to make it the duty of the local authority to carry out inspections at least within some period or other, and I suggest it be not less than every two years. I beg to move.
THE PARLIAMENTARY UNDER-SECRETARY OF STATE, DEPARTMENT OF THE ENVIRONMENT (BARONESS YOUNG): One can well understand why the noble Lord, Lord Craigton, might consider that it would be an advantage to put in a specified period of time at which measurements of noise should be taken by local authorities. The reason why this particular form of words has been put into this clause is that they are based on the Public Health Act 1936 and we have no reason for supposing that this has not worked adequately in the past. There is a practical reason for not giving a specified period of time: noise nuisance is very much a local matter. The fact is that for many authorities it may be appropriate that inspections should take place much more frequently than every two years, for instance in a heavily industrialised area. On the other hand, in a rural area it might not be necessary to have inspections as frequently as every two years; perhaps five-yearly intervals might be more appropriate. It is for that reason that we have specified the words, "from time to time". I hope that will answer Lord Craigton's doubts about this phraseology.
LORD CRAIGTON: Unhappily I accept what my noble friend has said. I beg leave to withdraw the Amendment.
Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.
On Question, Whether Clause 49 shall stand part of the Bill?
LORD WINTERBOTTOM: May I make a brief comment. This is a flourish of trumpets announcing what we are talking about in Part III. I hope that trumpets will never be considered pollution!
Clause 49 agreed to.
Clause 50 [Summary proceedings by local authorities]:
10.5 p.m.
LORD MERRIVALE LORD MERRIVALE moved Amendment No. 178C:
Page 58, line 35, at end insert—
("or
(d) the alleged offence resulted from operations which were subject to a notice served in accordance with section 52 or a consent issued under section 53 and the operations were not in contravention of the terms of such notice or consent.")
The noble Lord said: I beg to move Amendment No. 178C. Defences are provided where a consent made by a local authority under Clause 57 in respect of any premises or a notice served under Clauses 58 and 59 are being complied with in relation to any premises or to a building to be constructed, with reference to noise exceeding certain levels, or to a reduction in noise levels. I feel it only reasonable that notices issued under Clause 52 regarding control of noise on construction sites, and consents for work on construction sites under Clause 53 should be analogous to those previously mentioned. Therefore I hope my noble friend will agree to the inclusion of these additional defences regarding construction sites and prior consent to carry out works.
BARONESS YOUNG: As I understand it, what Lord Merrivale wishes to do in this Amendment is to provide to a contractor operating within the terms of a notice under Clause 52 or a consent under Clause 53 an automatic defence in noise nuisance proceedings. The works to which Clauses 52 and 53 relate tend to be noisy. The notice/consent procedure is designed to ensure that the noise is minimised. But even this minimum of noise could amount to a nuisance. In such a case the local authority could, theoretically, proceed against the contractor for this nuisance. The Amendment
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therefore seeks to safeguard the contractor from what might appear to be completely arbitrary behaviour.
I think the difficulty that we have with this Amendment is that it is very difficult to envisage in what circumstances a local authority might take such action, especially as it would involve an admission to the court that its original judgment had been at fault. But in the unlikely event of such proceedings being brought, the contractor should in practice be able to rely on the defence of the best practicable means given by subsection (5). This is on the assumption that he was really operating within the terms of the notice consent. Since the local authority is required by Clause 52 (4) and Clause 53 (5) to have regard to the relevant code of practice, and to the need to ensure that the best practicable means are employed to minimise noise, a contractor should have little difficulty in most cases in establishing his defence. I hope this will serve to reassure my noble friend Lord Merrivale that we have taken this point and that we feel this clause meets this case.
BARONESS WHITE: I wonder whether the noble Baroness could perhaps speak a little more slowly. This subject is somewhat difficult to follow.
LORD MERRIVALE: This is a highly technical matter as well as a legal matter. What I am trying to achieve is that the provisions within the clauses I have mentioned—that is Clauses 58 and 59—which have certain defences, should also be applicable under Clauses 52 and 53. But as the noble Baroness is advised that any contractor would have appropriate defences, all I will say now is that I should like to read in more detail what she has said. Then, if her assurances are not satisfactory, we can come back to this question again on Report stage. I beg leave to withdraw the Amendment.
Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.
On Question Whether Clause 50 shall stand part of the Bill?
LORD WINTERBOTTOM: I think that in this particular clause (and of course I am subject to correction) we are touching on something which is of very substantial importance. The Noise Advisory Council's Working Group, which produced a document called Neighbourhood Noise, which went on sale in 1970—the Scott Report—made six points. One of them was that the total exemption for authority undertakings was unnecessary and unreasonable: in fact, the Crown could do wrong in this matter. Apparently the Noise Abatement Act 1960 exempted various statutory authorities from responsibility in obeying this particular Act. The Scott Report proposed that in fact this immunity should be withdrawn and that various statutory authorities should be responsible for obeying the law of the land as if they were owned by private individuals. I should be grateful if the noble Baroness who is replying to this discussion could confirm that this is so.
If it is so, then a series of rather interesting situations arise. As I understand it, Clause 50, if we translate it into the English language, means that statutory undertakings ("undertakers" is in the document I have in my hand, but I do not really think that is meant) will be able to plead that noise was necessary for the continuance of their undertaking at a particular time or place; it does not mean that they can make noise because they find it convenient to do so. This is a very important point. In the past, I am certain that many of the statutory undertakings (or undertakers, depending on how correctly the typescript I have is produced) must have hidden behind this particular right. Under the 1960 Act they are protected; they do not have to obey the law that is applied to organisations other than those owned by the State or the Crown. If one looks at the list one sees a rather interesting number of undertakings to which this now applies, if this particular clause means what I believe it means: British Rail, British Waterways, Inland Navigation, Docks and Harbours, Gas, Central Electricity Generating Board, Statutory Water Undertakers, National Freight, National Bus, Passenger Transport Authorities, London Transport Executive, and—here
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is the real problem one—British Airports Authority.
It is very curious to see how they can react to this particular situation. As I understand it, there is in fact a protection. They can argue that noise is necessary for the continuance of their undertaking at a particular time or place. I suppose that London Airport here and now is an area which can hardly be moved at short notice. Nevertheless, it is a healthy fact that these statutory undertakings have in fact to adapt themselves to the requirements of the community that surrounds them in the same way as (shall we say?) a subsidiary of Imperial Chemical Industries or a smaller undertaking must adapt itself in order that the irritant of noise, which apparently is something that is becoming increasingly significant in our society, shall be denied to them in the same way as it is denied to the subsidiaries of major private companies. I should be most grateful if the noble Baroness would comment upon my interpretation of this particular clause and my interpretation of the situation of nationalised undertakings under it.
10.14 p.m.
LORD STOW HILL: May I make just one or two comments on Clause 50 on the Question, That the Clause stand part? I want to refer to subsection (3) of the clause which reads:
"The person served with the notice may appeal against the notice to a magistrates' court within fourteen days from service of the notice."
That, I believe, is broadly based on the model of the Noise Abatement Act 1960—subject to this. In the case of the 1960 Act the recipient of a notice is given no right of appeal. All he can do, if he receives a notice and wishes to challenge it, is to disregard it, and, when subsequently proceedings are taken against him in a magistrates' court for continuing the nuisance, plead that the notice was for some reason or another invalid.
One therefore has this new model. The person who gets the notice is given a right of appeal within 14 days to a magistrates' court, and one scans Clause 50 to try to discover what the magistrate is empowered to do if he has such an appeal brought before him. Can be set the notice aside? Can be amend it? What can be do? One finds no guidance at all in Clause 50 and one has to go grubbing

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through this Bill, I suppose, until one gets to Clause 61—that is to say 10 clauses later—before one gets any information on this point at all.
I start from the general proposition that our criminal legislation should be perfectly clear. The ordinary liege of Her Majesty must know, in terms chosen for their clarity, exactly how he stands in the face of the criminal law—and I suppose this is a branch of the criminal law. He is given a right of appeal to the magistrates' court. Therefore when one has found one's way to Clause 61 (and may I, in parenthesis, protest against having to look 10 clauses further on to find out how you stand if you are a person who wishes to appeal against a notice; I submit that that is thoroughly bad drafting and a thoroughly bad arrangement) what does one find? Subsection (1) says:
"Where any provision … provides for an appeal to a magistrates' court, the procedure shall be by way of complaint … and the Magistrates' Courts Act 1952 shall apply to the proceedings."
You know therefore what are the proceedings to which you are to be subjected, because you look at the 1952 Act. Then you want to know what the magistrate can do. That you find (in so far as you find it at all) in subsection (2) of Clause 61, if I have understood this Bill correctly. That subsection provides that:
"The Secretary of State may make regulations as to appeals under this Part of this Act to the Secretary of State or, subject to the preceding subsection, to magistrates' courts, and the regulations may in particular—
(a) include provisions comparable to those in section 290 of the Public Health Act 1936 (appeals against notices requiring the execution of works) …".
Then the succeeding paragraphs go on to give a regulation-making power with regard to other matters relating to a notice which need to be dealt with.
With great respect, I protest strongly against that way of drafting. So far as I know it is quite contrary to our criminal law—or semi-criminal law if one is dealing with a notice in this case. Our criminal law should be clearly spelt out in the terms of a Statute and not left to a Minister to determine by regulation. This really is mixing up the function of an executive Minister and the functions of the courts. I do not mind whether
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the Minister says that this is not really criminal in substance. The appeal lies with the criminal court—and I quite agree that appeals in non-criminal matters also lie with the magistrates' court—but this initiates criminal proceedings in that failure to comply with a notice gives rise to criminal proceedings pure and simple. So it is half a step towards a criminal proceeding.
I do not know who is responsible for this drafting. I should like to know whether the Minister can cite to me any precedent for a regulation-making power which gives power to define a magistrate's jurisdiction. Is the magistrate to be empowered to impose a penalty? What in the world is the meaning of the word "comparable" to those in Section 290 of the Public Health Act, 1936? "Comparable" is a word of wide import. A thing can be comparable even if it is very dissimilar; it may have points of similarity which give rise to the possibility of comparison. If I may respectfully say so, I do strongly protest against this form of drafting. I wish my noble and learned friend Lord Dilhorne, were here; I can just imagine how he would approach this matter and the sense of indignation he would feel about it.
I do ask the Minister to say that she will take this back, and that she will have this re-drafted in such a way there will be spelt out in the words of the Bill itself and in the subsequent Statute precisely what the powers of a magistrate are when he has an appeal against a notice before him: spelt out in terms of the penalty jurisdiction he is to have. I ask the Minister generally to re-draft this either non-criminal, semi-criminal or criminal proceeding (I do not know which it is) in a form in which it is clearly intelligible without having to look at the regulations made by an executive Minister. It is clearly undesirable to draft in that way. I hope the Minister will take this back and look at it again.
BARONESS YOUNG: I should like to thank the noble Lord, Lord Winterbottom, for his reception of the inclusion of statutory undertakers in this part of the Bill. I should like to confirm that it does include them, and I am glad that he accepts that this is a useful advance in the whole of the noise legislation that we have. The Department has in fact had consultation

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with those statutory undertakers most likely to be affected, in particular British Rail and London Transport. Indeed, it would not be untrue to say that they have accepted these proposals in a spirit of resignation rather than anything else, but the fact is that they do have a safeguard written in in Clause 63 subsection (4). This will give them some manoeuvrability that they may require to run their undertakings without what they might regard as frivolous intervention on grounds of noise. They can in fact plead that noise is an inevitable part of doing their statutory duty. Only in that case can they plead this defence in Clause 63. In other cases, of course, they would be subject to exactly the same rules as would any other body.
The noble Lord, Lord Stow Hill, has, I realise, raised a very different point. I shall want to read with very great care what he has said about this clause. Perhaps it may be helpful if I state what I think subsection (3) is trying to achieve. This provides for an appeal to the magisstrates after the service of a notice which has to be made within 14 days, and the time for appeal is kept to a minimum in order to reduce the delay in eventual compliance with any such notice. As I understood him, the noble Lord, Lord Stow Hill asked what was to happen then. The position is that magistrates, on receiving the appeal, can review the matters that have been dealt with in the notice, and if the court dislikes the terms of the notice, it can then set it aside, or not, as the court considers to be right under those circumstances.
Clause 61 really deals with procedures and not with action which magistrates can take under Clause 50, or indeed under any other clauses in this part. I think that there is some misunderstanding as to how this subsection would work, and with this explanation I hope the noble Lord, Lord Stow Hill, will feel that some of his criticisms have been met. I will, however, read very carefully what he has said; if I have not given him a sufficient answer, or if indeed there is anything further I can find out for him, I shall be very glad to write to him about these matters.
LORD STOW HILL: I am very grateful to the noble Baroness. She says the magistrates are given a power to
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review or dismiss a notice; I forget which she said. Is that provided in the Bill? If it is, I will withdraw and at once apologise to those who drafted it. I searched for it and could not find it. The only provision I found was a regulation-making power in Clause 61. It is that that I think is undesirable; it should be spelled out in the Bill. If it is in the Bill, as I say, I will at once withdraw and offer apologies to those who drafted the Bill: it would be most unfair if this criticism remained on the Record, not withdrawn, if that power is in the Bill spelled out in terms. But I have not found it. If the Minister can tell me where it is, I will withdraw at once. I have looked quite carefully and could not find it.
Clause 50 agreed to.
Clause 51 [Summary proceedings by occupier of land]:
10.27 p.m.
LORD MERRIVALE LORD MERRIVALE moved Amendment No. 178D:
Page 59, line 37, at beginning insert—
("Where an offence is committed under subsection (4) of this section,").
The noble Lord said: I beg to move Amendment No. 178D. Subsection (4) of this clause reads:
"A person who without reasonable excuse contravenes any requirement of an order under subsection (2) above shall be guilty of an offence against this Part of this Act."
It seems to me that this clause, Clause 51, and subsection (6), as drafted now, would allow a magistrates' court the right to direct a local authority to take steps to abate noise nuisance without affording an opportunity to the defendant to himself institute abatement measures. While I would agree that it is perfectly reasonable for a local authority to abate a nuisance in cases where a defendant is unwilling to do so himself. I do feel that in the first instance the defendant should always be allowed to take the appropriate steps himself. I have put down this Amendment with a view to endeavouring to achieve this end. I hope I shall have a favourable answer from my noble friend. I beg to move.
BARONESS YOUNG: I sympathise with the noble Lord, Lord Merrivale, in the intention behind this Amendment, which is indeed to make sure that the

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consent that has been given is in fact being carried out. The purpose of subsection (6) of Clause 51 is to give a magistrates' court the power to direct a local authority to take action to deal with a noise nuisance. Such directions would be given at the same time as the magistrates made any order under subsection (2).
This clause gives the court various powers against a person responsible for noise nuisance. In the first place, it can make an order under subsection (2) requiring the defendant to abate the nuisance and prohibit a recurrence, and requiring the execution of any necessary works for either purpose. Secondly, in addition to, or instead of, such an order it can use its powers under subsection (6). Thirdly, if the defendant contravenes any requirement of the court's order, he can be fined. This last possibility is quite separate from the other two and arises at a separate stage. To attempt to link subsection (6) with subsection (4) in the way suggested in the Amendment would result in fact in the nullification of the subsection (6) powers, and this is presumably not the intention of the Amendment.
The Government assume that the purpose of the Amendment is to make it clear that the court should only use the powers given by subsection (6) if it is convinced that the defendant would himself be unwilling to take the necessary action. As this subsection is identical in effect with the relevant part of Section 99 of the Public Health Act, 1936, and as there is no suggestion of a defect in these powers, the Government consider that the fears underlying this Amendment are unfounded. Nevertheless, they would be willing to consider the possibility of introducing an Amendment to make the power of subsection (6) available only where the court is satisfied that the defendant is not going to do the work himself. I hope that that is a sufficient reassurance to the noble Lord, Lord Merrivale, for him to feel able to withdraw the Amendment.
LORD MERRIVALE: I am grateful to my noble friend for her final remarks. What I was trying to achieve was that the defendant should be given the opportunity to first of all endeavour himself to reduce the noise. I understand that is what the noble Baroness has said the
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Government are prepared to do. With that assurance, I beg leave to withdraw the Amendment.
Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.
Clause 51 agreed to.
Clause 52 [Control of noise on construction sites]:
10.33 p.m.
LORD MERRIVALE LORD MERRIVALE moved Amendment No. 178E:
Page 60, line 28, leave out ("and")
The noble Lord said: With your Lordships' permission, I should also like to speak to Amendments Nos. 178F and 178L. The purpose of these Amendments is to replace subsection (6) by a new subsection (3)(e). As subsection (3) deals with what may be specified in a notice, it would seem to me to be sensible to include in this subsection the question of the time within which a notice is complied with rather than separately under another subsection. The execution of works, and the taking of other steps, should be specified in the code of practice proposed under subsection (4), and it would therefore seem unnecessary to reiterate this in subsection (6). I beg to move.
LORD ABERDARE: This group of Amendments would have the effect of preventing a local authority specifying in a notice the works to be executed and the steps to be taken for the purpose or the notice. A local authority would also be obliged to specify a reasonable time for compliance with the requirements of a notice served under this clause.
Similar powers to those in subsection (6) which allows a local authority to specify works or other steps in a notice are to be given to local authorities in other contexts in this Part of the Bill. This it not an innovation. Parliament conferred similar powers on local authorities in the Public Health (Recurring Nuisances) Act 1969. The power to specify works is discretionary and there is no compulsion on any local authority to exercise these powers if it does not wish. But even if a local authority did so wish and was not well advised in so doing, there is always the safeguard of an appeal against its requirements under subsection (7). We believe that there is no doubt that these powers, properly used, are a

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useful instrument for the local authority to have, and there is no evidence to suggest that they use their present powers irresponsibly.
A statutory requirement that a local authority should specify a "reasonable" time for compliance with the requirements of a notice seems to us unnecessary. Subsection (6) as drafted allows a local authority to specify a time for compliance and this has to be realistic. Local authorities already operate this kind of requirement in the context of the Noise Abatement Act and other legislation. Indeed, if insufficient time is allowed for compliance this could well constitute a valid ground for an appeal. I hope it will be some reassurance to my noble friend that we intend in due course to issue a circular to local authorities giving guidance on this and other similar matters which are essential to the smooth working of the Bill. I do not think that the Amendments he has suggested would help us very much, so I hope that he will not persist with them and will withdraw them.
LORD MERRIVALE: I should like to thank my noble friend for his reply. It appears that there is a precedent in the Noise Abatement Act and in other legislation for inserting this subsection into the clause. I am pleased that it is the intention of Her Majesty's Government to circularise local authorities about the way in which this clause should be applied. With that assurance, I beg leave to withdraw the Amendment.
BARONESS WHITE: Before leave is given, may I say that we have received very strong representations about the necessity for retaining subsection (6) and we should be very much against any suggestion of removing it from the Bill. So we are glad to have that reassurance from the Minister that the Government are also of the opinion that it should remain in the Bill.
Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.
10.38 p.m.
LORD MERRIVALE LORD MERRIVALE moved Amendment No. 178G.
Page 60, line 30, leave out ("have regard").
The noble Lord said: With this Amendment I should like to speak to
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Amendments Nos. 178H, 178J and 178K as they are consequential and interrelated. The point about Amendment No. 178H is that if a code of practice is to be effective it will not be sufficient for a local authority merely to be obliged to "have regard" to it. With regard to Amendment No. 178K, subsection (4)(c) refers to the use of,
"methods of plant or machinery … which are equally effective",
but it is not clear what the alternative methods should be effective in doing. It could mean that they should be equally effective either in carrying out the job in hand or in reducing the noise level.
The alternatives may not be strictly comparable in this way. The comparison may be between a piece of machinery which would complete a job in a short time, and in so doing would produce a certain level of noise, and other machinery which would take far longer but would produce a lower level of noise. Taking all the circumstances into account, it might well be preferable to allow a higher noise level for a shorter time or vice versa. That being so, I trust my noble friend will agree that it would be preferable to remove the poorly defined constraint that alternatives should be "equally effective" and to insert instead:
"In acting under this section the local authority shall—… have regard to the possibility of specifying the use of reasonable alternative methods, plant or machinery."
I beg to move.
LORD ABERDARE: My noble friend has described the effect of these four Amendments, but I am afraid I cannot advise the Committee to accept them. I hope I can convince him that what is in the Bill at the moment is preferable. In so far as the Amendments requiring the local authority to serve notices which are consistent with the code of practice have any effect at all, they do not provide any better safeguard for the interests of the contractor than the clause as drafted. If the local authority has patently failed to have regard to the relevant provisions of the code of practice, its requirements will be at severe risk of successful challenge in the courts under subsection (7).
But there is a disadvantage to his Amendment. To require the local authority to serve notices which are "consistent with" the code would limit its

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freedom of action to depart from the code where it judged it reasonable to do so. Circumstances may well arise when in a particular case it would be in everybody's interest to depart from the strict interpretation of the code. An excessive rigidity might well work to the disadvantage of a contractor. It would, for example, prevent local authorities from exercising any latitude where the contractor was working on a "green fields" site, and this would be undesirable for everybody concerned. And, of course, the appeal provisions are always in the background. The code will be there for the guidance of local authorities and others, and is not intended as a rule book. Discretion and good sense in its interpretation are important, and may be looked for from local authority officials. I hope that, in these circumstances, my noble friend will see that this part of his series of Amendments really would not help the contractor as much as anybody else.
As to his other Amendments, again I do not think the last one, No. 178K, would be desirable. It would mean the loss of the words "equally effective", and this would weaken the powers of the local authority. My noble friend was asking me what those words meant. In this context, "equally effective" means effective in minimising noise. Local authorities will have to decide whether short and noisy is better than longer and less noisy. I hope that, with that explanation, my noble friend will agree to withdraw these Amendments.
LORD MERRIVALE: I suppose that in this case I shall again have to bow to greater wisdom. What one definitely wants, of course, is flexibility regarding the use of this code of practice. I was interested to hear from my noble friend that the code of practice does not set down rigid instructions, but, in effect, is meant to act as (what shall we say?) not a source of inspiration but a source of guidance for local authorities. At this stage, I can only ask leave to withdraw the Amendment.
Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.
On Question, Whether Clause 52 shall stand part of the Bill?
LORD WOLVERTON: May I ask a question before we part with this clause? I was going to move some Amendments
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which I had been asked to do by the Federation of the Civil Engineering Industry. I did not put them down in time as I got them only this morning, and I did not think that we should reach Part III to-night. The industry say that they will be able to make adjustments to some of their equipment to make it less noisy. I was glad to hear the noble Baroness say that guidance would be given to local authorities, but there are certain aspects of this clause which worry me. It is not possible to make pile drivers less noisy. Will special guidance be given in the memorandum to be issued to local authorities so that throughout the country local authorities will be treating this matter in the same way, and that machines like pile drivers will be exempt?
LORD ABERDARE: I was a little surprised to hear my noble friend Lord Wolverton, with his long experience of Parliamentary affairs, say that he was going to put down Amendments for any other organisation. It is the normal practice to put down Amendments in one's own name—
LORD WOLVERTON: I should have put them down in my own name.
LORD ABERDARE: I do not think that my noble friend need worry. There will be the code of practice. If he looks at Clause 62 he will see the code of practice is there laid down. Furthermore, in acting under Clause 52 the local authorities should also have regard to the need for ensuring that the best practical means are employed to minimise noise. If he looks at Clause 63 he will see the definition for "best practicable means" which naturally covers the current state of technical knowledge and financial implications; and I think he will find that all those matters are satisfactorily covered.
BARONESS WHITE: I should like to make a brief point before my noble friend Lord Winterbottom makes a more substantial one. We were asked to consider possible Amendments to this clause which would exempt work on agricultural buildings more than a hundred yards from any dwelling. In the light of what the Minister has said and from what is included in the Bill, I should have thought that it would be undesirable to have such a specific Amendment. But I hope that in any guidance which is given it will be

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suggested to local authorities that in the country where, apart from the farm or agricultural holding, residential accommodation is a considerable distance away it would be reasonable to take a fairly lenient view of any noise which might occur.
LORD ABERDARE: I will certainly take that into account.
LORD WINTERBOTTOM: May I make three quite short points? The noble and learned Lord, Lord Stow Hill, made a complaint about drafting. Although I think I understand the reason why the content of Clause 52 precedes Clause 53, nevertheless, in terms of the average man trying to understand the Bill, it would seem that Clause 53 should precede Clause 52. Clause 52 gives a local authority power to impose requirements. Clause 53 gives the individual contractor the opportunity to ask the local authority what are its intentions. Although I understand that Clause 52 is weightier than Clause 53, I feel that this is the wrong way round, and is putting the cart before the horse. Perhaps when we send the Bill to another place it may be adjusted slightly.
The first of my other points refers to pile-driving, which was also mentioned by the noble Lord, Lord Wolverton, and which has kept me awake for many a long hour at night. Possibly the best way of countering the noise is by muffling in some way. But I should like to ask for how many hours each day the noise would be permitted and whether the control of this kind of nuisance covers the hours of day or night during which activities of this type may continue. It is a question not of techniques but of the number of hours each day that the activity may continue.
I should also like to ensure that it is made quite clear that the statutory undertakers (I understand that is the correct form of words) are as bound by this provision as anyone else. Most of the pile-driving at night is on behalf of river authorities, people building power stations and anyone driving piles where there is water—and that is usually a public undertaker. I should therefore like to ask that it be made quite clear that the individual who has to do the work knows that he
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can turn to the local authority for a definition before he starts. Secondly, is time a factor, as well as technology? Thirdly, do all these statutory undertakers know that they are bound by their construction activities to the same degree as they are by their operating activities?
LORD ABERDARE: To comment on the first point made by the noble Lord about drafting, a great many hard things have been said about the Parliamentary draftsmen. I must say I have the very greatest sympathy with them. I am not sure that noble Lords are correct in blaming the draftsmen—I think perhaps it should be the Minister who takes the blame; but at any rate my sympathies lie with them. As to the second point made by the noble Lord, regarding the number of hours that may be worked by pile-drivers, Clause 52(3)(b) says:
"The notice may in particular … specify the hours during which the works may be carried out."
There is a cast-iron provision there, making it clear that the licence will permit pile-driving only within certain hours. This applies to public undertakers as well.
Clause 52 agreed to.
Clause 53 [Prior consent for work on construction sites]:
10.54 p.m.
LORD MERRIVALE LORD MERRIVALE moved Amendment No. 178M:
Page 62, line 7, leave out ("twenty-eight") and insert ("fourteen")
The noble Lord said: I beg to move this Amendment and also to speak to Amendments 178N and 178O, which are related. I suggest that a local authority should be required to issue its consent within 14 days and not 28 days, as mentioned in the Bill, and that the code of practice should be applicable to a wide range of cases, thus enabling the determination of consent conditions to be carried out quickly and easily. Many developments are on a relatively small scale, and a delay of 28 days could be very significant.
I have in mind, too, under Clause 52(1)(a) the repair or maintenance of buildings, structures, and so forth. In such cases 28 days could be quite a long time. Large scale developments, on the

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other hand, usually involve a very much longer time scale, and therefore could accommodate an agreed extension to the 14 day period. I feel that the effect of the 28-day period would be to deter developers from making applications for smaller developments, and to apply pressure on local authorities with regard to the use of their powers under Clause 52.
Would it not be better therefore to encourage the obtaining of prior consent under Clause 53 by shortening the 28-day period, as I am seeking to do in this Amendment? I beg to move.
LORD ABERDARE: I can well understand what my noble friend has in mind. I hope that we shall arrange matters so that there is no undue delay. Certainly it is relevant to point out that the 28-day period is a maximum, and one would hope in the case of a relatively minor operation that the consent would go through much quicker than that. We think that 28 days is a reasonable maximum in the majority of cases. The giving of consents is not a rubber-stamping operation. Applications will require expert scrutiny and consultation between public health officials and the authority's professional staff. Discussions with the contractor and site inspections may also be necessary. It would be unrealistic to expect that these essential processes could be carried out properly if insufficient time was allowed for proper consideration. If we were to adopt the suggestion of 14 days that would be only 6 or 7 working days if allowance is made for typing and postal time. Local authorities might react to the imposition of an unrealistically tight timetable by attaching very stringent conditions to a consent. This would lead to delay while they were challenged in the courts, and the contractor would then be in a worse position than if the clause had been left unamended.
The 28 days period is a reasonable compromise between the sometimes conflicting interests of the contractor and the local authority. Since this clause is primarily intended for the benefit of the contractor, to enable him to get a decision before work starts, the onus is on him to make his application in sufficient time for the local authority to give proper consideration to it. By allowing the local authority a reasonable
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period to deal with the general run of cases, the chances of their being able to respond more quickly to the application where urgent consent is genuinely required are also improved. We intend to issue guidance to local authorities on the need to deal with cases as expeditiously as possible. I hope therefore that after hearing that explanation my noble friend will agree -to withdraw his Amendment.
LORD MERRIVALE: I was hoping that my noble friend would assure the Committee that Her Majesty's Government would give guidance to the local authorities so that they would know exactly how to proceed in order that in certain cases—emergencies, or in the case of the smaller developments—consent could be given in a short period of time. I was also pleased to hear my noble friend mention that the 28-day period would be a maximum period, and that Her Majesty's Government feel it to be a reasonable maximum. I only hope that local authorities will also consider this to be a very definite maximum, and that they will endeavour, whenever possible, to deal with the matter in a short period of time. I also take the point that in certain cases there will need to be expert scrutiny and consultation. It could be in the interests of the contractor that this should be so.
I also take my noble friend's point that in asking for 14 days, that would leave only six or seven working days. I was just wondering though (one very often hears in Parliament that half a loaf is better than none) whether my noble friend would agree in this case possibly that 21 days may be a reasonable compromise, or are Her Majesty's Government wedded to this idea of a 28-day period? Would my noble friend like to comment on that?
LORD ABERDARE: I should like to help my noble friend if I could, but in this case we have looked at the matter very carefully, and I really think 28 days for a major building contract is required. Since it is only a maximum, I think we must stick to 28 days.
LORD MERRIVALE: I take my noble friend's point at this stage, and ask leave to withdraw the Amendment.
Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.
Clause 53 agreed to.
11.3 p.m.
LORD WINTERBOTTOM LORD WINTERBOTTOM moved Amendment No. 178A:
After Clause 53 insert the following new clause:
Noise Ratings
(". The Secretary of State may by regulations require that—

(a) prescribed machinery shall have noise ratings ascribed thereto; and

(b) any machinery prescribed as aforesaid shall not be used if it emits noise above a prescribed level.")

The noble Lord said: This new clause is in itself quite a simple addition to the Bill—not an Amendment but an addition. If we are talking about noise, and in particular about noise arising from plants, it would surely be sensible that the actual noise emission by machine tools and machinery being offered for sale should be defined before the machine is offered to the public. If we have a certain noise emission rate considered as a standard for an operation on a construction site, it would be stupid to sell a machine with a noise emission rate higher than that which would be permitted on the site itself. So we are putting forth the suggestion laid down in the clause which we would wish to see added after Clause 53. It is very simple and good English:
". The Secretary of State may by regulations require that—

(a) prescribed machinery shall have noise ratings ascribed thereto; and

(b) any machinery prescribed as aforesaid shall not be used if it emits noise above a prescribed level."

So, if a local authority says that machine tools working on a site shall not emit a volume of sound above a defined level, then the machine tool should not be sold with an emission of noise above that of the prescribed level.
This suggestion really arises from the Scott Report which recommended that the Secretary of State should be empowered to specify the noise emission level of machinery. It is recommended that a comprehensive statutory framework for the progressive alleviation of the neighbourhood noise problem over the next 10 or 15 years should include a reserve power for the Secretary of State to introduce by regulation a statute of limitations on a noise output of a
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specified class of machinery. It is only common sense. We are not going to get a satisfactory world overnight. We must work towards a certain level. If we think in terms of a decade, it is entirely sensible that we should arrange that the machinery to be used on a construction site should be so designed that its noise emissions are acceptable to the people living in the general area.
Of course, it is not only the people who surround a building site or a working site who are affected; the people who actually work the machines are themselves affected. We are dealing not only with citizens but with the workpeople on the site. It is for this reason that I believe we should include a clause of this type, which would empower the Secretary of State to lay down levels of noise for machinery that is offered for sale for use on sites, where the local authority is empowered to lay down the standards of noise emission, and so on, which would take place with the work on that site. I beg to move.
LORD CRAIGTON: Does this new clause apply only to construction sites, or to any machinery, such as the noisy saws which householders use for cutting down trees on Sunday afternoons? I do not see why it should apply only to construction sites. Is that the noble Lord's intention?
LORD WINTERBOTTOM: I am afraid that I have not thought this matter through as deeply as I should have liked. I, like the noble Lord, suffer from the noise from active power saws on Sundays, but I find it difficult to know how one could silence a rip saw carving through a fallen tree. Nevertheless, I suppose that we in the country, who spend our weekends in the country, do not suffer so much as people who are closed in in an urban environment, who have to hear the traffic by day and pile-driving by night.
LORD CRAIGTON: They employ machinery with a noise rating.
LORD PLATT: Surely one of the most awful noises is that of the pneumatic drill, particularly on building sites. But is it possible to produce a piece of machinery that would dig up concrete without making such a frightful noise? We have to be a little careful in drawing up regulations or we may find that we

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are asking for the impossible. As an antedote at this late hour, I would say that the most pleasant noise is that of your wife mowing the lawn.
LORD ABERDARE: It was originally our intention to include a provision of this kind because we, too, had read the Scott Report. But, having looked at it carefully, we thought that it would probably be preferable to see whether manufacturers themselves would respond to market pressures for quieter machinery. We therefore thought this was not an essential provision and it would be better to leave it to see how manufacturers dealt with the situation, in the light of pressure for quieter machinery. Indeed, you can make quieter machinery. I do not think any drills are very quiet, but they can be made quieter. The noble Lord said, quite rightly, that his new clause was drafted in plain English. That is the most dangerous thing to do in any Bill—to put it into plain English. And I have to warn him that there would be great drafting difficulties with his clause—indeed, with any Amendment of this kind—because it would have to avoid the danger of being regarded as erecting a technical barrier to trade which would make it unacceptable to our trading partners, notably in the E.E.C. But, having said that, I appreciate that this is an interesting clause and I will certainly consider all that has been put forward by the noble Lord.
LORD WINTERBOTTOM: I beg leave to withdraw the Amendment.
Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.
LORD WINTERBOTTOM: I think my new clause, Amendment No. 178B is saying the same thing in rather more complicated language, and is therefore more in line with what the noble Lord, Lord Aberdare, seems to wish. However, as it is more complicated I will not press the matter.
Clause 54 [Noise in Streets]:
11.10 p.m.
LORD CRAIGTON LORD CRAIGTON: moved Amendment No. 178P:
Page 64, line 2, at end insert:
("( ) It shall be an offence under this Part of this Act to connect a burglar alarm to a bell which, when the alarum is operated, can he clearly heard from any street unless there is no reasonably practicable method of connecting
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such alarum to a police station; and notwithstanding the provisions of section 97(2) of this Act this provision shall not come into effect before the expiry of two years from the date of the passing of this Act.")
The noble Lord said: This Amendment is in such simple English that I will read it out to your Lordships. It says quite clearly what I should like to see:
"It shall be an offence under this Part of this Act to connect a burglar alarum to a bell which, when the alarum is operated, can be clearly heard from any street unless there is no reasonably practicable method of connecting such alarum to a police station; and notwithstanding the provisions of section 97(2) of this Act this provision shall not come into effect before the expiry of two years from the date of the passing of this Act."
The noble Lord, Lord Winterbottom, when referring to the pile-driving spoke of the noises by which one is personally affected, and he asked whether they have to go on for 24 hours in the day. I expect every noble Lord in the Committee has heard the noise of the burglar alarm that is set off by a heavy lorry, or even by a mouse, and rings for hours—even all night, even all week-end. It is well known to everyone and is one of the most irritating noises that one can imagine. I will read an extract from a letter from somebody who also wrote to his Member of Parliament. It says:
"It does seem extraordinary that the peace of law-abiding, peaceful citizens should be shattered periodically by shopkeepers who go away for weekends and are not available to control an alarm bell that admittedly has gone of inadvertently. Two nights running of sleeping pills seems to me to be quite unjustifiable if it is for reasons beyond one's control."
I am sure the police have powers to act in this matter. Maybe they do. I do not blame them if there are too many instances where a bell just keeps ringing. But something must be done, and if the police powers need strengthening perhaps my Amendment is not so essential. But it would have two advantages: one is that it would be an answer to quite a large number of potential offenders, and the other is that it would lessen some of the work of the police. I beg to move.
BARONESS YOUNG: I am sure we all have sympathy with the noble Lord, Lord Craigton, in his Amendment, especially if we have had the misfortune to suffer from one of these alarm bells ringing for a long period of time. It seems to be one of the facts of modern life that these machines go wrong, for whatever reason, and ring for long periods of time.

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But while we have a great deal of sympathy in regard to the problem I am not sure that this particular Amendment is the most appropriate way to deal with it. Unfortunately, burglar alarms, whether of a silent or an audible type, are in fact a necessary part of modern life, and it would be difficult to justify making it an offence to connect a burglar alarm to a bell when there are many such devices which cause no inconvenience to anybody and which provide the protection for which they are designed. It really is not unreasonable to allow this type of alarm, provided it is switched off as soon as possible after it has been activated, although clearly the key holder has a great responsibility to ensure that his alarm is in good working order and that if it is activated arrangements are made to switch it off. Some companies, I understand, are prepared to offer a switch-off service if an alarm is activated, and if more people were to take advantage of this it would do something to mitigate this dreadful problem.
We hope, however, that the Bill as at present drafted will lead to an improvement in the position. Under the Bill a local authority will be empowered to issue a notice prohibiting the occurrence or recurrence of a noise nuisance which it is satisfied is likely to occur or to recur. This should certainly be a way of dealing with faulty alarms which are continually activated. Furthermore, consideration is being given to the possibility of reinforcing these powers by issue of a code of practice on audible alarm bells. This might, for instance, require them to be switched off within a specified period, and failure to observe such a code of practice could then be taken into account in any proceedings which might subsequently be brought for noise nuisance. This may not be, as it were, a cast iron solution, such as the noble Lord's Amendment provides, but I hope I have said enough to show that we do think something should be done about this matter, and we hope that this Bill will go some way towards meeting it.
LORD AMHERST OF HACKNEY: There seems to be a problem here because it is difficult to know who can switch off a burglar alarm. Recently, one went off in our mews at about 11.30
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at night; it started to ring loudly, and after a certain time a cluster of people formed outside the house wondering what to do about it. We rang up the telephone number on the alarm; I spoke to a man, who said he could not do anything about it unless he was given authority from the police. In the meantime we found out that the owners of the house were in New York. I went round to the police station, and they said they appreciated the alarm was making a noise, but they could not of their own responsibility switch it off. They said the man I had already talked to was responsible; it was his alarm. So there does seem to be difficulty in knowing who can switch off when the alarm goes off and the owner is away. In the end, in this case, the man who made the burglar alarm came and switched off the bell outside. The other one inside went on ringing gently until the owners returned from New York.
LORD CRAIGTON: I am grateful for that support, but as all noble Lords in the Committee have not jumped to my aid, and as the noble Baroness gave what I thought was a reasonably satisfactory answer, I beg leave to withdraw the Amendment.
Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.
On Question, Whether Clause 54 shall stand part of the Bill?
LORD SOMERS: Before we leave this clause, might I put in an urgent plea to the Government to introduce a ban of some sort on the use of radios in residents' gardens in urban areas? This is sometimes an extreme nuisance. I need not go into all the technicalities and the acoustical reasons, but there is no doubt that noise from a loudspeaker carries for a much greater distance than a similar noise produced in a natural way. I think the reason is that it emphasises certain harmonics which result in the noise carrying much further. There is also another peculiar characteristic. Some loudspeakers tend to emphasise one particular note very much more than others, so if one is a sufficient distance away all one hears is a constant repetition of that one note. This can be absolutely maddening. As this part of the Bill is concerned with reducing noise which is a nuisance to other people, I sincerely hope that the

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Government will consider introducing something of this sort.
BARONESS YOUNG: It is always very difficult to strike a balance when one has a problem such as noise from transistor radios. Obviously, they can be very noisy and objectionable to some; on the other hand, there is the freedom of the individual to play one, and to that individual it is not objectionable at all. It is really a subjective matter. It is, of course, open to one individual, if the noise can be heard outside the house or in the street, to bring an action for nuisance under the Bill, and it is open to a local authority to have a bylaw, if it so wishes, prohibiting the use of radios in certain public places. So this would be another way that the problem could be met. It is very difficult to see how one could go further than that. Apart from any of the legislative difficulties, there is always the difficulty of enforcement of any proceedings that could follow, or indeed tracking down people playing radios or switching them on and off. I hope, however, the noble Lord, Lord Somers, will recognise that the whole provision on noise is strengthened by the fact that one person can now bring an action for nuisance under this Part of the Bill if a noise can be heard in the street or outside a private house. This Bill does not, of course, apply to noise within a private house or private property altogether.
LORD SOMERS: The noble Baroness speaks of the liberty of the individual, and, I quite recognise the desirability of that. But should it be the liberty of the individual to create noise which is a thorough nuisance to all those living in very close proximity to him? I remember that when I was a student and was practising regularly I made it a rule to keep my windows closed. I suppose I could have exercised my liberty of the individual in summertime and kept them open. I did not do it. So far as making a protest about radios is concerned, it is very often very difficult to track them down, to decide exactly where they are. You hear them coming from somewhere, but you cannot tell definitely whose they are. How can you make a protest?
Clause 54 agreed to.
Clause 55 [Designation of zones]:
LORD WINTERBOTTOM LORD WINTERBOTTOM moved Amendment No. 179:
Page 64, line 10, at end insert ("and in doing so, shall take into account noise from traffic and from all other sources present in or adjoining the area to which the Order relates").
The noble Lord said: If we turn this Amendment into a meaningful clause, to use an Americanism, it should now read:
"A local authority may by order confirmed by the Secretary of State designate all or any part of its area a noise abatement zone"—
and here the Amendment starts—
"and in doing so, shall take into account noise from traffic and from all other sources present in or adjoining the area to which the order relates."
The reason for this is that if you take London or any of the great cities in this country traffic noise is a predominant source of noise nuisance, and if we are trying to define a noise abatement zone it is rather stupid to say you cannot do this and cannot do that if you do not at the same time take into account the fact that traffic is also making a substantial addition to the background noise of the zone in question.
I think we have to bear in mind, when we think of the implications of Clause 55, that every effort must continue to be made to reduce traffic noise at source, if the Government's policy on noise abatement is to be of real benefit to the community, and in particular if the benefits of noise abatement zones, which at the moment deal only with industrial noise, are not to be jeopardised by continuing unacceptable nuisance from traffic. Part of industrial noise is major heavy vehicles moving in and out of factory space. My life when I live in London is dominated by a whole series of noises, one of them being a major dairy operation opening its roller doors at five o'clock in the morning, and lorries bringing in milk and moving out the full cases. We have to think of a noise abatement zone in its entirety; not only the noise arising from industry in a certain area but also the movement of traffic in and around the industrial area controlled in the noise abatement zone. It is for this reason that I move this Amendment.
11.25 p.m.
LORD ABERDARE: We expect that a local authority will have in mind all types of noise when considering whether

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or not to designate a particular area as a noise abatement zone, but we do not think that there would be merit in singling out traffic noise for special mention. Indeed, we think there would be some disadvantage in so doing. The clause as drafted allows a local authority to designate a zone, taking into account whatever factors it thinks appropriate. No two areas will be the same, and it is therefore appropriate to leave to a local authority the widest possible discretion in the process of making designation orders. We do not think it right to require local authorities to take a particular type of noise into account; it is the total noise with which they ought properly to be concerned.
Moreover, the Amendment might give the impression that the noise abatement zone clauses are designed to deal with traffic noise, and this would be misleading. The powers provided in Clauses 55 to 59 relate to noise from classified types of premises—for example, factories; and I should think possibly even the dairy which the noble Lord was concerned about—and they are not appropriate for dealing with noise from moving sources. There are already adequate powers to control traffic noise by existing legislation, such as the Construction and Use Regulations made under the Road Traffic Act 1972. There are powers available to local authorities to ban traffic, or certain classes of traffic, from using specified roads under the Road Traffic Regulation Act 1967, and there are the powers available to local authorities under the Heavy Commercial Controls and Regulations Act 1973 to prohibit or restrict, the use of heavy commercial vehicles.
Where there are limitations on the action we can take in these respects is in the economic and technological constraints imposed by the need to make use of existing vehicles and to meet the European Community's general requirements. The need to reduce noise is one requirement that has to be weighed against others. New and generally exhortatory legislative powers are not going to alter this situation. We have to tackle the question of vehicle noise at source. The Government have already secured the E.E.C. agreement to a revision of existing vehicle noise limits by October 1, 1974, and we are also sponsoring a great deal of research, particularly into the production
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of a quiet heavy goods vehicle. These are the reasons why I suggest that the Amendment has some disadvantages, and I hope that the noble Lord will agree to withdraw it.
LORD WINTERBOTTOM: I am grateful to the noble Lord for his explanation. We live in an imperfect world, and what we are trying to do is to lessen the degree of imperfection. I am glad that thought is being given to this particular problem of background noise arising from traffic. Death and noise on the roads are things that we seem to accept as part of nature; and of course they are not. I am glad to know that we are giving a lead to Europe in this matter of quiet vehicles, and doing research into very quiet heavy goods vehicles. I hope that we shall not use the European Community too often as an alibi. As an ardent European I should be unhappy if this were the sort of thing behind which we hid. But having received the noble Lord's reassurance, I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.
Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.
On Question, Whether Clause 55 shall stand part of the Bill?
LORD MERRIVALE: As I understand this clause, it requires that a noise abatement zone order shall specify the classes of premises to which it applies. However, construction and demolition works are controlled separately under Clauses 52 and 53, so would it not be inappropriate for there to be dual control in a noise abatement zone order? Is it the Government's intention that the Secretary of State will not allow construction and demolition works to be covered in a confirming order? I regret that I have not given my noble friends notice of this point, but perhaps either he or she can reply to it.
LORD ABERDARE: I think that "he" will reply to this point, but I do so with some uncertainty because, as my noble friend said, he has not given me any warning. My understanding of a noise abatement zone is that it is a zone where the general noise level is measured and where efforts are made to restrain the level of noise to that level, and, in certain cases to reduce it. But if there were a construction operation going on within the zone, that would be a purely temporary interruption in the normal

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noise level of the zone and, I think, would be controlled under the other clauses, as my noble friend said. But I should like to confirm that point.
Clause 55 agreed to.
Clause 56 [Register of noise levels]:
11.33 p.m.
LORD MERRIVALE LORD MERRIVALE moved Amendment No. 179B:
Page 64, line 31, leave out ("on") and insert ("before").
The noble Lord said: As this clause now stands, the noise level register might contain entries which were misleading because an appeal to the Secretary of State had not been determined. This would obviously be unsatisfactory, and it seems sensible to allow an owner or occupier of premises an opportunity to accept or to appeal against the validity of the noise levels before an entry is recorded in the register. I hope that my noble friend will consider this to be a reasonable Amendment. I beg to move.
BARONESS YOUNG: I hope I can show my noble friend Lord Merrivale that his Amendment is unnecessary. The recording of the noise level in the register will be a statement of fact, and against that fact the person concerned with the noise level will have an opportunity to appeal. The Amendment suggests that he should be told before it is recorded, so that he can then give notice of his appeal. I do not think that this Amendment is necessary, because a person will have the opportunity to appeal if he is dissatisfied. The recording in the register will be merely a statement of the measured noise level. I think my noble friend will agree that anybody who is concerned will have an adequate opportunity to object.
LORD MERRIVALE: I am most grateful to my noble friend for stating categorically that this Amendment is unnecessary, and that the recording will be merely a statement of fact. With that assurance given by my noble friend, I beg leave to withdraw the Amendment.
Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.
11.35 p.m.
LORD MIDDLETON LORD MIDDLETON moved Amendment No. 179A:
Page 65, line 5, leave out subsection (5).
The noble Lord said: Clause 56 provides that when a local authority has designated a noise abatement zone it shall measure the noise level emanating from premises covered by the order, that such measurements are to be recorded in a noise level register, and that a copy of that record must be served on the owner and the occupier of the premises. Subsection (5) says:
"Except as provided by the preceding provisions of this section the validity or accuracy of any entry in a noise level register shall not be questioned in any proceedings under this Part of this Act."
I do not see any provision in the preceding provisions of Clause 56 with regard to proceedings. Subsections (3) and (4) refer to a right of appeal after receipt of a copy of an entry in a noise level register. An owner or occupier could therefore presumably question an inaccuracy under subsection (3), which provides that he can appeal to the Secretary of State against the record so long as he does it within twenty-eight days of receipt of a copy of the record. One can, however, envisage an administrative mistake, for example, or some other cause putting an owner or occupier out of court through missing the twenty-eight days allowed for the appeal. Under subsection (5) it would seem that the register then becomes sacrosanct, and that the validity or accuracy of any entry cannot be questioned in any further proceedings.
Local government officials are not infallible. Inaccuracies can occur only too often in the making of measurements and in the compiling of records. The validity of noise level measurements in particular, may, in our urban circumstances, be open to all sorts of question. The subsection appears at first sight to be one which could act unfairly on a person charged with an offence. If a mistake has been made in a register, it is only right that a defendant in peril of the criminal law should be allowed to question it. The mistake may, for example, be a clerical error, referring to the wrong premises, to premises not within the noise abatement order, or to the wrong level of noise. I am sure there is a good reason for this subsection and that my noble friend will justify its existence, but it does not seem to me to serve any useful purpose and it does not seem to me to be right that it should be there so long as there is no provision in the Bill—and I cannot find one—for

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rectification of a noise level registry in the same way as, for example, you can rectify a land registry through the provisions of a land charges bill. I beg to move.
BARONESS YOUNG: The noble Lord, Lord Middleton, is I think concerned that there will not be an opportunity for somebody to object to the measurement which is put into the noise register in a noise abatement zone, and perhaps it might be helpful if I explained that subsection (3), which of course is the subsection particularly referred to in subsection (5) when it says
"Except as provided by the preceding provisions of this section …",
provides an opportunity for an appeal to the Secretary of State if anyone considers that a local authority has not used the right methods of measurement or has not taken accurate measurements within the procedure as laid down.
Subsection (3) is designed to ensure that the matter may be dealt with promptly while the facts are fresh in the minds of everyone. Subsection (4), to which this also applies, enables the Secretary of State to give directions to the local authority about the record of measurement so that a record of undisputed validity and accuracy can be produced. I hope, therefore, that my noble friend will agree that the position of the individual or industrialist in a noise abatement zone will be adequately safeguarded. If the possibility of an appeal is not taken up, or is exhausted, the difficulty is that under his Amendment the possibility of questioning the accuracy of any measurement could be raised a long time after the original measurements were taken, and therefore would not contribute anything to safeguarding the individual, which is what we want to do. The aim of subsection (5) is to create finality because, as I said in answer to a previous Amendment on this subject, the object of the noise register is to provide a record of fact and not a judgment about noise levels. It is to provide a record of fact against which future noise levels can be measured. I hope I have said enough to explain that the individual has this right to appeal on this point.
On the particular point raised about the clerical error, the noise readings could
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not be taken without co-operation with the industrialist or the individual, because they would be required to be taken at certain times, and obviously this would have to be done with agreement. Furthermore, there would be nothing to prevent the individual from seeing that the record in the register was accurate about the premises, the day, and so on. If it were not true, that would be a ground for objection.
LORD PLATT: I hope that the noble Lord, Lord Middleton, will not readily withdraw his Amendment. Subsection (5) reads in a peculiar way—that the register shall not be questioned in any proceedings under this Part of the Act except as provided by the preceding provisions. Is it not in any case completely redundant because it already says in subsection (3) that the owner and occupier of the premises:
"may, within twenty-eight days of the date of service, appeal to the Secretary of State against the record."?
If he may do so within 28 days is it not implied that he may not do so within 29 days? Therefore, does not subsection (3) do everything that you are trying to do in subsection (5)? I may have misunderstood the noble Baroness, but that is my reading of it.
BARONESS YOUNG: I do not think that the noble Lord, Lord Platt, is quite right on this matter. The individual concerned has the right to object within 28 days. I have no doubt that if he objected on the twenty-ninth day, in many cases that might well be accepted. If subsection (5) is left out there is no ultimate limit to when objections might arise and they would be held in a completely different context than the time when the measurement was taken. This is a technical matter in a new field, and therefore it is necessary to have a limit put on the time far objection against the measurement which has been taken. That is why it is written in this way. After all, it is not a measurement that is going to stand for all time. It could well be that five years later other measurements would be taken and the same procedure gone through. What it is doing is setting finality on the measurements taken at a specific time.
LORD PLATT: My point is that that limit is set at 28 days.
LORD MIDDLETON: I am most grateful to the noble Baroness for what she has said. I am concerned with the man who has missed the opportunity to lodge his appeal within 28 days: there may have been a muddle, or the record may be wrong. The noble Baroness said that this is a new field and that in this respect we are feeling our way, but it seems to me quite wrong that someone who has committed an offence cannot challenge this record, if the record of facts is wrong. However, I should like to study very carefully what has been said, and to reserve the right to bring this up again at a later stage, if necessary. I beg leave to withdraw the Amendment.
Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.
11.46 p.m.
LORD CRAIGTON LORD CRAIGTON moved Amendment No. 179F:
Page 65, line 15, at end insert—
("( ) A local authority may measure the level of noise in any part of its area not designated as a noise abatement zone under section 55 of this Act and may enter the particulars of such measurement in the noise level register").
The noble Lord said: I beg leave to move this Amendment. As I read this clause, the local authority has powers only to measure the noise in a noise abatement zone and to enter only such zonal information in the register. Supposing a ratepayer, not in the noise abatement zone, complains about a noise: should the local authority not have power to test the truth of his complaint? It can do this only by measuring the noise, and it can most properly give the ratepayer the answer by entering the noise level in the register, so that the authority may justify to ratepayers the case for action—perhaps by making a new noise abatement zone—or for inaction. This seems so obvious to me that I fear I must have made a mistake somewhere. I am sure the noble Baroness will tell me, if I have. I beg to move.
BARONESS YOUNG: I can assure the noble Lord that in fact his point is met in the Bill. It is open to a local authority at any time to take a noise measurement outside a noise abatement zone and to enter it in a register of noise levels. This would be a different register from that in a noise abatement zone, which would have its own register for that zone. But
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there is nothing to prevent a local authority, under Clause 49, from taking measurements and recording them anywhere it chooses within its area.
LORD CRAIGTON: I am very grateful to the noble Baroness for that explanation, and I beg leave to withdraw my Amendment.
Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.
On Question, whether Clause 56 shall stand part of the Bill?
LORD MERRIVALE: I should like to take this opportunity to ask my noble friend whether it is the Government's intention to bring this Clause 56 into effect only after regulations prescribing the way in which, and the methods by which, noise levels are to be measured have been prepared. Subsection (8) reads:
"Regulations may provide for the way in which, and the methods by which, noise levels are to be measured for the purposes of this section, …"
and so on. This subsection recognises the fact that noise levels can be measured by different methods, used in different ways. Surely there is a need for standardisation of the methods adopted by different local authorities.
As I see it if this clause is brought into effect before regulations are made prescribing the methods to be used, not only will there be a variation in the approach of different local authorities, but some local authorities may find it necessary to remeasure noise levels of premises where measurements have already been carried out. I know that I have not given notice to my noble friend on this matter, but would it be possible to confirm, or consider confirming at a later stage that regulations will be introduced at least no later than when this clause takes effect? It would be preferable if the regulations could come in beforehand.
BARONESS YOUNG: I am glad to confirm this point. It will be brought into effect after regulations have been laid down. As I indicated in answering an earlier Amendment, the measurement of noise levels is a new and somewhat complex science and we are devising a scheme in conjunction with the Building Research Station. It is hoped that we shall be able to devise regulations that

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will cover the different types of area, and the different types of noise abatement zone, which could apply to different local authorities.
Clause 56 agreed to.
Clause 57 [Noise exceeding registered level]:
11.52 p.m.
LORD MERRIVALE LORD MERRIVALE moved Amendment No. 179C:
Page 65, line 35, after ("section") insert ("within twenty-eight days from receipt of the application").
The noble Lord said: I believe this Amendment conforms to normal practice whereby there is mention of a period within which consent should be given or refused. Without such provision the application could remain undetermined indefinitely, and this would place the applicant in a difficult position for he might not know whether or not he should continue with his plans. I beg to move.
BARONESS YOUNG: My noble friend has a real point here and we shall consider requiring the local authorities to notify an applicant of their decision within a specified period of time. This is given in the other clauses of the Bill and I think that something should be put in here.
LORD MERRIVALE: I am most grateful to my noble friend. I beg leave to withdraw the Amendment.
Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.
On Question, Whether Clause 57 shall stand part of the Bill?
LORD MERRIVALE: I presume that the level of noise measured and recorded in the noise level register will usually be the level of noise when plant and machinery are on the premises and operating normally. However, the noise level under start-up and emergency conditions is higher than the registered levels, although this is only for a limited time. Could my noble friend say whether it is intended to advise local authorities that consents under Clause 57 should be granted to allow levels of noise above the registered levels under start-up and emergency conditions? This is possibly permitted under subsection (2), although
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I am not sure about that. Perhaps my noble friend could clarify this point.
BARONESS YOUNG: The noble Lord, Lord Merrivale, has asked a question as to the circumstances in which the noise permitted would be above the noise level recorded in the register for a noise abatement zone. It is possible for a local authority to give a written consent in certain circumstances for industry to rise above these noise levels. Such a circumstance could well be the kind of circumstance that the noble Lord has mentioned. There could be examples, such as the expansion of existing facilities, or a return to full-capacity working after existing noise levels had been registered, where indeed a higher level might be justified. I hope this answers his point.
Clause 57 agreed to.
11.58 p.m.
LORD CRAIGTON LORD CRAIGTON moved Amendment No. 179:
After Clause 57, insert the following new clause:
Prohibition of vehicles
".—(1) A local authority may make a noise abatement order which shall prescribe the level of noise which shall not be exceeded by road vehicles of the classes named in the order except with the consent of the local authority.
(2) The local authority's consent may be made subject to such conditions, whether as to the amount by which the level of noise may be increased, or as to the period for which, or the periods during which, the level of noise may be exceeded, as may be specified in the consent.
(3) The local authority shall notify the applicant of its decision on any application for consent under this section, and the applicant may appeal to the Secretary of State against that decision within three months of the date on which the local authority notifies him of the decision.
It shall be the duty of the local authority to act in accordance with the decision of the Secretary of State on the appeal.
(4) If noise emitted from any road vehicle constitutes a contravention of subsection (1) of this section, or of a condition attached to a consent under this section, the person responsible shall be guilty of an offence under this Part of this Act."
The noble Lord said: I beg to move this new clause. As the Bill is drafted, the only major uncontrolled noises left out seem to be vehicles and aeroplanes. I should like to bring in vehicles. The existing provisions about vehicle noise are governed by the Ministry of Transport Road Vehicle (Maximum Noise) Regulations 1968. I am advised that in

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the five years that have ensued only twelve prosecutions have taken place. Why is this? It is, as I understand it, because the prescribed method of measurement of noise in these regulations is virtually unenforceable. First, the measuring instrument has to be in open country, so that no other vehicle or building can be in the vicinity; secondly, the vehicle's speed has to be 30 m.p.h. only; and thirdly, the measuring instrument must be 25 feet away from the vehicle. This sort of restriction might be all right for the Yorkshire Moors, but I do not think that it goes down in Bond Street.
It is essential that some legislation should be available to enforce this. We have been able to enforce the speed limit: why not a nuisance noise limit? This new clause would produce a system that could be enforced in practice. I would hope the local authorities could fix, say, 80 decibles as the maximum noise. This would give the Government an opportunity to correct what seems a strange omission in this Part III of the Bill, which is headed, "Noise." I beg to move.
LORD SOMERS: I should like to support this Amendent very strongly. A great deal of noise from road vehicles is easily avoidable. People who drive cars with noisy exhausts, merely for the purpose of feeling that they are driving a very powerful vehicle, should be made to have them properly silenced. There is also the rather more difficult problem of very high-powered diesel vehicles which make an absolutely shattering noise that could, I think, be silenced to a very great extent. I think that the reason, probably, why there have been so few prosecutions, as the noble Lord has just said, is that it is extremely difficult to catch a car when it is travelling at a very high speed with a noisy exhaust; and unless it is travelling at a high speed it does not make much noise.
LORD ABERDARE: In considering this Amendment I am afraid that I rather have to repeat what I said to the noble Lord, Lord Winterbottom, who was equally interested in an earlier Amendment on the question of vehicle noise. These provisions in the Bill—noise abatement zones—are designed to deal with noise from fixed premises, such as factories, and not with noise from moving sources such as road vehicles. When we
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were preparing this Bill we considered the possibility of introducing new legislation to deal with vehicle noise, but came to the conclusion that the Government had all the powers they could wish to have to give better control over this source of noise and that there was nothing to be gained from new powers in the Bill. I have already mentioned the extensive powers we have under Section 40 of the Road Traffic Act 1972, under which the Secretary of State for the Environment may prescribe any reasonable level as the maximum permissible noise level for vehicles; and limits have been prescribed in the Motor Vehicles (Construction and Use) Regulations 1973.
We accept that the existing limits are too high, but since motor vehicles are an internationally traded product, effective action requires international co-operation, and unilateral action can only touch the surface of the problem and would place United Kingdom manufacturers at a serious competitive disadvantage. There are also the local powers of the local authorities under Sections 1 to 6 of the Road Traffic Regulation Act, and the Heavy Commercial Vehicles (Control and Regulations) Act 1973, to regulate the movement of traffic through their area and thereby to reduce traffic noise. But I can see grave difficulties in going any further as my noble friend was suggesting. The noble Lord, Lord Somers, himself mentioned how difficult it was to enforce this kind of provision and catch people for making a lot of noise, and I really do not think, with due respect to my noble friend, that this would fit neatly into the present proposals for noise at all into the present proposals for noise abatement zones. I hope that he understands the difficulties and will withdraw the Amendment.
LORD CRAIGTON: I have heard my noble friend's case with due respect. I am grateful to him for such a careful explanation, which I shall read with great care. I beg leave to withdraw the Amendment.
Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.
Clause 58 [Reduction of noise levels]:
12.3 a.m.
LORD MERRIVALE LORD MERRIVALE moved Amendment No. 179D:
Pace 66, line 46, at end insert:
("Provided that the time specified in the notice in accordance with subsection (3) above

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is not less than two years from the date when consent was granted under the preceding section.")
The noble Lord said: The previous clause, Clause 57, provides for the granting of a consent to an increased noise level, perhaps after the determination of an appeal by the Secretary of State. Such a consent may specify the period for which the consent applies, and it is expected that an appropriate period would be specified where the activities producing increased noise were of a limited duration. On the other hand, there will surely be many instances where activities producing increased noise level will be more permanent in character. I think that in industry it is inevitable. While I would agree that it would be wrong to remove the possibility of the variation of a consented level, it would be reasonable for a minimum period during which the consented level may not be varied to be prescribed in the Bill. Also, it should be a reasonable period of time that is inserted in the Bill, for failing this we might easily run the risk of unduly penalising industry, on which in effect we all depend so much.
Under Part I of this Bill certain noble Lords (perhaps also the noble Baroness, Lady White; but the noble Lord, Lord Garnsworthy, I know) rejected the idea of inserting at the end of subsection (4) in Clause 5 wording to the effect that a notice served in pursuance of this clause shall not revoke or modify a disposal licence within two years, except in the case of an emergency. That was what we were debating at that time. On that occasion my noble friend Lady Young said—and I quote:
"We propose to consider whether any greater security can be given to an operator once he has a licence, by laying down explicitly in the Bill that once a licence has been issued it shall not be unreasonably varied or shall only be varied where there is good reason to do so in order to secure satisfactory standards of operation."—[OFFICIAL REPORT, 17/1/74, col. 1119.]
The noble Baroness also spoke on that occasion to the effect that the licence holders must be able to make their investments with a reasonable degree of confidence. I think the Government gave certain assurances then, and I hope that my noble friend will be able to do so now. I agree that in this Amendment I am not considering waste,
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but noise at consented levels, where also high investment may already have been made. Therefore I hope my noble friend will be able to give certain assurances so that at least the Amendment may be useful as a probing Amendment, if nothing else. I beg to move.
BARONESS YOUNG: I think it would be useful at this point to consider the relationship of Clauses 56, 57 and 58. Clause 56 establishes the noise abatement zones and Clause 57 allows an industry to have a higher level than the register has allowed it in the noise abatement zone. This is presumed to be the exception rather than the rule in this case. Clause 58 will allow a local authority to lower the levels of noise allowed within a noise abatement zone. Therefore if this Amendment were agreed to, one of the difficulties would be that an industrialist could, if he had permission for a higher noise level, keep this for two years without having it altered, and therefore in a sense he would be at an advantage as against other people in the noise abatement zone whose noise level was lower. So that is one quite practical difficulty.
But if what the noble Lord, Lord Merrivale, is seeking is, as I think it is, a safeguard against what might appear to be unreasonable behaviour by the local authority in that they would be continually asking for lower levels at a time when the industrialist was quite unable to achieve it, of course he has a safeguard in that he has a right of appeal to a magistrates' court against that local authority's requirements. This should be a safeguard for him.
I am not sure that I would entirely agree with the noble Lord that the situation with regard to a licence holder in Part I, who has a licence for disposal, is exactly comparable with an industrialist in a noise abatement zone. The fact is that a local authority would have to consider carefully the zone that it decided upon as a noise abatement zone. It would clearly have to get the co-operation of everyone in it, and there would have to be a great deal of consultation between the local authority and the industrialists. In the case of a licence holder, he is applying to the local authority for a quite specific job to do, and therefore he needs safeguards which are quite different from the kind of situation that would

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arise in a noise abatement zone. I trust this will reassure the noble Lord that we have understood his point, and I hope we have met it.
BARONESS WHITE: I do not wish to detain the Committee at this "early" hour, but would just like to say I am very glad indeed that the noble Baroness has taken the line she has. I think we would have been very unhappy had she been able to accept her noble friend's Amendment. Of course, she is perfectly right; the circumstances are very different in this Part of the Bill from those in Part I, and we are very happy with the line she has adopted.
LORD MERRIVALE: I thank my noble friend. I take the point that there would be practical difficulties in the implementation of my Amendment if it were incorporated in the Bill. The noble Baroness also said there are safeguards, in that the local authorities should not behave unreasonably, and that there is a right of appeal to a magistrate's court. The noble Baroness stressed, and this I think is a very good point indeed, that there would be extensive consultation between local authorities and industry. With those assurances, and also bearing in mind the practical difficulties regarding my Amendment, I beg leave to withdraw it.
Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.
12.13 a.m.
LORD MERRIVALE LORD MERRIVALE moved Amendment No. 179E:
Page 67, line 2, leave out ("a magistrates' court") and insert ("the Secretary of State")
The noble Lord said: I beg to move Amendment No. 179E. As I see it, appeals against noise reduction notices will usually be made on the grounds that the noise level or levels specified in the notice are inappropriate for the area in which the premises concerned are situated, or that the steps prescribed in the notice to reduce the noise levels do not constitute the best practicable means of abatement. These two grounds are the same, I should imagine, as those on which one would normally expect appeals to be made under Clauses 57 and 59. In those cases, a new increased level is under consideration, whereas in Clause 58 a new reduced level gives rise to the appeal. The two circumstances are surely very similar, and I would have thought
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one could regard the serving of a noise reduction notice as the belated imposition of a condition which would normally be attached to a planning consent.
In Clauses 57 and 59, the Bill proposes that appeal should be made to the Secretary of State. There are certainly merits in that. For instance, one merit is that there should be a large measure of consistency in the determination of the appeals. It is essential that the consent to noise levels for premises in one part of the country are the same as for premises similarly situated in another part of the country. The determination of the best practicable means of abatement usually requires the assessment of highly technical considerations by persons with the requisite technical competence and expertise. I am sure my noble friend would agree that the D.O.E. inspectors are perfectly suitably qualified to advise the Secretary of State when determining such appeals.
The determination of appeals under Clause 58, bearing in mind that these are cases which do not involve the perpetration of a statutory nuisance, also demand a large measure of consistency, so that reduced noise levels are consistent both with one another and with the new or increased noise levels allowed under Clauses 57 and 59. Furthermore, under Part I of the Bill magistrates' courts usually will not have the appropriate technical expertise to decide what is the best practical means; nor will they have available independent assessors to assist them in this task. In view of these arguments, I sincerely hope my noble friend will feel it is appropriate that appeals against noise reduction notices should be made to the Secretary of State. I beg to move.
12.15 a.m.
BARONESS YOUNG: The noble Lord has advanced two arguments in support of his Amendment, the first being that the magistrates would not have the technical expertise to deal with this particular kind of case. I hope he will be reassured when I say that we believe that they would. Since the Noise Abatement Act, which is now about 14 years old, they have been dealing with this kind of case. They have also had to deal with questions of noise nuisance, which are somewhat similar in character, and of course they

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can get the technical advice that they require in order to make a judgment.
His second argument was that there is a difference between Clause 57, where a person has a right of appeal to the Secretary of State, and Clause 58, where it is to the magistrates. We do not think that the two circumstances are really the same. Under Clause 57, which is an appeal against a local authority's refusal to allow noise levels to be increased, the matter goes to the Secretary of State. The reason is that refusal of consent could in certain circumstances have very widespread implications for jobs, or the whole of the industry, or possibly for investment or for some such big reason. Once the noise level has been accepted and the question is one of reducing it, we believe the situation is not parallel. The situation is one in which there must be a measure of agreement about reducing the level, and it is only when discussions have failed that the person has a right of appeal to the magistrates. It could not involve the same kind of major implications for industry as applies under Clause 57. I think the noble Lord will recognise that magistrates have considerable experience in dealing with these kinds of case; although in a technical matter they would have available to them, or could get, the technical advice they need to make a judgment. For those reasons, I hope he will feel able to withdraw the Amendment.
LORD MERRIVALE: I am to some extent grateful to my noble friend for her Answer, and particularly that she feels the magistrates have the appropriate expertise. The advice I have had from industrial sources is that they do not; but I would not argue that matter at this stage. I need to study what my noble friend has said as to the exact reasons why certain cases should go on appeal to the magistrates' court and others to the Secretary of State. I may return to that later.
LORD SHACKLETON: Before the noble Lord withdraws the Amendment, I wonder whether the noble Baroness would consider further what she has said. I did not find it entirely convincing. I have consulted my noble friend Lady White, and it may well be that on the Report stage the noble Lord may wish
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to return to it again when he has discussed it. I did not find the arguments entirely convincing, as I have done most of her other arguments.
LORD MERRIVALE: I am grateful to the noble Lord the Leader of the Opposition for that unexpected support. I beg leave to withdraw the Amendment.
Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.
12.21 a.m.
LORD CRAIGTON LORD CRAIGTON moved Amendment No. 180:
Page 67, line 11, at end insert:
("(9) If it appears to the Local Authority that in regard to any premises within its area action cannot properly be taken against any person requiring him to abate the level of noise occurring in those premises then the Local Authority shall themselves take such steps as are reasonable and within their powers to bring about such abatement.")
The noble Lord said: In giving the local authorities powers to control noise in premises where no one else can be blamed, I was thinking of the word "premises" not only as a building but also as an area. On looking up the word in the Library, I found that small boys using an enclosed space in a built-up areas as a dirt track for motor cycles were using "premises" within the meaning of the Act. The example I have in mind is that there might be traffic noise at certain times of the day for which no one person was responsible, but which could be minimised by the local authority by perhaps a small diversion. Or there could be excessive noise created by, say, holidaymakers on a beach that maybe could be controlled a little by displaying a notice or by an attendant. I believe that this would be a useful power for a local authority. They may need to use it very seldom but I think they would be sorry if the noble Baroness said that they could not have that power. It would not do any harm, and there might be examples where it would do a great deal of good. I beg to move.
LORD MERRIVALE: I am sorry to oppose my noble friend, but it would seem to me—I may be wrong—that acceptance of the Amendment would mean several things. A local authority could avoid serving a noise reduction notice; it could also mean the removal of the opportunity for the person on whom a notice would be served to take

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corrective action himself, and possibly also could mean the removal of the right of appeal against such a notice. Bearing in mind that noise reduction notices will be served in cases where a statutory nuisance is not involved, the provision of such far-reaching powers to a local authority can scarcely be justified. Furthermore, Clause 65 of the Bill contains substantial financial penalties, £200 and so forth, which would be sufficient inducement to ensure that noise reduction notices are complied with. I shall be interested to hear what the noble Baroness has to say.
BARONESS YOUNG: I understand the purpose of the Amendment, but I do not think that it is necessary. The purpose of this clause is to give the local authority adequate powers to require any person responsible for noise from classified premises in a noise abatement zone to reduce the level of noise from those premises. Furthermore, as my noble friend pointed out, there are fairly high financial penalties for non-compliance with the noise levels, and these penalties rise very rapidly. Therefore, there is every incentive on a person to keep to the noise levels that have been agreed. If, however, my noble friend is referring not to premises but to areas of a local authority, that is a matter which could be covered by local authority by-laws.
LORD CRAIGTON: The word "premises" in the Bill refers to any area—not simply to bricks and mortar. My noble friend Lord Merrivale did not read my Amendment. I am thinking of a noise about which no single person can have any action taken against him. Of course, if someone is responsible for it, then this clause will operate. I am thinking of a noise anywhere in a noise abatement zone, not necessarily in a building, for which no one person can be held responsible, and where there are no powers under which a local authority can do anything about it. Will my noble friend see my point of view and consider whether something can be done about this matter?
BARONESS YOUNG: I will certainly read very carefully the report of what my noble friend has said, and if there is some gap in the provisions which we ought to fill I will consider it.
LORD CRAIGTON: In view of that assurance, I beg leave to withdraw the Amendment.
Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.
Clause 58 agreed to.
12.26 a.m.
BARONESS WHITE BARONESS WHITE moved Amendment No. 180A:
After Clause 58 insert the following new clause:
".—(1) It shall be an offence for any licensee of a place to which the public has access or of any club to permit noise levels therein which may cause impairment of hearing.
(2) The Secretary of State shall by regulation prescribe the relevant levels.
(3) The penalty for an offence under this section shall be for the first offence a fine not exceeding £200 and for a subsequent offence a fine and the forfeiture of the licence."
The noble Baroness said: Had my noble friend Lord Kennet been able to be present he himself would have wished to move this Amendment, because it embodies a subject in which he has taken a very keen personal interest. Anyone who has studied the question of the noise level in discotheques, clubs and "pop" concerts must be concerned about it. I do not think any of us can accept with equanimity a situation in which young teenagers, as well as older teenagers, subject themselves, sometimes with great frequency, to a level of noise which may have permanently damaging effects on their hearing. Anyone who knows young people who frequent these places is aware that they may come back from them in a state of partial deafness, because they have been subjected to a level of noise which I find almost inconceivable.
I do not wish at this hour to weary your Lordships with too many figures, but I have here various computations of the danger level—"danger" in the sense of a possible threat to hearing—of noise. I am advised that it starts at some 80 decibels, and that 120 decibels is loud enough to cause actual physical pain. This sensation is positively sought after by some teenagers, and certain "pop" groups produce a noise of up to 125 decibels which is well above what is regarded as the lower danger level. It produces a physical reaction on the persons who hear it which is apparently rather like a blow in the chest. It is not simply a question of what one hears; it has a very marked physical effect.
Studies have been made and my noble friend Lord Kennet has supplied me with a report, which was recently compiled at Leeds Polytechnic in the Department of Architectural Studies by Mr. Fearn, who is the principal lecturer in environmental physics. He has carried out a very widely-based survey with a control group, not only to see what the effects of exposure to noise at this level may have, but also to try to see what recovery of impaired hearing can be expected over a period of time. I must say that if one accepts the evidence given in this report—and there is no reason not to—it is really very disquieting indeed. It is perhaps significant that this study was made in the City of Leeds, because that city has made a by-law, which took effect at the beginning of this month, limiting the level of noise which may be permitted in places of public entertainment or clubs. It is obviously too soon to judge whether the limit of 96 decibels is the right one. Complaints have been made by organisers of "pop" concerts that this level is too low. So far as one can judge on the medical evidence, it would probably be about right. But in the new clause which I am putting before your Lordships, we felt that it would be quite improper to suggest any particular level. What we are suggesting is that in the light of the kind of evidence which I have mentioned we should put this enabling clause into the Bill which would make it possible for the Secretary of State, by regulation, to prescribe (on taking advice, obviously) a level which would appear to him to be reasonable.
Nobody wants to interfere with the enjoyment of the young, and it is quite clear to many of my generation that they obviously enjoy a level of noise which I find utterly intolerable; but for them it brings great pleasure. One hesitates, therefore, to suggest action of this kind, but these young people—and some of them are really quite young teenagers who go to these discotheques—should not be exposed to something which is going permanently to damage their hearing, and in a way which I think, if one uses a little imagination, can be quite peculiarly tragic if it should occur. I am advised that with noise damage of this kind one has a sort of deafness which may result in a constant ringing in the
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ears which one cannot stop, and this must be almost literally a maddening state of affairs.
These youngsters are sometimes exposed with great frequency to noise which is at a level which would not be allowed in industry; and also, for various reasons of physics which I cannot profess to understand, it appears that the type of noise which subsists in these discotheques is of a level which impairs one's hearing of the speaking voice. I think it would be inappropriate to try, in a layman's terms, to explain this, but it means that in some ways this noise is really far worse than even bad industrial noise. If any noble Lords who are skilled in physics wish to look at the evidence I have here, I would be most happy, on behalf of my noble friend Lord Kennet, to show it to them, or to place the documents in the Library, if desired. If we are serious about the problem of noise, it seems to me that this is a case in which we ought to take powers in this Bill which would, as I say, enable the Secretary of State to prescribe levels above which young people should not be so exposed. I think I should emphasise that it is not only the teenagers who go to these discotheques; there is also the staff, who are there sometimes for very long periods and who may be exposed to really very serious danger indeed to their hearing. It is for those reasons that I plead with the Committee to accept this new clause.
12.35 a.m.
LORD PLATT: This is not a matter on which I, as a medical man, can claim any particular expertise, but I have carried out some research on the subject and I am sure that everything the noble Baroness, Lady White, has put before us is true. I have a certain amount of knowledge of "pop" groups and so on, having at least five grandchildren who have played in them, and I know what the noise can do. Not only can it have the devastating effect that the noble Baroness described, but I also believe that it could be permanent, as she said and even progressive. It is a very serious thing. The fortunate thing about it is that in spite of the intolerable noise the deafness phenomena is comparatively rare, but I do not think that is a reason for us to say that we are not going to

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take any notice of it. The noble Baroness mentioned the staff. I do not know whether she was including the players who get the biggest share of the noise and for the longest time. I think that the Committee should take this matter seriously and I hope that we shall be able to write something constructive on this subject into the Bill.
LORD MERRIVALE: I should like to support the noble Baroness, Lady White, in her intention. I feel that the noble Baroness, Lady Young, should give careful consideration to this Amendment. Perhaps I should have consulted my son, as I believe he was a member of a "pop" group called "The Stormy Clouds" and he might have been able to advise me on the question of the strength of noise of some of the instruments. When I heard the noble Baroness, Lady White, refer to 120 and 125 decibels, with my limited knowledge of physics it seemed to me that that was certainly above the threshold of pain. If the Minister could give favourable consideration to what the noble Baroness is trying to achieve it would be a very good thing.
The noise made by "pop" groups was brought to my attention some years ago when I visited the E.M.I. studios where a group was being recorded. The recording on tape was played back at absolutely the greatest possible noise level. I asked the technician, "Why do you play it at the threshold of pain?" He replied, "Because the defects emerge better when it is played at a very high level of decibels." On the question of the desirability of keeping the number of decibels reduced within licensed premises and clubs I think one should also take account of the damage that could be caused to eardrums by the very high level of the low notes which do more harm to the eardrums than the high notes.
LORD SOMERS: May I interrupt the noble Lord for a moment? I am afraid he is mistaken there: it is the high notes that cause harm.
LORD MERRIVALE: I thought it was the low notes, and that beyond a certain level only dogs could hear some sounds. However, I stand corrected. I should like to support very strongly the plea made by the noble Baroness, Lady White.
LORD CRAIGTON: I should also like to support the noble Baroness, and I hope she will not take "No" for an answer.
LORD ELTON: I also would ask my noble friend to take a friendly view of this Amendment. The objection against it might be that there may be a limitation of freedom concerned here, but there is in this Chamber a considerable precedent for protecting people from exposure to self-injury. We have recently passed laws making it obligatory to protect oneself from injury while riding motor-cycles by wearing protective clothing. We do not allow people to smoke injurious drugs and we do not even allow them to go and see films which may corrupt them; so it is quite right that we should try to prevent them from receiving a particular form of injury which may result from a particular form of enjoyment. It may be difficult to recognise the levels which are specified by the Minister, but I understand from the Noise Abatement Society that instruments are being developed which can do this quite cheaply and efficiently.
Finally, I should like to urge the Minister to pay attention to the competitive effect. Where any group can get a bigger clientele by investing in even more expensive electronic machinery, then it is tempted to do so, in order to rob its competitors of an audience. If we put a limit beyond which competition cannot go, we remove this factor; and art will perhaps replace science at the upper levels of noise in discotheques in this country.
BARONESS YOUNG: The number of people who have spoken on this Amendment at this late hour shows that the noble Baroness, Lady White, has raised an issue of great interest and concern to all the Committee. People in general hold differing views about "pop" groups and discotheques, as the noble Baroness herself pointed out.
Underlying this argument is the freedom of the individual and the right to attend "pop" groups, and indeed to play in them. I should like to follow up some of the points that have been made, because this is a matter of serious concern; and I think it would be helpful to the Committee if I gave all the evidence we have managed to collect on

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this matter—because one of the problems is that, so far as we can ascertain, the evidence on the question of impairment of hearing is not yet complete and experts on this subject differ.
LORD PLATT: Before the noble Baroness goes any further, may I say that she spoke rather as though we were disapproving of "pop" groups or were trying in some way to prevent their meetings. Surely no such intention was in the minds of any of us. It is only a question of how many decibels are allowed.
BARONESS YOUNG: I think the answer to the noble Lord, Lord Platt, is that those who enjoy going to discotheques and listening to "pop" groups often enjoy exceedingly loud music. That, as I understand it, is part of the pleasure; and that of course is the point at issue.
LORD SOMERS: May I interrupt the noble Baroness once more? The noble Lord, Lord Elton, has just pointed out that we are not allowed to damage ourselves by drugs, by indulging in car accidents, by smoking too much or by various other means. We are not even allowed to commit suicide, though we may often feel like it. What is the difference? What are we trying to do in the way of reducing noise?
BARONESS YOUNG: I hope that in Part III of the Bill we are trying to do quite a lot. I was about to explain that we have been looking very hard at the evidence on this question of the level of noise and its effect on hearing, which we recognise to be a very important matter, and I shall try to show how far we have progressed on this subject.
Research into this problem suggests that those who are most at risk are the performers and disc jockeys who might be exposed to high noise levels for long and continuous periods. This is primarly a question for the Department of Employment who are responsible for the health, safety and welfare of employed persons. That Department has a code of practice for reducing the exposure of employed persons to noise, and it might be appropriate for the provisions of this code to be brought to bear in the case of performers and disc jockeys. But, as I indicated earlier, one of the difficulties has been that expert opinion differs on
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the degree of risk to members of the audience; that is, those attending a discotheque or a "pop" group. It is thought that the worst situation for the average audience, those going to a "pop" group perhaps once a week or twice a week, would be about 104 decibels. That would be at a "pop" concert or a commercial discotheque.
The medical evidence on permanent hearing damage is not very clear. A survey of studies which has been carried out by the National Physical Laboratory has found that existing statistics are suspect and too little is known about the teenage behaviour patterns for reliable conclusions to be drawn. One does not know enough about the number of times teenagers go to discotheques or hear "pop" groups, nor the hours during which they are exposed to this very loud noise.
It is not only a question of numbers of decibels, but also the numbers of hours of noise to which a person is subject, and also the frequency, whether it is every day, part of a day or once a week. It is because we do not have this definite evidence that we do not feel able to accept this Amendment. It would be on a basis that there was conclusive evidence which, as I think I have shown, we do not yet have. But, having said that, I can reassure the Committee that we recognise that this is something of concern and we shall of course study carefully what has been said.
LORD SHACKLETON: It is an interesting thought that the greatest number of decibels are probably pounding out from the Slade and other groups at this very moment. Since I am in considerable disagreement with the noble Lord, Lord Somers, on certain aspects, and am one of the few Members of your Lordships' House who has actually made speeches in defence of "pop" festivals, I find the noble Baroness's argument somewhat confusing. The suggestion was that it is for the Department of Employment to protect the performers, and that they might impose the obligation on the performers to wear ear muffs while the public are exposed to 125 decibels. That points to the difficulty of this problem. I am sure this is a difficult issue to deal with in this Bill.
My noble friend Lord Kennet was only seeking to give the Government

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a power. Noble Lords who judge the noise in discotheques by the noise in Annabel's would be very misguided if they thought that that was the noise inflicted by "pop" groups in certain clubs which I do not attend, but which I am sure Lord Merrivale's children or grandchildren—
LORD MERRIVALE: My son!
LORD SHACKLETON: —would be able to supply information on. This is more serious and may carry long-term implications. It may be much less serious out of doors at a "pop" festival, but within a jazz club with a live "pop" group it is quite astonishing how acute it may be. Most of your Lordships, like me, would flee at that point. The fact that this may be doing permanent damage suggests it is a matter to which further consideration might be given before the Report stage. I am sure my noble friend has no intention of pressing this Amendment to a Division at the moment.
It raises again these difficult questions of the freedom of the individual and the duty of the State. I think that most of us would really be horrified at the State having to interfere in this sort of area. None the less, we may have to face the consequences. I hope that before we come to the Report stage, the noble Baroness might make some further inquiries, possibly from the noble Lord, Lord Platt, and from Leeds, as to further evidence that might be available. We could look at it again at the Report stage. It is a serious problem, and not one lightly to be dismissed from the standpoint that it may not be many years before we have a certain number of people who will be unnecessarily deaf.
BARONESS YOUNG: I would certainly be very happy to look at any further evidence between now and the Report stage. Indeed, if any noble Lord would let me have any evidence he has I should be very glad to receive it. I can say further that the Noise Advisory Council has set up a new Working Group on noise as a hazard to hearing. One of the objectives of this Working Group will be to look at the problem of exposure to excessive noise in discotheques. If I may indicate the kind of difference of expert opinion there is, I think the noble Lord, Lord Shackleton, said as a statement
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of fact that the public is subjected to 125 decibels. My evidence is that the average audience would be subjected to 104 decibels; whereas a pilot study of ten "pop" groups undertaken under the auspices of the Institute of Sound and Vibration Research found that the mean noise level within a "pop" group is about 110 decibels and 105 decibels within the audience. I am only saying this to indicate that there is some difference of expert opinion.
LORD ELTON: May I draw to the attention of my noble friend that the "mean noise" is not what we are really concerned with; it is the "peak noise".
LORD SHACKLETON: If I may say so to the noble Baroness, I do not wish to blacken the reputation of certain groups or clubs, but there are certain much more intense noise producers than the average 104 decibels.
BARONESS WHITE: I should like to feel that this matter is going to be given genuine consideration. If the Government can put in this Bill anything like Clause 44 (when they do not know what they are going to do with it) then there is, to my mind, no good reason why they should not put in enabling powers, maybe somewhat differently drafted from this particular Amendment. But they should take to themselves enabling powers. That will give them an opportunity to study the reports of the various committees referred to by the noble Baroness. They do not necessarily have to use enabling powers unless they are convinced; but the powers will be there. From such evidence that we have been able to obtain, we have little doubt that there are certain circumstances in which such powers should be used. But that is a matter which could be left to the future. I should have thought that we have established beyond any serious doubt that there is a situation here which must cause concern and that we should put ourselves in a position, if we are serious about noise, to do something about it.
I would entirely agree that the new clause as drafted may need amendment because, for example, I have "shall" when I was told on some earlier amendment it ought to have been "may", and of course one would be happy in that connection. I am reminded that there

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are some noble Lords in this House who know something about gun-fire. I do not think we need go into that, but I should have though that anyone who had had experience of certain types of gun-fire, at any rate at close quarters, would not be unduly complacent about the possible permanent effects of noise. But in the circumstances I would ask leave to withdraw the Amendment.
Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.
Clauses 59 and 60 agreed to.
Clause 61 [Appeals to Secretary of State and magistrates' court]:
On Question, Whether Clause 61 shall stand part of the Bill?
12.56 a.m.
LORD STOW HILL: This was a clause to which I referred earlier when I was addressing the Committee upon the provisions of Clause 50(3). I do not want to detain the Committee. The noble Lord on the Front Bench said that criticism should not be addressed to Parliamentary Counsel but to Ministers. At this late hour I hesitate to do so, but I agree with him 100 per cent. that criticisms should not be addressed to Parliamentary Counsel, and I did not intend it. Over the years I have received the most invaluable help from Parliamentary Counsel, for which I am infinitely grateful, and I yield to nobody in my admiration of their skill and expertise. This Bill is a long and complicated and difficult Bill, and if no more can be said in criticism of some passages in the drafting than has been said, I should have thought one could say that this is a very high example of the art and a great tribute to the Parliamentary draftsman who was its author.
The only comment I would make about this clause is this. It is a matter of judgment, and I may be wrong, but I submit that subsection (2) gives the Secretary of State far too wide a regulation-making power. I should have liked to see, and I submit it would be right, that the powers of a magistrates' court, when an appeal is brought to the court under subsection (3) of Clause 50, against a notice, and indeed against other notices for which provision is made in subsequent clauses, should be spelt out in terms, and somewhere near the subsection which gives
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the right of appeal. I would submit that it is wrong in principle that the Secretary of State should be given the power in effect to formulate the jurisdiction of the Appeal Court in some important respects. From what the noble Baroness said, I apprehend that I was right in my thinking that one cannot find in the Bill any formulation of the jurisdiction of the Appeal Court when an appeal goes to it under subsection (3) of Clause 50. If so, I would respectfully submit that my criticism is well-founded. But if I can be referred to some passage which does formulate that jurisdiction in the terms of the Bill, I would at once gladly withdraw it. But the last persons against whom I wish my criticism to be directed are Parliamentary Counsel, who I think in formulating this Bill have excelled themselves in producing in such perfect form such a long, complicated and important measure.
BARONESS YOUNG: I shall certainly read very carefully what the noble and learned Lord, Lord Stow Hill, has said on these points and look at them; and I will, if I may, write to him on this particular point which he has raised.
Clause 61 agreed to.
Clauses 62 and 63 agreed to.
Clause 64 [Interpretation and other supplementary provisions]:
On Question, Whether Clause 64 shall stand part of the Bill?
LORD CRAIGTON: The noble Baroness and her friends who have so ably conducted this Bill will, I know, be glad and relieved that there is no Amendment tabled to delete subsection (3) which makes the Bill not applicable to aircraft noise—the most objectionable noise in our environment. But the tabling of this Amendment has not gone by default. Noise is not the only objectionable feature about aircraft. We realise that it would be virtually impossible to achieve it, at least in subsection (3), but we feel very strongly that the Department of the Environment should have some status in the operation of aircraft. Therefore, I have tabled an Amendment in Part IV, and I want to give my noble friend warning that if I am supported by my noble friends on either or both sides of the Committee I intend to press it

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very strongly, not because it is such an important Amendment but because it gives my noble friend some status about aircraft operation which is badly needed and which is such a vital matter. I do not want the noble Baroness to reply to that point.
Clause 64 agreed to.
Clause 65 agreed to.
House resumed.