HL Deb 20 February 1973 vol 339 cc9-19

2.55 p.m.

BARONESS TWEEDSMUIR OF BELHELVIE

My Lords, I beg to move that this Bill be now read a third time. I should like to take this opportunity of referring to the acceptance that Lord Shackleton secured for his Amendment to Clause 2 of the Bill, which enables Her Majesty's Government to pay pensions to former members of the South Arabian Security Forces. I have not sought to delete this Amendment, although I pointed out to the noble Lord at the time that the Amendment is not necessary because Clause 1 of the Bill already gives adequate powers to Her Majesty's Government to assume responsibility for any overseas pension by agreement with the overseas Government concerned. If we cannot reach such an agreement, we do not need further legislation to extend loan advances to those who would otherwise receive pensions. I did, however, undertake to convey the very genuine concern expressed by the Committee to my right honourable friend the Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs; and this I have done.

Now that the noble Lord, Lord Shackleton, is in his place, I would say only that before he came in I was recalling to the House that I said at the time that his Amendment was unnecessary, in that we have powers to give these pensions if a policy decision is taken so to do; but that I had not sought to delete it. I undertook to convey the concern felt by all those who spoke at the time to my right honourable friend. Ministers are now considering this matter again; but as noble Lords will be aware, before I spoke on this Amendment in Committee on February 6 I said that we had given the greatest thought and consideration to what is without doubt a very difficult question. It is only fair to say, therefore, that while we shall take into full account the strong feelings expressed by the Committee, it is unlikely that Ministers will alter their conviction that it would be wrong, for a variety of reasons, to make these payments. But I have left the Amendment in the Bill because I thought it was only right not to try to reverse a decision so recently taken by this House.

Moved, That the Bill be now read 3ª.—(Baroness Tweedsmuir of Belhelvie.)

LORD BROCKWAY

My Lords, I was unable to be present at the earlier discussions on this Bill, but as the noble Baroness knows, I put questions on the matter very early and we have been in correspondence about it. I hope very much that the Government will retain the Amendment which was moved by my noble friend Lord Shackleton. It seems to me both to clarify and to make more definite the implications of the earlier clause. In saying that, I want to express my appreciation to the noble Baroness for the degree to which Her Majesty's Government have met our requests on this matter.

LORD SHACKLETON

My Lords, I have no complaint against the noble Baroness. She has been completely frank with the House. She could have saved herself some trouble if she had not been; therefore I acknowledge straightaway that her frank admission then that the Government were opposed to providing pensions for the South Arabian Armed Forces was the view she then held and the view the Government still hold. If I understand her remarks rightly—and I regret to say I shall have to take this opportunity to restate the case—the Government, if only for reasons of taste (I hesitate to say for reasons of cowardice), are not prepared to attempt to reverse in this House the decision we took the other day. I accept that this is an issue that confronts the Government. The Lords do not like being asked to eat their words, and because consistently we accept the decisions of another place the Government are inclined, if they are so willed, to reverse that decision elsewhere.

I am, however, bound once again—and I must apologise for inflicting this on the House—to re-state the case which led to my noble friend Lord Beswick, the noble Lord, Lord Trevelyan, the noble Lord, Lord Gridley, and myself pressing an Amendment which at that time we had regarded as a probing Amendment and which we were aware was imperfect. Indeed, I had considered trying to draft a more perfect one, but I decided that this was a good enough vehicle to provide a platform for the case which I wished to make, and it certainly did that. I fully accept what the noble Baroness says: that the Amendment of itself does not achieve what I seek; it does not compel the Government to do what the House of Lords wishes them to do, and the Government could do it if the Amendment had never been moved. None the less, if that Amendment remains in the Bill the implication is clear as to what the House of Lords, after hearing the discussion, wish to do.

I should like, if I may, to deal with some of the arguments. Let me, first of all, admit responsibility for shortcomings on my own part in this matter. My recollection is not perhaps as clear as it should be, but I see no reason to vary the views that I expressed on the last occasion. I would remind the House of the circumstances of our withdrawal from South Arabia. This uniquely, with the exception of Palestine, was the one territory from which we withdrew without agreeing to a public service agreement. It was questionable in the extreme whether we should get out without bloodshed. We had large forces gathered there, if necessary to cover a retreat. I remember the negotiations which were conducted in Geneva, and almost daily one ticked off the different stages of the withdrawal, hoping that ultimately we should get an agreement or at least get out without bloodshed in which both British and South Arabian lives would be lost. And in the end, in the small hours of the morning on the day we actually withdrew, we got such an agreement.

It was quite clear that that agreement was to lead on to further negotiations in which such aid as seemed to be justified would be given to South Arabia. Let me say straight away that this was not likely to be a popular issue with the British public. The British public do not like their men shot, wherever it may be, though I am bound to say that some of the atrocities we have seen nearer home—the indiscriminate murder of women and children—were not seen in South Arabia. We did manage to get out. We negotiated an agreement which provided for fairly generous funds, up to the sort of level we would have given to the previous Federal Government.

Then came the second negotiations, and in the second negotiations we offered a sum which in no way matched what we had offered during the first six months. It was my Government which did this and I must collectively accept responsibility, though there were those who knew my views on this matter at the time. We offered a sum which was conditional on pensions being met. It provided no money comparable to that which we had promised to the previous Sultanic Government, the previous Federal Government. Those negotiations failed, as in my view they were bound to fail. The result was that those with whom we negotiated in Geneva disappeared from the scene—some of them, for all I know, are still under house arrest—and a more extreme Government took their place, one that felt no obligation to us, because they felt that they had driven us out, with some justification; they felt that we were prepared to give to Sultans—I am putting their point of view—what we were not prepared to give to them, and it was clear that they were not going to meet the pensions.

Subsequently, after a good deal of argument and difficulty, the Government decided to pick up the pensions of indigenous civil servants as well as of the expatriates, but refused—when I say they refused, I doubt whether we seriously considered it at that time, and I am being as frank as I can—the possibility of paying pensions to the Armed Forces. I gave some of the facts on the last occasion. The position is that a number of officers—and in one particular category pensions were promised to them and those pensions have never been paid—have had to flee the country and are no longer even able to live in their homeland. The arguments that have been given against paying these pensions are, first of all, that the whole basis of their service was different from that of civil servants, and, more especially, that the mutiny, so called, of June 20 was held to have deprived them of any claim they had on the gratitude of the British people.

I should like to deal with this argument very briefly, although my noble friend Lord Trevelyan was in Aden at the time and will know the facts much better than I did. It is certainly true that at a time of great unrest, when it was obvious to everybody that the British were not going to remain, some of the Aden armed police fired at and killed a number of British soldiers. This was the occasion when a number of Argyll and Sutherland Highlanders and Northumberland Fusiliers were killed in Crater. It actually followed a minor mutiny in the Champion Lines, which was pretty quickly put down by the intervention of South Arabian officers. In fact, they saw a group of British soldiers—I think they were Royal Army Service Corps—returning in a lorry, carrying their rifles, and they thought an attack was to take place. At that moment it was believed elsewhere in the territory that the British Army were going to sort out the Federal Forces, the local forces; and indeed some of the troops up-country I believe began to move towards Aden. This was quelled. Although for those who were killed it was very tragic, it was not a widespread mutiny and a large proportion of the Forces were not involved at all, least of all the Hardhrami Beduin Legion, but that mutiny is one reason that has been given in the past for depriving of pensions these people, some of whom—not all perhaps—served the British Crown.

But the main reason we have been given is that this would create a precedent. I submit that it would not create a precedent. This was a unique situation. The only circumstances at all similar were our withdrawal from Palestine, and it is worth while reminding ourselves that in relation to the Civil Service in Palestine, in 1948, the then Minister, Mr. Rees Williams, now Lord Ogmore, who was then a member of the Labour Government, said: In the circumstances of the termination of the Mandate, Her Majesty's Government feel that in the interim period pending the establishment of successor States the local non-expatriate staff who have served the Mandatory Government loyally and well should also have an assurance that, so far as may be practicable, they will receive the payments due to them."—[OFFICIAL REPORT, Commons, 1/3/48; c. 22.] I appreciate that it is a very confused picture, and I should like briefly to refer to the position of the Hadhrami Beduin Legion. I saw something of the Hadhrami Beduin Legion. I visited Macullah a couple of days after the bazooka attack on the Residency. At one point the Hadhrami Beduin Legion—on whom except for special units which sometimes turned up the British depended for their protection—fired in defence of the British. The commanding officer of the Hadhrami Beduin Legion, Colonel Johnson—and much of what I am saying is based on the passionate feelings of those who were actually serving in the territory at the time and were best able to judge the situation—was authorised to say that their pensions would be paid. We can argue whether weasel words were used as to how they were to be paid; and it is a fact that the pensions of armed forces in other territories have, along with their conditions, been taken over by the successor Government, but they have not been part of the public service agreement. However, on this occasion a promise was made.

I appreciate that the Government are in some difficulty on this matter and that there is only so much in the way of resources to dispense overseas; but I believe that there is here something of a debt of honour. I do not believe that the British have always honoured these debts to those who served them, and I think it is right that we should press this case on the Government. What I should like to suggest to the noble Baroness, regardless of the merits of the Amendment which, I fully concede, actually achieves nothing by itself, is that the Government should undertake to review the cases of officers in the various units I have mentioned. As I understand it, although I do not know, gratuities to other ranks were paid; but the Government should also undertake to review whether gratuities could be paid by voluntary action or ex gratia to those who have deserved well of us. There is no argument but that some of the forces behaved with loyalty and at great risk in circumstances that it is exceedingly difficult for us to visualise.

There is no doubt that the police were in fact closely in touch with "FLOSY" and the N.L.F. Indeed, this was a source of their information. There were incidents of a most remarkable kind where they had in fact connived, but they were in a very difficult and dangerous situation. Any theory that they got together and shot down their British officers, or took part in a general mutiny, is quite untrue. Furthermore, we relied very much on the Federal Forces in the end to come to terms with the successor Government, the National Liberation Front, and they played a role that the noble Lord, Lord Trevelyan, will understand and know better than I do.

I would ask the Government to think very carefully before they proceed to remove this Amendment in another place. I have already conceded that the Amendment may not be satisfactory, but I think that we shall all be in grave difficulty unless at some stage we get a genuine undertaking from the Government. I ask the Government to understand the situation of these people who served the Crown with loyalty, and are now paying a penalty that we ought to do something to mitigate. Therefore, I hope that the noble Baroness will give this matter her consideration. I shall be very willing to meet with her further and look through the papers, but I am reasonably satisfied that my recollection of events is correct.

3.15 p.m.

LORD TREVELYAN

My Lords, I fully support everything that the noble Lord, Lord Shackleton, has said, and I do not want to add very much to it. Certainly I do not want to repeat what I said during the Committee stage. He has referred again to the mutinies that occurred at a very difficult time. I have already said that I believe, and have always believed, that those mutinies were, in the main, caused by the panic of ignorant and stupid people at a time when the country was teetering on the edge of anarchy. But those forces pulled themselves together, and it was they who enabled us to withdraw in peace. I may mention that the General Officer Commanding even inspected one of the forces concerned, the armed police, in Crater a few weeks after the mutiny occurred. These military officers were not saints. Who would have been saints in such conditions! But I believe that they were neither better nor worse than the civil officers to whom we have rightly already given pensions.

There is one point that I particularly wish to make. I wish to plead with the Government that they will again consider this matter seriously and with no prejudice. I was much influenced by the fact that this case was supported by several senior British officers of the Federal and Aden Administration, by the Commander of the Hadhrami Beduin Legion, and by the senior British staff officer who was responsible for liaison with these Arab forces. I trust very much their experience and judgment, and I hope that, when the Government consider this case, they will consult with those people and take their opinion.

3.18 p.m.

BARONESS TWEEDSMUIR OF BELHELVIE

My Lords, I should like to reply to these two interventions on what is, without doubt, a problem that causes grave difficulty and concern to the House as well as to Her Majesty's Government. I should like to say first to the noble Lord, Lord Shackleton, that I have left this faulty Amendment in the Bill for the reason I gave to him: that I did not think that I could ask this House to withdraw it without a clear undertaking that its purpose will be secured. Although it is faulty, it is an indication to another place of what is felt by noble Lords in this House.

I appreciated the way in which the noble Lord, Lord Shackleton, tried to show that this was a unique case, because, as I argued before to the House, the question of precedent is important; a precedent, once established, will have repercussions elsewhere. Even if the circumstances are not the same, the fact remains that there will always be pressure for what has been done once to be done again. The noble Lord said that he felt that we had a debt of honour because a definite promise was made. One of the reasons why the Government are considering this matter before it goes to another place is that we have been having a considerable search to find out what assurances were in fact given to the Hadhrami Beduin Legion. I am informed that authority was sent by the Foreign Office to the High Commissioner for him to assure the Hadhrami Beduin Legion that their pensions would be paid; but that the methods would have to be worked out. It was explicitly pointed out that in Her Majesty's Government's view the successor State was obliged to assume financial responsibility for such payments. But we cannot find any record of the manner in which this communication was, in fact, conveyed to the Hadhrami Beduin Legion. However, I shall accept the noble Lord's suggestion that he and I should meet together to discuss certain papers which were available to him when I think he was a member of the Cabinet.

It is quite true, also, that at the time it was no doubt considered difficult to give an undertaking on pensions, not only for reasons of precedent but also because our own troops—the Argylls and the Northumberland Fusiliers— had been the victims of mutiny and had been shot and killed. But at this distance in time it is impossible to make any distinction between those who took part in such a mutiny and those who, in the words of the noble Lord, Lord Trevelyan, pulled themselves together in the end and made it possible for a reasonable withdrawal to take place.

LORD SHACKLETON

My Lords, may I interrupt the noble Baroness about this promise, this assurance? First, we should all feel better if she were ready to table such information as she has, both as to the instructions given by the Foreign Office and as to the form in which—no doubt, in perfectly good faith—the commanding officer of the Hadhrami Beduin Legion actually gave this assurance. Secondly, does the noble Baroness really mean that it is impossible to distinguish those members of the Aden armed police from the other forces who were nowhere near and took part in no such events, but in fact defended British lives?

BARONESS TWEEDSMUIR OF BELHELVIE

My Lords, I am advised that it would be invidious and impossible at this distance in time to make a distinction between those who were loyal and those who were not. The noble Lord specifically mentioned the Hadhrami Beduin Legion who were not in the area at the time. Their case would be quite simple on its own, but there were others. In any case, a great deal of research would have to be undertaken to find out who was eligible. The noble Lord is quite right in saying that certain gratuities were given to other ranks. Perhaps the noble Lord, Lord Shackleton, would not mind listening, because I am replying to a specific suggestion which he made.

LORD SHACKLETON

My Lords, I am so sorry.

BARONESS TWEEDSMUIR OF BELHELVIE

My Lords, the noble Lord suggested that the Government should undertake to review the case of officers. I shall certainly convey the noble Lord's suggestion to my right honourable friend. As I am sure the noble Lord will realise, I cannot do more at this stage. But the fact that this Amendment—which, as the noble Lord once said to me privately, and I am sure he will not mind my repeating what he said, sticks out like a sore thumb in print—is left here will be a guide to the feelings of noble Lords in this House. All I can say is that I shall convey the suggestions made to my right honourable friend.

LORD BESWICK

My Lords, before the noble Baroness sits down, may I ask whether she will say again what were the total numbers involved? Was I not right in suggesting at the previous stage that there were between 250 and 300?

BARONESS TWEEDSMUIR OF BELHELVIE

My Lords, I could not give an exact number, because that is just the kind of point that needs a great deal of research. But if we count those who received gratuities—and we are now talking also about officers—the number is probably less than that quoted by the noble Lord, Lord Shackleton. We do not have the exact number. On the question of precedent, I should also say that whereas loan advances to local officers—that is, civilians—in South Yemen amounted to £200,000, the precedent thus established meant that Zanzibar was given £250,000. I say seriously to your Lordships that it is very important to realise that a precedent created now may have repercussions, even if the situation is not exactly the same.

On Question, Bill read 3ª; an Amendment (privilege) made: Bill passed and sent to the Commons.