Lords Sitting of 7 February 1973

Preamble
The House met at half past two of the clock: The Lord Chancellor on the Woolsack.
Prayers—Read by the Lord Bishop of Lincoln.

LORD PORRITT
Sir Arthur Espie Porritt, Baronet, G.C.M.G., G.C.V.O., C.B.E., having been created Baron Porritt, of Wanganui in New Zealand and of Hampstead in Greater London, for life—Was, in his robes, introduced between the Lord Luke and the Lord Brock.

T.A.V.R. AND COUNTY REGIMENT TITLES
2.45 p.m.
Lord INGLEWOOD: My Lords, I beg leave to ask the Question which stands in my name on the Order Paper.
The Question was as follows:
To ask Her Majesty's Government whether they will endeavour, so far as is appropriate, to give the battalions to be formed under the reorganisation of the T.A.V.R. the honoured names of the county regiments which recently lost their separate identity.
Earl FERRERS: My Lords, following the creation of the new T.A.V.R. units on April 1, 1971, it is necessary to review the organisational grouping of T.A.V.R. sub-units for command, training and administration. A review will start towards the end of this year. It will not necessarily lead to a re-structuring of battalions, but should this happen, historical and county affiliations will certainly be borne in mind when deciding on any new titles which may be necessary.
Lord INGLEWOOD: My Lords, may I thank my noble friend for that reply, which leaves us not without hope? While appreciating that some counties are too small to become a recruiting area for a whole battalion, may I ask whether in good recruiting areas he will try to avoid
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a battalion's recruiting on both sides of a county boundary and instead have an area entirely within one county? And will he give the battalion the name of its former county regiment, so involving the county again with the Army and providing a magnet for recruiting?
EARL FERRERS: My Lords, I can assure my noble friend that Her Majesty's Government are particularly conscious of the effect and the necessity of territorial recognition with regard to the T.A.V.R. units. In fact, in almost all cases where it is not possible to do this at battalion level it is done at sub-unit or company level.
LORD INGLEWOOD: My Lords, I thank my noble friend.
LORD SLATER: My Lords, can the noble Earl give a reason why there cannot be restoration of the title attached to the county regiments? Does it not mean that we are overlooking the work done and the bravery shown by people of my generation and of others during the last two wars—and particularly the First World War? When we requested permission for miners to come back out of the Armed Forces and into the pits to produce the coal required at that particular time, we were turned down by the Ministry of Labour until such time as the register of unemployed miners was cleared. I remember—
THE MINISTER OE STATE, DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH, AND SOCIAL SECURITY (LORD ABERDARE): My Lords, I think it would be more in order if the noble Lord were to put his interesting speech in the form of a question.
LORD SLATER: My Lords, I am sorry to trespass on the time of the House. Is the noble Earl aware that committees were set up at that time to traverse the country to try to carry out the edict of the Ministry of Labour, particularly to try to get these people off the unemployment register?
EARL FERRERS: My Lords, I think I should need notice of the historical point to which the noble Lord, Lord Slater, makes reference. The point with which he is concerned is, I believe, similar to the one with which my noble friend was concerned: that people

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should be able to identify themselves and the regiment they are in with the area from which they come. As an example of the type of complication which this causes, I would draw the noble Lord's attention to the 5th Light Infantry Battalion which recruits from Shropshire, Herefordshire, Cornwall, Yorkshire and Durham. Obviously, it would be difficult to call the battalion the "5th Light Infantry Shropshire, Herefordshire, Cornwall, Yorkshire and Durham Battalion." Instead, it is described as the 5th Light Infantry Battalion, and those territorial connotations come out in the company names.
LORD SHINWELL: My Lords, may I ask whether the Minister is aware that there is considerable controversy among the members of the Auxiliary Forces about this matter? Also, is he aware that the building up of the Auxiliary Forces is equivalent in importance to obtaining recruits for the Regular Forces and that it is desirable to have territorial connotations in order to attract as many recruits as possible?
EARL FERRERS: My Lords, of course there is bound to be controversy, particularly when there has been the expansion in the Territorial Army that there has been over the last 18 months or so. It is for this reason that my noble friend has requested that a review be undertaken at the end of the year, in which all these points will be taken into account. I would tell the noble Lord, Lord Shinwell, that this is being done by Headquarters United Kingdom Land Forces.
LORD INGLEWOOD: My Lords, may I ask whether my noble friend would not agree that the example he quoted, where five counties were involved, is exactly the form of organisation that I hope the restructuring of the T.A.V.R. will avoid? I did not mention the name of any county in my original supplementary question. Would he not now agree that the last county of the five he mentioned is quite capable of raising a whole battalion, or more than one battalion, on its own?
EARL FERRERS: My Lords, I did not think that the reference to Durham would escape the notice of my noble friend. It is true that it is a very good
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recruiting area and is represented both in the Northumbrian Volunteers and in the Light Infantry to which I have referred. But the very point to which my noble friend referred is the kind of subject which will be considered in the review.
THE EARL OF DUNDEE: My Lords, may I ask my noble friend whether he is aware that the historic names of Highland regiments in Scotland do have an appreciable effect on recruiting?
EARL FERRERS: Yes, my Lords, that also is perfectly true.
LORD SHINWELL: My Lords, may I ask the Minister a further question? May we have an assurance that before a decision is reached, presumably by the Ministry of Defence and the military chiefs associated with that Department, members of the T.A.V.R. will be fully consulted, so that at any rate their opinions may be available to the public?
EARL FERRERS: Yes, my Lords, I can give the noble Lord, Lord Shinwell, the assurance that the T.A.V.R. will be consulted at all levels—at company and battalion level, as well as there being consultations with other Departments of the Army and the Ministry of Defence.

LOBSTER STOCKS SURVEY
2.54 p.m.
LORD DERWENT: My Lords, I beg leave to ask the Question which stands in my name on the Order Paper.
The Question was as follows:
To ask Her Majesty's Government whether they can yet make a Statement on the result of the survey of East Coast lobster stocks.
EARL FERRERS: Not yet, my Lords. The survey is part of a two-year examination of lobster stocks throughout the United Kingdom. This will be completed in 1973 and it is hoped that a full report will be available early in 1974.
LORD DERWENT: My Lords, I appreciate that the survey team is not yet in a position to give solutions' for' the problem. Would it not be possible to issue an immediate report of what they have been able to find out so far, so

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that other people who are interested in this matter and knowledgeable about it can consider their findings?
EARL FERRERS: My Lords, I appreciate my noble friend's concern about this matter. In fact, an interim report is being made by the survey team for my right honourable friend the Minister of Agriculture, Fisheries and Food. I would ask my noble friend to be patient, because that is a report of work that is being done, and the conclusions which could be drawn from it might be the reverse of those which would be drawn from the final report. At the moment the indications are that pre-emptive measures are not necessary, but I can assure my noble friend that my right honourable friend is very concerned with this matter, and if it is necessary to take any measures, he will take them.
LORD SHEPHERD: My Lords, I am certain that the House is grateful that the Government are concerned. On behalf of my noble friend Lady Serota, may I ask, where have all the lobsters gone? Is it that, like beef, they have now become so expensive that they go to Paris and not to London?
EARL FERRERS: I wondered whether the noble Lord, Lord Shepherd, would get us back on to prices. But I think that the price of lobsters is slightly different from the price of beef to which he referred yesterday. When the noble Lord asks where have all the lobsters gone, I would ask him to be as patient as I asked my noble friend to be, because that is precisely what the survey team is trying to find out.
LORD BLYTON: My Lords, can the Minister say whether this report will include a reference to the taking of berried lobsters out of the sea, which reduces the stocks of lobsters round the East Coast?
EARL FERRERS: My Lords, that is another point with which the survey team is concerned. One of the things which is concerning people most is not that there are not enough eggs laid by the lobsters, but what happens to the eggs after the lobsters have laid them. The noble Lord, Lord Blyton, will also wish to know that the survey team is considering measurements of catches, the size and range of the lobsters caught, the effort of the
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industry relative to the catches, the scale of the activities of part-time fishermen and skin divers and so forth and the study of lobster growth and migration, which would include berried lobsters.
LORD POPPLEWELL: My Lords, can the Minister give any indication of when he hopes that the report will be completed? I know that lobster-men, particularly in the Northumberland area, are extremely interested in this matter as it affects their livelihood. They are concerned about the results of this research.
EARL FERRERS: My Lords, it is expected that the report will be ready at the end of the year and published early in 1974.
LORD HAWKE: My Lords, is my noble friend aware that Cornish fishermen are very disturbed about the number of lobsters stolen out of their pots by holiday skin divers.
EARL FERRERS: My Lords, I was aware of that. It is one of the matters that the survey team is looking, into—not into the lobster pots, but into the effect on the lobster population of the activities of skin divers and amateur fishermen.
LORD SHINWELL: My Lords, is the noble Earl aware that we are amazed at his versatility: that he is able to answer questions on Defence matters and on lobster pots?
EARL FERRERS: My Lords, the two things are not disconnected. My noble friend's Question referred to the defence of the lobster population.
LORD BALERNO: My Lords, can the Government give any information about whether the survey team will examine the problem of lobster farming off Scotland and its potential, which I understand is very considerable?
EARL FERRERS: My Lords, I should prefer not to answer that supplementary question off the cuff, but to find out the facts and write to my noble friend. The survey is concerned with the lobster population, what happens to lobsters and where they go; but I would not be prepared to say that it is necessarily concerned with the future farming of lobsters off Scotland.
VISCOUNT ST. DAVIDS: My Lords, is the Minister aware that there is a fine

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method used in some places to increase the lobster population, by providing suitable reefs in which the lobsters may hide themselves and lay their eggs? In many places this seems best done by using old motor cars which, if dumped in suitable quantities and in suitable spots, provide splendid hiding places for the lobsters. Is it being considered whether we should have a few artificial reefs round the coast? It would dispose of a number of cars, which some people might think an advantage.
EARL FERRERS: My Lords, in anticipation of the supplementary questions that might be asked, I thought I would try to find out as many of the answers as could, but I am not aware that the possibility of providing cars in suitable places is part of the survey being carried out by the Department concerned.

THAMES PASSENGER SERVICES
3.0 p.m.
EARL OF KINNOULL: My Lords, I beg leave to ask the Question which stands in my name on the Order Paper.
The Question was as follows:
To ask Her Majesty's Government whether any recent studies have been, or are being, made for making better use of the river Thames for water-bus services to assist the acute London traffic problem.
LORD MOWBRAY AND STOURTON: My Lords, a comprehensive study of a fast passenger service for the London river was completed in 1970. The study was commissioned by the Greater London Council, and the cost borne by the Council and the Government. The conclusion of the study was that a fast river service was feasible, and this led directly to the Government's recent offer of a grant of £75,000 towards a pilot hovercraft service between Greenwich, the City and Westminster.
THE EARL OF KINNOULL: My Lords, while thanking my noble friend for that reply, and welcoming the Government support, particularly for the hovercraft service, may I ask of what the service is comprised? May I also ask whether Her Majesty's Government have any idea as to the fares structure?
LORD MOWBRAY AND STOURTON: My Lords, the service which will start this spring will consist of two 60-seat HM2 sidewall hovercraft which will run between Greenwich, the City and Westminster, and the cost of a single journey will be 15p. Weekly season tickets will be available.
LORD AVEBURY: My Lords, is the noble Lord aware that Londoners will greatly welcome anything which takes traffic off the roads? Why is it that these studies have been restricted to the use of the river for passenger services when there are many goods which could equally well be taken up and down on the river, thus removing heavy goods vehicles, which cause so much nuisance, from the centre of London? Will Her Majesty's Government give some attention to this problem, particularly in regard to bulk commodities, such as paper and fuel, which clutter up the roads in central London causing great annoyance in the residential areas?
LORD MOWBRAY AND STOURTON: My Lords, the Government would be delighted if this greater use of the river were to come about. The river is heavily used already. The G.L.C. and the Department are only too delighted to give help to anybody who applies.
LORD POPPLEWELL: My Lords, can the noble Lord say which service is suggested? Is it to be a service for commuters travelling backwards and forwards in this area, or a service more appropriate for tourists and people who want to travel along the river and see the sights?
LORD MOWBRAY AND STOURTON: My Lords, I can tell the noble Lord, Lord Popplewell, that we envisage that all the year round this service will run in the morning from 7.30 until 10 o'clock mainly between Greenwich Pier and Tower Pier, but also to a Westminster Pier to be arranged—it is not quite certain which of the two it will be. Then, in the evening, it is envisaged that the traffic will be travelling from West to East. During the summer period these hovercraft will be used as the company concerned sees fit, for tourist traffic, in order to get the maximum traffic. In case the House is interested, there will be a third hovercraft commissioned in the spring of 1974.
LORD STRABOLGI: My Lords, would the Government consider extending this service Westwards, so that it could be used by commuters who live, for example, in Chelsea and Fulham?
LORD MOWBRAY AND STOURTON: My Lords, it is not really for the Government to do this; it is a matter for the company operating the service. However, the Department regard this pilot service as the possible start of a developing programme to use the Thames as a useful commuter artery; and other councils, such as Bexley, are, with the G.L.C., considering for the future piers at Erith and at Woolwich. The Woolwich pier might well be operating in the next few years.
BARONESS STOCKS: My Lords, would it be correct to assume that the usefulness of the development of the river for public transport is not so much a question of up and down the river as criss-cross the river? Supposing you lived at Thames-mead and wished to work in Dagenham, you would have to go a good way East to get to the Woolwich free ferry. Why should there not be the kind of ferry that takes commuters backwards and forwards all day from the centre of Liverpool to the centre of Birkenhead?
LORD MOWBRAY AND STOURTON: My Lords, discussions are going on now between another company, the G.L.C. and the Department on this matter.
LORD CONESFORD: My Lords, will the Government consider saying "15 pence" rather than "15p"?
LORD MOWBRAY AND STOURTON: My Lords. I defer to the view of my noble Lord.
LORD RAGLAN: My Lords, if traffic on the river is going to be encouraged there will soon be the same sort of snarl-ups on the river as there are at the moment on the roads; and I can foresee difficulties with me going up and down and the noble Baroness, Lady Stocks, going criss-cross.
LORD MOWBRAY AND STOURTON: My Lords, I accept the noble Lord's point. Probably the main snag here would be the embarking and disembarking points. I do not think the G.L.C.
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are likely to license more traffic than the river can hold.
LORD MERRIVALE: My Lords, can my noble friend say to what extent the hydrofoil service between London and Greenwich has been used, and whether, in effect, the hovercraft service is to supersede the hydrofoil service?
LORD MOWBRAY AND STOURTON: My Lords, the hydrofoil service went out of commission because it was not making a profit. There is nothing to stop the company concerned from coming back and starting again. The hovercraft service is by a separate company.
THE EARL OF KINNOULL: My Lords, can my noble friend say whether consultations are taking place with London Transport, particularly with the commuter services, to provide a co-ordinated service for passengers?
LORD MOWBRAY AND STOURTON: My Lords, I think the study, which was completed, as I said in my original Answer, in 1970, considered all this, and the G.L.C. are having discussions with more than one company. If any company can put forward a practical proposition the G.L.C. and the Department will look at it favourably.
LORD WYNNE-JONES: My Lords, did the noble Lord give an answer to Lord Avebury's question about using the river for dealing with heavy traffic as well as passengers'? Can the noble Lord say whether anything is being done to encourage either hovercraft or hydrofoil for this purpose? I think the noble Lord would agree that at the moment, so far as transport of goods is concerned, the traffic is entirely in the neighbourhood of high water.
LORD MOWBRAY AND STOURTON: My Lords, I would point out that the original Question deals chiefly with services for commuters. If the noble Lord would like to put down a Question, I will obtain all the necessary details.
VISCOUNT ST. DAVIDS: My Lords, a few answers ago the noble Lord gave the Government's approval to the spreading of cargo off the roads and on to the waterways in the neighbourhood of London. Can he say whether this includes approval for the recent schemes of the British Waterways Board and other

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authorities to transfer cargoes from lorries on to waterways on the periphery of London and so bring them to the docks without cluttering up our streets?
LORD MOWBRAY AND STOURTON: My Lords, I think the noble Viscount has successfully made his point.
VISCOUNT ST. DAVIDS: My Lords, did not the noble Lord give approval to that?
LORD MOWBRAY AND STOURTON: My Lords, I think that is another Question, and I would say again, as I said to the last noble Lord who spoke, that if the noble Viscount will nut down a Question on this point I will deal with it.

ICELAND AND N.A.T.O. BASES
3.8 p.m.
LORD KENNET: My Lords, I beg leave to ask the Question which stands in my name on the Order Paper.
The Question was as follows:
To ask Her Majesty's Government whether they are concerned with the negotiations between Iceland and the United States about the evacuation of American forces from the NATO air and naval bases at Keflavik.
THE MINISTER OF STATE, FOREIGN AND COMMONWEALTH OFFICE (BARONESS TWEEDSMUIR OF BELHELVIE): My Lords, the Icelandic Foreign Minister had bilateral discussions with the United States Government from January 24 to 26. Mr. Agustsson said that his projected discussions were not based on the provisions of the defence agreement between Iceland and the United States, but were part of exploratory discussions in his study of Iceland's security and defence.
LORD KENNET: My Lords, have the Americans kept us in touch with what went on in those bilateral conversations? I ask that for two reasons: first, it is a NATO base that those conversations are about, and we are part of NATO; and secondly, because the House might assume that our own conduct in the fishery dispute with Iceland would have a large bearing on the Icelandic attitude in these talks on the base with the United States.
BARONESS TWEEDSMUIR OF BELHELVIE: My Lords, if the United States Government had anything definite to report after that meeting they would report to NATO as a whole. There is no connection between this general review of Iceland's defence matters and the fishery dispute, although of course we bear it in mind, because Iceland is a valuable ally within NATO.

ASHDOWN FOREST BILL [H.L.]
Read 2ª, and committed to a Select Committee.
CITY OF LONDON (VARIOUS POWERS) BILL [H.L.]
Read 2ª, and committed to the Committee on Unopposed Bills.

EUROPEAN SECURITY
3.11 p.m.
LORD KENNET LORD KENNET rose to call attention to the question of European Security; and to move for Papers. The noble Lord said: My Lords, I realise that in opening the debate this afternoon we have a subject before us which is somewhat vague. European security can mean different things to different people. I should perhaps preface my remarks by saying what it means to me. It means, above all, the question of military security, the absence of war and the question of normalising relations between the two halves of our divided Continent.
I do not know whether Europe will achieve any disarmament in our lifetime or in that of our children, or indeed whether it will ever achieve any disarmament before there is a nuclear war—though I am certain that, if there is one, disarmament will be achieved afterwards. But this I do know: history will record that since the end of the Second World War the first two years during which the Governments of Western Europe could responsibly have hoped to see an agreement on arms reduction were 1961 and 1973. In 1961 we had the McCloy/Zorin joint statement of principles on disarmament between America and Russia. I think it is now forgotten how very close the world then was to meaningful disarmament. This year, in 1973,

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we have a good chance of seeing the opening of what has now come to be called M.B.F.R., the negotiations on mutual and balanced force reductions in Europe. I say this is only the second year in which Western European Governments could responsibly hope to achieve disarmament. I want to stress that word "responsibly". We could have had unilateral defence reductions of our own any time we wanted—we could have had them, that is, without an increase in security and without even maintaining our security at the level it is at now. What is new is that we now have a chance of getting the arms reductions without reducing our security.
The situation at the moment is so complicated it makes one's head go round. There are four sets of talks, and I shall argue that our best hope lies in getting a correct relation between those four sets of talks. Taken in order of seniority, as it were, in the length of time they have been going on, there is first the Committee on the Conference on Disarmament at Geneva, which has been sitting for nearly twenty years and is multilateral—it contains Eastern, Western and neutral countries. This is the forum which has produced a whole series of arms control arrangements, principally the Non-proliferation Treaty. The second oldest set of talks is the one called SALT, the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks, which are going on between Russia and America. They are now about three years old and entering their second working session, which we may expect to last years rather than months. These talks also take place in Geneva and therefore are beside the first set, geographically. The third is the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe, the pour-parlers for which have been going on now for several months in Helsinki. This concerns all the European countries, America and Canada. The fourth set concerns M.B.F.R., the negotiations on mutual and balanced force reductions in Europe, the pour priers for which began last week in Vienna.
Everything depends on the right relations between these four sets of talks. First of all, I should like to ask the Government what is the news about getting China into the C.C.D.G. in Geneva—that is the long-standing set of multilateral talks—because it strikes the eye
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at once that China is an invisible participant in all these four sets of talks—a sort of Banquo at the Four Feasts. If anything was done at any of these talks which China deems to be against her interests it would be only too easy for her to stymie the execution of such an agreement at a later stage. The Chinese have to be got in, and the obvious place to get them in is at the multilateral set of talks in Geneva. I do not think the Government disagree with this view, but I should very much like them to give us news of how it is going on.
We have at the moment this very real hope of disarmament, which has a concrete bearing on Britain's defence policy. We read that the Prime Minister has come back from Washington after discussing with the Americans the future of the British independent nuclear deterrent. Everything hangs here on the succession of weapons systems. We have the Polaris rocket at the moment; and then there is the Poseidon rocket, which the Americans are putting into their submarines to supersede Polaris—which we have not got but might logically want. Thirdly, there is the Trident system, which has not yet begun to be built by the Americans. So in the absence of disarmament we can see many decades ahead.
I am not among those who believe that the date of the phasing out of the British deterrent force should depend solely on the physical fact of rust: that is to say, that when our present rockets decay beyond serviceability we shall never get any more, and that we should take that as the date of our nuclear disarmament. That seems to me a capricious way of proceeding. But it obviously is a fact that when our present force does wear out we shall be faced with the question: do we get another one exactly the same, or do we get one a little better? All I am saying to-day is said in the hope that before that time comes we shall secure multilateral agreement on disarmament arrangements which will enable us to avoid the expensive, distressing, upsetting and provocative necessity of renewing our own submarine force, possibly on a more modern scale.
I should like to ask the Government several what I may call "chestnut" questions. I always ask them: I have never received answers, but I hope that we may

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have answers to-day. There was the question of the Soviet unilateral declaration that they held our strategic nuclear force to he limited by their agreement with the Americans—that is the strategic arms limitation agreement. I have asked the Government many times: why have they done nothing about that? It may be that they have a good reason, but they have never given it. It seems to me odd, if another country says, "I claim that your force is limited" and we do not agree, that we should not ourselves say anything to that country. We have also read in the Press that M. Pompidou, when he went recently to Minsk, said something about the corresponding unilateral declaration which has been made by the Russians with regard to the French independent nuclear force. Can the Government tell us what change he got when he raised it with the Russians, and why we do not? I should like to ask, again—I have asked this question many times—why we have not taken up the Russian invitation to join the little treaty about making the navies a little safer, by getting rid of "buzzing" at sea, and so on. There is a little treaty between Russia and America about this matter, and the Russians have invited other naval Powers to join. I have asked in this House why we do not join, and my honourable friend Mr. Judd has asked in another place; but neither of us has received any answer. Why is this?
Then there is the question of a report from SALT to the disarmament negotiation going on in Geneva. I have asked whether this should not be done by Britain, but again I have had no answer. Of course, a report from SALT to the General Assembly would be just as good. It would be a sign of responsibility to the world as to what goes on on the part of the Great Powers. Since I last mentioned this, there has been a resolution in the General Assembly (it is Resolution 2932B, if the noble Baroness wants to look it up) which called for precisely that: a report from SALT to the General Assembly. Britain stood aside from this Resolution. Why did we abstain? What sort of pusillanimous alliance bureaucracy was it that led us to abstain on that obvious resolution, instead of voting for it?
But the great test of getting the right policy in all these matters is the same as it has always been—the right handling of the 600 Soviet intermediate and medium range missiles which stand in Western Rusia. Those can reach us, and are targeted on us, but they cannot reach America. I have been asking for two years where we are going to discuss this matter. Let me remind the House of what we are talking about. There are 600 of these missiles with ranges of 1,200 and 2,300 miles. They each carry a warhead of 1 megaton—1 million tons T.N.T. equivalent. They have a colossal superiority over anything we have. They have stood there for 15 years threatening us. Until last year there was nowhere where we could talk about it with the Russians. Now there is. I have been asking about it for two years, and my right honourable friend Mr. Callaghan has been asking about it in the House of Commons; neither of us has received an answer. Are the missiles going to be talked about? If so, where? If the Government cannot answer, how can they claim that they take the security of this country seriously? It seems such an enormous matter to brush aside without answering in Parliament.
I hope that the Government will also be able to tell us that the M.B.F.R. negotiations will not only be confined to conventional weapons—some feel they might be. NATO research on this is confined to conventional weapons; they have done nothing about nuclear weapons or, apparently, about chemical weapons. I am sure that the Government are not foolish enough to go into the negotiations with their hands tied and their feet hobbled with a purely conventional weapons approach. If there is no answer on the point about 600 M.R.B.M.s, I shall be forced to conclude—I do not know whether my noble friends will join me in this—that the Government show a pretty casual attitude to the security of this country in this matter, as they do in the whole matter of Iceland. We had a Parliamentary Question just now. The Keflavik base in Iceland is the ears and eyes of NATO. This is what brings us our knowledge of Soviet naval and submarine movements in the Atlantic. No doubt behind the scenes the Government are very worried about this, but I wish they

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would take Parliament a little more into their confidence. The picture they present to the world is of a Government prepared to subject the major long-term interests of the whole alliance to a short-term private interest in the fishery dispute that they are conducting.
Now I turn to the European Security Conference to be held in Helsinki. This is supposed to talk about frontiers. It is a Soviet desire that it should stabilise frontiers. We have to distinguish between inviolability and unchangeability. It is quite right that frontiers should be inviolable, if you mean by that that they should not be violated by force; but I do not think that we could accept that frontiers should be unchangeable, especially not in this year when we have the question of Ireland uppermost in our minds. It is also a curious fact that an agreement on the unchangeability of frontiers would contravene the Soviet Constitution itself, and its Article 17. The Russians are only 53 per cent. of the population of the Soviet Union, and that figure is going down. By 1980 they will he in a minority. The majority of Soviet citizens will be Asians, Ukrainians, Georgians, and whatever. This is bound to give rise to a natural fissiparous tendency in the Soviet Union.
It was for this reason that on December 21 last Mr. Brezhnev made an important speech in which he said that the Soviet nationality and identity had now become more important than the separate national identities of the constituent republics of the Soviet Union. The Soviet Constitution was going to have to be changed. When the change had been formulated it would be put to the Soviet people in a referendum. He did not make it clear whether it was going to be one single all-union referendum, or whether it was going to be a series of separate referenda—one in each republic of the Soviet Union. This is obviously an extremely important matter for the Soviet Union constitutional lawyers to settle. Mr. Brezhnev even seemed to be proposing a constitution for the Socialist community (which I take to mean the Warsaw Pact countries plus Mongolia) analagous to the first Soviet Constitution itself. It seems to the Westerner that there might be a conflict between declaring frontiers to be quite unchangeable and Article 17 of the Soviet Constitution, which allows the free right
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of secession to any one of its constituent republics.
In Helsinki, also, there is to be discussion on the question of the exchange of people and ideas, and on propaganda, and all that. On this point Mr. Brezhnev made a most important declaration. He said:
"We are for comprehensive contacts between the people of various countries, provided one acts in the spirit of mutual respect and non-interference in the affairs of others and not from the positions of the Cold War. It is clear that the Socialist countries do not intend to conduct negotiations with anyone on the dissemination of anti-culture, such as pornography, racial slander, fascism, violence, hostility between the peoples and mendacious and slanderous propaganda."
I think we can all agree that that is well formulated. We shall watch with care how the Soviet Union comes to grips with its own propaganda machine during the course of negotiations in Helsinki.
I should now like to quote from something broadcast by Moscow Radio last week. It said:
"The Tory Government is sticking to its attempts at suppressing by force the growing tide of the democratic movement for social and civic rights for the people of Ireland. This short-sighted policy is dictated in the main by the interests of the British monopolies who are making a fortune out of the poverty and cheap labour of the poorest Catholic section of the Ulster population. In their attempts to keep Northern Ireland as a private preserve of the City of London, the Conservative Cabinet is doing its utmost to ensure that no social changes take place in their European colony. London is in league with the most double-dyed of vocal reaction and does not stop at cruel terror to which about 700 Irishmen have already fallen victim."
I do not think I need go on any longer. There is clearly some way for countries to come in achieving Mr. Brezhnev's ideal about a free and civilised exchange of information.
Turing now to the M.B.F.R. negotiations, how do the Government see the relationship between the Vienna negotiation and the Helsinki negotiation? How about the timing? I am sorry to keep quoting Mr. Brezhnev so much, but he is the only man whose remarks mean anything in Russia, and one has to keep having recourse to him as a source. When waiting for M. Pompidou at Minsk Airport last month he said something extraordinarily important. He said that the question of the balanced reduction of weapons would not be brought up until

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after the security conference. If he meant that, it is rather bad news; and the Government ought to look out for it to make sure that if he was saying that the agreement on a balanced reduction of weapons should not be finalised until after the security conference had come to its first agreements, that would be another matter. But if he meant what he said, that it was not to be brought up until after the end of the security conference, that is a grave statement and I should like to know the Government's views on it.
Now about the M.B.F.R. talks in Vienna. When the Soviet delegation arrived there, the Soviet delegate made a great point about talking about the mutual force reductions, not mutual balanced force reductions. He left out the word "balanced". That very same day I understand that the Austrian Government made arrangements to change all the signposts in Vienna from "Mutual balanced force reductions" to "Mutual force reductions", and changed the notices on the meeting hall and so on. Is this true and, if it is true, what did our Government have to say about that? Did they go along with the Austrian willingness to get rid of what must to us he the cardinal concept of the whole matter? Indeed, since that date there has been a barrage of propaganda from Eastern European capitals attacking the concept of "balanced" and saying that when the West says "balanced" it means "unbalanced". This propaganda does not make sense at the moment; but when you get a wave of nonsense propaganda from Eastern Europe it oftens heralds the emergence of a new line and betokens domestic quarrels inside the Soviet camp.
In any case, why did the Government go along with the Soviet proposal to have these crucial negotiations in Vienna rather than having them in Geneva as had originally been intended? Because it simply makes life very difficult for the small countries; they now have to have their experts scattered around three capitals. They must have them in Geneva for the disarmament negotiations; they must have them in Vienna for the mutual force reduction negotiations, and they must have them in Helsinki for the Security Conference. It is really a bit
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much, and my nasty mind turns to the possibility that the Russians may have done it just in order to make life difficult for everybody except the super Powers, who of course have enough staff to go round thirty capitals, let alone three. It would be helpful if the Government could tell us why they agreed to this, if indeed they did, or whether it was a question of force majeure.
As to balanced reductions, I think myself that it does not really matter whether the reductions are balanced. Who cares about that, and what is a "balanced" reduction? How would you know it if you saw it? What matters is that, after the reductions are over, and at every identifiable stage during the process of reduction, what should be left is a balanced situation. "Mutual balanced force reductions" is shorthand for "mutual force reductions and withdrawals leading to a balanced situation." That should be our attitude in the West: let us proclaim it and not fuss too much so long as it is understood by both sides.
There is a question of the membership of these Vienna talks. Will the Government enlighten us about this?—because at the moment the situation is as clear as mud. We thought that the Russians were going to be very restrictive about these talks and say that they would only come with two or three of their best friends and everybody else must keep out. So we in NATO did something of the same sort and arranged a complicated system whereby Norway, Italy and Greece would come in in rotation as representing the flank countries; and so we presented a tight, narrow front. Now, when we get there, I gather that the Russians are taking exactly the opposite line and are saying that everybody is welcome—all the world and his wife—and if we keep anybody out it will only cause trouble later. They seem to have given way to the Roumania view about this, the view of independent Communist Roumania. If this is so, I myself think it is good news. What is the Government's opinion? Are not the Russians, perhaps, for once being rather helpful, rather far-sighted, and making things easy? If they are making things easy for their own satellites in Eastern Europe, that can only be very good news for us. Those people, too, are human beings; they, too, are Europeans, and every extra little bit of

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freedom they are given we should rejoice at and should, in so far as it lies in our hands, go along with it.
My Lords, the main point I want to refer to (I have already spoken for rather too long) is the importance of information in this whole field. Eyes are better than teeth—
LORD SHINWELL: My Lords, may I venture to ask my noble friend a question? I am listening with great interest to what he is saying, in particular about the proposal for mutual force reductions or mutual balanced reductions. Has he tried to ascertain what is the motivation so far as the Soviet Union are concerned? Is it not simply that they have reached a stage of military expenditure which has become far too burdensome, and they would be very glad to reduce their military expenditure? What does it mean in the long run? If they reduce their military expenditure, military forces, either in manpower or equipment, and the West does the same, what position are we in? Are we not in precisely the same position, relatively, as we were before?
LORD KENNET: My Lords, I think my noble friend is exactly right. We are in precisely the same position, relatively, as before. But we are in the same position, in the same balance, at a lower level of expenditure. This, to my mind, has two advantages. First, we all spend less money on Defence, which means that we can spend more on more important things—and that is just as important to the Russians, who have an even worse housing problem than we have, as one finds out if one goes and looks at it—and also it means intrinsically a slightly safer position from a military point of view, because if fewer weapons and soldiers are lying around there are less likely to be mistakes.
In getting to such a situation. I cannot emphasise enough how important information is going to be. I was just coming to the formulation that eyes are better than teeth, and if we wish to draw our teeth mutually we must put our "specs" on. Over the last year I have been asking in this House about inspection and control of a M.B.F.R. agreement when it is reached. This means that we have to get access to American satellite data, or so at least I have said before. I asked the Government what they were
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doing about that; I received no answer. Assuming we are not doing anything, which I suspect is very likely the case, and assuming that the Government do not wish to disturb the august repose of the super Powers in this matter, would they reflect on the apparent intention of France and Japan to build and launch their own observation satellites within the next few years? Might there not be a joint West European system of satellite observation for the inspection and control of mutual and balanced force reduction agreements? This, at least, would be more constructive than the joint Anglo-French nuclear deterrent which the Secretary of State for Defence seems sometimes to be talking about.
Well, information rather than arms eyes rather than teeth. What can we hope for in the long run? What kind of Europe should we he working towards? I hope that there will come out of the Helsinki and Vienna negotiations a continuing body, or two continuing bodies—one for each, perhaps, with slightly different membership and obviously very different functions. This would be one or two—I hesitate to use the word "bridge" because it has fallen into disrepute, but one or two links or footbridges, if you like, between the two armed camps whose own levels of armament would be falling. In the West we would have the European Community, the integration of which we may be certain will proceed steadily, if not very fast. In the East, they have the C.M.E.A., the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance, which corresponds to the E.E.C. although it is not nearly as tight. One may not safely assume that that will increasingly integrate, because integration there means Russian domination and all the others know it.
It will be interesting to get the near end of that footbridge rightly anchored in the European Community. It will be interesting to see how much traffic it will bear; it will be interesting to see how big, how important, a link we can make it between the two halves of Europe. Obviously, the more we democratise our own half, the more important it will be. I imagine that in the long run we shall be seeing a quadrupartite world, a cruciform world, perhaps, cross-shaped. There is already a natural de facto alliance between America and Russia. We can

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see it everywhere, and it makes me rather uneasy. There is a strong coincidence of interest between Western Europe and China. This coincidence is generated simply by the existence of the Russo-American coincidence of interest. It is no bad thing. It seems to me that a cross-shaped, quadrupartite world is one which has inherent in it many of the seeds of the stability which we all seek. My Lords, I beg to move for Papers.
3.39 p.m.
LORD GLADWYN: My Lords, I confess to being under some slight disadvantage, because until just before this debate I myself did not know what was inherent in, or indeed what was meant by, the subject of the debate; namely, "European Security". Nor did I know to any notable extent the general line which the noble Lord, Lord Kennet, was going to deploy. I must say that some confusion is engendered by the wording of the Motion. For what is meant by "European security"? Unless we can define "Europe" in some way, it is very difficult to know what we do mean. The Conference on "European" Co-operation and Security which is about to open at Helsinki in a way adds to the confusion, because there we are apparently speaking about the security of Europe, but the Soviet Union, which extends to Vladivostcck, and the United States of America and Canada are all going to participate, presumably on a basis of equality, and therefore if we are discussing security at Helsinki it is surely not European security but general security. A much larger problem is involved.
Then the noble Lord, Lord Kennet, referred, very properly from his point of view because he was taking in the whole picture, to the SALT negotiations, but, rightly or wrongly, while the SALT negotiations concern only the two super-Powers they have an indirect effect upon everybody. They cannot be said to come only into the European picture, while the conference on general and complete disarmament, which has been going on for so long in Geneva, embraces the entire world, and as the noble Lord, Lord Kennet, was saying we hope—and perhaps the noble Baroness in her reply will tell us whether we are right to hope
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—that the Chinese will soon be represented there also.
It is an appalling problem to try to contemplate the co-ordination which I thought the noble Lord, Lord Kennet, said was necessary, between all these great centres of present activity. Can we really imagine that there might be some super-Power—unless it is the United Nations—which could co-ordinate such activities? I am afraid that in this wicked world they will all have to pursue their respective ways and we shall have to go on with them, such as they are, hoping for the best.
But, my Lords—and you may think, perhaps, that this is my King Charles's head—I myself will take Europe security as meaning (anythow for the purposes of our investigation to-day) something much less than the problem very properly raised by the noble Lord, Lord Kennet; namely, the security, by which I suppose one must mean the ultimate defence, of the body which we have just joined, that is, the extended European Economic Community—minus, one must imagine. Ireland, because Ireland is neutral and therefore could not take part in any discussions on this subject, unless she joins NATO, and perhaps even without the Danes who so far have not shown any great interest in the problems of defence or security other, of course, than being a member of NATO. In so doing, I hope to follow up one or two points made by the noble Lord, Lord Kennet, and to see whether I can develop them to any noticeable degree.
As I see it, the States of the extended Europan Economic Community, minus Ireland and perhaps even minus Denmark, simply cannot avoid—and I believe the noble Lord, Lord Kennet, eventually admitted that—fairly soon tackling the problem of their own defence. By that I do not mean just co-operation in the so-called Eurogroup in NATO, which as we all know includes Turkey but does not include France, useful though this is. What I mean is getting down to the planning of a real scheme for specifically Western European defences within the general framework of the North Atlantic Alliance. That is a problem which we can at least understand and perhaps we can debate it with some profit as a problem for which there certainly should be a

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definite solution. After all, we are told that we must work towards, and indeed even expect to see, not only an economic but also a political union of Western Europe in no less than eight years from now. That is what our Ministers tell us. Are we then to suppose that such a union is to have a common foreign policy but not a common defence policy? That would be absurd, and yet if we are to have any common defence policy then, if we are to form this union in eight years' time, we must decide fairly soon on the general lines of the defence policy which we have in mind. Surely that is common sense.
As I see it, my Lords, there are three broad possibilities. The first, and no doubt the ideal one, assumes that the European Security and Co-operation Conference and the Conference on the Mutual and Balanced Reduction of Forces have been, by 1980, brought to a completely successful conclusion, in which case we must suppose that the Americans will have gone back to America and the Russians will have gone back to Russia; the various European countries—strictly speaking the European countries West of the Soviet Union—freed, presumably, from the membership of any bloc yet not forming a bloc themselves, living together in prosperous amity, largely disarmed and neutralised and certainly forming part of a denuclearised area and thus menacing nobody. That is presumably what we must hope to see. It would involve a European Economic Community extended—some might even say dissolved—and if that were so then the extended European Economic Community would presumably need no defence. That would be assured by the two super-Powers. I imagine also that there would be no central authority, but there might be a loose customs area organised under the general direction of the Council of Europe at Strasbourg.
A great deal of money would no doubt be spent on preserving and improving the environment; enormous sums would be devoted to aid and to rectifying the terms of trade. It would obviously be a kind of paradise compared to our modern world, and I suppose it would represent the complete détente that all our rulers now, including Mr. Brehznev, say they want to achieve in less than eight years from now. I devoutly hope that I
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may live to see this day, along with the noble Lord, Lord Kennet, and I hope also the noble Lord, Lord Brockway, who seems to have the one great virtue, namely the secret of perpetual youth.
Unhappily, détente—and I am sure about this—will not come about by any unilateral concessions on the part of the West. Nor are the tensions to be distended for the most part (as I believe, anyhow) due to us, though of course we do bear part of the responsibility. They stem—and we must appreciate this—from such causes as the need for certain regimes to maintain themselves in power; from nationalist emotions; from fear of economic collapse; from misguided ideologies; from the unseen pressure of the starving millions of the world, to say nothing of the sheer aggressive tendencies of the human animal. They will not easily disappear. The idea that we can achieve the détente by a display of reason and good will is, I am afraid, a pure illusion. We can probably in practice achieve it only by reducing fear on both sides of the Iron Curtain; and that implies making it apparent that we ourselves are safe.
If we do not do this—and this is my second possibility—I am afraid it is quite likely that something much worse than the present situation will prevail in eight years' time. For whether we like it or not, it is certainly possible to imagine that the Americans, as in Vietnam, will have evacuated Europe on terms which do not necessarily in themselves ensure the security of their allies. Such a disastrous development might well be due not so much to some aberration on the part of the Americans as to sheer reluctance on the part of the allies to do anything much to provide for their own defence.
It would not then in all likelihood be a question of our being attacked or invaded by the Soviet Union. But there is no doubt whatever that in such an event the Western European democracies would be subjected to strong pressures to join some united Europe, led by Moscow; and that this would lead, bit by bit, to the transformation of our present free societies into directed economies and to the formation, to the evident dismay of Peking, of a European colossus of some 700 million to 800 million people which would certainly seek to achieve

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the leadership of the world. One may not regard such a development as at all likely; and perhaps it is not. But it cannot be denied that it is possible more especially if we do not now bestir ourselves and seriously begin to organise our Western European defence. This indeed is the third possibility and clearly the most hopeful and creative; and it is entirely compatible with at least some progress in the negotiations for European security and still more with progress towards a mutual and balanced reduction of forces. I entirely agree with the noble Lord, Lord Kennet, in his hope for some steady progress on both these fronts, with perhaps the creation of a body that would supervise the whole situation. I agree with that, and I think it is possible.
The general idea would be that in return for greater willingness on the part of their European allies to think out new schemes for their own conventional defence—and no doubt also as the result of some agreed compromise on trade between Europe and North America—the United States, though gradually reducing the number of their forces stationed in Germany, would, failing the complete withdrawal of Russian forces to Russia, agree to maintain considerable conventional and nuclear forces in Europe, perhaps indefinitely, but certainly until such time as the European allies, by concentrating on a new type of forward defence, might be deemed capable by themselves of halting any Soviet armoured thrust towards the West—that is, unless of course the Russians were prepared to have first recourse to nuclear weapons, which, given the fact that there would be at least some nuclear come-back from the European side on a second strike, they would almost certainly not be prepared to do.
This is not the moment to develop this possibility in any detail; rather I shall hope to do so in the debate on the Defence Estimates. Nevertheless, I believe that it is entirely possible, given general agreement on the part of Western Germany, France and the United Kingdom—and if they got agreement the rest would follow—to think out a ten-year programme for a new kind of conventional defence which would be credible even if at the end of such a period the Americans had no more than token
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forces in Western Germany. I believe, too, that not only would such a scheme, if it were developed in an integrated way and combined with a streamlining of the production of the specialised arms involved, be very considerably cheaper than our present set-up but nothing would be more likely in the long run to result in an East-West détente based on a genuine balance of power.
I know that most noble Lords who are expert in this matter—and there are many in the House to-day—will tend to say that all this is nonsense and that, pending full agreement on the mutual and balanced reduction of forces, about which I am not at all optimistic, our entire safety will depend both on the maintenance of substantial United States forces in Germany and on their determination to have recourse to tactical nuclear weapons in the event of a serious armoured thrust from the East—the idea that conventional defences might be so reorganised, either with or without the Americans, as to contain such a thrust being pure moonshine.
Yet if this is really so, my Lords, what is our future in the event of American determination if necessary to press the nuclear button becoming less credible than it is at present; and still more so in the event of our ever being left on our own? The answer is quite simple. If that were to happen we should have no future; we should be completely at the mercy of the East. The idea that Europe, whether or not in ten years' time it has a President, would be willing to order a first nuclear strike against a major nuclear Power is the greatest of all illusions, and I only hope that it is not shared either by our own Government or by the Government of France, though I sometimes suspect that it may be. A small second-strike European nuclear force, whether tactical or strategic, is quite another matter, which can be argued on its merits; but that is not my present point.
It is said that necessity is the mother of invention. I rather think that, perhaps some time after the coming French elections, and whether or not my own theories are acceptable, we may be forced to have a new look at the whole problem of Western European defence within the framework of the Western Alliance. I have put no very difficult questions to the noble Baroness who will reply.

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Nevertheless, perhaps she will comment on my reflections. I know that sometimes she makes favourable remarks in a general way about some of the things I say, though that does not mean that she accepts my remarks. But I suggest that what I have said might be careful] considered by the Administration.
3.57 p.m.
LORD BROCKWAY: My Lords, I wish first to express to my noble friend Lord Kennet my appreciation of the fact that he has chosen this subject for debate to-day. I also congratulate him on the penetrating speech which he delivered. The noble Lord, Lord Gladwyn, expressed some difficulty over the meaning of security, which is our subject this afternoon.
LORD GLADWYN: European security.
LORD BROCKWAY: I stand corrected: European security is our subject to-day. I should have hoped it meant that people in their ordinary lives might feel free to live those lives in security, without the danger of war. I hope that that will be the aim of our discussion. If it is our aim, then we begin with some hope, for the situation to-day is far better than it has been for many years. There is détente between the United States and the Soviet Union; there are the visits not only of President Nixon to Moscow and Peking but of our own Foreign Secretary; there are the SALT talks; there are discussions proceeding at Helsinki for the conference on European Security and Cooperation, and talks are beginning on the mutual and balanced reduction of forces.
We may be inclined to be a little cynical about the Disarmament Conference which has been held at Geneva over the years. We recall the millions of words that have been uttered there, the great projects presented, even those designed to lead to total disarmament, only to see them put aside. Nevertheless, even from those talks one has, at least on the borders the agreements regarding arms on the sea-bed, and the Non-Proliferation Treaty. If one looks at the whole scene, one sees that it is more hopeful than it has been for many years. That means that as we move towards the discussions which will arise from Helsinki and Vienna we should approach them in a spirit of confidence and of trust.
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I was disturbed, as I read the debate in another place on this subject, at the doubts and the suspicions which were continually expressed in speech after speech. I remember that the Chancellor of Western Germany, Willy Brandt, after his successful negotiations with the Soviet Union, Poland, Czechoslovakia, and other Communist countries, expressed the view that he was met on the Soviet and Communist side by sincerity. I recognise at once that we must be alert about our own interests, but if these discussions are to be successful we must seek to put on one side the doubts and suspicions which have poisoned negotiations in the past, and at least try to approach an agreement on the basis of mutual sincerity.
Of the four conferences to which my noble friend Lord Kennet referred—the SALT discussions, the Disarmament Conference at Geneva, the Vienna Conference on Mutual and Balanced Reduction of Arms, and the Conference on Security and Co-operation—the Conference on Security and Co-operation is, in the long run, the most important. It is true that its success will depend upon the Vienna Conference dealing with the mutual and balanced reduction of forces, but I hope that the difficulties which have arisen at Vienna—the conflict as to whether the discussion should be limited to the Central European Powers or whether other nations shall be brought in—will be overcome and an agreement reached. As I see it, Central Europe is the concentrated point for reductions, but quite obviously the whole of Europe is interested. It should be possible to reach a solution of the problem that, although recognising that Central European countries have the major responsibility for discussion and decision, the other nations of Europe, including the neutral nations, should have an opportunity to make comments upon them.
The ambassadorial level discussions at Helsinki on the agenda for the European Conference have now gone on for several weeks, with a coming temporary adjournment. On the whole they have been encouraging in their results. The one point of conflict has been the Western proposal for free movement of peoples from the West to the East. I am entirely in favour of that proposal in principle. I want to see a breakdown

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in all the barriers, not merely for cultural exchange but also for an exchange of information, news, ideas, and for liberties of thought which are at present restricted in the Communist countries. But I should have thought that it might be possible to reach a solution by saying that we will seek to extend all these liberties, and hope that as co-operation extends between the East and the West, as a result of this Conference and its conclusions, we may move to the point where in the future there will be absolute freedom of movement between the peoples from one side to another.
It is quite clear—and I believe this is accepted—that one conference is not going to settle these issues. The Helsinki ambassadorial discussions are preparing the agenda and the meeting in June is to be on a Ministerial level. There is the idea that the Conference itself should be followed by the appointment of continuing commissions dealing with security, economic and social co-operation, problems of pollution, an exchange of information and cultural liberty. It seems to me that those commissions will be working out those problems for many months, and I would hope that the full Conference would meet again to receive the reports of those commissions, and even then that the commissions will continue, progressing towards greater co-operation between East and West. I should like to see some continuing body, bridging Eastern and Western Europe, to deal with these problems as they develop and grow. We should regard this Conference not as a conclusion of discussions but as the beginning of continuing co-operation.
I do not apologise for speaking with emphasis on this subject because I have been urging this course for six years in this House, and for a long time mine was quite a lonely voice. At the beginning the situation was difficult because the Communist countries made their proposals in a spirit of aggressive attacks upon the West and America and they could be dismissed as propaganda. But as the years have passed they have made concession after concession, and now we have reached the position, despite the doubts—indeed, obstructions—over the last six years where the Conference is becoming a reality. I beg Her Majesty's Government to put at the back of their
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mind the doubts which have existed on both sides of the House over the last six years, and to seize this opportunity and all that it allows.
I take the view that this can be the great breakthrough for peace in the world; not merely to avoid war in Europe—wars in Europe become world wars. Here can be provided the opportunity for real co-operation between East and West. It can end the antagonistic mobilisation of armed forces between NATO and the Warsaw Pact countries so that ultimately their necessity will disappear. It will provide the opportunity for disarmament, including areas in Europe which may be made free altogether from nuclear weapons and be an example to the world. All those opportunities lie in this Conference if we and other nations will seize them. I beg Her Majesty's Government to do what they can in this respect.
May I, before I sit down, add one personal remark, which I had intended to make earlier to the noble Baroness? I should like to apologise that yesterday I suggested that she had sought to avoid an answer to the question I had put on this subject in relation to East Germany. An exchange took place over the Table and I am afraid that those of us who were on the side Benches did not hear the answer of the noble Baroness. I apologise if I gave any impression that she was seeking to avoid an answer to the question which I had put.
4.10 p.m.
LORD SANDYS: My Lords, it is always a pleasure to follow the noble Lord, Lord Brockway, because he is perfectly tuned in to the international wavelength, and I do not think there is one word which he has said in his speech on European security from which I dissent at all. I should particularly like to thank the noble Lord, Lord Kennet, for giving us the opportunity to discuss the subject of the present debate. As it happens, I was the only representative from your Lordships' House on a British delegation to Helsinki which returned at the weekend, and I have the opportunity now to knock off what little snow is remaining on my boots and to give some indication of the feeling in Helsinki at the present moment.
The noble Lord, Lord Kennet, has very accurately indicated the four conferences

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which are proceeding on the question of disarmament and security generally, so it is rather confusing to add a fifth, also in Helsinki. The conference which I attended was also in Helsinki and was also on European security, and it was conducted by the Inter-Parliamentary Union. This conference was running in parallel with what has been referred to earlier as the ambassadors' conference. It may be said that this conference was successful in its week's study and discussion on a whole range of subjects, but we narrowed our ground: we did not include M.B.F.R.s at all. The questions now being discussed in Vienna were thought better avoided and left off our agenda.
Well, what did we discuss?—European security in the absence of M.B.F.R. discussion, economic co-operation, cultural relations and freer movement among peoples. The noble Lord, Lord Brockway, expressed warm enthusiasm, as I understood it, for greater cultural exchanges, and I am sure he has already read with interest the resolutions regarding this particular matter which were unanimously agreed at the I.P.U. Conference. The ambassadors' conference at Helsinki about preparations for the European Security Conference, the multilateral discussions, appear to be covering precisely parallel ground to the I.P.U. Conference, and in the same place. It is very appropriate at this point that I should express the wholehearted gratitude of the British delegation to our Finnish hosts, who looked after us particularly well by making available to the Conference for a whole week the whole of their Parliamentary building and its ancillary services. I am quite sure that this very generous gesture by the Government and Parliament of Finland is most warmly appreciated by all participants in the conference.
Something which I think was typified throughout our visit was the desire of the Finnish people, as expressed through their elected representatives, that the conference should really work. They wanted a successful outcome, and they, as a neutral nation, wanted to see the two contending, opposed forces reach at least some degree of unanimity. In the case of our conference it is a remarkable fact that instead of being faced at the end of a week's discussion with vast
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areas of abandoned agendas, we did, after very protracted discussions, reach unanimity on all three subjects. I think it is to the credit of the Inter-Parliamentary Union that this was achieved.
I listened with great interest to Lord Gladwyn's speech in which he expressed the view that discussions on the M.B.F.R.s and the European security question might well continue probably up to about 1980. I would not dissent from that. But if it is not inappropriate to ask this question, may I ask why it is that Parliamentarians from a group of European countries can meet for a week in congenial surroundings and reach agreement within that short space of time on at least certain issues? Surely, there is a case for the Parliaments of European countries, and indeed of countries on the fringe of the European Continent, to have this opportunity of implementing the decisions reached. These resolutions are no more and no less than the strength that is given to them by the member-Parliaments of the Inter-Parliamentary Union, but here is an opportunity for Her Majesty's Government to examine the resolutions to which we gave our name and seek means whereby they can be implemented in the forthcoming programme of legislation.
I would pass from that aspect to the very important matter which the noble Lord, Lord Kennet, mentioned, the question of Mr. Brezhnev's speech last year. The noble Lord apologised to your Lordships for making constant reference to it. I must confess that as I read Mr. Brezhnev's speech I felt that that in itself might form the subject of debate, because its range of subject was so wide; indeed, it encompassed not only foreign relations, disarmament, forces in general, but also agriculture, pollution and a vast range of communications problems. The European Conference is a subject which I think I should mention in the course of my speech, because Mr. Brezhnev referred particularly to the status of the European Conference.
One has to wade deep in his speech. I went through 54 pages in the English text before I reached it. He said:
"The all-European conference on security and co-operation, for which the socialist countries have worked for many years, should open a new chapter in European history. It appears

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that the conference will begin not later than the middle of 1973.
"The peoples attach great hopes to the convocation of the all-European conference. They expect it to deal with the basic problems of strengthening European peace, to put an end to the suspicion and fear bred by the cold war, and give the European confidence in the morrow."
He went on from there—and I must ask your Lordships' indulgence for another two sentences:
"We shall strive to achieve meaningful results at the conference, which would be of benefit to all its participants.
"Everybody knows the political principles which, in the opinion of the U.S.S.R. and its allies, should constitute the basis for ensuring the security of the European nations."
I think we fully appreciate the basis of those principles and that we should heartily agree with what the noble Lord, Lord Gladwyn, said about illusions, because, if I remember aright, the poet Voltaire said:
"Illusion is the first of all pleasures."
And indeed, frequently in the past European history has been determined by those who have had illusions and have fallen prey to those illusions, with disastrous results for whole peoples, and at times the Continent.
I should like to refer particularly to a document which came into my hands almost at the end of the Conference and which was presented as a gift personally to each member of the British delegation by our colleagues in the Czechoslovakian delegation. I thought that it was symtomatic of the degree of historical interest which they have in European questions that they had taken the trouble to research into a peace charter which was drawn up in the years 1462 to 1464, called, "The Proposal for a Universal Peace Organisation made by King George of Bohemia". This won in those days the support of Poland and Hungary and, for a time, Venice and France. It was concerned in those far-off days 500 years ago with no less a strikingly similar situation between two opposing forces in Europe, those of Christendom and Islam. This peace treaty aimed to convene security, as it was known in those days, and it was so remarkably like some of the principles of the United Nations Charter that perhaps I may give two of them mentioned in this document.
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One was the principle of peaceful settlement of international disputes, and the second the principle of equality of States associating together for peaceful cooperation while maintaining their sovereignty.
I feel that King George of Bohemia was a remarkably modern-minded person. But, surely, although this desirable state was never fully achieved, for a length of time peace was achieved in Europe between Christendom and Islam—until, presumably, the battle of Lepanto, and we all know the result after that period—and surely the achievement of almost 100 years of peace was a very significant achievement. All these efforts, be it by diplomats, experts, parliamentarians, or those who are attempting to construct footbridges—and here I very much agree with the noble Lord, Lord Kennet, that the word "bridge" is perhaps rather lacking in inspiration nowadays—are very attractive. The personal contact achieved at this Conference in Helsinki undoubtedly provided and produced a number of footbridges between East and West. I feel that these can be worked on, improved and enlarged, and surely all these contacts and channels of communication established between individual members are likely to bear fruit in the future.
LORD KENNET: My Lords, before the noble Lord sits down, may I remind him that 1462 was the year when Pope Pius II tried to launch the last of the Crusades, but fortunately no one went with him—perhaps because they all listened to King George of Bohemia.
4.23 p.m.
LORD DAVIES OF LEEK: My Lords, I am sure that the brevity of this debate is no measure of the usefulness of it. It is not my intention in this short debate to detain the House, and I hope that I shall not reiterate points that have already been made. I listened to the speech of the noble Lord, Lord Gladwyn, with interest, and I consider it axiomatic of all security conferences and the hopes of mankind since the days of Nebuchadnezzer and the days when the Assyrians came down like wolves on the fold that man has hoped to eradicate fear, if only he could. In a materialistic way we grow up with the illusion that affluence will eradicate fear. The strange

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fact is that the most affluent society in the world, the United States, is the most nag-ridden with fear, distress and violence. In other words, it is quite true that man does not live by bread alone; he needs something else. He needs some faith. I am not a good Christian, but metaphysicians and philosophers who have been struggling since pre-Grecian days, and all the histories of Christs on earth—and different ones—have shown us that man must have a peg to hang the hat of faith on, and believe in something. Consequently, whatever way we look at a European Security Conference, if we go into it with cynicism and shouting, "Yarboo ! this is not going to succeed", it surely will not succeed.
There is always a little risk in eradicating fear. The little risk that we must take is to get rid of our Walter-Mittyish ideas, and pillars of clouds, that we are now a Great Power. We no longer can defend and police the Pacific. In another ten to twenty years, Hongkong will be gone out of the—I will not use the old word "Empire", but out of the sway of Great Britain because of our agreement with China. We are no longer the force in the Mediterranean Sea, as Suez proved; and our forces cannot bring peace to Northern Ireland. Those are the facts of the situation when we are discussing European security to-day.
Who, then, is Britain building up forces to attack by herself? In this Walter-Mittyish idea that we can increase our military expenditure and thereby eradicate fear and bring security, certain qualifications must be enunciated. The first is that no longer can we think of Eastern Europe and Western Europe as a peninsula sticking out from the side of the Urals and detached from the world. The second axiom of our discussion is that Mr. Nixon has made a U-turn. Just as Prime Minister Heath has made a U-turn in his economics and stolen the clothes and left the poor Labour Party naked in the cold river, so has Mr. Nixon made a U-turn because of the pressure of events and reality. He has had to make a U-turn in his attitude to the Communist world, and there is no argument about that. Here was a mighty nation with the greatest nuclear forces in the world, and it was forced to make a rapprochement with China and the Soviet Union. I am not
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denouncing that; I think it is a good thing for the world.
I had better not be didactic about this, but am I right in assuming, in passing, that that in itself helps the world to a little better understanding than we had in 1954 at the Geneva Conference, when John Foster Dulles forced upon the world the war in Indo-China through a policy that went awry? Am I now right to assume that we have eradicated a little fear in that great sphere of influence? I think so. Nixon is going to visit Moscow, he is going to visit Peking again, and very soon he will be at the European Security Conference.
What worried me a little—and I listened with care to the constructive speech of my noble friend on the Front Bench—was the speech of the Prime Minister at the Lord Mayor's banquet, and the speech here of the noble Lord. Lord Carrington, who was talking to us about the realities which would continue to govern European defence. I have uttered some of the realities. He said to us that there is,
"… first and foremost the need to maintain and foster the North Atlantic Alliance … Secondly, as I have said time and again during the past year, we in Europe cannot count on that co-operation unless we assume a greater share of the burden of defence"
of other nations. He further said that we are called upon to make a greater effort to avoid the threat to Western Europe. Let us be fair to the noble Lord, because he qualified this statement when he added:
"The danger of direct military assault is perhaps now amongst the least of our worries. But harsh, even aggressive, political attitudes and policies, with the fact of overwhelmingly military superiority ever-present in the background, are another matter." [OFFICIAL REPORT, 1 / 11/72, col. 41.]
By including that last passage I have not left it as though the noble Lord, the Minister of Defence, was talking blindly. What he has assumed is that we shall not get a military attack. If we did, this country alone could not possibly do anything, especially in view of the fact that we cannot subdue Ulster. What he is pointing out is that we are prepared to take big risks to stop the aggressive political attacks and, perhaps, the propaganda of Eastern Europe.

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I am grateful to the noble Lord, Lord Sandys, and to the noble Lord, Lord Gladwyn, for their interesting speeches. The noble Lord, Lord Gladwyn, gave us the key to this debate when he asked: how can we eradicate fear? Unless we get rid of that, we cannot get anywhere. But I do not know the answer. On both sides of the Iron Curtain—I use that horrible old-fashioned expression—we must get together, because, to repeat a Macmillan phrase, "Jaw-jaw is better than war-war." What is wrong with the Disarmament Conference at Geneva going on for 20 years, if we are sill not firing shot and shell at each other in the struggle for peace? I am purposely cutting my speech, although I should like to build up this argument, but this House is so wise that it can follow even me. But what is there to stop us now, in this transition period, handing out a little more friendliness? Willy Brandt gave us the signpost with the Ost Politik. I have read the speech of Mr. Elliott, our Ambassador in Finland. I think we ought to pay tribute to Mr. Elliott, because at the preliminary to all these ambassadorial talks he hinted at the possibility of building a bridge over the chasm of fear. We could put out the hand of understanding.
No longer can we have European security without bringing in the rest of the world. In the same way as no man is an island, Europe is not an island any longer. So do not let us decry the work of the United Nations, despite all its failures. Many of us at different times have seen some of its work all around the world. Let us try to make these rickety man-made machines, which are trying to bridge over peace, work by building greater contacts. Russia is opening up her frontiers bit by bit. She is not ashamed now to show her house. The Eastern European countries in this affluent society are having their pollution and environment problems, in the same way as capitalism. Having presented to the world the two opposite economies, we have to decide how—it may take 20, 30 or 40 years—we shall find a rapprochement, and I would rather talk for 40 years than, through irritation and impatience, be driven into a nuclear war which would destroy civilisation. Noble Lords
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will be delighted that, having spoken for just ten minutes, I shall leave it there.
4.35 p.m.
LORD WIGG: My Lords, it was far from my intention to speak in this debate before I came into the House and listened to my noble friend Lord Davies of Leek, with whom I have been closely associated in a number of activities from the time when I first left the Army, nearly 40 years ago. During the last few months I have been away and have not had a chance to talk to him; and it looks as if my absence has made itself felt in his thinking because he seems to have reverted to his woolly Welsh ways, for he made some statements which are such unutterable nonsense that I take an early opportunity to put him right. I shall now do it publicly, because if I did it privately I should be more adjectival than would be in order in your Lordships' House.
My noble friend's first statement was a slur on the British Army. He did not intend it, for he is a very kindly man. But he said, dismissing the military potential of this country, that the Army cannot settle the problems of Ulster. Of course we could settle the problems of Ulster. But in a democracy, there is always the powerful instrument of criticism. You could tell the Army commander in Belfast, "Settle it, as the Russians settled the risings in East Berlin, in Hungary or in Czechoslovakia", and it would be settled. It is not a question of a deficiency in our Armed Forces, but of what steps we are prepared to take in a free society to bring about the result that we want. Therefore, for noble Lords to dismiss what is happening in Ireland as inability of the Army to do what is required is incorrect. In his next statement, my noble friend was tremendously pleased with Mr. Nixon's visits to Peking and Moscow and he regarded it as a change of heart. I am sorry, my Lords, but "Tricky Dicky"—
LORD DAVIES OF LEEK: My Lords, obviously my noble friend has now lost the capacity of following thinking, because I said nothing of the sort. I did not say that it was a change of heart; I said that it was forced upon him. The noble Lord must not be so arrogant. He must not assume that I cast any slur on the Army. I did no such thing. Of course the Army could have finished it if they

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had wanted to be butchers, but knowing the humanity of the Army we could not at this moment mount that kind of action. I am dealing with European security as well.
LORD WIGG: My Lords, I must take up the point about the Army. I very carefully said that I was quite sure that my noble friend would be the last person to cast a slur on the Army. What I point out to him is that the potential to settle the Irish problem is present, but it cannot be used because, basically, the Government have accepted—in my judgment, rightly—that Ulster is a political problem which cannot be settled by force. That is the first point.
The second point is that I do not believe that "Tricky Dicky" had a change of heart as a result of a sudden conversion. I believe that the actions of President Nixon, from the time he assumed office four years ago up to the time of his re-election, were dictated by one fact and one fact alone. Every action that he took both at home and abroad, was dictated by his desire to win the Election. He went off to China and to Moscow, but what one has never yet seen is the small print. But there are signs of it. There were complaints to Sir Alec Douglas-Home, when he was in Peking, that before President Nixon got back to Washington he was already going back on his undertakings to the Chinese. I do not believe that the exercise of power by powerful States is dictated by the sudden conversion of particular individuals. The conflicts that exist in the world to-day are there, although the means by which they find expression change. My view is that war, as we have known it twice in our lifetimes, is now a thing of the past because the capacity for one Power to destroy another is now so absolute that all-out war is not "on". I do not believe that President Nixon has changed his spots—not for a moment. His policy is based on the need to look after President Nixon.
There is a noble Lord whom I shall call by a name by which he is not known; that is, the noble Lord, Lord Birch. I well remember his commenting on the 1958 White Paper, and saying that the opening words were among the biggest load of nonsense that he had ever read, and I have repeated his words since on
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many occasions. What the 1958 White Paper said—and it was the Government's policy up to 1964, and has been since—is that,
"… the world stands poised between total war and total peace".
Total war, possibly, although I do not think it very likely. But total peace? Look around us, my Lords. Total peace is the Kingdom of Heaven. Ever since the Garden of Eden, ever since the days of recorded history, there have been struggles by wicked men to seize power and to use it in their own interest. That struggle will go on but it will take a very different form. It may well be that subversion, the kind of thing that is taking place in all the urban areas of the world, will become commonplace in our lives; that the old order, respect for authority, respect for discipline—even, if I may say so, respect for my noble friend's grey hairs—may become things of the past. We have to accept Northern Ireland or Palestine or Vietnam as an everyday occurrence. I have always held, and I still hold, that the interest of this country is to maintain the rule of law. I supported our intervention in Korea for that reason; I supported President Johnson in his attitudes towards Vietnam; and I support Her Majesty's Government in their attitude towards Northern Ireland—because I believe the alternative to an ordered society is anarchy, and there can be no looking after the interests of the old and the weak unless we establish meantime the rule of law.
I believe that one of the greatest instruments for the maintenance of the rule of law is the Army. This is not the occasion on which one should enlarge upon that subject, although I hope to do so in the future. I certainly do not accept the interpretation which my noble friend puts on the action of Willy Brandt and the Ostpolitik. I have a very different explanation. Just by chance, I have been looking at this matter, and I have put a Question on the Order Paper. I am not out to publicise my Question, but what are the facts? In 1958 there was a Protocol to the Treaty of Rome. I am astonished that nobody ever talked about the Protocol that Dr. Adenauer insisted should be included in the Treaty of Rome. It is a Protocol which relates to German internal trade and connected problems; and it means that all trade

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as between East and West Germany should be regarded as a whole.
So when Willy Brandt was firmly in the saddle he had something to offer the Communist bloc by way of this deal, because what it means is that the chicken from Czechoslovakia and Poland plus the ballbearings from Sweden are pouring into Western Europe—and there has even been some of them here. There are acres of warehouses in Hamburg stocked up with goods from all over Communist Europe, waiting to pour, free of duty, into Europe. Of course the Communists are only too pleased that there are such mugs as we are to permit this to go on without discussion. And it has gone on. It is significant that the French started to raise objections, but M. Pompidou, when he met Willy Brandt, took the hint and did not raise the subject. This is very apposite to the struggle in the world, because my noble friend is quite right: it is going to take on a different look—not guns, not atomic weapons, but the struggle for a position of power, and so on and so forth, to see who gets most at the least possible price.
My noble friend, as he has so often done in the past, excited me to get on my feet and talk—
LORD DAVIES OF LEEK: Very unfortunate !
LORD WIGG: —and to anticipate the speech I am going to make in the future on this very important subject. But perhaps I may conclude by saying this. I believe, and have believed ever since the end of the war, that the struggle for power has moved from Europe and that we are now no longer in the race. The struggle for power has moved South and East, and that is why I have listened with cynicism to the arguments about the Common Market. They are utterly and completely irrelevant. We have got in for one simple reason: that Mr. Heath has stood pat and has never shifted from his Harvard speech, and M. Pompidou was prepared to take him as he was not prepared to take Mr. Macmillan or Mr. Wilson. Because M. Pompidou. too, hopes one day to get rid of M. Debré, and then he will bring to pass the wild, foolish, fantastic nonsense of a European deterrent which France and Britain will hold in trust for the rest of Europe. Mr.
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Heath believes it: he said it at Harvard. Obviously, when he spoke to Pompidou and got "Yes" to enter the Common Market he told Pompidou of his acceptance of a joint British/French deterrent, and that is why he got his "Yes". For the Common Market is not to do with tariffs; it is to do with power: and as far as power is concerned, neither Britain nor France, nor any other country in Europe, nor Europe as a whole, is any longer in the race. The race is between the Soviet Union and the United States.
4.45 p.m.
LORD BOURNE: My Lords, I apologise to the noble Baroness for intervening, but there are two points which have not been covered in the debate so far and which I should like to mention rather briefly. For more than twenty years since NATO was set up there has been absolute peace in Europe, whereas there has not been peace in the Far East. One of the reasons for that, I suggest, is because, as the noble Lord, Lord Wigg, has just said, the scene in Europe is coloured by the super Powers; that is to say, the nuclear power of the United States of America and of the Soviet Union. Therefore I think it is highly dangerous to have more than the NATO representatives and the Warsaw Pact representatives at the M.B.F.R. Conference in Vienna; and the Soviet invitation to widen the membership of the Conference is, in my opinion, rather a risky one to accept. We all understand about the well-known neutrals—that is to say, Switzerland, Austria, Sweden, et cetera—but if any more countries are introduced to that Conference then before we know where we are we shall be outvoted by the neutrals who live quite close to Russia; and I think it is rather risky.
The second point was touched on by the noble Lord, Lord Wigg, when he mentioned the Anglo-French nuclear power agreement of the future. I have spoken about this subject before in your Lordships' House, and I am dead against such an agreement for the following reasons. First of all, M. Debré, who was then French Defence Minister, said—and I think he was quite right:
"The decision to employ nuclear weapons can only be made by a single nation".
I entirely agree with that: and, if your Lordships remember. I said that I was quite satisfied with the President of the

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United States having his finger on the trigger on our side. A French official recently said:
"NATO may change: France will never change".
I think that is distinctly apropos.
So I suggest that an Anglo-French nuclear power agreement would be wrong for the following four reasons. First of ail, the agreement would be highly dangerous, in that it would upset a balance which has kept peace for twenty years. Secondly, I agree that it is a single country's decision. Thirdly, we have lived under the threat of having 600 Soviet missiles close to our centres of population for many years past; and, anyway, there is not a proper warning period. Fourthly, there is the impossible cost. I believe that for its nuclear weapons the United States pays roughly the amount of the French and British Defence budgets added together, so the cost would be impossible. In conclusion I should like to ask the noble Lord, Lord Kennet, a question concerning his cruciform picture of the future. I wonder whether he could elaborate on that subject a little more, because at the moment it is one that escapes me.
4.50 p.m.
LORD HANKEY: My Lords, I hope I may say a few words before this debate ends. I would start by congratulating the noble Lord, Lord Kennet, on what I thought was an admirably documented and very objective statement of the situation. But, as I think my noble friend who has just sat down feels, I have some doubt about the analysis in his last paragraph of what he calls the cruciform situation. I personally have enormous admiration for what President Nixon and Dr. Kissinger have done. They have acted with enormous courage. I was privileged, while on a visit to Canada and the United States from which I have just come back, to hear a most remarkable interview on television with Dr. Kissinger. I think he is one of the most remarkable diplomats of our era. The point I want to make is that he does not see the situation as cruciform; and he says that President Nixon does not do so either. He sees the world as containing five major power factors: first, the U.S.A. and then Russia and, of course, China; then Japan and, finally (I say "finally" purely for convenience) Europe. Those five do not lend them-
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selves to a cruciform situation. I do not think that that forms part of the American idea.
I should like to say that President Nixon could not have a detente with either of the Communist Powers without appearing to be mixed up in the dispute between Russia and China. From that it follows that if he went to one he must go to the other. Secondly, I think it was extremely good that he was able to use the fact that both of them are getting a bit fed up with the Indonesian war and that neither of them wants the Americans to be in Indonesia, in order to settle the gathering number of outstanding questions.
I believe that we should never miss an opportunity of settling outstanding questions with the Communist Powers. One cannot always be sure what the result of negotiations will be; but one must never miss an opportunity of settling. We should always be on the look-out for the olive branch or for just that opportunity, in the way that President Nixon has been. I really think that he deserves thanks from all of us because his action has been good for European security. There is no doubt that these huge tensions between major Powers can easily produce situations which involve Europe's security and which are liable to be very bad for us. I believe that there are major dangers there to the continent in which we live.
I was extremely shocked when in Canada and America at the tremendous disillusion and the cynicism of American opinion. Their public opinion is really all over the place. Some of them go around saying, "That shows how tricky Dick's been all the time; and Mao is really the blue-eyed boy". Some are saying, "We sold the Vietnamese down the river"—although they hesitate to say that they ought to go on fighting. Opinion is really all over the place. No doubt, under the influence of President Nixon and his advisers, American opinion will settle down in time. I personally think that it would be very good for all of us if the situation were to settle down.
We ought to remember, referring to the people who believe that Mao is the "blue-eyed boy", that this is the same Mao who has had military trouble with

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every one of his neighbours with the exception of Pakistan—and China is divided from Pakistan by 12,000-foot mountains. This is the same Mao who ordered the episode of "letting 1.000 flowers bloom" and who afterwards slapped down on the journalists, the writers, and the intellectuals who said what they thought. He is the same Mao who put the Reuter correspondent under house arrest after his being beaten up, and who kept him without trial for over a year. I am all for making arrangements with these people; but do not forget, for instance, the Red Guards—they were not so very long ago. I think that we should be extremely cautious in our dealings with these great Powers. I find them very forbidding.
It is very important, too, that we should not conduct our affairs in Europe in such a way as to make U.S. opinion still more disillusioned about Europe. There is a major danger in our doing this either in trade affairs or in other affairs. I think we ought to be very careful. Let us make no mistake: If Europe gets into trouble without the U.S. nuclear umbrella being available, Europe would, in modern terms, be finished. I hope that Europe will pull itself together soon, as the noble Lord, Lord Gladwyn, urged that it should. I am entirely on his side. The advice he gave was extremely wise. But if Europe does not pull itself together, then I think that in twenty years' time there probably will be no Europe. The attitude of the anti-Europeans on this issue is what might be called a "non-attitude" and is entirely harmful and dangerous.
So clearly we must, so far as we can, take part in the forthcoming security and disarmament discussions. I think it extremely important that we should make the best of them. But let us not be bamboozled. If the discussions are going to end in the United States, with its disillusioned public opinion, withdrawing its troops from Europe, then I think that would be fatal for us. We need the American presence; we need the American umbrella, and we should not be under the illusion that we should be safe with the Russia which so recently destroyed Czechoslovakia. Unless we are strong and reasonably united—and I do not necessarily mean doing anything in nuclear terms—I do not think that our security will be very long lasting.
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Secondly, I should like to refer to what was said by the noble Lord, Lord Wigg. I thought that he made a very important and interesting point. I draw your Lordships' attention to it. I would put it in this way. The threat to Europe may be, in modern terms, internal rather than external; and, as the political and military detente grows, so we may be in danger of lowering our sights and not seeing the dangers which come from inside. One realises that the anarchism of the I.R.A. (busily murdering teenagers, and with Communist inspiration behind it) could be very dangerous. No doubt they will be run out of Northern Ireland. But where will they go after that? They will not be welcome in Canada or the U.S.A. I suspect they will start up in Liverpool and Glasgow and other places over here. Are we then going to use the Army as (in my opinion, inexcusably) we have done in Northern Ireland? It will be time to think up the proper, modern answer to internal subversion—which is a powerful police force backed by proper intelligence.
What happens if France goes Communist? One must think of these things. Europe's security situation will look different in a few weeks' time if the Communists really gain the advances which some people fear they might. I personally think the pollsters may be trying to frighten moderate opinion in France; and that France is probably still a sound country, though difficult to work with. I think that this is a danger, both in France and in Italy, that we ought to bear in mind.
My Lords, nobody in this debate has mentioned North Africa or East Africa. May I draw the attention of your Lordships to the extraordinary growth of the influence of the Communist countries all along the coast of North Africa in the last 20 years, and also to the penetration of East Africa by the Chinese. I believe that these things are very dangerous to European security. We want to be friends with the huge continent lying to the South, and unless we pull ourselves together and have a more unified foreign policy I do not think that we have much chance of achieving that. So I want to see Europe pull itself together and do something adequate about the Mediterranean. In my opinion we have the

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economic power and the imagination—and one might cite the precedent of the Marshall Plan—and we ought to be able to do something to produce an altogether better situation there. That would be very good for our security.
We have also mentioned Iceland. Iceland is the "cork" in the "Atlantic bottle". If, by stimulating a fisheries dispute, anyone succeeds in pulling out the cork, the naval situation in the Atlantic would be totally transformed. I think that this really dangerous situation is one which we ought to be watching very carefully. I have been interested in the Parliamentary Questions which are being asked on this subject, although it is a very difficult subject for the Government to be frank about.
In conclusion, my Lords, I think that the situation for European security is not as bright as it would appear to be and that we ought to be extremely careful. I hope that we shall do everything we can to produce agreement with the Communist Powers, and that we shall exercise great discretion, caution and wisdom in what we agree to.
5.2 p.m.
BARONESS TWEEDSMUIR OF BELHELVIE: My Lords, I also am grateful to the noble Lord, Lord Kennet, for calling attention to a great number of important questions, and I have listened with the greatest interest to the contributions made by noble Lords from both sides of the House. We are considering the subject of European security at a particularly good moment, as the talks to prepare the way for a Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe are taking place in Helsinki; and last week exploratory discussions began in Vienna on mutual and balanced force reductions in Central Europe. If, as we all hope, these preparatory consultations are successful, a Security Conference is likely to begin in the middle of this year and negotiations on M.B.F.R. in the autumn; so that 1973 could be a vital year for East-West relations, or what I think the noble Lord, Lord Brockway, called possibly a great break through. May I thank the noble Lord very much for his handsome analogy over Questions yesterday.
The noble Lord, Lord Kennet, was good enough to send me a letter in which he asked me no fewer than 11
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questions and he added a great many others to-day. So in fairness to those who have taken part in the debate, I should like to answer his main questions and perhaps write to the noble Lord in respect of his other questions. I should also like to refer to what other noble Lords have said. First, I should like to answer Lord Kennet's question about China and the C.C.D. China has on many occasions been told that she would be most welcome to join in the discussions, but she has never replied. But the Chinese have made clear that they would not be prepared to discuss disarmament in any body which did not include all interested countries. Another major question from the noble Lord, Lord Kennet, related to the question of where Soviet intermediary-range and medium-range ballistic missiles would be discussed. I can only say that it is too early to predict the scope of the M.B.F.R. or of the SALT phase 2 negotiations.
The noble Lord, Lord Gladwyn, as usual, gave us a very thoughtful theme to consider. My noble friend the Secretary of State for Defence will be very interested to know more of the noble Lord's ideas about the means for producing larger conventional forces more cheaply. I suggest that the noble Lord—
LORD GLADWYN: My Lords, the noble Baroness has got it wrong. I said not larger conventional forces, but more streamlined, economic and efficient forces.
BARONESS TWEEDSMUIR OF BELHELVIE: Well, my Lords, shall we say more efficient conventional forces.
LORD GLADWYN: And cheaper.
BARONESS TWEEDSMUIR OF BELHELVIE: My Lords, I thought the noble Lord said "cheaper" as well. That is very important and would appeal to my noble friend. Perhaps we shall return to this theme in the defence debate later this month. My noble friend the Secretary of State for Defence said in a former debate that the whole object of the NATO doctrine was to have what he called a flexible response, and I think it is agreed by everyone that NATO must have adequate conventional forces. We attach great importance to this. The NATO

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strategy is designed to provide the Alliance with the maximum number of options for defensive action. I agree with what was said by the noble Lord, Lord Bourne. We agree with him also that a greater degree of co-operation on defence among the European NATO allies is necessary, not only because the military potential of the Warsaw Pact continues to increase but also because it is important that the Europeans should make a real constructive reply to the United States commitment to keep and improve the United States forces in Europe, provided the Europeans adopt a similar approach. I was sorry to hear the noble Lord, Lord Hankey, say that he felt there was considerable disillusion among the American public at this time. I have a feeling that we could do a great deal within Europe to strengthen our understanding of and confidence in each other.
My Lords, Europe has enjoyed a peace, although an uneasy one, for about a quarter of a century and we are concerned, in the negotiations in which we hope to take part, to improve the quality of that peace. We have to try to create more confidence and trust among the countries of Europe; that, I think, was the point made by the noble Lord, Lord Davies of Leek. The whole history of this century shows how immensely difficult this is, but there is no task which is more important. It is the lack of confidence which led to the building of barriers in Europe where none should exist. It is the same mistrust which keeps the military confrontation at the present level. I think that I would also accept something said by the noble Lord, Lord Wigg—that a good deal of mistrust is due to the fear of subversion and all the modern forms that it takes to-day. That is why a Security Conference and negotiations for a mutual and balanced force reduction are inter-related, but they merit quite different treatment.
I should like to say something about the preparatory talks in Helsinki. Surely the fact that 34 countries, including the United States and Canada, have gathered together there is in itself something of an achievement. It would not have been possible without the improvement in the relations between East and West to which the Federal German Government made such an important contribution. I was
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interested that my noble friend Lord Sandys had been in Helsinki, and I should like to join with him in saying how much we appreciate the part that the Government of Finland has played in providing the necessary facilities for these talks, as well as the I.P.U. conference to which he referred. With our partners and allies we have worked hard to try to prepare for the Conference, and by the time that the ambassadors met in November last year we had a fairly good idea of what we wanted to achieve in the preparatory talks, and then, if all went well, in the Conference itself. Her Majesty's Government have always believed that a European Conference of this kind would only yield useful results if attention was concentrated on practical measures to increase confidence. It is right that we should subscribe to declarations of common beliefs, but such declarations, I suggest, would mean very little to the people of Europe unless they can grow into real action that is effective.
I am glad to be able to report to the House that the consultations in Helsinki have so far achieved useful work. In the first session before Christmas, there was a round of opening statements and a discussion of the future programme of work. Agreement was reached on the broad form that a Conference should take. It would begin with a meeting of foreign Ministers in a general debate; then at official level committees and subcommittees would discuss thte various areas of the agenda in detail and make recommendations; and finally, a further Ministerial meeting.
When the talks resumed on January 15, the Italian, Belgian and Danish delegations, after full consultation among members of the Community and the Alliance, put forward detailed proposals on the questions to be discussed at the Conference, and our ambassador associated himself with these proposals. They divided the agenda roughly into three broad themes. The first is political and security matters—and we think these should cover the principles guilding relations between States, and certain military measures, such as the prior notification of military movements which are designed to allay suspicions about each other's military intentions. The second item, we thought, should concern economic and

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environmental co-operation. We should like to discuss such matters as commercial exchanges and co-operation in a wide variety of economic and technical fields, including the environment. The third item was one again referred to, in particular, by the noble Lord, Lord Brockway; that is, the development of human contacts, the broadening of educational and technical exchanges and much more information. As your Lordships know, our Allies and ourselves believe this to be essential. After the last Ministerial meeting of the North Atlantic Council in December the 15 Foreign Ministers declared that they were determined to bring about closer relationships, both collectively and individually, and they attached particular importance to freedom of movement.
We consider it essential that agreement should be reached at the preparatory talks on the terms of reference for the committees and sub-committees of the Conference. This is not just a procedural question, because when the consultations end in Helsinki, probably next month, the Governments will have to decide whether to take part in the Conference itself. I do not believe that any Government will wish to do this without knowing what is to be discussed and without a reasonable assurance that a Conference will be worth holding. Other delegations have of course made suggestions for the agenda. The neutral and non-aligned countries played a considerable part, and we very much welcome the fact that they did. All this is now being worked on in Helsinki. But the agenda must reflect the fact that the Conference is one on security and co-operation in Europe. It cannot hope, I suggest, to deal with everything, or turn itself into a mini-General Assembly of the United Nations, although its work will obviously be of great interest to countries who will not be taking part, particularly in the Mediterranean.
There are, of course, some European problems which a Conference of 34 countries cannot be expected to handle. For instance, as I have said already, we do not think it is the right place to discuss the detailed question of force reductions. As your Lordships know, the proposal for a Conference on European Security first came from the Soviet Union and its Allies, while the proposal for mutual and
1102
balanced force reductions was made by the NATO countries. We believe that the fundamental problem of European security is military security, because no guarantees on paper, no principles of conduct or statements of good intentions could ever be a protection against military power. This is why there is a close relationship between the M.B.F.R. talks and the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe.
My Lords, the first session of the exploratory talks on M.B.F.R. took place on January 31. We are therefore only at the beginning. But I think it would be worth describing some of the problems and the background to this matter. NATO countries first proposed that negotiations on mutual and balanced force reductions should be held as long ago as 1968, and this proposal was repeated on various occasions. It was not until the autumn of last year that the Soviet Union provisionally agreed to a broad timetable which covered the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe, as well as M.B.F.R. That timetable provided for the opening of exploratory talks on M.B.F.R. at the end of January.
On November 15 of last year the NATO countries directly involved in Central Europe invited the Soviet Union, Hungary, Poland, Czechoslovakia and the German Democratic Republic to open these exploratory discussions. Our invitation was only accepted on January 18, when the Warsaw Pact countries raised questions concerning participation which have not yet been entirely resolved. It was then—I say this in answer to the query put to me by the noble Lord, Lord Kennet—that they argued that the talks should take place in Vienna rather than in Geneva, where at the request of the NATO countries, and with the full knowledge of the Soviet Union and its Allies, the Swiss Government had already made administrative preparations. But in order to get these important talks started, our Allies and ourselves agreed to go to Vienna, and that is why the talks started there at the end of last month. I should like to take this opportunity to pay tribute to the Austrian Government for making all the facilities available at such short notice; and also to thank the Swiss Government for the arrangements that they made, and to express in public our great regret for the inconvenience which must

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have been caused by the last-minute change of plan.
The aim of these exploratory discussions is to prepare the way for serious negotiations, which we hope will begin in the autumn. The talks in Vienna will not be concerned with the complex and difficult issues which will have to be tackled during the negotiations. They will be concerned mainly with reaching agreement on the agenda, organisation, procedure, and who takes part before the actual negotiations begin. But there will of course be opportunities for each side to learn something of the other's thinking on the substantive questions, and it is important that we should establish through the exploratory talks that there really is a sound basis for real negotiation.
We have always believed that such negotiations should focus on the military situation in Central Europe. This is because it is in Central Europe that the military confrontation between NATO and the Warsaw Pact is at its most acute.
The noble Lord, Lord Kennet, asked why it was right to limit those taking part in discussions on M.B.F.R. I think the answer lies in what I said about the exploratory nature of the talks, and the fact that if the actual negotiations are to yield the kind of results that we want they will have to be detailed and technical. It follows, I think, that they should be confined to the States that are directly involved in the military confrontation in Central Europe; in other words, those with forces and territories in that area. Certain other NATO and Warsaw Pact countries have a special geographical and military relationship with those principally concerned, and while they would not qualify as taking a direct part, it is right that they should play some part in the talks. The basis on which they should do so is among the questions now under discussion in Vienna. I understand this is known within NATO as "the problem of the rotating flanks".
There are those who argue for wider participation on the ground that the security of all European States will be affected by the outcome of the negotiations. We recognise that other European States have a legitimate interest in M.B.F.R. Our broad objective in negotiations is the same as that of the other
1104
members of the Alliance, and I hope it is also shared by the Warsaw Pact countries. It is to find some way of lowering the level of armed forces and armaments in Central Europe while at the same time keeping and maintaining undiminished security for us all.
The difficulties are of enormous complexity, and there are also the facts of the military situation. Defence expenditure in Western European countries has increased very little in real terms since 1968. By contrast, defence expenditure among the Warsaw Pact countries continues to increase. In the Soviet Union, for example, it has risen by 5 per cent. every year since the NATO countries first proposed talks on M.B.F.R. In fact the gap in conventional strength between NATO and the Warsaw Pact on the central front has continued to widen. In the central region alone, NATO has 23½ divisions and division-equivalents, compared with 70 of the Warsaw Pact. The fact that NATO divisions are half as large again as those of the Warsaw Pact means that the manpower ratio is only two to one, but even so I do not myself find that very comforting. The Warsaw Pact also has over 17.000 battle tanks in the central region, compared with 4,200 on the NATO side. When one considers artillery, the ratio is 5,000 as compared with 1.800. The Warsaw Pact forces also enjoy enormous advantages when it comes to reinforcement from peace-time levels. American reinforcements have to cross the Atlantic, whereas Soviet reinforcements could arrive much more quickly over short land routes.
I would suggest that these figures alone illustrate some of the problems that have to be overcome. They perhaps also explain why, at the NATO meeting in December, Ministers once more endorsed the principle that the overall military capability of NATO should not be reduced
"except as part of a pattern of mutual force reductions balanced in scope and timing."
should like, if I may, to remind the House that the United States reaffirmed its position that
given a similar approach by other countries of the Alliance, the United States would maintain and improve its forces in Europe and not reduce them unless there is reciprocal action by the other side."
LORD WIGG: My Lords, if I may ask the noble Baroness to give way, I hope

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it is not ungallant to charge her with having crocodile tears, but in so far as she speaks on behalf of a Conservative Administration, is it not the fact that Sir Anthony Eden gave an undertaking on behalf of a Conservative Government that Britain would maintain four divisions on the European land mass to the end of the century, and in the earlier White Paper four divisions were expressed as 88,000? Then it came to 77,000; then to 64,000; then 55,000; and we have never at any time since Sir Anthony Eden uttered these words, ever had 45,000. So to express regret now for the disparity between our strength and that of the Warsaw Pact countries means, if I may again misquote Shakespeare:
"The fault, dear Brutus, lies not in our stars but in ourselves."
BARONESS TWEEDSMUIR OF BELHELVIE: My Lords, if I may say so, "The fault, dear Brutus", no doubt lies also as much with the previous Government, who tried very hard, if I remember rightly, to reduce their expenditure on armaments.
LORD WIGG: My Lords, the previous Administration did not take steps to abolish conscription, which made it impossible to maintain 50,000.
BARONESS TWEEDSMUIR OF BELHELVIE: Perhaps, my Lords, I might be allowed to ask a question: Is the noble Lord, Lord Wigg, in favour of having conscription now?
LORD WIGG: My Lords, a thousand times yes; ten thousand times—on military and social grounds.
BARONESS TWEEDSMUIR OF BELHELVIE: My Lords, I know that the noble Lord, Lord Wigg, is a very ardent supporter of the Army, and it is good to hear him so clear on this question—
LORD WIGG LORD WIGG rose—
BARONESS TWEEDSMUIR OF BELHELVIE: My Lords, I think perhaps I should finish, because the House has been listening to me long enough. I will only say that I should be interested to know whether the noble Lord's profound belief that there should be conscription is also the official policy of the Party to which I understand he belongs.
LORD WIGG: My Lords, the noble Baroness knows perfectly well that it is not the policy of the Labour Party, and she is playing political tricks when she tries to fasten on to what I say. I held the view before I became a Minister; I held it during the time I was a Minister, and I hold the same view now: I say that this country cannot discharge its obligations to Europe or to itself unless it has a compulsory military service of some kind. It has gone back on it, and now I think it is too late.
BARONESS TWEEDSMUIR OF BELHELVIE: My Lords, I must thank the noble Lord for being so frank with us all. But it is time I ended this rather long speech, illumined as it has been by the last interruption. I should like to quote something which was said in another place by a Front Bench spokesman for the Opposition. I thought the words were rather good, and that is why I am repeating them:
"we all should feel as safe at the end"—
of the negotiations—
"as we do at the beginning."—[OFFICIAL. REPORT, Commons, 14/12/72, col. 670.]
This really is what I think should be in the back of all our minds as we approach these various preparatory talks. Because, although an arrangement under which each side reduced its forces by an equal percentage appears fair at first glance, in view of the present and growing disparity in forces and armaments and the geographical factors involved, such an arrangement would put the West at a serious disadvantage. That is why negotiations are likely to be at least as complex as any that have hitherto been undertaken and why I would advise the House that it would be unwise to expect early results.
5.27 p.m.
LORD KENNET: My Lords, the House will not expect me to take up every speech that has been made. However, on behalf of the whole House I must thank the noble Lord, Lord Sandys, for the news he brought from Helsinki. It was indeed interesting to have someone with snow still virtually on his boots, as he put it himself, to tell us what is happening.
The debate has been enlivened by the sudden outbreak of sniping between the authoritarian and the libertarian wings

1107
of my own Party: across the Severn. My noble friend Lord Wigg said that in his opinion every action taken by President Nixon had been designed towards winning the election. My Lords, I should hope so. That is what democrats are for, in my view, and if the American nation wanted better relations with China and Russia and the end of the Vietnam war, that is exactly what President Nixon has given them, and it is precisely because of their confidence that he was going to do that that they did re-elect him last autumn.
On the question of the "cruciform world", may I explain to the noble Lord, Lord Bourne, that it is simply a matter of the world containing four great centres of armed power, America, Russia, China, Western Europe. It happens to lie in the form of a cross, if you are looking at the world from the North Pole. That is all I mean by "cruciform". May I say this to the noble Lord, Lord Hankey: I am sure that Dr. Henry Kissinger was right in his television interview with Marvin Kalb, that the world is a five-centre one and not a four-centre one. I entirely agree with him that we are coming to that, but I think he was looking a little further ahead, because it strikes the eye that Japan is not at the moment a country of great military might. Its economic might is quite overwhelming; but as a military force Japan is not yet in the big league. Of course, neither is Western Europe, and there is no such thing as "Western European armament". Nevertheless, there are a lot of Western European countries that are armed, and together they are in alliance. The world, as I see it, has four centres now and these may become five centres later. Which is preferable? "You pays your money and you takes your choice". The four has a certain in-built stability about it; the five may be a bit like a handful of billiard balls, but it is certainly better than three and much better than two, which we had before.
If I may come now to the speech of the noble Baroness on behalf of the Government, I must thank her very much for giving me, by my reckoning, 2½ answers to my 11 questions. They were useful and full answers. I cannot conceal that I think 2½ out of 11 is a low ratio from
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what I hope was a responsible Opposition speech on the subject.
BARONESS TWEEDSMUIR OF BELHELVIE: My Lords, I am loth to interrupt the noble Lord, but I think his arithmetic is wrong. He may also remember that the question on Iceland was answered this afternoon.
LORD KENNET: My Lords, if that was counted it was 2½, out of 10. I do not think my arithmetic is wrong. The noble Baroness gave a good answer about China; a good answer about the location of M.B.F.R. in Vienna, and half an answer on the membership of M.B.F.R. That was how I totted it up.
I seriously regret that we still have no answer on why we have not taken up the Russian invitation to join the naval treaty; that we still have no answer on why we abstained on the General Assembly's resolution of the report from SALT; and why, after two years' repeated questioning, we still have no answer on where the 600 missiles are to be talked about. If the, noble Baroness were able to say to the House, "We do not yet know whether they will be talked about in SALT or M.B.F.R.; but we can promise that they are going to be talked about in one of them or we will know the reason why", the House and I would be satisfied. But the noble Baroness has not said that. She has said, "It is too early to predict the scope of M.B.F.R. or SALT." If the scope of both is insufficient to permit discussion of the 600 missiles, the Government are in quite severe dereliction of duty towards the security of this country.
My Lords, let me wind up by endorsing what the noble Baroness said in thanks to the Swiss Government for their abortive effort. It is a pity that it went that way. There is a slightly dangerous and unpleasant situation, but I understand the reasons for which we agreed to go to Vienna. Let me thank the noble Baroness most heartily for hammering home once again, as Sir Alec did in the House of Commons on December 22, the facts and figures about the Eastern predominance over NATO in Europe. My Lords, I beg to withdraw my Motion for Papers.
Motion for Papers, by leave, with-drawn.

LONDON TRAFFIC CONTROL
5.32 p.m.
Lord MOLSON Lord MOLSON rose to ask Her Majesty's Government: Whether they are satisfied with the present allocation of responsibility for the control of London traffic. The noble Lord said: My Lords, this is a genuine request for information, although, as is often customary when an Unstarred Question is asked, I shall express some opinions as to what should be done. I originally put this subject on the Order Paper many weeks ago, largely as a result of the appalling congestion in Covent Garden at the conclusion of a performance of the Royal Opera Company. Since then the subject has received considerable prominence. First, the Prime Minister was held up in a traffic jam, which prevented him from arriving by car at one of his official engagements. He arrived on foot. It is a fortunate event that this should have happened, for when he has the problem of London's transport borne so forcefully to his attention, it is likely that something will be done. I believe that that traffic jam was due to a juggernaut breaking down in Parliament Square. Secondly—and this may be in part as a consequence of the first event—the Greater London Council have banned all lorries from travelling into Central London, except those which are going to a London destination. Thirdly, there was Mr. Peyton's successful resistance to the proposal of the Common Market countries that heavier lorries should be allowed on our roads. Fourthly, only last week there was published the Expenditure Committee's Report on Urban Transport Planning. That is a most remarkable and important Report by a Select Committee from another place.
When I was at the Ministry of Transport, the Minister of Transport was the London traffic authority. Remembering the difficulties that he had, I am glad to know that this responsibility has been transferred to the Greater London Council. I feel the utmost sympathy with them in the heavy responsibility they have undertaken. When my noble friend Lord Boyd-Carpenter became Minister of Transport I warned him that at any moment there might be a serious traffic jam holding up the whole of London's traffic for many hours; and that he would be in great difficulties. I said that the
1110
Minister's head would probably be demanded on a charger. We just got by at that time.
Legislators, whether they are in Parliament or at County Hall across the river, are not as blind to problems of traffic and the like as outsiders sometimes think. But they cannot go very far ahead of public opinion. Politics, as has often been said, is the art of the possible. All Ministers of Transport have tried to keep up with public opinion, and even to push it a little further ahead. During the past 20 years I am glad to think that immense progress has been made in the regulation of traffic, and still more in the thinking that is applied to it. This is due in considerable measure to the remarkable Report on that subject by Professor Colin Buchanan. It is worth while considering how great is the progress there has been in the past 20 years.
Noble Lords will be surprised to hear that when, by the Road Traffic Act 1956, we introduced parking meters we were thought to be ahead of public opinion at that time. I remember those wise and experienced judges of Parliamentary opinion, the Whips, telling us that we must not nail the flag of parking meters to the mast because it was quite likely that there would be a revolt against our proposal and we should have to drop it. We were threatened at that time by direct action from the motorists, some of whom said that they would invade London in a great flood as soon as parking meters were introduced in order to demonstrate how completely unworkable our ideas were. Parking meters are now accepted with practically no criticism as a valuable contribution to the regulation of traffic. In just the same way we should have liked to introduce a great many more one-way streets than we were able to do; but there was every indication that anything like the one-way system that we have now would not at that time have been acceptable to public opinion.
My Lords, whoever is the traffic authority for London, there is an inevitable dichotomy between the traffic authority which legislates and the police who have to enforce the legislation. I very well remember that sometimes the Metropolitan Police—the traffic assistant commissioner—would ask for additional

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no-parking orders. On more than one occasion we replied, "Well, really that is not a reasonable request because you are not enforcing the no-parking orders that exist at the present time." To that the police replied, perfectly reasonably, "It is impossible for us to enforce when motorists quite politely and civilly ask: 'Well, if I may not park here, where can I go to park?'" The answer at that time was that there was not a sufficiency of off-the-street parking accommodation. Everybody has to recognise that the police have to maintain good relations with the public, otherwise they could not discharge their duties efficiently and satisfactorily. We certainly understood the difficulties of the police. I think that at the present time there is a sufficiency of off-the-street parking space in London. Certainly the great garage under Hyde Park is, as far as I know, never full. But, admittedly, much of the off-the-street parking accommodation is quite a considerable distance from where the motorist wishes to park.
We were also at that time confronted by the great difficulty the police had in enforcing no-parking orders. At that time it was necessary for a police constable to wait until the driver of the car who had parked appeared. After wasting a great deal of time in standing near the illegally parked car, the police constable would see somebody who looked like the driver of the car come along, and, seeing a police constable standing there, at once go away and remain away until the police constable himself had gone. In the Road Traffic Act 1956 we improved that position and made the liability that of the owner of the car. But I believe that the position is still not satisfactory and something more will have to be done to facilitate proceedings against illegal parkers. Since my time there has been legislation which has facilitated what I might call selective traffic regulations. There were the Road Traffic Regulation Act 1967 and the London Authorities Traffic Order Regulations 1972. The most interesting, and I think promising, experiment which is being conducted at the present time in banning private cars from part of Oxford Street has been carried out under this legislation.
I should like to ask my noble friend whether regulation of this kind could not
1112
be selectively applied in the Covent Garden area, especially in the evening. At the present time it really is nothing less than a national disgrace. On one side of Bow Street is the Royal Opera House; on the other side is Bow Street police station. As, apparently, there are no adequate regulations applying to traffic there, despite the fact that the police are present in force in Bow Street police station nothing effective is ever done to control the traffic. When a performance at the Opera House is over, traffic comes from both sides. Cars have frequently been parked outside for hours; and the police, having no plan, occasionally spasmodically instruct all waiting cars to do a circle round the neighbouring buildings and come back again—which of course is no solution to the problem. Vegetable lorries, which (I am not sure of this) I believe are not supposed to come into that part of London before 11 o'clock at night, frequently appear, causing great obstruction; and Long Acre, which is the normal way for traffic from the Opera House to go to the West End, is frequently completely blocked. I hope the Government will not reply that as the Market is likely to be removed in another 18 months or two years it is not necessary for anything to be done until then.
My Lords, my Parliamentary Question relates to London traffic, but I have ventured, with the indulgence of your Lordships, to refer to this extremely important Report of the Expenditure Committee on Urban Transport Planning. I hope that my noble friend will be able to give an assurance that the customary reply which the Government produce to reports of this kind will not be long delayed. There are a great many recommendations with which I will not weary your Lordships, but the two objectives are quite brief and indicate how forward-looking this Committee have been. Probably most of your Lordships would agree that the objectives they lay down can be regarded as necessary and wise. The first is:
"National policy should be directed towards promoting public transport and discouraging the use of cars for the journey to work in city areas."
Secondly:
"The Department of the Environment should have a positive policy for urban transport laying down a broad approach which should ensure that local authorities follow."

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This Unstarred Question of mine and this brief debate only just refer to the outlines of a problem in so far as it affects London. But I believe that, whether or not the Government produce in the near future a complete statement of their attitude upon this Report, this House will probably want a full debate upon this matter. It clearly is of the utmost importance for the urban environment, which was so fully and well debated in this House last week, and also it is essential for the economy of the country.
5.49 p.m.
LORD CHAMPION: My Lords, I am sure we are most grateful to the noble Lord, Lord Molson, for asking this Question. It is an extremely important one. Most of us who spend some time in London are bound to know something about it. I cannot restrict myself too narrowly or strictly to the confines of the Question but must expand a little into what is a very complex subject. So far as I can see, there are at least four parties involved in every major decision affecting London's traffic. They are the Greater London Council, the police, the borough councils or the Common Council, and the Minister of the Environment or the Minister for Transport Industries under him. The G.L.C. have the primary duty in the control of London traffic and have to take the initiative in all matters affecting it. What do the G.L.C. think about all this? To find out, I turned to the most authoritative statement of their position made in evidence given to the Environment and Home Office Sub-Committee of the Commons Select Committee on Expenditure, whose Report was published in December last, and I must say that I agree with the noble Lord, Lord Molson, in his statement about the excellence of that Report and its importance. It is one that will be studied—or ought to be studied by everyone who has anything at all to do with urban traffic.
Clearly, the general duty laid upon the G.L.C. to
"secure the expeditious, convenient and safe movement of vehicular and other traffic and the provision of suitable parking facilities on and off the highway"—
to quote the 1963 Act, can be carried out satisfactorily only within an overall plan for development, such as the Greater London Development Plan which has now emerged from the Layfield Panel of
1114
Inquiry, the report of which Inquiry I understand the Secretary of State is to publish shortly, and also a Government Statement on it. That Greater London Development Plan resulted from the requirement of the 1963 Act to produce such a plan which would lay down,
"considerations of general policy with respect to the use of land in various parts of Greater London, including, in particular, guidance as to the future road system."
Just what has been involved in all this preparation of a Plan by way of consultation with borough councils, traffic studies and consultation with the Police is set out in the Memorandum of Evidence submitted to the sub-committee by the Greater London Council, and it is printed in Volume II of the Report. In particular the memorandum says:
"it is the lengthy process of consultations with every possible interest which restricts progress and not finance".
Later in the same Memorandum the G.L.C. draw attention to the fact that the "way ahead lies with the central Government" because,
"progress cannot be made in many instances until decisions on the Greater London Development Plan issues have been taken by the Secretary of State for the Environment."
On the point of consultation between the G.L.C. and the borough councils, Sir Desmond Plummer said:
"I think that the London Government Act 1963 did not sufficiently clearly define the areas between the two parties. I think that if these had been more clearly defined it would have simplified the process and made less opportunity for argument."
The first questions that I have to put to the Government are therefore these. First, do the Government agree with the Greater London Council in the matter of inevitable delays on the major aspects of London planning, particularly as it affects the Government itself; and, secondly, would the Government also agree that the allocation of responsibility between the G.L.C. and the London boroughs is in need of a clearer definition than is contained in the London Government Act? The second duty laid on the Greater London Council by Part II of that Act was the responsibility for making an Order for controlling vehicular and other traffic, and also in this connection there is the obligation before making the Order to consult the Commissioner for the Police and the boroughs and the Common Council where it is

1115
appropriate. The Council must always take into consideration the Minister's reserve power to give a direction to make such an Order, or a direction prohibiting the making of such an Order. The consultation with the police is very important for, after all, they are the enforcing authority.
What is the police attitude to the making of an Order and its enforcement, and also to the general problem of London's traffic? In this connection, I propose to quote at some length from a report that appeared in The Times on January 25 headed, "Keeping London Traffic Moving", in which Mr. Henry Hunt, the Assistant Commissioner in charge of traffic, dealt with this matter, The report says:
"Generally speaking, Mr. Hunt said, his association with the G.L.C. was not a difficult one and they had really the same objectives in view.
He continued: 'What I am concerned about from time to time is as a traffic authority they are anxious to implement many of their schemes which they think will benefit London.
Everything that I have to consider when certain schemes are put forward is: is this for the benefit of the free circulation of London's traffic as a general principle? I can safely leave out the question of protecting the Londoner, as that is always in our minds. No one I have ever worked with has suggested that that should be a secondary consideration.
Any scheme that is introduced for traffic in London must have some teeth to it and be capable of enforcement and those that are charged with the enforcement of the law must be armed with the necessary powers to enforce it. I mean powers for the benefit of the community as a whole. Therefore I should like all schemes that are to the benefit of the community and for the free circulation of London's traffic to be designed as far as possible to be self-enforcing. That is because we have only limited numbers from which to draw manpower'."—
that is, manpower for enforcement.
After remarking that London over the past 37 years has been toying with the problem but has not really got down to it—and here he was speaking about the necessity for circular roads—he then spoke about the problem of enforcement, and especially enforcement of the law on parking, saying:
"We have not got teeth in relation to the laws on parking…We are unable to enforce the law for some reason or another against 40 to 45 per cent. of the drivers who receive parking tickets."
But, my Lords, car parking is not the only police problem: there is the problem
1116
of lorry parking, the routing of heavy lorries and the enforcement of the law on bus lanes. On car parking, the tale is a sorry one. It is the old tale of the law falling into disrepute if it is not enforced. On the matter of the penalties enforced for meter infringements the deterioration over the past few years is indeed frightening. The House will of course be aware of the fixed penalty system under which you pay up or risk prosecution. In 1966, fixed penalty notices were issued in 271,000 cases, and of these some 92,000 were non-payers—they did not pay up. In 1971, 1,018,507 notices were served and non-payers had increased to the amazing total of 580.000—nearly 50 per cent. of those upon whom these notices were served.
Why did they get away with it? In the main they got away with it because of the difficulty of finding the drivers of the vehicles, and it is no wonder that the Hall Expenditure Committee recommended the adoption of the police suggestion of "keeper liability", which is a technical term covering the liability of the owner of the vehicle, under which he would be liable to conviction under the fixed penalty procedure if the penalty was not paid by the driver of the vehicle.
The noble Lord, Lord Molson, talked of what happened when the meters were brought in initially. He said there was talk then of a revolt against the parking meter. I do not know that there is so much of a revolt against the meter to-day as a revolt against paying, judging from the figures I have quoted and which are in my opinion quite frightening.
On the routing of lorries, the subcommittee recommended that local authorities should be further required to lay down specific routes for heavy lorries to follow, and be encouraged to establish special parks for the overnight garaging of heavy vehicles in their areas. In this connection Mr. Hunt, the Traffic Commissioner whom I mentioned, said:
"Because there are no circular roads, and the M.4 is already open and the M.3 and the M.11 will be open soon, lorry drivers, transporters and containers and heavy tankers have found it easier to drive in through the west London area and through the central London area than go round the outskirts."
The noble Lord, Lord Molson, said that something had been done about this matter but I confess that I was not aware of that fact. I shall be glad to receive

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confirmation when the Minister replies that something has been done. The duty of the Greater London Council, the borough councils and the Common Council on routing seems to be clear, for it would fall within the order-making powers of the G.L.C.
One could go on about London's traffic problems for a long time. I must say how much I agreed with the noble Lord, Lord Molson, when he said that eventually we must have a full-scale day's debate on this important matter. We must of course also consider the commuter and the public transport solutions that might be possible. In this connection, I welcome the joint statement of the Minister for Transport Industries and the G.L.C. announcing the setting up of the London Rail Study. The only comment I would make on this issue is that I should have thought that most of the factors which will enter into such a study are already very well known and that what is really required, rather than another time-consuming study, is a decision on improving the facilities for what has become known as "Park and ride". When in Government one always tends to go in for studies, Royal Commissions and all sorts of other things which only put off taking decisions. It is an old tactic which Governments of all complexions, including my own, have followed. However, eventually decisions will have to be made, and I rather suspect that the factors on which decisions could be based are in this instance already known.
I can best sum up by saying that the trouble with London, as with most large towns and cities, is too much traffic for too little road space. There is too little enforcement of the orders made by the G.L.C., partly because of the need for amendment of the law to bring in "keeper liability" in relation to parking offences and partly because there are too few police and wardens for the job that has to be done. There are also too lengthy delays in completing and then implementing development plans, partly because of excessive consultations and partly because of delays on the part of central Government.
Given the acceptance of the necessity for democratic control by local government, I cannot honestly find much wrong
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with the present allocation of responsibility for the control of London's traffic. I do not know what I could put in its place. What is required is action on some of the points I have mentioned, as well as action—here I strongly agreed with the noble Lord, Lord Molson—on many of the recommendations made by the Expenditure Sub-Committee on Urban Planning. I heartily agree about the importance of these recommendations, the need to consider them carefully and particularly the need to implement them as soon as is humanly possible.
6.6 p.m.
LORD FERRIER: My Lords, I welcome my noble friend's Question. An indication of the great value to your Lordships' House of the device of the Unstarred Question is that it enables us to raise important matters of topical interest. I should have liked to hear the Government reply before I spoke, but I know that a Peer who speaks after a Minister has replied to a debate is not always popular, particularly when an Unstarred Question is under consideration. I therefore hope that your Lordships will forgive me if I speak for a few minutes to reinforce what my noble friend said and what was said in support of his remarks by the noble Lord, Lord Champion, about the need for a full-dress debate on this matter. I suggest that such a debate is necessary in relation not only to the traffic problem of London but to the problem of traffic generally because it is one that affects all large towns and cities, not least my own native city of Edinburgh.
Curiously enough, I was turning up the OFFICIAL REPORT of the debate which took place in 1967 on the Third London Airport. I found that at that time I produced a bee which I have had in my bonnet ever since—namely, that the reclamation required for a London Airport on the Maplin Sands and a barrage across the Thames could be used as an opportunity for making an additional orbital highway to connect the Midlands with the Channel Ports, thereby relieving London's traffic of a great many heavy vehicles which at present must come into the city. After all, they have to come into it in order to get through it.
There are two important factors which have so far not been mentioned. One is the fact that by law drivers are not

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allowed to drive for more than a certain number of hours each day, and then they must stop. The trouble is that there is sometimes nowhere for them to stop. In this connection, one's mind goes back to Sir Colin Buchanan's Report, to which my noble friend referred, in which the phrase "orbital highway" appeared for the first time, certainly in this country. Since that Report was published the concept of the orbital highway has been broadly accepted and is now regarded as meaning a road on which provision must be made for drivers to be able to drive off the highway, have security for their loads and be given provision for refreshment and rest. I am looking forward with interest to the Minister's reply, because this is a very wide-ranging subject and concerns the whole problem of providing space. For only by providing additional space for an orbital highway shall we begin to solve our traffic problem. As the noble Lord, Lord Molson, said, if there is nowhere for people to park, they are justified in asking, "Where may we stop?"
I read with great interest the Report of the debate last week on the Motion of the noble Lord, Lord Nugent of Guildford, and I was particularly struck by the remarks of the noble Lord, Lord Airedale, in which he drew attention to the electric car. To what extent is the environmental view, as it were, of London's traffic problem taken into account? The development of the electric car is inevitable. What assistance are the Government giving to the technical development of a suitable battery, in which respect I believe great advances have recently been made? The second point I might mention (in the absence of my noble friend Lord Conesford) is containerisation. That is another aspect of environmental, overall planning that will have to be taken into account, not in years to come but as from now. If lorries are to get any bigger, and even if they remain the size they are to-day, they will not be allowed to come into the centres of towns. There will have to be containerisation; and on orbital systems, or elsewhere, there will have to be stations at which transfers can be made of containers on to vehicles which will be acceptable in the centres of cities. I should like to repeat what I said; that I
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hope, with the noble Lord, Lord Molson, that we may have a debate on a larger scale on this matter in the very near future.
6.11 p.m.
LORD CAMOYS: My Lords, I did not put my name down on the list of speakers, but with your permission I should like to say a few words. I disagree to a great extent with the noble Lord, Lord Molson, and other noble Peers. First of all, on the question of parking in London, we must bear in mind that the private motorist is probably the most heavily taxed person that there is. The taxes on a motorcar are enormous and there is also the cost of insurance; therefore he should be allowed to park in London. Secondly, I object very strongly to the system by which the police tow away from places such as, let us say, St. James's Square or Berkeley Square, cars which have been parked too long. They are employing a very expensive system as it needs two police officers, a driver and someone else. I am not talking about cars which are parked in dangerous places—that is another matter—but I am talking about cars which are parked in safe places. This action adds to the traffic congestion, as there is the stoppage when they pull the car out and drive it to wherever they take it. I suggest to your Lordships that it would be much better to put a parking notice of £10 or even £20 on the car that stays there too long, rather than employ our very sparse police force in such a ridiculous operation. I feel most strongly about that. I believe also that we must try to provide in the centre of London, instead of the unused huge office blocks, proper motor parking buildings. With your Lordships' leave I make that suggestion to the House.
6.13 p.m.
LORD SOMERS: My Lords, I apologise also for not having put my name down, but I should like to say a word or two about this extremely important problem, which well merits the Question which the noble Lord, Lord Molson, has put down. The suggestion has been made in the past that motorists should be excluded from London altogether. A preliminary experiment has been made in Oxford Street, as noble Lords know. I am not sure whether that is the solution: but one thing to me is quite certain, and that is

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that if it were to be done then something would have to be done about public transport. During rush hours public transport is running to full capacity now, and if it is asked to take any more it will find it quite impossible. So far as the Underground is concerned, trains are running practically nose to tail. What are you going to do? Are you going to build an extra pair of lines? If so, it will cost a fortune. Therefore it seems to me that some other solution must be found. Buses, too, are running to absolutely full capacity during rush hours.
My Lords, I do not know that I can go all the way with the noble Lord, Lord Molson, in his praise for what the parking meter has done. It certainly has shown where one may park and where one may not park, but, on the other hand, it has not made it any easier to park, because when one finds a line of parking meters they are invariably full and one cannot wait there for a quarter of an hour, hoping that one of the cars may move out. I remember some years ago—it must have been about ten years ago—when I was still driving, I drove in a complete circle around Grosvenor Square which was absolutely packed, hoping that one of the cars would move out so that I could leave my car there. But none did, and so I gave it up and had to find somewhere else.
LORD MOLSON: My Lords, if the noble Lord will allow me to interrupt, may I say that the purpose of the parking meter is to limit the time which any individual may occupy part of the limited space? It is not thought of as being a way of providing additional parking space; it means that the parking space on the roads is divided among the various people who want to park there and the profits, if any, from the parking meters are used for providing off-street parking accommodation.
LORD SOMERS: Yes, my Lords, I understand that. But on the other hand, I do not think that that is the real solution, because the traffic is not eased whether your car or somebody else's car is opposite a parking meter. How are you to know where there is going to be a space where you can put your car? I do not really believe that that is the solution.
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I was very interested to notice last week that opposite the Albert Hall, on the eastbound side of Kensington Gore, a special lane for buses had been made. I regret to say that a great deal of commercial and private traffic uses that lane when the buses are not there—which certainly implies that we need a great deal more in the way of lane discipline in our driving tests. But it is a very interesting experiment, because buses are without doubt one of the greatest causes of holdups in London traffic. I shall never forget the day when we had a one-day bus strike and I was driving through London. My Lords, it was like driving through open country. There was practically no opposition whatsoever. Buses, naturally, are always stopping and very often in great numbers, and they cause a great deal of obstruction. Possibly some system by which one could allocate certain roads to buses and others to private cars may be possible, but it is very difficult in a city so complicated as London where no two streets run in the same direction.
I have every sympathy with what the noble Lord, Lord Champion, said about the division of authorities in making rules about traffic, because if there is one thing that is notable about local governments it is the fact that they can never agree with one another and therefore, as the noble Lord said, I believe that the police should most certainly be consulted. Apart from that, there should be one single authority which makes rules for the whole of London. The private motorist is blamed for a good deal that is not really his fault. I know that a great deal is his fault. As regards the matter of parking, for instance, parking meters have removed parking from the main roads altogether, with the exception of course of commercial vehicles, which can park where they like. How often does one; find a commercial vehicle standing by the curb around which all the buses have to manoeuvre! That makes for a great deal of traffic congestion. If only there could be some system by which we could provide special parking bays for commercial traffic; it would be an expensive procedure certainly, but something, I should have thought, must be done to get these commercial vehicles off the main roads. This is something that must be

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done, because, as other noble Lords have said, if it is not then before very long the traffic in London will come to an absolute standstill.
6.21 p.m.
LORD ARDWICK: My Lords, may I call attention to what I think is a fallacy in the speech of the noble Lord who has just spoken? He spoke about buses being full to capacity in the rush hour. This is of course perfectly true. But the capacity of a bus is not to be judged by the number of people in it but by the number of passenger-miles it can travel in a given time, and that number of passenger-miles would be enormously increased if there were no private traffic and commercial traffic hindering the flow of the buses. I am not sure, too, that when the noble Lord talked about the nuisance of the buses he was conveying a very good image of this House: it sounded as though it was a terrible thing that the motorist should be incommoded by the common people riding in buses. But of course it is the private cars, carrying a relatively small number of people, that are incommoding the vast number of people who have to travel in buses, who have no other transport and cannot have any other transport—and, indeed, whom this city could not accommodate once they all found themselves in possession of the means to run a private car. The private car has to be dealt with in some radical way, as has the commercial vehicle, before we can get the real flow of traffic that we need. I am quite sure that if this were done we could have an extremely efficient and cheap public transport system.
6.23 p.m.
LORD MOWBRAY AND STOURTON: My Lords, as noble Lords have said, the House, and, I would add, not least the Government, should be grateful to the noble Lord, Lord Molson, for raising this very important subject of the control of traffic in this our capital city. In these days, at the end of the third quarter of the 20th century, it seemed to me somewhat ironic yesterday when we had no less a figure than Queen Boadicea being paid homage to and invoked as part of an effort to draw attention to a local road problem. At least I am glad that in this House to-night no one has suggested what Caractacus might have done about London's
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traffic problems. Because we are living in a situation which has changed considerably since those days, is changing, and is changing fast every day we live. The main change in this context is, of course, the enormous increase in the ownership of private cars which has led to the greatly increased density of traffic in London.
This traffic, as your Lordships know, is properly the concern of the Greater London Council. They are the traffic regulating authority. On the other hand, law and order in London are the responsibility of the Commissioner of the Metropolitan Police, and this responsibility includes the enforcement of the road traffic law and the day-to-day direction and control of traffic flow. Problems of traffic management are essentially local, and it is therefore appropriate that they should be dealt with at a local level. But it is important that traffic should not be considered in isolation; it must be looked at as part of the whole transport situation in an area. I have already said that the G.L.C. is the traffic authority for London. This Council is also responsible for preparing transport plans for the whole of Greater London and for the activities of the London Transport Executive.
It is unfortunate that public attention tends to be drawn to the problem of traffic congestion only when the system temporarily fails to cope with some unfortunate and unpredictable combination of circumstances. And we must get this into perspective. Every so often there is bound to be a totally unusual conjunction of events which results in the sort of snarl-up about which we all like to complain. But rather than looking for someone to blame on these occasions, I think it would be fairer to remember how well the Greater London Council and the Metropolitan Police cope most of the time. Although the volume of traffic has grown steadily at about 5 per cent. a year for the last 20 years, the roads in London are to-day safer and the vehicle speeds are higher than ever before. That this has been achieved reflects greatly to the credit of the responsible authorities. I should particularly like to pay tribute to London's police and traffic wardens. Keeping the traffic moving on our roads is a thankless and

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difficult task which makes great and constant demands on them, and for the most part goes unsung. Certainly the individual motorist is rarely to be heard praising traffic wardens or the police. Yet it is mainly thanks to their unending and untiring efforts that so many traffic jams are prevented.
It is very easy for the public—and even, as the noble Lord has reminded us, the Prime Minister—to have the impression that there are very few police operating in the centre of a traffic jam. The reason for this, of course, is quite simple. But before I go on I should like to say, concerning the Prime Minister and the famous walk on November 29, that I think the fact that he was able to complete his journey on foot did arouse his concern for those who he knew would not be able to do this. Hence his famous telephone call to Sir Desmond Plummer. The reason why he and other people do not see police at the centre of a traffic jam is understandable from the analogy of a log jam. If you have a log jam, no lumberjack starts to unscramble it at the centre of the jam. What does he do? He goes to the periphery. That is what the police did on that evening of November 29, and what they do on any other occasion on which there is a jam; they start to release the jam from the outside.
Admittedly the Covent Garden/Bow Street area, to which the noble Lord, Lord Molson, referred in particular, and indeed the whole part of the West End which we know as theatreland, do have very real traffic congestion problems in the evenings. It is largely caused by people driving in and trying to park. If public transport were used by more people this would undoubtedly ease the problem. London Transport have tried to help by running a Star Bus service to cater for this traffic, but unfortunately the service is not being patronised sufficiently. I am sure that the traffic authorities will note the suggestion of the noble Lord, Lord Molson, of a one-way traffic lane there, and I will leave it at that.
Although we have achieved much in London by traffic management and control, there is not much further scope for improvement of this kind at the moment, because if things are not to get very much worse some more drastic action is needed, and soon. The G.L.C., of course, are well aware of this, and last July they
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published that excellent discussion paper Traffic and the Environment, which set out their ideas as to what might be done over the next decade. I would draw the attention of the House to the G.L.C.s paper as evidence of what they are doing, and how they are doing it, to find the best way of enabling, encouraging and persuading road users to come to terms with all the rest of London's traffic problems. I understand that their decisions on the measures described in their paper are due to be announced very shortly.
The noble Lords, Lord Molson, Lord Champion and Lord Ferrier, drew attention to the problems of heavy lorries in our capital city. We often express concern on this matter, because the congestion these lorries cause is obvious, and so is the resulting ill effect on our environment. We know that the G.L.C. are considering this matter in several ways, and you will have seen in the Press that they are to ban, except for access, so-called "juggernaut lorries" from parts of Central London. This will cover an area of six square miles North of the Thames. The noble Lord, Lord Ferrier, raised the point that the parking of these lorries in residential streets is going to be a very big problem, because the G.L.C. have already banned overnight parking of lorries in places such as Tower Hamlets and they intend within the next two years to extend this ban to over 60 square miles of Inner London. This is going to be a problem, because the lorries must park somewhere, and the G.L.C. have set up a working party to consider the question and look for sites to form lorry parks as part of the national network of strategic lorry parks. Of course, we must realise that there is a risk that in solving one problem of this sort we may create another; but only by experiment can we go further, and only by experiment can we find out what the final solution is going to be.
On road pricing of vehicles, I do not think I can add to what my noble friend Lord Gowrie said in the debate last week on the urban environment, so I should like to leave that alone. The noble Lords, Lord Camoys and Lord Somers, asked about the parking problem. I do not want to go further into the matter of parking than the G.L.C. paper, Traffic and the Environment. Your Lordships can see from that which way

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the thinking is going. The noble Lord, Lord Champion, said that the non-payment of fines in connection with meter parking and illegal parking where there are no meters is "frightening"—that I think was the word he used. The effective enforcement of these regulations has been made very difficult by the number of drivers who evaded the fixed penalty by saying that they were not the driver.
The Commissioner of Police of the Metropolis and the G.L.C. both favour legislating for owner liability, which would make the owner rather than the driver of a vehicle liable for certain minor road traffic offences. The Government are fully aware of these views and, as stated in an Answer on January 24 in another place, we are considering the possibility of legislation on this particular subject. I do not think that I can add any more to that. My noble friend Lord Ferrier asked me about electric transport, and what we were doing about it. This is not really germane to traffic control, but the Department of Trade and Industry is at the moment underwriting a project for an electric bus which is being tried out in Leeds and other cities. Of course this has important implications, as he will see.
My Lords, although I have stressed the important role of local authorities in dealing with traffic and other transport matters, this does not mean that the Government are trying to avoid playing a part in transport matters, in London or elsewhere. Quite the reverse. We believe that the solution to the problems of traffic congestion lies, at least in part, in improving public transport services so that they offer a reasonable alternative to the private car—especially for the journey to work. Many noble Lords have mentioned this, and we agree with what they have said. The sort of reduction in traffic congestion that would be achieved if commuters used public transport instead of their cars is well illustrated by the fact that 700 people coming into London use 500 cars. The same number of people could travel in 14 buses, or in just one train. I agree so much with what the noble Lord, Lord Ardwick, said here.
For these reasons, the Government are giving the highest priority to improvements
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in public transport. Since June, 1970, we have committed over £66 million to improving the Underground. In addition to investing in London Transport, the Government have committed a further £50 million to improving British Railways London and South-East commuter network, as well as subsidising fares to the tune of £10 million a year. Although this stretches far beyond London, it is an essential element in the transport system which enables the capital to function effectively. Nor have the Government forgotten the London bus. We now pay half the cost of London's new buses and up to three-quarters of the cost of creating bus lanes like the one in Oxford Street. These grants are now running at the rate of a further £3 million to £4 million a year. So, although no single action by the Government can solve London's transport problems, the very large sums which are being invested in the public transport system should in due course help to alleviate them.
With regard to the Expenditure Committee's report, to which the noble Lord, Lord Molson—and other noble Lords—referred, and his wish for an undertaking that the Government would make money available for the suggested projects, the noble Lord will know, from his own experience as a Minister in the Ministry of Transport, that the Government will need to look very carefully at the proposals.
LORD MOLSON: My Lords, I did not go so far as to ask the Government to commit themselves to any financial expenditure on this; I asked merely that the Government would speedily announce their views regarding the recommendations that have been made by the Select Committee.
LORD MOWBRAY AND STOURTON: My Lords, I thank the noble Lord. I hope that perhaps we shall have examined the main parts of their advice within the next three to four months. Obviously, those which we consider necessary we shall wish to do everything possible to implement, within the financial limits at the time. I think that the noble Lord, Lord Molson used the words, "the art of the possible". I think that this is what we feel too.

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The noble Lord, Lord Champion, referred to the Greater London Development Report and the Inquiry under the chairmanship of Mr. Frank Layfield, Q.C., which was set up not only to examine objections to the Plan but also the Plan itself. This Inquiry has lasted two years, and during that period there have been important developments in thinking about traffic in London, which have been collected both in the revised draft of the transport section of the Plan put forward now by the G.L.C., and also in their discussion paper, to which we have referred. The Report of the Inquiry was submitted to my right honourable friend the Secretary of State for the Environment, as the noble Lord knows, last December, and he has announced that it will be published as soon as possible. I regret that at this stage I cannot comment on the merits of any of the solutions to London's traffic problems proposed either by the G.L.C. or by the various groups set up to oppose the Plan. But I must emphasise that we recognise the need for urgent decisions and that there will be no avoidable delay in reaching them. Public consultation is necessary but, as the noble Lord, Lord Champion, rightly said, we do not want excessive consultation. I do not suppose that when the G.L.C. originally started consulting they realised the delay that would be imposed upon them.
I was asked by the noble Lord, Lord Champion, whether the Government agree that the G.L.C.'s responsibilities vis-à-vis the boroughs need modifying. The simple answer is, No. We think that the present arrangements are working
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well, although inevitably there are minor disagreements between the G.L.C. and the boroughs. The large sums which are being invested in the public transport system should help to alleviate many of our problems in due course.
We have this evening discussed most of the problems in regard to traffic in London, but I must remind noble Lords that London is not the only city in the world where traffic congestion is a problem. Every major city has its own traffic problems, to a greater or lesser extent. This is true all over the world and much effort is being exerted on a search for solutions. This is one of the major problems of modern urban life. I would remind the House how the daily achievements of the police alleviate the problem; and I think it would be fair to say that in many ways London has given, and is continuing to give, a lead to the world in dealing with the problem of movement in cities. It only remains for me to repeat that Her Majesty's Government are open at all times to new ideas and would certainly welcome all noble Lords' suggestions, or a further debate on this problem. Finally, I should again like to thank my noble friend Lord Molson and other noble Lords for their most helpful and constructive speeches.

COSTS IN CRIMINAL CASES BILL [H.L.]
Reported from the Joint Committee on Consolidation Bills without amendment, and recommitted to a Committee of the Whole House.